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VOLUME V

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

DR. CONSTANTIN DUMBA

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Washington, Whose Recall Was Requested for Interference with the Making of American War Munitions

(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)

A RECENT SKETCH OF THE GERMAN EMPEROR

By Robert F. K. Scholtz

(© *Illustrirte Zeitung*)

THE EUROPEAN WAR

Period October, 1915—December, 1915

INTRODUCTION

WITH the opening of the second year of the war the focus of military events had been shifted far from that "western front" where the occupation of Belgium and the swift invasion of Northern France had challenged the world's attention a year before. In August, 1915, the armies of the northwest were facing each other, intrenched. And, although the allied offensive in Champagne was launched in September and in October Belgium cried aloud to the world in the execution of Edith Cavell, the greater part of the military events and most of the diplomatic bargaining of the first quarter of the war's second year were centred far off to the east.

They were sorry events for the Entente Allies. The armies of Russia were being pushed back, not only from the outskirts of Poland, but toward the heart of the great eastern empire itself, in what seemed like a wholly calamitous retreat. Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, and Greece—although the Entente armies were invited by the Premier to use Saloniki as a base in fulfillment of Greek treaty engagements with Serbia—refused to abandon her neutrality. Little Serbia was attacked anew and overwhelmed. And far off to the Dardanelles a small army of British and French soldiers was flinging a forlorn hope with magnificent, unexcelled, tragic valor against the unconquerable steeps of Gallipoli with only defeat in sight; by the end of Autumn it was seen that that campaign must fail.

The Italian mountaineers were fighting hard and were making slight gains; but the Austro-Hungarian armies still held Gorizia. And now and then an Austrian airplane would drop a bomb on Venice. The Russian retreat stopped in the Autumn. The Champagne offensive met with partial—only partial—success. Yet from all quarters of the globe it seemed that there came, in this three-month period, disappointment and discouragement upon the armies of the Entente. It was a strange quarter year; it had in it a good deal of "frightfulness," a good deal of curious ingenuity. German Zeppelins were raiding London, bombarding English coast towns. Submarines were continuing to sink merchant vessels and drown noncombatants. The Turks were killing the Armenians by the thousand. In the United States the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador was found to be implicated in a plot to cripple American munition plants. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle has spoken of how the first "year of resistance" was followed by "the long, anxious year of equilibrium." And certainly for the Entente the second year of the war began sadly. It was not a hopeless time, of course. It had its flashes of success, withal. But that quarter year was marked by losses and strange setbacks. And, both in the events themselves and in the results and sequels, it is a time that is full of interest.

Military—Including Bulgaria's Entry and Greece's Refusal

A correspondent who was with the Russian armies in 1915 and 1916 has said that by July of the former year Russia

was short of almost everything that an army needs. Certainly in the late Summer the Russian retreat began to assume in the minds of onlookers—however sturdily the Russians themselves may have withstood its peril to their morale—something of the quality of panic. The Teutonic drive seemed to move like nothing in the world so much as a military parade, showing all its splendor on a cleared asphalt avenue, unimpeded by so much as the passing of a dray. Hindenburg in the north, Mackensen to the south, pressed on with a persistence that seemed to have something fatalistic about it. Warsaw had been entered by the army of Prince Leopold of Bavaria on Aug. 5. On the 15th the northern German forces defeated the Russians near Kubisko and drew near to the great fortress of Kovno, while the southern armies advanced along the River Bug. On Aug. 18 Kovno, a position of great importance strategically, fell before von Hindenburg; it was evident that the Russians had hoped to hold it, for they had not removed their stores, and with the fall of the fortress the Germans were able to take, not only many prisoners, but quantities of the war material of which the Russian armies were so desperately in need. One military expert has said that the fall of Kovno crumpled up the entire Russian plan of defense. Certainly with its evacuation a great further retirement became necessary. And on the same day two forts of besieged Novo-Georgievsk—the last position on the line of the Vistula—fell; while to the south Mackensen and his Austro-German forces crossed the Bug River for the attack on Brest-Litovsk. Teuton armies were already, as the crow flies, 100 miles east of Warsaw.

From those days on until the end of the first week in September German and Austrian victories followed very rapidly. Doomed Novo-Georgievsk, that great intrenched camp, fell on the 20th of August, and a great store of guns and supplies with it. On the 22d the Russians abandoned the northern salient of Ossowitz, which had withstood attack for months. Three days later Mackensen's advance troops entered Kovel; with its capture the Teutons cut the Russian armies into two separate bodies to the north and south of the Kovel-Kiev railroad. What followed was inevitable—Brest-Litovsk fell on the 26th of August, Bialystok the next day. On Sept. 2 the German armies entered Grodno, and with the fall of that fortress the whole second line of Russian defense—a thing that had looked so formidable a short time before—was in the enemy's hands. The Czar's forces retired across the Niemen.

Suddenly, however, on Sept. 8—just as the Grand Duke Nicholas was removed from his position as Commander in Chief of the empire's land forces and sent to lead the armies in the Caucasus—the Russians were able to report a victory. This was in Galicia, near Tarnopol, where they recaptured old positions. The statement from Petrograd was promptly denied by Berlin, but Russia reiterated the announcement of success, and next day won another victory southwest of Trembowla. Germans were forced to acknowledge a "stubborn counteroffensive." But Tarnopol in Galicia is far to the south, even of Kovel and the Pripet marshes. To the north, in Russian territory, the Austro-German advance kept on. By the middle of September the battle line was about seventy-five miles due east of Brest-Litovsk in the south, while away to the north the Germans had thrust a sharp salient toward the Petrograd railway between Vilna and Dvinsk. It is true that the Russian offensive to the far south was maintained. But on the 20th of September the Germans occupied Vilna.

There, in spite of further pressure toward Dvinsk, their progress came practically to an end. And there began that strange contradiction that turned away annihilation, quashed the German hopes of a separate peace, and, though it could not transform retreat into advantage, kept it a mere retreat and not a catastrophe. In the first place, the Russian army escaped from Vilna. Alexeieff, appointed on Sept. 1 as Chief of Staff, completely reorganized the military forces of the Czar and began to try out tentative offensives. By all the rules

of war, Russia on the 1st of October was a defeated nation. And on the 1st of October the entire German offensive was checked.

In writing of the Russian offensive of 1916, Stanley Washburn, an English author, harks back to the "year of disaster" with the expression of his belief that the period that ended in October, 1915, "must ever give Russia the greatest credit which she will ever attain in this war. Morale and endurance," he adds, "are natural in success, no matter how heavy may be the sacrifices; but morale in defeat is the true test of the character of an army and of the people who are the basis from which an army is formed. We who were with those heroic troops during the great retreat know that their only assets were their leadership and the character of the troops themselves. Rifles were lacking, shells had run short. Communications were so hacked to pieces by the advancing enemy that such material things as they did have were frequently delayed or unattainable. Yet for nearly six months, day in and day out, they fought their heartbreaking battles, always retreating, never in equal numbers, and suffering from almost every material want, and yet after six months they brought to a standstill in the barren wastes of their own country the most efficient army that the world has ever known."

The Russian retreat ended on Oct. 1, and for the rest of the present period there is, as the official dispatches say, "little to report on the Russian front." Hindenburg continued to hammer away toward Dvinsk and the Russians to hold him back; there were sporadic steps forward and back for each army. In Galicia the Russians were gaining a bit. In the far north the Germans were trying to capture Riga. But the Teutons were unable to press on any further in Russia. The conquest of Serbia began. And with the entry of Bulgaria into the war in October the interest of the world in the "eastern campaign" was concentrated in the Balkans. By that time the entire Russian front had settled into a "strategic calm."

It was on Sept. 16 that the Allies presented a joint note to Bulgaria, asking for a specific statement of what she intended to do in this war. On the 21st the Bulgarian Government ordered a general mobilization and concentrated troops close to the Serbian border. But five days later the Government assured the Entente Powers that the mobilization had been "ordered in the national interest" and had no aggressive intent. It was not until Oct. 14 that Bulgaria openly entered the conflict with a declaration of war on Serbia. But behind that overt move there lies a long story—a story of national pride and of successful diplomacy.

Bulgaria's entry into the war was a triumph for German diplomacy. It helped the Central Powers at once. It proved immediately harmful to the Allies. It extended Germany's dominion of "Middle Europe," of which we have since heard so much in that significant slogan of "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf." And it took clever advantage of conditions created by the Treaty of Bucharest at the close of the second Balkan war, wherein Serbia, Greece, and Rumania all profited at Bulgaria's expense in the division of the land that Bulgarian armies had helped to wrest from their common foe.

Bulgaria could have endured the loss of the lands that went to Rumania, and even to Greece—she was apparently reconciled, at any rate; but to Serbia had gone that portion of Macedonia that Bulgaria regarded as her own. She called attention to the 500,000 Bulgars in Macedonia, now living under Serbian rule. She alleged that Serbia had broken an ante-bellum treaty which, anticipating the defeat of the Turks, allotted Macedonia to Bulgaria in the proposed division of the spoils. A Serbian writer has called Macedonia "the soul of Serbia," forever and intrinsically a part of Serbia, in spite of the years of Turkish dominion. But Bulgaria thought otherwise. The Government promised that it would "wait for happier days," and "Bulgarian irredenta" became a murmur that might some day be a battle cry. When Turkey entered the European war it was possible for her, as Germany's ally, to

take steps to placate Bulgaria. But the Entente Allies could do nothing unless they should be able to persuade Serbia, Greece, and Rumania to abrogate the Treaty of Bucharest and allot the conquered lands all over again. That, of course, they could not do. On Sept. 1, 1915, the Bulgarian Foreign Office issued the following statement:

"Now, as heretofore, the Bulgarian Government is guided by three factors:

"First, the nonacceptance of the Treaty of Bucharest, which was not ratified by the National Assembly, and which is not acceptable to Bulgaria so long as it remains unrevised.

"Second, the unwillingness of the Bulgarian people to engage in a war the outcome of which is at all doubtful.

"Third, the absolute necessity of convincing the Bulgarian people that whatever action is undertaken for a result to be achieved will be such that no betrayal afterward will be possible."

Russia made an appeal to Slav feeling in Bulgaria to keep out of the war "against a Slav and allied people," and announced that she would withdraw her Minister unless Bulgaria broke with the Central Powers within twenty-four hours. Next day, Oct. 5, on receipt of an unsatisfactory answer, the Russian Minister asked for his passports, and with him the representatives of Serbia, France, Great Britain, and Italy.

The military events that followed were so closely connected with the Austro-German march on Serbia that it is necessary for a continued narrative to swing from "diplomatic circles" to the Austro-German army, Mackensen's army, 400,000 strong, which on Oct. 7 forced the passage of the Danube, Save, and Drina Rivers and began an attack on Serbia. Three days later Belgrade fell, and the Serbians were driven further back along the Danube. It was all a piece of the hardest and most desperate fighting. The Entente Allies were rushing up troops as fast as they could. The Serbians forced back the Teutonic right wing after the capture of Belgrade, but the main invading army swept on. It is pretty generally believed that Bulgarian soldiers crossed the frontier into Serbia on the 11th of October; at all events, when Bulgaria declared war, on the 14th, her troops had already entered Serbia at several points. On the 26th a junction between the Austro-Germans and a Bulgarian contingent was effected on the Danube. A famous announcement of those early October days was, "Bulgaria must be on the side of the victors." Whether or not "the side of the victors" was what she had actually chosen, there was no question of victory in a battle against Serbia. Worn by the Austrian campaign of the previous year, harried and depleted by the scourge of typhus, Serbia was able to put in the field forces that were scarcely two-thirds of Bulgaria's number—discouraged, tired armies, against a fresh and confident foe. And there was that great army of Mackensen's driving against Belgrade as irresistibly as the same General had driven against Kovel. Her western allies were far away. With the threat of overwhelming invasion upon her, Serbia, in the name of treaties only two years old, asked a neighbor's aid. And this is where Greece, persistently neutral, becomes a factor in the war.

The Allies' occupation of Saloniki was widely discussed. It was argued that if it was so wrong for the Germans to march across Belgium, it must have been equally wrong for the Allies to take possession of the Greek port. Assuming that Belgium had not resisted and gone to war, people asked, if Germany had merely violated her neutrality, what would have been the difference between such action and the Allies' use of the Greek port? Did not the Allies violate the neutrality of Greece in "seizing" Saloniki? Were not the two cases parallel?

They were not. Under the treaty of Bucharest, which had ended the second Balkan war, and which had so deeply offended Bulgaria, Greece had been placed under positive obligations to help Serbia in case of attack. Serbia had also acquired certain leasehold rights, for like assistance, in the port of Saloniki, as Serbia has no port of her own. And when Bulgaria threatened tc attack her, Serbia turned to Greece for aid. On the

day that Bulgaria ordered mobilization, Premier Venizelos of Greece asked Great Britain and France for 150,000 troops, on the assumption that Greece would herself mobilize to go to Serbia's assistance. The next day—Sept. 23—a general mobilization of Greek land and naval forces actually was ordered. But Greece was a land divided against itself: Venizelos had from the first urged participation, on the side of the Entente, in the war; King Constantine opposed it. And Constantine won. On Oct. 13 Greece formally denounced her Serbian treaty.

Serbia's rights in Saloniki, however, remained. And the Venizelos Government had asked Great Britain and France for troops. On the 5th of October, therefore, in accordance with this request and these treaty rights, French and British troops were landed at Saloniki to aid Serbia from that port in case of attack.

But dissension in Greece continued. Venizelos found it necessary to enter a protest, when the allied troops actually landed, against their occupation of the Greek port. That, however, could not save the Minister and his Cabinet, nor could the decisive vote of unshaken confidence passed by the Chamber. Scarcely had the troops from the west landed, when King Constantine forced the Venizelos Ministry out of office; and the new Government, formed under Zaimis ten days later, announced a policy of armed neutrality in regard to Serbia and every other question of the war.

Great Britain, at this point, offered Greece the island of Cyprus as the price of her entry into the war as Serbia's ally. But Zaimis refused. And it was explained that the promise of aid to Serbia had been given as effective in case of a "Balkan war"; this was a general European war. Greece did not consider the treaty obligation binding in such a war as this.

But the Zaimis Ministry, too, was short-lived. In November Stephanos Skouloudis became Premier and assured the Entente that Greek neutrality was "sincerely benevolent."

These diplomatic and political records have a necessary place in a chronicle of military events in Serbia in the Autumn of 1915. Serbia asked Greece for military aid and did not get it. She did, however, get the advantage of her allies' use of Saloniki as a base. But that was belated and of little use. Troops of the Entente left Saloniki on the 16th of October to go to Serbia's assistance, and a junction was formed between French and Serbian troops on the 24th; French troops repulsed a Bulgarian contingent two days later, and at several points French soldiers won momentary victories on Serbian soil. But the Bulgarian and Austro-German armies were closing on Serbia like the jaws of a nutcracker. Nish fell on the 7th of November, and General Jecoff was quoted as saying: "After fierce and sanguinary fighting the fortress of Nish has been conquered by our brave, victorious troops, and the Bulgarian flag has been hoisted to remain forever." The Serbians retreated in good order, destroying what might be of use to the enemy, fighting hard. But on the 13th of November the enemy claimed the capture of 54,000 Serb prisoners. Meanwhile, the whole nation—after the fall of Nish—was being pushed back through the mountains, refugees, in the Winter. The aged King Peter started in an automobile toward Prisrend, and beyond it Albania. But his motor car broke down on those wild roads, and it was in a country wagon that he finally escaped from the enemy.

Meanwhile, with the junction of Bulgars and Teutons in October the triumphant announcement had been made that "Orient and Occident were united" in the victory over Serbia. The route to Sofia was open. Twelve white buffalo had dragged Duke Adolf Friedrich of Mecklenburg across the Timok River—the first Teuton to use that reopened road. And on the 12th of November it was reported that the Kaiser himself was passing through Orsova, on his way to Sofia, about to visit Czar Ferdinand, en route to Constantinople.

And while all this was going on, a Franco-British army estimated at 250,000 was fighting on the Gallipoli Peninsula, being killed and maimed and defeated, hungry often, and half-mad with thirst, struggling against all the odds of war-

fare as it can be waged by man and nature alike. Yet the withdrawal of those armies to help Serbia would have been for Great Britain the confession of an immense defeat. During the opening of the Serbian campaign, the British Higher Command was still clinging to the hope that disaster might be averted at Gallipoli; at least the British were keeping great numbers of Turks busy there. When the Dardanelles campaign was at last seen to be a failure, Serbian defense had failed, too.

Great Britain had sent reinforcements to Gallipoli, which had begun to make a landing on Suvla Bay, on the west side of the peninsula, early in August. Although the attack of Aug. 6-10 had failed, it is true that later the news that went home was generally good. On the 25th of that month the Allies advanced along a twelve-mile front, and on the 1st of September it was announced that they commanded the Buvuk-Anafarta Valley. A little later they inflicted some damage on the Turkish trenches. But the retirement of Sir Ian Hamilton, on the 19th of October, from command of the land forces at the Dardanelles—he was replaced by Major Gen. Sir Charles C. Monro—was not a sign that things had been going well.

As a matter of fact, the Gallipoli campaign had practically ended with that defeat, in early August, at Sari Bair. The little victories, the bits of good news, of the months that followed were not only sporadic, but insignificant. To all large intent, there was no news from Gallipoli in the early Autumn, because the whole campaign had declined into a secondary operation. What the Allies did at the end of August was simply to fortify and secure their own line. And, holding it thus secure, intrenching it, making it impregnable from Anzac to Suvla, they kept large reserves of Turks, with their guns and ammunition, from use elsewhere. They did nothing else. The main object with which the Gallipoli force had been sent out—to help the British fleet through the Narrows of the Dardanelles—was definitely abandoned in the middle of August. The force was kept there because Great Britain still hoped that the army could accomplish something, and refused, until it was forced upon her, to acknowledge defeat. It was November before it was finally decided that the men at the Dardanelles must be transferred somewhere else.

A special commission was created later by Parliament to report on the Dardanelles expedition. It was headed by Lord Cromer, former Governor General of Egypt, who died a few days after the report was made public, in March, 1917. The report criticised the British War Council for lack of harmony and found fault with former Premier Asquith, former Admiralty Lord Churchill, and Lord Kitchener for procrastination or failure to co-ordinate the arms of the service in the campaign.

When the Russian retreat had entered upon its last phase, and when the question of what Bulgaria was going to do had become urgent, the Allies on the western front launched their one great offensive of the second year of the war. It was of brief duration. It did not accomplish what it was meant to accomplish. But it is by no means to be dismissed as a mere failure. It did make gains for the Entente. And it was a brilliant piece of work so far as it went.

After artillery duels along the greater part of the western front, the Allies began a 300-mile attack, the British starting near Loos, the French in Champagne, on the 25th of September. Next day, on the offensive from Verdun to the sea, the Allies smashed twenty miles of German front, took Loos and Souchez, and made great gains in Champagne and north of Arras. The days that followed were full of hard fighting, and on the 30th the French in Champagne pierced the German second line. In five days the Allies had taken 121 guns and thousands of prisoners, and while Berlin was announcing that the attack was a failure, the drive continued and the French and British armies took more prisoners still.

This taking of prisoners should be borne in mind, because it was one of the things that the " Champagne offensive " did achieve. Its original object had been either to break the German line or to cut the enemy's communications. It did not do either of these things. It did take

30,000 prisoners, and it did, in spite of German counterattacks which regained in October some of the ground taken by the Entente armies in the early days of the offensive, dislodge the Teutons from an important position. This was the line of hills that lies between the Lens-Givenchy section of Artois and the great plain of Northern France. This the Allies seized and held, though at the cost of heavy losses. And as the Autumn closed in, the western front settled once more, as did the new "line" far back in Russia, into deadlock.

On the Italian fronts the middle of August was ushered in with sharp bayonet fighting, and at the end of the month it was reported that great movements were being developed by the Italians against Trent and Trieste, with threats upon Rovereto as a base of attack against Trent. But gains on the Italian fronts were slow. Fighting was in progress, and some of it was very fierce fighting indeed. On the 22d of September the Italians succeeded in dislodging the Austrians from the Dolomite Valley, and next day, after months of sturdy defense, the Austrians evacuated Monte Coston. But no decided change, considering the second year as a whole, took place in that first period. An Italian offensive in October won several victories on the Isonzo, but they were held back from the Gorizia bridgehead. On the other hand, Austrian advances in the Trentino were checked. The Italian fronts had little of permanent significance to report.

Nor was there much of military importance in reports from the Caucasus and the Tigris-Euphrates front. Grand Duke Nicholas, sent in early September to command the Russian forces in the first-named campaign, repulsed the Turks on several positions and made gains. Early in October the Russians made another advance in the region of Van, which, in mid-August, had been recaptured by the Turks and then taken again by the Russians. The Russians appeared to be slowly moving forward, but fighting was intermittent and news meagre. On the Tigris, the Turks who were fighting against the British forces were defeated on Sept. 29 at Kut-el-Amara. But the allied triumph, as later events proved, was of short duration there.

Naval

The outstanding naval event of this period is the repulse of the German attack from the sea upon Riga. On the 21st of August a German fleet entered the Gulf of Riga, and was defeated in battle with the Russian defending ships. German losses were reported as one battle cruiser, two smaller cruisers, and several destroyers, with four bargeloads of troops. It was the second attempt within a month, and it was followed, a few days later, by a bombardment, by German cruisers, of signal stations near the Russian port. Bombardments from the sea were of course taking place in various parts of the world. Omitting for the time mention of submarine activities against merchant vessels, the record of naval events for the period is almost entirely one of bombardments. An Austrian fleet of twenty-one vessels opened fire on the Island of Pelagosa in the Adriatic on the 17th of August, killing four Italian soldiers. A British fleet of thirty ships shelled Zeebrugge on the 23d, and on the 17th, 19th, and 25th of September a British squadron again bombarded German batteries on the coast of Belgium. Meanwhile, in September, Italian, French, and British warships made attacks near Smyrna, and a Russian squadron opened fire on German land positions on the Gulf of Riga. With the entry of Bulgaria into the war the Entente Allies declared a blockade of the Bulgarian coast in the Aegean Sea, and on the 21st of October an Entente squadron shelled the Bulgarian port of Dedeaghatch, damaging much enemy property and killing about 1,000 soldiers. Russia took her especial part against Bulgaria by bombarding Varna.

And in various parts of the world submarines were sinking transports and steamships and destroyers and each other, and engagements between torpedo boats were taking place. British submarines torpedoed four Turkish transports in the Dardanelles early in September, but Britain later lost, by submarine,

a transport of her own. At the end of October an engagement between French and Germans off the Belgian coast near Ostend resulted in the sinking of a torpedo boat destroyer, and in two similar duels near the entrance to the Baltic in October, British submarines sank a German destroyer and a torpedo boat. On the 23d of October it was announced that British submarines had, in the preceding ten days, sunk twenty German ships in the Baltic, with an aggregate of 38,000 tons. As for the German submarine activity, that is a story so closely interwoven with the position and diplomacy of neutrals that it must have its place in another part of this chronicle.

Aerial

On the 17th of August German airships raided the outskirts of London, killing ten persons and wounding thirty-six. On the 7th of September a Zeppelin attack on the east coast of London killed ten persons and wounded forty-three. On the 8th, both the east coast and the vicinity of London were again raided by Zeppelins that dealt death to twenty persons and injury to eighty-six. A raid on the east coast on the 12th of September killed no one and did no actual damage. Next day an airplane from Germany dropped bombs on the coast of Kent. Just one month later a night raid by Zeppelins on London killed fifty-five persons and wounded 114.

That is the record of air raids by Germans on civilians during the present period. It is set forth thus baldly, in mere chronological statement, to give an isolated view of the raiding as a whole.

Apparently the German raiders sought to damage either important buildings in London's metropolitan area, or the London docks themselves. Just where the bombs were dropped British officials refused to say—because the raiders were obviously ignorant of the whereabouts of the strategic points they sought. The Zeppelin attacks, from any point of view of military or " moral " advantage, failed. In a late report of the damage done in one week's raiding of London and the neighborhood roundabout, it was shown that the number of persons either killed outright or dying later of their wounds was thirty-eight; of this number two were policemen and one was an Army Service Corps man. The others who died, and all of those who were injured, were civilians. And the buildings damaged or destroyed were not military, Governmental, or shipping headquarters, but workingmen's flats, a public house, a little stable. One church was hit. An omnibus was struck in the explosion of a bomb—of the twenty people aboard it, nine were instantly killed, and eleven injured; one of the persons reported as " injured " was the driver, who had both legs blown off, and died soon afterward in the hospital.

Of the fifty-five persons killed and 114 injured in the London raid of Oct. 13, fourteen killed and thirteen wounded were listed as " military casualties." The others were women and children and civilian men. Several houses were set on fire, but no serious military damage of any kind resulted from the raid.

It was natural that the achievement of Zeppelin raids on London should call forth sharp question as to England's aerial defense. Inevitably, air defense became a subject of keen inquiry. In the House of Commons on the 15th of September Sir Henry Dalziel made a speech which was, in effect, a general question to Arthur Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty, as to the protection which was, and which might be, given against enemy attacks from the air. In reply, Mr. Balfour confessed frankly that the aerial defense of unfortified London was not yet what it should be; the attacks had, to a great extent, taken the Admiralty unaware. But the naval aerial service had been quadrupled; Sir Percy Scott, a distinguished Admiral, had been placed in charge of defensive measures; and, in short, everything was being done that could be. On the 1st of October bright lights were prohibited and night traffic reduced.

And meanwhile Austrian airships were dropping bombs on Venice. An attack in August was practically without result, but in October a church was destroyed. On the 25th of August, however, six

civilians were killed by the attack of an Austrian airplane on Brescia.

French military airplanes were meanwhile busy. On Aug. 25 a great "flying squadron" of sixty-two birdlike planes attacked the arsenal of Saarlouis, in Rhenish Prussia, and on the same day a company of sixty, French, British, and Belgian, shelled the Mont Huest Forest in Belgium. On the 28th of August French aviators beat off an air attack on Paris, and the next week forty French airplanes bombarded Saarbrücken. On the 22d of September they bombarded Stuttgart, and next day they attacked German bases in Lorraine and the Argonne. In October they shelled railway stations and military buildings in Luxemburg and Metz. And meanwhile Italian air squadrons were making attacks on the Austrians.

Submarines—Including Negotiations and Neutral Action

In pursuance of the Teutonic submarine warfare "against merchantmen," these outstanding things happened:

The White Star liner Arabic, unarmed, a passenger vessel, proceeding from England—and to a neutral port, New York—was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine off Fastnet on the morning of Aug. 19, 1915. Of the forty-four persons lost two were American citizens, passengers.

The Allan liner Hesperian, a passenger ship outward bound from Liverpool to Montreal, was hit by a mine or submarine off the coast of Ireland on Sept. 4. She remained afloat for thirty-four hours, but sank as she was being towed into Queenstown Harbor. Seventeen persons were drowned, one of them an American. The Hesperian had carried one stern gun. It was generally believed that the Hesperian had been torpedoed, but the German Government declared that no German submarine could have been in the vicinity of the disaster at that time, and that the Hesperian must have struck a mine. The tangible evidence of torpedo attack in this case, as in that of the Nebraskan some months earlier, was a fragment of metal said to have been picked up on the deck of the ship after the explosion, which was forwarded by the British Admiralty to the United States Government for examination, and was declared by our naval experts to be a piece of a torpedo. But the only proof that the metal had been found as reported was in the statement of the British Admiralty. And in the negotiations with Germany the subject, which rested on a flat unsupported statement and a flat unsupported denial, was dropped.

On the 7th of November the Italian liner Ancona, bound from Messina to New York with more than 400 passengers, was sunk off the coast of Tunis by a torpedo from an Austrian submarine. More than 200 passengers perished, among them seven Americans.

In a note to Germany on the 21st of July, in the matter of the Lusitania, President Wilson had informed the Imperial Government that any further acts "in contravention of neutral rights" by submarine commanders would be regarded by this Government, when they affected American citizens, as "deliberately unfriendly." Looked upon in this country as mild, criticised by many Americans as too much so, the policy of Washington toward Germany's submarine warfare was denounced in the German press as hostile and "unneutral." The submarine campaign, at the time of the July note, was at the height of its popularity in Germany.

The loss of life by the sinking of the Arabic was relatively small. But the diplomatic situation precipitated thereby was of the gravest. There was not a question here of the attempts at justification that had rested upon the Lusitania's small-arm cartridges and empty shrapnel shells, and the fact that she was carrying a cargo and passengers to Germany's enemy. The Arabic was outward bound to New York. She was sunk within a few weeks of the United States' warning. If done by Government orders, this could not fail to be understood as a "deliberately unfriendly" act.

It was a crisis which was immediately met by the action of German diplomacy. On the 24th of August Count von Bernstorff delivered to the United States

Government a note containing a request for patience until full reports could be made, and, in the meantime, an anticipatory apology; if it should be shown that American lives had been lost through the action of a German submarine commander, the Imperial German Government, the note stated, would deeply regret it; it was contrary to German intentions; the German Government wished to tender its sincerest sympathies.

The fact that the German Government was willing to go as far as this was in itself an earnest of further concessions. Yet the immediate exchange of communications that followed was disappointing. Germany promised to sink no more liners without warning, but she was not sufficiently definite in regard to the matter at hand. Discussions dragged on and, in the midst of them, the Hesperian went down, apparently sunk by a submarine. Although our Government let the question of the Hesperian and the cause of its destruction drop because of insufficient evidence, the tension of the situation was plainly increased. The United States reiterated, with greater emphasis than before, its demand for apology and reparation in the case of the Arabic. For another month negotiations went on. And on the 5th of October the German Government made complete apology, promised reparation, receded from its position on the whole matter of submarine war, and met every demand of the United States.

Unquestionably the German disavowal was a great triumph for American diplomacy. There were no more submarine outrages around the British Isles—there was very little submarine activity of any sort there—for a time after the destruction of the Hesperian. The destruction of the Arabic was highwater mark in submarine warfare for a time. On Oct. 1 the British Admiralty reported to the United States Government that between fifty and seventy German submarines had been sunk by the British by special new devices. What the future might hold it was impossible, of course, to foretell. But the success of that particular "war zone" campaign was beginning to decline. A pause came in Teutonic submarine operations about the British Isles; their work continued, but only on a small scale. And then the Ancona was torpedoed in the Mediterranean.

Submarine activity in the Mediterranean became zealous early in October. German U-boats were transferred in large numbers to the southern sea, and submarines flying the Austrian flag—hitherto seen only in the Adriatic—appeared in the Mediterranean. At first the campaign was conducted against the transports that were taking the allied troops to Gallipoli, the Saloniki base, and the Suez Canal. Then the Austrians began to operate against merchantmen. The destruction of the Ancona caused, inevitably, a fresh diplomatic crisis—in a new place. The Ancona was an Italian liner—and Germany was not formally at war with Italy. The submarine that torpedoed the Ancona flew the flag of Austria-Hungary. Stories of the manner of the sinking contained details of unusual cruelty. But while reports as to what had actually happened varied, the United States was forced, after sending a specific inquiry to Vienna, to wait for official information. It was not until December that the United States Department of State sent a demand for disavowal and reparation to Austria-Hungary.

The Cavell Case

In Belgium, on the 12th of October, Edith Cavell, an English nurse, who had helped soldiers to get out of conquered Belgium, was put to death, after trial by court-martial. She was shot, by order of General von Bissing, Military Governor of Belgium, whose power in the conquered land was supreme.

In England, "Edith Cavell Day" called out large numbers of enlistments, and the country was stirred as it is probable nothing had stirred it since the destruction of the Lusitania. In the United States public opinion was tremendously aroused, and one prominent American, in an address which is reprinted in part in the present volume, wrote: "Let our nation begin with the case of Edith Cavell, and demand of Germany the dis-

missal of the officers who flouted, deceived, and mocked the representatives of the United States. That concerns our honor as a nation. And you, women of America! Make her cause—the cause of mercy—your own!" In Germany, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, declaring that his country's enemies were making capital out of the execution, offered to the world a defense of his country's action, saying that "it was a pity that Miss Cavell had to be executed, but that it was a matter of military necessity."

The United States representatives in Brussels, Brand Whitlock and Hugh Gibson, his Secretary of Legation, did all that human power could do to save Edith Cavell. German officials gave assurance that the American Legation would be informed when sentence was pronounced; they were promising that when Mr. Gibson learned from unofficial outside sources that judgment had been passed some time before, and that Miss Cavell was to be executed in a few hours. Calling upon the proper German official, Mr. Gibson and the Spanish Minister were assured that this was most unlikely, and advised to take the word of the German representative and wait for the promise to be fulfilled; under pressure of importunate requests, the official at last telephoned to the Judge of the Court and found that the "outside" report was true. After that, every possible persuasion was offered, to under officials and to von Bissing himself, but it was impossible to accomplish even an hour's stay in the sentence. Edith Cavell was executed at the time that the court had appointed—2 in the morning. The reports referred to are published in the present volume.

Defense Measures and Financial

The case of Edith Cavell had, as has been said, an immediate reaction upon enlistments in England. But this was the period in which the voluntary system of recruiting an army was having its last trial there, and it was destined to rejection at last. If in these last months, however, voluntary military service was showing itself to be less successful than the country's need demanded, it is by no means to be dismissed as simply having "failed." Nearly 3,000,000 men had enlisted in the army and navy in the first thirteen months of war. Before Lord Derby tried his scheme of enlistment Lord Kitchener was able to report that the British front in Flanders, which had begun with seventeen miles, had been increased to fifty.

Lord Derby's "scheme" intrusted the entire business of recruiting to civilian organizations, instead of, as heretofore, to the military authorities. It began its operations by sending personal letters to every eligible man. On the 5th of October it was announced that the Earl of Derby, had undertaken, at Lord Kitchener's request, the direction of all British recruiting. In carrying out the scheme the married and unmarried men were divided into two groups, of which the bachelors were to be sent to the front first and the married men in order later, according to age. A canvass was made under direction of the Joint Labor and Parliamentary Recruiting Committees. On the 20th of the month a public statement urged all men to enlist at once, with the assurance that recruits would be allowed to remain at their ordinary work, if they wished, after enlistment, until the country was in actual need of their services—although every one, of course, was to be subject to immediate call, with allowance of a fortnight after enlistment to settle his private affairs. King George also issued a personal appeal as part of the "Derby plan."

Speaking to the House on Nov. 2, Prime Minister Asquith declared that upon the matter of recruiting he was determined to "stick at nothing," and that if voluntary enlistments did not have the needed results he would ask Parliament for a compulsory service act. And on the 11th of the month Lord Derby made it evident that conscription would follow soon if men who were fit for service, both married and unmarried, failed to enlist. Married men, it was promised, would be allowed exemption until the bachelors had been brought in, "if necessary, by force." The Derby scheme was to a very large extent successful, but all during the Autumn the possibility of

compulsory service was feelingly discussed throughout the country.

Another and similar question was that of munitions. Early in September Lloyd George, Minister of Munitions, declared that the country needed hundreds of thousands of additional workers in the munition factories. And in another speech, facing the darkness that lay upon the prospects of the Entente Allies at that time, he pointed out that although the Allies had immense—almost boundless—resources at their command, the Central Powers were still superior in arms and equipment. The tide of German invasion would be stopped, he said, as soon as—and by no means until—the Allies were supplied with "abundance of war material." Meanwhile the British Government was constructing eleven new arsenals.

Estimates of the total cost of the war, made at this time, varied from $40,000,000 to $50,000,000 a day. In asking for the seventh British loan, with the opening of Parliament on the 7th of September, 1915, Premier Asquith placed the cost to Great Britain at something over $17,500,000 daily, and prophesied that it would soon be more. At that time loans to Britain's allies and dominions had totaled about $1,250,000,000, and the credit passed by Parliament then brought the war loans of Great Britain to $6,310,000,000. In October the Anglo-French loan of $500,000,000 was issued in the United States; the money subscribed remained in this country, and the object of the credit was to stabilize exchange and maintain export prices. Especial interest attached to the credit because it was the first time in modern history that Great Britain had sought a loan outside her own borders. She continued to act largely as banker for her allies.

Great Britain pursued the general policy, however, of raising as much war revenue as possible by taxation. On the 21st of September, Reginald McKenna, Chancellor of the Exchequer, introduced the second 1915 budget—the greatest war budget in the world's history. The new and increased taxes proposed would yield, it was estimated, an income of $390,000,000 for a year, increasing the revenue to $1,525,000,000 at once, and to considerably more with the close of the fiscal year. The greatest increases were in the income tax; the exemption limit was reduced to $650 and a general increase of 40 per cent. was listed; the income tax and supertax increases alone were figured to bring in additional revenue amounting to $235,425,000. Customs taxation was also greatly increased, and new duties were laid on imports, while increases in telephone, telegraph, and postal charges were estimated at $25,000,000. Mr. McKenna also warned the country definitely—following Mr. Asquith's vague foreshadowing—of increased expenditures, prophesying in the near future a daily average of $25,000,000. The Russian war debt in this period reached a total of $5,157,880,000.

In Germany immense sums of money were being raised by loans; the third credit brought subscriptions, in September, up to $6,250,000,000. An interesting stimulus to public subscription was offered in the "Ten War Loan Commandments," which are reprinted in this volume. It is interesting to quote a letter received in this country, at about this time, from a woman in Germany—that she had invested part of her meagre savings "to help set Germany free." * * * Meanwhile, on the 13th of November, General von Bissing levied a new tax of $8,000,000 a month on Belgium. * * *

The pinch of hunger was already beginning to be felt in Germany. In this period news reached the outside world that "substituted foods" were in common use and that the Imperial Government had taken out of the hands of the provincial authorities the control of food prices and supplies throughout the empire. There were hints, too, of a "pinch" of another kind. After complaints of the rising price of food, Vorwärts, the organ of the Social Democratic Party, went so far as to urge consideration of peace; on the 5th of November it was punished with suppression.

Political

In France the conspicuous internal

event of the quarter year was the overthrow of the Viviani Ministry and the formation of the first true Coalition Cabinet in the history of France. Discord had been threatened in August, but had been averted by the Premier's personal appeal, and a vote of confidence passed. But when, on the 13th of October, Foreign Minister Delcassé resigned—following the unhappy developments in the Balkans—discontent broke out again. On the 28th M. Viviani resigned with his Cabinet, and the next day a new Ministry was formed with Aristide Briand as Premier. The Coalition Cabinet did in truth call upon the talents and the experience of the nation. It was made up of MM. Jules Cambon, General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; de Freycinet, State; General Galliéni, War; Viviani, Justice; Malvy, Interior; Lacaze, Marine; Ribot, Finance; Painlevé, Instruction and War Inventions; Sembat, Public Works; Clementel, Commerce; Doumergue, Colonies; Malines, Agriculture; Matin, Labor, and Combes, Bourgeois, Cochin, and Guesde without portfolio.

In England, meanwhile, political interest was aroused by the resignation of Sir Edward Carson from the Coalition Cabinet, which he had entered as Attorney General with its formation in May. His resignation practically synchronized with the recall of Sir Ian Hamilton from the Dardanelles — in October — and although his letter of resignation merely stated that he was "in entire disagreement" with the Cabinet action in regard to "far-reaching military questions," it was generally believed that his discontent focused on the situation in the Near East. It was also believed that Sir Edward disapproved of the concentration of the conduct of the war in the hands of a small "inner council." Shortly after his resignation this council became more definitely and formally established; it consisted of the Prime Minister, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Colonial Secretary, the Minister of Munitions, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer—that is, of Mr. Asquith, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. McKenna. And it was said that it was partly his exclusion from the War Council that caused Winston Churchill, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, to resign entirely from the Cabinet and go to the front in France. At all events, Mr. Churchill had remained in the Coalition Cabinet long enough to give the new War Council the benefit of the knowledge of military and naval affairs which he possessed when he resigned from his office as First Lord of the Admiralty. And on the 15th of November, three days after his resignation, he appeared before the House of Commons and in a detailed address offered his defense against the criticism to which he had been subjected since the beginning of the war.

The Russia of those days was a country where strange things often happened —and were rarely explained. When in early September the Czar removed the popular Grand Duke Nicholas from his place as Commander of the Russian Armies and sent him to the Caucasus, he assumed himself, in practice as well as theory, the leadership of all the armies of the empire, and was greeted with much patriotic and sentimental acclaim. But the act was plainly a political "mystery," and evidence pointed to reactionary influence.

What may be called "intramural" declarations of war pass almost unnoted in the midst of stirring events. When Italy joined the Entente, her quarrel was with Austria alone. In August, however, she followed a demand for a release of her subjects in Turkish ports with a declaration of war against Turkey, and in October she joined her allies in hostilities against Bulgaria. She was still not at war with Germany.

Neutral—United States of America

Reports of massacres and deportations of Christians in Armenia had been reaching the outside world for some time, when a committee of prominent Americans was organized to make an investigation of the exact state of affairs. Their investigation and their report, which was made public on the 3d of October, formed one of the most interesting of "neutral activities" at this

time. The report was signed by the Right Rev. David H. Greer, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of New York; Oscar S. Straus, former Secretary of Commerce and Labor and ex-Ambassador to Turkey; Cleveland H. Dodge of Phelps, Dodge & Co.; the Rev. Dr. Stephen S. Wise, rabbi of the Free Synagogue, New York; Charles R. Crane of Chicago, Vice Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Democratic National Committee in 1912; Arthur Curtiss James, Director of many railroads and of the Hanover National Bank, the United States Trust Company, and of Phelps, Dodge & Co.; the Rev. Dr. Frank Mason North of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church; John R. Mott of the International Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association; William W. Rockhill, former Ambassador to Turkey and also to Russia; William Sloane, President of W. & J. Sloane; the Rev. Dr. Edward Lincoln Smith of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions; the Rev. Frederick Lynch of the New York Peace Society; George A. Plimpton of Ginn & Co., a trustee of Constantinople College; the Rev. Dr. James L. Barton, for many years a missionary in Turkey, and, at the time of the issuance of the report, Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions; the Rev. Dr. William J. Haven, one of the founders of the Epworth League; Stanley White, President of the White Advertising Corporation, and Professor Samuel P. Dutton, an authority on Balkan affairs.

They drew their facts from Greek, Bulgarian, American, Turkish, German, British, and Armenian sources, using only "data of unquestioned veracity, integrity, and authority," and they found that "crimes now being perpetrated upon the Armenian people surpass in their horror and cruelty anything that history has recorded during the last thousand years." After their investigations they decided to appeal for funds for Armenian relief, and opened headquarters for the collection of aid. But the massacres, of course, did not end on the 12th of October; the American Ambassador to Turkey reported that they had been renewed.

During October also, Lord Bryce, in the British House of Lords, reported that about 800,000 Armenians had already been slain; he called the massacres a "deliberate and premeditated attempt to exterminate a nation."

In the United States the so-called "munitions campaign" reached its head in the Autumn of 1915. Protest had failed to reduce the American sale of war material to the Allies. Efforts to lay an embargo upon all munitions exports had not even succeeded in persuading Congress to vote upon a resolution. In reply to a note from Austria-Hungary, Secretary Lansing had made the position of the United States, in refusing to place such an embargo, plain, and a repeated protest from Vienna was of no effect. But other means had already been taken at least to decrease the export of munitions from the United States to the enemies of the Central Powers. On the 5th of September, Dr. Constantin Dumba, Ambassador from Austria-Hungary, admitted that he had proposed to his Government certain measures to be taken to cripple American munitions plants. The letter, containing full details, which he had written to Baron Burian, had been given to James F. J. Archibald, an American newspaper correspondent who was about to go to Vienna under an American passport; it was taken from Archibald by British authorities at Falmouth. The documents in the case are published in the present volume. The letter was made public, and on the 9th of September the United States State Department requested Dumba's recall. He asked that he might be given "extended leave of absence" instead, but the American demand stood firm. He was recalled on Sept. 27, and sailed under American safe-conduct on Oct. 5.

"Munitions plots" aroused a great deal of excitement at this time. Certain it is that there occurred during this period an astonishing number of explosions in munition plants and fires on ships—four of the former within twenty-four hours in November. Certain it is, too, that arrests were made—most nota-

ble among them that of the German Lieutenant, Robert Fay. He was arrested, with another German, on Oct. 24, charged with conspiring to blow up ships; next day he voluntarily confessed that he had been detailed by the German Secret Service to regular work of this sort, and that he had made reports to Captains Boy-Ed and von Papen, German Naval and Military Attachés at Washington. Certain it is, moreover, that in the late Summer a veritable epidemic of strikes spread through munition plants, and prominent labor leaders made accusations of plots to cripple industry. These —the explosions, the fires, the Fay confession, the other arrests, the strikes —were things that happened at this time.

Meanwhile, the allied blockade of Germany continued to interfere with American trade and communications. On the 21st of August Great Britain and France declared cotton absolute contraband. Through the Autumn months there were various "exchanges" and public statements on the subject of American trade. In September the British Government announced its willingness to release American-owned cargoes of German and Austrian goods, and a few days later the United States State Department made public a note from Great Britain denying "discrimination between British and American exporters" to neutral countries in Europe. But on the 21st of October the United States Government found it necessary to address to the Government of Great Britain a detailed protest against interference with American trade. Not only did the United States protest against interference; it declared absolute non-recognition of the legality of the British blockade of European ports.

Against the background of such international situations and "foreign affairs" the United States began definite preparation for its own defense.

In an address before the Consulting Board of the Navy, on Oct. 6, President Wilson, who had opposed increased armament hitherto, declared himself in favor of adequate preparation for national defense. And in a speech at the Manhattan Club in New York City, Nov. 4, he made definite announcement of his defense policy. On the 19th of October, Secretary Daniels presented details of his five-year building program for the navy, and a few weeks later Secretary Garrison outlined the War Department's plans. The proposals called for appropriations by Congress of $217,652,173.32 for the navy and about $183,000,000 for the army's needs. It was with programs and discussions of "preparedness" that the United States closed the present period and awaited the assembly of Congress.

PERIOD XIII.

Sinking of the Arabic and Hesperian—The Recall of Ambassador Dumba—Storming of Kovno—The Czar Succeeds the Grand Duke Nicholas in Command of the Army—How the British Lost Sari Bair—Attack on the Meuse Heights—The Sympathies of South America—The English Graves—An Object Lesson in British Sea Power—The Nation that Died for All.

ARABIC AND HESPERIAN

Official Interchanges With Berlin

Two Cases of Vessels Sunk in the Submarine Zone Since the Lusitania Note of July 21

In the American note to Germany, sent by President Wilson on July 21, 1915, this concluding passage appeared:

THE very value which this Government sets upon the long and unbroken friendship between the people and Government of the United States and the people and Government of the German Nation impels it to press very solemnly upon the Imperial German Government the necessity for a scrupulous observance of neutral rights in this critical matter. Friendship itself prompts it to say to the Imperial Government that repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly.

The White Star liner Arabic, outward bound for New York, was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine off Fastnet on the morning of Aug. 19, 1915. Eighteen passengers and twenty-one members of the crew were reported missing by the White Star Line on Aug. 22, and the first messages received by the State Department at Washington from Ambassador Page in London reported the loss of Mrs. Josephine Bruguiere and Dr. Edmund Woods, American citizens. Secretary Lansing instructed Ambassador Gerard at Berlin, as announced on Aug. 23, to ask the German Imperial Foreign Office whether a report of the sinking of the Arabic had been received by the German Government, and a statement issued from the White House on the same day, after a conference between Secretary Joseph Tumulty and President Wilson, read as follows:

With reference to the sinking of the Arabic, as soon as all of the facts are ascertained, our course of action will be determined.

The British Admiralty made this announcement on Aug. 23:

The Arabic was an unarmed passenger ship, outward bound to a neutral port. It

was thus impossible for her to have been carrying contraband to this country. She was sunk by a German submarine without warning, and she neither attempted to attack the submarine nor to escape from it.

The following report was sent by The Associated Press on Aug. 25 *from its London office:*

The American Embassy has transmitted by cable to Washington the gist of seven depositions taken by Consul Washington at Liverpool, six of which were from Americans on board the Arabic and the seventh from Captain Finch of that steamer.

All the deponents state under oath that the Arabic was pursuing a peaceful course and that she was not warned. All of them assert that they saw the torpedo or heard shouts that a torpedo was coming; also that the Arabic made no attempt to escape or to ram the submarine.

Captain Finch in his affidavit emphasized the last point, saying that, in the first place, it would have been suicidal, and, in the second place, as he did not see the submarine he could not have attempted to ram her.

The depositions in full will be mailed today.

The managers of the White Star Line at Liverpool gave out to the newspapers yesterday the following statement:

> At the time of the Lusitania torpedoing many misleading and untrue statements appeared regarding the vessel. Similar statements are beginning to be hinted at in connection with the Arabic, which are equally untrue. For this reason we thought you would like to have one or two definite facts that had better be published at once in order to prevent people from hazarding opinions and finding excuses for the torpedoing.
>
> The facts are:
>
> There is no doubt the Arabic was struck with a torpedo. Captain Finch did not see the submarine, but undoubtedly saw the torpedo.
>
> There is no question of the Arabic having tried to ram the submarine, because it was not seen from the bridge.
>
> There is no question of the Arabic having tried to escape, except the very proper precaution of having put the helm hard over when they saw the torpedo.
>
> The Arabic was undoubtedly sunk without warning. She was in peaceful trading, with various nationalities aboard. She was outward bound, so there is no question of munitions, and she was not disguised in any way nor had she any guns mounted.
>
> The statement has appeared in the press that she was off the south coast of Ireland, which leads some people to think she was near the coast. As a matter of fact, she was over sixty miles south of Ireland.
>
> With respect to precautions taken, these were very thorough and very proper, having regard to all that has taken place in the danger zone. The Captain had life jackets on hand for everybody. Rafts were unlashed and deck lifeboats opened up, and both rafts and deck lifeboats played an important part in lifesaving, as well as the regular lifeboats.

One of the affidavits made to Ambassador Page by James Colman, an American citizen aboard the Arabic, was cabled by The Associated Press on Aug. 21, *as follows:*

> The first any one knew of the torpedo was while some were looking at the steamer Dunsley foundering a little distance away. Suddenly the cry went up that a torpedo was coming toward us. Captain Finch was zigzagging his vessel, for evidently he had already spotted the submarine, and was trying to avoid it. Before any one of us fully realized it, crash came the torpedo into the ship, almost knocking the ship over, it seemed. The Germans did not fire any shot across the bow of the Arabic to stop her, and did not make any effort to ascertain if there were Americans aboard. It was simply a cold-blooded attack with utter disregard of the consequences.
>
> Every American on the ship to whom I have since talked agrees that the Germans apparently were determined to kill every one.

Several survivors of the disaster reported spying the wake of the torpedo, but testified that they failed to observe the submarine. A Queenstown dispatch to The London Daily Chronicle dated Aug. 20, 1915, *said:*

C. S. Pringle of Toronto, a cabin passenger on the Arabic, said today in describing the disaster:

"After breakfast most of the passengers went up on deck to enjoy the fresh air. The sea was calm and the atmosphere was quite clear, in fact, it was a perfect Summer morning. With my telescope I noticed what appeared to be the track of a torpedo coming at right

angles toward the Arabic. I saw no submarine then or later on.

"The torpedo traveled at enormous speed and struck our steamer on the starboard side. The impact made her shake frightfully and then there was a sudden explosion. The passengers were by this time rushing for the lifeboats. Captain Finch was on the deck giving orders and the boats were being got down over the side of the vessel. Suddenly the ship began to sink, and in eight or ten minutes she went down. There was no panic, but naturally there was a good deal of excitement among the women and children. They were the first to be put into the lifeboats.

"Considering that no warning was given by the submarine it was astonishing that a much larger proportion of those on board were not lost."

Joseph G. De Lorimer, K. C., of Montreal, said he was saved after he had been struggling in the water, holding on to a raft for considerable time. He had gone on deck to sit down, he said, and a friend was standing by his side when he exclaimed, "We are gone." They both then saw a white line in the water which proved to be a torpedo. Mr. De Lorimer rushed to his cabin for a lifebelt and brought it on deck. He was in the last boat that left the ship as she took the final plunge. Previous to this the liner listed tremendously and turned turtle. One or two lifeboats were struck by the staboard quarter of the Arabic and all the lifeboats were caught in the whirlpool as she sank.

A Queenstown dispatch to The London Daily News dated Aug. 20, 1915, bore this testimony by Captain Finch of the sunken liner:

I left Liverpool at 2:34 P. M. Wednesday, and had on board 423 souls, all told, including 261 members of the crew. All went well with us on our way down the Channel until 9:30 A. M. Thursday, when the ship was torpedoed. There was a northeasterly wind, and there was only a slight swell on. Therefore, before we were torpedoed we were going at sixteen knots.

Asked as to whether any warning had been given by the submarine, Captain Finch said:

No; we were torpedoed without receiving any warning whatever. I was on the bridge at the time, and had been on the bridge all the way down the Channel. The first indication I had that we were attacked or of the presence of a submarine at all in our vicinity was when I saw the torpedo coming toward the ship at a distance of about 300 feet. That was the very first I saw of it. It approached us at right angles, coming toward us from the north and striking us on the starboard side at a point some 90 or 100 feet, I should say, from the stern.

When the torpedo struck us there was a terrible explosion, so loud that I had never heard anything like it. You can imagine how terrible it was when I tell you it shook the whole ship from stem to stern. The explosion was so stupendous that one of the boats which was swung out from the ship's side was blown into the air in splinters. Then, after the torpedo struck, an immense volume of water was thrown up in the air to a tremendous height, and, of course, there was a great shock.

Asked whether the torpedo struck the ship in a very vital part, Captain Finch said:

Oh, yes, indeed! Why, the ship sank in ten minutes. As soon as she was struck she gave a great list, first to starboard and then to port, and after that she seemed to steady herself a bit. Then she went down quickly by the stern, and disappeared completely in ten minutes.

I did not see a single sign of a submarine, and, as far as I am aware, nobody else saw a submarine, either before or after the occurrence.

German Official Statements About the Arabic's Sinking

The following statement concerning the German Government's attitude in regard to the Arabic was given out in New York on Aug. 24, 1915, *by Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador:*

THE German Ambassador received the following instructions from Berlin, which he communicated to the Department of State:

> So far no official information available concerning the sinking of the Arabic.
>
> The German Government trusts that the American Government will not take a definite stand at hearing only the reports of one side, which, in the opinion of the Imperial Government, cannot correspond with the facts, but that a chance will be given to Germany to be heard equally.
>
> Although the Imperial Government does not doubt the good faith of the witnesses whose statements are reported by the newspapers in Europe, it should be borne in mind that these statements are naturally made under excitement which might easily produce wrong impressions.
>
> If Americans should actually have lost their lives, this would naturally be contrary to our intentions. The German Government would deeply regret the fact, and begs to tender sincerest sympathies to the American Government.

German Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg informed The Associated Press correspondent in Berlin on Aug. 25 *as follows:*

As long as the circumstances surrounding the sinking of the Arabic have not been fully cleared up, it is impossible for me to make a definite statement. Thus far we have received no report about it.

Now we do not even know whether the sinking of the ship was caused by a mine or by a torpedo fired from a German submarine, nor do we know whether, in this latter case, the Arabic herself may not by her actions, perhaps, have justified the proceedings of the commander of the submarine.

Only after all these circumstances have been cleared up will it be possible to say whether the commander of one of our submarines went beyond his instructions, in which case the Imperial Government would not hesitate to give such complete satisfaction to the United States as would conform to the friendly relations existing between both Governments.

On Aug. 27 *The Associated Press announced that the State Department had been informed that Germany was ready to renew discussion of the Lusitania incident and to offer reparation for the American lives lost when that vessel was sunk by a German submarine. "There has been no response to the last American note on this subject," the announcement said, "and it is known that the United States will not listen to reparation proposals with the situation created by the sinking of the Arabic still pending." But following an oral statement to Secretary Lansing on Sept.* 1, 1915, *that Germany had accepted the declarations of the United States in the submarine warfare controversy, Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, sent the following letter to Mr. Lansing:*

Washington, D. C., Sept. 1.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: With reference to our conversation of this morning, I beg to inform you that my instructions concerning our answer to your last Lusitania note contains the following passage:

> Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of noncombatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance.

Although I know that you do not wish to discuss the Lusitania question till the Arabic incident has been definitely and satisfactorily settled, I desire to inform you of the above because this policy of my Government was decided on before the Arabic incident occurred.

I have no objection to your making

any use you may please of the above information.

I remain, my dear Mr. Lansing, very sincerely yours,

J. BERNSTORFF.

In connection with the letter, Secretary Lansing made the following statement:

In view of the clearness of the foregoing statement, it seems needless to make any comment in regard to it, other than to say that it appears to be a recognition of the fundamental principle for which we have contended.

This inference was borne out in an Associated Press dispatch from Berlin, dated Aug. 26, 1915, *as follows:*

The Associated Press is in a position to state on the best authority that the Arabic incident may be considered as eliminated as a source of discord between Germany and America; or at least is regarded by the German Government in that light. Moreover, Germany, in its desire to continue its friendly relations with the United States, had adopted before the sinking of the Arabic a policy designed to settle completely the whole submarine problem as affecting America, on the basis of good-will and mutual understanding.

This is shown clearly by the statement of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg last night, particularly by his concluding remark to the effect that not until all the circumstances in connection with the sinking of the Arabic had been cleared up would it be possible to say " whether the commander of one of our submarines went beyond his instructions," in which case Germany would give complete satisfaction to the United States.

Furthermore, in the course of the conversation the Chancellor twice again referred to the instructions given to submarine commanders. He did not specify in detail the nature of these instructions, but it may be said that they are designed to prevent a repetition of the Lusitania case and to provide that opportunity for escape for American noncombatants upon torpedoed ships which the United States desires.

Having given these instructions, Germany asked suspension of judgment on the Arabic case until the facts were ascertained, being confident it would be shown that the sinking of the vessel was not an unprovoked attack without warning by a German submarine, but was attributed either to a mine explosion or to some action of the vessel itself.

Should it develop, however, that a submarine acted contrary to instructions, ample reparation will be offered.

Germany is still unable to understand why Americans in these troubled times travel on belligerent ships instead of taking American or other neutral steamers, but since they in some instances insist upon taking passage on vessels belonging to belligerents, Germany will do its utmost to provide for their safety.

It is not permissible to quote the remarks made by the Chancellor in the course of the conversation, other than the formal statement which he made. It may be said, however, that Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg showed genuine interest in the state of feeling in the United States concerning the sinking of the Arabic, and expressed the hope that the American people would not form an opinion on the basis of conflicting statements giving only one side of the story. He spoke with emphasis of Germany's desire to maintain the friendship of America.

Quite contrary to the expectations raised in the United States by Count von Bernstorff's and the German Imperial Chancellor's preliminary assurances, Germany's note to the American Government on the sinking of the Arabic, as communicated to the American Ambassador, James W. Gerard, for transmission to Washington as a memorandum dated Sept. 7, 1915, *was cabled from Berlin on Sept.* 9 *in these words:*

On Aug. 19 a German submarine stopped the English steamer Dunsley about sixteen nautical miles south of Kinsale and was on the point of sinking the prize by gunfire after the crew had left the vessel. At this moment the commander saw a large steamer making directly toward him. This steamer, as developed later, was the Arabic. She was recognized as an enemy vessel, as she did

not fly any flag and bore no neutral markings.

When she approached she altered her original course, but then again pointed directly toward the submarine. From this the commander became convinced that the steamer had the intention of attacking and ramming her. In order to anticipate this attack he gave orders for the submarine to dive and fired a torpedo at the steamer. After firing, he convinced himself that the people on board were being rescued in fifteen boats.

According to his instructions the commander was not allowed to attack the Arabic without warning and without saving the lives unless the ship atempted to escape or offered resistance. He was forced, however, to conclude from the attendant circumstances that the Arabic planned a violent attack on the submarine.

This conclusion is all the more obvious as he had been fired upon at a great distance in the Irish Sea on Aug. 14—that is, a few days before—by a large passenger steamer apparently belonging to the British Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, which he had neither attacked nor stopped.

The German Government most deeply regrets that lives were lost through the action of the commander. It particularly expresses this regret to the Government of the United States on account of the death of American citizens.

The German Government is unable, however, to acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the Arabic.

If it should prove to be the case that it is impossible for the German and American Governments to reach a harmonious opinion on this point, the German Government would be prepared to submit the difference of opinion, as being a question of international law, to The Hague Tribunal for arbitration, pursuant to Article 38 of The Hague Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

In so doing, it assumes that, as a matter of course, the arbitral decision shall not be admitted to have the importance of a general decision on the permissibility or the converse under international law of German submarine warfare.

This Imperial German justification of the sinking of the Arabic, as reported from Washington on Sept. 11, *immediately presented a grave issue for the consideration of the United States Government. A Washington dispatch transmitted by The Associated Press on Sept.* 13 *said:*

Conferences today between President Wilson and Secretary Lansing, and between Secretary Lansing and Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, brought the situation growing out of German submarine activities to the following status:

1. The German Ambassador has been supplied with the evidence of officers and survivors of the Arabic, all agreeing that the liner was proceeding peacefully when torpedoed without warning, and has been advised that the United States desires a disavowal of the attack and reparation for the American lives lost.

2. The evidence will be sent by Count von Bernstorff to the Berlin Foreign Office, to which it has not been available before, and probably ten days will elapse before Berlin can be heard from. In some quarters it is believed possible that the Foreign Office, upon examining the evidence, may change its position and disavow the action of the submarine commander, who, it was claimed in the last note, sunk the liner because he thought she was about to attack him.

3. The United States has all information on the case as it now stands, and is readyto decide upon its course, but action may be delayed until Count von Bernstorff has had time to exchange communications with his Government.

4. While the United States will not consent to arbitration of a principle nor of a question involving the safety of American lives, it has accepted Germany's assurances that peaceful liners will not be torpedoed without warning, and if Germany desires to arbitrate the amount of indemnity, the question of whether the Arabic actually attempted to attack the submarine or whether her action justified the submarine commander in believing he was about to be attacked, that probably would be agreed to.

A special dispatch to THE NEW YORK

TIMES, *dated Sept.* 11, 1915, *stated the problem presented by the German note on the Arabic in this wise:*

Far from contributing toward the adjustment of the issue, the memorandum is regarded as complicating the situation by introducing elements that involve a departure from the fundamental principle for which the United States has been contending in behalf of the rights of noncombatants at sea, and which was thought to have been recognized in the pledge given to the State Department by the German Ambassador on Sept. 1.

The most embarrassing and perplexing new element injected into the situation is the refusal of Germany to " acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the Arabic." This is regarded here as nothing less than an assertion of a right to sink merchant steamers without warning, even when they do not try to escape or offer resistance, on the mere assumption of submarine commanders.

From all that can be gathered in responsible quarters here, the American Government is not ready to accept any such limitation upon the right of American citizens to traverse the high seas in vessels which do not rob themselves of immunity by efforts to escape or by actually offering resistance. The German Government, according to the best obtainable interpretation of the memorandum, after justifying so radical a departure from the pledge in the Bernstorff memorandum, and after refusing to acknowledge responsibility for any mistaken impression of its submarine commander as to the " intentions "—not the " actions "—of the commander of the liner, proposes that difference of opinion between the two Governments over this " point " be submitted " as a question of international law " to arbitrate at The Hague.

It is believed that it would take at least a year to obtain a decision before The Hague, and, in the absence of a guarantee against attacks like that upon the Arabic, hundreds of lives might be lost. Should the arbitrators uphold the German contention that Germany was under no obligation of responsibility for mistakes by submarine commanders, then both nations could abide by the arbitral judgment that the submarine commander who made the mistake was justified in torpedoing a liner merely because he thought the liner intended aggressive action.

But suppose arbitration should result in a decision that Germany was under obligation to grant indemnity in such a case? The rule of procedure under international law would thus have been settled, but what of the human lives that would have been lost during the arbitration? This is a phase of the German proposal which raises most serious doubts in Washington as to the wisdom of accepting it.

An Associated Press dispatch from Washington dated Sept. 13, 1915, conveyed a statement by President Wilson, as follows:

President Wilson expressed his views of the gravity of the international situation which confronts the United States to a delegation of Virginians, who asked him today to visit the Manassas battlefield late this month.

" We are all hoping and praying that the skies may clear," said the President, " but we have no control of that on this side of the water, and it is impossible to predict any part of the course of affairs."

The President was reminded that some time ago he had promised to go to Manassas to dedicate a tablet.

" When I made that promise," the President told the delegation, " things were just beginning, and a great many things have happened since which have altered not only the aspect of our own affairs, but the aspect of affairs of the world. My experience here day by day is that questions turn up so suddenly and have to be handled so promptly and sometimes with so much thoughtful discretion that I really dare not let my thoughts go out to other matters.

" I could not come to Manassas without having something to say. It would not be worthy of the occasion if I did not make preparations that would be

worth while, and that is out of the question. My thoughts are mortgaged beyond recall for the present.

"I simply feel that I have forfeited my liberty for the present, and that my nearest duty is the most obvious and imperative duty. I have been obliged to say this to all invitations, however tempting in character, and I would not be worthy of your trust if I did not come to such a conclusion, because I know that you want these international matters taken care of as best we know how, and I ought not to send my thoughts afield."

Case of the Hesperian

While the case of the sinking of the Arabic was being negotiated in interchanges between the Governments at Washington and Berlin, the first news of the alleged torpedoing of the Allan liner Hesperian came to Washington in the form of a cablegram to the State Department from Consul Frost at Queenstown, dated Sept. 5, 1915. *The dispatch reads:*

THE Allan liner Hesperian torpedoed by German submarine seventy miles southwest of Fastnet at 8:30 o'clock Saturday evening, [Sept. 4.] One or two Americans on board, none lost. Loss of life about eight.

Vessel has not sunk. Admiralty boats landed passengers and troops at 8:30 o'clock this morning. Have returned to bring Hesperian in here, due about 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

There were about 45 Canadian troops on board, unorganized and mainly invalided, also one 4.7 gun mounted and visible on stern. Vessel bound for Montreal.

An affidavit detailing the circumstances of the sinking of the Hesperian and signed by four officers of the vessel —William O. Main, Commander of the Hesperian; Alexander Maxwell, Chief Officer; Charles Richardson, First Officer, and William F. Reid, Second Officer—was cabled to the State Department on Sept. 7, 1915, *by Consul Frost at Queenstown.. The affidavit was not given out in full, but this paraphrase was issued:*

The Hesperian left Liverpool at 7 P M. on Friday, Sept. 3, and by 8:30 P. M. on Sept. 4 had reached latitude 50 north, longitude 10 west, about eighty miles southwest of Fastnet.

Dusk was closing in rapidly at the time specified when an explosion took place against the starboard bow No. 2 bulkhead, admitting water into compartments 1 and 2. The vessel sank about ten feet within four hours.

The explosion occurred within about eight feet of the surface, throwing a mass of water and steel fragments on the deck. From the steel fragments preserved it is indubitable that the explosion was caused by a torpedo and not by a mine. The characteristic odor of high explosive was noticeable.

No warning of any kind was received by the Hesperian. The track of a torpedo approaching the vessel was not observed by any of the ship's officers. They thought that on account of a failing light it may not have been possible to have seen it. No submarine was sighted before or after the explosion.

A 6-inch gun mounted on the stern of the Hesperian was painted a service gray, and would not have been conspicuous even at a short distance, and the officers think it could not have been observed at all through a periscope.

On board the Hesperian were forty Canadian soldiers, including officers, all either invalided or in attendance upon those invalided. These soldiers were all from various Canadian organizations, but were not organized or traveling as a unit.

No American citizens were among the passengers so far as known. One cabin steward, N. J. Dallas, was an American citizen.

Very slight panic or confusion existed, and the boats and lifesaving apparatus were in readiness and worked well.

Wireless signals, siren, and rockets

brought a British warship on the scene by 9:30, and two other Admiralty vessels before 10:30, but the Hesperian was not under convoy, and had not spoken to an Admiralty ship prior to the torpedoing.

The loss of an American life aboard the Hesperian was first officially intimated in a dispatch to the State Department on Sept. 8, 1915, *from Consul Wesley Frost at Queenstown. A Washington dispatch to* THE NEW YORK TIMES *of that date reported:*

The report said that among the missing members of the crew was a man named Wolff—his initials were not furnished to the Consul, but who was understood to be from Newark, N. J. The Consul said he had been informed that Wolff had registered as an American when he enrolled as a member of the Hesperian's crew.

The Consul's message was not made public, because officials did not look upon the information it contained as definite or conclusive, and did not feel that they could accept it as such.

An Associated Press dispatch from Queenstown, dated Sept. 8, 1915, *stated:*

It has been established that an American named Wolff was lost on the Hesperian. Wolff signed as an able seaman of the Hesperian's crew. He came from Newark, N. J., and was of Dutch parentage.

Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, made known on Sept. 8, 1915, *that he had received this wireless dispatch from the German Foreign Office in Berlin:*

According to information available in Berlin, it appears improbable that the Hesperian was torpedoed. Much more likely the boat ran on a mine.

On the same date a special dispatch was sent from Washington to THE NEW YORK TIMES *as follows:*

Secretary Lansing sent a cablegram to Ambassador Gerard at Berlin today, directing him to inquire of the German Government whether it had any report on the attack on the Allan liner Hesperian, and, if so, to ask for a copy of the report. The American Government wishes to be in possession of the German official version of the sinking of the vessel before determining its course of action.

In connection with the delivery on Sept. 14, 1915, *to Ambassador Gerard in Berlin by the German Government of a note in regard to the sinking of the steamship Hesperian, this semi-official explanation of the German position was given out:*

As we are informed from a competent source, the news already received, taken in connection with facts officially known, seems to exclude almost absolutely the possibility that a German submarine could under any circumstances have been concerned in sinking the British passenger steamer Hesperian.

First, according to the pre-arranged distribution, no German submarine should have been on Sept. 4 in that part of the ocean in which the Hesperian sank.

Furthermore, the explosion, according to descriptions received from British sources, was of such a nature as to indicate from its effects that it was rather of a mine than of a torpedo.

The circumstances that, according to these descriptions, the vessel was struck near the bow and that the bow compartments filled with water, goes to confirm this assumption.

The Archibald Incident

Dr. Dumba's Recall Requested

Texts of American Note to Austria-Hungary and of the Offending Letter

BY President Wilson's direction, as announced by the State Department on Sept. 9, 1915, the Austro-Hungarian Government was informed that Dr. Constantin Theodor Dumba, its Ambassador to the United States, "is no longer acceptable" to this Government, and his recall was requested. The request was based on the admission of Dr. Dumba that he "conspired" to instigate strikes in this country for the purpose of preventing the manufacture of munitions of war and that he was guilty of a "flagrant violation of diplomatic propriety" in employing James F. J. Archibald, an American citizen, to bear official dispatches to the Government of Austria-Hungary.

While the Administration was silent on the subject, preferring to let its note to the Austro-Hungarian Government with respect to Dr. Dumba speak for itself, a Washington dispatch to THE NEW YORK TIMES dated Sept. 9, said that

> the opinion is widespread in well-informed circles that the dismissal of Dr. Dumba is intended by President Wilson as an answer to the activities of those persons in this country who have attempted to embarrass the Government through their propaganda in behalf of the Teutonic allies. It is also regarded as notice to diplomatic representatives generally that the Government will not tolerate acts that in any way bear on the right of the American people to conduct their domestic affairs without foreign interference. But, beyond these things, the dismissal of Ambassador Dumba is construed as meaning that the President has determined that the time has passed for showing too tender consideration for Governments that are prone to manifest a disregard for the rights and privileges of the United States and its citizens at home as well as on the high seas.

A further dispatch to THE NEW YORK TIMES from Washington dated Sept. 10, said:

> The Dumba case marked the culmination of a series of pin pricks that the Government has borne with only occasional remonstrance.
>
> Among these pin pricks are recorded the following:
>
> The advertisement inserted in American newspapers by the German Embassy, warning Americans not to take passage in British vessels—"the amazing indiscretion," President Wilson called it in one of the Lusitania notes; the propaganda of Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, former German Colonial Minister, which ended by his practically enforced departure from these shores, because he justified the Lusitania horror; the forgery of United States passports to enable German reservists to join the colors at home, and to serve as spies in the countries of Germany's enemies; the effort to send military information by radio from Sayville; the furnishing of perjured affidavits to the State Department to back up the German contention that the Lusitania was armed; the interference with work in munitions plants, although initial responsibility for this is not known to have been fixed; the accusations against President Wilson's neutral conduct; the organization of so-called peace societies and associations of laboring men, with the object of creating sentiment against the President and interfering with industries whose products might benefit the Entente Allies; and the pro-German propaganda with its many ramifications, including what is regarded here as the most important and dangerous—the effort to influence United States Senators and Representatives to bring pressure to bear on the Executive and the Congress for the adoption of measures placing an embargo on war munitions exports.
>
> The cumulative pin pricks have had their effect scarcely less than the cleaver cuts, like the greatest of all of them, the sinking of the Lusitania, with the loss of more than one hundred Americans—men, women, and children. In official circles today there is a new feeling that the period of half-way measures in dealing with the

situation confronting the United States has passed, the period of overzealous consideration for the sensibilities of foreign Governments and those Americans who have said "We must be firm, but must have no trouble with anybody."

The alleged discourtesy of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador was regarded in Washington as having been aggravated by the fact that the American Government recently sent a diplomatic communication to Dr. Dumba's Government, in which the principle was laid down that there was no violation of neutrality in the exportation of arms and ammunition from this country to Great Britain and to other enemies of Austria and Germany. This communication put President Wilson and Secretary Lansing squarely on record as refusing to be influenced by the propaganda among pro-Germans in the United States to induce the Government to place an embargo on such exports. Austria-Hungary was told for the benefit of herself and Germany that if the rule were adopted that neutral nations should not ship war supplies to belligerents, every nation would be obliged to turn itself into an armed camp at all times in the realization that it must maintain large armies and keep on hand great stores of arms and ammunition for its own protection in the event of hostilities.

This note, which was signed by Secretary Lansing and represented the views of President Wilson, was intended to be the last word in the controversy over the munitions export business. It was held, in effect, by this Government that an American manufacturer of war munitions had as much right to engage in trade with belligerents as had the manufacturer of goods not necessary to the conduct of a war. The note was sent in response to a polite protest from the Vienna Government, which contended that, while the export of munitions was not expressly forbidden, the output of the United States had so increased since the outbreak of the European war that the status of the United States as a neutral nation was impaired. Austria-Hungary suggested that a provision of one of The Hague treaties appeared to make it necessary for the United States to place an embargo on munition shipments, but this point was answered by the assertion that it was for the neutral country and not for a belligerent to determine whether it was to the interest of the neutral to stop munitions exports.

The recall of Dr. Dumba does not constitute a break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government will continue to be represented in this country by Baron Erich Zwiedinek, the Counselor of the Embassy, who was to serve as Chargé d'Affaires after Dr. Dumba left.

ARCHIBALD'S CASE

The Central News reported in London on Sept. 1, 1915, that James F. J. Archibald, an American newspaper correspondent who was apprehended by the British authorities when the steamer Rotterdam, bound from New York for Rotterdam, put into Falmouth, was carrying dispatches to Berlin and Vienna from the German and Austrian Embassies at Washington; that Mr. Archibald was charged with performing an unneutral service. He was subsequently released, but the dispatches were retained by the officials.

Dr. Henry van Dyke, the American Minister to the Netherlands, on Sept. 11, explained at The Hague the departure of James F. J. Archibald for New York as follows:

> Being informed of a secret treasonable message from Ambassador Dumba to the Foreign Office in Vienna carried by James Archibald, I stopped Archibald, took up his passport, and sent him back to America aboard the Rotterdam, to report to the Department of State.

A letter in the handwriting of Dr. Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, to Foreign Minister Burian at Vienna, recommending a plan to cripple factories making munitions for the Allies in this country through Hungarian employes in those factories was among the documents seized in the possession of James F. J. Archibald, as first announced by the London correspondent of The New York World.

There was also found hidden in Archibald's stateroom, The World correspondent asserted, a typewritten memorandum of considerable length prepared by the editor of a Hungarian newspaper in this city, which explained how Hungarians employed in the Bethlehem Steel Works and other plants making munitions were to be used to cripple these plants.

One paper found in Archibald's possession was written by Captain von Papen, Military Attaché of the German

Embassy, to the German War Office. The last sentence of this letter was:

> I could probably dispose of the useless toluol from the Lehigh Coke Company, which is lying here for the account of the Norwegian Government.

There was nothing in the dispatch to throw further light on this. Efforts were made to learn from officials connected with the German Embassy how a German Military Attaché could have the authority to dispose of property of the Norwegian Government, but at the German Summer Embassy at Cedarhurst and the offices of the Attachés no information could be obtained.

The Lehigh Coke Company has its plant at South Bethlehem, Penn. It is supplied with coal by the Bethlehem Steel Company, and is under a contract to supply all of its product to the Bethlehem Steel Company. The Bethlehem Steel Company, controlled by Charles M. Schwab, is one of the largest plants in this country making munitions for the Allies.

THE STRIKE PLOTS

A special dispatch from Detroit, Mich., to THE NEW YORK TIMES, dated Sept. 10, said:

> Detroit and Cleveland have been centres for ninety days of a resourceful campaign aimed to cause 50,000 or more Austro-Hungarians, employed in motor factories, foundry and machine shops, and kindred industries having to do with the production of war munitions, to give up their places.
>
> Employers of these men have been alive for weeks to the peril that lay behind the efforts of Dr. Dumba and his agents and have matched resource with resource in their efforts to preserve industrial peace. They have been successful, in the main, partly through secret agencies, which have sought to frustrate the plans which, when officially revealed, brought about the demand for Dr. Dumba's recall.
>
> In addition to Dr. Dumba and Archibald these persons are conspicuous in the inquiry here:
>
> Dr. Ernest Ludwig, Consul for Austria-Hungary, stationed in Cleveland, whose jurisdiction incudes Middle Western territory.
>
> Hans Pelenyi, the Vice Consul.
>
> William Warm, associate editor of the Cleveland Daily Szabadsag, (Liberty,) who devised the scheme to tie up munitions plants in advance of action by Dr. Dumba, and is now New York correspondent of the Szabadsag.
>
> Z. Zalay, former editor of The Toledo Herald, who first brought Warm's scheme to Archibald's attention.
>
> G. Hosko, editor of the Cleveland Szabadsag, who exposed publicly the false "credit" which Dr. Dumba obtained for the strike scheme and revealed his coworker as the real author.
>
> A large number of persons are working against these men. Count Stanislaus von Waleski, an official of the Polish National Alliance, is one. He is the representative of a Detroit corporation's agency which ferreted out Austro-Hungarian strike propaganda.
>
> Henry J. Hinde, General Manager of the Toledo Machine and Tool Company, is another. Menaced by a walkout, he hired Secret Service agents to frustrate the Teutonic activities, but finally adjusted their differences.

DIPLOMATS RECALLED

Dr. Constantin Theodor Dumba had been Ambassador to the United States a little more than two years, having been named for the office in March, 1913. He succeeded Baron Hengelmuller, whose long period of service as Ambassador had been marked by great social popularity. As Dean of the Diplomatic Corps he had won distinction throughout the country.

Dr. Dumba had served as Minister to Sweden for several years before coming to Washington, and had made an excellent record for himself in that post. Having large wealth and coming of a prominent Austrian family, he was regarded as eminently fitted for diplomatic duties.

The recall of Dr. Dumba, which the United States has requested of Austria-Hungary, puts the Ambassador into a fairly long list of diplomats who have made themselves so unsatisfactory to the United States that passports have been handed to them or their Governments have been asked to withdraw them. While there is no fixed rule on the subject, the simple dismissal of an envoy by giving him his passports is regarded as the harsher course.

As far back as 1793 Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State under President Washington, asked for the recall of Citizen Genet, who was sent to this country by the French Committee of Safety after the execution of Louis XVI. The Minis-

ter's offense was that while the United States was at peace with Great Britain he wished to commission privateers to prey on British commerce, and made inflammatory speeches against Great Britain.

Twelve years later, in 1805, passports were handed to the Marquis of Casa Yrujo, then Spanish Minister at Washington, for tampering with the local press by attempting to bribe a Philadelphia editor to present the Spanish side of a controversy with the United States.

The first British Minister to be recalled was F. J. Jackson. Mr. Jackson had accused the American Government of bad faith in entering into an agreement with his predecessor which he said the United States knew the previous Minister had not been authorized to make. He also circularized British Consuls in an effort to arouse feeling against the United States.

M. Poussin was recalled as Minister from France because of his impertinence to the American Secretary of State.

In 1855 British Minister Crampton was recalled at the request of the United States, and the exequators of three British Consuls were canceled because of their activities in enlisting soldiers for the Crimean war, though the actual enlistments were to take place in Canada.

The most historic incident of the sort arose when Lord Sackville-West, in response to a decoy letter, advised Americans of British birth to vote for Grover Cleveland for President. The incident came to light after Mr. Cleveland's inauguration and he referred in an annual message to this "unpardonable conduct," saying: "The offense thus committed was more grave, involving disastrous possibilities to the good relations of the United States and Great Britain, constituting a gross breach of diplomatic privilege and an invasion of the purely domestic affairs and essential sovereignty of the Government to which the envoy was accredited."

President Cleveland directed that passports be handed to the discredited Minister. Lord Salisbury, in acknowledging notice of this action, said that the handing of passports to Lord Sackville-West left nothing to dispute, but he denied that the acceptance or retention of a Minister depended solely upon the Government to which he was accredited. This principle was assented to by Mr. Bayard, then Secretary of State, but he added that the circumstances involving an interference with the American suffrage left no other course open to the United States.

The most recent incident affecting an envoy of Ministerial rank was the dismissal of the Spanish Minister, Dupuy de Lome, who wrote disrespectfully of President McKinley to a friend in Cuba. In President Taft's Administration passports were handed to the Nicaraguan Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Rodrigues, as a protest against the judicial murder in Nicaragua of two Americans, Mr. Cannon and Mr. Groce.

There have been a number of incidents in which foreign Governments recalled their representatives in protest against some American action.

Full German Text and Translation of Dr. Dumba's Letter to Baron Burian

As cabled from London on Sept. 9, 1915, the following is an exact copy in German of Ambassador Dumba's letter to Baron Burian, the envelops of which was addressed: "Durch gute Gelegenheit Ser. Excellenz Freiherrn von Burian, &c., &c., &c., Wien":

New York, 20. Auguſt 1915.

Hochwohlgeborener Freiherr!

Geſtern Abend erhielt Generalkonſul von Nuber das anliegende Pro-Memoria von dem Hauptredakteur der hieſigen einflußreichen Zeitung „Szabadſag" nach einer vorher-

gehenden Besprechung mit mir und in Ausführung seiner mündlichen Vorschläge behufs Vorbereitung von Aufständen in Bethlehem Schwabs Stahl- und Munitionsfabriken sowie im Middle West.

Heute 12 Uhr fährt der Eurer Exzellenz wohlbekannte Mr. Archibald auf der „Rotterdam" nach Berlin und Wien. Ich möchte diese seltene sichere Gelegenheit benutzen, um die Vorschläge Eurer Exzellenz wohlwollenden Berücksichtigung wärmstens zu empfehlen. Ich habe den Eindruck, daß wir die Produktion von Kriegsbedarf in Bethlehem und in Middle West wenn auch nicht ganz verhindern, so doch stark desorganisieren und auf Monate aufhalten können, was nach Aussage des deutschen Militärattaches von großer Wichtigkeit ist und das relativ kleine Geldopfer reichlich aufwiegt.

Aber selbst wenn die Aufstände nicht gelingen, so ist dort Wahrscheinlichkeit vorhanden, daß wir für unsere gedrückten Landsleute unter dem Druck der Konjunktur günstige Arbeitsbedingungen erzwingen. In Bethlehem arbeiten jetzt diese weißen Sklaven zwölf Stunden täglich in sieben Tage in der Woche!! Alle schwachen Leute gehen zu Grunde, werden amstekrank (bruskrank?).

So weit deutsche Arbeiter unter den geschickten Elementen vorhanden sind, wird für ihren Austritt sofort gesorgt werden. Es ist außerdem ein deutsches privates [underlined] Stellenvermittlungsbureau geschaffen worden, welches solchen freiwillig und schon gut funktioniert. Wir werden auch beitreten und die weitgehendste Unterstützung ist uns zugedacht.

Ich bitte Eure Exzellenz um gütige Verständigung durch drahtlose Antwort mit Bezug auf diesen Brief, ob Hochdenselben einwilligen.

In größter Eile und ehrungsvoller Ergebenheit. C. Dumba.

[Translation.]

Following is a translation of Dr. Dumba's letter to Burian. The letter was entirely in Dr. Dumba's handwriting. The envelope was addressed, "Through good opportunity to his Excellency Freiherr von Burian, &c., &c., &c., Vienna."

New York, 20 August, 1915.

NOBLE LORD:

Yesterday evening Consul General von Nuber received the inclosed pro memoria [aide mémoire, as it has been called, or simply "memorandum"] from the chief editor of the local influential newspaper Szabadsag after a previous conversation with me and in pursuance of his oral proposals with respect to the preparation of disturbances in the Bethlehem Schwab's steel and munitions factories as well as in the Middle West.

Today at 12 o'clock Mr. Archibald, who is well known to your Excellency, leaves on the Rotterdam for Berlin and Vienna. I would like to use this rare, safe opportunity to recommend the proposals most warmly to your Excellency's favorable consideration.

I am under the impression that we could, if not entirely prevent the production of war material in Bethlehem and in the Middle West, at any rate strongly disorganize it and hold it up for months, which, according to the statement of the German Military Attaché, is of great importance, and which amply outweighs the relatively small sacrifice of money.

But even if the disturbance do not succeed, there is a probability at hand that we shall compel, under pressure of the crisis, favorable working conditions for our poor, oppressed fellow-countrymen. In Bethlehem these white slaves at present work twelve hours a day seven days in the week! All weak persons succumb, become consumptive. As far as German workingmen are found among the skilled elements, provision will be made forthwith for their exit. There has, besides this, been created a German private (underlined) registry office for providing employment, and which already works voluntarily and well for such persons. We, too, shall join, and the widest support is contemplated for us.

I beg your Excellency kindly to inform me through wireless reply with respect to this lettter, whether you approve of same.

In greatest haste and respectful devotion, C. DUMBA.

American Note to Austria-Hungary Requesting the Recall of Ambassador Dumba

Secretary of State Lansing on Sept. 9, 1915, announced that the Department of State had instructed Ambassador Penfield at Vienna to deliver to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs the following note:

MR. CONSTANTIN DUMBA, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Washington, has admitted that he proposed to his Government plans to instigate strikes in American manufacturing plants engaged in the production of munitions of war. The information reached this Government through a copy of a letter of the Ambassador to his Government. The bearer was an American citizen named Archibald, who was traveling under an American passport. The Ambassador has admitted that he employed Archibald to bear official dispatches from him to his Government.

By reason of the admitted purpose and intent of Mr. Dumba to conspire to cripple legitimate industries of the people of the United States and to interrupt their legitimate trade and by reason of the flagrant violation of diplomatic propriety in employing an American citizen protected by an American passport as a secret bearer of official dispatches through the lines of the enemy of Austria-Hungary, the President directs me to inform your Excellency that Mr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the Government of the United States as the Ambassador of his Imperial Majesty at Washington.

Believing that the Imperial and Royal Government will realize that the Government of the United States has no alternative but to request the recall of Mr. Dumba on account of his improper conduct, the Government of the United States expresses its deep regret that this course has become necessary and assures the Imperial and Royal Government that it sincerely desires to continue the cordial and friendly relations which exist between the United States and Austria-Hungary.

Ambassador Dumba's Statement in Defense

At Lenox, Mass., Dr. Constantin Theodor Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, admitted on Sept. 5, 1915, that he gave James F. J. Archibald, an American newspaper correspondent, a letter for delivery to Foreign Minister Burian in Vienna, in which he proposed certain measures to be taken to hamper the manufacture of munitions for the Allies in America. Dr. Dumba said:

THERE was nothing in the dispatches which Archibald carried that cannot be satisfactorily explained. The proposals regarding embarrassing steel works were nothing more than a very open and perfectly proper method to be taken to bring before men of our races employed in the big steel works the fact that they were engaged in enterprises unfriendly to their fatherland, and that the Imperial Government would hold the workers in munition plants where contracts are being filled for the Allies as being guilty of a serious crime against their country, something that would be punishable by penal servitude should they return to their own country.

There are thousands of workingmen in the big steel industries, natives of Bohemia, Moravia, Carniola, Galicia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, and other peoples of the races from Austria-Hungary, who are uneducated and who do not understand that they are engaged in a work against their own country. In order to bring this before them I have subsidized many newspapers published in the languages and dialects of the divi-

sions mentioned, attempting in this way to bring the felonious occupation to their attention. But this has been difficult. In some of the great steel plants of Pennsylvania these uneducated men of my country are nothing more or less than slaves. They are even being worked twelve hours a day, and herded in stockades. It is difficult to get at these workers except en masse, and a peaceful walkout of these workingmen would be of the greatest advantage to my Government, as well as an indemnity to themselves.

It is my duty as the representative of Austria-Hungary to make known these facts to the Imperial Government, and in so doing I am performing a service for which I was sent to this country. The dispatches or letters carried by Archibald contained nothing more than a proposal that we attempt to call out the workmen of our own country from these steel and munition works and provide for them other employment. To do so money would be necessary and a labor employment bureau would have to be organized. This is one of the things I shall bring before the Secretary of Labor in Washington this week. This seems to me to be a legitimate and entirely satisfactory means of preventing the making and shipping of war materials to our enemies.

My letter which Mr. Archibald carried does not contradict anything that Count von Bernstorff has said, for his people and the great bulk of those who make up our Austro-Hungarian races are entirely different types. The greater part of German workmen of all ranks are educated. They read and discuss matters and can be easily reached. Not so with the many races and the great ignorant mass of our peoples. Promises of better wages and easier employment must be made and their position in aiding the enemy must be brought home to them. Where there are a hundred German-born men working in the factories there are thousands of Austrians. Remedies for reaching these races must differ, and there is no conspiracy in an open attempt to call out the Austrian citizens at Bethlehem or elsewhere. Such a proposal as this was the letter of which it is said a photographic copy was made and its contents cabled to the State Department at Washington. It is to prevent the letter from being censored or garbled that I shall ask Secretary Lansing for an opportunity to explain.

BARON ZWIEDINEK'S STATEMENT.

The news of the request for the recall of Ambassador Dumba was received with incredulity at the Austro-Hungarian Summer Embassy at Lenox, Mass., on Sept. 9. Later, after the news had been in a measure confirmed, Baron Erich Zwiedinek, Counselor of the Embassy, who was to become Chargé d'Affaires after the recall of Ambassador Dumba, issued the following signed statement:

It is difficult, in the lack of fuller information, for officials of the embassy to discuss this matter, but I am very much surprised at hearing this news, which I am still reluctant to believe and which I very much hope will not be verified.

I know Dr. Dumba personally very well, and from my conversations with him I could not think that he should have intended fomenting strikes in munitions plants. We have certainly and naturally felt a satisfaction when reading in the papers of difficulties and strikes in factories making munitions for the Allies, but to foment such a thing ourselves would have been such an absolutely impossible undertaking that it would be for me quite inconceivable that Dr. Dumba should have suddenly had such an idea.

One has only to think of the enormous number of laborers employed in these factories, which runs into the hundreds of thousands, to realize how many millions of dollars would be necessary to produce any practical effect. Dr. Dumba, so far as I have understood, asked for only a few thousand dollars, so it seems to me evident that he had only a humanitarian idea in mind, as he also mentioned to me when returning from New York.

The Imperial and Royal Government had pointed out the legal penalties which would be incurred by Austro-Hungarian subjects who returned home from Amer-

CAPTAIN FRANZ VON PAPEN

Military Attache of the German Embassy in Washington, Whose Withdrawal Was Announced as a Consequence of the Dumba Exposure

(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)

RECENT PORTRAIT OF T. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

German Imperial Chancellor, Whose Speech at the Opening of the Reichstag on August 15 Roused Worldwide Comment

(Photo from Bain News Service)

ica after the war if they had worked in factories making munitions for the Allies. These penalties would not only have been those prescribed by the law for helping enemies of the monarchy, but much more so those of public opinion, as in the case of a man who had made munitions for the Allies who should go back to his home village perhaps to inherit the property of men who had been killed by those munitions. Naturally, these considerations, if brought to their attention, might have caused a certain number of Austro-Hungarian subjects to leave their employment in American munition factories, and I had been of the opinion that Dr. Dumba's plans were designed only to give aid to needy workingmen who had given up their work and had not yet found other employment. The small sum of money suggested in this connection, I believe only $15,000, would have been absolutely insufficient to finance a strike.

Besides, I am quite certain that if, on second thought, Dr. Dumba had come to the conclusion that his ideas were not in accord with the duties and obligations toward the United States Government imposed by his position here he would have withdrawn himself. Therefore, even if appearances at first should be against him, I am especially sorry that the whole matter of sending this letter has been done in such a rush. I am confident that the Imperial and Royal Government has not the slightest desire for any complications or difficulties with the United States, for it puts too much value on the cordial and friendly relations which have always existed between the two Governments and which have been emphasized of late.

The Hyphen

By BEATRICE BARRY.

Where do you stand? The sentiments you voice
  Would be called treason in your native land!
You would not dare there to rejoice
  At work done by assassin's hand;
You would not form "societies" or say
  Just when you would, and when you would not, fight,
And then the Government proceed to flay
  For policies you did not think were right.

Those things cannot be done where you were born—
  Where liberty of speech is quite unknown;
So all the vials of your wrath and scorn
  Are for another country than your own—
A country that extended friendly hands,
  Helped the ambitious, succored the forlorn.
Allegiance to all other Kings and lands
  You have renounced on oath. Are you forsworn?

Ingratitude so base must be confined
  To some loud-voiced and too impressive few.
Rise, then, and say that you have been maligned
  By those who undertake to speak for you!
Does honor leave you any other choice?
  Surely our doubts, by these your spokesmen fanned,
Will die still-born, when, with one mighty voice,
  You answer honestly—where do you stand?

Standing by the President

By Ex-President Theodore Roosevelt

Theodore Roosevelt, speaking on the evening of Aug. 25, 1915, on the drill plain of the United States Military Instruction Camp at Plattsburg, N. Y., denounced the hyphenated American, the professional pacifist, the poltroon, the "college sissy," and the man with "a mean soul." Later he gave out for publication a statement in which he said Americans should stand by the Presiden, but only so far as he was right, and spoke of "elocution as a substitute for action." Because of the ex-President's utterances criticising the Administration, Secretary of War Garrison telegraphed a rebuke to Major Gen. Leonard Wood for permitting them to be made at a Federal encampment. Just before leaving the camp on Aug. 25 Colonel Roosevelt dictated the subjoined statement.

I WISH to make one comment on the statement so frequently made that we must stand by the President. I heartily subscribe to this on condition and only on condition that it is followed by the statement so long as the President stands by the country.

It is defensible to state that we stand by the country, right or wrong; it is not defensible for any free man in a free republic to state that he will stand by any official right or wrong, or by any ex-official.

Even as regards the country, while I believe that once war is on, every citizen should stand by the land, yet in any crisis which may or may not lead up to war, the prime duty of the citizen is, by criticism and advice, even against what he may know to be the majority opinion of his fellow citizens, to insist that the nation take the right course of action.

There is even a stronger reason for demanding of every loyal citizen that, after the President has been given ample time to act rightly and has either not acted at all or has acted wrongly, he shall be made to feel that the citizens whom he has been elected to serve demand that he be loyal to the honor and to the interests of the land.

The President has the right to have said of him nothing but what is true; he should have sufficient time to make his policy clear; but as regards supporting him in all public policy, and above all in international policy, the right of any President is only to demand public support because he does well; because he serves the public well, and not merely because he is President.

Presidents differ, just like other folks. No man could effectively stand by President Lincoln unless he had stood against President Buchanan. If, after the firing on Sumter, President Lincoln had in a public speech announced that the believers in the Union were too proud to fight, and if instead of action there had been three months of admirable elocutionary correspondence with Jefferson Davis, by midsummer the friends of the Union would have followed Horace Greeley's advice, to let the erring sisters go in peace—for peace at that date was put above righteousness by some mistaken souls, just as it is at the present day.

The man who believes in peace at any price or in substituting all inclusive arbitration treaties for an army and navy should instantly move to China. If he stays here, then more manly people will have to defend him, and he is not worth defending. Let him get out of the country as quickly as possible. To treat elocution as a substitute for action, to rely upon high-sounding words unbacked by deeds, is proof of a mind that dwells only in the realm of shadow and of sham.

THIS NATION'S NEEDS

Colonel Roosevelt's speech follows in full:

I wish to congratulate all who have been at this Plattsburg camp and at the similar camps throughout the country upon the opportunity they have had to minister to their own self-respect by fitting themselves to serve the country if the need should arise. You have done your duty. In doing it you have added to your value as citizens. You have the

right to hold your heads higher because you are fulfilling the prime duty of freemen.

No man is fit to be free unless he is not merely willing but eager to fit himself to fight for his freedom, and no man can fight for his freedom unless he is trained to act in conjunction with his fellows. The worst of all feelings to arouse in others is the feeling of contempt. Those men have mean souls who desire that this nation shall not be fit to defend its own rights and that its sons shall not possess a high and resolute temper. But even men of stout heart need to remember that when the hour for action has struck no courage will avail unless there has been thorough training, thorough preparation in advance.

The greatest need for this country is a first-class navy. Next, we need a thoroughly trained regular or professional army of 200,000 men if we have universal military service; and of at least half a million men if we do not have such universal military service.

At present a single army corps from Germany or Japan (which, if subtracted from the efficient fighting forces of either would not even be felt) could at any time be ferried across the ocean and take New York or San Francisco and destroy them or hold them to ransom with absolute impunity, and the United States at present would be helpless to do more than blame some scapegoat for what was really the fault of our people as a whole in failing to prepare in advance against the day of disaster.

But the professional navy and the professional army are not enough. Free citizens should be able to do their own fighting. The professional pacifist is as much out of place in a democracy as is the poltroon himself; and he is no better citizen than the poltroon. Probably no body of citizens in the United States during the last five years have wrought so efficiently for national decadence and international degradation as the professional pacifists, the peace-at-any-price men, who have tried to teach our people that silly all-inclusive arbitration treaties and the utterance of fatuous platitudes at peace congresses are substitutes for adequate military preparedness.

These people are seeking to Chinafy this country. A high Japanese military officer recently remarked to a gentleman of my acquaintance that the future dominion over the seas and lands of the Pacific lay with Japan, because China was asleep and America was falling asleep, and in this world the future lay with the nations of patriotic and soldierly spirit. If the United States were to follow the lead of the professional pacifists and to permit itself to be Chinafied, this observer's opinion would be quite correct.

It is an abhorrent thing to make a wanton or an unjust war. It is an abhorrent thing to trespass on the rights of the weak. But it is an utterly contemptible thing to be unable and unwilling to fight for one's own rights in the first place, and then, if possessed of sufficient loftiness of soul, to fight for the rights of the weak who are wronged. The greatest service that has ever been rendered mankind has been rendered by the men who have not shrunk from righteous war in order to bring about righteous peace, by soldier-statesmen of the type of Washington, by statesmen of the type of Abraham Lincoln, whose work was done by soldiers. The men of the Revolution and the men of the civil war, and the women who raised these men to be soldiers are the men and women to whom we owe a deathless debt of gratitude.

This means that all our young men should be trained so that at need they can fight. Under the conditions of modern warfare it is the wildest nonsense to talk of men springing to arms in mass unless they have been taught how to act and how to use the arms to which they spring.

For thirteen months America has played an ignoble part among the nations. We have tamely submitted to seeing the weak, whom we had covenanted to protect, wronged. We have seen our own men, women, and children murdered on the high seas, without action on our part. We have treated elocution as a substitute for action. During this time our Govern-

ment has not taken the smallest step in the way of preparedness to defend our own rights. Yet these thirteen months have made evident the lamentable fact that force is more dominant now in the affairs of the world than ever before; that the most powerful of modern military nations is utterly brutal and ruthless in its disregard of international morality, and that righteousness divorced from force is utterly futile. Reliance upon high-sounding words unbacked by deeds is proof of a mind that dewlls only in the realm of shadow and sham.

This camp has lasted two months. It has done immense good to you who have been able to come here—although, by the way, you must not think that it has more than marked the beginning of training you to your duties. But you have been able to come because you are either yourself fairly well-to-do or else because you happen to serve employers who are both public-spirited and fairly well-to-do, and who give you holidays with pay.

The Government has not paid a dollar for this camp. Inasmuch as we as a nation have done nothing whatever for national defense during the last thirteen months, the time when during all our history it was most necessary to prepare for self-defense, it is well that private individuals should have tried, however insufficiently, to provide some kind of substitute for proper governmental action. The army officers and enlisted men have put all good Americans under a fresh debt by what they have done in connection with this camp, and we owe much to the private citizens who have advanced the money without which the camp could not have been held.

But you men have had to buy your own uniforms; you have had to spend money in fifty different ways; in other words, you have had to pay for the privilege of learning how to serve your country. This means that for every one man like yourselves who can afford to come here there are a hundred equally good American citizens, equally patriotic, who would like to come and are unable to. It is undemocratic that the young farmer, that the young hired man on a farm, that the hardworking clerk or mechanic or day laborer, all of whom wish to serve the country as much as you do and are as much entitled to the benefit of this camp as you are, should be unable to attend such a camp.

They cannot attend to it unless the nation does as Switzerland has done and gives the opportunity for every generous and right-thinking American to learn by, say, six months' actual service in one year or two years how to do his duty to the country if the need arises—and the Americans who are not right-thinking should be made to serve anyhow, for a democracy has full right to the service of its citizens.

Such service would be an immense benefit to the man industrially. It would not only help the nation, but it would help each individual who undergoes the training. Switzerland has universal military service, and it is the most democratic and least militaristic of countries, and a much more orderly and less homicidal country than our own.

Camps like this are schools of civic virtue as well as of military efficiency. They should be universal and obligatory for all our young men. Every man worth his salt will wish to come to them.

As for the professional pacifists and the poltroons and college sissies who organize peace-at-any-price societies, and the mere money-getters and mere money-spenders, they should be made to understand that they have got to render whatever service the country demands. They must be made to submit to training in doing their duty. Then if, in the event of war, they prove unfit to fight, at any rate they can be made to dig trenches and kitchen sinks, or do whatever else a debauch of indulgence in professional pacificism has left them fit to do. Both the professional pacifists and the professional hyphenated American need to be taught that it is not for them to decide the conditions under which they will fight. They will fight whoever the nation decides to fight, and whenever the nation deems a war necessary.

Camps like this are the best possible antidotes to hyphenated Americanism. The worst thing that could befall this country would be to have the American

nation become a tangle of jangling nationalities, a knot of German-Americans, Irish-Americans, English-Americans, and French-Americans. If divided in such fashion, we shall most certainly fall. We can stand as a nation only if we are genuinely united.

The events of the past year have shown us that in any crisis the hyphenated American is an active force against America, an active force for wrongdoing. The effort to hoist two flags on the same flagpole always means that one flag is hoisted underneath, and the hyphenated American invariably hoists the flag of the United States underneath. We must all be Americans and nothing else. You in this camp include men of every creed and every national origin—Jew and Gentile, Catholic and Protestant, men of English and Irish, German and French, Slavonic and Latin, and Scandinavian descent. But you are all Americans, and nothing else. You have only one nationality. You acknowledge but one country. You are loyal to only one flag.

There exists no finer body of American citizens in this country than those citizens of German birth or descent who are in good faith Americans and nothing else. We could create an entire national Administration, from the President down to the last Cabinet officer, every one of whose members would be of German blood and some of them of German birth, but all of them Americans and nothing else, all of them Americans of such a type that the men who feel as I do could heartily and without reserve support them in all our international relations. But the Americans of German blood who are of this type are not hyphenated Americans. They are not German-Americans. They are just plain Americans like the rest of us. The professional German-American has shown himself within the last twelve months to be an enemy to this country as well as to humanity. The recent exposures of the way in which these German-Americans have worked together with the emissaries of the German Government—often by direct corruption—against the integrity of American institutions and against America doing its international duty should arouse scornful indignation in every American worth calling such. The leaders among the professional German-Americans have preached and practiced what comes perilously near to treason against the United States.

Under The Hague Convention it was our bounden duty to take whatever action was necessary to prevent and, if not to prevent, then to undo, the hideous wrong that was done to Belgium. We have shirked this duty. We have shown a spirit so abject that Germany has deemed it safe to kill our women and children on the high seas. As for the export of munitions of war, it would be a base abandonment of morality to refuse to make these shipments. Such a refusal is proposed only to favor the nation that sank the Lusitania and the Arabic and committed the crime against Belgium, the greatest international crime committed since the close of the Napoleonic contests a century ago. It is not a lofty thing, on the contrary it an evil thing, to practice a timid and selfish neutrality between right and wrong. It is wrong for an individual. It is still more wrong for a nation. But it is worse in the name of neutrality to favor the nation that has done evil.

As regards the export of munitions of war, the morality of the act depends upon the use to which the munitions are to be put. It was wrong to subjugate Belgium. It is wrong to keep her in subjugation. It is an utterly contemptible thing not to help in every possible way to undo this wrong. The manufacturers of cannon, rifles, cartridges, automobiles, or saddlery who refuse to ship them for use by the armies that are striving to restore Belgium to its own people should be put on a roll of dishonor.

Exactly the same morality should obtain internationally that obtains nationally. It is right for a private firm to furnish arms to the policeman who puts down the thug, the burglar, the white slaver, and the blackhander. It is wrong to furnish the blackhander, the burglar, and the white slaver with weapons to be used against the policeman. The analogy holds true in international life.

Germany has herself been the greatest

manufacturer of munitions of war to be supplied to belligerents. She supplied munitions to England to subjugate the Boers and to the Turk to keep the Christians in subjection. Let us furnish munitions to the men who, showing courage which we have not shown, wish to rescue Belgium from subjection and spoliation and degradation. And let us encourage munition makers, so that we may be able to hold our own when the hour of peril comes to us in our turn, as assuredly it will come if we show ourselves too "neutral" to speak a word on behalf of the weak who are wronged and too slothful and lazy to prepare to defend ourselves against wrong. Most assuredly it will come to us if we succeed in persuading great military nations that we are too proud to fight, that we are not prepared to undertake defensive war for our own vital interest and national honor.

Therefore, friends, let us shape our conduct as a nation in accordance with the highest rules of international morality. Let us treat others justly and keep the engagements we have made, such as those in The Hague Conventions, to secure just treatment for others. But let us remember that we shall be wholly unable to render service to others and wholly unable to fulfill the prime law of national being, the law of self-preservation, unless we are thoroughly prepared to hold our own. Let us show that a free democracy can defend itself successfully against any organized and aggressive military despotism. To do so we must prepare as a nation; and the men of this camp and the men responsible for starting this camp have shown our Government and our people the path along which we should tread.

German Suffragism and War

A correspondent of The Associated Press in Berlin notes that a woman Socialist discusses in the Vorwaerts of Berlin the view held by many of her sex in Germany that the war will bring German women nearer the goal of political equality. She says:

We warn the people of our party not to cherish too many hopes, and to remember that every privilege which has any value and brings us forward must be won. The war has perhaps brought us nearer to enfranchisement, in that the opponents of woman suffrage have been deprived of many of their most serviceable arguments, and, above all, because the least interested woman must clearly see how urgently women citizens need political influence, which they can exercise only through the vote. The bare fact that a war of such tremendous effect, such widespread dimensions, and such painful losses in every belligerent country could have come to pass must create in women—who are most deeply affected—a resolve to co-operate in the prevention of future wars.

After the war a struggle to bring about a readjustment of political power will recommence. Women will take part in it more than hitherto, because the war has taught them how much the State stands in need of their responsible co-operation.

Above all things, we must now follow and study attentively political events and economic and social measures, for this knowledge of what is occurring in public life gives us the right and the power to express our views and present our demands. Many of our party comrades have been killed and our ranks thinned. We women must, therefore, see to it that new partisans, sincere and unbending advocates of democracy and socialism, come to us. It must be our task to strengthen and consolidate the party, for nothing but the strengthening of democracy in Germany and the permeation of our whole political life with democratic ideas will bring us a lasting peace and woman suffrage.

Résumé of the Military Operations in Europe from Aug. 15 to Sept. 15, 1915

By Lieutenant Walter E. Ives

Formerly of the Royal Prussian Thirteenth Dragoons.

DURING the period of the European War covering the time from Aug. 15 to Sept. 15 the Russian theatre of operations continue to be of the same predominant importance which has characterized it ever since the beginning of May. The third week of August finds the victorious Germanic allies continuing their advance along the entire front, which they had reached at the close of our previous monthly résumé on Aug. 15.

The Austro-German armies, which were then closing in on the second Russian line of defense, extending from Brest-Litovsk to Kovno, advanced on a line forming a semi-circle, which stretched from Wladow over Radin-Siedlee-Malkin-Wiznita to Ossowetz. From Ossowetz the front extended in a northerly direction toward the region east of Wilki on the lower Niemen. The Russians' resistance along this entire front, though only of the character of rear guard actions, was vigorous. Their object was to gain the time necessary to establish their main armies behind the new defensive line, an abandonment of which was at that time hardly contemplated.

The protection of the Brest-Litvosk-Bialystok-Grodno Railroad was of prime importance for the holding of the new Russian front. Consequently the Russian resistance was the fiercest in the sector where the German advance had worked closer toward the important Russian railway than at any other point—between the Narew and Bug Rivers.

About Aug. 18 the incessant Russian counterattacks seemed—at least temporarily—to have arrested the German advance in the region of Zjechanowez and Mosowezk (forty miles west of Bielsk) and south of the Bug, in the sector west and south of Bjela; the pace of the German advance was likewise slackened. At the same time the success of Field Marshal von Mackensen's right wing army, which in the third week of August forced the Bug crossing east of Cholm, and advanced on Kovel, was one primarily against the Russian troops in Galicia, whose communication with Kiev it threatened. For the operations against the Brest-Litovsk-Kovno line, however, (due to the lack of space for development in the Pripjet region) the achievement was only of secondary importance. Only in co-operation with an advance on Brest-Litovsk from the west, but never independently, could the movement on Kovel be a menace to Russia's greatest stronghold. North of the Narew the Ossowetz-Lipsk-Kalwaria-Wilki line had for months given sufficient proof of its formidableness barring the approach to the Niemen.

Thus, in the beginning of the third week of August the prospects of the Russians' holding the important Brest-Litovsk-Kovno line were not altogether bad.

The aspect of the situation, however, was entirely changed when on Aug. 17 Field Marshal von Hindenburg's sudden onslaught broke through the advanced fortifications of Kovno northeast and south of Wilki, and on the 18th stormed the powerful fortress.

The suddenness of this conquest came as a complete surprise to every one. That the Russian staff had not anticipated it is evidenced by the amount of prisoners and booty taken here in contrast to other points of strategic importance like Ivangorod or Warsaw, which were depleted of all materials of

war as soon as the futility of a defense was recognized.

The unforeseen fate of Kovno, then, must be considered responsible for upsetting the entire Russian plan of defense. A German advance east of the fortress threatened to roll up the second Russian line from the north even before it was occupied by the entirety of the forces designed to hold it, and demanded categorically the abandonment of the entire front.

In consequence of the now necessary further retirement of the main armies, the Russian rear guards had to be taken back more expeditiously, were they not to lose their conjunction with the former, and their resistance grew weaker. On Aug. 26 the German troops reached the Brest-Litovsk-Grodno line in the region of Bielsk, while other parts of Field Marshal von Hindenburg's army were approaching the Niemen on a front from Simno (west of Olita) to Novo Dor, (west of Grodno.)

Threatened on both flanks, the Russian salient remaining in the Ossowitz region must be rapidly withdrawn, and the fortress which had withstood for months all attempts at taking it by assault was abandoned on Aug. 22.

The retiring movement of the Russian armies between the lower Niemen and the lower Bug was followed by the retreat of the Czar's troops defending the approach to Brest-Litovsk from the west, south, and southeast. They were hard pressed by Mackensen's pursuing armies. By Aug. 23 the later had fought their way to the sector east and southeast of Bjela; on the 25th, Austrian advance guards entered Kovel, and their cavalry began to swing northward, forcing their way through the difficult Pripjet region. The following day the Russians abandoned Brest-Litovsk. Its occupation by the Teutons was followed on the 27th by that of Bialystok and the storming of Olita.

Grodno was now the only stronghold of the second defensive line remaining in Russia's hands. Its abandonment, though, after the fall of Kovno and Brest-Litovsk, was a foregone conclusion. When the Germans entered the fortress on Sept. 2, only a rear guard of about 5,000 men was captured, and the booty, as at Brest-Litovsk, was slight.

And so, Sept. 2 saw the entire formidable second Russian line of defense in German hands.

Of the numerous victories which had brought about this condition those of Kovel and Kovno are beyond doubt the outstanding features because of their immediate bearing on the German General Staff's next strategic aims.

To understand the logic of this deliberation is it necessary, first, to realize that with the capture of Kovel the Russian armies north and south of the Kovel-Kiev Railroad became two separate units, against which the German advance could strike separately. It is, therefore, wrong to regard the third Russian line of defense as one connected front running from Riga to Rovno. The line actually ends in the region of Luninez, (east of Pinsk,) and so the extreme left wing of the Russian northern army rests on the marshes along the northern bank of the Pripjet. The extreme right wing of the Russian southern army leans on the Kovel-Kief Railroad to the west of Sarny. The only road remaining to connect the two separated army groups between Sarny and Luninez is hemmed in closely by marshes on both sides and quite inadequate to maintain an effective communication—the capture of Kovel virtually has broken the Russian battle line in two.

Secondly, the capture of Kovno, aside from rendering the Russian second line of defense untenable, gave to the German left wing in the Baltic provinces a point of vantage greatly needed for the successful pursuance of its operations. Kovno is strategically and geographically the best suited point of vantage from which to strike the first blow at the Riga-Luninez line in the sector of Wilna, just as Kovel is an ideal base of operations from which to make the decisive thrust at Russia's armies in the south. Both are similarly fit to lend vigorous support to the German strategy, which in either instance consists of an attempt at bending back or breaking the right wing of either Russian battle line, and at rolling it up from the north. In case of success this

means the cutting off of the northern armies from Petrograd and Moscow anl of the Russian troops in the south from Kief and Karkow.

Recognizing the danger threatening his northern army from the German operations in Courland, Grand Duke Nicholas had already late in July begun to push northward all available reserves for the extension and strengthening of his extreme right wing between Riga, Ponewjesh, and Kovno, and up to the middle of August, while gradually giving way on the entire front south of the lower Niemen, he succeeded in holding his line in the Baltic provinces—at times even in assuming an effective counteroffensive. While his new reinforcements thus protected the right wing of his northern army, his southern battle line seemed adequately secured in its right flank by the fortress triangle of Dubno, Luzk, and Rovno.

Toward the middle and end of August the Teutons began to shift great reinforcements toward their left wing in the Baltic provinces, to overcome those which had been sent to the same field of action by the enemy, while they continued at the same time to force their way across the Niemen north and south of Olita, in co-operation with and support of the more vigorous operations of the left-wing armies. On Sept. 3 the latter threw the Slavs back to the Duna River south of Riga and captured the bridgehead at Lennewaden. On the following day the bridgehead at Friedrichstadt was taken and the west shore of the river between both towns cleared of the Russians. Meanwhile slow but steady progress was being made east of Kovno along the Kovno-Wilna Railroad, and by Sept. 3 the advance reached the region of Kernowa and the Novo-Troki Lakes, about eighteen miles northwest and southwest of Widna.

On this line the Russians again put up a most vigorous defensive of the city. South of the Novo-Troki Lakes on a line from there to the vicinity of Orany the Germans likewise were met with fierce resistance, which, by Sept. 14, had not been entirely overcome. South of Orany, however, the German advance remained unchecked. On Sept. 9 a crossing of the Kotra River was forced and the town of Skidel taken on the 11th, while Walkowysk, the most important railroad junction between the Russian second and third line of defense, was captured as early as Sept. 8. South of the Bialystok-Slonim Railroad Prince Leopold's Bavarian troops, supported by several Austrian army corps, advanced in close co-operation with Field Marshal von Hindenburg's armies, and by Sept. 13 had forced their way to the region east and northeast of Rossany and Kossowa, while the army group of Field Marshal von Mackensen by that time had forced a crossing of the Jassjolda River between Solez and Chomsk, and was advancing on Pinsk and Luninez from the northwest and west.

In spite of this steady Teutonic progress east of the Brest-Litovsk-Olita line, the success against the third Russian line of defense by a frontal attack on its lap from Luninez to Wilna was by no means assured so long as the German left wing north of the Orany sector was held in check and its extreme end could not follow up its gains at Lennawaden and Friedrichstadt by either forcing the Duna River or cutting the Petrograd Railroad southwest of Dunaburg. The enormously difficult topographical conditions of the country in which the German attacks were being directed greatly favored the defenders, and awakened in them perhaps not unfounded hopes that by the time the German battle front should reach the Wilna-Luninez position, the Teutons would be in a state of exhaustion and unable to break through it.

All such hopes, however, were shattered when on Sept. 12 and 13 Field Marshal von Hindenburg with his left wing armies suddenly launched one of his characteristic drives which succeeded in smashing the strong Russian lines northwest of Wilna, and in reaching the all-important Wilna-Dunaburg Railroad northeast of the city. At the same time a second similar drive further north rolled back the Russian lines in the vicinity of Jacobstadt.

The assumption, therefore, is that, un-

less the grip which the Germans have finally gained on the main Russian bread line to Petrograd northeast of Wilna can be speedily loosened by an effective Russian counterattack from the region of Wilna, the third Russian line of defense is doomed.

The situation of the Russian southern army at the end of the second week of September is not less precarious. On Aug. 29, under the pressure of the Teutonic advance from Kovel, a co-operating sudden offensive of the Austrian armies on the Bug, (east of Brody,) the Russian front northeast and southeast of Waladimir-Wolinsk, and along the Bug and Zlota Lipa in Galicia was forced to retire to new positions on the Styr and Sereth Rivers. Continuing their advance the Austrians on Sept. 1 carried the Styr line north and south of Luzk and captured the fortress on the following morning. On Sept. 8 Dubno fell before their advance from Brody, and by Sept. 14 the Austrian battle lines converged in the neighborhood of Rovno from the northwest and southwest. Further north the region of Kolki and Derashno had then been reached, and the attacks from there were reported to make progress in the direction of Sarny.

In view of the danger to the Russian line in Galicia in case of the not improbable capture of Rovno and Sarny, it is hard to see the object of the Russians' stubborn counteroffensive which began on Sept. 6 west and southwest of Tarnopol. To hold the southern wing of their opponents in Galicia while their right wing east and northeast of Brody was being turned, and, perhaps, even to permit it to advance slightly, is exactly what the Austro-German stategy is striving to do. Unless the Russians can support their east Galician offense by successful co-operative attacks west and northwest of Rovno, and unless they feel strong enough to start a general westward movement with all their southern armies, vigorous enough to affect the strategy of the German northern armies (north of the Pripjet marshes), the Russian offensive in East Galicia can accomplish little to extricate the Czar's forces from their desperate situation, which it might easily render worse.

On the western front the only event breaking the monotony of constant artillery duels which has attracted attention during the last four weeks was another vigorous attack by the German Crown Prince in the Argonne on Sept. 8 and 9.

Since his offensive was launched northeast of Vienne le Château, due west of the Four de Paris-Varennes line, which had been pushed forward by a similar surprise attack early in August, it is evident that the Crown Prince's object was to straighten the bend of his front north of Vienne le Château and bring it on the same level with his Four de Paris-Varennes line. In this he has succeeded, taking thereby 38 officers, 2,000 men, one heavy gun, 49 machine guns, and 64 mine throwers—considerable booty in view of the conditions now prevailing on the west front.

Nevertheless the success was merely tactical. It has not tightened the grip on Verdun to an extent which would give justification to call it a strategic advantage.

All along the rest of the entire western front the deadlock continued during the preceding month.

On the Italian front the same period has likewise brought no changes of any importance. After the failure of the second big Italian offensive which, in the first part of August, as mentioned in the review in CURRENT HISTORY for September, had been directed chiefly against the upper Isonzo in the region of Tolmino, a second regrouping of the Italian armies took place. Toward the end of August, while the attacks on the Isonzo front were losing their intensity, the principal offense was shifted to the Tyrolese field of action, and the attempt made to take Rovereto through a sudden rapid advance along the northeast shore of Lake Garda. At the same time Rovereto was threatened to be cut off from Trent by a vigorous offensive through Val Sugana. Rovereto would form an excellent base of attack against Trent, and its capture would be at least an achievement of some military value for which the

Italian people have been longing since their entrance into the war. In the first week of September rumors to the effect that the Austrians had abandoned Rovereto were plentiful, but were not confirmed.

In the Dardanelles the advantage of the last four weeks of fighting remains with the Turks. By Aug 20 it was established that the landing of the fresh expeditionary force in the Anafarta region by the British from which much had been hoped, had failed to make any impression on the Turkish positions, and that the Allies' enormous losses were out of all proportion with any possible achievement.

Subsequent attacks on the Turkish positions in the latter part of August were likewise unsuccessful, and in the first part of September vigorous Turkish counteroffensives near Sedd-el-Bahr, at Avi Burnu, and notably in the Anafarta sector gained territory from the Franco-British troops for whom, in view of the very limited area they are holding, loss of ground is a serious matter.

Engagements which have occurred since Aug. 15 in the Caucasian and Serbian theatres of war have had the character of skirmishes. In the former field of action fighting has centred with alternate success around Olti, near Tewa, and in the Van region. Along the Serbian front desultory artillery engagements have taken place near Orachatz and Drenutz on the Save River. Both the Caucasian and Serbian seats of war, however, will in all likelihood come into greater prominence in the near future.

The Motor Scout

By O. C. A. CHILD.

I'm off for a run in the rain tonight
  On the pitch black roads where the holes are hid—
Where I've got to ride like a fiend in flight,
  And the cursed old wheel is just bound to skid.

It's a chancey thing, but they're short of shell
  And the guns won't wait to be fed till day,
But what is one life in this wholesale hell?
  A ha'pence of change in the price we pay!

Say, that was a rut for my life, right there!
  A slip is a fall at this frightful speed,
But it's make or break and no time to spare,
  To look to my way, with the guns in need.

'Twas the Captain told me we hold this road!
  Well, I hope to Heaven the old man knew.
Was that a spiked helmet the match flare showed?
  Then it's speed, more speed, and I'll see it through!

A shot!—and another!—the hiss of lead!
  Those Germans are shooting with right good will!
And heavens above!—there's that hill ahead,
  And I've got to rush it and risk a spill!
    * * * * * * *
'Twas a gear that broke and my skull's broke, too!
  This is the last of my midnight runs.
Ah, how I wanted to put it through!

Germanic Empires on Basis of

How the Teutonic empires of Germany and Austria-Hungary would be bounded if an armistice should be declared on the basis of foreign territory occupied and held by their military forces on Sept. 15, 1915, is indicated in the map shown above. The heavy black line bounding the hypothetical empires comprehends the battle fronts

Present Conquered Territory

east, west, north, and south. Dotted lines indicate the present political boundaries of the European countries, which with respect to Germany and Austria-Hungary run outside the heavy black line only slightly in Alsace, east of France, along the Italo-Austrian frontier, and in Galicia east of Lemberg.

Russia's Fresh Resolution

Czar Succeeds the Grand Duke Nicholas. Imperial Commander in Chief Begins a New Phase of Struggle With the Teuton Powers

Announcement was made in Petrograd on Sept. 8, 1915, that Grand Duke Nicholas had been relieved of his position as Commander in Chief of Russia's land and sea forces, and appointed Viceroy of the Caucasus and Commander in Chief of the army on the southern front. This action was taken by the Emperor on assuming himself the supreme command. The Grand Duke displaced the famous Viceroy of the Caucasus, Count von Vorontzoff-Dashkoff. In relieving the Grand Duke, the Emperor addressed a communication to him which read as follows:

AT the beginning of the war I was unavoidably prevented from following the inclination of my soul to put myself at the head of the army. That was why I intrusted you with the Commandership in Chief of all the land and sea forces.

Under the eyes of all Russia your Imperial Highness has given proof during the war of a steadfast bravery which has caused a feeling of profound confidence and called forth the sincere wishes of all who followed your operations through the inevitable vicissitudes of war.

My duty to my country, which has been intrusted to me by God, impels me today, when the enemy has penetrated into the interior of the empire, to take supreme command of the active forces and to share with the army the fatigue of war and to safeguard with it Russian soil from attempts of the enemy. The ways of Providence are inscrutable, but my duty and my desire determine me in my resolution for the good of the State.

The invasion of the enemy on the western front, which necessitates the greatest possible concentration of civil and military authorities as well as the unification of command in the field, has turned our attention from the southern front. At this moment I recognize the necessity of your assistance and counsels on the southern front, and I appoint you Viceroy of the Caucasus and Commander in Chief of the valiant Caucasian army.

I express to your Imperial Highness my profound gratitude and that of the country for your labors during the war.

The change in supreme command of the army came as a surprise to the general public, although it had been rumored for several days in army circles.

The Novoe Vremya interpreted the new military régime in Russia as follows:

Our insolent foe has now received a worthy answer to his projects. The Russian Emperor has placed himself at the head of the military forces, and hopes of the Germans for peace are turned to dust and ashes.

For more than a year the chief command of our army has been vested in Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch, whose name will forever remain graven in the heart of every Russian soldier.

The text of an order of the day issued by Grand Duke Nicholas transferring command of the Russian armies to the Emperor was forwarded by the Petrograd correspondent of the Havas News Agency, as follows:

Valiant Army and Fleet: Today your August Supreme Chief, his Majesty the Emperor, places himself at your head. I bow before our heroism of more than a year, and express to you my cordial, warm, and sincere appreciation.

I believe steadfastly that because the Emperor himself, to whom you have

taken your oath, conducts you, you will display achievements hitherto unknown. I believe that God from this day will accord to His elect His all-powerful aid, and will bring to him victory.

(Signed) NICHOLAS,
General Aide de Camp.

In a message to President Poincaré, dated Sept. 6, 1915, *Emperor Nicholas announced that he had placed himself in command of all the Russian armies. It follows:*

In placing myself today* at the head of my valiant armies, I have in my heart, Monsieur President, the most sincere wishes for the greatness of France and the victory of her glorious army.

NICHOLAS.

President Poincaré sent the following response:

I know that your Majesty, in taking command of your heroic armies, intends to continue energetically until final victory the war which has been imposed upon the allied nations. I address to your Majesty in the name of France my most cordial wishes.

RAYMOND POINCARE.

Away down on the list stands the name of the Czar's second cousin, the Grand Duke Nicholas Michailvitch, and the designation:

" Aide de Camp to his Majesty the Emperor and Commander in Chief of the Field Army, during the war of 1914-."

The Grand Duke Nicholas has received no censure from military critics, either of the Allies or neutral nations, although those of the latter have deplored the Russian lack of preparation in trained men and munitions—subjects with which the Grand Duke as " Commander in Chief of the Field Army " had nothing to do. His business has been to win victories, or, when these were impossible, to extricate his forces with the minimum loss. His successful retreats have caused English, French, and American experts to designate him a genius in that department of strategy—his tactics had to depend upon the material furnished him.

From the beginning of the war, however, there has been dissatisfaction among the lower classes of Russia that the " Little Father " was not leading his armies in person. It is a tradition among the Russian people that he should do so, and this tradition does not take into account the Czar's status as a military man. His Majesty's father, Alexander III., although a pacifist always intimated his readiness to lead his armies should the occasion arise. His uncle, Alexander II., for a time personally conducted the Russian arms in the Balkans in 1876-7, and his grandfather, Nicholas I., received his military training at the hands of von Lambsdorff, and commanded personally the Russian troops on several Napoleonic battlefields. And it was Nicholas I.'s elder brother, Alexander I., who planned and personally conducted the famous retreat of 1812 which brought disaster to Napoleon.

Presiding on Sept. 4, 1915, *at the first meeting in Petrograd of a special conference having for its object the discussion of measures to be taken for national defense, the Emperor declared that Russia would continue the war until complete victory had been achieved. He said:*

The question before the conference is of the gravest importance. It concerns the more speedy equipment of the army with munitions, which is the one object for which our valiant troops wait in order to stop foreign invasion and bring success once more to our arms. Parliament has given me, resolutely and without the least hesitation, the only reply worthy of Russia—a reply which I expected from it, namely, war until victory is complete.

I doubt not that this is the voice of the

*Czar Nicholas's message announcing that his Majesty has placed himself at "the head of my valiant armies" is likely to have less effect on the active General Staffs of the various nations engaged than it will on the executive part of Russia's military establishment and the people at large. With the Czar's known lack of military training, persons who know Russian bureaucracy and the mind of the people say that it can be nothing more than a political and sentimental expediency, which, however, is likely to be productive of practical results.

Like the Executive head of any State, the Czar is not only nominally but actually the head of the forces of the empire. His title is " Head of the Army, his Majesty the Emperor." Then follow the Princes and nobles of the realm who go to make up the Czar's military household, many of whom have, in addition, commands in the field, but few of whose names have appeared in the records of the present campaign.

whole Russian nation. Nevertheless, the great resolution we have taken implies the greatest intensity of effort on our part. This thought has become universal, but it is necessary to put it into action without delay, and it is the precise way in which this is to be done that should occupy our conferences.

This conference has brought together in the common work of solidarity the Government, delegates of Parliament, and delegates from public institutions and our industries; in a word, the representatives of all business in Russia have intrusted you with complete confidence, with powers of an exceptional extent. I shall always follow with the most profound attention your labors, and will take a personal part in them if necessary.

We have a great task before us; we shall concentrate upon it all the human effort of the country. Let us leave aside for the moment every other preoccupation, however grave; and even if it should concern the State, so long as it does not essentially affect the present time, nothing must distract our thoughts, our will, and our strength from what is now our single goal, which is to drive the enemy from our borders.

With this end in view, we must make certain of the complete military equipment of our active army and other troops called to the colors. This task is now intrusted to you, gentlemen. I know that you will devote all your strength and all your love for the Fatherland to its accomplishment. Set to work with the help of God.

Russia's New Counteroffensive

Almost simultaneously with the announcement that the Emperor had personally displaced Grand Duke Nicholas as Commander of the Russian forces and transferred him to the Caucasus, the fighting along the eastern frontier, despite the beginning of the Autumn rains, was resumed with the intensity which characterized it throughout the Summer. The new fighting started with a Russian victory. The official report from Petrograd on Sept. 8, 1915, *said:*

IN Galicia, near Tarnopol, yesterday we achieved a great success against the Germans. The German Third Guard Division and the Forty-eighth Reserve Division, reinforced by an Austrian brigade, with great quantities of heavy and light artillery, according to statements made by prisoners, had been preparing for several days for a decisive attack. This was fixed for the night of Tuesday-Wednesday. Forestalling the enemy our troops took the offensive, and, after a stubborn fight on the Roljonka, the Germans were completely defeated on Tuesday evening.

At the end of the engagement the enemy developed an artillery fire of most extraordinary intensity. Only the impossibility of replying with the same weight of metal prevented us from further developing the success we had obtained. The Germans, besides suffering enormous losses in killed and wounded, left as prisoners in our hands more than 200 officers and 8,000 men. We captured thirty guns, fourteen of which were of heavy calibre; many machine guns, gun limbers, and other booty.

After a brief pursuit our troops occupied their former positions on the River Sereth. The Emperor, having received a report of the defeat inflicted upon the enemy, sent an order to express to his valorous troops his joy and thankfulness for their success and the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy.

The German official reports contradicted this account of a great Russian success near Tarnopol and Trembowia, but on Sept. 13 *the following dispatch to the Exchange Telegraph Company from Amsterdam said:*

Emperor William has dismissed General von Kluege, Commander of the Eighth Division, who was held responsible for the Austro-German check by the Russians on the Sereth River in East



Germanic war area in the East, showing the battle line on Sept. 15, 1915.

Galicia. General Kluege, according to the German newspapers, retired from the service at his own request and with a pension.

The Petrograd official statement of Sept. 13 *reiterated the earlier report, as follows:*

The Austrians and Germans have been dashing from one side to the other in an effort to strike a decisive blow. The German official statement of Sept. 9 contradicts the statement made in our communication of Sept. 8 that we made numerous prisoners and captured thirty guns and machine guns.

The Great General Staff considers it

its duty to explain that it always has endeavored within the limits of human power and the rules of military art to present each event in its reality, avoiding any trace of partiality. Mistakes always are possible in conditions of excitement, and occasionally of uncertainty, which accompany military action. Therefore, desiring to establish with certainty our great success near Tarnopol and Trembowia, which already is proved by the action of our troops, the Great General Staff postpones its definite reply regarding the trophies taken until it has received precise reports from the corps engaged.

The report of one of the armies engaged on the 8th says that of the guns captured from the enemy we already have succeeded in taking within our lines six ten-centimeter guns and six fifteen-centimeter guns. The clearness of this document alone makes it impossible to doubt our success.

Reports from the Commander in Chief on the corresponding front, dated Sept. 7, state that this stroke was planned beforehand by the army commander concerned as the result of information supplied by scouts. This, therefore, refutes the charge that we made a false report regarding the most important event which has occurred recently in the ranks of the Russian Army.

While the German drive toward Dvinsk goes forward unchecked, according to the Berlin official statement issued on Sept. 14, *and Field Marshal von Hindenburg's army had taken* 5,200 *prisoners in the encounters of the past twenty-four hours and forged ahead to within about thirty miles of the Dvinsk fortress, the Russians had not only continued their successes in Galicia, where they were pressing the Austrians back, but had assumed the offensive in South Russia. The communication issued by the War Office at Petrograd on Sept.* 14 *said:*

The German pressure in the regions of Lake Pikstern and Sanken and the village of Rakiszki, west of the line of Jacobstadt-Dvinsk, continues.

In the region of the railway station at Podbrodze repeated enemy attacks have been repulsed. West of Podbrodze German attacks in the region of Mischogola are characterized by great intensity.

On the front from the region of Orany to the region of the village of Kossovo the enemy continues his prudent advance in an easterly direction.

More serious engagements have occurred in the region of the villages of Mosty and Czernica, west of Slonim. South of the River Pina the enemy's cavalry fell back to the region at the confluence of the Rivers Touria and Pripjet. Near Zwizdje, in the region of Derajno, we have successfully crossed the Goryn River and made progress fighting, capturing an entire Austrian battalion. In the regions of Derajno and Klevan the enemy assumed the offensive, which we checked. By an energetic counterattack we then advanced to the region west of Klevan, where in fights near the village of Oaeszwa we took over 1,300 prisoners.

Yesterday the Russians in the region west of Wysznewec repulsed the enemy from Rydomel and the adjacent neighborhood. The enemy, hurriedly retreating here, sustained great losses and was driven out of Ostoka Village. Up to the present the number of prisoners counted is 20 officers and 2,000 men.

Our fire checked attempts of the enemy, who in order to arrest our offensive made a counterattack in the region of the Villages of Gontow and Dykowec, southwest of Wsyzenewec. We captured here also about 140 officers and 7,500 men, one heavy and six light guns, four caissons, twenty-six machine guns, and much booty.

In Galicia we are pursuing the retreating enemy in a westerly direction from the front of the Sereth River. Violent engagements have occurred in the regions of the Villages of Gliadka, Cedrow, and Juzephowka, west of Tarnopol, and also near the Village of Dzwiniacz, in the region of Zalesczikі.

In engagements in the region of Juzephowka and Dzwiniacz in the course of Sunday we captured over 2,700 soldiers and 35 officers and four machine guns.

From Aug. 30 to Sept. 12 the number of Austro-German prisoners taken by us has exceeded 40,000.

Russia's Fortresses Fallen

German Official Accounts of the Victorious Drive Beyond Warsaw

THE CAPTURE OF KOVNO

The following from the German Great Headquarters appeared in the Frankfurter Zeitung of Aug. 23, 1915:

SINCE the 17th of August the main defensive work of the Niemen line, Kovno, a fortress of the first rank, is in our hands. As early as July the extensive forests lying to the west of the fortress were cleared of the enemy, and opportunities thus created for the construction of effective roads of approach and for the necessary work of acquiring information.

On the 6th of August began the attack on the fortress. After bold advances by the infantry had gained observation stations for the artillery and the installation of the guns, a very difficult matter in the pathless forest country, had succeeded, we were able, on the 8th of August, to open fire with the artillery. While this was taking the advanced positions and also the permanent works of the fortress under an overwhelming fire, infantry and pioneers worked their way forward irresistibly in hotly contested battles lasting night and day. No less than eight advanced works had been taken by storm by the 15th of August. Each of these was a fortress in itself, constructed in months of work with the employment of every means at the disposal of the art of engineering and with an immense expenditure in money and human labor. Exceedingly strong counterattacks of the Russians against the front and the south flank of the attacking troops were repeatedly repelled, with heavy losses to the enemy.

On the 16th of August the attack was carried forward close to the line of permanent fortifications. By artillery fire raised to the highest degree of intensity, and brilliantly directed with the help of observations from balloons and aeroplanes, the defenders of the forts, of the connecting lines and intermediate batteries, were so shaken and the works themselves damaged to such an extent that the assault could be initiated. Pressing forward irresistibly the infantry first broke through Fort 2 and then swinging toward its throat [connection to the rear] and rolling up the front stormed in both directions the entire line of forts between the Jezia and the Niemen.

Our artillery, which had been quickly brought up, now undertook at once the reduction of the main defenses of the west front and after their fall, on the 17th of August, attacked the enemy's forces retreating on the east bank of the Niemen. Under the protection of the artillery brought close to the Niemen the river was crossed under the hostile fire, at first by several small detachments and then by stronger forces. Soon, thereafter, we succeeded in getting across two bridges to replace those destroyed by the enemy. In the course of the 17th of August fell the forts of the north front, which had already been attacked from the north, also the eastern, and finally the entire southern front.

In addition to more than 20,000 prisoners, we captured an incalculable amount of booty, more than 600 guns, including a large number of the heaviest calibre and most modern construction; great masses of ammunition, numberless machine guns, searchlights, war material of all sorts, automobiles, automobile tires, and provisions running into the millions in value. Because of the great extent of this modern fortress, the complete accounting of the booty naturally is the work of many days; it is growing from hour to hour. Hundreds of Russian recruits were picked up in the city after it was vacated by the enemy. According to their reports, some 15,000 weaponless

reserve troops had escaped from the city at the last moment in hasty flight.

In addititon to the desperate counter-attacks of the Russians, which again set in from the south after the fall of the fortress, and were, as before, without result, the conditions are evidence of the fact that the Russian command had considered the quick fall of this strongest of the Russian fortsesses outside the realm of the possible. What high value the Russians put on the possession of this fortress is proved, in addition to the fact of its very strong construction and its extraordinarily heavy equipment with artillery, by this, that the resistance of that part of the garrison which was not shut in was continued to the very last moment and that a number of prisoners, relatively very great under these circumstances, fell into our hands.

CROSSING THE VISTULA

From the German Great-Headquarters the Frankfurter Zeitung published the following on Aug. 24:

In their retreat in the second half of July from Western Poland the Russians found a strong shelter in the Fortresses Ivangorod and Warsaw, and in the Vistula line connecting them. A halt was for the time being given to the German troops pressing on behind them. It was necessary that this halt should not last long, in order to take from the enemy the possibility of transferring the masses of his troops, which had retired behind the Vistula to another point against one of our army groups on the wings.

An attack on Ivangorod could not bring a swift success in this sense, for the special distinction of this fortress was just this, that its defender could get along with small forces. The command of the army, therefore, decided upon forcing the Vistula crossing to the north of Ivangorod, in the neighborhood of the mouth of the Radomka. For the execution of this project the German troops of the army group of General von Woyrsch were selected. These had been standing opposite Ivangorod. They, therefore, had to be moved considerably toward the north. Such a transfer to one side of large bodies of troops makes high demands on all divisions of the command. The march to the left in this case was particularly difficult, because it had to be accomplished quickly, and the crossing of the stream had to follow at once, since otherwise surprise of the enemy could not be counted upon. Surprise was the essential thing. In it lay the hope of success.

All precautions that could be thought of for keeping the move secret were taken. All the inhabitants of the country in the neighborhood of the crossings had to leave their villages, of which, as a matter of fact, the Russians had not left very much behind. The greater part had been sacrificed to systematic burning. Careful search was made for hidden telephone connections of the enemy, without any results however, so that the leaders were never without anxiety that the Russians would in spite of all get knowledge of the enterprise.

The Army Command Woyrsch had provided General of Cavalry Baron von König, leader of the Landwehr Corps, with instructions, had turned over to him the execution of the operation of crossing and provided him with the necessary means, especially numerous bridge-building outfits, including some from our allies. These did excellent work under the leadership of Colonel of Pioneers Mischek, of the Austro-Hungarian Army.

On the evening of July 28th preparations were complete, namely, acquisition of knowledge of the approaches for pontoons for the ten places selected for crossing, (chosen in several groups at considerable distances one from the other, so that if the crossing did not succeed at one place it would be carried out at another,) and placing in readiness of the infantry and artillery, so that these could quickly reach their crossing points without interfering with one another's lines of approach. Conferences had been held at the headquarters of the leader, of the higher pioneer and artillery officers, and everything was arranged down to the smallest detail.

On the 29th of July at 1:30 A. M. the troops were to reach the shore of the Vistula at all points in order at once to be able to begin the crossing. The Vistula in this region has an average breadth of 1,000 metres. Numerous sand banks lie in it, so that there was danger of the pontoons running aground. What were the positions of the enemy behind the river, in what strength he stood and how his forces were divided, was quite unknown to us. It was necessary to strike into the dark. It will be easy, therefore, to appreciate the tension of the situation. In the case of a battle under ordinary circumstances the strain is developed gradually in correspondence to the slowly nearing decision. In crossing a river the action begins with the very highest tension. A bare half hour must bring the decision. It is a "to be or not to be." Either the opposite shore is attained and held or the troops in crossing receive such a fire that they cannot get over, or—and this is worse—the enemy, being in too great strength throws such of the troops as have crossed first, and naturally are only in small force, back into the river, which is equivalent to annihilation. This easily conprehensible tension was still further increased by the darkness of the night and the absence of any of the noise of battle, the absolute silence, which preceded the move.

At 1:30 A. M. the troops everywhere break out from their last lines of cover on the shore. With the exertion of all available strength the heavy pontoons are quickly brought forward. Now the water is reached. Now they push off. Still everything is quiet, a good sign—1:45. Suddenly heavy artillery fire sets in. At one point then the enemy's attention has been attracted. At his first shots our artillery, standing in readiness, has taken up the fire against the hostile shore, thereby giving effective fire protection to the infantry which is still engaged in crossing.

Finally the tension relaxes. The first report comes in. Now the pontoons return; the first organizations are across. Everybody breathes more lightly. Now we are across. And where the Army Group Woyrsch has once taken footing it holds on! Now we are across. This thought returns again and again, grows stronger with every new report that another battalion has crossed. It has grown light. Our artillery now speaks decisively in the fight which is to break the last resistance of the surprised enemy.

The first 200 prisoners are reported. All goes well. But an unexpectedly heavy fight still lies before us. We did indeed surprise the enemy's protecting troops close to the shore. But it still remains to defeat the reserves further to the rear. How dangerous the enemy considers our breaking through his river barrier which he had considered impregnable was soon recognized. From Ivangorod, Warsaw, and Lublin he gathered more and more troops in order to throw us back. Superior in numbers though the enemy was, he nevertheless had to be attacked, for the bridgehead had to be extended so that the points where we began the building of bridges would be safe against the hostile fire.

After battles lasting for days the possession of the bridgehead is fully assured, the enemy thrown back from position to position, his power of attack broken!

In the meantime the Austro-Hungarian troops of this army standing under the command of General of Infantry von Koevess had won a great success before Ivangorod. They had broken through this strongly constructed and obstinately defended fortress position and taken from the enemy fleeing to the eastern shore 2,300 prisoners and thirty-two guns.

But the greatest satisfaction fell to the troops of this army when it became known that the day following the Vistula crossing the Russians had begun the gradual evacuation of Ivangorod and were about to give up the Blonie line protecting Warsaw and the Lublin position. Thus the conquest of the Vistula exercised a great influence on distant sections of the front.

German Praise of Russian Fighting

The subjoined article appeared in the Frankfurter Zeitung of Aug. 15, 1915, as written by that newspaper's correspondent on the eastern front, Dr. Fritz Wertheimer, and was headed "Fighting in the Swamp Lands (on the Swïnka) between the Wieprz and the Bug."

THE Russians give ground while resisting strongly. The pressure from the north, west, and south exerted on the masses of their troops still standing before the Bug, and which is gradually forcing them into a narrower space, has certain advantages for them, such as better opportunities for the bringing up of reserves and heavier employment of artillery. Thus, the Siberian Army Corps, which suffered fearful losses before the Wieprz through the destructive fire of our artillery, would now be relieved by fresh troops, and we observed artillery with the Russians in such masses and with such a wealth of ammunition as we had not experienced since the beginning of the Russian campaign. For the space occupied by a single one of our divisions nine heavy and two light batteries were employed, which never seemed to be lacking in ammunition, and since the Russians are continually being thrown further back, and thus get nearer to their sources of supply, this relative advantage is all the time becoming more effective.

Moreover, they know this difficult country and the few existing roads extremely well. They understand splendidly how to arrange small ambushes, letting a company work itself forward in the swamp grass of the forest in order to take it in the flank, or to attempt to surround it. Their machine guns are very skillfully placed and intentionally keep silence in order to work the more surprisingly and effectively in the twilight or at night, when the German attack takes place. Their trenches are constructed in many rows, one behind the other, at every point where there is a spot of dry ground. They have no single unified and closed front line, but have divided their forces upon several independent points of support. This makes it necessary for us in attacking to advance with a considerable division of our forces and in many directions. Naturally this considerably increases the difficulty of attaining the aim of our leaders to keep their troops as much as possible acting as a unified whole.

At every moment the formation of the battle changes, here suddenly appears a dangerous gap which must be filled up, over there care must be had that the artillery does not put its own troops under fire. And when after heavy exertions the troop believes, in the evening, that it has got to the point where it can dig itself in, hostile attacks against the adjoining regiment, or the next division may make new shifts necessary, with difficult night marches through the swamps, or even new attacks to forestall those of the enemy. All this takes place under the hail of hostile shrapnel. Then suddenly the Russian frees himself from the enemy. In the meantime he has taken back his artillery as far as he can, and has occupied new advantageous positions, has drawn his ditches across roads and paths, has felled trees, so that in falling they lie crosswise and block the way, and has covered his retreat with a lively fire by his rear guards.

After some three or four kilometers, he again makes a halt. A hill, the course of a river, appear favorable to his defense, have perhaps been selected already beforehand and prepared. These are now occupied and consolidated. Carefully our patrols push forward and feel for the enemy. Again it takes a day or two till we have worked our way up and can seize the Russian.

Continually small attacks occur in which the enemy, because of his exact knowledge of the ground, which he has but just occupied, has a considerable advantage. His sharpshooters sit in high trees, before his trenches is the water of the swamps. Small streams, insignificant in themselves, such as the Mogilnica and the Swinka, thus become strong obstacles and cost blood and time.

The following by Dr. Wertheimer appeared in the Frankfurter Zeitung of Aug. 20, 1915, *discussing operations between Wieprz and Bug on Aug.* 9:

The fighting in these days is all alike in respect to the obstinate resistance of the Russians. * * * The Russian artillery has guns enough, of heavy calibre too, and uses them liberally against our infantry, but always at such a safe distance that our heavy artillery never can reach them. The Russian always takes his artillery back in time so that he may not lose any of his valuable material. His infantry does excellent work in the preparation of defensive works which may already be in existence, and in the quick development of new ones. While there may be gaps between them, yet small knolls and hills or strips of forest are strongly arranged as flanking positions, so that even here progress is difficult.

The Russians hold out well in their positions in spite of our artillery fire; and even when they have vacated a trench during our artillery preparations, they have come back when the infantry attack began and defended themselves desperately. Thus it is always two or three days before our tireless troops succeed in taking the advance positions and work their way in for the last assault. The Russian then frequently does not await the storm, removes his material during the night and withdraws several kilometers to the rear where he takes up positions prepared in the meantime. In this kind of retreat, our opponent has gradually acquired very considerable skill. In accomplishing it, he always suffers very sanguinary losses through our well directed artillery fire; but what are men to him? Although he loses ground it is but slowly, so that it never becomes a catastrophe for him. The booty which he is compelled to leave to the enemy is on the whole, small. Of course, his own equipment is no longer so abundant as of old. Even in positions taken by storm, there is not so much infantry ammunition lying about as formerly.

Russian Praise of German Methods

The following appeared in the Frankfurter Zeitung of Aug. 17, 1915, *giving a Russian view of German methods on the advance through Courland:*

It is one of the most entertaining phenomena of these dark war times that in hostile countries they charge us with a lack of originality and then straightway know of nothing better to do than to copy from us from A to Z. Thus there appeared a few days ago a long article in the great Russian liberal paper, Russkae Slovo, concerning "German Methods of Modern War," which once again would urge the Russians to imitation, and which is of great interest to us because it pictures most clearly all that detail work during our advance in Courland, which is easily underestimated but to which we are doubtless greatly indebted for our successes. We quote here some of the important passages:

"In more than one respect," says the Russian paper, "the battles of the German offensive against Schavli afford a complete treatise on the art of making war. They teach us the latest war novelties of Germany. According to their custom, the Germans rush precipitately forward, and hardly have they occupied a new position when they fortify it in such a fashion that the forces necessary for the defense of what they have won can be reduced to the minimum. The trenches of the Germans are kept in remarkably good order and relatively almost empty; every thirty or forty yards you find a machine gun. But behind the trenches circulate the movable stores of ammunition, so that ammunition may be dealt out quickly there where it is needed. This is always quickly at hand, and storing it up, with all attendant confusion is avoided. Never by any means any superfluous thing in the

trench, but rather space, light air, cleanliness!"

"Not a man would dare eat his 'iron ration,' without being well justified in doing so. In January we took German prisoners in East Prussia, who for days had not eaten, but the iron ration was still untouched. In this one can see the discipline of these Germans. At Libau the Germans used gigantic automobile trucks in which liquid cement was brought up with which the trenches were strengthened and made proof against shells. These power trucks too had another use. They were equipped with great water tight containers which enabled the German soldier to have his weekly, or even daily bath. The trying conditions of modern warfare favor the development of all sorts of infective diseases. In order to combat these, the Germans aim at the most particular sort of cleanliness. Behind the trenches one finds notices posted up everywhere in which the soldiers are threatened with heavy penalties, should they after a day of rest, come again to the front wearing a dirty shirt.

"Even in the trenches basins of concrete are built which are filled with water for the soldiers' daily to bathe, wash and be massaged. This has become so much of a habit with them that when we take German prisoners, their first request is always for a bath. These Germans keep their trenches as clean as they do their bodies. And then, too, we find in every German trench a broad board, which serves as a table. With us nobody ever had the idea. Our soldiers eat their food on their knees, throw the breadcrumbs and bones on the ground and even what remains uneaten of their food when their hunger is satisfied. Thus our trenches are rapidly converted into great refuse pits. With these Germans it is quite different.

"Again, they strive to have as few soldiers as possible in a trench; they don't want their soldiers to be exposed to fire needlessly. But they have telephone stands everywhere. At the slightest alarm the telephone goes into action, the German trenches being simply covered with a network of telephone wires. All commands are transferred by telephone, which means a great saving in officers, as none are required for the transmission of orders.

"So as not to lose any cannon, these Germans, again, make use of powerful motor trucks. Our officers were at first astonished; they would capture a German trench or German position, and would find there only a few German soldiers and no cannon, no machine guns, and no ammunition at all. What had become of it? It was only later that we learned that the Germans have heavily armored motor cars, which during the battle are stuffed full of ammunition; but at the slightest danger for the cannon—especially the heavy ones—these are hitched with chains to the automobiles and drawn away, so that we are left to look on. The fewer the number of German soldiers on the firing line the greater the number of cannon and machine guns. 'Thick rows of machine guns, light rows of soldiers,' that is their motto.

"They forbid the German soldiers to write letters before they have been completely rested. When their nerves are quite relieved from the strain, letter paper is distributed, with the warning, 'Pull yourselves together, don't cause your parents and brothers and sisters anxiety with your letters.' In short, with these Germans everything is provided for and everything foreseen, from the bread crust which must not be thrown away to the sheet of letter paper, which is handed out only at the right time. In fact, this is a war which the German has entered with all his soul, and at the same time with all his brains."

Thus the Russkoe Slovo. These dissertations can be condensed into the statement that our warfare represents the victory of quality over quantity.

Battles of the German Crown Prince

Great Headquarters Eyewitness Reports of the Campaign in the Argonne

In the western theatre of war the spectacular drives of the forces led by Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm in the Argonne region, with Verdun as their objective, have been the chief feature of operations while the campaign in the east was at its height. As noted in the résumé of military operations for the month ended Sept. 15, appearing elsewhere in this number, the Crown Prince's efforts have thus far not achieved the great result attempted. On Sept. 9 the second important effort within three months to break the French lines in this region resulted in a temporary gain with the capture of 2,000 prisoners and some artillery. German Great Headquarters "Eyewitness" reports indicating that this campaign is regarded as of high importance have been appearing in the German press; the subjoined accounts are translated from the Frankfurter Zeitung and the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.

THE ASSAULT ON LA FILLE MORTE

The Wolff Telegraphic Bureau received the following from the German Great Headquarters, published Aug. 4, 1915, in the Frankfurter Zeitung:

THAT part of the Argonne lying to the north and east of the Biesme is a long ridge running from northwest to southeast, falling in precipitous, much-cleft ravines to the valleys of the Aire and the Biesme. The course of the Roman Road approximately designates the line of the Biesme. The course of the Roman road approximately designates the line of the crest. The road reaches the highest point of the ridge on Height 285. Offshoots of the range, one running toward the northeast, Height 263, the other to the west, La Fille Morte, roughly parallel to the road from Varennes to le Four de Paris, divide this part of the Argonnes like a natural wall into a northern and a southern half. Height 285, which is but sparsely wooded and is free from shrubbery, affords a point of observation from which a wide outlook can be obtained over the Argonnes and beyond, toward the east to the heights north of Varennes, toward the west on the hilly land of the eastern Champagne.

Because of its dominating situation, the possession of the range of Heights 263, 285, La Fille Morte, is of high military importance for the troops fighting in the Argonne. When in the last days of September the Germans pushed from the east into the Argonne's isolated patrols and small infantry detachments succeeded temporarily in occupying Height 285. On the evening of the 29th of September they had to retire in a northerly direction before greatly superior French forces. Since that time the French had been in possession of this range. Their positions had been pushed beyond it to the north about one kilometer. In embittered, hotly contested struggles the German troops early in January and in the middle of February threw the enemy back along the whole front, from the Bolante to Height 263, for several hundred meters.

While over in the West Argonnes the French in our victorious battles from the 20th of June to the 2d of July were thrown out of their fortified positions Labordère, Central, Cimetière, Bagatelle, and forced back down upon the slopes descending into the valley of the Biesme, the German troops in the East Argonnes were preparing themselves for the attack on the dominating elevated positions 285 and La Fille Morte. Once this object was attained, the Germans would stand on the whole Argonnes front, from the region north of Vienne le Château to Bourenilles, in positions of superior advantage, like an iron wall against which every attempted attack of the French would necessarily shatter itself.

The French positions to the northeast, north, and northwest of Height 285, on the Riegel, the Bolante, and the promontory projecting into the Vallée des Cour-

tes Chausses, throughout lay forty to fifty and in some places only twenty paces from the German positions. In view of the fact that along this whole front the land slopes in general from south to north—from Height 285 toward the northeast into the Osson valley, from La Fille Morte into the Meurisson hollow, further to the west into a side valley of the Courtes Chausses—the French had the advantage of better opportunity for observation and consequently a better field for shooting at our positions and connections toward the rear.

In the valleys of the Osson, the Cheppe, the Meurisson, the Vallée des Courtes Chausses and on the mountain slopes falling into these ravines, the low forest is filled with a thick undergrowth of bushes and briars. On the heights the forest grows lighter, and the ground is covered with ferns and high grass; here, moreover, as in the Bois de la Grurie, (West Argonnes,) everything that grew had been swept away by the infantry and artillery fire during the long months of fighting.

The French positions on these heights consisted of several rows of trenches, one behind the other, cut to the depths of two or three meters into the ground. These were connected by a many-meshed net of connecting trenches with one another and with the reserve positions lying on Height 285 and La Fille Morte. The trenches of the fighting positions were braced with strong beams, strengthened with walls of wire netting and cement, and provided in many places with covering one to two meters thick and broken up at intervals of every five to six paces by strong buttresses for protection against enfilading fire. Dozens of blockhouses, with several stands for machine guns, side by side and over one another, served as supports for the forward and rear positions and the intervening ground. As shelters for the men manning the forward trenches and for the reserves roomy caves had been excavated. In front of the foremost firing positions, between the lines of trenches further back and especially in the ravines and branching gulleys covered with almost impenetrably thick underwoods, broad wire obstructions had been provided, consisting of stretched barbed wire, Spanish riders, and barbed wire covered rolls.

Of all this skillfully constructed labyrinth of defenses nothing was to be seen from the German positions except a light yellow strip of excavated clay, here and there the beam of a blockhouse or a piece of bright barbed wire. Far toward the rear there stood scattered through the whole forest the French heavy and light batteries, and somewhat nearer the mine-throwers, bronze mortars, and revolver cannon.

The 13th of July was selected as the time for the attack on these positions. Shortly after daybreak the artillery and mine fire was to begin, for 8 A. M. was set the attack on the projecting part of the French defenses before our left wing, and for 11:30 A. M. the assault along the front as a whole.

From reports of prisoners obtained later and from French orders which we found, it appeared that the enemy had for some time for his part planned a great attack in the Eastern Argonnes, which, originally ordered for the 11th of July, had afterward been postponed to the 14th, the date of the French national holiday. On this day all the troops of the French Fifth and Thirty-second Army Corps—making with added units more than eight divisions—were to attack along the whole Argonnes front and connecting sectors outside. In the Bois de la Grurie, and to the west of the Argonnes, this attack was actually carried out on the 14th and failed with heavy losses. In the meantime things came to pass in the East Argonnes quite differently than had been expected by the French.

Because of the fact that the French themselves were planning an effort and that—warned by the increased activity of the German artillery and by other signs of an impending attack—they were not at all surprised by our assault, our troops found the enemy exceedingly well prepared. The French fighting positions were strongly manned, the artillery was supplied with an extraordinarily large amount of ammunition, and all the means

Scene of the German Crown Prince's Drive in the Argonne, and Westward to Rheims

for fighting at close range were in readiness in the greatest abundance.

BATTLES OF JULY 13 AND 14.

This account from the German Great Headquarters appeared in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of Aug. 6, 1915:

The 13th of July dawns. On the preceding evening and during the night the last preparations have been made in the German trenches. Every man knows exactly the task assigned him. At the thought of the impending assault hearts beat faster, tense and excited are the men with the joyous anticipation of battle. What will the next twelve hours bring? Death, perhaps, to many a dear comrade, but surely for all the victory. It cannot be otherwise; ever till now, where the German fists have struck, the enemy has been compelled to yield the field, no matter how bravely he defended himself, and however much blood had to flow. Thus it was in the Autumn, and in January and February. Last evening the Captain had asked for volunteers for the first line of the charge. Every man declared his readiness. But so many the Captain could not use; lots had to be drawn. Yes, you at home there, if you were here you would have reason to be proud of your boys.

The dawn is coming on. It will be a cool and cloudy morning. It has not grown very light yet, when shrieking and howling there comes from far to the rear from a German battery the first heavy shell, strikes in the enemy's position, bursts with a thundering crash, and showers everything with a hail of broken metal, lumps of earth, and stones. Now things begin to happen. In the minutes that follow one might well think that all hell had opened. From all sides comes a humming and roaring and whistling and shrieking, hurling death and destruction into the hostile positions, which very soon are wrapped in a cloud of dust and vapor. Moved by curiosity, our fellows stick their heads over the breastworks and note the good effects of the artillery fire. But this amusement of playing spectators doesn't last very long, for very soon the French batteries and mine throwers also open their fire, which from hour to hour is increased to the most raging intensity. Enduring this for hours without action in the murderous hail of shells is much worse and more disintegrating than any assault.

At 8 A. M., about in the middle of the left wing, between points 263 and 285, the Fifth Silesian Chasseurs and an infantry battalion from Metz break out for the storm against the advanced French point of support. In seven minutes the first three trenches have been overrun, and the enemy at this place is surrounded on both sides so that he cannot flank from here the main attack later on.

In the meantime, along the whole front the artillery and mine fire achieves its highest point of intensity. In the course of the forenoon many trenches, both on the side of the enemy and on that of the Germans are simply leveled. At one point a mine strikes in a French collection of hand grenades, which blows up with a terrible crash. The next day there were found behind the front in a single dugout which had been struck by the shell of a heavy mortar 105 dead Frenchmen. Without paying any attention to the destructive fire, our artillery observers sit in their places and make the necessary reports on the effect of the fire. At three different points Lieutenants Kayser and Fritsche and Substitute Officer Bock held out the whole morning in their sapheads only a few meters from the enemy's trench and from there directed the fire of their batteries.

Shortly before the assault two pioneers, Sergeant Bansamier and Noncommissioned Officer Tuttenuit, creep forward in a sap close to the French position, and here, under a hail of hand grenades and mines, calmly place a double charge of explosives for firing. At 11:30 it is fired—a tremendous explosion—and in the next moment the first musketeers and pioneers leap through the funnel formed by the explosion toward the French trench. In the turn of a hand the still undamaged French wire obstructions are torn down and cut apart, to the right and left hand grenades fly among the heads of

the Frenchmen, and, as the first man of all, Pioneer Blum, of Company I of Pioneer Battalion 16, leaps into the hostile trench. Some two or three minutes pass and the first wave of the attackers has overrun the foremost trench and is storming on toward the second and third lines. At the same moment the storm breaks loose along the whole front, from the Bolante to the other side of the Roman Road.

At many points our men, as they leap forward out of the trench, are met by a raging infantry and machine gun fire. Everything now depends on overcoming the obstructions as quickly as possible. At one particularly dangerous point a young officer, Lieutenant von Marshall, far ahead of his men, leaps across the broad wire entanglement some four paces wide. The others follow him. Before them lies a blockhouse from which two machine guns are vomiting death and destruction. The riflemen throw themselves upon it, cast their hand grenades through the loopholes and the rear entrance, and thus incapacitate the crew of the guns. Three, four, five trenches are rushed, then on they go down into the valley of the Meurisson. Here there stands in a covered position a mine thrower which is bravely served to the last minute by a French Captain of artillery. His men lie dead or badly wounded beside him. He is just about to hurl one of his terrible mines when a young farmer from the Silesian-Polish border, the Chasseur Kucznierz, leaps to his side and calls out: "So you have thrown your mines at us! Here are your wages!" The officer starts to lift his revolver, but the Silesian rifle butt is swifter than the bullet of the Captain.

Ever onward rush the brave chasseurs. In the heat and excitement of the fight many do not notice that they have already reached Height 285, the selected objective, and press on beyond it, down into the Vallée des Courtes Chausses. In the meantime, the officers, correctly recognizing the situation, have halted a large part of their companies on the top of the height and begin at once with consolidating the new position and putting it into such a degree of order as would barely meet first necessities. A small detachment of the boldest rushes on into the middle of the French batteries and camp, at their head Lieutenant of Reserves Englisch of the Third Company of Chasseurs, Battalion 6.

The chasseurs attempt in their enthusiasm over their valuable booty to draw away the captured guns—four light and one heavy. It is impossible, the cannon are too firmly built in and they are too heavy. So they have to content themselves with smashing to pieces with axes, spades, pickaxes, and other tools, whatever they can of the sighting apparatus, the apparatus for loading, &c., of these guns in order to leave to the enemy the booty they are compelled to resign in as useless and spoiled a condition as possible. In the very last minute Chasseur Wistoba and Officer Broll each stuff a hand grenade from the muzzles into the barrels of two of the guns and by their explosion destroy the load chambers and other parts. Broll throws a second hand grenade into the stack of ammunition near by, which goes up into the air with a mighty crash, and then, on the run, back to the battalion, for a minute's longer delay would have delivered these daring fellows into the hands of the approaching French reserves. At another point the chasseurs had in quick order totally smashed a powerful motor which supplied suppressed air to the mine saps.

All this has happened in hardly more than two hours. In the meantime a complete brilliant success had been won also on all other parts of the battle front. Quite especially distinguished was the work of a battalion of Infantry Regiment 105 under the leadership of Captain Wegener at the storming of La Fille Morte. The battalion had made its attack from the Black Mount and had first of all to storm the exceptionally strongly built point of support of the enemy called the Stone Fortress. The quick success of this attack is in large part to be ascribed to Lieutenant of Reserves Breithaupt of the Second Company, who with his detachment was able by skillfully en-

circling the Meurisson hollow to take the enemy in the rear and cut him off. At some places on the Bollante the Frenchmen defended themselves with desperate obstinacy and great power of resistance. It was not always possible for our troops here to rush forward from one position to another over the ground covered with shrubbery. They had to work their way forward step by step through the wilderness of saps and connecting trenches. At the exit of such a trench a French officer had taken up his position and shot down every German who showed himself at the other end. A soldier knelt beside him with a second rifle, which he handed to his Lieutenant loaded after every shot. It was only after a considerable time that a German officer succeeded by means of a well aimed hand grenade in removing this obstinate heroically fighting enemy.

On the other wing to the east of the Roman Road the attack at first made only slight progress. Here Lieutenant Johanssen, also of the doughty Silesian Chasseurs, did great service in that he recognized at the decisive moment the possibility of taking in the flank from the west and forcing to yield the French who were attacked in the front by the men of the 130th.

In the afternoon the French undertook several counterattacks against Height 285. These were repelled by the men of the 144th and the chasseurs.

Along the entire front the German troops in the hot struggles of July 13 had attained the objects set for them to the full. The line of heights; 285; La Fille Morte, was firmly in possession of the Germans. The enemy had left in their hands 64 officers, among them 1 Major and 9 Captains, and more than 3,400 men as prisoners, 2 mountain and 2 revolver cannon, 34 machine guns, 51 mine throwers, 5 bronze mortars, and an incalculable amount of ammunition, weapons, and tools. More than 2,000 dead Frenchmen covered the battlefield and were buried by our troops the next day.

In the Argonnes battles, from June 20 to July 13, there were taken prisoners 116 officers and more than 7,000 men. More than 4,000 dead Frenchmen were counted, and the number of wounded is estimated at 5,000 to 6,000. From this the total French losses in this period is found to amount to roundly 16,000 to 17,000.

Our troops without qualification admit with respect and admiration the courage, obstinate and careless of death with which the Frenchmen defended themselves step for step, from trench to trench, from one shell hole to another. But do they over there well know what they are fighting for? Do they all believe the fairy tales that the German barbarians in love with conquest have instigated this war, and do they all hate us Germans? Surely not. But they do their duty to the utmost, to the last breath, like true soldiers. Hence, honor to the memory of our fallen enemies.

So much more the deep, therefore, is indignation among our troops over the unmeasured truthfulness of the French reports. Officially the Parisian press announces:

> The army of the Crown Prince has again taken up the offensive in the Argonne and has suffered a new reverse. The enemy who temporarily had penetrated our forward trenches was immediately hurled back by our counteroffensive. The gains of the Germans in no case amount to more than 400 meters. Point 285, which for a moment was occupied by the enemy, was immediately retaken by us.

When to this is opposed the fact that we continue in firm possession of Height 285, that the hostile counter-attacks were not able to take from us a single centimeter of the ground we had won, and that our gain in ground amounts throughout to from 700 to 800 meters, and at some points even to more than 1,000 meters, it is to be woundered at that the French officials are not ashamed, before their own troops, who, of course, are able to judge of the result of the battle, thus to affront the truth.

"If we continue to suffer this kind of reverses," say our men at the front, "then we will gradually work our way by reverses to Paris."

How the British Lost Sari Bair

Description of the Most Ferocious "Soldiers' Battle" Since the Crimean War

By Ellis Ashmead Bartlett

Ellis Ashmead Bartlett, authorized press correspondent with the allied forces at Gallipoli, sent the following dispatch describing "a second Inkerman" to The London Morning Post, dated Eastern Mediterranean, Aug. 19, 1915, *and published on Sept.* 1:

SINCE the great battle, the greatest fought on the Gallipoli Peninsula, closed on the evening of Aug. 10, both armies have been busily engaged in consolidating their new positions, in taking stock of gains and losses, replenishing their ammunition and munitions, and reorganizing the divisions, brigades, and battalions which of necessity became intermingled in this rugged, mountainous country.

Since my last cabling I have had time to visit the ground over which the Anzac corps advanced in its desperate efforts, extending over four consecutive days, to reach the crest of Sari Bair, commanding the ridge overlooking the Dardanelles. The New Zealand infantry, the Gurkhas, and some other battalions almost reached the objective, but were unable, through no fault of their own, to hold their position. A battalion of Gurkhas actually reached the crest of the plateau, but the Turks, taking advantage of the confusion, counterattacked in great force, and the gallant men from the hills were driven from the crest to the lower spurs beneath.

It was a bitter disappointment to have to relinquish the crest when it almost seemed to be within their grasp after so many months, but there was no alternative. The Anzac corps fought like lions and accomplished a feat of arms in climbing these heights almost without a parallel. All through, however, they were handicapped by the failure of the corps to make good its positions on the Anafarta hills, further north, and thus check the enemy's shell fire.

When all the details of these complicated arrangements are collected and sifted, they will form one of the most fascinating pages of the history of the whole war. It was a combat of giants in a giant country, and if one point stands out more than another it is the marvelous hardihood, tenacity, and reckless courage shown by the Australians and New Zealanders.

In order to enable the forces detailed for the main movement to go forward, which it was hoped would lead to the occupation of the Sari Bair position from Chunuk Bair through Q Hill to Koja Chemon Tepe, it was necessary to attract the enemy's attention toward the south and force him to keep his troops in front of our lines in position while the main force debouched from the Anzac position in Lone Pine—a position situated on a plateau 400 feet high, southeast of the Anzac lines.

The Australians rushed forward to the assault with the fury of fanatics, taking little heed of the tremendous shrapnel fire and enfilading rifle fire. On reaching the trenches the great difficulty was to force a way in, for the cover was so strong and heavy it had to be torn away by main force. Groups of men effected entrances at various points and jumped in on top of the Turks, who fought furiously, caught as they were, in a trap. Some surrendered, but the majority chose to die fighting. In every trench and sap and dugout desperate hand-to-hand fighting took place, four lines of trenches being captured in succession, and fresh infantry being poured in as the advancing lines were thinned by losses.

In this fighting bombs played the most important rôle, and it was only by keeping up and increasing the supply that the Australians were able to hold the position after it had been won. The Turks massed their force, and for three nights and days made desperate counterattacks, frequently retaking sections of the line, only to be driven out again. In this extraordinary struggle, which took place almost under ground, both sides fought with utter disregard of life. The wounded and dead choked the trenches almost to the top, but the survivors carried on the fight over heaps of bodies. In spite of immense reinforcements, with most determined courage the Australians held the ground thus won, and finally the Turks wearied of the struggle.

The trenches were now merely battered shambles, and the task of removing the dead and wounded took days to accomplish. The bodies of 1,000 Turks and Colonials were removed from the trenches alone, while hundreds of others lie outside. The total Turkish losses in this section alone are estimated at 5,000, chiefly incurred in furious counterattacks, among which each bomb burst with fearful effect.

The capture of Lone Pine is the most desperate hand-to-hand fight that has taken place on the peninsula, but this was but a diversion and preliminary to the main movement northward, which began the same evening under cover of darkness. No finer feat has been accomplished in the course of the war than the manner in which the troops destined for the main movement against Sari Bair Ridge were deployed for the attack. Millions of rounds of ammunition and thousands of shells were successfully concentrated at advanced posts without the enemy becoming aware of the movement. Neither did he know of the strong reinforcements which had reached the Australian corps. All this required the utmost skill, and was successfully kept a profound secret.

It was at 9 P. M. Aug. 6 when the force destined to attack old No. 3 post crept forward from the outposts. For nights past the navy had thrown searchlights on this and other lower positions and had bombarded them at frequent intervals. This procedure was not departed from on the 6th, and the Turks had no suspicion of the coming attack. When the lights were switched on to another position the Australians dashed forward and speedily captured the positions in succession, and throughout the night Bauchop's Hill and Big and Little Table Tops were occupied.

By the morning of the 7th our whole force was holding the front from Damakjelik Bahr to Sazil Dere and slowly moving toward the main Sari Bair position in face of great difficulties, harassed by the enemy's snipers and checked by the difficulties of the ground and the scarcity of water.

At dawn on the 7th the left of our line had reached the Asma Dere position. The Indians had advanced a long way toward Dehunuk Bahr, while the New Zealand infantry was on the Rhododendron spur and ridge. It was decided to postpone a further advance until nightfall. The forces were reorganized into three columns. For the final assault on Chanuk Bahr, which was timed to begin at dawn on Aug. 9, large reserves from another division were thrown into the firing line to assist the New Zealand and Indian infantry, and the men, as far as possible, rested through the day and the early part of the night.

The advance on the morning of the 9th was preceded by a heavy bombardment of Chanuk Bahr and Q Hill by the naval and land guns. The advance of No. 3 column was delayed by the broken nature of the ground and the enemy's resistance.

Meanwhile the Gurkhas advanced gallantly up the slope of Sari Bair, and actually succeeded in reaching the heights on the neck between Chanuk Bahr and Q Hill. It was from here that they looked down on the Dardanelles, but were unfortunately unable to hold the position in face of violent counterattacks and heavy shell fire.

During this time the Turks counterattacked the left column in great strength, and the column was compelled

The twelve miles of battle front reported by Lord Kitchener in the House of Lords on Sept. 15, 1915, as held by the allied forces at the Dardanelles.

to withdraw to the lower slopes of Sari Bair.

Meantime throughout the day and night the New Zealanders succeeded in maintaining their hold on Chanuk Bahr, although the men were thoroughly exhausted. During the night of the 9th the exhausted New Zealanders were relieved by two other regiments. At dawn the Tenth Regiment of the Turks, which had been strongly reinforced, made a desperate assault on our lines from Q

Hill and Chanuk Bahr. To the strength of a division, in successive lines, they hurled themselves, quite regardless of their lives, on the two regiments which, after desperate resistance, were driven from their position by artillery fire and sheer weight of numbers further down the slopes of Chanuk Bahr.

Following up their success, the Turks charged right over the crest and endeavored to gain the great gully south of Rhododendron Ridge, evidently with the intention of forcing their way between our lines and the Anzac position. But they had reckoned without our artillery and ships' guns. This great charge of four successive lines of infantry in close formation was plainly visible to our warships and all our batteries on land. In this section the Turks were caught in a trap. The momentum of their charge down hill prevented them from recoiling in time, and they were swept away by hundreds in a terrific storm of high explosive, shrapnel, and common shells from the ships' guns and our howitzers and field pieces.

Never since the campaign started has such a target delighted the hearts of our gunners. As the huge shells from the ships exploded huge chunks of soil were thrown into the air, amid which you saw human bodies hurled aloft and then chucked to earth or thrown bodily into deep ravines. But even this concentrated artillery fire might not have checked the Turkish advance unless it had been assisted by the concentrated fire of ten machine guns at short range. For half an hour they maintained a rapid fire until the guns smoked with heat.

During the whole of this time the Turks were pouring across the front in dense columns, attempting to attack our men. Hardly a Turk got back to the hill.

Their lines got mixed up in a wedge as those in front tried to retire while others pressed them from the rear. Some fled back over the crest, seeking to regain their trenches; others dashed downward to the ravines.

In a few minutes the entire division had been broken up and the survivors scattered everywhere.

Thus, if they succeeded in driving us from the crest of Chanuk Bahr, the Turks paid a terrible price for their success.

Thus closed, for the time being, amid these bloodstained hills, the most ferocious and sustained "soldiers' battle" since Inkerman.

Preparedness

By O. C. A. CHILD.

Must we, then, see our flag, flung from its staff,
Ground in the dirt 'neath boot-heels of a foe
Who, trained, triumphant, scatter us like chaff
And marches onward, slaying as they go?

Must we, then, wait until, through gore flecked streets,
Invaders ride—our dead their horse hoofs spurn—
An Emperor's scornful proclamation meets
Our shame-sick eyes—must we see that to learn?

No! by our God, not so! Grind sharp the sword,
Then slip it in its sheath against The Day!
Marshal the men and mold them from a horde
To armies, ready when the bugles bray!

Hold the great ships in leash until it be
The time when, banners rippling in the sun,
We march prepared to fight for either sea—
To claim a victory timely zeal has won!

Britain's Massing of Resources

By H. H. Asquith, British Prime Minister

In its description of the opening of the House of Commons on Sept. 15, 1915, The Associated Press reported Prime Minister Asquith's speech as follows:

LONDON, Sept. 15.—The Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, in the House of Commons, gave an exhaustive survey today of the financial and military situations, making candid statements of what had already been done and of the preparations "for carrying the war to a successful conclusion."

Both houses were crowded with members and spectators, who followed with the deepest interest Mr. Asquith's plain and businesslike statement in asking for another vote of credit of £250,000,000, ($1,250,000,000,) the seventh since the war began, which was finally passed, and which brings the total to £1,262,000,000, ($6,310,000,000,) and Lord Kitchener's reading of a carefully prepared and optimistic speech on the military operations and needs.

The Premier had to deal with huge figures to explain the financing of the war, and warned his hearers that although the expenditure was now over £3,500,000 ($17,500,000) daily, there was a likelihood of its increasing owing to advances to Great Britain's allies and her dominions, which had reached £250,000,000, ($1,250,000,000,) and to provision for munitions.

Since the war began nearly 3,000,000 men, he said, had enlisted in the army and navy. Besides that, 300,000 persons were now engaged in the manufacture of munitions, but both figures would have to be increased, and he appealed to the women to give their assistance, believing that they would make "a gigantic stride toward the solution of one of the most pressing problems."

Mr. Asquith candidly admitted that mistakes had been made, and added: "I do not say even now that we are doing all we might, or even all we ought to do."

He protested, however, against the attempts of a section of the press "to belittle and disparage our efforts."

After reviewing the operations in Flanders, the Dardanelles, and Poland, Mr. Asquith stated that the country had vastly exceeded any standard dreamed of before the war. As the war went on, however, that standard would rise, and new sacrifices would be demanded in men, munitions, and money.

A discussion on the question of conscription followed the Premier's speech, and the House finally granted the vote asked for.

The growing expenditures for the war were emphasized by the Premier in his speech. He said the average daily cost from April 1 to the end of June was £2,700,000 ($13,500,000;) from July 1 to 17, £3,000,000; from July 18 to Sept. 11, £3,500,000. Thus the total for this period in round figures was £500,000,000. There had been repaid £50,000,000 to the Bank of England, £30,000,000 had been lent to foreign Governments, and £28,000,000 had been lent to the Dominions.

Comparing actual expenditures since the last vote of credit with estimates, Mr. Asquith said there had been some abnormal items, to disclose which would not be in the public interest, but the House might take it that these were of financing necessary operations. Part of this amount was to be repaid in the course of a few months and the remainder represented advances for future expenditure.

Mr. Asquith estimated that the weekly gross expenditure henceforth would not exceed £35,000,000. It was his opinion that the new vote would carry the country through to the third week of November.

"These figures throw some light, in many terms, on the contribution we are making to the war," he continued. "I do not wish to say even that we are

doing all we can, all we ought, but as attempts are constantly being made—with whatever intention, but with the most mischievous effect—to belittle and discourage our efforts, I give some comparisons between peace and war figures.

"Since the outbreak of the war it will be found an aggregate of not far short of three millions have enlisted in the army and navy. Recruiting, on the whole, has kept up well, but, I regret to say, in the last few weeks has been falling off."

Regarding the work of the Munitions Department, the Premier said all that was now necessary to complete this great and necessary task was an adequate supply of labor, unskilled quite as much as skilled. There was no field wherein women could do more useful work. The Minister of Munitions had established twenty shell factories, and eighteen more were in course of construction. In all, 715 controlled establishments were under the department. In these factories 800,000 workmen were now employed, and the country had vastly exceeded any standard dreamed of before the war.

Reviewing the military situation, Mr. Asquith stated that in France and Flanders the position of the British troops had been strengthened everywhere by large reinforcements of men and munitions and that there had been a considerable extension of lines taken over from the French.

In the Dardanelles, he continued, the British had made substantial gains, though they had not succeeded in dislodging the Turks from the crest of the hills. The British now held a front of more than twelve miles.

In the east, Mr. Asquith said, the Russian Army remained unbroken. He asserted that the superiority of the Germans was only in artillery, and that their objective was still far out of reach.

"They succeeded in forcing back the line of our gallant ally and taking several fortresses," he continued, "but all accounts show that the Russian retreat is being conducted in masterly fashion and that the Russian Army is still unbroken. The assumption of supreme command by the Czar is the most significant proof that could be given of the unalterable determination, from highest to lowest, of the Russian people."

Mr. Asquith said that the total of Britain's loans to other belligerents was £250,000,000.

He referred to the high total of casualties, and said that the proportion of those who recovered from wounds was large.

"This is a war of mechanism, organization, endurance," he continued. "Victory seems likely to incline to the side that can arm itself best and stay longest. That is what we mean to do."

The Premier deprecated all recrimination. "Our business is to deal with the present, and forecast and provide for the future," he said. "We have satisfied the legitimate requirements and hopes of our allies, and we have to discharge the unique burden imposed upon a family of free people by our own sense of responsibility and our standard of duty and sacrifice."

One thing Mr. Asquith opposed was "the sinister spirit of domestic strife."

"We must all be ready to give and take, and take and give," he said, "and it must not be said that in the greatest moment of our history our arm was shorn of its strength by any failure on the part of either rulers or ruled to concentrate upon the unexampled task the consistent counsels, undivided energies, and unbreakable, indomitable will of the British people.

"The situation is a testing one. A survey of the past year calls for satisfaction at the great efforts and sacrifices made, and for regret that some mistakes and miscalculations have been made. Today we realize more clearly, through the mists of sophistry and mendacity in which Berlin seeks to obscure and befoul the international atmosphere, the sincerity of our own diplomacy, and the passionate love of peace wherewith we sought to avert the catastrophe of a world-wide conflict.

"It was the imperious call of duty which forced us to vindicate our national honor and enlist our whole strength in the sacred cause of freedom. I have no doubt either of the wisdom of our choice or of its ultimate triumph on the stricken field."

Three Million Soldier Britons

By Kitchener of Khartum

British Secretary of State for War

In his statement reviewing the Allied campaigns, made in the House of Lords at the opening of Parliament on Sept. 15, 1915, Earl Kitchener reported a recent extension of the British line in France, making a continuous battle front of approximately fifty miles. New armies trained from the 3,000,000 recruits added to the British forces since the beginning of the war have from time to time been sent out to join Field Marshal French's command. The text of the British War Secretary's speech, as cabled in large part from London by The Associated Press, appears below.

In his statement in the House of Lords on Sept. 15, 1915, *Earl Kitchener said:*

FOR the last few months the front held by the Allies in the west has been practically unchanged. This does not mean that there has been relaxation of active work on the part of the forces in the field, for the continuous local fighting which has taken place all along the line has called for the display of incessant vigilance.

Meanwhile, our positions have been much strengthened, not only by careful elaboration of the system of trench fortifications that already existed, but also by a large increase in the number of heavy guns which have been placed along our lines.

The Germans recently on several occasions used gas and liquid fire, and have bombarded our lines with asphyxiating shells, but these forms of attack, lacking as they now do, the element of surprise, have failed of their object and lost much of their offensive value owing to steps taken by us to counteract the effect of these pernicious methods.

As new armies have become trained and ready to take the field considerable reinforcements have been sent out to join Field Marshal French's command. You will be glad to hear his opinion of these troops, communicated to me. He writes:

> The units appear to be thoroughly well officered and commanded. The equipment is in good order and efficient. Several units of artillery have been tested behind the firing line in the trenches, and I hear very good reports of them. Their shooting has been extremely good, and they are quite fit to take their place in the line.

These new divisions have now had the opportunity of acquiring by experience in actual warfare that portion of the necessary training of soldiers which it was impossible to give them in this country and which, once acquired, will enable them effectively to take their place in the line with the rest of the British Army.

With these additional reinforcements, amounting to eleven divisions, (about 200,000 men,) Sir John French has been able to extend his lines and take over from the French approximately seventeen miles of additional front.

Throughout the Summer months the French have held their own along their extended line of the front, and in some places, notably near Arras and in Alsace, have made substantial progress. In the struggles around Arras early in June they captured whole heights at Nôtre Dame de Lorette, as well as a number of strongly fortified villages around this high ground, thereby securing an area of great tactical importance, in view of future operations.

In Alsace a number of dominating eminences have been wrested from the enemy and have been subsequently held in the face of formidable counterattacks. One particularly commanding summit, which overlooks the left bank of the Rhine in this quarter, and which had been the scene of continuous encounters for many months, after changing hands many times, rested finally in the possession of our allies.

French trenches along the entire front have been developed and strengthened, and now everywhere present a network of almost impregnable fortifications. Of this I was able to satisfy myself during a visit lately to our allies, at the invitation

of General Joffre, when I was profoundly impressed with the high state of efficiency and morale of the French Army. It was evident that officers and men recognized that the only possible termination to the war was to inflict on the enemy a thorough defeat. Their resolution to do this was never firmer nor more intense.

Our allies' aircraft have been particularly active. They have carried out numerous effective raids on a large scale, penetrating far into hostile territory.

Turning to the eastern theatre: The enemy taking advantage of their central position, since early in June have been employing a very large proportion of their forces in strenuous efforts to crush our Russian ally. In the prosecution of these operations, which we all have followed closely, the Germans, in addition to their great numerical superiority, developed vastly preponderating artillery, which enabled them to force the Russians from their defenses. The German objective was evidently to destroy the Russian Army as a force in being and thus set free their troops for action elsewhere; but, as in the case of many other plans arranged by the German Staff during this war, there has been signal failure to carry out the original intentions.

In the history of this war few episodes stand out more prominently, more creditably, than the masterly manner in which the Russian forces, distributed along a line of 750 miles, have been handled while facing violent assaults from an enemy greatly superior in numbers, especially of guns and munitions.

The success of this great rear-guard action has been rendered possible by the really splendid fighting qualities of the Russian soldier, who in every case where actual conflict has taken place has shown himself infinitely superior to his adversary. These fighting qualities of the Russian Army empowered her able Generals and competent staff to carry out the immensely difficult operation of retirement of the whole line over some 100 to 200 miles without allowing the enemy to break through at any point or by surrounding their forces to bring about a tactical position which might have involved the surrender of a considerable portion of the Russian Army.

Thus we see the Russian Army remaining today intact as a fighting force. It doubtless has suffered severely from the hard fighting to which it had been subjected during recent months, but the German forces also had to pay heavy toll for their advance into Russia, and who will venture to say, until the present grip is relaxed, which armies suffered more?

It must not be forgotten that Russia, with her vast territory, has always been able ultimately to envelop and annihilate large invading armies. In this she certainly is no less capable today than she was a century ago.

As regards the net result, all that the Germans can place to their credit is that at an enormous sacrifice they have captured certain fortresses. But our recent experience shows that the best fortifications, and practically the only ones that can effectively resist the new machinery of war, are those which can be quickly dug deep in the soil. Such trenches today form better defenses than the most carefully fortified places of which the engineers until lately were so proud.

The Germans appear almost to have shot their bolt. Their advance into Russia, which at one time was carried out at an average daily rate of approximately five miles, has now diminished to less than one mile a day, and we see the forces which they boastingly described as defeated and broken troops flying before them, still doggedly and pluckily fighting along the whole line, and in some places, indeed, turning on the jaded invaders and inflicting heavy losses.

The Russian Army, far from falling out of the fighting lists, as Germany fondly hoped, is still a powerful and undefeated unit, and the determination and confidence of the troops, fortified by the increasing supply of munitions, have risen in proportion to the strain imposed upon them.

In this momentous hour of stress his Imperial Majesty the Czar has taken executive command of his armies in the field. The enthusiasm created by his step will serve to concentrate all the

energies of his officers and men on driving back the invaders and preventing them from reaching any vital portion of the empire.

To sum up, we may fairly say that, while the Germans have prevailed by sheer weight of guns and at immense cost to themselves in forcing back the Russian front, nothing but barren territory and evacuated fortresses have been gained. Thus their strategy has clearly failed, and the victories they claim may only prove, as military history has so often demonstrated, to be defeats in disguise.

Dwelling on Italy's part in the war, Lord Kitchener said:

"The achievements of the Italian artillery have been truly remarkable, and the manner in which heavy pieces were hauled into almost inaccessible positions on lofty mountain peaks and in spite of great difficulties evokes universal admiration. The Italian Army now occupies strategic positions of first-rate importance. The gallant conduct of the infantry of the line in action has impressed upon their enemies the great military value of the Italian Army, while the bold feats of the Alpine troops and the bersaglieri when scaling rugged mountain sides were marvelous examples of successful enterprise."

Lord Kitchener then referred to the Dardanelles operations, saying:

On the Gallipoli Peninsula during the operations in June several Turkish trenches were captured. Our own lines were appreciably advanced and our positions were consolidated.

Considerable reinforcements having arrived, a surprise landing on a large scale at Suvia Bay was successfully accomplished on the 6th of August without any serious opposition.

At the same time an attack was launched by the Australian and New Zealand corps from the Anzac position, and a strong offensive was delivered from Cape Helles in the direction of Krithia. In this latter action French troops played a prominent part and showed to high advantage their usual gallantry and fine fighting qualities.

The attack from Anzac, after a series of hotly contested actions, was carried to the summit of Sari Bair and Chunuk Bair, dominating positions in this area. The arrival of transports and the disembarkation of troops in Suvia Bay were designed to enable troops to support this attack. Unfortunately, however, the advance from Suvia Bay was not developed quickly enough, and the movement forward was brought to a standstill after an advance of about two and one-half miles.

The result was that the troops from Anzac were unable to retain their position on the crest of the hills, and after being repeatedly counterattacked they were ordered to withdraw to positions lower down. These positions have been effectively consolidated, and, now joining with the line occupied by the Suvia Bay force, form a connected front of more than twelve miles.

From the latter position a further attack on the Turkish intrenchments was delivered on the 21st, but after several hours of sharp fighting it was not found possible to gain the summit of the hills occupied by the enemy, and the intervening space being unsuitable for defense, the troops were withdrawn to their original position.

Since then comparative quiet has prevailed, and a much-needed rest has been given to our troops.

In the course of these operations the gallantry and resourcefulness of the Australian and New Zealand troops have frequently formed the subject of eulogy in General Hamilton's reports.

It is not easy to appreciate at their full value the enormous difficulties which have attended the operations in the Dardanelles or the fine temper with which our troops have met them.

There is now abundant evidence of a process of demoralization having set in among the German-led, or rather German-driven Turks, due, no doubt, to their extremely heavy losses and to the progressive failure of their resources.

It is only fair to acknowledge that, judged from a humane point of view, the methods of warfare pursued by the Turks are vastly superior to those which have disgraced their German masters.

Throughout, the co-operation of the

fleet has been intensely valuable, and the concerted action between the sister services has been in every way in the highest degree satisfactory.

Of the fighting in Mesopotamia, Lord Kitchener said reconnoissances had shown that the Euphrates was clear of Turks for a distance of sixty miles.

"Since this victory," he said, "there has been no further fighting on the Euphrates, Tigris, or Karun Rivers. Climatic conditions in this theatre of war have rendered the operations extremely arduous."

The Secretary went on to say:

As I have informed your Lordships, some of the new armies we have prepared and equipped for the war are already in the field, and others will quickly follow them. The response of the country to calls for recruits to form these armies has been little short of marvelous, but it must be borne in mind that the provision of men to maintain the forces in the field depends to a great degree on a large and continuous supply of recruits.

The provision to keep up their strength during 1916 has caused us anxious thought, which has been accentuated and rendered more pressing by the recent falling off in the numbers coming forward to enlist, although every effort has been made to obtain our requirements under the present system.

I am sure we all fully realize that the strength of the armies we are sending out must be fully maintained to the very end. To fulfill this purpose we shall require a large addition to the numbers of recruits joining. The problem of how to secure an adequate supply of men and thus insure the field force being kept up to its full strength is engaging our close attention and will, I hope, very soon receive a practical solution.

The returns of the Registration act, which will shortly be available, will no doubt give us a basis on which to calculate the resources of the country and so determine the number of men available for the army after providing for the necessary services of the country as well as those of our munition works.

Whatever decision may be arrived at in the full light of the facts before us must undoubtedly be founded on the military requirements for the prosecution of the war and the protection of our shores, and will be the result of an impartial inquiry as to how we can most worthily fulfill our national obligations.

Although there has been a falling off in the number of recruits, I do not draw from this fact any conclusion unfavorable to the resolution and spirit of the country. On the contrary, I think now, as I always have thought, that the manner in which all classes have responded to the call of patriotism is magnificent, and I do not for one instant doubt that whatever sacrifices may prove necessary to bring this gigantic war to a successful conclusion will be cheerfully undertaken by our people.

A Warning to British Labor

By David Lloyd George

Minister of Munitions for Great Britain

A Bristol (England) dispatch to The London Daily News, dated Sept. 9, 1915, reported:

JUDGED either by its matter or manner, an address which Minister of Munitions Lloyd George delivered this afternoon before the Trade Union Congress will, undoubtedly, rank among the supreme speeches of his career. It would be as difficult to exaggerate the gravity of the statements of fact he felt called upon to make as to convey any adequate idea of the emotional atmosphere he created by his appeal.

"Unless," he told the Congress, "the unions allow unskilled men and women to do, as far as they are able, work hitherto done by skilled men, unless they allow, in fact, an unqualified re-

laxation of the union rules, we are making straight for disaster. Every hour counts, every hour means death, every hour takes us further from victory and nearer defeat, unless it is an hour spent by the nation in putting its whole strength into this great struggle for victory and freedom for the democracies of Europe."

The State, Mr. Lloyd George declared, had kept its bargain with labor by abolishing war profits in the munitions factories employing no fewer than 95 per cent. of the workers engaged. Had labor shown equal readiness to fulfill its side of the agreement? The answer was a reluctant no. In some factories, including the Government arsenal at Woolwich, said the Minister, the output was being restricted, in others men were refusing to work beside unskilled hands, and this at a time when 80,000 more skilled men and 200,000 more unskilled men and women must be employed if the Government was to carry out its program and the country play the part now inevitably assigned to it in the Allies' campaign.

With flashing eyes and upraised hands, in a voice that rose and fell in every gradation of appeal and challenge, sometimes begging, sometimes exhorting, but always vibrant with the emotion of a patriot, Mr. Lloyd George drove the moral of hard facts into the hearts and consciences of hearers never before touched with so sure a hand on every chord of feeling and reason.

The effect was amazing. Men who had come to heckle remained to cheer. Hardened Socialists sprang to their feet and shouted while they clapped. Questions that were meant to hurt died on the lips of the questioners and melted into applause. The congress became a great patriotic demonstration.

The speech was not a mere piece of able oratory, born to die in an afternoon. The congress had asked specifically for an explanation, and got it, and that explanation will be reckoned in the days to come as one of the things that won the war.

The Associated Press report of Lloyd George's speech in Bristol on Sept. 10 *said:*

Mr. Lloyd George in his speech today declared that the war had resolved itself into a conflict between the mechanics in the contending nations.

"With you," said the Minister to the Congress, "victory is assured. Without you our cause is lost.

"I come here as the greatest employer of labor in this country. You passed resolutions yesterday pledging yourselves to assist the Government in a successful prosecution of the war, and I am here on behalf of the Government to take you at your word."

As between British and German workmen, the Minister said, he believed the British were the better.

Mr. Lloyd George told the delegates that notwithstanding all the efforts that have been made to speed up the work of turning out war munitions only 15 per cent. of the available machinery was being worked on night shifts.

"The country is not doing its best," he declared.

The Minister said the Government had under construction eleven new arsenals, to man which, in addition to the existing arsenals, 200,000 more men were required.

"The Government," he added, "cannot equip the army at this time unless the unions suspend during the war all instructions barring unskilled labor and all restrictions tending to prevent a maximum output. Therefore there must be no stoppages."

"Has the State kept its end of the bargain?" a voice shouted.

"No," another voice answered.

Replying to this, Mr. Lloyd George said the surplus profits of the firms engaged in munitions work would go to the Treasury to finance the war.

Mr. Lloyd George quoted from a trade union circular issued in Coventry, in which the men were counseled, in effect, not to work at their full capacity.

"This means," he commented, "that there has been a deliberate attempt to restrict the output in guns, the making of which is vital to the protection of the lives of men at the front. Is there any

one here who will defend an action of that kind?"

There were loud cries of "No!"

"Then," said the Minister, "you have answered the question I came down to ask you. I knew you would not support such action."

Continuing, he said that as Minister of Munitions he had the right to ask workmen to come forth courageously and fearlessly say they would have no part "in trying to hold the arm of their native land when it is fighting for its life and their future labors depend largely upon the result of this war."

The Minister concluded by appealing to the men not to array the country against organized labor.

The congress adopted, virtually without opposition, at today's session a resolution presented by the Railway Clerks' Union on the subject of recruiting. The congress resolved:

"That this congress, being convinced that the issues involved in the present European war are of transcendant importance to the democracies of this and other countries, hereby records its entire approval of the action of the Parliamentary Labor Party in co-operating with the other political parties in the national recruiting campaign."

The consensus of opinion, as revealed in speeches in support of the resolution, was that it was no part of the teaching of trade unionism that it is the duty of man to turn the other cheek to the man who smites him. One speaker said that if when "Dear Brother Fritz" invaded Belgium the British Government had not decided to resist this move, the men and women of Britain would have forced it to do so.

No Time for Peace

By Rene Raphael Viviani

Premier of France

The Associated Press, in a dispatch from Paris, reported the speech delivered by Premier Viviani at the opening of the French Chamber of Deputies on Aug. 26, 1915, as follows:

BY a vote of 539 to 1, the Chamber of Deputies today voted the credits asked by the Government after a stirring appeal by Premier Viviani, whose eloquent periods and vivid portrayal of the determination of France to fight for the attainment of an honorable and not a premature peace brought the members to their feet in tumultuous applause.

Premier Viviani arose to address the house as soon as the session was called to order. All the members of the Cabinet were on the Ministerial benches, and the galleries were filled with prominent persons, among them many women. Nearly all the members of the Diplomatic Corps were in their boxes.

"I am not going to speak of the sanitary service alone," said the Premier, "but also of parliamentary incidents that cannot be ignored. In the higher interest of the country, by which we are judged, we must justify the union of Government and Parliament.

"The home services of the War Department have accomplished their tasks. In other quarters errors have been made, but Parliament has lent cordial co-operation without seeking at the time to fix responsibility for mistakes. The errors have been repaired.

"Let us banish pessimism and depressing anxiety. France, by the grace of all her children's efforts, her public servants prompted by necessary criticism, is equal to the task of fulfilling her destiny.

"Put the question of peace before the country, and it would be blown to nothing. Not until heroic Belgium has been freed, not until we have retaken Alsace

and Lorraine could there be mischievous division among us.

"Our enemies may continue astray in their dull error of last year, but not we, who have seen workmen and employer, the rich citizen and the poor, men of every party and every walk in life fulfilling with a single purpose and with equal zeal their duties in defense of the liberty of the world.

"With this certain knowledge we come before Parliament, which has given the country an admirable spectacle of rising to the demands of the future; which has devoted admiration for the army, from the Commander in Chief to the private —for all those combatants who, silently absorbed in their heroic labor, ask nothing better than to be left outside the sphere of politics.

"We must destroy the legend that the Republic of France, having borne for forty-five years a horrible wound, did not make provision for military defense. I must repeat the words of the Commander in Chief during the last session of the Chamber: 'The republic may be proud of her armies.'

"France has created an army fulfilling the most modern conceptions. She has instilled the love of justice, the love of right, and upon the day the war began the children of France united in support of this high ideal, without which there would have been only armies of mercenaries."

At this the Deputies sprang to their feet and cheered the Premier wildly.

When the demonstration had died down, the Premier continued:

"Yes, the German press has said that France was divided. Yes, there are divergencies of opinion. These are the essence of free government. But it would be a fatal division, if there were in this country a fraction of the people who even thought of a premature peace.

"Parliament possesses supervisory rights, but nevertheless the authority of the Government must be all the stronger, owing to its greater responsibilities.

"We must have not only the expression of your confidence, but, for the great task before us, we must have the freedom of action necessary. We must have the definite adhesion of all hearts, all minds, and the good will of every one.

"Never has this been more necessary to the Government from an internal as well as an external point of view. The more that is demanded the greater the force required. It is for Parliament to grant it to the Government."

Premier Viviani concluded by saying:

"I ask you to adopt the conciliatory attitude necessary, so that we may go on to victory."

The entire Chamber applauded, and it was voted that the Premier's address should be posted on the billboards throughout France.

A Train from Lille to Warsaw

The staff correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES *cabled from Berlin on Aug.* 17, 1915:

Lille-Warsaw express. These words record another German mechanical and technical triumph.

Eleven days after the capture of Warsaw the military railroad officials have inaugurated a through train service, connecting the extremes of occupied enemy territory, leaving Lille at 6:40 o'clock in the morning, Brussels at 8:30, and Berlin at midnight, and arriving at Warsaw in time for luncheon the next afternoon.

The first trip of the new train eastward from Berlin carries a party of seven American war correspondents, including THE TIMES representative, who are going to witness the bombardment of Fort Novo Georgievsk.

Great Britain and Germany

By T. von Bethmann-Hollweg

German Imperial Chancellor

The assertion that the Germans, by a refusal of Sir Edward Grey's proposal of a conference of the European powers, are guilty of this war, is denounced by the German Imperial Chancellor in the subjoined speech, delivered in the Reichstag at its meeting on Aug. 19, 1915, as a calumny "behind which our enemies wish to hide their own guilt." The speech is remarkable as a statement of Germany's military and diplomatic position, and it immediately aroused vigorous discussion on both sides of the Atlantic. Full texts of the speech and Sir Edward Grey's reply thereto, which was addressed as a letter to the British press on Aug. 25, 1915, are given below.

Below appears the full text of the speech delivered in the Reichstag by the Imperial Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, at its opening on Aug. 19, 1915. *Concerning it the Berlin correspondent of the Kölnische Volkszeitung says:*

A characteristic of the Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag was increased severity toward England. It was as if the Chancellor was filled with physical loathing when he spoke of Sir E. Grey's frivolity and blood-guilt in this war. When he spoke of England the House listened breathlessly to the descriptions of how England strangled and violated the rights of neutrals. When, toward the end, the Chancellor pleaded for the good intentions of his former pro-English policy, the Reichstag showed that it accepted his explanations, although there was little or no applause. In that part of the speech there was apparent much disappointment, personal bitterness, and acerbity against England.

SINCE our last meeting great things have again happened. All attempts of the French, in spite of their contempt for death and the utmost sacrifice of human life, to break our west front have failed against the stubborn pertinacity of our brave troops. Italy, who thought to conquer easily the goods of others which she has coveted, has been thus far brilliantly repulsed, despite her numerical superiority and unsparing sacrifice of human lives.

At the Dardanelles the Turkish Army makes an unflinching stand. Where we have assumed the offensive we have beaten and thrown back the enemy. With our allies we have freed almost all Galicia, Poland, Lithuania, and Courland from the Russians. Ivangorod, Warsaw, and Kovno have fallen. Far into hostile territory our lines present everywhere a solid wall. We have strong armies free for new blows. Proud and fearless, and relying on our glorious troops, we can regard the future.

Amid the horrors of war we recall gratefully the practical love of humanity displayed by neighboring neutral States toward us on the occasion of the return of civilians from hostile countries and the exchange of prisoners of war. The Netherlands has already twice given ready and devoted assistance to our severely wounded returning from England. I express the heartfelt thanks of the German people to this nation, [applause,] and add a word of special thanks to the Pope, who has displayed untiring sympathy with the idea of the exchange of prisoners and with so many works of humanity during the war, and to whom belongs the main credit for their realization.

Our enemies incur a terrible blood-guiltiness by seeking to deceive their peoples about the real situation. When they do not deny their defeats our victories serve them to accumulate new calumnies against us. For instance, that we were victorious in the first year of the war because we had treacherously prepared for this war long beforehand, while they in their innocent love of peace [laughter] were not ready for war.

You remember the bellicose articles which the Russian Minister of War caused

to be circulated in the Spring of 1914, in which the complete preparedness for war of the Russian Army was praised; you remember the frequently provocative language which France has in recent years employed; you know that France, whenever she satisfied Russia's financial needs, made it a condition that the greater portion of the loan should always be applied to war equipment.

Sir Edward Grey said in Parliament on Aug. 3: "We, with our mighty fleet, shall, if we participate in the war, suffer little more than if we remained outside."* The man who, on the eve of his own declaration of war, speaks in such a very sober and businesslike tone, and who, in accordance therewith, also directs the policy of his friends, can only act so when he knows that he and his allies are ready. [Loud applause.]

The fable that England participated in the war only for the sake of Belgium has been abandoned in the meantime by England herself. It was not tenable. Do the smaller nations still believe that England and her allies are waging war for their protection and the protection and freedom of civilization? Neutral commerce on sea is strangled by England. As far as possible goods destined for Germany must no longer be loaded on neutral ships. Neutral ships are compelled on the high seas to take English crews aboard and to obey their orders.

England without hesitation occupies Greek islands because it suits her military operations, and with her allies she wishes to constrain neutral Greece to make cessions of territory in order to bring Bulgaria to her side. In Poland, Russia, who is fighting with the Allies for the freedom of peoples, lays waste the entire land before the retreat of her armies. Villages are burned down, cornfields trampled down, and the population—Jews and Christians—are sent to uninhabited districts. They languish in the mud of Russian roads, in windowless, sealed goods wagons. Such are the freedom and civilization for which our enemies fight. In her claims to be the protector of smaller States England counts on the world having a very bad memory.

In the Spring of 1902 the Boer republics were incorporated in the British Empire. Then their eyes were turned to Egypt. To the formal annexation of this there was opposed the British Government's solemn promise to evacuate the land. That same England that to our proposal to guarantee to her Belgium's integrity if she remained neutral proudly replied that England could not make her obligations relative to Belgian neutrality a matter for bargaining; that same England had no scruple in bartering away to France her solemn obligation, undertaken toward all Europe, by the conclusion of a treaty with France, which was to give to England Egypt, and to France Morocco. In 1907 the southern portion of Persia, by agreement with Russia, was converted into an exclusively English sphere of interest, and the northern portion was delivered over to a freedom-loving regiment of Russian Cossacks.

[Herr Liebknecht here interjected "Potsdam interview."]

I am coming to that later. Whosoever pursues such a policy has no right to accuse of warlike aspirations and territorial covetousness a country which for forty-four years has protected European peace, and, while almost all other countries have waged wars and conquered lands, has striven only for peaceful development. That is hypocrisy. [Tempestuous applause.] Conclusive testimony of the tendencies of English policy and of the origin of the war is contained in the reports of Belgian Ministers.

For what reason are these documents as far as possible hushed up in London and Petrograd? The public of the Entente may look at the publications which I caused to be published, particularly about the negotiations of the English Military Attaché with the Belgian mili-

*Sir Edward Grey's exact words on Aug. 3, 1914, were:

> For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce and to protect our shores, and to protect our interests if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside. We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it, or whether we stand aside.

tary authorities. Here it is a question of England's policy of isolation. His colleagues in London and Paris form an exactly similar judgment to that of Baron Greindl, and this harmonious judgment is of quite decisive weight. Against these testimonies all attempts of the enemy to ascribe to us warlike ambitions, and to themselves a love of peace, fail. Was German policy not informed of these events, or did it intentionally close its eyes to them by still seeking an adjustment? Neither one nor the other.

There are circles who reproach me with political shortsightedness because I again and again endeavored to prepare an understanding with England. I thank God that I did. It is clearly proved that the fatality of this devastating world conflagration could have been prevented if an honest understanding with England, directed toward peace, had been accomplished. Who in Europe would then have thought of making war? With such an aim in view, should I have refused the work because it was heavy and because it again and again proved fruitless?

When it is a question of the utmost gravity in the life of the world, my motto is "With God nothing is impossible," and I would rather die in the struggle than have evaded it. King Edward saw his main task in personally promoting the English policy of isolation against Germany. After his death I hoped the negotiations for an agreement, already inaugurated by us in 1909, would make better progress. The negotiations dragged on till the Spring of 1911 without achieving any result. Then England's interference in our discussion with France in the Morocco question showed the entire world how English policy, in order to impose its will on the entire world, menaced the world's peace. Then also the English people was not exactly informed concerning the danger of the policy of its Government. When, after the crisis, it recognized how, by a hair's breadth, it had escaped the abyss of a world war, a sentiment grew up in wide circles of the English Nation in favor of establishing relations with us which would prevent warlike complications. Thus arose Lord Haldane's mission in the Spring of 1912.

Lord Haldane assured me that the English Cabinet was inspired with a sincere desire for an understanding. It was depressed by our impending naval budget. I asked him whether an open agreement with us, which would not only exclude an Anglo-German war, but any European war whatsoever, did not seem of more importance to him than a couple of German dreadnoughts more or less. Lord Haldane appeared inclined to this view. He asked me, however, whether, if we were assured of security in regard to England, we would not fall upon France and destroy her. I replied that the policy of peace which Germany had pursued for more than forty years ought really to save us from such a question. If we had planned robberlike attacks, we could have had the best opportunity during the South African war and Russo-Japanese war to show our love of war. Germany, which sincerely wished to live in peace with France, would just as little think of attacking another country.

After Haldane had left, negotiations were continued in London. In order to arrive at lasting relations with England we proposed an unconditional mutual neutrality undertaking. When this proposal was rejected by England, as going too far, we proposed to restrict neutrality to wars in which it could not be said that the power to whom neutrality was assured was the aggressor. This was also rejected by England, who proposed the following formula: "England will not make an unprovoked attack on Germany, and will refrain from an aggressive policy toward Germany. An attack on Germany is not included in any agreement or combination to which England is at present a party. England will not join any agreement which aims at such an attack." My opinion was that among civilized powers it was not customary to attack other powers without provocation, or join combinations which were planning such things. Therefore, a promise to refrain from such attacks could not be made the substance of a solemn agreement. The English Cabinet then proposed to affix the following to the above formula: "As both powers mutually desire to secure between themselves peace

and friendship, England declares that she will not make any unprovoked attacks," &c., as I have already told you.

This addition could not in any way alter the nature of the English proposal, and nobody could have blamed me if already at that time I had broken off negotiations. In order to do all in my power to secure the peace of Europe I declared myself ready to accept this English proposal also, on condition that it was completed as follows: "England, therefore, will, of course, observe benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon Germany." Sir Edward Grey flatly refused this addition, as he declared to our Ambassador, from the fear that it would endanger the existing British friendship with other powers. This means for us the conclusion of the negotiations. England thought it a token of special friendship to be sealed by a solemn agreement that she would not fall upon us without reason, but reserved for herself a free hand in case her friends should like to do it.

Mr. Asquith on Oct. 2, 1914, referred to this at Cardiff. He told his audience that the English formula that England would not attack Germany without provocation was not sufficient for the German statesmen, who demanded that England should remain absolutely neutral in the event of Germany being involved in war. This assertion of Mr. Asquith's is a misrepresentation of the facts. Naturally we demanded unconditional neutrality at first, but in the course of negotiations we restricted our demand for neutrality to the contingency of war having been forced upon Germany. This Mr. Asquith withheld from his audience. I believe myself justified in declaring that he thereby missled public opinion in England in an unjustifiable manner. If Mr. Asquith had given the complete facts he could not have continued his speech as he did. He said: "And this demand, namely, for unconditional neutrality in any war, was proposed by German statesmen at a moment when Germany had greatly increased her aggressive and defensive means of power, especially on the sea. They demanded that we should give them, as far as we were concerned, a free hand when they chose the moment to conquer and govern Europe."

I cannot understand how Mr. Asquith could objectively represent so wrongly a fact of which he was very well informed to draw from it conclusions which were contrary to the truth. I mention this incident in order to protest before the entire world against the falsehood and slander with which our enemies fight against us. After we had made, in full cognizance of the anti-German direction of English policy, with the utmost patience the greatest possible concessions, they wanted to expose us before all the world by an exaggerated misrepresentation of the facts. Should our enemies succeed in drowning also these statements in the noise of battle and in unworthy work of inciting peoples, the time will come when history will pronounce judgment. At that time the moment had come when England and Germany by a sincere understanding could have secured the peace of the world. We were ready, England declined; she will never free herself from this blot.

Afterward Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador in London, M. Cambon, exchanged the well-known letters which aimed at an Anglo-French defensive alliance, but by separately concluded agreements between both the General Staffs and the Admiralty Staffs they became, in fact, an offensive alliance. This fact was also held from the public. Only when there was no way out the English Government, on Aug. 3, 1914, informed the public of this. Until then the English Ministers had always declared in Parliament that England, in the case of a European conflict, reserved a completely free hand. The same policy was pursued by England when naval negotiations, in the Spring of 1914, were opened with Russia, and the Russian Admiralty desired to invade our province of Pomerania with the assistance of English vessels. Thus the encircling by the Entente with its openly hostile tendencies became narrower. We were obliged to reply to the situation with the great armament of the budget of 1913.

As regards Russia, I have always acted

from the conviction that friendly relations to individual members of the Entente might diminish tension. On isolated questions we had come to a good understanding with Russia. I remind you of the Potsdam agreement. The relations between the Governments were not only correct, but were also inspired by personal confidence. But the general situation was not solved, because the revanche idea of France and the bellicose pan-Slavist attempts at expansion in Russia were continually encouraged by the anti-German policy of the balance of power of the London Cabinet. The tension thus grew to such an extent that it could not stand a serious test. Thus the Summer of 1914 arrived.

In England it is now asserted that war could have been avoided if I had agreed to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey to participate in a conference for the adjustment of the Russo-Austrian conflict. The English proposal for a conference was handed here on July 27 through the Ambassador. The Foreign Secretary in a conversation with Sir E. Goschen, in which he characterized the proposed method as unsuitable, declared that according to his information from Russia, M. Sazonoff was prepared for a direct exchange of opinion with Count Berchtold, and that direct discussion between St. Petersburg and Vienna might lead to a satisfactory result. Therefore it would be best, Herr von Jagow said, to await this discussion.

Sir E. Goschen reported this to London, and received Sir Edward Grey's answer, namely, that this would be a procedure which was by far to be preferred to all others. At that time Sir Edward Grey agreed to the German standpoint and expressly put aside his proposal for a conference. We especially pursued our mediatory action at Vienna in a form which approached to the last degree the line of what was consonant with our alliance. On July 29 the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg reported that M. Sazonoff had announced to him that the Vienna Cabinet categorically declined a direct discussion. Therefore, nothing else remained than to return to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey for a conversation of four. As the Vienna Government, meanwhile, declared itself prepared to agree to a direct exchange of opinion with St. Petersburg, it was obvious that a misunderstanding prevailed.

I telegraphed to Herr von Tschirschky, our Ambassador in Vienna, that we could not expect that Austria-Hungary should negotiate with Serbia, with whom she was in a state of war. But the refusal of any exchange of opinion with St. Petersburg would be a bad blunder. Though we were ready to fulfill our duty as an ally, we must decline to be drawn into a world conflagration by Austria-Hungary ignoring our advice. Herr von Tschirschky answered that Count Berchtold had declared that, in fact, a misunderstanding prevailed on the Russian side. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg had at once received corresponding instructions. When in England shortly before the war excitement increased and serious doubts became loud concerning our endeavors for the preservation of peace, I published this incident in the English press. And now the insinuation is spread that this incident never took place at all, and that the instructions to Herr von Tschirschky were inventions in order to mislead public opinion. You will agree with me that this accusation is not worthy of reply.

After clearing up the above-mentioned misunderstandings conversations began between St. Petersburg and Vienna, until they found a conclusion by general mobilization of the Russian Army. I repeat that we carried on direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg with the utmost vigor and success. The assertion that we, by a refusal of the English proposal of a conference, are guilty of this war belongs to the category of calumnies behind which our enemies wish to hide their own guilt. War became unavoidable solely by a Russian mobilization. We shall emerge as victoriously from the fight against these calumnies as from the great fight on the battlefield. Our and the Austro-Hungarian troops have reached the frontiers in the east defined by the Congress of Poland. Both now have the task of administering the country. For centuries geographical

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(Photo © by Harris & Ewing)

GENERAL VON GALLWITZ
In Command on the Narew River
(Photo from Medem Photo Service)

and political fate has forced the Germans and Poles to fight against each other. The recollection of these old differences does not diminish respect before the passion of patriotism and tenacity with which the Polish people defends its old Western civilization and its love of independence in the severe sufferings from Russoism, and a love which is maintained also through the misfortune of this war.

I hope that today's occupation of the Polish frontiers against the East represents the beginning of a development which will remove old contrasts between Germans and Poles, and will lead the country liberated from the Russian yoke to a happy future, so that it can foster and develop the individuality of its national life. The country occupied by us will be justly administered by us, with the assistance of its own population. As far as possible we will try to adjust the unavoidable difficulties of war, and will heal the wounds which Russia has inflicted on the country.

This war, the longer it lasts, will leave Europe bleeding from a thousand wounds. The world which will then arise shall and will not look as our enemies dream. They strive for the restitution of the old Europe, with powerless Germany as a tributary of a gigantic Russian Empire. No, this gigantic world's war will not bring back the old bygone situation. A new one must arise. If Europe shall come to peace it can only be possible by the inviolable and strong position of Germany. The English policy of the balance of power must disappear, because it is, as the English poet, Shaw, recently said, a hatching of other wars. When our Ambassador on Aug. 4 took leave of Sir Edward Grey, the latter said that this war which had broken out between England and Germany would at the conclusion of peace enable him to do us more valuable services than the neutrality of England would allow him. [General laughter.] Before his eyes the giant victorious Russia rose, and perhaps behind it defeated Germany. Then weakened Germany would have been good enough to be a vassal of her helper England.

Germany must thus consolidate, strengthen, and secure her position so that other powers can never again think of a policy of isolation. For our and other people's protection we must gain the freedom of the seas, not as England did, to rule over them, but that they should serve equally all peoples. We will be, and will remain, the shield of peace and freedom of big and small nations. We do not menace the little peoples of Germanic race. How busily are the diplomats of the Quadruple Entente engaged in influencing the Balkan peoples by telling them that the victory of the central powers would throw them into slavery, while the triumph of the Quadruple Entente would bring them freedom, independence, gain in territory, and economical thrift. It is only a few years ago that the hunger for power of Russia created, under the motto, " The Balkans for the Balkan people," the union which soon decayed through her favoring the Serbian breach of agreement toward Bulgaria. The German and Austro-Hungarian victories in Poland have freed the Balkans from Russian pressure. England was once the protector of the Balkans. As the ally of Russia she can only be the oppressor of their independence.

Hardly another great people in the last century has endured such sufferings as the Germans, and yet we can love this fate which gave us in such sufferings the spirit to accomplish gigantic deeds. For the empire, at last united, every year of peace was a gain, because we made best progress without war. We do not want war. Germany never strove for supremacy in Europe. Her ambition was to be predominant in peaceful competition with great and small nations in works for the general welfare of civilization. This war has shown of what greatness we are capable, relying on our own moral strength. The power that gave us the inner strength we cannot employ otherwise than in the direction of freedom. We do not hate the peoples who have been driven into war by their Governments. We shall hold on through the war till those peoples demand peace from the really guilty, till the road becomes free for the new liberated Europe, free of French intrigues, Muscovite desire of conquest, and English guardianship.

Reply to the Germam Chancellor

By Sir Edward Grey

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain

To the Editor of The London Daily Telegraph:

SIR: There are some points in the speech of the German Chancellor, made last week, which may, I think, be suitably dealt with in a letter to the press, pending the fuller review of the situation which may be appropriate to some other method and time. I will state the facts and the reflections they suggest as briefly and clearly as I can, and ask you to be good enough to make them public:

1. The Belgian record of conversation with the British Military Attaché was published by Germany last Autumn to prove that Belgium had trafficked her neutrality with us and was, in effect, in a plot with us against Germany.

The conversation of which most use has been made was never reported to the Foreign Office, nor, as far as records show, to the War Office at the time, and we saw a record of it for the first time when Germany published the Belgian record. But it bears on the face of it that it referred only to the contingency of Belgium being attacked, that the entry of the British into Belgium would take place only after the violation of Belgian territory by Germany, and that it did not commit the British Government. No convention or agreement existed between the British and Belgian Governments. Why does the German Chancellor mention these informal conversations of 1906 and ignore entirely that in April, 1913, I told the Belgian Minister most emphatically that what we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected and that as long as it was not violated by any other power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory?

Let it be remembered that the first use made by Germany of the Belgian document was to charge Belgium with bad faith to Germany. What is the true story? On July 29, 1914, the German Chancellor tried to bribe us by a promise of future Belgian independence to become a party to the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany. On the outbreak of war he described the Belgian treaty as a scrap of paper, and the German Foreign Secretary explained that Germany must go through Belgium to attack France, because she could not afford the time to do otherwise. The statement of Herr von Jagow is worth quoting again: "The Imperial Government had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as, if they had gone by the more southern route, they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition, entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops." In the Reichstag, too, on Aug. 4, 1914, the German Chancellor stated, in referring to the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg: "The wrong —I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained."

The violation of Belgian neutrality was therefore deliberate, although Germany had actually guaranteed that neutrality, and surely there has been nothing more despicably mean than the attempt to justify it ex posto facto by bringing against the innocent and inoffensive Belgian Government and people the totally false charge of having plotted against

Germany. The German Chancellor does not emphasize in his latest speech that charge, which has been spread broadcast against Belgium. Is it withdrawn? And, if so, will Germany make reparation for the cruel wrong done to Belgium?

2. The negotiations for an Anglo-German agreement in 1912, referred to by the German Chancellor, were brought to a point at which it was clear that they could have no success unless we in effect gave a promise of absolute neutrality while Germany remained free under her alliances to take part in European war. This can, and shall, be explained by publishing an account of the negotiations, taken from the records in the Foreign Office.

3. The Chancellor quotes an isolated sentence from my speech of Aug. 3, 1914, to prove that we were ready for war. In the very next sentence, which he might have quoted but does not quote, I said: "We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside." I leave it to any one outside Germany in any neutral country to settle for himself whether those are the words of a man who had desired and planned European war, or of one who had labored to avert it. The extent of the German Chancellor's misapplication of the isolated sentence which he quotes will be obvious to any one who reads the full context of the speech.

As to the other statement attributed to me; not even when we were perfectly free, when Japan, who was our ally, had not entered the war, and when we were not pledged to other allies as we are now by the agreement of Sept. 5, 1914, did I say anything so ridiculous or untrue as that it was in the interest of Germany that we had gone to war and with the object of restraining Russia.

4. The war would have been avoided if a conference had been agreed to. Germany on the flimsiest pretext shut the door against it. I would wreck nothing on a point of form, and expressed myself ready to acquiesce in any method of mediation that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. Mediation, I said, was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible, if only Germany would press the button in the interests of peace.

The German Chancellor, according to his speech, encouraged nothing except direct discussion between Vienna and Petrograd. But what chance had that of success when, as we heard afterward, the German Ambassador at Vienna was expressing the opinion that Russia would stand aside, and conveying to his colleagues the impression that he desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably colored his action there?

Some day, perhaps, the world will know what really passed between Germany and Austria respecting the ultimatum to Serbia and its consequences.

It has become only too apparent that in the proposal of a conference which we made, which Russia, France, and Italy agreed to, and which Germany vetoed, lay the only hope of peace. And it was such a good hope! Serbia had accepted nearly all of the Austrian ultimatum, severe and violent as it was. The points outstanding could have been settled honorably and fairly in a conference in a week. Germany ought to have known, and must have known, that we should take the same straight and honorable part in it that she herself recognized we had taken in the Balkan conference, working not for diplomatic victory of a group but for fair settlement, and ready to side against any attempt to exploit the conference unfairly to the disadvantage of Germany or Austria.

The refusal of a conference by Germany, though it did not decide British participation in the war, did, in fact, decide the question of peace or war for Europe and sign the death warrant of the many hundreds of thousands who have been killed in this war.

Nor must it be forgotten that the Emperor of Russia proposed to the German Emperor that the Austro-Serb dispute should be settled by The Hague Tribunal.

Is there one candid soul in Germany and Austria-Hungary who, looking back on the past year, does not regret that

neither the British nor Russian proposal was accepted?

5. And what is the German program as we gather it from the speech of the Chancellor and public utterances in Germany now? Germany to control the destiny of all other nations; to be "the shield of peace and freedom of big and small nations"—those are the Chancellor's words—an iron peace and a freedom under a Prussian shield and under German supremacy. Germany supreme, Germany alone would be free—free to break international treaties; free to crush when it pleased her; free to refuse all mediation; free to go to war when it suited her; free, when she did go to war, to break again all rules of civilization and humanity on land and at sea; and, while she may act thus, all her commerce at sea is to remain as free in time of war as all commerce is in time of peace. Freedom of the sea may be a very reasonable subject for discussion, definition, and agreement between nations after this war; but not by itself alone, not while there is no freedom and no security against war and German methods of war on land. If there are to be guarantees against future war, let them be equal, comprehensive, and effective guarantees that bind Germany as well as other nations, including ourselves.

Germany is to be supreme. The freedom of other nations is to be that which Germany metes out to them. Such is apparently the conclusion to be drawn from the German Chancellor's speech; and to this the German Minister of Finance adds that the heavy burden of thousands of millions must be borne through decades, not by Germany, but by those whom she is pleased to call the instigators of the war. In other words, for decades to come Germany claims that whole nations who have resisted her should labor to pay her tribute in the form of war indemnities.

Not on such terms can peace be concluded or the life of other nations than Germany be free, or even tolerable. The speeches of the German Chancellor and Finance Minister make it appear that Germany is fighting for supremacy and tribute. If that is so, and as long as it is so, our allies and we are fighting, and must fight, for the right to live, not under German supremacy, but in real freedom and safety. Your obedient servant,

E. GREY.

Foreign Office, Aug. 25, 1915.

How Germany Saved Her Merchant Fleet

Godfrey Isaacs, Managing Director of Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Company, Ltd., at its last annual meeting in London related how the Germans tried to save their mercantile marine by a wireless message sent out at 5 o'clock on Aug. 4, seven hours before war was declared. Germany's chain of wireless stations in all her colonies cost her £2,000,000. He said:

In the light of what subsequently happened, you will probably say that it was a very bad investment; but you would be mistaken. You will remember that this country declared war on Germany at midnight on Aug. 4 last. At 5 o'clock in the afternoon of Aug. 4 Germany sent out a message to all its wireless stations, which passed that message on from one to another, and sent it out to sea, covering a radius of something like 2,000 miles or more—a message to this effect:

War declared upon England.
Make as quickly as you can for a neutral port.

By that message, which occupied but a few minutes, Germany contrived to save the greater part of its mercantile marine. If it had but saved one of its big ships—the Vaterland or any one of that class—it would have paid for the whole cost of these wireless stations. We all know that it was a great deal more than that, and it did a great deal more than send this message to its mercantile marine. But I don't think I am permitted to go further or to tell you any more than I have told you with regard to the saving of the mercantile marine.

Billions for Germany's War

By Karl Helfferich

German Secretary of the Treasury

The subjoined speech by Karl Helfferich, Germany's Treasurer, was made in the Reichstag on Aug. 20, 1915. It preceded the addition of $7,500,000,000 to the first German war loans amounting to $5,000,000,000. The speech is translated from the official German verbatim report.

QUESTION OF MEMBER, Dr. LIEBKNECHT (Social Democrat)—Is the Government, in case of corresponding readiness of the other belligerents, ready, on the basis of the renunciation of annexations of every kind, to enter into immediate peace negotiations?

SECRETARY OF STATE von JAGOW—I believe that I shall meet the wishes of the great majority of this House if I decline to answer the question of the member, Dr. Liebknecht, as at the present time injudicious. [Energetic storm of "Bravos." Member Dr. Liebknecht cries: "We want peace!" Resounding merriment.]

There follows the second consideration of the supplementary statement of the costs of the war.

COUNT WESTARP, (Conservative,) bringing in the report—In the case of the loan which we last voted, a contribution of 200,000,000 marks was set aside for the nursing of maternity cases and for the support of the wounded and the unemployed. The Government has promised to increase this fund this time also. It has been raised chiefly for the support of maternity cases. Unemployment has not developed to such a degree that large sums have had to be applied for it, but this is always possible in the future. The commission has decided unanimously to recommend to you the granting of the loan. The commission is convinced that not one of our enemies is up to the present willing to give up the plan of annihilating Germany, to say nothing of being ready to make peace, on the basis of our just demands after this war which has been forced upon us. The commission considers the way proposed for raising the costs of the war satisfactory. It has also convinced itself that our national economy is in a position to bear the newly proposed loan, and that in the furthest circles of the nation there exist the will and the joyful readiness to raise the loan. Greater sacrifices than the greatest financial sacrifices are made by our brothers in the field, offering their lives to save our fields from devastation. The whole German people is firmly determined, in this battle, so long as it lasts, to offer every further sacrifice, until we reach a peace which shall correspond to the just requirements of the security and the future of the German Empire. [Loud applause.] In the name of the commission, I ask for an acceptance of the measure before you which shall be as nearly as possible unanimous. [Applause on all sides.]

THE SPEECH.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY HELFFERICH: In itself the proposition before you needs no vindication nor proof. But, as we stand on the threshold of the second year of the war, we wish to give to the German people, to neutrals, and also to the world of our enemies, a picture of our financial situation. Up to the present, for war purposes, the Reichstag has granted 20,000,000,000 marks, ($5,000,000,000,) and with the present proposition the total will be 30,000,000,000, ($7,500,000,000.) One has often the impression that in this war we have in some degree lost the sense of large figures. ["Quite right!"] We must seek new standards. The 20,000,000,000 marks granted so far represent approximately the value of the German railroad system, with all adjuncts, and the entire rolling stock. ["Hear, hear!"] In spite of this we already need an increase of the existent credits, in view of the enormous

and constantly increasing strain on all our powers in this inexorable battle for the life and future of our people. Each month the war devours the mighty sum of 2,000,000,000 marks, ($500,000,000.) [" Hear, hear! "] This amount, which one month of war now costs, is a third higher than the entire cost of the war of 1870-71. [Loud cries of " Hear, hear! "] We wish to look these figures and the truth in the eyes unterrified. We shall consent to no self-deception as to the greatness of the undertakings which have yet to be performed, as to the weight of the sacrifices which have yet to be made. [" Quite right! "] It is a frightful time that is laid upon the German people and the whole world. We shall not meet this time with big words. [Assent on all sides.] We must be sober and come to a clear understanding that the second year of the war will be more difficult than the first. New problems stand before us, old problems become more difficult. But we must remember that the means which are necessary to carry the matter through become constantly greater than the means expended up to the present. However heavy all these problems may be, we shall not and can not draw back from them. The German people knew from the beginning of the war what sacrifices must be made in this war. Every German knows today also why these sacrifices are made and

THAT THEY WILL NOT BE MADE IN VAIN.

[Loud applause.] The best foundation for this proposition is the unanimous will of the people to prosecute the war to a victorious end, to a peace for which we can answer before ourselves, our children and grandchildren. [Loud applause.] But we are not so far yet that our enemies are compelled to declare themselves defeated; they are still struggling, although hard hit, against the thought that their cause is lost, that they may soon be compelled to save what can be saved and to offer us security for the future. So long as our enemies do not consent to draw the necessary consequences from our invincibility and from our victories, arms are our only means to convince them, [" Quite right! "] so long must and shall we make every sacrifice that the war imposes on us. For the raising of the credit now proposed, this time also the method of a loan will be taken. The grounds that I brought forward in March to show that war taxes, so long as this is practicable, should not be introduced continue to exist today. We are unwilling to raise by taxation the heavy burden which our people bears so long as there is no imperious necessity for this. A heavier burdening of the consumer would, with the already high prices, be as great a mistake as a heavier burdening of commerce. The direct taxes will be raised hereafter in part in the separate States of the empire and will be followed up more strictly. Concerning the

WAR PROFIT TAXES

I can say this: In the conference of the Finance Ministers of the States of the empire, a fundamental unanimity of opinion was reached. It is a question of a proposed law, which must be thoroughly worked out in detail, for the matter is not yet so far matured. According to our view, the raising of such a tax —I say expressly raising—can only be carried on after the conclusion of the war, for only then will it be possible for those concerned to see clearly the financial changes which the war has brought to them. The Governments of the States of the empire are convinced that the establishment of the idea of war profit taxation without objection is a fiscal impossibility. And on the other hand, the confederated Governments are of the opinion that all those who, during the period of the war, in contrast with the great mass of their fellow-nationals, have been in a position to increase their means to a considerable degree, are also in a position, and under an obligation to contribute to the burden of the war in a larger degree than through the ordinary taxes. [" Bravo! "] Our leaning has been toward the imperial property increase tax. Property increase through inheritance from near relations shall remain free from taxation, and on this point there is complete harmony. The special tax on war profits as a contribution to the cost of the war shall be pay-

able not only in cash but also by war loan certificates. Therefore the expectation or apprehension of such taxation need keep no one from subscribing to the war loan. [Great hilarity.] All countries have had to have recourse to loans. Even England, which, in the first months of the war, proudly announced that war expenses would be financed to a considerable extent by taxation has now come to another view. It is well known that by raising the income tax, by the tax on beer and the tax on tea, England last Autumn covered only some 5 per cent. of the cost of the first year of the war. A second project was given up in the Spring of the present year, without noise or discussion. And if the Government takes under consideration the question of taxing wages, which have up to the present remained free from taxation, it meets with so much resistance that the fate of the undertaking cannot remain in doubt. If we wish to have the power to settle the terms of peace according to our necessities and our requirements, then we must not forget the question of cost. [" Quite right! "] We must have in view that the whole future life activity of our people, so far as this is at all possible, shall be free from burdens. [" Quite right! "]

THE LEADEN WEIGHT OF BILLIONS

has been earned by the instigators of this war; in the future, let them, rather than we, drag them about after them. [Loud applause.] We know well that it is a question here of a problem of unusual difficulty, but everything that can be done in this direction will be done. [" Bravo! "] The granting of the war credit has as its counterpart the realization of this credit by the floating of the loan. The public knows that the issue of a third war loan is imminent. Our preparations are to a great degree made. In a few days an invitation to subscribe will appear in the newspapers. Toward covering the previous expenditures, there were also available the war treasure which was in existence before the outbreak of the war, and the balances of the Imperial Treasury. In the same manner the surplus of the account of the ordinary budget of the last fiscal year was devoted to the same end. In March I estimated the surplus at 38,000,000 marks, but the final statement showed that it amounted to 219,000,000 marks. [" Hear, hear! "] That is a very fair sum, but for the further conduct of the war we need much more considerable means. The material forces which gave to the first two loans a result out of proportion to all expectations, are today as firm and strong as ever. The enormous sums which the empire required have remained almost wholly within the country, they have gone to our soldiers, to our agriculturists, to our industry, to both workmen and employers, and in part

HAVE BECOME A NEW RESERVE CAPITAL.

You can convince yourselves of this if you examine the development of our loan banks. At the time of the first large payment on the second war loan payments into the loan banks amounted to 1,500,000,000 marks and more. Payments from the loan banks amounted to 536,000,000 marks in advances, which were devoted to the aim of making payments on the war loan. In the interval payments from the loan banks have diminished to 292,000,000 marks. This is not more than 3 per cent. of the total amount of the second war loan. [" Hear, hear! "] I wish our enemies would also say, " Hear, hear." [Laughter.] It is spread abroad by our enemies that the success of our war loans is only an illusion, that they are financed with bills of exchange of the loan banks. [Laughter.] I happen to have here The Daily Telegraph, a relatively decent sheet. [" Hear, hear! "] In it it is related that our loan banks accept everything that is brought to them, down to toothpicks and chafing dishes. [Laughter.] You may laugh at this, but you must also clearly understand that these systematically propagated calumnies, these depreciations of our financial position and of everything that happens in Germany, work great detriment to us in neutral lands, and it is altogether to our interest that this web of lies concerning our finances should be torn to pieces. [" Quite right! "] The German people may be proud of our savings banks. In 1913 their deposits increased a billion marks.

ST. MICHAEL'S COLLEGE LIBRARY

In 1914, in spite of the state of war, the deposits increased 900,000,000 marks, although considerable payments were made from the savings bank books on the first war loan. In the first six months of this year the increase amounted to almost a billion and a half marks. ["Hear, hear!"] Of course, the amount was almost wholly applied to payments of the war loan on the part of the savings banks, these payments amounting to 1,800,000,000 marks. But today it can be said that the savings banks are once more completely intact; they have a balance of 20,000,000,000 marks more than at any time previous to the outbreak of the war. Matters stand equally favorable with regard to the banks. Here, also, after the heavy payments made on account of the second war loan, capital has reached its former level, and even risen above it. The fluidity of money is a sign of financial strength and health, and to some degree it took the direction of Stock Exchange speculation. But a slight hint was sufficient to bring a check to this tendency and to broaden the understanding that there are better possibilities today for the use of money than speculations.

ALL MONEY BELONGS TO THE FATHERLAND.

War loan stock is now the best form of capital. [Applause.] Free activity on the Stock Exchange has hitherto in reality confined itself within certain limits, and the first warning brought it to full recognition. Now, in the case of the third war loan, we are going to bring all our forces into motion and action. To this end we have still further extended the organization which worked so well in the case of the first two loans. To begin with, we shall bring all the Post Offices of the empire into the work of subscription, and we shall also allow fractional payments to 100 marks for the small subscriptions under 1,000 marks. We further hope, after the good and effective examples of the last loan, to enlist the co-operation of employers, in order that they may facilitate the participation of their workers and employes, in small subscriptions. Further, we shall give out intermediate certificates, in order that the subscriber to the loan may have something in his hands as soon as possible. The cessation of the issue of intermediate certificates in the case of the second loan caused undesirable situations. We shall enlist co-operation for the new loan to an even larger degree than in the case of the first two. But sensational advertisement, such as England employs in floating her war loans, we shall avoid. [Applause.] It does not suit German taste to involve the serious matter of war in circus advertisements. ["Quite right!"] And we do not need, as England does, to tell our subscribers that they are conferring a favor on the Fatherland when they subscribe for the loan. The German does not make presents or give alms to his Fatherland, but

HE FULFILLS HIS DUTY.

[Loud applause.] Instead, we shall, as hitherto, bring the widest possible circles into co-operation in the work of floating the loan; the representatives of the local Governments, the clergy, and, before all, we count on you, the chosen representatives of the people. The administration of imperial finance will support you to the utmost of its power. As far as concerns the interest on the new loan, we shall remain on the simple, straight path which has hitherto brought us such excellent results. The 5 per cent. war loan is the most genuinely national paper that Germany has ever had. ["Quite right!"] We shall only raise slightly the price of issue, thanks to our financial strength. For the rest, we shall leave experimenting with alluring financial tricks and sensational attractions to our opponents. The certain feeling of strength and power shows itself always in simplicity. [Applause.] We can be all the more proud of our financial situation when we look at it in comparison with the financial relations of our enemies. According to exact investigations, the total costs of this world war for all participants are estimated to run to about 300,000,000 marks ($75,000,000) daily. ["Hear, hear!"] This makes about 8,000,000,000 marks a month, and for the year in round numbers,

ABOUT A HUNDRED BILLIONS.

["Hear, hear!"] This is the greatest de-

struction of values and dislocation of values that the world has ever seen. Of single countries, until a short time ago, Germany had borne the heaviest burden. But since then England has outstripped us. There the daily expenditures for war purposes have reached the total of £4,-000,000, that is, more than 80,000,000 marks. ["Hear, hear!"] We shall not grudge to England, which places so high the idea of the "record," this superiority, [laughter,] especially since the English themselves have the feeling that we are accomplishing more with smaller means. Only a short time ago a member of the English upper house said that he had the impression that a pound went further in Germany than three pounds in England. ["Hear, hear!"] I could give examples of the truth that in certain fields the Lord underestimated these relations to a noteworthy degree. [Renewed cries of "Hear, hear!"] As to the totals of the two groups of belligerents, taken in round numbers, the expenditures fall as follows: To the coalition of our enemies fall nearly two-thirds of all expenditures, to us and our allies a little more than one-third of the cost of the war. ["Hear, hear!"] Of the belligerent countries, up to the present only Germany, England, and Austria-Hungary have covered an amount worth mentioning of their war costs by long-term consolidated loans. England has raised from 18,000,000,000 to 19,000,000,000 marks, of which some 12,000,000,000 to 13,000,000,-000 should be paid in. We stand today at a paid-up total of 13,000,000,000, and with the impending war loan, as I confidently hope, also with regard to subscriptions, and the sums assured for the prosecution of the war, we are ahead of every one. Our ally Austria-Hungary has a long-term loan of nearly 8,000,000,000 kroner ($1,600,000,000) on the market, which, in view of the condition of industry, national wealth and national prosperity in Austria-Hungary,

DESERVES THE HIGHEST RECOGNITION.

[Loud cries of "Bravo!"] In order to make this clear to you, I compare France, which remains far behind the sums which I have hitherto named. The net return of her long-term loan, the Obligation de défense national, today hardly reaches 2,000,000,000 francs, ($400,000,000,) something like one-quarter of what Austria-Hungary has up to the present done in the domain of long-term loans. All the rest of her financial war needs France has supplied by short-term credits, 8,000,-000,000 francs; she has borrowed 16,500,-000,000 francs from the Bank of France and, on very oppressive terms, has obtained a credit of 1,500,000,000 francs from England. Of Russia, Italy, and the smaller Entente powers I shall say nothing, for one should not be cruel without need even to one's enemies. [Loud laughter.] Not only with reference to the amount of the sums, but also the way in which they were raised, I think I can safely say that on this point also we have shown incontestable superiority. France,

THE LAND OF THE RENTIER,

has hardly, so far, got as far as a regular loan, the beforementioned obligations were not offered for subscription, but were gradually sold like Treasury certificates. Lately, interest-bearing paper certificates of 20 and 5 francs have been announced. From time to time they are wont to talk of future great consolidated loans, but France has always decided that the time for that had not come yet. And England, the land of 2½ per cent. consols, tried first with a 3½ per cent. loan, of which indeed 7,500,000,000 marks was subscribed; but the loan which was issued at 95 went down already on the first day below the price of issue, a sign that the loan was badly supported. In an hour of weakness the writer of The Times financial reports not long ago let out the fact that so much had been said about the brilliant result, that capitalists had not thought it necessary to show especial zeal, so that the great banks immediately before closing had to make special efforts in order to save the situation. But the English market was burdened with it, and no further headway could be made. The loan which should have lasted until the end of July, was used up by the end of March. They helped them-

selves out with Treasury exchanges, but the press of buyers remained absent. Only very recently have they again undertaken the emission of a great loan. Meanwhile

THE MAN OF "SILVER BULLETS,"

Lloyd George, has not found his confidence justified. The rate of interest was set at 4½ per cent., which, together with the far-reaching rights of conversion, means an actual interest basis of more than 4 per cent. The loan which, according to the declaration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the House of Commons, was to cover the war needs until March, 1916, has brought some £600,000,000; this amount will have been used up by September. Even this result was only reached, for this I call The Times to witness, because the great banks decided on the last day—of course quite voluntarily [laughter]—to raise their subscriptions to twice the amount of the previous sums. In all, in round numbers £200,000,000 were subscribed by the banks, although the Chancellor of the Exchequer had shortly before declared that he did not want a bank loan, but wanted a national loan. To this course of things in France and England I place this fact as a contrast, that in our own case, with the two loans, the price never for a single day fell below the price of issue, but, on the contrary,

ALWAYS KEPT ABOVE THE PRICE OF ISSUE,

that we were able to issue the second loan at 1 per cent. higher than the first, and with the new loan we shall set the price of issue yet a little higher. If, then, the old proverb still has its meaning, that to make war you need money, then even our enemies will see how favorable our position is on the financial war stage also. If we consider the standard national securities in England, France, and Germany before the war, we shall find that the 3 per cent. French rente has fallen about 20 per cent., in England the 3½ per cent. consols touched a low mark of 65, and have since fallen even lower. Our German national securities, on the contrary, show a fall of only 8 to 9 per cent. So in this respect also we cut the best figure. ["Bravo!"] But here also our enemies have invented false pretenses to prove that we are bleeding to death. From time to time the London Stock Exchange quotes our 3 per cent. imperial loans. A short time ago the Stock Exchange quoted them at 49½. [Laughter.] In vain did I put myself to great trouble, by circuitous ways through neutral foreign countries, to buy German Government loans at this excellent price. [Loud laughter.] Such an opportunity, I said to myself, would never return. [Renewed laughter.] But I did not succeed in obtaining a single stock certificate. [Prolonged laughter.] But such rates are not made for us, nor for the English, for they will not buy our paper, but for Messieurs the French. There the rate of 49½ is accepted with enthusiasm.

A further favorable sign for us is that the Imperial Bank has raised its gold stock more than a billion marks since the war began.

OUR GOLD RESERVE

is today 5.4 per cent. better than in England and about 8 per cent. better than in France, but in spite of this firmly established fact, untruths are sent abroad in foreign lands on this point also. Thus The Times wrote that the increase of the stock of gold of the Imperial Bank is due to the fact that we took over the stock of gold of the Austro-Hungarian banks. [Laughter.] Of course, we are helping our allies financially also; our German banks have helped the Austro-Hungarian monarchy to make certain financial transactions, in agreement with the direction of the empire; we have also in respect of the Turks, who are fighting so splendidly, [cries of "Bravo!"] fulfilled our financial duties as allies, and shall continue to do so. We have not haggled with our allies, we have not taken money from them. To regard our allies as objects of expropriation is not the German way; that we leave to the Britons. ["Bravo!"]

Now, as to our foreign rate of exchange. I took the trouble to show you earlier on what combination of circumstances our foreign rate of exchange rests. Things have not improved, but they have become no worse; the matter

stands in about the same condition as in the month of March. This after another half year of war is an advance, in spite of the common proverb that to be stationary is to recede. Meanwhile the derision of the French and the English on this point has disappeared. Proud England is fighting a doubtful battle to maintain the exchange of sterling against its ever-increasing depreciation. Recently it has gone down about 5 per cent. [" Hear, hear! "] In March the exchange value of France was still at par. Today 100 Swiss francs cost 110 French francs. In New York the depreciation is 16 per cent.; the French exchange is now worse than the German. But the French have a speedy consolation ready. The French Finance Minister Ribot has calmed the French in Paris with the following words: " There exists no deprecation of our credit; there are simply certain difficulties in paying." [Loud laughter.] According to the report, these words were received with general expressions of " Très bien! " [Renewed laughter.]

Now I come back to the chief and essential matter, to the root, which is

THE SECRET OF OUR SUCCESS ON THE FINANCIAL STAGE.

The secret does not lie in what is generally called wealth. In this the British Empire, and per head of population, France also excel us. The wealth of Germany does not rest on savings, it much more truly embraces our entire commercial and technical apparatus. It consists above all in our people's power of work, employed in war and for the war. What the war has consumed, is not our money, it is the sum of war material and means of support, which our people now, thank God, on its own soil, by straining every energy, is able to produce ever anew. The money we use, we do not use up, it is with money as with the railroads which bring us the things we need. As the railroad cars roll along well filled to their destinations, so the money rolls out of the Imperial Bank, and flows back into it again by way of the war loans. Good financing is as important for the conduct of the war as a good railway system. But even the best railway system would be good for nothing, if there is nothing to transport, and the best money system is useless, if work does not produce the things which are needed to carry on the war. Where money rolls across the frontiers, in order to complete the war material and the supply of food, it does not roll back so easily, and interruptions occur, such as we see in the case of our opponents. If our enemies wish to repair their gold machine and study our example, this will only profit them when they can imitate the power of production of our industry, when they can imitate our workers and employers in every branch of production. And this they cannot do, they can do it as little as they can imitate our army. [" Quite right! "] Much more belongs to this than insight born of need. Thereto belong generations of co-operation, thereto belongs

AN IRON EDUCATION,

thereto belongs consciousness of duty and discipline, thereto belongs a nationality welded together by a history of millenniums. [Loud applause.] Against this nationality, the might and the malice of our enemies will be shattered. We carry the consciousness of victory within us. We feel the promise of victory redoubled within us in these days when, amid the thunder of our guns, enemy forts fall, where every one feels the approach of great decisions, where the wing-flapping of world history is audible in the smallest hut also. We know the nation is saturated with the consciousness and the will to exert and to apply all its forces, as well in the contest in the field, and in the fight against the forts, as in the war of industry. Therefore I hope that what you now grant, will be subscribed by the whole people. No one will exclude himself. They who have remained at home, will thereby contribute to bring us, by overwhelming successes, nearer to victory and to peace, the German peace which will perfect the work of 1812 and 1870, the peace which shall assure to us and to our allies a lasting security, a peace which shall control the passions of turbulent peoples, and give to the German Nation the warrant to maintain its place in the world, and to fulfill its mission. [Loud, long-continued applause.]

Human Documents of Battle

Personal First-Hand Experiences of Men At or Near the Front

Written in the hurry and confusion of the campaign, the subjoined personal accounts of experiences by soldiers and eyewitnesses at the front, while at times inaccurate and incomplete, convey in a unique manner the vivid details and atmosphere of the war—an atmosphere that must be lacking in the future histories of the conflict. Perhaps never in the wars of the past have the scenes of the clash of armies been brought so immediately and realistically before the eyes of the world. The letters from German soldiers appeared recently in the German press.

With the Turks on the Plains of Troy

From a German Officer's Letter

WE rode toward our positions in the direction of Troy. The terrible uproar continued. Under special orders I took a ride along through the country. Those of the poor inhabitants who had still dared to remain in the villages on the coast now began their final and hasty retreat to the interior. Everywhere I met their carts loaded with their few belongings, the owners following on foot. I came to Tschiblak, a village in the neighborhood of the Trojan ruins. By the walls women and children were crowded in fear, huddled together immovable. I comforted as well as I was able their anxious spirits. Roundabout burst the shells. At every explosion a cry of fear from the natives, who believed the enemy coming ever closer. I had to ride on. Behind Troy then for several hours I watched with the telescope the stretches of coast. Finally, toward 4 o'clock, came orders to ride forward toward Kum Kaleh. We met long columns of Turkish infantry on the march, with artillery between and ammunition carts.

Finally, we safely found our way through the continual hail of shells and settled on a hill from which a good deal of the region in which the battle was being fought could be observed. From dispatch riders and returning officers we gathered details. * * * About a division had landed—French Colonial troops and Senegalese. They had come ashore in small boats and sought to gain ground. * * * A portion of the Senegal negroes wanted to go over to their Turkish co-religionists and had hoisted a white flag. When the sign of surrender was noticed on the ships they fired from there into the ranks of their own fighters. So only a few succeeded in making their way to the side of the Turks. Those who came over told of preposterous tales. To give them enthusiasm for the war the English had told them the Turks had turned over to the Germans the Holy Places of Islam, Mecca, and Medina, and England with the Allies was about to bring the blasphemers to account and to win back these places so holy to the Moslems.

Kum Kaleh was stormed ten times, bloody street fights were continually taking place in which the bayonet played the chief rôle. Toward 9 o'clock, when the tumult had reached its height, the enemy was shooting like mad from his ships with high explosive shells and shrapnel, while two searchlights lit up the scene of battle as with daylight and searched the ground behind. I received orders to bring up a battalion standing ready at Troy and to guide it through the swampy Meander plain toward Kum Kaleh. It was an adventurous ride in the pitch-dark night; roads there were hardly at all, and we had to ride by guess. Finally, I safely reached my destination, and, more quickly than I had expected, put the battalion on the march and led it to the battlefield. No decision

had been reached when I arrived there at midnight. * * *

In the course of the afternoon of the next day the first prisoners came in—French territorials, including a Captain and negroes. The Captain had fought in Flanders, then in Southern Alsace. One thing could be gathered from the equipment found with wounded and prisoners, that the whole expedition had been fitted out to the smallest detail with all possible means. Preserves in great quantities, faultless clothing and durable footwear, folding wire entanglements, all sorts of engineering tools, immense masses of wine and foodstuffs. Even strong Flanders horses had been brought ashore. Especially excellent were the maps. * * *

Toward evening came more booty and the joyful news that the enemy had been finally defeated, and, leaving hundreds of dead, had fled to his ships. As far as possible they had taken the fallen Frenchmen with them, leaving the negroes, apparently without exception.

Attack on the Heights of the Meuse

A German Soldier's Letter from the Field

WHAT has happened here in recent days you know from the newspapers, but the meagre words of the chief command give after all only a very incomplete conception of the notable work done here. * * *

The preparations had been completed. On the 24th of April at noon the dance was to begin. At 5 o'clock in the morning the batteries began their fire; from 10 to 11 heavy effective shooting was carried on in slow rhythm. From 11 to 12 deep quiet. Sharply at 12—away! Mortars, heavy and light field howitzers, field guns bellow all at once in salvos and an iron hail falls on the foremost trenches while other field batteries direct their fire behind these positions so that nothing shall be allowed to escape. Until 12:20 all the guns fire for all they are worth. When you consider that even the more slowly working heavy howitzers during these twenty minutes fired 250 shots (as a battery) you can get some weak conception of this lovely rain of shells. Sharp on the dot of 12:20 the fire is transferred to the second line, sharply at 12:30 to the third, and after another twenty minutes behind the third, or, rather, that was how it was intended to be. But things came differently. I must explain here that we, that is, the chief of artillery, (my General,) has direct wires to the general command, to the chief command of the army, and to all points issuing commands to the infantry. Their ends all come together in our little room where orders are given.

MEUSE HEIGHTS.

I sit at the telephone:

"12:20—Our infantry moves to attack."

Every one is keyed up to the utmost. Will they get through with one rush? Will they get to close quarters? Will the ten minutes be sufficient for the second line of the enemy, usually the most to be feared? All this flashes like lightning through the brain.

The bell rings.

"12:24—The regiment has taken the first trench!"

A lighting up of all faces, but yet they repress the flame of joy that is ready to spring up.

"12:32—The enemy clears out of the second trench!"

"12:35—Our infantry is pressing into the second line."

Now here and there a "Hurrah" can hardly be held back.

"12:44—Our infantry has reached the third trench. Lay the fire ahead."

"12:50—The third trench is taken."

"12:52 (report of the artillery observer who accompanies the storming troops and carries the telephone forward

with him)—I cannot get forward in the sap. Everything is filled with prisoners!"

"12:52—Transfer the fire ahead 500 meters; our men are not to be held!"

And now the excitement breaks loose. Hurrah, and again hurrah.

That's how our field-grays storm! Five months of work building defenses against them and in twenty minutes these splendid fellows were through. The artillery, according to unanimous opinion, had made first-class preparation, and his Excellency said, beamingly: "The wire entanglements hung in the trees!" And then comes the report that makes the artilleryman feel his heart leap:

"12:59—We have the first two guns."

"1:20—Send forward six limbers to take away captured cannon!" And so it went on. Total result of the first day that brought us nearly to the edge of the heights: 1,600 prisoners, 17 guns. The losses on this day were comparatively light, as the enemy was completely swamped in the rush.

Epinal

A German Letter from the Front

MORE than nine months now we have been in the enemy's country. Nine months! We have seen the harvest brought in, in part also go to ruin. Gradually the Winter came. Snow and ice spread over our paths and the trenches. It was a hard time for man and horse, but it had its good side. You became accustomed to the Winter positions, and it was fairly quiet, both with friend and foe. Then came the Spring sweeping through the land. The frozen crust of Winter broke and new life entered nature and man. Spring and war; the month of May with its "become!" the war with its destruction. What contrasts! I find this the most trying time for the nerves.

There is bloom, and fragrance, and chirping, and the renewing of life everywhere. Never before did the Spring seem so glorious to me. We city people perhaps have hardly had the opportunity so to observe it and marvel at it. Instinctively one clings more intensely to this beautiful earth. And therefore one has no joy of one's life. Who guarantees from one second to another this gloriously blooming tree? Perhaps it will strike you, you building red-throats under our eaves. Perhaps that pioneer so exuberant in strength who there chats with the young Frenchwoman, perhaps her, perhaps you, before you have finished writing these lines.

And as I happened to be speaking of the Frenchwoman—it is a thing to marvel at how these people here have accommodated themselves to their position. And, what is this of Epinal? I do not know the place, but I remember still from school it is a French city, or a fortress. I believe that since that time, some fifteen years ago, I have hardly ever heard the name or read it. Then came the war. Soon we were on the soil of France. There was talk here and there. You asked the women and girls about their husbands, sons, and brothers. "A Epinal." And I ask them still today. "Epinal, Epinal!" And Autumn came and Winter and it has become Spring again and they hold fast to their Epinal, as if those were there on an excursion or a business trip. For nine months none here has heard a word. And they believe them all there. How different with us! These people here hear nothing but German; only among themselves perhaps they gossip and guess and know nothing of losses and mischance and of all theirs. Only the men in field gray they see coming and going, these men in field gray who help them plow their fields and sow them, build their streets and convert their manure

piles into gardens. And if perchance they hear their own bells ringing because of a German victory, they shrug their shoulders in disbelief. They surely believe that, through accident, this little piece of earth that is their own alone is occupied by the enemy.

The Spring came and the Summer is advancing, and the day of peace will come, some time or other, overnight, perhaps. What an awakening will that be in France! After the war the French garrisons and the trenches will open and then homeward will wend what remains of this France, poor in men even without this. And the mothers, sisters, brides, will stand then in the streets and wait for those whom they imagined in Paris, Lyons, Belfort, and who do not come. And see those who are coming, with sticks and crutches, and those that must be brought in carriages. Then will the eyes of these poor ones be opened.

The day will come! Who of us will live to see it? In any event it will be well if we do not live to see it here. I would not like to be present when they stand here and wait for those from Epinal—of whom so many even from the war's beginning, scattered in field and forest, the earth covers, on whose common graves German fellow-feeling has erected a wooden cross bearing words such as these:

"Here lie 150 brave French soldiers
of the regiments ——
Erected by German comrades of the ——
regiment."

A. N.

A Frankfort Boy

A German Letter from the Field

WHEN I came back wounded from France and lay in the hospital at Sachsenhausen they brought me a newspaper in which was told of a man of the Landwehr who had captured thirty Russians and who asserted he had "surrounded" them all. With my fellow-sufferers there I laughed over it. If then I could have imagined that I myself would succeed in such an "encircling" I certainly should have had doubts about it. And when I tell you that with two men I captured 210 Russians and a baggage train of 30 wagons and four field kitchens!—well, in short, I'll have to tell you how it happened. It was before Eydtkulmen; had been with my two men all night in the saddle, with 18 degrees of cold, and an empty stomach, riding on a stiff trot toward Deeden, when about 200 meters before me I suddenly see Russians coming out of all the houses; two houses the rascals had just set afire. At the first house I halt and take cover, as several shots fall. Suddenly three Russians come running around the house directly into my arms; my revolver points out to them where they are to put their weapons. Luckily for me there was one of them who spoke German, and I yell at him to go at once to his men and to say that I have in the near-by forest five machine guns and Uhlans at my disposal who will at once open fire on the column if another shot falls from their side. He quickly calls out to his men in Russian what I have said, and just as quickly they throw away all arms. While I am occupied with the prisoners shots again fall, and I see 150 meters away by the side of a cemetery a trench with about another 30 men. I left the prisoners in charge of my two men and had the baggage train which was standing in the field under protection drive up on to the highway, helping them along with revolver and lance. On a trot I drove toward Eydtkulmen; just before this place I came to the —— Division, to which I turned over the train. The Major to whom I delivered the 30 wagons and the field kitchens could hardly believe me, but when soon thereafter my two men with the column of 210 prisoners arrived he congratulated me and presented me to the commander of the —— Division.

Horrors of the Dukla Pass

By Alden Brooks

The following episodes are described in recent Bucharest correspondence of Alden Brooks to THE NEW YORK TIMES, headed "In the Backwash of Austria's Army."

WE reached a small village called Szvidnik, where there was a long stretch of grass beside the road upon which the cattle could graze, and where every one could take a rest before mounting up at last steeply over the hills.

We looked into the windows of several of the houses. Everywhere we met the stare of silent wounded Russians lying on straw and mattresses. Further on was a little chapel flying a red cross on the relic of its roof. Inside every available yard, right up to the altars, was covered with these same miserable wounded Russians. They had been there for over a week now without proper care. We wandered among them. The air was very foul; there were flies; there were a few stifled groans here and there, and it was all very sad. A few were asleep, a few were in pain, a few were dying, a few were already dead; but the great majority lay there staring silently with curious, sleepless eyes. One of them suddenly began to whisper to me in broken German. He spoke with tears of six bullets in him and his right leg broken. Could I get him a piece of paper to put over his head and keep off the flies? It was the least I could do.

There was a priest outside, a stout, amiable man. All these, it seemed, would probably die, gangrene was so far advanced in every instance. Removing them was a mere matter of form, and in any case a long undertaking. There was the Austrian and German wounded to be cared for first. We drove the cart under a tree in a sort of garden and ate bread and sausages, bought in Bartfa. There were some soldiers close by, sitting around a fire. They were arguing about something, and, just after we had sat down, two of them began to go for each other in earnest, one an Austrian, the other a German. The German was getting the best of it when there suddenly appeared a young German Lieutenant.

A loud inquisition followed. In the end the Austrian was led off and tied to a tree to stay there until sunset. As for the German, since he was the aggressor, he was ordered to remove his uniform, boots, everything except his trousers. Then, hands tied behind his back, he was brought before the Lieutenant. Before I half realized what had happened, the Lieutenant drew his sword and rammed it violently into the man's stomach. There was an agonizing scream, and the man fell to the ground. It was the most dastardly brutal act I have ever seen. Yet no one said a word. On the contrary, a great silence fell upon the company and every one was of a sudden off about his business, while two of them took a spade, and, scooping up a bit of earth, buried the poor wretch. As for the young monster of a Lieutenant, he came over to a pump near us, and, after wiping his sword carefully upon the turf, washed his hands, then stood there idly and cleaned his finger nails.

From Szvidnik to the Dukla Pass the road curved up rapidly. The forests were torn and burned with shot and shell. Here were more scenes of violent struggle, trees fallen across the road, and now roughly shoved aside, rudimentary trenches, abandoned artillery caissons, two or three cannon with broken wheels, and soon bloated, mangled horses, legs in the air, and finally the dead. They lay there to right and left, Russians for the most part, some dead in a last agony, their fingers clutching the air; others in the gutter, where they had crawled to die, blackened face buried on an arm; others killed in full action, legs

ARCHDUKE CHARLES STEPHEN OF AUSTRIA

Who May be Proclaimed King of New Poland

(Photo © by American Press Assn.)

ARCHDUKE KARL FRANZ JOSEF

Heir-Presumptive of Austria-Hungary. Emperor Franz Josef Celebrated His Eighty-fifth Birthday on August 18

(Photo from P. S. Rogers)

tense, still striving, an extended hand clutching a broken rifle.

We drove on. Mile upon mile of such sights. There came a jagged promontory of rock near the road. The Hungarian seized my arm and pointed up.

"Look there."

"What?"

"Lammergeier!"

And as he spoke two huge vultures flew heavily over our heads, only to perch on a rock lower down.

"Ah, that must be it," he said, pointing now to a road running parallel to ours on the other side of a bit of ravine, "the road to the Beinhaus I heard them speaking of."

As I could see no Beinhaus, or charnel house, he went on to explain that there was an old abandoned salt mine near by and that they were throwing the dead into it, as the quickest and simplest way of being rid of them. The road soon joined ours, and at the junction was a cross, and upon it a haggard, weather-beaten Christ. Here we met three large hay wagons coming down the hill. We gave them the right of way. Each was packed with dead bodies, hands and arms and feet falling over the sides or jutting out through the bars. We watched them joggle down the by-road to the salt mine. Suddenly one of the bodies tumbled off the top of the first cart. There were shouts and oaths exchanged between the first and second wagons; but the body lay where it had fallen. Finally, the last wagon stopped and two soldiers pitchforked it up on top of the others.

"A soldier's burial," murmured the Hungarian.

Lieutenant Hanot's Feat

AMONG a recent batch of French officers decorated with the Legion of Honor figures the name of Sub-Lieutenant Hanot. The Journal Officiel gives the following brief description of the feat of arms for which the distinction was conferred on him:

"Conveying an order to the line of fire, and passing an enemy outpost, discovered seventeen Germans in a dug-out; ordered them to surrender, and brought them into the French lines marching the goose-step."

The incident occurred a few weeks ago. Lieutenant Hanot, while threading his way between the trenches which the French had just captured, lost his bearings, and inadvertently went beyond the first line of French trenches. He was immediately assailed by a hail of bullets.

Seeing that he could only escape by a miracle, the young officer resolved to sell his life dearly, and rushed forward with drawn revolver. By chance he stumbled into the German communication trench, and the first man to bar the way was the officer commanding the section. The Frenchman blew the man's brains out. Behind the German officer were three or four soldiers, who offered no resistance when ordered to throw up their hands.

"I have a battalion with mitrailleuse behind me," cried the Frenchman in excellent German, "and if but one of you moves I will have you all exterminated."

Thereupon from the next communication trench emerged, one by one, a dozen or more German soldiers, their hands in the air. "Pardon, pas kaput!" they begged.

Not a little surprised, and somewhat uneasy all the same, the French officer debated within himself what he should do with his captives. It was no easy thing to get the seventeen prisoners to the French lines unless he could maintain their belief in the battalion close by.

After a second's hesitation, the Lieutenant ordered them all out of the trench, made them fall down flat on the edge of the parapet, and then told them to go forward in bounds on all fours in order to escape the bullets which swept the

900 yards separating them from the French lines.

When they were nearing the French outpost guard he gave them the order to march at the goose-step, and the Germans obeyed immediately, raising their legs in their best parade manner, to the huge amusement of the French officers and soldiers, who could hardly believe their eyes when they realized that these seventeen prisoners had been captured by one man.

A British Recruiting Scene

[From The Westminster Gazette.]

I EDGED my way into the crowd. A tall, sunburnt soldier was talking quietly in serious tones. He leant over a raised desk with his stick in his hands. A Union Jack hung from a pole by his side. He was sparing of gesture. The homely image was the weapon upon which he relied, with a word or two of slang for ornament. Latin's dead. He had no tricks—the words came from the living mouth—he had looked into hell. The crowd grew and grew.

He was calling for recruits, and spoke of men who hung back.

" Shirkers," shouted a woman.

" Well, that's one name for 'em—I've heard worse than that though. Ohd haven't they got any imagination? I'm sure if they could but see the sights I've seen they'd come rollin' up—aye, rollin' up—wreck and ruin wherever you look—fire and brimstone all that there—dead and livin' all mixed up of a heap—men, horses, sheep, cattle—you should have seen 'em when the floods went down all a hangin' over the tangled wire—then you'd feel what I feel," with just one bang of his great fist on the desk. " Now—listen—you hear lots say they should be *made* to go—I'm not 'ere to talk politics—but *this is a free country*, and *I* don't want conscription for one—*now you're never goin' to wait till they come and fetch you!* "—throwing his head and shoulders back till you could hear them crack.

Then a band came marching by with a crowd behind it, and the roll of the drums made our flesh creep.

But the music only raised his scorn and bitter ire. He paused. The strains died away.

" Oh! yes—it's all right when the band plays!—it sounds fine, don't it?—it makes you want to knock somebody down—like when you see the soldiers at the Picture Palace and they plays ' Rule, Britannia ' on the pianny—then you wave yer hats and handkerchers and give 'em a cheer. Oh! yes, I know—like when you sit at home by the fire with your slippers on—(there's no slippers in the trenches—you never get your boots off—there's lots o' fire though)—and read the fine stories in the papers—and then you say, ' We've done well today '—' *We've done well* '—like that—' *We've done well* '—and these are the men who stop comfortably at home and pinch the jobs of them as is fightin' the battles for 'em—pinch their jobs—aye!—they'd pinch the missus if she'd let 'em—a general roar of laughter.

" Not *me*," shouted a woman; " and he's left five little 'uns behind 'im "—one in her arms.

" We'll take care of 'im," said the soldier gravely; " but this is not a pantomime. I'm not here to make you laugh—but, I tell you, Charley Peace was a gentleman compared with some I know. Why, a cat's got more conscience—a cat'll pinch the bloater off of the table when your back's turned, but when you look around and find it's gone, there she is, a-washin' of her face, and a-starin' up at you like as if she owned up to it and couldn't help it."

" Oh! you young men, think of France and Belgium! think of the men who are layin' down their lives by the thousands and thousands so that you shall sleep safely in your beds! think of the Lusitania! think of the gassin'—I tell you, we're up against a reptile. What do you do with reptiles?—stamp on 'em—*crush*

the life out of 'em!"—and his hands met like cymbals.

Then he quickly surveyed the crowd, resting against the pole and clutching the Union Jack.

"Now—who's comin'?—I'm not goin' to single out anybody—that wouldn't be fair, and we don't do it—but there's men of military age here and physically fit, I'm sure. Now, who's goin' to be first—you can be sworn in at the hut there right away—then you've only got to pass the doctor. You'll be in khaki this time to-morrow. Give the men in the trenches a rest—they come home to be patched up and have to go back again—give 'em a rest, I say! Now—hallo! here's one—[cheers]—another—come along, my lad—another—I thought you was all right—and another," with a girl on his arm blushing furiously, but proud of him—and so the cockades were busy.

It is such a lovely evening, but war broods like a horrid shape over all.

The sun sets over the tree-tops—a blood-red. Half a silvery moon hangs in the eastern skies—a splintered shell. The mighty pulse of London throbs in our ears—the booming of great guns.

The Blonde Beast

By HAROLD BEGBIE.

[From The London Daily Chronicle.]

Everything which is desperately immoral, being in its constitution monstrous, is of itself perishable.—Wordsworth.

The stars standing over the sea
  In the depths of the night,
The moon making darkness to be
  More lovely than light,
The sun surging upward in flame
  From the waves and the sky,
Endure as their legions of shame
  Go bloodily by.

For the patience of God is above,
  And the beauty of life;
The stars know the lasting of love
  And the passing of strife;
And there shall be joy in the way,
  And delight in the hour,
And their hosts shall be dust in that day,
  And their seed without pow'r.

They are trampling on cities and lands
  To the guilt of their goal,
There is innocent blood on their hands,
  And a lie in their soul;
The sea is made foul by their breath,
  And the earth is a tomb;
But the stars are their coursers to death
  And the sun to their doom.

They have chosen the charter of rage,
  They have taken the sword;
They have torn from God's Writing the page
  Of the love of the Lord;
They are Murder and Rapine and Lust,
  They are Madness and Pride,
And Him who wrote love in earth's dust
  They have jostled aside.

They are rushing from slaughter to God
  Like the swing of a bell,
Each beat of the clock is a rod
  That fast flogs them to hell.
They shall find not one hour of all time,
  Nor one point in all space
To escape from the anguish of crime
  And the loss of God's grace.

No joy evermore in the day,
  And no peace in the night,
Shall be theirs as they tremble away
  From humanity's sight,
As they reel from the light of the sun,
  And the welcome of man,
And drop from the web they have spun
  To eternity's ban.

And the earth shall return to her peace
  And mankind to their goal,
And the love of the heart shall increase,
  And the strength of the soul;
And the world shall be glad with great glee
  In the goodness of right,
With the stars standing over the sea
  In the depths of the night.

Latin America as It Is Today

By Julius Moritzen

The changes wrought by the great war in the economic and political structure of the South and Central American nations, their closer relations with the United States as an outgrowth of the European conflict, and the Latin-American republics as new factors in world affairs are dealt with succinctly in the subjoined review.

ANY present consideration of Latin America in its relation to other countries and to the stirring events abroad must include Mexico, although Mexico constitutes a problem by itself. While it is true that the existing chaos below the Rio Grande antedates the great war, and while the economic and political status of the neighboring republic has been lowering without any reflex pressure from the titanic struggle across the Atlantic, yet the Mexican situation is closely interwoven with the affairs of all the nations in the Western world. That leading republics in South and Central America so consider it is apparent from the several conferences in Washington and New York with the purpose of aiding Mexico in putting her topsy-turvy house in order.

One need not assume the rôle of seer to affirm that, just as the first clash of arms abroad marked the coming of a new era in Europe, so the Latin-American people are destined to play an increasingly important part in much that will concern the well-being of the Americas as a whole in the future. That the advanced positions of the leading nations in South and Central America are due in a large degree to co-operative effort with the United States only accentuates the new spirit that now possesses the Western Hemisphere; a spirit wholly constructive and healing in its intent.

The great European war revealed with startling suddeness the interdependence of nations in every part of the globe. Let be for the moment that certain countries appear self-sustaining, that the horrors of warfare apparently have left the people in these specific lands comparatively untouched in respect to means of subsistence. No fallacy could be more cruelly deceptive than to insist that such a state of affairs can continue for an indefinite length of time. As for the neutral nations, and particularly those of South and Central America, despite momentary demands for products of their soil, the catastrophe abroad disarranged their entire financial and commercial machinery. It was left for the Pan-American conference held in Washington in May to show to what an extent Latin America was made to suffer as a result of the European madness. It was also the purpose of that noteworthy conference, participated in by men identified with great enterprises throughout the American republics, to devise ways and means whereby a new order of things might prove the saving clause in a situation fraught with momentous consequences.

A Congress for Solidarity

THE calling of the Pan-American Financial Conference at the joint instance of President Wilson and Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo was an event of such historic importance that it must be left to time to measure adequately its full value to the Latin-American republics and the United States. Preliminary, as it were, the work begun at Washington a few months ago is already bearing fruit. In recently expressing their thanks for the warm welcome extended to their representatives as the guests of the American Govern-

ment, the Presidents of the southern nations as with one voice declared their readiness to co-operate that the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere might be an example to the whole world. The coming return visit to South and Central America, of financiers of the United States, unquestionably will give further impetus to that movement which, as President Victorino de la Plaza of Argentina expressed himself in his cablegram to President Wilson, is "stimulating the economic bonds necessary for their mutual development," meaning the various republics of America.

In estimating to what an extent Latin America has suffered as a result of the war in Europe and how the rehabilitation of trade and traffic may be brought about, whether it concerns present and future relations with the United States, or with the European powers now engaged in conflicts basing their very existence as powers, it is essential that geographical conditions be considered. What applies to Argentina and Brazil, for instance, does not necessarily have the same important bearing on the west coast countries of South America. Generally speaking, however, the effect of the world war has been identically depressing. The rebound also is gradually introducing a more satisfactory condition in the business affairs of all Latin America. It remains to be seen how the appearance of the United States as an element for greater buying and selling among South Americans is working a change in countries formerly almost wholly depending upon Europe for their capital. Central America may be eliminated from the present consideration, not because European money is not plentifully invested there, but because much closer relations have existed for some years between these five republics and the United States than between the latter and South America. It is, however, necessary to add that as a considerable purchaser of South American products the United States has been chiefly deficient in purveying to these countries. Europe's predominance as salesman has been due to the fact that trade in times past has had the habit of following investment of capital. The bankers of London, Berlin, Paris, and other financial centres abroad opened up South America to itself, hence exploitation left a dependence upon them unfortunately not always of greatest advantage to the South Americans. Mexico is sometimes cited as an instance where United States investment, under circumstances not always too exacting, has become its own boomerang, alike distasteful to capitalists and those the money was meant to partly benefit.

South America's Money Question

THE South American banking situation is so complex that it reacts into every avenue of economics and politics. Demands of growing countries for funds, the necessities of foreign trade, the requirements of speculation have created all manner of banks, trust companies, investment, mortgage, loan, and brokerage companies, not to mention the ever-present exchange merchant. The money question of all Latin America is a hydra-headed monstrosity whose recurrent mischief making never worked greater harm than when the European war broke out. The decline in pounds sterling, so vexatious to financial interests in England and the United States, was as a drop in the ocean to what at times happens to the money values of some Latin-American countries. To stabilize these moneys was one of the chief functions of the Pan-American Financial Conference.

The opening up of branch banks of the National City Bank in some of the leading cities of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, and the possibility that other American financial institutions will follow suit, may be considered entering wedges to that greater business development looked for between the United

States and South America. To the extent that American capital enters the southern field, to that extent may it be expected that European bankers will relax their hold on South America. Let there be no anticipation that because of the present world war, financial interests abroad are likely to exclude themselves permanently from South America. At this very moment there is the keenest rivalry to be prepared to extend operations in Latin America. The minute the war ends there will be a revival of efforts to capture more and more of the trade in the southern republics. What other meaning is contained in the French commercial mission to Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay or the formation of the German Economy Association for Central and South America, with Dr. Bernhard Dernburg as its President? Has it been overlooked that Japan has started a commercial propaganda in Chile, with a view to meeting Europe on its own field of selling cheaply? These are facts the United States exporters must take into consideration now that this opportunity is present to deal more largely with the southern neighbors. It will be a battle royal for a trade well worth the struggle and the outlay in time and money. The real fight will begin when Europe signs its treaty of peace.

Now, as to the position of South America fourteen months ago. It is quite well known that a serious financial crisis has existed in some of the South American countries for the last few years. Brazil was sinking deeper and deeper under its load of indebtedness. Argentina, more elastic in its commercial structure, while no less in need of money, found means to tide over the difficulty as occasion demanded. A similar story could be told relative to the other republics in South America. The national strong boxes were depleted, if not entirely empty. The respective Governments were confronted with conditions that made the office of Minister of Finance no easy task. Money was decidedly scarce everywhere. With collateral the richest that any soil could produce as nature's bounty, yet South America only grudgingly found the purse strings unloosen to satisfy its wants. High interests, besides, were additional penalties where loans were at all obtainable.

Then came the war. This proved the climax where all things had conspired to produce a depressing financial outlook. Money from European sources was not to be thought of now. Brazil, about to negotiate a large loan with French banking interests, saw that avenue of relief cut off at once. To make matters worse, ocean traffic came to a temporary halt on account of the presence of the German fleets in both the Atlantic and the Pacific waters. Fear seized the shippers of Brazilian coffee and rubber, Argentina packing interests, Chilean nitrate exporters, producers of cacao in Ecuador, and copper and tin mining concerns in Peru and Bolivia. Except for the trade in coffee between Brazil and the United States and Argentina's increased shipments of beef to northern ports, few vessels left South American ports during the early months of the war, when German men-of-war scoured the oceans for prey. When finally the Atlantic was cleared of the raiders traffic took a new spurt. As a result, the financial cloud began to lift slowly. At the present time it may be said with confidence that the worst is over.

"America for the Americans"

IT was a positive stroke of international genius when Secretary McAdoo invited the Latin-American republics to participate in a conference the purpose of which should be to talk the situation over as between country and country. Here for the first time it can be said that the United States and South and Central America found each other. It was an opportunity seldom offered where the well-being of a whole continent, so to speak, was at stake. At Washington was

discussed also the existing need for better transportation facilities with the ports to the southward. It is immaterial to the real purpose in view whether the respective Governments or private capital furnish the necessary means for carrying the proposed plan for increased traffic facilities to completion. Without more and faster steamers plying up and down the coasts of North and South America, without the closer connection that transportation alone can furnish, the Pan-American question of solidarity must remain a vague something that looks well enough in theory, but which lacks that practical stamp which alone is entitled to the name success. All this South America realizes today more keenly than at any time in its economic history.

Because certain steamship companies in Europe continue to run their vessels to South America, this is not enough to warrant the belief that the situation from now on is clear. The United States has entered into the life of the South American republics for weal and woe. There can never again be that distance in economic and political relations as characterized the countries concerned before the European war. Henceforth the slogan "America for the Americans" takes on an actual meaning. It is not for nothing that eighteen Chief Executives of Latin America cable President Wilson their appreciation of this new-found friendship that tells the world of the continent whose neutrality stands unimpeachable despite agencies that would wreck this neutral attitude that will mean so much to the future of the nations everywhere. When it becomes possible to travel, as travel demands are today between South America and the United States, then the interrelation between the Governments and the people will be as important to the nations as a whole as it is necessary to the trade operations between the various countries to have more and quicker ships for both freight traffic and passengers.

At its nearest calculation, Brazil alone has an area of 3,292,000 square miles, figures better appreciated when it is said that this South American republic is larger than the United States, fifteen times larger than Germany, and sixteen times larger than France. The immensity of this territory is cited in the present instance to show the impossibility of presenting in a single article all the phases and features having to do with South America in its reawakened activity and response to outside influences. In the same way, Argentina, progressive, growing in population faster than any other country outside the United States, has in that wonderful City of Buenos Aires enough to rivet the attention of the traveler for months, as well as to furnish material for columns upon columns of printed matter. A city with more than one million and a half of population, with a subway that outrivals other metropolitan centres in point of construction and management, a city where opera is given under auspices unequaled anywhere, where the people live in an atmosphere of constant advancement, such is Buenos Aires, on the River Plate.

On the other hand, so much of South America remains still a no man's country, such vast regions yet await the settler, so many opportunities lie buried in that wonderfully fertile soil, those mountains rich in minerals of every kind, that one is unable to even hint at what these republics will be like when, with the coming years, the ingenuity of man and the demands of the world will unchain the latent forces of the South American tropics. That more and more Latin America will enter into the economic plan of the Old World and the New, that at the end of the European war immigration may here set a new high-water mark, are possibilities evident enough from all that has taken place in such proximity to the United States, while North Americans, but a few years ago, scarcely knew their South American fellow-men except by name.

South American Sympathies

WHEN it is said, that, following an early declaration of neutrality, South America has maintained its neutral attitude ever since, there ought to be added that the Governments' strict interpretation of international obligations has found the press and the public independent in their sympathies. People living in the United States have no conception of what the European outbreak meant to South America at the beginning, and the diffculty of adjusting ordinary affairs of life to the changed order of things. Let it be remembered that in Argentina, for instance, Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, Italians, Spaniards are present in large numbers. The German element here, as elsewhere in South America, has been an important factor in the industrial progress of the country. Yet the war abroad has spelled little less than disaster to many Germans in Argentina. There is no denying the fact that the Argentines are overwhelmingly favorable toward the Entente powers. The newspapers show it constantly. Belgium found no greater champions during its invasion than the press of Buenos Aires. The Allies' cause, despite the rigid attitude of the Government of Argentina, notwithstanding repeated appeals for greater moderation in expressions of the press, also is the cause of the greater part of these South Americans. What with the large number of Italians resident in Buenos Aires, Italy's entrance into the war made Argentina's sympathy for the Allies more emphatic than before.

Argentina, more so than any other South American republic, has drawn upon Europe for its varied population. Brazil, while originally developed through Portuguese admixture, is more largely peopled with Germans than any other country in South America. That a considerable portion of the Brazilian population leans toward the Teutonic cause is a very natural state of affairs in view of the fact that some of the States are settled with natives of Germany. Here the German language takes precedence over Portuguese in the schools and home circle. In Rio de Janeiro, however, both the Government and the public maintain a rather undeviating neutrality. The leading newspapers, headed by the Jornal do Commercio, espouse the Entente cause. The fact that Dr. Lauro Muller, the Foreign Minister of Brazil, is of German parentage may or may not have something to do with Rio de Janeirans showing less antipathy to Germany than is the case in Argentina. Dr. Muller will be remembered for his visit to the United States a few years ago. He is one of the ablest statesmen in South America.

AN AMERICAN TRIPLE ENTENTE.

This brings us to what is generally known as the A B C alliance of South America. As fate would have it, the alphabet has been instrumental in ranging the three most important nations in Latin America under a common termination which is simplicity itself. The A B C powers of South America! There is here a resonance that spells Triple Alliance, Entente! The newspapers are beginning to fill with the doings of the Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean nations. Solidarity is believed to be the underlying motive for the coming together of these three republics. Twice in the diplomatic dealings of the United States has the A B C combination figured as a conspicuous element. In both instances Mexico was concerned, and on both occasions—at Niagara Falls when the Huerta insult to the American flag was the issue, as well as more recently with the appeal to the various factions across the border—disinterestedness marked the appearance of the representatives of Argentina, Brazil and Chile in a matter where the Mexican civil strife was considered the affair of all America. That Bolivia and Guatemala were invited to take part in the conferences presided over by Secretary of State Lansing gives emphasis to the declaration that Mexico's interests were the chief concern of all the republics.

Whether or not too much importance is being attached to the recent meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the fact is patent that it was more than a social affair that called Señores Muller, Murature, and Lira together. There is no public record that any signed agreement between the three countries has come into existance as a result of the visits to Buenos Aires and Santiago. That a treaty actually was signed is the current report in the capitals of the countries interested. Possessing effective navies, their armies drilled and equipped on European lines, the Governments headed by Victorino de la Plaza, Wenceslao Braz Gomez, and Ramon Barros Luce, respectively of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, constitute a united body of political consequence to Europe and the rest of America providing an alliance for whatever purpose has been agreed on.

It is not to be overlooked that in certain sections of Latin America the reported entente between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile is looked at askance. The question is already being asked whether any such combination as that outlined may not prove a menace to the independence of the smaller countries. The Monroe Doctrine is being dragged into the limelight once more as perhaps the real cause for the forming of the A B C alliance. To all suggestions that smack of interference with their own plans the three nations concerned have turned the shoulder of indifference. The Governments of the other republics in South America have been very careful to express no opinions. Here and there some fervid Latin-American orator, or some journalist with access to less influential newspapers, has ventured to say that the rest of South America had better have a care. The leading journals, however, are free from making political guesses of a nature that might be decidedly uncomfortable and cause Governmental embarrassment. That the international position of South America is undergoing a tremendous change there is no gainsaying, and that in the transformation Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are playing stellar rôles is an indisputable fact. Whether European influence will be less great as a result is a mooted question. Nor is it revealed so far what concerted attitude the A B C alliance would take should the defense of South America from whatever quarter be the issue, except that it can be taken for granted that the liberty-loving Latin Americans will defend their independence to the last man. Is the A B C alliance strengthening itself to cope with eventualities? The answer is for the future and the eventuality.

Railways vs. Revolution

IN relation to the political and economic regeneration of the Latin-American countries more than passing mention ought to be made of the recent election in Peru when José Pardo, once before the Chief Executive of the west-coast republic, was chosen President. In point of orderliness this election stands first among the similar events in Peru. Under the régime of President Billinghurst Peru made considerable progress, but the Chief Magistrate failed to gain the confidence of the military as well as of a large portion of the civil population. President Billinghurst's overthrow at the hands of Colonel Oscar Benavides proved an affair that led to the former's exile. Colonel Benavides assumed the provisional Presidency, and the recent election was the result of a coalition between leading parties guaranteeing Pardo's selection in advance of the voting. The Peruvian Minister to the United States, Federico A. Pezet, happened to be in his home country during election time, and his presence is said to have had a very marked effect upon the conduct of the campaign.

With the opening of the Panama Canal Peru assumed a commercial importance

which, while momentarily halted because of the European war, is bound to assist in opening up this country to foreign capital. The chief lack of Peru is railroad communication sufficiently advanced to bring more of the interior into touch with the coast. Some of the railroad enterprises are remarkable enough, but more lines are needed. Neighboring Ecuador suffers similarly from the absence of adequate transportation means. Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil—in each of these countries railways are the call. Argentina and Chile are alone among South American nations where the transportation question is being solved more nearly in accord with the demand for mileage, and both countries are continually extending their railway nets anticipative of ever greater demands for their products and foreseeing the necessity of being able to take advantage quickly of new markets. The Andean railway systems, joining Chile and Argentina, have also been of marked influence in smoothing over political differences growing out of boundary disputes, which is one more instance to the effect that nations get along better when better acquainted with each other. Except during the Winter season, when the Andes passes are blocked with snow, railroad traffic across the mountain range is of considerable volume.

Aside from the economic advantage of having railroads penetrating into the byways of their territories, it is an agreed fact that wherever transportation is fairly adequate revolutionary disturbances have been reduced to a minimum. Mexico, of course, may be exempted from this conclusion, for the Mexican uprising originally embraced an element whose grievance was so logical that the liberating propaganda against dictatorial powers did not have to confine itself to remote sections of the republic. It is evident, however, that more recently the splitting up of factions has led to guerrilla warfare shockingly demoralizing, and the same may be said of recent occurrences in Haiti, and in Venezuela and Ecuador some time ago. In almost every instance the constitutional régime has been confronted with great obstacles, where no railroads were present to send troops into distant parts. Certainly, Argentina and Chile consider revolutionary activity a matter of the past, and the orderliness of these countries is also attributable to the general education of the masses, a sequence where the country is easily accessible in every direction.

Commercial Rapprochement Near

IT has been shown so far that, as between the United States and South America, the commercial rapprochement so much desired and so necessary is in a fair way to be accomplished to the complete satisfaction of the countries interested in extending their fields of trade. Whether or not it needed the European war to force the American republics into the arms of each other, mutual gain would seem assured from greater business development throughout the Western Continent. But what of the political outlook, as it may concern the twenty Latin-American nations in their relation to the big brother in the North? Has there been any indication that a full understanding exists regarding the future attitude of America as a whole? Is there any foundation for the rumors that the A B C alliance of South America came into being as an effective argument against United States supervision over the less affluent countries in Latin America; as a warning that so far and no further would the northern nation be permitted to go in the desire for putting unstable Governments on more solid footing? Is the participation of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Guatemala in the parleys with the United States regarding Mexico nothing more than an empty response to a friendly invitation on the part of the American Department

of State? Let us look into this situation a little closer, for, without absolute assurance that South American commercial co-operation also means international accord where the Foreign Offices are concerned, the trade structure would become little less than a house of cards. If rumors carrying uneasiness can be contradicted finally, it ought to be done forthwith and bereft of equivocation. While the Pan-American movement is in its infancy, every obstacle to mutual confidence should be removed as weeds in a garden, in order to give the useful plant its fullest scope and growth.

The leading newspapers of South America, while discussing the advantage of co-operation between their countries and the United States, have been somewhat guarded in touching on the political phases springing from the trade entente. It is to be recalled, however, that within the last few weeks the Brazilian Congress was the scene of inquiry regarding the meaning of the republic taking part in the conferences anent Mexico. Cabinet Ministers were obliged to reply to the requests of the Deputies for information in this matter. And the strongest possible emphasis was placed on the declaration that in no event would Brazil sanction anything placing Mexican sovereignty in jeopardy. Brazilian participation, was the official statement, was in the nature of cordial acquiescence that Mexico ought to be saved from itself, but that even so Mexicans themselves were to accomplish this task, difficult as it might seem. Here the matter was permitted to rest for the moment.

Europe and Latin-American Alliance

NOW, since Europe is directly concerned where the relations of the United States and Latin America are in question, it may not be amiss to look across the ocean for some sign of how the A B C alliance is accepted there.

The Frankfurter Zeitung, whose political articles carry considerable authority, in a recent issue said as follows regarding South America and the changed conditions wrought by the war:

> A short time ago Europe learned that an alliance had been concluded between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile which was intended to guarantee peace on the South American Continent. Amid the roar of cannon the announcement passed almost unheard, and only a few were conscious that in the Far Southwest a new page of history had begun which might become full of significance for us.

The German newspaper then went into the complete history of the situation, the supposed reason for the forming of the alliance, the relation to one another in the past, and continued with reference to Germany:

> These then are the three States which have concluded an alliance that puts an end to mutual enmity which appeared implacable a few years ago. But in addition the alliance signifies that the three most important South American republics are ripe for an independent policy. It signifies that they are weary of the desire of their "big brother" in the north to interfere, that they are going their own way, and that in place of the Monroe Doctrine they demand the recognition of their own program, "South America for the South Americans."
>
> For European interests it can only be desirable that the A B C States should form a counterpoise to the influence of the United States. It was the intention of the latter to claim, economically, the whole of the South American Continent for herself; South America was to buy only in North America, and to export exclusively to the latter, insofar as the Union was capable of being a buyer. The greatest efforts were made to achieve this object, but the success achieved was not in proportion to the means employed. Europe—England in the first place and Germany in the second—remained the main purveyor and capitalist of the rising States of the Southwest. Unfortunately, Europe is now working against herself. Germany is cut off from the outer world, and must for the moment renounce her splendid position in South America. For England, certainly, the sea route is open, but she is as little capable of maintaining her position, because she is obliged to sacrifice all her energy to the war. The advantage rests with the United States in South America, just as it does with Japan in Asia. To appraise correctly the new conditions created by the A B C alliance

will be an important preliminary to the reconquest of the South American market, one of the most important tasks awaiting us upon the conclusion of the war.

So much for the Frankfurter Zeitung, presumably an estimate representative of what Germany as a whole thinks of South America in its present and future relations with the United States and other nations. South American newspapers made sparing reference to the article; its tenor was such as to lead with suspicious direction from the counting room to the foreign office. By implication, the Frankfurter Zeitung was saying things dangerously close to the thin-crusted ice of diplomacy. Too many interests were at stake to comment diffusely on a matter where the issues crisscrossed continents and oceans.

In his somewhat picturesque but little satisfying book, "Pan-Americanism," Professor Roland G. Usher ventures to say that no matter who will be the victor in the European war, it will be the fate of the United States to defend itself against the promised aggression of the conqueror. Whatever good ground Professor Usher may have had for writing his "Pan-Germanism," the consensus of the press of the United States is that the distinguished author fell foul of the real facts when he penned his more recent volume. The South American newspapers, likewise, far from being flattered because of allusions to their liberty-loving qualities and the spirit of independence characterizing their international dealings in recent years, in a majority of instances refused to believe that such danger as Professor Usher threatened actually existed. Speaking of the future of Pan-Americanism the writer says:

> A Pan-American confederation and administrative bond between sovereign States, with something approaching a Federal Executive and possibly a Legislature, can be real only as the expression in institutional life of a mutuality of economic interests and an identity of political ideas, of a mutual confidence and an identity of policy. None of these exists. In short, not one of these conceptions from the slightest to the more elaborate seems based upon realities. On the contrary, Pan-Americanism is likely to impress an impartial mind as an absolutely artificial and sentimental concept, diametrically opposed to the racial, economic, political, legal, and social interests of the American republics. A concept so contrary to all fundamental factors in the situation on whose existence all observers quite agree, an ideal which so clearly lacks an adequate motive in its own fundamental assumptions, demonstrates to the South Americans very convincingly that the advocacy of Pan-Americanism is intended to further the aggressive schemes of the United States by clothing them in so gracious and idealistic a form.
>
> The day is at hand when the Latin-American republics will challenge Pan-Americanism, the Monroe Doctrine, and the assumption by the United States of the supremacy of the Western Hemisphere. As soon as a convenient occasion offers, some public manifestation of this intention will appear.

Since that occasion has not yet arrived, the author of "Pan-Americanism" should turn to the answers by the eighteen Presidents of Latin-American republics to President Wilson's message congratulating them on the success of the Pan-American Financial Conference. Something has already been told about the reply of President de la Plaza of Argentina. What the next-door neighbor of Argentina, Uruguay, thought of that Washington conference for American unity is contained in the cablegram sent by President Feliciano Viera. It read as follows:

> The co-operation furnished by the Uruguayan Government has been an affirmation of the solidarity of interests and objects which exists among the American countries and a recognition of the prestige and spirit of initiative of the Union. I am glad to share the opinion of your Excellency that the work of the conference must bear beneficial fruit for the American countries. Permit me to add to these sentiments my wishes for the prosperity of the United States and for the happiness of your Excellency.

In this message, as in that of the Argentine Chief Executive, there is not the slightest hint of fear of United States aggression. The similar spirit pervaded each of the other sixteen cablegrams sent President Wilson as representing the feelings of the respective Governments. Professor Usher evidently was not one of those fortunate enough to see the magnificent coming together of the men who met in Washington last May. If he had, he might, perhaps, have wanted to detach

Pages 319 and 320 from his "Pan-Americanism."

It would occupy entirely too much space and would scarcely add to the already established fact that Latin America is desirous of United States friendship, to speak in detail of the extraordinary tributes paid the American Government while the visitors from South and Central America were the special guests of this country last May. In view of the sometime strained relations between Washington and Colombia, it may be of value to show how that relationship has been improved. By a curious coincidence the best-endowed speaker among the Latin Americans, according to their own judgment, was Señor Santiago Perez Triana, a former Colombian Minister to Great Britain and a leading financial expert. To him it fell on various occasions to act the mouthpiece for the South and Central American countries. Señor Triana, from whom something more conservative might have been expected, owing to the Panama affair, which is not yet entirely adjusted, boldly declared at Washington that America needed today a "Pan-American union for the maintenance of peace and the defense of neutral rights — a whole hemisphere acting as a unit in sharp contra-distinction to Europe, rent into hostile camps." His speech proved little less than a revelation and was echoed to the full by his fellow-delegates from Latin America.

Forces Working for Common Interest

IF Colombia can take an attitude of such friendly interest in Pan-Americanism, is there any reason to believe that Latin America is hostile to these efforts for western-world co-operation? Since the Colombians are willing to forget past misunderstandings, as Señor Triana repeated again and again, South and Central American nations with no grievances whatever will hardly oppose what seems the best solution for the welfare of America.

Latin America consists of about 9,000,000 square miles of territory. The population is estimated at 75,000,000. In some of the republics education is woefully behind what civilization demands. This is a fact readily admitted by the Governments themselves, but, on the other hand, praiseworthy efforts are being made to better this state of affairs. In the cities, however, school work is according to the most modern methods. The overwhelmingly large Indian populations in the remote sections of South and Central America are the present stumbling blocks, but with the coming of more railroads and more settlers important changes must occur. The number of Latin-American students in United States colleges and universities is constantly increasing, and here is being made ready a new bond of fraternity. The visits of leading American statesmen to South America have also added to the general educative scheme below the Rio Grande. New ideals are being presented, and Latin Americans are quick to take advantage of what is both idealistic and pratical. Denominational barriers are being removed to facilitiate free religious observance. The interdenominational conference of Protestant churches, to be held in Panama City shortly, is a step in the direction of bringing social workers throughout America into closer association. The Young Men's Christian Association movement has the sanction of Latin-American Governments in some of the leading republics, and more and more the southern nations are copying the Constitution of the United States in important particulars.

The language question may for some time yet prove one of the main reasons for keeping Americans of the north and Americans of the south at a distance from each other. With Spanish and Portuguese the national tongues of Latin America, the United States must gain a fuller acquaintance, at least with Spanish, before the best results can be ob-

tained from increased intercourse. American schools, however, are gradually rising to their opportunities in respect to this language matter. Commercial institutions are specializing in the teaching of Spanish. Young men and women are perfecting themselves in this linguistic medium for the Americas getting better acquainted. It is on this field that Europe must be met squarely, for trade can only prosper where buyer and seller understand each other. European exporters learned this lesson long ago.

A Predilection for Paris

IT is a foregone conclusion that so soon as Americans gain a more perfect knowledge of the languages of Latin America a new spirit of inquiry regarding the life and aspirations of these interesting people must spring up. The literature of South America, for instance, is an inexhaustible mine of information anent the mental activity of the republics. To understand why South Americans of culture show such predilection for Paris and other great European centres of learning and literary productivity, it must be known that the passion for writing possesses every Latin American of consequence. Not one of the Presidents at the present time but what has made his mark as littérateur or journalist. Dr. José Murature, the Foreign Minister of Argentina, is the editor of that great newspaper in Buenos Aires, La Nacion. Knowing Spanish will yield a wonderful harvest to the North American investigator of South American conditions. Without this knowledge such investigator will grope largely in the dark. The Latin American, by the way, in almost every case has a working acquaintance with the English language, due, perhaps, to the fact that Great Britain has been prolific with men and money where these southern countries are concerned. The recent agitation in Cuba for the retention of the English language in the schools shows how great a value this island republic places on linguistic accomplishments. There is reason to believe that those few working for the removal of the English teaching will meet defeat.

American journalism in its wider sense can do much to facilitate the opening up of Latin America to United States interests. It is a fallacy to hold to the supposition that revolutions furnish the most interesting " copy " from the newspaper point of view where even Central America is concerned. Here, as elsewhere in Latin America, earnest efforts are being made to reduce internal disturbances to a minimum. It is not that risings of the people have not been justfied frequently in the past, but that, with the coming of the years, such methods are losing their popularity. If the taking over of the Custom Houses by the United States Government in Santo Domingo, Haiti, and, perhaps, Nicaragua can relegate revolutions to obscurity, the motive actuating the American authorities should be at once apparent. Cuba is an example that, so soon as the less settled republics regain their stability, Washington is only too pleased to let go its supervision of Latin-American fiscal affairs.

Now, then, Latin America today needs funds with which to conduct its business. Europe is a closed door, no better evidence to that effect being needed than the coming to the United States of the financial ccmmission of the allied powers to raise loans in this country. On the admission of leading financial interests, funds are plentiful here, and investors are in search of outlets. It is for banking experts to examine for themselves what are the collaterals of the southern countries. But one fact stands out, namely, that no greater opportunity ever presented itself to lend a neighbor a hand than this hour when South and Central America are looking wistfully northward. Notwithstanding pessimistic utterances to the contrary, Pan-Ameri-

canism has arrived and come to stay. Is it too much to say that this solidarity between the twenty-one American republics refutes any belief that mere selfishness bases the motive that has brought about this good understanding between the Americas? the picture that unfolds before the vision grips the imagination, for here for the first time in history an entire continent looms as beacon to guide the world on its onward course.

The English Graves

By LAURENCE BINYON

The rains of yesterday are flown,
And light is on the farthest hills.
The homeliest rough grass by the stone
With radiance thrills;

And the wet bank above the ditch,
Trailing its thorny bramble, shows
Soft apparitions, clustered rich,
Of the pure primrose.

The shining stillness breathes, vibrates
From simple earth to lonely sky,
A hinted wonder that awaits
The heart's reply.

O lovely life! the chaffinch sings
High on the hazel, near and clear.
Sharp to the heart's blood sweetness springs
In the morning here.

But my heart goes with the young cloud
That voyages the April light
Southward, across the beaches loud
And cliffs of white

To fields of France, far fields that spread
Beyond the tumbling of the waves,
And touches as with shadowy tread
The English graves.

There too is Earth that never weeps,
The unrepining Earth, that holds
The secret of a thousand sleeps
And there unfolds

Flowers of sweet ignorance on the slope
Where strong arms dropped and blood choked breath,
Earth that forgets all things but hope
And smiles on death * * *

They poured their spirits out in pride,
They throbbed away the price of years;
Now that dear ground is glorified
With dreams, with tears.

A flower there is sown, to bud
And bloom beyond our loss and smart.
Noble France, at its root is blood
From England's heart.

Great Britain's Register

Stock-Taking of the Human Resources of the British Empire

In accordance with the instructions furnished by the British Registrar General, a specimen form is filled up for a commercial clerk, married, and with two children, one of whom is over 15 and in the receipt of a purely nominal salary. These two must be regarded as wholly dependent. He partially supports a relative. He possesses a motor bicycle, of which he is an efficient driver, and the mechanism of which he understands. The particulars in this specimen form are, of course, purely imaginary.

BRITISH Registration Day under the terms of the National Registration bill was Sunday, Aug. 15, 1915. The forms were collected by the enumerators during the week following. All persons, male and female, between the ages of 15 and 65, were required to fill out the forms in the manner shown above.

In Lord Lansdowne's speech in the House of Lords July 13, on the second reading of the National Registration bill, he declared that the bill was the only foundation by which any country could measure its resources, especially its resources in men. He claimed that the bill would make up the defects in British organization and machinery. The country, he declared, would not tolerate a recurrence of certain incidents of which it had had recent experience, for there had been a great awakening since the time when an invincible navy, a small army, sufficient for home purposes, and an expeditionary force were considered sufficient. But the old go-as-you-please system, which left every man to do as he liked, had broken down entirely.

Lord Lansdowne admitted that the stream of men that had flowed into the army had surprised "many of us." Unfortunately the stream of equipment was not so satisfactory. "The great purveyors and contractors left us in the lurch, and there was a scramble with our allies in foreign markets for munitions." But no one knew, added Lord Lansdowne, what the defects in organization had cost Great Britain in money, anxiety, men, and lives. The ideal to be aimed at, he explained, is that every member of the community should bear the part which he is best qualified to take. In the past, however, this did not happen under the recruiting system, for men were taken from munition works and agriculture and other trades who were needed at home, and, worst of all, numbers of married men were taken.

Speaking of the details, he maintained that it was absolutely essential that women should be included in the bill, for it was absolutely impossible to organize the industrial forces of the country without including the women. As for Ireland, the bill was not forcibly applied, because undoubtedly there was not the same enthusiasm for the measure as in England, and the great majority of men in Ireland lived on the land, and were unsuitable for industrial work. Lord Lansdowne predicted that the register would prove most valuable after the war when the work of demobilization had to be undertaken.

Finally, he insisted that the bill was not intended to introduce compulsory service by a side wind. The only form of compulsion in the bill was registration. But there was no word or syllable about compulsory service either in the army or navy, and nothing could be done about that without further legislation.

In a sense he did not think that the bill brought Great Britain nearer compulsory service, for he did not believe that voluntary service, with its anomalies and injustices, would be tolerated much further by the country. But the bill did in another sense assist compulsory service, for it would make the application of compulsion easier. If any one objected, let him ask the question whether he could guarantee how long the war would last, and whether in the future the stream of munitions would not outstrip the stream of men. For the present the bill would as-

GRAND DUCHESS TATIANA

Second Daughter of the Czar of Russia. She Is 18 Years Old

(Photo from P. S. Rogers)

M. ALBERT THOMAS

France's Under Secretary for War and Minister of Munitions

(Photo from Press Illustrating Co.)

NATIONAL REGISTRATION ACT, 1915. Form for MALES.

Name:
(Surname first) NEMO, JOHN JAMES

Residence:
(Permanent postal address). 13, Somewhere-st., London, S.W.

(Present address, if away from home) .....

Age last Birthday (1.)	If born abroad and not British, state Nationality. (2.)	State whether Single, Married, or Widower. (3.)	How many Children are dependent on you? (4.)		How many other Persons are dependent on you, excluding employees? (5.)		Profession or Occupation. State fully the particular kind of work done, and the material worked or dealt in (if any). (6.)
			Under 15 years.	Over 15 years.	Wholly dependent.	Partially dependent.	
40		Married	1	1		1	Clerk; Commercial.

Name, Business, and Business Address of Employer. (If not working for an Employer, write "None.") (7.)	Are you employed for or under any Government Department? Say "Yes," or "No," or "Do not know." (8.)	(a.) Are you skilled in any work other than that upon which you are at present employed, and if so, what? (b.) Are you able and willing to undertake such work. (9.)	
		(a.)	(b.)
A. N. Other & Co., Ltd., Paper Manufacturers, 500a, New Bridge-st., London, E.C.	No.	Motor cycle driving and repairs.	Yes.

Signature JOHN JAMES NEMO.

sist Lord Kitchener in voluntary recruiting, and how then could it be refused to him because it might be used for compulsion?

"If there are a few," said the noble Lord, "who object to this bill because they think that to that extent it brings us nearer to compulsion, they will find that their real opposition is this: That they want to deny to Lord Kitchener now the measure which he requires to assist in the organization of a voluntary army, and they want to impede him, if at a future time he should desire to obtain this weapon in order that the war might not be brought to an inglorious conclusion."



An Object Lesson In

(A) Actions of Heligoland Bight, Aug. 28, '14; Dogger Bank, Jan. 24, '15; and Belgian Coast, Oct. 19, '14; and this chart, which was originally published by The London Times. The London Times says: "German warships and merchant ships have been swept from every ocean, either being sunk, captured, or interned. The German battle fleet remains penned in harbor, and the watch over the North Sea by our grand fleet gives us freedom of commerce with allies and neutrals, and the power to send troops and supplies in safety to every theatre of war. British sea power has cut off Germany from her colonies, which are one by one falling into our hands."

The key to the chart is as follows:

(A) Actions of Heligoland Bight, Aug. 28, '14; Dogger Bank, Jan. 24, '15; and Belgian Coast, Oct. 19, '14; and subsequently. (B) Action off Coronel, Nov. 1, '14. (C) Action off Falklands, Dec. 8, '14. (D) Actions in Gulf of Finland, Aug. 27, '14; Gulf of Riga, June 3 and 6, '15; and coast of Courland, July 2, '15. (E) Blockade of Adriatic; action between Gloucester and Goeben, Aug. 8, '14. (F) Samoa occupied, Aug. 29, '14. (G) German Pacific colonies occupied; action at Herbertshohe and defeat of main German forces, Sept. 11-12, '14; capture of Nauroh, last wireless station, Sept. 21, '14; occupation of Friedrich Wilhelm Town, Sept. 24, '14. (H) Occupation of

British Sea Power

Togoland, Aug. 26, '14. (I) Invasion of Cameroons, Duala captured, Sept. 27, '14; Victoria captured by marines, Nov. 13, '14; blockade of Cameroon coast, April 23, '15. (J) Conquest of Southwest Africa; surrender of Luderitzbucht, Sept. 19, '14; Swakopmund occupied, Jan. 14, '15; Windhuk and wireless station seized, May 12, '15; German final surrender, July 8, '15. (K) Operations on Lake Nyasa. (L) Action between Konigsberg and Pegasus, Sept. 20, '14; bombardments of Dar-es-Salaam, Aug. 8, '14, Nov. 28, '14, and Feb. 26, '15; blockade of German East African coast, Mar. 1, '15. (M) Dardanelles operations; first bombardment, Nov. 2, '14; Naval attack begun, Feb. 19, '15; action against the Narrows, Mar. 18, '15; landing of allied armies, Apr. 25, '15. (N) Operations against Turkey in Asia; Akaba bombarded, Nov. 2, '14; seizure of Fao, Persian Gulf Nov. 8, '14; Basra occupied, Nov. 21, '14; Sheik Seyd bombarded, Nov. 15, '14; Kurna captured, Dec. 9, '14; Smyrna bombarded, Mar. 5, '15. (O) Kiao-Chau occupied, Nov. 7, '14. (P) Emden sunk, Nov. 9, '14. (Q) Konigsberg sunk, July 11, '15. (R) Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse sunk, Aug. 26, '14. (S) Cap Trafalgar sunk, Sept. 14, '14. (T) Navarra sunk, Nov. 11, '14. (U) Dresden sunk, Mar. 14, '15. (V) Karlsruhe sunk, Nov. 25, '14. (W) Prinz Eitel Friedrich and Kronprinz Wilhelm interned, Apr. 8, '15, and Apr. 27, '15. (X) Convoy of Canadian troops. (Y) Convoy of Australasian troops. (Z) Convoy of Indian troops.

Germany After a Year of War

"Showing the Superior Power

Black areas indicate Teutonic territory throughout the world.

—Frankfurter Zeitung's Charts of Germany's Enemies"

Gray areas indicate territory of enemies of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Germany After a Year of War

"The German War Economy—English Been

Germany has been buying abroad, in time of peace, foodstuffs to the amount to $750,000,000 annually. Now England seeks to starve Germany out by preventing all these imports. Germany is consequently thrown entirely on her own resources. During the first months of the war a limited amount of food was still being imported; the total somewhat increased by some help from invaded districts. Organization began immediately; the rich potato yield was made to serve more largely than ever before for human needs. Bread was partly made of potato flour, the potato distilleries were permitted to turn out but 60% of their

—Frankfurter Zeitung's Charts "Starvation Policy and How It Has Met"



former production; the bread ticket regulated the daily rations of every German. The number of pigs, formerly tremendous ravagers of the potato crop, was reduced from 26 to 17 million. Pork was not used fresh, but smoked, thus allowing the real output to keep to its former amount. The beer production was cut down 40%. There is an excess production of sugar, for Germany produces, in peace times, one-third more than she uses. This surplus is being used for feeding cattle and for preserving a great quantity of foods, thus making the excellent fruit crop of 1914 useful.

Gains and Losses on the Sea

The curves indicated at the right show the tonnage of merchant vessels, sail and steam, which have been as good as lost, together with those held in the prize courts and those undoubtedly destroyed. The liners interned at the beginning of the war in enemy ports are also included. On the side of the German opponents, the loss, especially in England's case, has been enormous. Since the historic day, Feb. 18, (the day of the German war zone declaration,) the tremendously increasing losses of the enemy are clearly shown by the rapid upward curve, while the German curve remains about stationary. The actual losses of the enemy are still greater than the curve indicates, as our specific knowledge of the total loss is not complete.



The German Mail Service for the Front

In one week there is almost as great a number of sendings as in the whole nine months of the Franco-Prussian war. 1870-71: Total to and from the front about 100 millions.

1914-15: During the first year of the war about 4,000 millions.



Loss in Merchant Vessels

Germany ...255,977 Tons
Enemy .....790,000 Tons

Increase in Number of Prisoners of War



The upper of the three curves indicates the total number captured by German and Austrian troops. The middle curve shows the number fallen into German hands alone, the lower those taken by our allies.



Loss in Battleships

Germany	95,507 Tons
Enemy	331,870 Tons

Prisoners of War

1,900,000

(July 25)

Russian	1,518,000
French	268,000
Serbian	50,000
Belgian	40,000
English	24,000



A Sword in Pity's Hand

By Gilbert Murray

This comment is taken from a new and unpublished preface to Professor Murray's translation of "The Trojan Women," the Euripidean war play which was given recently at Harvard University, under the direction of Granville Barker, and a little later at the dedication exercises of the new stadium erected for the College of the City of New York:

NOT Peace, but a Sword!" The burden of the Trojan women has now fallen upon others, upon Belgian women, French women, upon the women of Poland and Serbia. God grant that the discipline of the Allies may hold firm, and that mankind may not have to add to that tragic list the names of German and Magyar women!

Some twelve years ago, when I was steeped in this drama of Euripides, I felt that, vivid as it was, the things it depicted belonged to the horrors of the far past. War might come again, even among civilized nations; but it could never again be this kind of war. Mankind had advanced since the days of Troy or Melos; there were rules of honorable warfare firmly established, pathetic efforts made by man in his gentler moments to insure that, even in his fury, he should not sink utterly below the brutes. Women and children were safe, prisoners were safe, the wounded were safe. So much seemed certain; and yet the very reverse was true. The next war was to be baser and crueler than the old wars, just as it was vaster in extent.

Other things, too, are strange. We could scarcely have believed that, if war could come, the first step would be the deliberate massacre of a small and unconcerned nation, as innocent as Melos and as far removed from the quarrels of its great neighbors. We could scarcely have believed that, with almost all Europe eager to preserve peace, with Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Serbia, day by day and almost hour by hour offering to accept any form of arbitration, mediation, conference, or even delay, one power would have taken on herself the responsibility of saying: "No, I can have arbitration, but I prefer war. It is by war that I shall gain the most."

And that power was not only the strongest in the world, the best prepared and the most accustomed to think of politics in terms of force—that was natural. She was also the nation of all others whom in so many walks of life we most honored; the nation who had given us so much of our music, our philosophy, our great works of ordered knowledge; who through all the interwoven lines of human endeavor was making the rest of us her willing disciples. She was not content to be the first nation of Europe, the most rapidly growing in wealth and activity; not content to penetrate all neighboring lands with her influence and impress their imaginations with her disciplined strength; not content that we thronged to her universities to be taught; that we filled our libraries with her books and hardly counted any work successful till it won the approval of her authority. She was not content. She craved for a homage more abject, more brutalized. She wanted subjects, not neighbors. We offered her justice, but she preferred organized murder. It seems incredible, and yet it is the oldest of old stories. By that sin fell the angels! Other nations, great and fine nations, have gone mad before, and almost always with this same madness. Hubris the Greeks called it, the ancient sin of pride which must needs come to a fall if any balance is to be maintained in human life. There is hardly one strong nation in the world's history, from Xerxes to Napoleon, that has not in one degree or another been drunken with it. This should make our judgment more gentle, though it must not weaken our resolve.

Doubtless we have all sinned in our day; but that is no reason now against defending the innocent. We have all at some time, in some degree, transgressed the law; but that does not absolve us from the duty of upholding the law. We have all been cruel; but does that mean that we have no right any more to feel indignant pity? And pity in this case has put a sword into our hands.

Reasonable men in Great Britain do not need to be warned against the folly of any desire to "crush Germany." Such a thing cannot be done, and if it could it would be a disaster. We do not need to be warned against deliberately setting ourselves to "hate Germany." To hate Germany would be a stupidity as well as a sin against civilization; I should not like to die calling a whole nation of men my enemies. But before peace can come the world must set its seal upon three great lessons: That public right still lives between nations, that the freedom of a civilized people shall not be violated with impunity, and that those who are swift to make war for the sake of gain shall find in their wars not profit, but bitter loss.

Magazinists of the World on the War

Condensed from the Leading Reviews

Two review articles by German writers, one by Herbert Kraus on "The Monroe Doctrine as Germans See It," the other by Count E. Reventlow on "The Duty of Neutrals in This War," have been deemed of sufficient note to warrant separate places in this number. But of perhaps equal importance is the article by Sydney Brooks, quoted below, while special problems in Ireland, Russia, Ruthenia, France, Turkey, Italy, and Serbia are dealt with in a wide range of topics treated by the world's leading writers and presented in the subjoined text.

Future Developments of the Nations

By Sydney Brooks

THE war widens, it will widen still more before it is over, Sydney Brooks says in The Atlantic Monthly for August, in an article entitled "Side Issues of the War." Twelve powers, including Turkey on the Germanic side and Portugal and Italy on the side of the Allies, have spread the conflict to three-fifths of the total population of the earth and over three-fifths of its land surface. Three-quarters of the peoples of Europe are now at war. Only China, Mexico, the greater part of South America, and Spain are confidently neutral; the "United States, the Republic of Switzerland, the small kingdoms in the north of Europe, and the tempestuous powers of the Balkans are all alike obliged to take into account the possibility of intervention." The future effects of the war, particularly in Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, are considered by Mr. Brooks in a careful forecast:

There has been much to deplore and a little to be ashamed of in the British record during the past year, but there has been vastly more to admire; and I, for one, am confident that we are turning at this moment one of the most glorious pages in British annals. I am not thinking solely or even mainly of naval or military successes in the seven widely separated theatres of war in which Great Britain is engaged. I am thinking of a nation strung up to the heroic pitch, wholly united in a cause that holds out no prizes but those of duty done, honor fulfilled, and security won by valor and sacrifice, absorbing discipline and steadied by it without losing their characteristic flexibility and self-reliance, and pitting against a monstrous mechanism of tyranny the full, spontaneous, and orderly strength of millions of free men.

Great Britain, it may be said, has not yet scaled these heights of splendor. But she is nearing them; she is climbing already beyond the lower slopes; she will gain the summit. She will not, however, do so without carrying still further that process of shedding old habits of thought and old ways of doing things which set in from the first moment of the war. We have seen in the past twelve months two developments of unique significance in British life—the exaltation of the State and the crushing down of party politics. It has been made a reproach to the Socialists of all lands that they did not prevent the war. If they cared for the reply, they might well make answer that at any rate it has had to be waged by applying their doctrines. Whether that shows the common sense of socialism or merely its abnormality, I shall not attempt to determine. But the fact is patent that in Great Britain, as in all the other belligerent countries, the State has taken on an unprecedented increase of powers and responsibilities. For the time being, the old economics are dead.

The British are among the least submissive and the most independent of peoples. Yet their chief complaint against their Government at this moment is that it has not sufficiently restricted their liberties, that it does not enforce discipline on every human being in the kingdom, that it does not prescribe for each one of them his or her special sphere of usefulness. Every step that the State has taken beyond the province assigned to it in times of peace has been received with a round of popular applause. The State regulates the prices of food; the State makes vast pur-

chases of necessary commodities for resale to the people; the State takes over the railways; the State gags the press; the State, by one enactment after another, places the entire kingdom under what is virtually martial law; the State fixes wages, annexes profits, takes control of the saloons, starts new industries, enters the insurance business, commandeers all the engineering works in the country, abolishes trade union restrictions, regulates and disciplines labor—essays, in short, a hundred enterprises that would be utterly closed to it in ordinary times.

The approval with which the British people have watched and encouraged these inroads upon their traditional philosophy is something more than a tribute to necessity. It implies a conscious recognition that the organization of Great Britain as a community has hitherto been singularly defective and that only State action can improve it. This recognition, in my judgment, will outlive the war. A sane and humorous people like the British are never likely to deify the State as the Germans have deified it; but they will more and more incline to enlarge its functions and to invoke its assistance. The awful transitional period that lies ahead of Europe, when the stimulus of war is removed and its ruin and waste come to be counted, and a desperate scramble of readjustment and rebuilding begins, will force all nations to turn to the State for leadership in the work of salvage. I cannot conceive that in Great Britain all problems of Government ownership or control of such utilities as the railways, such services as the banks and Stock Exchange, and such industries as mining, will not after the war be considered from a new standpoint. I cannot conceive that the British people, when peace returns, will tolerate for long the failure of the State to recolonize the British countryside or to provide a genuinely national system of education. Still less can I conceive of the empire continuing to be the same loose, unfederated, disjointed congeries of States that it was when the war began; or of domestic politics being resumed on anything like their old footing; or of women continuing to be excluded from that share in public and professional life to which their incomparable services during the war have with compelling effect underscored their claim; or of emigration from an exhausted and overburdened Great Britain to the ampler skies and prospects of Greater Britain beyond the seas being allowed to pursue its old haphazard course.

System, organization, discipline; a new sense of the State; a more realistic conception of unity throughout the nation and of brotherhood among all classes—these are the attributes that one hopes may survive the war and animate the British people without detriment to their native impulses of initiative and self-confidence. I find myself relying, blindly perhaps but profoundly, upon those three or four millions of young men who will have volunteered for the war, to introduce into Great Britain, on the return of peace, a wider democracy, not so much of political forms as of spirit and opportunity, a national and not a party outlook in public affairs, a better type of legislator than "the tired lawyer," and a higher standard of efficiency in the business of government. With the soldiers of the war, if they will but hold together and assert themselves, rests the future of the nations engaged in it; and in France and Great Britain and Italy, the three belligerent lands in which political life is most highly developed, their influence will naturally be thrown, not on the side of a resumption of party politics, but on the side of prolonging and upholding the temper and methods of the really national Governments that the plain urgencies of the war have already set up in London and in Paris.

If Great Britain has much to learn from Germany, Germany has far more to learn from Great Britain, Mr. Brooks believes:

But the capacity of each to assimilate what gives strength to the other is by no means identical. Great Britain can find room for, and in almost all departments of life stands to benefit by, those qualities of patient foresight, scientific exactitude, thoroughness in preparation, thrift, realism, and devotion to the State of which Germany has set so far-shining an example. For these are virtues that already exist in the British character, but are largely lost to the national service through faulty organization. They can be developed and they can be applied without any harm to, and, indeed, with a positive enrichment of, those traits that are the backbone of the British people. Great Britain, for instance, could adopt national military service without canonizing the uniform or enthroning a military caste. She could extend the functions of the State and yet still regard its agents and functionaries with the good-humored tolerance of today. She could reach Germany's standard of education and intelligence without forfeiting her ancient dower of a natural and resourceful rebelliousness. She could become as systematic, economical, and provident as her adversary and still retain her talent for meeting responsibilities gladly and for thriving on emergencies. What Britain, in short, can borrow—and, if she is to hold her own in the war and in the not less difficult times that will succeed the war, must borrow—from Germany is in

the nature of expansion. What Germany can borrow from Great Britain is in the nature of explosion. Once plant in the Fatherland the careless British doctrine that a man is a human being and not a cog in a machine, and the whole apparatus of autocracy, caste-government, impotent Parliaments, and manufactured opinion begins to crack and crumble.

I fancy that in any event it will hardly emerge intact when the defeat which is as distant as it is inevitable strips from the ruling classes in Germany the prestige of infallibility and success. The people have long been beating against the bars. More and more they have begun to ask for a share in the Government commensurate with their numbers and intelligence, and to realize that the ballot, as an end in itself, is insufficient; that, divorced from direct responsibility, it is little more than a national plaything, and that it affords no adequate security against the subjection of Government to the interests of a single class or against the capricious and hazardous policies of a semi-absolutism. For some years before the war the German people had been working around to the conclusion that no Emperor, however patriotic, and no Chancellor, however dexterous, could be quite so safe a guardian of the national interests as the nation itself. I do not say that they had actually reached that conclusion or that, even if they had, they possessed the political capacity to give effect to it. But unquestionably that was the direction in which the German mind was moving. It seems not unreasonable to assume that the defeat of Germany in this war, by discrediting the whole philosophy of the State for which the Hohenzollerns have stood, must powerfully aid the political enfranchisement of the masses.

But it is, perhaps, on Russia that the war is destined to work its greatest effects, says Mr. Brooks:

Whatever else happens, the days of Prussianism in the empire of the Czars are numbered; and with its disappearance there vanishes a baleful influence that since the days of Peter the Great has corrupted the Slavonic spirit and interposed an estranging barrier between the Czar and his peoples. Changing the name of the capital from St. Petersburg to Petrograd was a small thing, but symbolic. It was a token that the Russian sovereign and his subjects, long separated by Prussian ascendency in the Court, the army, and the bureaucracy, were at last coming together in a mutually intelligible identity. The true genius of the Russian people is kindly, tolerant, and democratic. It is almost everything, indeed, that the Prussian spirit is not. That is why this war is for Russia essentially a war of moral liberation that will clear a path for the fruition and expansion of all that is most genuinely Russian. The results may be long in showing themselves, but those who know Russia best and are possessed of something of her own unconquerable faith have the least doubt of their ultimate advent. Another and a decisive milestone is being passed on the long and tortuous road of Russia's progress toward liberalism and unity.

But it is on wider problems than these that the observer of the present struggle soon finds himself ruminating. There is not a question of all the many questions that have harassed European statesmanship for the past hundred years that has not been started by it into fresh vitality; and one at least, forgotten by all diplomats and remembered only by dreamers, has re-emerged from a still older tomb. Poland! That name, that ideal, that inveterate aspiration of a people martyred with the peculiar callousness of the eighteenth century—what "practical" man gave it, until the present war and Russia's resounding pledge of national resurrection, a single moment's thought? Yet the final and, as it were, the sacramental token of victory for the Allies has been solemnly and sincerely declared to be the ancient Kingdom of Poland reconstituted and made whole. And the principle by virtue of which this miracle is to be wrought is the principle of nationality. There, if anywhere, is the point of sharpest opposition between the Teutonic powers and the Allies. The triumph of the former means the trampling of the smaller peoples of Europe beneath the jackboot of Prussian militarism; the triumph of the latter is the vindication of their right to security and self-realization.

But one who, with this clue in his hands, seeks to thread the maze of European politics, will find "the principle of nationality" an erratic and even convulsive guide. By its light he may, indeed, picture to himself, without too much effort, the lost provinces restored to France, Belgium once more independent, and the neighboring kingdoms as self-contained and relatively tranquil as they are today. But as his eyes travel eastward, he becomes aware that, if nationality is to determine everything, very little is left of the map of Europe. Poland rises again; Austria-Hungary disappears, the German elements gravitating toward the Hohenzollerns and the Slav toward the Romanoffs, leaving Hungary to form a Magyar Switzerland; a Greater Serbia, a Greater Rumania, emerge; Bulgaria expands to the limits of her original agreement with Serbia and Greece; Italy annexes whatever in Austria and along the Dalmatian coast is Italian in speech or sentiment or by tradition; and Greece overflows into Asia Minor. Such a rearrangement is not

impossible, if and when the Allies win. But it raises almost as many problems as it solves, and the more he looks into it the more will a dispassionate onlooker wonder whether nationality may not prove as refractory and aggressive—and may not be the forcing-bed of as many wars—as religion itself.

Not even here, however, do we reach the limits of this "greatest of all wars." Is the 500-year-old curse of Turkish rule at last and really to be removed from Europe? Is Russia actually within sight and touch of her insistent goals—Constantinople and an outlet to the warm waters? And if the Turks are driven from Europe, can they hold their own or maintain any sort of authority in Asia Minor? Syria and Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia, what is to become of them? Can Great Britain with her 80,000,000 Moslem subjects be indifferent to the fate of a country that contains the holy places at Mecca and Medina, and that commands the trade route to India as well as the coasts of Egypt? Is another and a greater empire to rise where the Assyrian and Babylonian empires fell? Will cities more magnificent than they cover the sites of Nineveh and Babylon, and the Tigris spread fertility like the Nile, and Mesopotamia become once more the granary of the East, and the oil wells of Kerkuk rival those of Baku? These are not idle speculations. They are as much and as pertinently the conceivable consequences of the war as the fate of Germany's possessions in Africa and the Pacific, and the rounding off of the all-British route from Cairo to the Cape.

But all forecasts, all possibilities, are subject to the issue of the struggle and the nature of the peace. The world is at war today very largely because the Congress of Vienna one hundred years ago redrew the map of Europe on the artificial and transient lines of dynastic claims and antiquated technicalities, and ignored the rights and sentiments and individuality of the peoples it was dealing with. Since then democracy and nationality have made themselves felt as the most potent of all forces in the politics of today. If the settlement is guided by them, a new and saner dispensation may be created such as Europe has not seen since the peace of the Antonines was broken. For by far the most crucial question propounded by the war is not its effect upon this country or upon that, but whether it is to end merely to be renewed later on, or whether "the greatest of all wars" is to be also the last.

The Future of the Ruthenians

By Bedwin Sands

IN The British Review Bedwin Sands declares that the Ruthenians, who are known by American immigration agents as Russian Poles, Galicians, South Russians, Bukowinians, and so on, are descendants of the ancient Scythians, and that several authorities claim that they are the purest type of Slavs. The Germans called them Ruthenians, but recent writers in Russia and abroad use the name of Ukrainians. The original Rusjky, that is, the people of the Kiev Kingdom or land of Rusj and of the Eastern Carpathians and sub-Carpathian districts, were called Malo-Russky, or Little Russians, part of that country being called historically Ukraine, or border, they have extended that name within the last few years to the whole of their land and that of Ukrainians to their people. Of their characteristics Mr. Sands says:

The Ukrainian occupies a place apart in the Slavonic family. The Slavs are like so many brothers settled under different climes. The Ukrainian is a fine-looking, tall and slender, dark-haired son, the favorite child with visitors, but, if a sudden change of sex be forgiven in the course of this simile, he is a veritable Cinderella to his younger brother, the Muscovite. The latter has gone north, has taken in Mongol and Finnish blood, and become a pushing, masterful, money-saving creature. He is less shapely but more sturdy, less poetical but more enterprising, less fond of books, of education, of merry songs and dances, but keen on "siller," and can be depended upon for a certain standard of patient output. He will ignore the gibes of the quick-witted Ukrainian and go on with his work unperturbed. The rugged, stern Muscovite, like the Bulgarian, is by now too far removed from the pure Slav stock to care for public opinion. Only sensitive Western nations trouble about that. Tell a Bulgarian or a Muscovite he is an Oriental—he will not often care to deny it. The Ukrainian is anxious to be considered a European. He certainly deserves the name. Ten years of life under a free Government has proved it many a

time, in Canada and the United States of America.

The national aim of these 30,000,000 people, whose language shows their affiliation with the Serbo-Croats and Poles, besides securing the right for the Jews to reside in all parts of Russia, is freedom to worship as Greek Catholics. In addition, they desire the introduction of the Ukrainian language as the language of instruction in primary, agricultural, and other lower schools, and their language as a subject of study in all Ukrainian schools; the introduction of all studies bearing on Ukraine in all the Ukrainian universities; the free use of the Ukrainian language in all meetings and public institutions, and the right of the Zemstvos, of the co-operative insurance, financial, and other public institutions of the Ukraine to form unions covering the whole or parts of the Ukraine.

Ireland's Recruiting

By N. Marlowe

Describing "The Present Mood of Ireland," N. Marlowe says in The British Review:

In the matter of recruiting Sir Edward Carson's followers in the North of Ireland gave at once a practical demonstration of their loyalty to the empire. But the significance of the contrast between the recruiting figures for Ulster and those for the rest of Ireland is not entirely political. The main industrial districts of the island are situated in the northeast of Ulster, and it is possible to argue that, even if Ireland had no "politics" and no "religion," the greater proportion of recruits would have come from this quarter. It is always easier to find soldiers in the towns than in the countryside. Nationalist Dublin, as we have seen, has done very well, (it has recently provided five new battalions of Dublin Fusiliers,) and the recruiting figures for the City of Cork are also good. The smaller towns in the south claim excellent records. For instance, Wexford, with a population of 14,000, has sent 2,000 recruits to the army and navy. Criticism, therefore, is chiefly directed against the agricultural counties. The farmers' sons are a favorite target for letter writers to The Irish Times. But excuses are forthcoming. The laboring population in the country districts was already limited before the war, and such recruiting as has taken place in it has been felt by the employers, the owners of land, and their sons. Moreover, the increased demand for agricultural produce, consequent on the war, makes the shortage of labor more pressing than usual. In poor counties like Donegal, Mayo, Clare, and Kerry, where the drain of emigration has been severe, many a peasant finds it impossible to spare the one son who is still at home—there has already been a great struggle to keep him away from America. Such being the position, the Sinn Fein party could declare with some truth at the beginning of the war that there was no need for an anti-recruiting campaign in rural Ireland. "England," wrote Arthur Griffith bitterly, "having destroyed our Constitution, suppressed our Parliament, loaded her debt on to our shoulders, turned our tillage fields into cattle ranches, trebled our taxation, and halved our population—all within a century—wants what is left of us to fight for her supremacy over the world."

The Nationalist argument for recruiting was:

> "The more we help the better terms shall we receive when the time comes to reconsider the Irish settlement. By refusing to make war sacrifices we merely play into the hands of the Orangemen of Belfast. The Irish are a warlike race, and after they have been trained in arms and fought on Continental battlefields, is it likely that they will submit to the partition of their country?" Thus spoke Mr. Dillon to the Nationalists of Belfast, and, as may be imagined, his words did not conduce to the maintenance of the party truce: the Orangemen were never in a nastier temper than they are today, and swear that when their soldiers return from the war home rule will be "relegated to the devil."

But the politicians have used other appeals with effect, e. g., the wrongs of Belgium, horror of Germany, and the cry of small nationalities. Mr. Marlowe continues:

> Sometimes, too, the Irish recruiting speeches strike a really original note. Listen, for instance, to the speeches of Professor (now Lieutenant) Kettle, who fifteen years ago was distributing anti-recruiting leaflets in the streets of Dublin. "Why," he exclaims, "we Irish have only just succeeded in civilizing England. If Germany should win this war and es-

ELENA

Wife of King Victor Emmanuel of Italy and Daughter of Nicholas, King of Montenegro

QUEEN MARIE

Wife of Ferdinand I. of Rumania and Daughter of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha

(Photo from P. S. Rogers)

tablish her hegemony over the world, we shall have to begin the work of ages all over again. We shall have to civilize the Germans, and how long will that take? No—it is too great a sacrifice that the Kaiser's friends here ask of us!" Ireland, continues Lieutenant Kettle, must put aside all considerations of profit and loss—since when did we become a people of hucksters? She must remember her duty, if not to England, then to Europe. Certainly it is "difficult" for Irish Nationalists to don the khaki, nor have we any assurance that England has renounced her imperialistic ambitions. Still, the fact remains that the present war is a good one, and Ireland can only effectively count in the settlement by sending her sons into the British Army. So the controversy reached a higher plane.

"Dinant la Morte"

By Camille David

HUMAN suffering such as Dante himself could not have imagined" is described by Camille David in The Contemporary Review for August from facts which he attests after visiting the ground on which Dinant was razed. During the awful sack of Dinant and the flight of the terrified inhabitants in the last days of August, 1914, M. David presents this as a faithful record:

Saturday, Aug. 22, was quiet, except that toward evening there was artillery thunder in the valley.

Sunday was a terrible day. As early as 5:15 in the morning, at dawn, the Germans, under the orders of Lieut. Col. Blegen, began to bombard Dinant. Shells rained on the town. Soon the mitrailleuses, which were hidden in the trees, sent down a great shower of bullets. From the left bank the French replied vigorously. Hardly had the fight begun before several hundred Germans of the 108th Infantry Regiment advanced through the Ponds de Leffe and by the heights of St. Nicolas. The first victims fell at Leffe.

The faithful took refuge in the Eglise des Prémontrés, where mass was being celebrated, while outside was the crack of rifle fire. It was 6:30 o'clock. The German soldiers burst into the church and drove out the worshippers. They had heard their last mass!

Protests and supplications aroused no pity in the barbarians. With the butt ends of their rifles they separated the men from the women, and made them stand in a group while they shot into the middle of them under the horrified eyes of the women. About fifty civilians fell dead. The women uttered terrifying shrieks. At the door of his house, and in the presence of his wife and children, they killed M. Victor Poncelet. Bloodthirsty fury took possession of the soldier-assassins. Street by street and house by house they pillaged the town and set fire to it, destroying Dinant from top to bottom. * * *

At 9 o'clock a pitable cortège approached the prison. It was composed of men, women, and children, about 700 of them. With their hands held up and surrounded by soldiers, these martyrs crossed the burning town. Tears flowed, sobs, lamentations, prayers arose from among them. No one listened. The officers and soldiers were unmoved. Until dusk these wretched people were kept prisoners. The soldiers passed backward and forward in front of them, saying: "You will all be shot this evening." Evening arrived. Darkness fell slowly, so slowly, prolonging the terrible agony. The battle had come to an end. Namur having fallen, the French had orders to retire toward Philippeville. The Germans were masters of the town.

At 6 o'clock a German Captain had the women placed high up on the Montagne de la Croix. A cordon of infantry barred the street before them. Thirty steps away, against the wall of the garden of M. Tchoffen, the public prosecutor, in the Rue Léopold, at the corner of the Place d'Armes, a row of men was placed standing, and in front of them a second row kneeling. Opposite the public prosecutor's house soldiers were stationed ready to shoot. To avoid the ricochet of the bullets they were aiming slantwise. A little further on, waiting their turn, another group of inhabitants helplessly watched these lugubrious preparations. The German officer passes in front of the crowd in reserve and chooses more victims. At this tragic moment a thrill of horror goes through the condemned men and through the crowd of relations and friends who are looking on at the scene. The women implore and wring their hands and throw themselves on their knees, the children weep, the men cry: "Mercy! Mercy! we did not shoot, we had no arms. Have pity on us for our children's sake."

It is in vain! The German officer will listen to nothing. He takes up his posi-

tion, shouts an order, lowers his sword. The rifles go off, the bullets fly, and men fall. A great clamor is heard which makes the rocks tremble. Women are fainting. * * * The dead now rest in M. Tehoffen's garden. A few flowers and some little wooden crosses stuck in the ground mark the two big graves.

Not all the men, however, have been hit. About twenty were not touched. They fell down pell-mell among those who had been shot. Others were only wounded. One received a bullet in his head, another was hit by five bullets, another had his thigh perforated. All remain motionless in a pool of blood which gradually congeals, lying side by side with the corpses of their friends, now become cold and stiff in death. Not a cry, not a murmur, not a breath rises from this human heap. Agony and the will to live glue them to the pavement. Fear itself prevents their teeth from chattering. They feign death and await the darkness of the night. There is silence for a long, long time. Then a head lifts from among the dead in the shadow. Enemies are no longer to be seen near the prison. In a low voice, in a whisper, the owner speaks and says in Walloon: "Can you see any one over St. Nicolas way?" A man lying on his back opens his eyes and answers: "No, nobody." "Let us go into the house opposite," says young G. It is 8 o'clock and quite dark. The survivors, silently, with beating hearts, revived by hope, rise up, cross the street with a run, plunge into a house, climb through the gardens, the unhurt dragging and supporting the wounded, and hide in the mountain. They are covered with dark blood which is not their own. They rub themselves with leaves and grass. For several days and nights they live on carrots and beets and other roots. The wounded are untended. Their comrades tear up their shirts for bandages. They suffer terribly from thirst.

* * * * * * *

That tragic Sunday, Aug. 23, saw other massacres. In the prison civilians were shut up, men and women together. At 6 o'clock in the evening a big gun started shooting from the upper part of the mountain, and dropped a rain of bullets on the prisoners, who were in the courtyard. A woman fell pierced through the body. Three other people perished at her side. Soldiers ran up to kill them. In order to save himself Dr. D. smeared his face with the blood of the victims and pretended to be dead.

The butchery had been organized at various points in the town. Inhabitants who had taken refuge in cellars and were discovered were shot at once. At Leffe, at about 5 o'clock in the evening, the soldiers forced M. Himmer, the Argentine Consul, Director of the Oudin Works, a Frenchman, and fifty workmen, women and children to come out of the cellars of the weaving factory, where they had fled. Four times did they set fire to the establishment. M. Himmer came out first with a white flag. "I am Consul for Argentina," he said to the officer, "and I appeal to that country." What was that to the assassins? They were all shot. The officer said: "It would have been too much luck to spare you when your fellow-citizens were dead." The toll of the dead at Leffe is horrible. One hundred and forty civilians were shot. There are only seven sound men left.

In the garden next to that of M. Servais, ex-Secretary of the Commune, also shot, rest eighty of the inhabitants of Dinant. In the cemetery of the Faubourg de Leffe others lie buried. Others again to the right of the road, in a garden near the Catholic school, at the entrance to the Fonds de Leffe. And here it was the inhabitants shut up in the Couvent des Prémontrés who dug the grave. M. M. told me, shaking with indignant feeling: "They made us dig the grave, like martyrs, saying to us, 'That's for you this evening.' They made us bury our massacred fellow-citizens. I saw seventeen bodies thrown into that enormous hole, and then the contents of three carts, each carrying fifteen murdered corpses. They were tossed in like bundles, without being identified."

Toward 6:30 the German savages passed along the Rue St. Roch. Against the house of M. B. a group of civilians was shot. Then the soldiers threw the bodies into the cellar, which has been walled up. Forty victims are in that charnel house. In the Rue En Ile a paralytic was shot in his chair. In the Rue d'Enfer a young fellow of 14 was killed by a soldier. He had with him a little child whom a soldier tossed into the burning house of M. François G.

At Neffe, a southern suburb of Dinant, armed bandits sacked, pillaged, and stole, with fire and slaughter. Under the railway viaduct they shot men, women, and children. An old woman and all her children were killed in a cellar. A man, his wife, and son and daughter were put against a wall and killed. An old man of 65, his wife, his son-in-law, and the young wife were shot. Down at the river bank there was further butchery. Inhabitants of Neffe who had gone by boat to the Rocher Bayard suffered the same horrible fate. Among them Mme. Collard, aged 83, and her husband, and many women and children. Ninety-eight civilians were buried in M. B.'s garden, according to the accounts of the German soldiers themselves. And while this awful carnage was deluging the town with blood, the German soldiers gave demonstrations of their cowardice. For

instance, this in the Faubourg St. Paul. Mme. L. P. relates: "Soldiers came into my house. They struck me with their fists in the chest, smashed everything in the house, then, with a revolver pointed at me, dragged me out of doors. Other women were there under the threats of these brutes. They pushed us before them to the parapet at the waterside, exposing us to the French fire, while the coward Prussians stooped and fired, sheltering themselves behind women." It was there that Mlle. Madeleine Massigny was killed.

I have heard of four cases of violation, a young woman who died after the abuses of fifteen horrid bandits. I have also had an account of a young mother who was confronted with a choice between the strangling of her little girl and her own dishonor. It will be readily understood that names cannot be given, and that the population keeps religious silence with regard to these cases.

Dr. A. L. took refuge with his wife and a baby of a few months in a sewer. They had no food but a little sugar, and nothing to drink but the filthy water flowing by. To feed the child they had to damp the sugar with this noxious liquid. The horrible situation lasted two days.

The "Kultur"-bearers have refinements of cruelty. In the barracks at Leffe 300 civilian prisoners were placed in line along the wall with their arms up. Behind them a pastor recited the prayers for the dead, while an officer worked an unloaded gun! This torture was kept up for a quarter of an hour. It seemed a century long. In the Eglise St. Paul prisoners were kept for five days. In the Eglise des Prémontrés an officer of the 108th Infantry came to demand a candle. He was given a taper. He refused it, and the sacred lamp was taken down. He was satisfied, and marched all around the assembly, jeering, and holding his revolver at the faces of the women. He carried his trophy away with a roar of laughter.

Pillage and fire continued on the Monday and Tuesday. The soldiers drank as much wine as they could steal. They wallowed in murder and blood, celebrating their triumph glass in hand. Drunken officers sat down with their men. They obliged the inhabitants who had survived to be present at their orgies on pain of death. On Monday the soldiers, just to amuse themselves, killed three old men of 80. On Tuesday, at 5:30 in the morning, soldiers scattered through the town, shouting and setting fire to the houses on the Quai de Meuse and in the Rue du Moulin des Batteurs.

From the Monday processions had been formed. Surrounded by soldiers, who struck the French monks in the face with horsewhips, the prisoners were taken away toward Prussia, some by Ciney, others by Marche. About 400 went. How many will return? And what must have been the sufferings of those innocent victims on the long routes, who had not been able to dress themselves suitably or get their boots, who had been torn from their wives and children, leaving behind them that nightmare of bloodshed and ruin. One had only stockings on his feet. Many were in sabots. Already the dead were strewn along the roads. On the left of the Ciney road, on the Tienne d'Aurcy, lie buried four old men who were found with their hands bound, unable to go any further, and exhausted by suffering and fatigue. They were MM. Jules Monard, 70; Léon Simon, 65; Couillard, 75, and Bouchat, 73. The farmer of Chesnois was harnessed between the shafts of a cart and forced to drag it up the hill of Sorinnes.

Such is the true and sad story of Dinant. It remains for the world to pass its judgment.

Mobilizing the Russian Nation

By V. Kuzmin-Karavayeff

(In Vyestnik Evropy, "The European Messenger.")

THE main interest of the moment, the main problem, is the mobilization of Russian industry, or, more exactly, of the forces of the nation and of society. By mobilization is understood the measures which change the country from the normal conditions of peace times to a war basis. This includes the filling up of the ranks of the army, the supply of horses, and the organization of all kinds of munitions of war. The rôle of the people in all these matters has generally been passive. It has only had to meet certain demands, such as requisitions from factories and manufacturing plants, to supply hay, food products and articles required for supplies of other kinds, for the army. But the active rôle has always

been reserved for the military power itself.

When the present war had just begun the forces of society, which had gained experience in the Russo-Japanese war, were given an active participation in the care for the sick and wounded, at first only in the interior of the country, but soon also at the front. Gradually the share of the forces of society in the active work of the war was enlarged. It was frequently given a share in the sanitary organization of the different war sectors; it was called on to share in the provision of uniforms and linen for the troops, in erecting baths, laundries, victualing stations and so on. But all this did not touch the burning need, as the tenth month of the war revealed it—the point at which the evident insufficiency of the forces of the Government showed itself.

Our recent military reverses and the successes of the Austro-Germans have shown that our enemies have a notable superiority in the weight of metal thrown by their guns. To try to develop our fire also to the same irrational number of shells per day and per hour—a number entirely unjustified by the results gained —would, of course, be a stupid and useless imitation. But to improve the quality of our artillery fire, and its accuracy, is indispensable. The prolongation of the war has exhausted our reserves of shells. In like manner our supplies of other kinds of military equipment have been exhausted. No foresight could have anticipated the conditions created by this unprecedented war. The Germans used up their supplies prepared in time of peace long before we did. But they have long had a largely developed production of war munitions, with which they even supplied the armies of foreign countries, and also, from the early weeks of the war, they have had command of all the metallurgical resources of Belgium and a large part of Northern France. It is impossible not to regret that the call for the forces of the nation and of society was not heard earlier in Russia.

But it is not too late. The war may and must last long yet. The vital thing is that the problem of the hour has been recognized, and that the necessity of mobilizing all forces of the nation to meet it has been seen. The representatives of industry have said the first word. To their voices have immediately been added those of the representatives of our social organizations, the local and municipal councils. The telegraph wires daily bring news that the national mobilization is developing in width and depth, and growing irresistible. The technical forces of all teaching bodies, technical organizations of all kinds, trade organizations and so on, are taking part in it. And if the members of the Imperial Duma, of all parties and factions, await with such eagerness the day of renewal of their legislative activity, this passionate desire is explained, to a notable degree, by the moral necessity of plunging into the general work of the mobilization of all the forces of the nation. To be a member of the Imperial Duma, to feel one's responsibility as a representative, and at the same time to remain in enforced idleness, or to devote one's painful leisure to the work of the Red Cross or to social organizations, was simply torture. There are groups of the Extreme Right of the Imperial Council who do not share this feeling, and who have not taken part in the national life of these momentous days.

And in the region of direct legislative work, the mobilization of industry and of the forces of the whole nation opens up for the Imperial Duma a whole series of important and responsible problems. A work of immense significance is in motion. No ready forms and molds exist. The forms and regulations of the committees already created to supply war munitions and for other purposes must be thoughtfully worked out, their activities must be regulated without delay. And it must not be forgotten that this work requires the co-ordination of the efforts of such different participants as men of science and technical knowledge, social workers and organizers. And with them must cooperate the forces of the working classes, without whom not one step forward can be taken, and which up to the present have not been included in the work of organization.

The members of the Duma, as they have declared in interviews with newspaper correspondents, feel that, in the person of the new War Minister, General A. A. Polivanoff, the fullest co-operation of the Ministry of War with the mobilized forces of society in the task of providing war munitions for the army is guaranteed. The Ministry of the Interior, under the guidance of Prince Stcherbatoff, will also, it may be affirmed, raise no obstacles. Of the problem of the hour, Prince Stcherbatoff says: "All the efforts of society and of the Government must be strained toward a single point—to fight and to win." If the Imperial Duma succeeds in finding forms for the vital regulation of the work, and if, in addition to the authority of the social organizations, the authority of the Duma also supports the work, then we may look forward with confidence. The army knows that for nearly a year already all the thoughts of the land and of the people are with it. When the army learns that to it, to its military equipment, its martial might, the whole force of the nation is also directed, its force will be increased tenfold. And this the Germans already understand. On the Pruth, on the Dniester, on the Vistula, they are firing hundreds of thousands of shells. They know that to their successes will soon come an irrevocable end.

Turkey's Present Rulers

By E. Nouridjan

Formerly Counsel of the Imperial Ottoman Embassy.

(*In La Revue.*)

IN Turkey, as everywhere, murderers and robbers are brought before an Assize Court or a criminal tribunal and punished in conformity with the law. Authors have based on this the idea that the Turks respect human life and property, and so were not as savage as they were thought to be! But what these writers did not see, what they could not see in a superficial study, in the course of a long or short voyage, was that assassins are punished in Turkey not because human life is respected there, but simply because assassination being the exclusive privilege of the Sultan, the murderers infringe his monopoly.

The Sultans, however, have never failed to exploit this monopoly; Sultan Abdul Hamid accorded assassination permits to his favorites. Who can tell the number of people assassinated in the last few years by two of these favorites, Gani Bey and Fehim Bey, for motives that had nothing to do with politics? They assassinated in order to steal, but, it is reported, they were scrupulous in handing over to their master a part of the booty.

When the Committee of Union and Progress in fact usurped the sovereign power, it naturally profited by one of the most important privileges attached to the person of the Sultan; the right of inflicting death. It is just to the committee to say that it has used and abused this right in a way to make Abdul Hamid, the red Sultan, grow pale! The first act of the Committee of Union and Progress, in assuming power, was in order to get its hand in, to give the order for the assassination of the Christians of the Province of Adana; since then, the assassinations of which the committee had been guilty cannot be counted; it disdained no adversary; the strongest and the weakest, all disappeared as if by magic, in accordance with its wish. After having thoroughly purged Turkey, it sent its emissaries as far afield as Paris, to complete their exploits. One of these last was killed while endeavoring to accomplish his mission; his accomplices were released for lack of proof.

In France people still believe in the Young Turks and the Old Turks. The expressions Old Turk and Young Turk do not even exist in Turkey—any more

than the things themselves, nor is there any equivalent term. What are called in Europe Young Turks are the Turks who are not satisfied with their posts, and who are intriguing against the Old Turks, that is, against those who have more desirable posts.

The state of war, as will easily be believed, has in no way remedied the current evils and has only increased the opportunities for abuses. The Constitution, having proclaimed equality among all the races, it was, or at least it appeared, natural that the Christians should perform military service, for which only Mussulmans had hitherto been liable. * * * Those who do not wish to serve have, it is true, the privilege of being excused on payment of 1,000 francs, ($200.) But every three months a new decree of mobilization is issued, and the payment must be repeated; I know Christians who have paid six or seven times, and are always threatened by a new demand. Some, sick of this and without means, declared that they were willing to serve. In groups of three, they were intrusted to two gendarmes with fixed bayonets, who led them to the high roads, where, under threat of the bayonets, they had to break stones for twelve and fourteen hours a day; the moment they wished to rest they were abused and threatened; at the end of a week of this existence these poor "soldiers" sold whatever they possessed, their furniture, their wives' jewels, to pay the fine for non-service. They were set free—until the next decree of mobilization. Such is the life of all Christians in Turkey between the ages of 19 and 45. Long live the Committee of Progress! Who would have said that we should come in time to regret Abdul Hamid?

Five years ago I was chatting with an official who had spent twenty years in European countries and occupied a high post in Turkey.

Do you not see, I said to him, that you are on the road to ruin? How can you expect a country to progress when the fools rule the intelligent?

He began to laugh.

How long, do you think, he asked me, Turkey can exist under these conditions?

You want me to answer frankly?

Yes.

Ten years, at most.

In my opinion, that is enough. So you think we can last ten years more? Well, why should we not profit by present conditions for ten years? Why do you want us to commit suicide now?

Italy and Serbia

By C. Stojanowich

Former Minister of Commerce of Italy

(*Rivista d'Italia.*)

After a general discussion of the Balkan problem, M. Stojanowich takes up the special question of the relations between Italy and Serbia as future neighbors:

DURING this war the question of the delimitation of our frontier in the direction of Italy has come to the front. Between Serbia and Italy, precisely as also between Serbia and Rumania, there has never existed, and cannot arise, so far as can be foreseen, any cause of conflict. If the Serbians, Italians, and Rumanians win their freedom from Austria, and if our expansion absorbs those regions of Austria-Hungary which are inhabited by our co-nationals, this solution cannot bring causes of dissension nor furnish reasons for strained relations in the future. For centuries our boundaries have marched with those of the Rumanians, and history knows of no conflict between these two nations. Our relations of neighborhood with Italy,

which lasted for a long time in the Middle Ages, have always been amicable, and were always consolidated by close commercial bonds, as well as by those of economics and culture, and we are not able to perceive any cause that should hinder these relations of neighborhood, once more restored, from becoming closely knit, as before, and even rendered more intimate. A strong and great Serbia, with a reinforced and enlarged Rumania, in union with Italy, will represent, both north of the Balkans and in the Apennine Peninsula, a powerful barrier against the irruption of the Germanic torrent, which for more than twenty centuries has threatened to overwhelm the Balkan lands and Italy.

The barrier which, when the war is ended, should find its expression in a Slavo-Latin alliance, would consist of about 70,000,000 of population. If two more Balkan nations, natural members of the Balkan confederation, in spite of temporary misunderstandings, have essential reasons for uniting with the compact mass of the others, should also enter this alliance, then the new regrouping of forces in Europe, represented by Italy and the consolidated Balkan group, would become highly important.

The future relations of Italy with the Balkans should be regulated in such a manner that Italy should be able to advance her interests in common with her natural friends; and this in complete contradiction with the past, when the relations of Italy were bound up with the interests of powers which, both by reason of geographical position and through racial causes, were straining toward the conquest of those lands and those seas in which Italy must safeguard her own interests. I repeat, the Greater Italy, together with a strong "Balcania," should form that natural group which alone can guarantee the necessary development and the defense of all those interests which we in Balcania, and Italy likewise, have most at heart. No nation can have a greater interest than Italy in the formation and consolidation of the Balkan group. And especially is it Italy's chief interest to co-operate in the systematization of the separate Balkan nations, along the line of their national aspirations, since with the Balkan States so constituted Italy will have ready to hand that alliance which is best suited to her for the protection of her own interests, which cannot fail to harmonize with those of the Balkan States.

Our intention is to seek sure pathways. Generations which are to come after us will have as their task to develop the grand idea which affirms its rights arising from a hecatomb of those who have fallen, and who have given it faith and life. Therefore Mazzini has said: "Great ideas make great peoples." (Il pensiero di Mazzini, cccliv.)

Therefore it is opportune to indicate also the false ways which have already been too much trodden, and which, it seems, some still wish to follow, holding obstinately to the old errors which still survive in Europe, according to which Balcania is considered a territory open to conquest, subjugation, division at pleasure. But this is now an absurdity. Only evil and avaricious nations can counsel the sustaining of unnatural relations in Balcania, from which can come only new conflicts, new and unnecessary struggles, which will work detriment to the progress of all European peoples. Therefore, like all the nations of Europe, the Balkan peoples must work in such a manner that we may not once more become the victims of new underhand machinations, which could only serve to kindle conflagrations more tremendous even than the present war, and which would be nothing but the inevitable result of false political principles, drawn from the errors of the past. Let that ideal which stands in the program of the Balkan peoples, which contains the sanest principle that has been consecrated by history—the principle of nationality—be followed, and there will be secured, in the best way possible, a durable condition of peace, both in the Balkans and in Europe. The Balkans, because of these questions of nationality, fomented and incited dangerous desires in other nations, and were the occasion of intrigues, disorders, gigantic struggles, between European imperialism and the principle of the protection of the smaller peoples and

of their independence. In such a conflict, the foreign forces could succeed only when the Balkans were divided; the Balkan States, because of internal dissensions, which, however, were always inspired from without, were led to gravitate toward different European groups, the tendencies of which are irreconcilable.

The Balkan States can be grouped in two strong ethnical groups, that is: A Slav group, formed of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro, and a non-Slav group, formed of Greece, Rumania, and Albania. The formation of these two groups could be accomplished without any injury at all to the separate Balkan nations, while the delimitation of the boundaries between the different Balkan nations must follow the standard of the principle of nationality. And side by side with national diversities, the common possession of the past, the sharing of misfortunes throughout the course of their history, the similar characteristics of the different races, resulting from centuries of oppression, must bring into high relief the all-compelling reasons for the creation of a union of interests among the Balkan States. The desire to divide the inheritance of the Turks, which will continue in the hearts of the Germans, united with the experience of the unhappy past, should consolidate among the Balkan peoples all the reasons which make greater solidarity imperative. The examples of the recent past, save a few exceptions, are there to confirm our conviction that a splendid future lies before the Balkan peoples.

However great one may consider the forces for the consolidation of the new Balkan constellation, we are convinced that, if the Balkan States come forth stronger from the present war, the natural increase of the population of these States will constitute a reinforcing of the elements of defense against any foreign invasion whatever. The 25,000,000 of actual population, and the 35,000,000 which will result from the territorial increase of the actual Balkan States, will, in a few decades, presumably amount to 70,000,000. If to this complex, Italy should be added, as the nearest and most natural ally, then within a half century Italy and Balcania together will form a group of 150,000,000 inhabitants which will represent the strongest barrier and the most powerful defense against the pressure of Central Europe toward the Balkans, the Adriatic, and the Mediterranean.

He who wishes peace and progress in Europe must open the way that leads to certain and lasting success, and this way is that of the protection and respect of the smaller peoples. And therefore we must take account of the interests of the Balkan peoples, who, in their age-long struggles, have wet with their blood every yard of soil they have reconquered, every enterprise they have undertaken. In the actual position of the relations between the various Balkan States, which, although it has not yet reached a final stage, and is nevertheless one of the most solidly based, the bad example of the past must not be renewed, and no groupings must be created like those invented by the infernal ingenuity of Bismarck in 1878.

The Cost of Swiss Neutrality

By Ernest Lemonon

(*In La Revue.*)

SWITZERLAND on Aug. 4 announced her neutrality to the belligerent powers. Among other means of safeguarding her neutrality, Switzerland decided to mobilize her army. To meet the first expenses of the mobilization Switzerland had at her disposal 41,000,000 francs, ($8,200,000.) Considerable as this sum was, it was, however, notoriously insufficient. It was possible to foresee that the war, while it would steadily increase expenses, would at the same

time bring a constant diminution of receipts, and that thus the budget situation of the Swiss Confederation, already difficult enough, would be notably aggravated.

On Aug. 12 the Swiss Government decided on an internal short-term loan of 30,000,000 francs, ($6,000,000.) Issued at 5 per cent., payable in February, 1917, it produced nearly 42,000,000 francs, thus exceeding by 12,000,000 francs the sum required. But soon a new appeal for credit became necessary. The Federal Council, which this time needed 50,000,000 francs, issued a long-term loan. This time, also, the subscription greatly exceeded the amount of the loan; it gave more than 179,000,000 francs. Nevertheless, the Government was soon under the necessity of procuring new funds; it found them by having recourse to the disposable capital of special funds, by issuing Federal Treasury notes, and by imposing a war tax.

From the month of August to the end of December, 1914, the sums paid for the cost of mobilization mounted to 103,480,000 francs. Since that date each month there have been spent about 15,000,000 francs, ($3,000,000.) The message of the Federal Council relating to the war tax, dated Feb. 12, 1915, indicated that at the end of June the cost of mobilization would have reached 230,000,000 francs, ($46,000,000.)

The total of expenses paid by the State Treasury for the period Aug. 1 to Dec. 31, 1914—including the cost of mobilization—exceeded by 147,857,000 francs the total Government receipts. Naturally, this deficit has since increased; it is estimated that at the end of 1915 it will amount to at least 300,000,000 francs, ($60,000,000.)

But this direct cost is only a small part of the total cost of the war to Switzerland. Her economic loss is also exceedingly heavy. In fact, Switzerland gives the impression of a country whose economic life has been violently interrupted. Whether we consider her railroad traffic, her foreign commerce, or her internal production, there is apparent a veritable economic stagnation.

Therefore the Swiss, like all neutrals, need peace. But no more than the French can they desire that, in five years, in ten years, a new conflict should burst out; quite the contrary. What they need, as we do, is to be certain that the balance of Europe will no longer be menaced by German ambitions; what they need is that Germany, which has been the ceaseless troublemaker, should be beaten down and permanently deprived of the power to do harm.

A Ray to Cut Through Wires

A Petrograd dispatch to The London Morning Post, dated Aug. 20, 1915, *says:*

I hear that the Germans have now some mysterious scientific device for clearing a way through wire entanglements from a considerable distance. The instrument has all the appearance of what is known as a projector—that is, a searchlight. No specimen has yet been captured, and nothing is known about it, except that it disposes of wire entanglements from a distance of a mile by some means at present incomprehensible to the lay mind.

Greek fire projectors have now made their appearance on the western front. These also were apparently intended originally to fuse wire defenses, but they can only operate from a maximum of a couple of score of yards. The new instrument must probably be some novel application of electric forces.

Looking Ahead

By H. G. Wells

This article by Mr. Wells appeared originally in The London Daily Chronicle.

THE war has lasted a year, and we are growing accustomed to it. At first it presented itself to our minds as a rapid dramatic catastrophe. We are now able to regard it as a state of affairs. It seemed to be the end of the world, when it was merely the end of an age. It turns out to be neither so destructive nor so terrible as we expected. We are prepared to consider it calmly, as something that may go on for another year or for another two years. We have experience enough in England now to contrast life under war conditions with life under the plethoric conditions that preceded the war. We are in a position to estimate something of the changes that are in progress, and to frame some conception of the changes still to come.

On the whole I think most thoughtful people will be ready to confess that what one might call the normal peace life of the world, the life of home and harvest, has proved to be a stabler, tougher thing than they had imagined. Not only over the still neutral areas, but over ninety-nine-hundredths of the belligerent countries the usual crops are standing, and will be gathered, the children are still playing, the pot still boils. Famine is represented only by fractional rises in the price of food; pestilence has been held off. There are no signs of exhaustion anywhere. There are local desolations, but if they were blacked out upon a three-foot globe they would scarcely be perceptible. There has been a great deflection of industrial energy into the manufacture of purely destructive mateial, but as yet that has produced no marked evil results upon the general life. It has been balanced to some slight extent by a decreased production of luxuries. War is, I still believe, the profoundly evil consummation of evil conditions of human life, but that does not blind me to the fact that England is today a cleaner, harder, brighter, and finer country than it was last August. It is sweeter-spirited, and on the whole it is happier than it was a year ago.

Along the "front," which amounts altogether to a strip of country rather over a thousand miles long and twenty wide, about 25,000 men are being killed or wounded or made captive every week; vast treasures of physical energy that can never more be recovered by mankind are being wasted in shell and mine explosions; but this does not affect the obstinate normality of the bulk of human lives. Whatever processes of general change are going on are not catastrophic, but secular, changes; they are changes perhaps deeper and broader, and in their deep, broad way more rapid, but otherwise not different in quality from the gradual changes of the peace state.

If an American who had been in England in 1913 or early in 1914 were to revisit this country today he would notice no perceptible ebbing of the national life; in many ways, indeed, it would seem much fuller. London, it is true, is not so brilliantly lit at night nor so crowded with idlers, and there are fewer theatrical productions; the Court has become inconspicuous; the West End shops concentrate upon war novelties; a larger proportion of women prefer to be out of the fashion, and there are everywhere, in town and country alike, great multitudes of soldiers. If our American was very observant he would notice a diminution in the number of big, expensive automobiles upon the road and an increase of cheaper American types. * * * There would be many such intimations of changing conditions, but no revolutionary differences.

The omnipresent soldiers would most impress the American visitor. In 1914 there were few soldiers to be seen in England, except here and there where there was a garrison or in such a spe-

cially military district as the Aldershot region; now in London every third man is in khaki, and the countryside everywhere is alive with marching troops, artillery being exercised, and columns of transport and horses. And the quality of these troops is manifestly of a better type socially than the old army. They are not only brown and extraordinarily fit, but alert looking and intelligent. The average chest measurement in England must have increased by some inches in the last twelvemonth. It is rare, indeed, now to see a good-looking, well-built youth out of uniform. And something more than the chest measurement has changed. Our American visitor would presently begin to realize the deep significance underlying this "khakification" of England. The flower of British manhood has left desk and counter, lecture room and plow, butler's pantry and factory bench, to become the finest democratic army the world has ever seen. They have not been called out by compulsory service under the rather irksome conditions of peace; they have been called out by a vast emergency, romantically and generously.

Between two and three million young men who under normal conditions would have drudged on rather dully at the profit-seeking routines of industrial and commercial life have been touched to heroic intentions and introduced to a life hardier, more healthful, and more stirring to the imagination than anything that seemed possible to them in 1914. They will not go back in the old spirit to their former lives. They may become better disciplined, but they will be less submissive. They are not only serving their country; these men are taking possession of their country. They are camped in parks that were once protected from trespassers; they are billeted in houses that once excluded every stranger; they are seeing the railways administered by the Government for the common weal. Their womenkind are assured of separation allowances and, if they are injured, they get pensions; they are no longer liable to dismissal at short notice. All the resources of the country are for the men who serve their country now—a doctrine that may easily be extended from war-time to peace-time. It extends already from the fighting forces to the munition makers, to the miners, to the productive worker generally. That is the first great change that is perceptibly dawning upon England, this new valuation of service as something more important than property. It is a change that may go on to extraordinary consequences. That England is all colored khaki is the mere superficial first intimation of these.

This pulling up of all the multitude of young men from the roots on which they have grown, this invigorating transplanting of them, does not end with the mere army and navy. If our American were to push his inquiries below the surface he would discover that in relation to these khaki myriads, myriads of other people, men and women, are being shifted about into new occupations, people's homes are invaded by billeted troops, women are taking up men's work in countless spheres, tradition and prejudice are vanishing, countrysides are changing in character. For an overwhelming mass of the population habit is being destroyed and totally new relationships are being substituted. The strength of English conservatism has always been long established social habit. We had become an unenterprising people, because we had never been obliged to shift. We were fairly comfortable as we were. * * * This war has shifted us. England is mobile and plastic today, as it has never been before. England has fused. England, which was a rock, is alive.

And what is true of England is probably even more true of every one of the belligerent countries, and even of the neutral countries within the radius of the war influence. Social and economic conditions that seemed frozen forever into certain forms are now molten. They may not remain molten, they may set and crystallize again presently into a new series of forms and traditions, but those will not be the old forms and traditions. Nineteen hundred and fourteen is ancient history. Only old women and British politicians dream of returning in England to that vanished state of affairs,

of finishing the war and reviving the Ulster dispute and the dispute about the Welsh Establishment, and all the extinct bickerings of that remote period. It is the same everywhere. Enormous readjustments and reconstructions are inevitable. To a certain extent they will be foreseen and designed; to a much larger extent they will just happen, fate deciding among the divisions and indecisions and pettiness and self-seeking of men.

Let us speculate a little upon the probable forms that will be established when presently a new phase of comparative stability is attained. I will assume that the war regimen will continue for Europe for at least another year. Neither side, it is clear, will or can give in until it is decisively beaten, and there is far less appearance now of any such decisive ending than there was a year ago, when the Germans marched upon Paris and had Calais for the taking. We have to clear our minds of the idea of a possible internal collapse on either side. I will assume, too, that whatever happens the United States will remain morally above the possibility of participation in the struggle. One thing follows upon these assumptions almost inevitably. The United States will take the financial sceptre out of the hands of London and become the country of rich men, the usurer country, to which all other countries will be in debt. An exhausted Germany will face the peace with no gold and enormously depreciated paper currency; France and Great Britain will be in a scarcely better position. For the necessary capital for peace recuperation, just as much as for war supplies, they must look to America. England will cease to be the "fat" land of the world; that doubtful privilege of fatness will pass across the Atlantic. That does not mean that the American common man will be any better off than he is at present, a rise in prices will probably make him practically worse off, but that the American plutocrat will become the financial master of the world. One practical consequence of the world's debt to America will be that imports will rise against and exceed exports. There will be more prosperity and less stimulus in American life. The United States will in fact tend toward the pre-war conditions of Great Britain, and will in many ways take her place in the world's affairs.

The social effect of the war upon the belligerent communities seems likely to be of a quite unanticipated character. It is not the common people who are paying most for this war, it is the property-owner and the share-holding class. Because of the comparatively restricted areas of the actual fighting the destruction of the ordinary civil life of the community has been less than any one would have dared to hope a year ago. And because it is before everything else a war of gear and millions, it has been more necessary in this war than it has ever been in any preceding war to keep the mass of the population favorably disposed and actively and willingly co-operative. A vast proportion of England's internal expenditure upon the war has gone in wages and billeting allowances, separation allowances, and so forth to our own people. There were anticipations last year of wide unemployment and distress; there is and has been less unemployment and, in spite of rising prices, less distress, than in normal peace years. The poorer classes have experienced no class disaster by this war. On the other hand, as one specimen of the securer classes, I find the carefully arranged system of investments upon which I had relied for my old age and for my widow's security has depreciated by about 30 per cent. We are fighting this war very largely on our savings, on our social fat; the whole community is being impoverished, but, relatively, the rich are getting poorer and the poorer better off. Much wealth is being destroyed, but much wealth is also being distributed. From being a rich plutocratic community, infested by non-functional investors, England while the war lasts is tending —not, indeed, toward ruin, but toward a general economic mediocrity.

The modern war regimen tends to destroy plutocracy and substitute an economic democracy; it also tends to convert all classes of the community to the advantages of collective over individual enterprise. The disadvantages of chaotic

individualism have been demonstrated in this war by a thousand striking instances that should fill the socialist textbooks of the coming years. The England, therefore, that emerges from this war will be a leaner and more experienced and more democratic England, with its habits of acquiescence and chaotic "freedom" broken, and its imagination touched to activity. Something analogous will have happened to all the European communities.

Through the silences enforced by the necessities of war it is apparent that no European people is altogether satisfied with the Governments that have made and failed to triumph in this conflict. It is not too much to expect that the end of the war will prepare the way for a very grave and extensive series of attempts to reconstruct these Governments upon the lines and suggestions of these experiences—in other words, it will prepare the coming of a period of revolution. This may not follow immediately upon the war. Pacification will be the first aim of the European mind, and at the end of the war the dominant idea will be the desperate resolve to establish some sort of peace alliance that shall prevent a recurrence of this war. It will be as the concentration upon this end relaxes, in the nineteen-twenties, let us say, and as the international interest becomes fatigued and less urgent, that the revolutionary forces that are now gathering will come into play. And they may not come into play as insurrectionary forces. England in 1832 showed that there can be revolution without insurrection, just as Norway and Sweden have shown there can be separation without war. The revolutions of the twentieth century may be brought about by the conviction of reasonable men.

Toward what forms will the revolutionary forces of the twentieth century drive? Here it is that a man's desires and persuasions and fears most blind and confuse him.

The world is sick of dynasts; but also it is sick of party politicians; the dream of strong men dictators is the dream of despair. Democracy has still to work out some method of discussing its affairs more satisfactory than the venal newspaper; it has to determine upon some way of choosing its rulers, some electoral method that is proof against the manipulation of the party organization. With every step away from individualism toward social organization the need for these solutions becomes more urgent. But this is an intellectual task, and the popularization of constructive ideas is a process much more subtle and less calculable than the development of revolutionary forces. That there will be a vast revolutionary effort toward republicanism and a higher level of social and economic organization as the outcome of this war is almost a certain thing; but what that effort will achieve, how far it may not be tricked, misled, divided against itself, and defeated, lies among the dramatic secrets of the future.

A Message to King George

By KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM.

In reply to a telegram received from King George on the occasion of the anniversary of the ultimatum addressed to Belgium by Germany, the King of the Belgians sent the following message, dated at Havre, France, Aug. 5, 1915:

I express to you my deep gratitude for the telegram which you have sent me and my unshakable conviction that the efforts of the allied armies will lead to a peace founded on the triumph of justice. Having at the outset sacrificed herself in order to safeguard her honor and to remain faithful to the treaties which insured her autonomous existence and the very equilibrium of Europe, Belgium will continue to do her duty until the end, in spite of the suffering and mourning with which she is overwhelmed. Your fresh expression of sympathy touches me profoundly, and from my heart I give you the assurance of my devoted attachment.

The Under Side—A Hospital and a Hostel

By Arnold Bennett

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WHEN I paid a visit to the chief military hospital in London, an establishment which is the administrative head of thirty-six London hospitals with accommodation for 3,000 wounded, the exceedingly benevolent Colonel in charge took me first to the X-ray room, which clearly for him was the heart of the organism. My imagined perspective of a hospital was at once rather violently altered. The opaque blinds of the laboratory were drawn down, producing black darkness, and my hand was X-rayed as a matter of form, but the interest began with the exhibitions of numberless large photographic negatives of heads, shoulders, wrists, and other parts of the human body.

In each of these a small faint blur showed the situation of a projectile which had entered the flesh on some battlefield in France or Belgium. The wounded man, part of whose frame was the subject of the photograph, had been transported to the base hospital in motor and train, across the Channel in steamer, to London in one of the grandiose trains of the War Office, and to the hospital in motor; and his tragedy had suddenly become a speck on a glass plate; or, rather, a speck on two glass plates, for of every suitable wound two photographs are taken. And the surgeon was professionally less occupied with the man than with these telltale plates, which he would hold up in the air in order to peer at them. On a table was a measuring apparatus with strings and other devices.

"As we take two photographs at different angles," said the Colonel, "it is obvious that the wound must be at the point where the two strings cross each other, and the distance of that point from the surface is automatically shown on this inch rule. So that the surgeon operating knows exactly where he is."

And we gazed almost passionately at the point where the two strings met, which had neither length nor breadth, which had nought but a geometrical existence—and it was the tragedy of some man lying upstairs! The organization of the German Army and the organization of the British Army met and canceled each other out in that intersection of two bits of yellow string—the total impersonalization of war.

After the X-ray room in importance came the kitchen, whose walls were hung with framed diplomas won in culinary contests. The kitchens were like those of a large hotel, except that they were much airier and that the cooks saluted.

"Give your patients well-cooked meals," said the Colonel, "and they will stand anything without a murmur. Give them poor meals, and nothing else will please them."

From which it was apparent that a military hospital is very much like the outside world. Thence I was led to the operating room, of which the chief preoccupation seemed to be sterilizing. I saw that surgical instruments had grown simpler with the advance of the craft, and I learned that the patient was not put under the anaesthetic in the operating room itself, amid all the terror-striking apparatus of his ordeal, but in an apartment adjoining.

Everywhere was the peculiar inexplicable gay serenity of a good hospital. The immense wards were, of course, full of flowers, for no hospital that respects

itself would be without many flowers. But there was more than the gayety of flowers in those wards. There was an extraordinary contentment, even in the entirely crippled man who wheeled himself about very slowly from room to room, and in the man who sat up in bed meticulously washing his face and hands, and in the calm, pale countenances of those who lay prostrate and quite motionless beneath their white coverlets. I imagine that it signified the peace of being withdrawn from the world.

In the ward allocated to officers, however, the world had surged in; it was the visiting hour for officers, and women were clustered in armchairs around many of the beds. A pianola in the middle distance was performing Chopin in the most brilliant manner. Here flowers blossomed even thicker than elsewhere, and between the beds were screens, creating corners of privacy. In a hospital the principal difference between an officer and a ranker appears to be that an officer has his tea out of his own earthenware, and the crockeries of no two officers are alike. I saw various specimens in a pantry close by, waiting to be called for.

While I regarded the enormous bower, screened everywhere with foliage, and the serene gossiping groups around the beds, each bed a throne, and while I listened to the virtuoso pianola, a grave suspicion crossed my mind. Was it not notorious that the authorities of institutions invariably concealed things from inspectors such as myself?

"But where are the serious cases?" I asked.

"They are scattered about the hospital," answered the Colonel, with placidity. "There are several here in this ward. That is one, there; and three beds further on is another. You can't see under the counterpanes, you know."

I should never have suspected the existence of serious cases in that ward. The revelation made me uneasy and rather afraid. And these sensations were intensified when, after indicating the nurses' tennis court, and the mortuary, the Colonel took me along a slope into the Memorial Chapel, with its stained glass, its altar, and its walls incised and painted with the cenotaphs of dead soldiers. There was one comprehensive inscription: "To all who have fallen ——."

"Very many of my old friends are here," said the Colonel, quietly.

I seemed to understand for the first time the solemnity of the military tradition of Britain.

On the same day I lunched at a hostel for soldiers and sailors blinded in the war (only no sailors have yet been blinded in the war) organized and superintended by C. Arthur Pearson, who is Chairman of the Blinded Soldiers and Sailors' Care Committee, in a palace called St. Dunstan's, Regent's Park, lent by an American banker. The palace has a garden of fifteen acres, into which runs an arm of the Regent's Park Lake. On the waters of this gulf, by the way, blind soldiers practice rowing, which is considered to be the finest of all exercises for the blind.

It was in the ballroom of the palace that I heard the Bishop of London, sitting at ease in a chair, and crossing and uncrossing his legs, recount, with many jokes, his Easter experiences at the front to about forty blinded soldiers (including one or two officers) and their nurses. Unseeing eyes gazed at us out of white bandages; black spectacles glared at us; some eyes were closed; others were bent toward the invisible ground.

"Now, when I was at St. Omer," the Bishop would say, and, interrupting himself, "Were any of you at St. Omer? Hold your hands up if you were."

And up would go hands. And then the Bishop would name another place, and up would go other hands; and battlefield after battlefield was thus recalled. This, indeed, brought the war home to London; it was very pathetic.

If not the Bishop of London, then other entertainers divert the guests of the hostel every afternoon after luncheon for about an hour. And then lessons are resumed.

"How do you begin?" I asked Mr. Pearson.

"We begin," said Mr. Pearson, with

that exuberant, energetic, twinkling brightness that nothing can conquer, "we begin by teaching them to be blind."

I think there was more in this phrase than a seeing person could explain in two columns. It seemed to mean a recommencement of life, a transmutation of all sorts of values, a complete change of attitude toward the phenomena of existence. The results are astonishing. At least they were astonishing to me, who was quite unfamiliar with such activities as I saw in the palace. It was astonishing to me to watch blind carpenters making complicated cupboards, and blind cobblers knocking minute nails with certainty into the soles of boots, and blind craftsmen making the most variegated baskets and mats. The massage class, where men learn the one craft in which the blind can surpass the seeing, I did not reach. But I saw the typewriting department, and when the instructress of one of the men, herself totally blind, took down a letter in Braille shorthand from dictation and typed it out on the typewriter, with absolute assurance and exactitude, I had nothing to say; the tears came into my eyes—the thing was so marvelous and so touching. Nearly all the teachers in the Braille section are voluntary. Branches of instruction beyond the palace include poultry farming, market gardening, and telephone operating.

The palace was, if possible, even more cheerful than the hospital. In the case of most of the inmates hope, ambition, and curiosity had already been fairly reestablished in those minds ravaged by what at first must seem an overwhelming disaster. The profound lesson of "being blind" had been in the main learned. It was miraculous. And these men were prodigies. But they were also martyrs. We are all of us their debtors.

The hostel is now so organized that it expects with proper financial help to be able to deal with all soldiers blinded or to be blinded in the war. It is managed under the joint auspices of the British Red Cross Society, the Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England, and the National Institute for the Blind. It has received a considerable contribution from the Prince of Wales Fund. But the State has no hand in it. The State—that is, our collective selves—pays none of these heroes, prodigies, and martyrs more than 17s. 6d. a week—at the outside. Such is the official recompense of a supreme sacrifice. Let us remember this when the question of disabled soldiers' and sailors' pensions next comes up for review.

Afterwards

By GEORGINA B. PAGET.

[From The Westminster Gazette.]

Last night I dreamed he came to me,
My soldier and my saint;
Somewhere, far off, an earthly sea
Beat desolate and faint;
In a dim twilight place we met,
No world before, behind.
I could not see his face, and yet
I knew his eyes were kind.
No words; he knew my heavy part—
Longing that may not cease—
And, knowing that he knew, my heart
Fell upon utter peace.
And then I woke—a late cock crew,
The clocks were chiming seven—
O God! if Heaven be dreams come true
We need not dream, in Heaven.

GENERAL KROBATIN

Austria-Hungary's Minister of War

(Photo from Bain News Service)

LUDWIG III.

King of Bavaria, Who Addressed the People of Munich After the Fall of Warsaw, Prophesying a Permanent Extension of Germanic Frontiers

The Nation That Died for Europe

By G. K. Chesterton

This is one of the first articles written by Mr. Chesterton since his recent illness. It appeared in the British press on Aug. 6, 1915.

I HOPE you will grant me space to say a few words about the Belgians still in Belgium. The admirable efforts of the National Committee for Relief in Belgium are going a long way to avert famine, but if the million and a half destitute Belgians are to be kept alive the National Committee must have yet further support. The only conceivable cause of doubt in the matter must lie in the mere weariness in well-doing, produced not by any intellectual difficulty, but by such wholly unintellectual things as time and fatigue. I think, therefore, the best way of preventing any possible neglect of so great a matter is to repeat once more the great truths upon which rested the whole original claim, not so much on our sympathy as on our common honesty. The simplicity and enormity of the Belgian story can best be set forth, perhaps, in four truisms, all toweringly self-evident.

First, of course, the mere badness of the story is almost too big to be held in the mind. There have been stories of a woman or a child actually robbed of reason for life by the mere ocular shock of some revolting cruelty done in their presence. There was really a danger of something of the kind paralyzing our protest against the largest and, by the help of God, the last of the crimes of the Prussian Kings. The onlookers might have been struck into a sort of gibbering imbecility, and even amiability, by the full and indefensible finality of the foul stroke. We had no machines that could measure the stunning directness of the blow from hell. We could hardly realize an enormous public act which the actor did not wish to excuse, but only to execute. Yet such an act was the occupation of Belgium; almost the only act in history for which there was quite simply and literally nothing to be said. Bad history is the whole basis of Prussia; but even in bad history the Prussians could find no precedent and no palliation; and the more intelligent Prussians did not try. A few were so feeble-minded as to say they had found dangerous documents in Brussels, as if what they had done could possibly be excused by things they did not know when they did it. This almost piteous lapse in argument was, however, covered up by the cleverer Prussians as quickly as might be. They perferred to stand without a rag of reason on them than with such a rag as that. Before we come to the monstrous material suffering, there is in the existing situation an abstract unreason, nay, an abstract insanity, which the brain of man must not bear. A nightmare must not abide to the end. The tiniest trace of Prussian victory that remains will make us think of something which is not to be thought of; of something like the victory of the beasts over mankind.

Second, it must be remembered that this murder has been done upon a people of such proximity and familiarity that there cannot be any mistake about the matter. There is some shadowy justification for the comparative indifference to the wrongs of very remote peoples, for it is not easy for us to guess how much slavery shocks a negro or cannibalism a cannibal. But the innkeepers and shopkeepers of Ostend felt exactly as the innkeepers and shopkeepers of Dover would feel. We have to imagine a prehistoric cruelty coming suddenly upon a scene which was civilized and almost commonplace. Imagine tigers breaking out of the Zoological Gardens and eating all the people in Albany Street; imagine red Indians exhibited at Oypmpia literally scalping every passer-by from that place to Ham-

mersmith Broadway; imagine Jack the Ripper crowned King of Whitechapel, and conducting his executions in broad daylight outside the tube station at Aldgate; imagine as much as you can of what is violent and contradictory in an overturn of all modern life by troglodytes; and you are still falling short of this fearful Belgian scene in that familiar Belgian scenery. It is idle to talk of exaggerations or misrepresentations about a case so close to us. Chinese tortures may not be quite so fantastic as travelers tell us; Siberia may not be so desolate as its fugitives say it is; but we could no more invent such a massacre in Belgium than we could a massacre in Balham. The things of shameless shame that have been done are something worse than prodigies, worse than nightmares, worse than devilries; they are facts.

Third, this people we have heard of daily have endured this unheard-of thing, and endured it for us. There are countless cases for compassion among the bewildering and heartrending by-products of this war, but this is not a case for compassion. This is a case for that mere working minimum of a sense of honor that makes us repay a poor man who has advanced his last penny to post a letter we have forgotten to stamp.

In this respect Belgium stands alone; and the claims even of other allies may well stand aside till she is paid to the uttermost farthing. There has been self-sacrifice everywhere else; but it was self-sacrifice of individuals, each for his own country; the Serbian dying for Serbia, or the Italian for Italy. But the Belgian did not merely die for Belgium. Belgium died for Europe. Not only was the soldier sacrificed for the nation; the nation was sacrificed for mankind. It is a sacrifice which is, I think, quite unique even among Christians, and quite inconceivable among pagans. If we even privately utter a murmur, or even privately grudge a penny for binding the wounds of so solitary and exceptional a martyr, we ourselves shall be something almost as solitary and exceptional. We shall, perhaps, be nearest to the state of that unspeakable sociologist who persuaded his wife to partake of a simultaneous suicide, and then himself cheerfully lived on.

Fourth, if there be any one on this earth who does not find the final success of such crime more than the mind can bear; if there be any one who does not feel it as the more graphic since it walks among the tramway lines and lampposts of a life like our own; if there be any one who does not feel that to be caught napping about Belgium is like being caught robbing one's mother on her deathbed, there still remains a sort of brutal compassion for bodily pain, which has been half admitted here and there even by the oppressors themselves. If we do not do a great deal more even than we have already done, it may yet be said of us that we left it to the very butchers of this nation to see that it did not bleed to death.

I, therefore, plead for further help for the members of the National Committee, who have taken this duty upon themselves. All subscriptions can be addressed to the Treasurer at Trafalgar Buildings, Trafalgar Square, London, or to local committees where they have been formed.

A Letter from Sir John French

In a recent speech delivered in London, Ben Tillett, the British labor leader, who had just returned from a visit to the battle front, read the following letter from Sir John French, Commanding in Chief the British Forces in France:

I sincerely trust your visit to the front and experience have been helpful and convincing. Our armies are doing splendid work, and more men and more material must be immediately forthcoming to back up the zeal and grit of our fighting force. Our men in the field are looking to the nation to vigorously back them up. Energetic measures and concentration of our national resources to secure greater efficiency will lessen the loss of life by limiting the duration of the war.

A Year of the War in France

By Emile Faguet, Frederic Masson, and Jean Richepin of the French Academy; Victor Berard; Alfred Capus and Rene Bazin of the French Academy

These articles were published in the French original by Les Annales of Paris.

A Year of War

By Emile Faguet

Member of the French Academy

A YEAR of war behind us. Before us, no one knows, no one in the world. Let us come to ourselves and pass again the road we have traveled, in order to bring back our successive impressions to us. This is, perhaps, not unprofitable in order to gain a firm standing ground, and to face the future with serenity.

First came Germany's threats, the decree of mobilization. The blow was sudden and heavy. The President of the French Republic said indeed, as was his duty, " Mobilization is not war "; but no one, any more than he, was deceived, and men looked at each other firmly, but with straitened heart and thoughtful brow.

Then the declaration of war, the tocsin sounding through all the countrysides of France, the decisive words; words, I mean, full of decision:

" It is done, the lot is cast. Let every one rise to the call of duty."

All rose to the call. No one was downcast. Men felt themselves at a terrible turning point of history; but they were firm, looking fate in the face. The sight of the mobilization was such, too, as to give courage. It was accomplished with admirable order and precision. There was not an accident, not a hitch, not a delay. That part of our preparation was evidently perfect. Confidence, I will not say, was born, but, so to speak, it grew more substantial.

An incident arouses the nation's joy. Mulhouse is occupied. A short-lived joy. The feat of arms, which remains fine, was risky. We are forced to leave Mulhouse, which is threatened, and move backward. But our hearts are untroubled by it, and remain firm and valiant.

A graver check; we are bent back at Charleroi, for lack of adequate munitions, without doubt, and this withdrawal necessarily entails that of our whole battle-front. By forced marches, the enemy reaches Compiègne, then Senlis. Paris is threatened.

By General Joffre's imperious order, a quick right-about, admirably carried out, of the whole army of the east, supported by the army of Paris. An immense and furious battle. It is won all along the line. From that moment General Joffre is the object of the admiration, the love, the fullest confidence of France. He is the man of the victory of the Marne; the future, the early liberator of our territory. The whole world is watching him.

The enemy changes his method. He adopts the intrenched retreat. He burrows holes; he digs into the earth and hides there. As elsewhere there is submarine war, in France there is subterranean war.

We accept this method and adopt it, taking the new qualities which it demands—endurance, tenacity, obstinacy.

It is war mile by mile, village by village, house by house; for, on the one side as on the other, everything becomes a fortress to be besieged and carried. This war, of necessity, is slow; but it is advantageous to us, because it lends itself to our best weapons—cannon and bayonet.

So we make continual progress in it, day by day. Four principal war regions—Alsace, the Heights of the Meuse, the Argonne, and the banks of the Yser. At first the struggle is intense in the Argonne, where we contest the ground foot by foot, in a country of forests, valleys, ravines, exceedingly difficult. We make continuous progress, wasting the enemy day by day, inflicting losses on him which he himself recognizes as enormous.

Then it is the campaign of the Yser, in the partly flooded Flemish plains. Prodigies of heroism are accomplished there, and the enemy is pushed back.

Then, on parallel lines, the two campaigns of Artois and Alsace. The enemy, on the one hand, is pushed away from Arras; on the other hand, he abandons, little by little, the mountainous part of Alsace, where he was formidably intrenched and organized. He defends himself furiously, but always retreating, always exhausting himself in efforts. He invents new methods of destruction against us—asphyxiating bombs, grenades, clouds of noxious gas; nothing shakes the courage of our warriors, and nothing prevails over their energy or their confidence in France, in their Generalissimo, in their leaders and themselves. This year of war will have been the year of French heroism, as also of a strategy firm, prudent, cold, and obstinate in its purposes.

At that point we stand. At the moment in which I write there is a relative lull, a nearly stationary condition. It is probable, it is almost certain, that there is a shortage of munitions, on the one side and on the other. But we know that our workshops are working in such a way that the fight can go on, as, in fact, it does go on, and that we shall not be taken shorthanded. What this year has proved is that we are, in the last analysis, invincible, even after a check, even after a retreat; that we have immense resources and an incalculable power of recovery. In these conditions we can view the future coolly and steadily, and with the assurance that it will give us final victory.

There is an immense power in this, that there exists between the army and the noncombatant population a "sacred union," which never slackens, and a continuous communication, so to speak, of confidence, of hope, and of will. Our children who fight sustain us by their ardor, their lightheartedness, their gayety. We sustain them by the absolute confidence which we have in them and by the ardent tenderness with which they know that we surround them. In this way it is the whole of France—young men, women, old folk—which holds on and endures the shock, opposing to it an immense force and a gigantic effort.

Thanks to this, thanks also to our valiant allies, who with us defend the independence of the world, we are conquering and accomplishing our mission of civilization. We shall re-establish peace in the universe by reducing to impotence the nation whose industry is war, and which can think of the world only as dominated by itself.

We shall re-establish peace by the union of the peoples who wish to live free, independent, self-governed, and respecting the independence of others. We shall re-establish peace in justice, instead of establishing it, as others dream, in prolonged and permanent violence.

That is the true divine task, and we can say not "God is with us," but "We are with God." If there be anything godlike, what is it but a world peopled with nations self-governed and who, working in peace, guarantee firmly, jealously—all the liberty of each, each the liberty of all.

Let us continue to labor at this task with pure heart, with serene conscience, with unconquerable hope. France will come forth from these trials, so valiantly accepted, so bravely undergone, with a moral beauty which, however grand her past, she has never possessed so full and radiant.

1789—1815—1915

By Frederic Masson

Member of the French Academy

WILL history this time serve for something? Will her lesson be understood? Exactly a hundred years ago events took place in Paris and in France which had as consequence a disastrous defeat, a foreign invasion whose march no national effort could arrest, the shameful capitulation of the capital, the dismemberment of the national territory, the disbanding of the army, the execution of the bravest citizens with a travesty of justice, and, during three years, France held in tutelage by Europe. And what was that but the closure of one cycle of that long period of civil wars and intestine dissensions which, begun in 1789, lasted until last year? * * *

An immense conspiracy is formed, the more redoubtable that it has neither formal plan nor organization. It is the unanimous revolt of affections, interests, passions, convictions. Thus, when the leader returns from the island in which he was believed to be imprisoned, an immense acclamation rings out, and, from Grenoble to the Tuileries, he is borne on the shoulders of soldiers and citizens. But now, as twenty-three years before, to form the unity once more, the loyalty of one part of the nation is not enough; it is necessary to demand obedience from all, if it is impossible to inspire enthusiasm and sacrifice in all. Traitors must feel a continuous watch kept on them, that their first attempt to communicate with the foreigners will bring a hand of iron upon them to punish them. All commerce with the Princes, who have fled again, must meet the same punishment; all enterprises against the defense of the nation—whatever they may be, from whatever source—must be immediately stopped by ruthless examples.

On the contrary, everything is prepared, everything is organized for the betrayal. Treason is at home in the General Staff of the Army, in the Ministries, in prefectures, in the frontier towns; all these men who were thought to be won by ribbons, decorations, posts, salaries, have been bought, but have quickly given themselves up, and impatiently await the moment when they can receive from their lawful Princes what they owe to the usurper. No one can tell to what depths intrigue extended nor what a range it had. Marshals of the empire betray, Generals of division pass over to the enemy, commanders of forts give up their fortresses! Astonishing and terrible spectacle which would make us doubt the soul of France, were it not for the people and the soldiers, the good stuff of which France is made.

And then the abyss! And, when they have surrendered their fatherland, these aristocrats of old or recent date, there comes the terror—white, this time—against all who have trusted the promises of amnesty, who have believed in the capitulations; proscriptions, executions, the guillotine, five years during which the royalists are busy rebuilding, for their own profit, by special tribunals, provosts' courts or councils of war, a sham unity, while Europe, by its four Ambassadors, imposes degredation on our nation, commands, demands the disbanding of the army, the dismantling of fortresses, the proscription of her best citizens—and holds France, our France, in servitude!

A century has passed. This shameful spectacle of France surrendering and selling herself, in giving up and selling her leader—this spectacle that one cannot recall without an angry catch in the throat, a trembling of the whole being, a sweat of agony—behold it effaced by the sublime spectacle which we are watching. Without doubt there has been weakness; there have been flights that inspire disgust; there has been attempted treason, which the masses have done justice to; there have been indi-

vidual acts of cowardice, which were aroused, protected, by those who should have checked them; there have been safe places where tender youths have taken refuge against the perils to be faced; but all this cannot count against the passion of patriotism and glory, in which are mingled all generations, all classes, all parties; there is only one party, France; there are no longer peasants, middle class, workmen, and masters—there are Frenchmen. In the best, the wisest, the bravest, all recognize the right to command and the right to die first; and over the corpse of a Sub-Lieutenant or a Captain conflicts rage in which all men seem Homeric heroes, uttering the same cries, making the same gestures. Whatever happens, whether we are crushed under certain victory or survive for days that will be radiant, perhaps, and, perhaps, still blood-stained, we shall have for a year drunk from the chalice of the gods a wine that transforms us; we shall have lived sublime hours, hours each one of which is worth a life, in which we join in the communion of faith. There are no longer, whatever an agitator may have said, either poor or rich among those who, French to the core, know nothing of unwholesome profits and rotten speculations; there are men who, with equal heart, endure ruin, offering to the country the few pence that remain to them. What are they to live on tomorrow? They do not know, nor occupy their thoughts with that. First, we must conquer and be free.

To live in freedom or to die.

The Two Souls

By Jean Richepin

Member of the French Academy

THAT their soul and our soul constitute two souls absolutely irreducible, and even impenetrable, to each other is what is certain with a universal certitude.

The truth which we must have the courage to state, or, rather, to cry to the four corners of earth and heaven, to spread and impose its imperious evidence, is this—that not only to our soul in particular, but to the human soul in general, to the collective soul of humanity itself, remains and must remain incurably irreducible their soul, the thing without name which takes the place of the soul in them.

Let this not be taken for a lyrical exaggeration, in which breathes forth our hate! Not at all! I claim to speak simply, even coldly, in cold blood and quiet sense, in all sincerity, as in exact logic. And I shall give my arguments, submitted to the control of the strictest reason.

Two letters, extracts from which I shall quote, will serve me to measure, to weigh, to gauge, and to judge the two souls. From them will be seen, in a dazzling light, what an abyss separates them forever, and that one soul, ours, is the very expression of the human soul, in all that is loftiest in it, while the other, theirs, shows and demonstrates itself to be, without any possible dispute, outside of humanity.

One of these letters has, nevertheless, as author one of their least debased spirits, a refined artist, a younger man of the very first rank among their writers. The other, in revenge, was written by the humblest of our little soldiers, almost illiterate. Both, moreover, are ingenuous and in good faith. And this is what makes the strength of their compared testimony.

The splendid verses in which the great Belgian poet Verhaeren branded with a hot iron the executioners of his sublime country will certainly be remembered. It is well known, too, that he has been often and enthusiastically fêted in Germany,

that he had not only admirers but disciples there. It is one of these, Julius Bab, who has addressed an open letter to him, protesting against the indignant protest of his friend and master.

The letter is respectful, saturated with the old-time affection. It makes no accusation. It pities, it even defends Verhaeren against the charge of calumniating Germany when he described the Germanic Sadism, and the cut-off feet of children found in their soldiers' bagpipes. It is willing to believe that the poet has been the victim of malicious hearsay. None the less, it insists that, if the Belgians were martyred, it was their own fault, yes, because that tenacious race rose to commit a terrible murder against the soldiers of his nation. And as for the faults of Germany, he simply denies them, like any of the ninety-three intellectuals.

Forced, however, to admit that at least some of them are known, Julius Bab does not hesitate to excuse them thus:

"You could not know that, forced into a fight for her existence, Germany was obliged to violate a neutrality, which is now known to have been violated long before by the adverse party. You could know nothing of the terrible actions committed by the Belgian people, which forced our soldiers to a desperate defense."

And he does not hesitate, this refined Julius Bab, to affirm his solidarity in the last analysis with those whom Verhaeren calls Huns and Germanic Sadists. He writes, bravely:

"It is from the common run of these men that our spirit has been expanded. It would be pitiable and vulgar in us to seek, in the opinion and fate of the world, a lot other than theirs."

And he ends, after a touching picture of her doorkeeper, a soldier of the Landwehr who comes on furlough to kiss his wife and children, with these delicate lines:

"When he was gone, I felt my brain pierced, as by flames, by those abominable verses on the cut-off feet of children, which pretend to characterize our German soldiers."

And do you know what he adds, this man of refinement? No, you cannot guess. Read!

"For a minute, I felt a burning shame for you, Poet Verhaeren."

After this, he again pities the noble poet, and, still respectful, expresses his poetical admiration for him in spite of everything, but declares that, by driving away his German brothers, Verhaeren has expelled him from his heart.

And now rid yourself from the slime of this Germanic soul by looking at a French soul, a human soul, in the letter of the little soldier Georges Belaud, a mere cook, who died a hero, and who, before his death, wrote, among other fine and tender things, these lines to his wife:

"Know well, if I die, I trust you perfectly, and ask of you to live to bring up my son to be a man, a man with a heart, and give him a good education, according to your means."

Readers, you will not look too closely at Belaud's style? Read only his soul. His style we have carefully left unchanged. Just as it is, our Society of Men of Letters has published it. Just as it is, the Hundred Club has had it printed by the pupils of the Ecole Estienne, on large paper de luxe, of folio size, to honor the memory of a cook, and also and above all to oppose with pride this letter of one of our humblest to the famous manifesto of the intellectuals. And let Julius Bab also profit by it, if he can! Let him learn on what moral plain, superior to his own, lives and dies a poor French workman, without other instruction than that of the primary school, but capable of thinking, of feeling, of leaving as his last testament such a phrase as this:

"And above all, my Yvonne, you will tell him, my son, when he grows up, that his father died for him, or, at least, for a cause which will be of service to him, to him and to all coming generations."

Oh! pitiable belated ones from beyond the Rhine, oh! heap of false supermen who are still so far from being true men, how many of these generations would be needed for you, these coming generations, in order that the soul of a Julius Bab should become merely capable of

understanding the soul of a Georges Belaud?

Try to consider it a little, and at least grow conscious of your grossness, your baseness, oh! wretched people, and try to prove to us that, in spite of everything, you have the vague semblance of a soul, by weeping to find it so brutal and so poor.

French Foreign Policy and the War

By Victor Berard

IN March, 1905, his Majesty Wilhelm II., Emperor and King, made, with much stir, the Tangier journey and speech, to signify to France and to the world that he had found an obstacle in the way of his caprice and a refusal to obey his orders in the policy of Théophile Delcassé. In June, 1905, those of our statesmen who hoped to curry favor with the invincible Emperor by flatteries, by submissions, by unheard-of concessions, forced M. Delcassé out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he had presided over for seven years, (1898-1905.) In 1915, after ten years of slow but irrestible advance, justice has at last come to this man, and when a Frenchman thinks today of the servants of the fatherland, who, in history, will one day incarnate the resistance of French liberty and Latin civilization, against the absolutism and barbarism of the Germans, it is to two names from the Spanish frontier, two half-Catalonian Frenchmen, that his memory goes—Joffre, the man of the war, and Delcassé, the man of the period before the war.

Their tasks were alike. It is to Joffre that the merit of our military preparation redounds. Whatever may be the shortcomings, inherent, perhaps, in our national temperament and our parliamentary government, (England has met exactly the same,) the republic presented before the enemy other arms, if not other soldiers, than the empire of 1870. Lifting the broken sword of France, the Government of the National Defense earned the fatherland's gratitude and the admiration of humanity by prolonging the war for six or seven months (September, 1870-March, 1871) in an unequal struggle against Prussian organization.

We are now in the twelfth month of our glorious resistance to an organization yet more complete, which expected to have made an end of us within a fortnight—a mere Lent before the great festivity, before the Germanic Easter of the slaying of the lamb and the gorging of Paris.

The France of 1870 found herself alone, without the alliance of a neighbor, without the help of a friend, without sympathy in the Old or the New World. The France of 1915 rests in the most faithful and potent allies that a nation has ever had at her side; and of the Triple Alliance of the Germans, of which M. de Bülow said, only a year ago, that it was "the rock of bronze" against which would come, only to be broken, all the assaults of the enemies of Germany, what remains today? A trio, from which Italy has withdrawn, to yield her place to the valiant but moribund Turkey, beside moribund Austria. And this is the work of Théophile Delcassé.

It is he who, as soon as he reached his post, determined to take from Germany all our former friends whom the craft of Bismarck and certain imprudences of our own had robbed us of. Russia had already come back to us; since 1891 the Czar, "liberator of Europe," had conquered all his hesitations, all his prejudices, all his repugnances, to lay his sacrosanct hand in the somewhat revolutionary hand of Mariamne. But, in 1898, when Théophile Delcassé took the direction of our diplomacy, this Franco-Russian inti-

macy seemed to strengthen the understanding of all the other Western powers with the Germany of Wilhelm II.; the will of Berlin was the arbiter of Europe; the Emperor had at his disposal against us Austria and Italy, signatories of the Triple Alliance, on the Continent; he had also at his disposal, by means of Rome, another maritime triple alliance which England, Spain, and Italy had signed against us.

When in the tragic light of Fashoda (September-October, 1898) this situation of France became apparent to our statesmen, and when it was necessary to resign ourselves to the abandonment of a glorious adventure, Théophile Delcassé—I still hear him explaining his plan to me in the first days of November, 1898, a few weeks after Fashoda—swore he would remain in the Ministry only to reconcile France with all her western neighbors—England, Spain, and Italy—and to bring them all into the friendship of Russia in order to deliver Europe from the Prussian tyranny.

In 1905, after seven years of conciliatory negotiations, generous, cordial, but always firm, thanks to the two collaborators whose names will always be inseparable from his—Camille Barrère, our Ambassador at Rome, and Paul Cambon, our Ambassador at London—thanks, above all, to the sovereign intervention of that King Edward VII. to whom France, restored, will owe a better statue than one in the courtyard of a palace-hotel, Théophile Delcassé had achieved his work. Even in 1902, he had been able to announce to the French Chamber that Italy would never allow herself to be made the instrument or the accomplice of an aggression against us; in 1904, the Franco-English and Franco-Spanish agreements announced to Europe that Bismarck's work was in ruins and that France was no longer encircled by enemies. The diplomatic preparation for the war was ending, from that time, by our triumph.

Between Joffre and Delcassé, it would be easy to show other resemblances—the same tenacity of hope, even at the least luminous hours; the same continuous effort, even at moments of half-success or of slight checks; the same confidence, silently held, in that inheritance of the oldest Latinism: Right, justice, the fatherland, the city, the nation, the people; the same capacity for pocketing the criticisms of the ignorant or the jealous, without answering otherwise than by added vigor in work and service. The French Pyrenees will have a very good right some day to raise statues to these two men, with an inscription in the Roman style: "To those who never despaired of the republic."

The Master Gunner

By Rene Bazin

Member of the French Academy

IT was in these words, or nearly, that a gunner told me the story of his mate, Vincent Archambaut, master gunner of the first gun of the first battery.

To begin with, he loved his gun, did Archambaut. You understand, a man is not only some one in a battery, he is some one on a gun, that he knows it, has the trick of its character, and that he ends by getting on with it as if it were a human being. He was a model gunner. When his "75" was in the battery, the trail resting on the ground, the spade well in, you saw big Archambaut seated between the wheel and the breech, according to regulation, his body erect, his neck a little on one side, his head bent forward, his eyes on the air-bubble of his spirit level, and his hands ready on the handles of the pointing mechanism. At the Captain's command he turned his wheels with certainty, stopping them at

the right place, and if the gun swung a bit out after the shot he brought it back again. We had a sort of confidence in him. A master gunner has two woolen stripes on his right arm and a red grenade on his left arm. He draws seven centimes. Isn't he a ranker? They all say so. Like the trumpets, who can't make up their minds to have no more rights than the men who make no racket. The question hasn't been settled, and will never be. What matter? Archambaut had our admiration; in case of danger we would have obeyed him naturally; he was born to be a fighter.

Still, fighting was not his trade. He belonged, by his family and his character, by his visage and his whole person, to the frontier races on the Sedan side, a big, quiet-faced chap, who put force and thought into every step he took. We didn't know much about him from what he said himself, and, as there were none of his neighbors in the battery, you may say we didn't know him at all. Sheep dealers, whom he had met at the fairs, declared that he was rich, having begun early to trade in grain and fodder; that he had even bought a quarter in a fine farm in the Champagne country, where the country rises a bit, gets wooded and is called the Argonne. I forgot to tell you that he was in the reserve, like me, and that the mobilization had mixed us and a few others in with the men of the active artillery.

On Oct. 21 we were resting, the guns limbered up, the horses cropping the grass of a clearing, fifty yards from a thicket of beeches and firs, and the whole country sloped gently up toward the north. Below us, wretched cut woods rose a little beyond. In a word, we had found shelter to breakfast without catching a shell. The sun was hot; the men were smoking; the Captain was walking up and down, his hands crossed behind his back, and I expect every one was beginning to think of his home, because he was feeling good. Suddenly an auto arrives by a wood road that our guns had had trouble getting along. The Captain chats an instant with the chauffeur; then he turns.

"Well, that's pretty good," I say, "Germans not far away!"

At the same time he calls out:

"Reconnoitre!"

The guides get to their horses, the servers get to their caissons. We know it never takes long to reconnoitre, in the artillery. Already the Captain, the brigade fourrier, the farrier, and the second mechanician, with six horses dragging the observation caisson, had got out of the clearing. I saw them going up the path among the beeches on the trot. The cruppers of their horses no longer gleamed among the branches. All vanished, for the mists that had chilled us through on preceding nights had not yet brought down the leaves, and all the gold I didn't have was hanging from the branches.

I counted ten minutes; then the fourrier reappeared in the path, alone, bringing the order:

"Form in battery, right face!"

This time it was the whole battery that disappeared under the trees and climbed up the slope, bending the saplings, and marking its tracks on the trunks of the old trees, barked by the wheels. The thicket is no great size. We soon see daylight among the beeches, then the bushes on the fringe of the wood, a line of cut grass forming a crest on yonder, then nothing but the sky, with the misty aureole of the Autumn sun. As usual, we were going to fire at an invisible target. The four "75s" already know their places, which the Captain has staked out. They come up on the trot. The fourth gun turns to the left and gets into battery formation at the place where the trumpeter stands, under the fan of a huge beech; the position of the first is indicated by the brigade fourrier. The second and third get in between them.

The Captain comes down from his observation ladder and comes up to the first gun, that sets the pace. Big Archambaut is there, beside his gun, waiting for the word of command to aim. He looks white to me, though he is generally full-colored. I say to him:

"What's up with you? Are you cold?"

With the tip of his nose, which he raises, he points to the sun.

"You're surely not afraid of the Ger-

mans? They must be over there, beyond!"

Archambaut, who has always been stingy with words, shrugged his shoulders this time. The Captain was behind us, on his horse, rising a bit in his stirrups, and, pointing with his arm, he indicated the direction to the master gunner. The Captain was the only one who could see over the crest, and this is what he saw—we all had a good look at the view when the battle was over—he saw a long valley, a bit hollowed, quite bare, all tilled, which went away in front of us to about 3,000 yards, and which had at the other end woods like the woods we were in. You would have said a fish-dish, with two tufts of parsley. In the whole hollow not a house, just a bit of hedge, a little tree, two roads that crossed. But at the north end of the valley, standing out clear in the light, you could make out the houses of a village, most of them grouped around the church on a level stretch to the left, some coming down the slope but as if held back by the others and not getting far from them.

Our Captain, who remembered that Archambaut belonged to those parts, asked him in a low voice quickly:

"You know the village of X?"

"Yes, my Captain."

"How far off, in your judgment?"

"Two thousand five hundred yards!"

Immediately, drawing himself up, he gave the commands that were required, taking care to space them out, and the whole battery worked, I assure you, rapidly and silently—the master gunners, the servers, the openers, the loaders. He gave the command:

"Attention! On the first gun, reciprocal aim. Position angle O! Corrector 16, by the right, by battery, 2,500!"

When the breech of the first gun was swung to, and it did not take long, the gun commander, behind, raised his arm:

"For the first hit! Fire!"

The other gun commanders, each in his turn, gave the same command, and there were four roars of our "75s" at intervals, then a profound silence, then the racket of the bursting shells, coming back to us from 2,500 yards off!

The Captain's voice blended with them:

"Short! But they are bursting well in the direction of the houses on the level stretch. Once more, my children; we are going to smash a German Staff!"

"A Staff! Then, my Captain—"

Archambaut had turned back. Sitting on his seat, on the left of the gun, he was looking in a strange way at his officer, as happens when we have things to say that are too much for us.

"My Captain, hammer at the right of the church, on the slope, a house with a tile roof, with a little bell tower, and white wall around the garden. Do you see it?"

"Very clearly!"

"It's the biggest in the village; it has a second story, it has four fine rooms, and there is a cellar with wine in it; they're sure to be there! Hammer it!"

"You know it pretty well?"

Archambaut answered, just audibly:

"It's mine!"

Then he turned and bent over his spirit level. I do not know what went on in the Captain's mind. The men on the other guns had not heard the last words, and did not understand. It only took a moment.

"Ten points less! Explosive shells, in twos, 2,700!"

Vincent Archambaut had already made the motions. He was watching the air bubble in his spirit level. When he saw it was at the mark, he pronounced, in a clear voice, as if on parade:

"Ready!"

His mate, at the right of the gun, seized the end of the firing cord, pulled it to him, let it go quickly, and the shell started.

The Style of Our Heroes

By Alfred Capus

Member of the French Academy

THE newspapers publish some of the finest letters written by our soldiers since the beginning of the war. Letters of farewell to wives, to children, to mothers, found on our heroes slain by the enemy. Impossible to condense more emotion, more human verity, nobility, in a simpler form. Ah! It is in writings like these that one seizes style at its source—style not yet arrived, of course, at the originality and perfection which great writers give it, but already ample, sincere, and strong, and containing the finest aromas of our language.

In reading over these pages, so full, so poignant, traced in a tragic hour, with death before the eyes and with a hand that does not tremble, one has the feeling of what French literature will be after the war.

It will have at its disposal, in a society compelled to reconstruct itself, materials of a magnificent reality, from which the masters of tomorrow will be able to draw new expression, movement, life, all the virile qualities of style.

Had our literature lost them! No. Rather, it disdained to use them, enticed, moreover, by the taste of the artificial, the vulgar, the raucous, which the triumph of cosmopolitanism was in course of establishing among us at so many points.

Another consequence was that the taste for satire, for vivacity, for lightness of heart, was beginning to leave our writers. Satire, in fact, requires that society should be looked at squarely, not sideways; directly, and not through fashion and conventions. And there is no genuine laughter apart from frankness and health.

Well, all these varied tones of the spirit of France—eloquence and depth, at the same time as lightness, the smile and grace—we find once more in the letters of our soldiers. It is in the furrow of their heroism that the coming litreature will grow.

Big Boy Blue

By JESSIE POPE.

[From The London Daily Mail.]

There's the blue of the sea and the blue of the sky,
As well as the blue of a feminine eye,
But none of these kindle a thrill so acute
As the eloquent blue of a hospital suit.

It's a soul-stirring symbol of valor and pain,
It tells what it's wearer would never explain.
Yes—what has been done, and what's yet left to do
Is silently preached by the Tommies in blue.

We see them ensconced in a smooth-running car,
And good-looking, kindly faced fellows they are.
Maimed, bandaged, and scarred, but enjoying their ride—
The flotsam tossed up by war's merciless tide.

Though the praise at our heart is not tardy or faint,
We suffer from British self-conscious restraint:
Yet I know of one hand that would like to salute
Each gallant Boy Blue in his hospital suit.

The Saints of France

By Maurice Barres

Member of the French Academy

Translated by Henry James

The subjoined article is quoted from "The Book of France," edited by Miss Winifred Stephens, and just published by Macmillan, because it represents the excellent literary material in a work the proceeds from the sale of which will benefit French sufferers from the war.

DO you know the joy of seeing clear? It is one of the greatest that life gives us. O light that drives errors away! And, far from wasting, this joy increases by as much as we entertain it. They say that to see clear is to make on occasion for disabuse; but if it happens that our vision, settling on an object, rouses in us feelings of admiration, how great then the pleasure! The perfect thing is to love what shows in fullest light.

Let us, therefore, avoid giving ear to a lot of taradiddles about our soldiers in the trenches. It is just as they are, in the gravity of their reality, wrapped in all their severity of color, that they will rouse most completely our affection and our respect.

A new sort of war altogether unrolls at this time along the far lines of the front. Beyond doubt our soldiers inherit the souls of their forefathers; a Déroulède is a Bayard; a Joffre repeats certain features of Catinat and of Drouot; and you have only to read in our young soldiers' letters the glad, bright, dashing things said as it might be by Lasalle and the others. But none the less the actual conditions of this war are so special that our soldiers take from them a character quite new, I believe, in our history.

I suffer when I find episodes of the front wantonly distorted to drama and story. The romantic at this moment would be just *in* the *poilu** and his trench. Well, I have been there to see! There were our soldiers stiffened out by their many thick garments and with the dried mud that wrapped them round in a sort of carapace. It was a day of rain. Some had on their backs their empty knapsacks of coarse cloth, and others over them the shelter of sheets of corrugated iron resting on the pair of earthen sides. The struggle of their life made their eyes shine in their bewhiskered faces, and yet left in all their being a vague expression of sleep. They listened to me with the charming natural politeness of our peasants and with their good smile. They quite understood my friendliness, and I met with emotion something in them that I catch myself calling their saintship. The *poilu* in his trench is a peasant disguised as a warrior, thinking of his people and things at home, not in the least wanting to eat the Boche heart and liver raw, holding on with his feet frozen and his hands numb, and quite sure "we shall get them in the end."

These admirable survivors of the first hecatombs that hold out with such splendid endurance in the mud of the trenches, under the ceaseless rain of bullets and shells, have learned to practice the virtue of patience with a stoutness not quite expected of our army and that seems to advert to the peasant qualities of our race. They know or they feel that this war is a war of wearing out, such as will be at the end to the profit of whichever of the two adversaries has best hoarded and stored his powers. They know that the one who attacks recklessly and without sufficient preparation the "inviolable front" breaks himself against a murderous resistance, bristling with obstacles scarce to be overcome. They have mastered this to their cost, and,

*The translator has rejoiced to seek no equivalent for this image of the French soldier, unshaved, unshorn, and during the Winter months shaggy, whenever possible, with the skins of beasts.

thank God, to the coast of the German masses dashed and smashed against our defenses. They reckon that time works for the cause of the Allies. This waiting upon time has enabled us already to repair our insufficiencies of material preparation, and has given us in addition opportunity and leisure to gain over the German a huge moral superiority.

This superiority was born of the battle of the Marne, when, in a manoeuvring fight, that is to say in the conditions most opposed to fighting in the trenches, we bent their masses under the weight of our shock and our effort, possessed though they were of the advantage of number. And then we have not ceased slowly to assert and enlarge this superiority in artillery fighting and minor actions, thanks to our 105s and our high explosive shells for our 120s. The *poilu* knows all this; he knows it by the best learning, by his daily experience; he makes sure of it in the horizon that he embraces from his trench and by the succession of facts that compose his perilous life. Hence his catch that "we shall get them in the end."

We shall get them, above all, if our civilians hold on.

And how may we best hold on? What does the patience asked of us come to?

It is asked of us not to know impatience. It is asked of us, commercial, industrial as we are, political as we are, not to weigh upon events by tears, by plaints, by carpings. These soldiers amazing in endurance, these leaders every one of whom has made his sacrifice, have only one thing in fear, which is that the impatience of their friends and their families may press them to proceed to a premature offensive by attacks ill-prepared.

But that will do for us—we understand. We shall take pattern from your patience, a pale enough merit on our part, but on yours as shining as the purple of your spilled blood. To the end we shall remain what we have been these six months—a nation gathered up behind its General of Generals and all alive with the spirit which but yesterday broke out in a speech repeated to me by a friend. "I have been with Mme. X. and her daughter," he writes me; "her son has just fallen on the field of honor. On the terrible news the mother said to the daughter: 'We'll say nothing about it. We'll hide our pain as much as possible, so as not to add to the sadness—there will be so many more deaths.'"

Think how fine! Even the word "sadness," by its belonging to the order of feeling and its giving thus the measure of the speaker's, is deeply moving in its spareness. Saintly women, it isn't only sadness that you instinctively wish to avoid spreading around you, but the public reason itself that you seek to protect, to forearm against the justest sensibility. You discern that if we should turn to softness our France, bodies and souls, would be flung to earth, martyred, annihilated, and the blood of our heroes have been shed for nothing. We should betray our dead. We must win. And already complete victory is to be seen at the end of our patience.

Pain becomes present in creatures so that all the moral beauty their nation is capable of shall thereby appear. This is what the Prussians are unable to learn. Envious ever of the chivalrous nation, they have wished to overthrow to earth our houses of certitude and of faith and to give us up to the anxieties of the spirit. They believe the treasure of our soul squandered in our vain disputes and our ancient serenity forever dead. But in the very instant of their uttering this cry of death, this cry of happy hatred of the old world of feeling, their insults themselves were our revulsion and the spirit of sacrifice transfigured our nation. They have piled up ruins at the heart of Rheims and of our villages of Lorraine and of the north and of the Ile de France, and, lo, the whole of France becomes a national cathedral! All Frenchmen are united, and even the contradictors of beliefs have suddenly felt themselves again sons of those who, through the long centuries, have prayed in the old houses of prayer. We take up again the feeling of our unity. All men's shoulders touch in the trenches, and all the hearts of women are together.

The heart of the women of France is not that instinct, that ingenuous state

of the first hours of the world, still akin to animal innocence; it is a condition of thought that has burned itself pure, working out of the most informed civilization, the material parts of which it casts off to become all love and reason. It was formed, from generation to generation, in the deep chapels of our churches and round about the sepulchre; it draws comfort and revival today from the van of the train of the wounded, from the bed of the ambulance, and, borne by the pair of wings of patriotism and charity, it moaningly hovers over our soldiers on the field of battle. The hearts of Frenchwomen flock to the army like a flight of birds, to admire and help with their love the saviors of the land.

We have not perhaps emphatically enough noted the true character of the trench warfare in which the German army took refuge when it recrossed the Aisne under our pursuit. Such a decision confessed to a want of power, or, rather, to a state of weakening. For the trenches, you see, allow an army to hold a given front with certainty by an effective force equal but to a third of the one necessary in occupation without trenches. It takes an average of a man every two yards to hold trenches, whereas a line of battle requires an average density of three men to two yards, (which of course doesn't mean that the men are aligned by any such simplified scheme.)

The trenches are an expedient of genius enabling the Germans to stand up to the allied Russians, English, and French from the North Sea to Switzerland and from Königsberg to the edge of Rumania. But expedients are by their essence precarious.

We shall break through the enemy's line when the victor of the Marne shall decide to. And I shall come back to this, I shall share with you a few of the ideas that are now familiar to our soldiers and that comfort their patience. I have only wished today to repeat to you what we are surely but of one mind about—the truth that any impatience would be on our part the worst of faults. It would be of such service to the Germans. It would have as a consequence to put the lives of our soldiers in peril by unwise operations and to compromise final success by attempting to gather it too fast.

This let all those of us behind say to ourselves and to each other: Any betrayal, and even any inward consent to impatience, goes straight against the purpose of the patient *poilus*, who mean to wait, and know how, that they may become masters of the hour.

"La Marseillaise"

By RAYMOND POINCARE, PRESIDENT OF FRANCE.

With impressive ceremony the remains of Captain Claude Joseph Rouget de Lisle, composer of "La Marseillaise," were placed, on July 24 last, in the Hotel des Invalides. Raymond Poincaré, President of the French Republic, said on that occasion:

Wherever it resounds, "La Marseillaise" evokes the idea of a sovereign nation that has a passion for independence and whose sons, all of them, prefer deliberate death to servitude. Its striking notes speak the universal language understood today throughout the world. A hymn like that was needed to interpret in a war like this the generous thought of France.

Once more the spirit of domination menaces the liberty of the people. Our laborious democracy for many long years contented itself with works of peace, and it would have considered criminal or insane any man who dared nourish warlike projects, notwithstanding repeated provocations, and, regardless of surprises at Tangier and Agadir, France remained willingly silent and impassive.

A Letter to the Young Soldier Who Receives None

By Eugene Brieux

Member of the French Academy

Translated by Pamela Glenconner

The subjoined article from "The Book of France," edited by Miss Winifred Stephens, and published by Macmillan, represents the good literary material in a work the proceeds from the sale of which will be used in behalf of French sufferers from the war.

ARE there any soldiers, I wonder, who never receive any letters? to whom no one writes because there is no one to write to them, no one who cares? Surely there must be very few. But if there should be even one in such a case my thoughts turn toward him now. May my words reach him!

How clearly I see him, this brother whom I have never seen! I see the expression deepen on his young face as the postman appears laden with letters. He looks serious, not sad, just a little awkward, perhaps, as he stands there looking on at something in which he takes no part. He knows there will be nothing for him; his impulse is to turn away when the post arrives and his comrades throng around that figure whose lot it is, in merely doing his duty, to be the dispenser of so much joy. The letters are distributed. He notices how eagerly his comrades seize each his own. He sees the letters opened and watches the faces around him. Some are reading, others listening, all are intent. All save he. What are these letters that are not for him? They are fragments of paper that bear folded within them love and good-will.

After the first few glances, rather than stand watching, the boy moves away. He knows it is no good waiting. However bulky the postman's bag there is nothing, he knows, for him. He prefers that it should not be noticed that there is never a letter for him, nothing at all for him, day after day. This is no new experience, mind you. He makes no grievance of it; he is used to being alone. Other men have fathers and mothers. He has never belonged to any one. He is alone.

None the less, how well he fights; just as well as his comrades; and so long as he acquits himself as well as they, he acquits himself better. He does not know this, but it is true.

When his comrades fight it is to defend their homesteads, to be worthy of the past. They recall those who have gone before. They fight for the protection of their hearths.

But when he fights, this boy who has no one to write to him, what does he fight for?

He has no home, no forebears, no worldly goods.

It is the future that is in his charge. He defends those who yet shall be. He, above all, may be said to fight for an ideal. If this can be said of any one, it may pre-eminently be said of him, for he fights for compatriots who are yet unborn; he offers his life that these may never be subjected to the shame of living under the domination of savages; men who, committing unspeakable offenses against the innocent, the wounded, and the aged, gratify their insatiable cruelty yet further by maliciously ruining the noblest of man's handiwork, and dishonoring the sacred stones.

And if he is killed, this lonely boy of whom I speak, it may be no one will mourn him. But he will not die. I see him on his return radiant with victory. His comrades will return to their homes. Their steps will ring across thresholds

GENERAL PORRO

Who Arranged Italy's Joint Military Action with the Allies in the Dardanelles

(Photo from Bain News Service)

HIS HIGHNESS THE GAEKWAR OF BARODA
India, Who Has Made Princely Gifts to the Cause of the Allies
(Photo from Bain News Service)

that have waited for them, who shall say how longingly? They will be met with glowing kisses, kisses softened by tears. The mothers will not speak—how should they when they tremble so? and the younger brothers, how their eyes will shine! They will be half afraid, hardly know what to do or say. * * * What loving arms will be opened to these comrades! * * * Homes. * * *

But the boy who had no one to write to him, there will be no special place for him. His reception will be the acclamation of the streets.

Let me speak to him, this brother whom I have never seen. May my words reach him!

My son, you have done well. Do you hear me? I have good news for you. One whom above all others you would honor and serve, she will love you, because you have been brave.

But never think of dying; you must not die. And if you are in the thick of the fight, as you always will be if I know you, the best way to avoid being killed is to kill the enemy who faces you. You know well enough that to turn back is unworthy. Shot and shell overtake the swiftest runners.

Then let me tell him something.

Let your confidence be your strength. If life has been unjust to you there will be full compensation for you one day. Never despair, my son, hold fast to the knowledge that all will be well. Why should you care if there be no letter for you? It is great to stand alone. Your comrades each were born into his family to find established homes. It will be your most excellent pride to found your home. Others have received; you have given. Your lot is the best.

And now, once again, God bless you, my comrade, my brother whom I have never seen! May this letter reach you, written by one who has no son, to you who have no father! I clasp your hand.

Gift Sword for King Albert of Belgium

In correspondence of The Associated Press dated July 30, 1915, the following appeared:

The sword of honor to be presented by the people of Paris to King Albert has been completed by the Sculptor Fetu. It will first be submitted to General Florentin, Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honor, then to President Poincaré, after which it will be placed on view for a time at the exhibition of Belgian art.

"No Thoroughfare," is the inscription upon the guard at the foot of the hilt in the form of a statuette in massive gold, representing a young athlete upon the defensive, brandishing a club. The statuette represents the Flemish type, a Belgian having posed for the figure. The guard is also of massive gold, bearing the arms of the City of Paris in blue and red enamel, with the cross of the Legion of Honor and the device, "Fluctuat nec mergitur," and the date 1914 in diamonds upon an oak branch in green enamel. On the other side of the guard, in golden letters upon blue enamel, is the inscription: "The People of Paris to His Majesty Albert I., King of the Belgians." The inscription on this side is surmounted by a laurel wreath set with emerals and rubies.

The blade of the sword is in steel of Saint-Etienne, ornamented with panoplies of steel upon gold, with these lines by Jean Richepin:

Droite, sans tache, sans effroi,
J'ai pour ame ton ame, O Roi.

(Straight, spotless, and fearless,
I have for my soul thy soul, O King.)

The sheath is of fish skin, tanned by a process revived from the eighteenth century. The chape bears the arms of the thirteen Belgian provinces, on a field of flowers and vegetation of the country—flax, hops, and colza. It is surmounted by a mural crown.

The Region of Battle

By Pierre Loti

The subjoined article by Pierre Loti, (Captain Viaud,) recording his impressions of the French battle front, appeared originally in L'Illustration, and is here translated by Charles Johnston.

WHERE was it that this happened? . . . One of the peculiarities of this war is that, in spite of my habit of maps, and in spite of the minute excellence of the maps I carry with me in traveling, I never know where I am. . . . However, this certainly happened somewhere or other. I am sure, alas! that it happened in France, since it was quite close to and under the enemy's fire.

I had been motoring since the morning, passing through I know not how many towns, large or small. I recall this scene, in a village where I stopped, and which had surely never seen so many auto buses, so many soldiers, so many horses. They brought in fifty German prisoners, unshaven, unshorn, dirty; I will not say they looked like savages; that would be flattery, for most of the savages, the savages of the great jungle, lack neither distinction nor grace; no, they looked like camp followers, their ugliness was heavy, stupid, hopeless. A handsome young woman of doubtful character, with plumes on her head, who had posted herself to see them pass, watched them with ill-concealed disappointment. "So these are the fellows," she said, "their ugly Emperor offers us, to improve the race? . . . You don't say! . . ." And, to give more force to her unfinished phrase, she spat on the ground.

Thereafter, for an hour or two, deserted countrysides, great yellow woods, leafless forests which, under the melancholy sun, extended endlessly. It was cold, one of those bitter, penetrating chills which are hardly known in my French southwest, and which gave the impression of the lands of the far north. After a long interval, a village through which the barbarians had passed showed us its charred ruins; but no one lived there any longer. Here and there along the road lay little burial mounds, solitary or in groups, the earth quite freshly turned, with leaves strewn on them and a cross made of two sticks; soldiers, whose names would never be known, had fallen there exhausted, to await death in solitude. . . . We hardly saw them in our rapid course, which we quickened more and more because of approaching night, already drawing in at the end of October. In measure, as the day wore on, an almost winterlike fog grew thick as a mortuary veil. A silence gloomier than elsewhere fell over all that region, from which the barbarians had been driven, but which still carried the memory of so many slaughters, furies, cries, rifle shots. . . .

In the heart of a forest, near a hamlet, of which nothing was left but charred spaces of wall, there were two of these graves side by side, near which I stopped. It was because a little girl, a child of 12, all alone there, was arranging damp bouquets of flowers, a few poor chrysanthemums from her wasted garden, and then some field flowers, late scabiosas gathered in the mournful meadows, upon the graves.

"You knew them, little one—they who are lying here?"

"Oh, no, Sir! But I know that they were Frenchmen. . . . I saw when they buried them . . . Sir, they were very young; their mustaches were not quite grown yet!"

Nothing written on the crosses which the Winter will lay low on the earth and which will soon crumble in the grass. Who are they? Sons of peasants, or townsfolk, or land owners? Who weeps for them? A mother in ample veils of elegant crêpe, or a mother in the modest mourning of a peasant woman? In

any case, those who love them will end their lives without ever knowing that they are rotting there, at the side of a lonely road in the extreme north—nor that this dear child, whose home is destroyed, has come to offer them a few poor flowers on an Autumn evening, while a great cold comes down with the night out of the enveloping forest. . . . Further on, in a certain village where the commander of an army has established himself, an officer rides with me, to guide toward a determined point of the great battle front.

Yet another hour's journey at high speed through solitudes. Then we pass one of those long convoys of auto buses, formerly Parisian, which since the war have become butchers' shops on wheels. In the seats where townsfolk and their wives used to sit half oxen are swinging, all bloody, hanging from hooks. If we did not know that there were hundreds of thousands of men to feed there in the fields we should ask ourselves why all this meat was carted into the middle of this desert which we are passing through at full speed.

The day drags to a close, and we begin to hear the continuous growling of a storm, which seems to be bursting close to the ground But that thunder has been growling for weeks now; it growls uninterruptedly along the whole serpent-like line that runs from the east to the west of France and which every day, alas! gathers up its heaps of dead.

"Here we are at our destination," says the officer who is guiding me. If I did not already know the new face which the Germans have given to the line of battle I should think, in spite of the cannonade, that he was mistaken; for at first sight you see neither army nor soldiers; we are in a sinister place, on a vast plateau, where the grayish earth is peeled, slashed, with here and there trees more or less broken, as though by some cataclysm of lightning or hail-stones; no trace of human beings, not even the ruins of a village; nothing to mark one or another epoch of history, or even of geology. And, as one sees in the distance, immense horizons of forest, which stretch out on all sides, to lose themselves in the almost black mists of twilight, it would be easy to think that we have gone back to the primal ages of the world.

"Here we are!"—that means that it is time to hide our auto under the trees, in order not to draw down on it a sprinkling of shells and risk having our chauffeurs killed—for there are, in the mist-veiled forest over against us, many cruel eyes on the watch, with wonderful binoculars that make their vision as piercing as that of the great birds of prey. So, to reach the firing line, we must continue on foot.

What strange soil! It is riddled with the holes made by shells that look like great funnels, and it is scratched, pierced, strewn with pointed cannon shot, copper shell cases, pieces of spiked helmets, and other barbarian refuse. But this region, which seemed deserted, is, on the contrary, densely populated!—only it is without doubt by cave dwellers, for the dwellings, scattered through the wood and invisible at first, are a kind of cavern, or molehills, half covered with branches or leaves; many years ago, at Easter Island, I had seen such architecture. . . . And in this vast setting of ageless forest these human dwellings complete the impression we had already received of a return to the dark abysm of time.

In truth, it rightly belonged to the Prussians to make us go backward thus. War, which was formerly a graceful thing, where one paraded in the sun with fine uniforms and bands, they have made sly and ugly; they wage it like ground wasps. And, of course, we have had to imitate them. . . .

But heads appear here and there, coming out of the burrows, to see who has arrived, and there is nothing prehistoric about them, any more than about the military caps that cover them—faces of our soldiers, healthy looking, good humored, apparently amused at living there like rabbits. A Sergeant advances, as earthy as a mole that has not had time to make its toilet, but he has a charming expression of youth and gayety. "Take two or three men with you," I say to him, "to clear out my auto, which is

there behind the trees; you will find in it a thousand packets of cigarettes and illustrated papers which the men and women of Paris send you to help you to pass the time in the trenches." What a pity that I cannot bring back, to thank the kind donors, all the smiles of pleasure with which their presents were received!

A kilometer or two more on foot to reach the firing line. An icy wind breathes from the forests in front of us, more and more drowned in black mists, hostile forests in which growls this seeming storm. It is mournful at dusk on this plateau of poor molehills, and I wonder that they can be so gay, our dear soldiers, in the midst of these desolate wastes.

A Changed English University

A letter to a Cambridge man in New York from another graduate of the same university, who recently returned to England, gives some details of the changes that the war has made on the aspect of the ancient courts and colleges. The writer says:

The war has left its mark on Cambridge. You will remember Whewell's Court stands apart from Trinity as a separate entity. Since last Summer it has been taken over by the Government, and they have had all sorts of soldiers quartered there. There are none now, but in one of the courts there still stands the soldiers' wash arrangements, a long zinc-lined trough, with a few taps running into it under a rough penthouse. The staircases still have the names of the undergraduates painted at their bottom, but only two or three dons are in evidence, and scrawled in chalk are such queer words as " Comp'y C," " Medical Room," or " Canteen."

In another court you may see the remains of the camp kitchens, little piles of brick, and an empty washtub. Even the porter has deserted his lodge. They are expecting a couple of hundred Canadian nurses next, but they won't do the damage the Welsh territorials did, who tore out about $6,000 worth of gas and electric light fixtures for pure lightness of heart.

Pembroke and Peterhouse are given up to the officers' training corps. I saw them come in from drill today, four companies strong. They were marching down Trumpington Street—men of all sizes, widths, and years. Nearly all, of course, were in khaki, but a few were still in civilian rig. Tonight as I write I hear the tramp, tramp of a regiment and saw making Girtonward a corps of active men.

At Jesus some of the officers are quartered, and beside the porter's lodge stands a most wonderful collection of pickaxes and shovels. At Caius is the headquarters staff of an army.

Jesus, Clare, and the Hall are said to have suffered most from the war on account of the number of their men who have gone to the front. It's a pretty serious matter for the dons, and still more for the coaches. Men have seen a perfectly secure income cut in half or disappear altogether almost overnight. One of the Jesus dons was telling me how the man who " kept " below him and the man above him had both been killed, and how another man from the same staircase had been seriously wounded. He also warned me that when I dined in Hall tomorrow night I should get only meat and sweets, although there might possibly be soup, because that didn't cost much. When I told him Trinity was still supplying at the High Table soup, fish, roast, sweets, and cheese, he almost rose in revolt at such shameless extravagance.

The Epic of France

By G. H. Perris

The subjoined article by the author of "The Campaign of 1914 in France and Flanders" appeared originally in The London Daily Chronicle.

IN grim silence and watch unfaltering, along their 400 miles of earthworks, or strained to the paroxysm of some deadly thrust, the men of France withstand, as alone they could, and as they only could, the consummation of an inexpiable crime. All are there, in equal, ungrudging sacrifice, rich and poor, teacher and artisan, squire, priest, farmer, Deputy; the simple minds that think only of defending their own homes, and those no less conscious of an ideal to save and enthrone anew. One against three, in the first months when father and son leaped to the devilish challenge; one against two, through the floods and frosts of the slow Winter; and, now that the struggle is more equal, and hope has become certainty of the just end, there is no place for laughter or any levity. For every day France bleeds.

Blood enough to have sated long since any less monstrous foe. Rivers of blood, the best in Europe—the old rich Gallic blood that mingled Roman experience and Mediterranean fire with the rough peasant vigor of the North, tempered through centuries of labor and exaltation. This was the black heart of the crime of crimes, that France, the standard-bearer of Western civilization, must be crushed. For if any nation in the world can claim a primacy in the spirit of progress, is it not this? The historic guardian of ancient treasuries, no liberty has been wide enough for her need of growth, no experiment too daring, no thought refined enough to satisfy her passion for harmony and grace. To those who knew her best minds, there was ever something of worship in their love, as in our regard for the fullest type of womanhood; and now how much more when this woman has been stricken with a blow as cowardly as brutal? France suffers in chief for the feeblenesses of all Europe. Let those who have the ill-will recall now her own weaknesses.

The scale of the virtues is easily misread by academic observers, even the nearest lacking imagination and sympathy. There was a clean, neat surface over the slavish mass of German life which deceived even the elect, and deceives some yet when its inner corruption is plainly displayed. There were, not so long ago, some ugly spots—last signs, perhaps, of the wounds of 1870—upon the sound body of the family life of France which caused too much alarm even to good men at home. "Take care!" cried the younger Dumas; "you will have to pay dear; you have not yet paid all the price of earlier faults. We have enough and too much of vagrom intelligence, libertinism, and skepticism; what we want, or we shall die, is more of the deeper things—God, nature, labor, love, the family." And how Bourget, in "Le Disciple," scourged the sensual nihilism, "for which nothing is true or false, nothing moral or immoral," then eating, as he thought, like a cancer into the life of the republic. Panamism, Boulangism, a crop of scandals, seemed for a time to justify the gloomiest prognostications.

Better years have passed; and then came the sudden call to the test of battle. In the twinkling of an eye limbs and minds were girded up; in the flame of faith every gross element disappeared. We British still do not know the weight of that typhoon; and so we do not know the sublime unanimity of courage which has lived it down. Only a faint outline of the story has been told; but some day soon men from all the world over will go in pilgrimage to the heroic fields of Meaux and Sézanne and Montmirail,

to storied farms about the Aisne and Somme and Oise, into the dark defiles of the Argonne, the chalk flats of Champagne, the heights around Verdun and Nancy, the crest of Les Eparges, the woods around Apremont and Pont-à-Mousson, the foothills of the Vosges. Let none of us doubt again the virtue of chivalry; where milder virtues are forbidden this will raise men to twice their stature. The story ran: "Where are the apaches? Oh, they are in the army!" But I thought of Shakespeare's Henry at Agincourt:

> Be he ne'er so vile,
> This day shall gentle his condition;
> And gentlemen in England now a-bed,
> Shall think themselves accursed they were not here,
> And hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks
> That fought with us.

A new age is being born. These unknown names will rise starlike into the firmament of our children's dreams, for they are the places where France was saved, and, with France, Europe and more. Today we think of Joffre and Foch, Sarrail and Castelnau, d'Esperey and Langle de Cary as obscure engineers working an enormous, horrible machine by electric wires from a village schoolroom. Tomorrow they will eclipse the fame of Napoleon and his Marshals; for they will stand for the myriad indistinguishable blue-coated citizens who gave their lives for France and her ideal mission among the peoples. Tell me not of Spartan mothers; for I have seen the mothers of France plowing the fields behind the firing line, serving their wounded, holding their posts in factory and shop, everywhere with marble face fronting destiny. Tell me not of Troy or Syracuse, of the brave Horatius or Athelstane or Cuchullin or the Cid Campeador. Marathon — all the old splendors are overshadowed by the new epic of France.

History will be rewritten in a new perspective aligned by these tremendous events. The Revolution and the subsequent wars will at length fall into a true proportion in the record of the modern world; and in the mind of France herself the delirium of the Terror, that horrid ghost, will be forgotten. There are no frenzies of meliorism, as there are no carmagnoles of murderous ambition, no Danton or Robespierre, and therefore no La Vendée, and no Bonaparte, in the story of the defense of the Third Republic. It is the supreme trial of slow-growing law. To doubt of the issue, when it is so clear and unescapable, were to doubt every worthy faculty in man. France sets us an eternal example of faith; and the greatest crown of the inevitable victory will be hers.

> To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite;
> To forgive wrong darker than death or night;
> To defy Power, which seems omnipotent;
> To love, and bear; to hope till Hope creates
> From its own wreck the thing it contemplates.
> This is alone Life, Joy, Empire, and Victory.

And this is France.

A Repentant German Poet

The Amsterdam correspondent of The London Daily Chronicle cabled on Aug. 14, 1915:

Even Ernst Lissauer appears to be becoming ashamed of his "Song of Hate." He writes to the Berlin Tageblatt saying he agrees with its view that the song is not intended for the young, and he has often advised against its publication in school books. The "Song of Hate," he writes, was written as a result of a passionate impulse in the first week of war, when the impression created by England's declaration of war was fresh.

The song, he writes, is a political poem directed, not against the individual Englishman, but collectively against the English will to destruction which threatens Germany. In the excitement of those days my feelings were deeply stirred by this. Whether these feelings can continue with the cool consideration of practical politics is another question.

Romantic German War Ideas

By Ernst Troeltsch

Ernst Troeltsch is Professor of Systematic Theology and Director of the Systematic Division of the Scientific Theological Seminary of the Heidelberg Academy of Science and of the Faculty of the University of Berlin. This article appeared originally in the Frankfurter Zeitung.

WITH the continuation of the war and the increasing successful self-assertion of the Germans, there grew among us also the need of an idea of our war. Clearer than in any other words is this shown in the following sentences from a letter from the field of last January:

"There are not merely moments, but often hours and days, in which one no longer knows why one is out here. One sees nothing but his immediate surroundings and hears nothing of all that which is transpiring in the world around. One stands solitary on his post and slowly grows intellectually dull. Then all sorts of thoughts storm in upon the soul: 'Why, indeed, this whole war? Is it not almost madness to murder each other? Why should just I have to give up my life? Couldn't we simply make an end of this mad war by mutual agreement? Has this entire conflict, indeed, any sense whatever?' Thus one dangerous thought pursues another."

We in the homeland have not fared very differently. We had need of nourishment for the soul in the shape of an idea of the sense and purpose of the war.

The nearest at hand were religious ideas, as, indeed, they are expressed by the writer of that letter; trial, cleansing, simplification, introspection, renascence of the Germany which is to rise purified from this war, and must, unless it wishes to suffer a dangerous degeneration. A whole literature has stamped these ideas in ever-new versions and forms. Fiery enthusiasts like Johannes Müller and contemplative ones like Paul Eberhardt have given effective expression to them. Beside the Kant-Fichte categorical imperative there flared up in revival the whole religious romanticism in modern form.

Beside these moved the German imperialists, to whom belong the majority of the German historians, a large number of national economists, the industrial magnates, and many writing officers. They saw all their hitherto teachings confirmed, and celebrated the great moment of the final breaking through of the Germans to the world race, (Weltvolk.) Races and States must grow or go under. The goal of every great and noble people, to become a world power, seemed to have approached very near; it is the sense of the immeasurable sacrifices and sufferings. To be sure, in this teaching there plays no religious tone; Christianity is not denied, but it is warned against every humanitarian and sentimental misunderstanding, a trait which has been exaggerated by our opponents into unmeasured caricatures, and which even among ourselves keeps wide masses aloof from this teaching. Nevertheless, even this teaching is idealistic and romantic enough. For, with Rohrbach, it regards the German world rule as the rule of the German spirit, German culture; it loves to refer to Schiller's "Tag des Deutschen," ("Day of the German,") and desires with sword and technical skill to create a clear path for an empire of the soul and of the spirit.

Contrasting views are put forth by the democratic idealism, as Rudolf Goldscheid portrays it to us in the warm-hearted writing entitled "Germany's Greatest Danger." The primary and inherent German idea of liberty must dissolve that alliance of politics and power between the ever-threatening Russian reaction and the misled Western pseudo-democracies, must come to an understanding with the latter, in spite of all present-day conflicts of opinion, as to the connec-

tion between internal political freedom and external political order of peace, and must create a European-American community against the dangers of the East. In this ideal there meet democrats, socialists, pacifists. In spite of all Darwinian, historical-evolutionist and sociological foundations, that, too, is certainly a genuine and very idealistic dream, a wonderland beyond the fearful chaotic prose in which we live and fight, especially beyond the unscrupulous imperialistic self-interest of the English policy, which must not be confused with its mask of democratic freedom.

Still others hope for a new reconstruction of Europe, emanating from the centre, a Continental alliance against Russia and England, of preponderating Germanic germ and with German culture. This is to be an insurance of Germany, and at the same time a rejuvenation of Europe, concluded economically, politically, and intellectually, a successor of the mediaeval empire, a new assembling of its horizon and its forces. In this camp are found the race philosophers, the Continental political economists, the friends of economic self-government, the advocates of an Oriental policy, the Grossdeutschen, (Greater Germanists,) the romantic Catholics, and the friends of the Middle Ages.

Related to these "imperials" is Alfons Paquet, the able geographer and world traveler, the delicate-spirited poet beloved by many, the meditative observer of human affairs in the chamber of the great world conflicts and of their basic cultural causes. In a small volume which he calls "The Kaiser Idea," (published in Frankfort by Rütten and Löning,) he has developed his idea of the war, a mixture of world-geographical realism, German imperialism, and religious yearning for love and purity in the relations of men as well as of races.

Germany has gotten into an uneven relationship toward the hitherto great powers, which "this war must dissolve through the shattering or the advancement of Germany with a new, a different look in the face of the world." It must step, as a representative or mediator of Europe, at the head of a European league of States beside the powers of the future, America and East Asia, and must seek intellectual community and agreement with both. That must be the work of a great prince, who, standing above the races, is not bound down by their prejudices and mass instincts and nevertheless understands their deepest yearnings. Such an Emperor, recalling Charles the Great, Otto III., Henry VI., Frederick II., Charles V., must be born to us out of storm and stress of the time, together with the complete radically rejuvenated and united Germany. This European empire is a timeless idea, which will dissolve the era of narrow nationalism and must dissolve it, and which by a general law has its parallel in America's coalescence, and in the empire of China and Japan, as once in the Roman Empire. The imperium must rise again out of the present conflict of races, and it is the destiny of the Germans to prepare the way for it through this great war. The new European Emperor will in a near or remote future be a German Emperor.

The decentralization hitherto of imperialism was caused by the monopolization of the imperial idea by the Papacy. The new empire must be exclusively temporal and must be clear of all conflicts between Church and State. But it is just this worldly imperium which then will the more need its religious complement, even as monarchism always fitly expressed and still expresses the imperium. Thus the idea of the European empire becomes associated with the idea of the European religion. It will, irrespective of monism and energetics, be a strong mystic theism and thereby closely connected with the historic religion of Europe, Christianity. Yes, it must not even dissolve connection with the historic churches, but must value these as its most important and popular organizers. A free and mutually moderating association side by side of various confessions and a complete inner religion of the spiritually free must bring about a spiritual syncretism, the expression of the European religion as the idea of an active living redemption to the Empire of

God. Therein the European religion will encounter related developments of other religious realms, and will be able to reach a settlement with them in a world community. Just as the empire has its appointed bearer in the Germans, so, too, will German Christianity, manifold and worked out in all forms and nevertheless ever developed toward spiritual freedom, and perhaps assisted by a neoidealistic Judaism serving as intermediary between Orient and Occident, have to form the point of departure of this European religion. That, then, is no imperialism of might and self-interest, but rather an imperialism of the spirit and the idea.

These visions of the future naturally lead the prophet at last to the question of the Christian mission which gained a powerful impetus in the nineteenth century and which has made use of new methods of communication almost more quickly than commerce. It is of highest importance for the future of the world. To be sure, in the Near Orient the religion of Islam there prevalent, and itself missionary from that region as a centre, must not be disturbed by attempts at conversion. There the custodians of the future and of mediation are the Christian churches which have been there for a long time and which frequently serve political purposes. They must receive a new inner life and must draw nearer to one another, must especially learn more of German theology, and by that very fact evoke countereffects from Islam itself, through which Islam will again become a cultural power as once before.

Catholic, Protestant, free-religious forces must create the religious universalism of the future and find the contact with the noble old wisdom of the East. Germany, as the motherland of the religious movements of modern times, as the homeland of the religious-idealistic philosophy and of a philosophic theology, will be called upon above all to participate in this. A German empire as the head of the European league, and the religious universalism emanating from Europe, will then give the world a new order, a relationship compared to which the present relations are merely the chaos with all the joys and pains of procreation. Everywhere is growing "the effort to clear the chaos that has developed out of common general increase in population and the rise of elements devoid of traditions out of this chaos." Our war is the beginning of this clarification, and back of it stands the idea of the European empire and of the religious Empire of God through which Europe is to find a new relationship to America and Asia.

Remarkable imaginations! Much that is profoundly thought out and much that is dilettante, much that is possible and much that is improbable, much that is keen sight and much poetry! Truly, the Germans are still today the race of the poets and thinkers. One of the few keen-sighted English opponents has brought that out carefully, too—one should not permit one's self to be deceived by all militarism and all technical skill, he says, the Germans are incurably poets and thinkers. To be sure, he added, that is precisely their weak point, in that they are unable to see the incongruity between their miserable Continental basis and their dreams; thus, he said, they plunge into misfortune through their dreaming.

Nevertheless, we must not delude ourselves by failing to realize that such romancing is in fact not altogether without danger, and that it needs continual supplementing through the sobriety of fact. The soaring sweep of such great ideas carries one lightly over the obscurity and difficulty of the actual situation and thereby clears away from the immediate duties and problems growing out of that situation. The internal rejuvenation has its very definite and concrete meaning which must be formulated; greater equalization in the German body politic, greater freedom of the people and more responsibility in the State mind, (mehr verantwortliche Staatsgesinnung.) The external constitution of the future is confronted by very practical problems; the greatest possible safeguarding of the empire, resumption of a definite political attitude toward England, safeguarding of the way to the Orient, restriction of the English tyranny on the sea, all of them

very concrete and difficult problems which demand the most objective seriousness and the most exact figuring out of the possible. In these sober, practical things is included, in the first place, certainly, the idea of the war; and, in so far as we need internal motive powers, there suffices in every way the moral sense of duty to the fatherland and the confidence in the power of truth and of the good. Of the last named forces we cannot have enough, and the severe analysis of the external and internal political situation cannot possible be deliberated upon too earnestly.

But of dreams and theories there may easily be too many, even if they are as intellectual and well informed as this apocalypse of the noble poet and geographer.

A Song of the Lusitania

The Amsterdam Telegraaf publishes a German song about the Lusitania, sent by a correspondent to whom it was given in a German variety theatre. The song, it is stated, is very well known in Germany, and is sung by the public in variety theatres and cafés.

In the translation of The London Times published below an attempt is made to reproduce the peculiar quality of German humor which distinguishes the original doggerel:

The Destruction of the Lusitania

A Marching Song. (Tune: Upidee, Upida.)

By RUDOLF KUHN.

I.

Carrying shameful contraband,
From New York to the English land,
Bearing thousands, on she came:
But the U-boat sniffed its game.

II.

Sailed the Lusitania gay
Further on her felon way;
Off Ireland's coast the U-boat peers,
See the course her quarry steers!

III.

Passengers from every shore—
English, Greek, and Dutch galore,
Americans and sons of France
Sail along to death's fell dance.

IV.

Ah! The U-boat's aim was good;
Who doesn't choke, drowns in the flood.
Vanderbilt was there that day,
The only one we missed was Grey.

V.

Each one gives his nose a wrench
At the gases' awful stench.
"They're our shells, our very own,"
Cries the Yankee Mr. Kohn.

VI.

The old water-nymphs below
Straight begin to curse and blow;
"What chuck ye then so carelessly
On the bottom of the sea?"

VII.

There lay the dead in Neptune's jaws,
Most of them with scalded paws—
Sons of England with their wives;
Ne'er so still in all their lives!

VIII.

Chant we now the funeral chant,
More U-boats is what we want.
To a chill grave with the enemy!
Till he stop bothering Germany.

The Freedom of the Seas

By Gerhard von Schulze-Gaevernitz

Pro-Rector and Professor of Political Economy in the University of Freiburg.

Dr. Gaevernitz, who is also a member of the Reichstag, traces in the following article what he conceives to be the interest of Germany and the United States in overthrowing Britain's supremacy of the seas. The article is part of an essay which Dr. Gaevernitz handed to the Berlin correspondent of The New York Evening Mail in response to the question: "What do the educated Germans really believe about England?"

THE "freedom of the seas," which has been formally incorporated in the law of the nations, is valid for England only if it is based upon a tacit acceptance of British naval supremacy. Even Manchester men and laissez-faire politicians have helped to build up the British Navy. Mr. Stead, the pacifist, had been agitating in Germany in the cause of peace. When he returned to England from his peace propaganda in Germany he advocated the construction of two British men-of-war for each German keel.

This apostle of universal peace was, at the same time, an apostle of British naval supremacy. To the same end England blocked the development of the right of private property on the sea, and upheld the right to capture, in order to kill the trade of her enemies. In this direction she has gone still further in the present conflict by extending the scope of the meaning of contraband to an extent which has paralyzed the commerce even of neutrals.

In the London Declaration of 1909 the rules of international martime law as established by custom were formulated. Under that declaration ore, raw cotton, agricultural and mining machinery were included in the "free list," that is, among the articles which, under all circumstances, could be dealt in freely with neutral countries. Grain is defined as "relative contraband," which is not subject to seizure if it is discharged at neutral ports and then conveyed to the enemy's territory. At present, however, England is seizing both conditional contraband and non-contraband as she pleases. British inspectors supervise Dutch trade in Holland. England forbids neutral countres to export to Germany under the threat of cutting off all supplies.

On account of the growing interdependence of nations British naval dominion now weighs on mankind far more heavily than a hundred years ago. In 1880 only the coast lines of oversea continents were opened up. Islands like the West Indies were the basis of the then existing colonial system. Oversea trade was made up of the more valuable articles of luxury, such as tobacco, coffee, sugar, and spices, which could be dispensed with. In case of need every European country could become a self-sustained State without serious inconvenience.

Since then the oversea countries have been thoroughly settled and opened up. A division of functions has taken place among the nations, and their economic life has become thoroughly interwoven by the vast increase in the volume of international trade.

The commerce of the world now consists, not of the luxuries for the rich, but of the necessities of life for the masses. Today the weal and woe of every nation, as of every individual, depends to a large extent on the international trade, which is mostly ocean-borne. Hence mankind has been delivered to the good-will or ill-will of Great Britain, the mistress of the seas.

By cutting off oversea communications, including the cables, Britain can bring the delicate machinery of the world's industry to a complete stop. By closing the seaways to industrial Europe England condemns the million-headed armies of workmen to unemployment and

cracks her whip of hunger in the huts of the poor.

European agriculture is also dependent upon exportation of farming products and the importation of necessary supplies. By cutting cottonseed meal and fodder, England stops the supply of milk in cities and treads upon the bodies of infants.

In oversea countries which export raw material the producer is on principle the credit taker, and in the end pays off his interest with goods. An epidemic of bankruptcies threatens these new countries. The storm of a commercial crisis sweeps over South America and the economic existence of thousands of debtors and creditors alike has been ruined. The exportation of goods, the investment of new capital stops when British political interest demands that the world's industrial machinery be stopped, and yet British political interests have nothing in common with South America.

The British sea blockade of 1914 shook the industrial structure of the United States "hardly less than if the States themselves had been participants in the war." Evidence of this is the closing of the Stock Exchange, the decrease of the exportation of goods, and the levy of "war taxes."

Last of all, all real coast countries whose cities and economic centres lie within range of the British guns are unconditional vassals of the ruling sea power. If the Briton bids them, the Portuguese must risk their lives for a matter that does not concern them at all. Even Italy is unable to take part in any political combination which is not acceptable to England.

Today, in a much larger measure than in the age of Napoleon, the "freedom of the seas" must be the political goal of all non-Britons.

But only two States are independent enough to profess openly that they want to reach that goal of humanity. They alone possess the economic means to oppose the Briton as equals on the sea. These countries are the United States and Germany.

The United States has definitely outstripped the British mother country because of the enormous natural resources and vast geographical extent, a gigantic production of raw materials, and the population twice that of England. Today the United States is the world's largest producer of gold and silver, mineral oil, cotton, steel, and coal. Possessed of the most efficient industrial machinery, it could, if it wished, easily match or surpass British sea power. But the sentiment of the United States is against "militarism" and "navalism." The United States is a colonial country abounding in strong individuals, but with a decentralized Government.

Flattered and deftly lulled to sleep by British influence, public opinion in the United States will not wake up until the "yellow New England" of the Orient, nurtured and deflected from Australia by England herself, knocks at the gates of the New World. Not a patient and meek China but a warlike and conquest-bound Japan will be the aggressor when that day comes. Then America will be forced to fight under unfavorable conditions. In the meantime, England's suicidal policy has sacrificed the foremost advance-post of the white race and culture, German Tsing-tao.

Hereby Britain has laid the north of China open to attack, while Japan, with a cold logic, has assailed Germany, the strongest white power in the Orient, has encircled the Philippines, reaches out for island bases and sea control of the Pacific, and bids fair to emerge from the war as the only sure "winner."

Thus the work of the liberation of mankind is left to Germany, and to Germany alone. On Nov. 11, 1870, Carlyle wrote to The London Times: "Patient, pious, and plodding Germany has coalesced into a nation, and has taken over the hegemony of the European Continent. That seems to me the most hopeful international fact which has happened in my lifetime."

Germany, the late-comer! While the Briton was conquering the world, Germany has been pushed out since the Thirty Years' war to the outer line of the world's affairs. The customary ballast of ships that were returning from Ger-

many was sand—the "produce of Germany," ("le produit de l'Allemagne,") as the French sarcastically put it.

The Hansa merchants were like so many roosters that picked a few grains in the stable of a noble steed and were kicked out when they became a nuisance. But in that quiescent life old Germany gathered a new youth—that mysterious strength which Carlyle foreshadows in depicting Frederick William I. and his surroundings. Then, toward the end of the eighteenth century, under the protection of Prussian neutrality in the revolutionary wars, that classical age arose when Germany was crowned with the wreath of intellectual achievement. Kant is the mighty figure that marks the boundary. How much philosophical thought is pre-Kantean even today and even with us. Oswald in Germany and English "pragmatism" are cases in point.

As long as the Germans were content to live in the clouds the Briton ceded to them the legion of intellectual empire, "the cuckoo house" and fools' paradise of philosophic speculation. He feared neither Fichte's virile "Talks to the German Nation," nor Hegel's world-embracing system of thought. But wrongly so, because that culture which seemed so remote from the world was in reality intently practical. The German culture was a new spring of inexhaustible strength which was to inspire the German idealist to a reshaping of the visible world.

With the alliance between historic Prussia and the "ideal nation"—"the German Nation"—as Fichte had visualized it—a great power arose in Europe on a thorough national foundation. This new German Empire, in the opinion of Bismarck, its founder, appeared to be "satiated in Europe," so lacking in tendencies of expansion that Great Britain ceded to it the rock island of Heligoland in 1892 without a shadow of misgiving. But the finger of economic necessities—a yearly increase of 800,000 in population on a small area—pointed beyond Europe.

By the merger of the historic Prussian customs union, principally with the West German ideas of Fr. List, Germany raised herself to the position of an economic world power, which by the restriction imposed upon a smaller Germany prepared the way for a greater Germany. List's final goal was also a political one; wealth was but the means, the end was the liberation of humanity from the mountain of British pressure. To this end List accepted Napoleon's Continental system as well as "Fichte's national idea."

"But do you," he appealed to his countrymen, "who are struggling to prevent the restoration of Gallic supremacy, find it more endurable and honorable to yield your rivers and harbors, your shores and your seas, to the sway of the British from now on?"

Step by step Germany caught up with the British model economic state, and overtook Britain first in iron and steel production, and then in chemical and electrical industries. Germany now became the seat of modern high finance; her aggregations of capital, accompanied by an even distribution of national wealth, outgrew all British proportions and began to approach American dimensions; with this difference, that the German system is more systematic and more closely co-ordinated with the State than the somewhat accidental, and still half colonial, capitalism of the United States.

Just as Karl Marx once studied in England, foreigners now come to Germany to study the latest tendencies of modern economic development. The Briton's philosophy of competition impresses them as small in its scope and antiquated in its method.

A fabulous transformation! About the middle of the nineteenth century Disraeli in his "Endymion" depicted the pitiful plight of the German diplomat, who, in leaving the metropolis of the world, (London,) exiles himself from the circle of brilliant women and world ruling statesmen, to return to banishment in his native land.

Germany, in the view of Disraeli, is the product of peace conferences and protocols. It plays at being a great power. Its people are poor in everything but forests. And today? Germany, like

King Midas, touches raw materials of seemingly insignificant value and turns them into ingots of gold.

It would have seemed like madness to our forefathers if any one had prophesied that Germany would tower to Great Britain's heights as an industrial State. And yet our entire military and economic power of resistance is based upon this fundamental fact.

To this new German industry, which exports goods instead of men, we are particularly indebted for the millions in our army. In comparison with the one-sided export industrialism of England, the new German economic system rests firmly upon a proportionately broader agricultural basis than that of England. Great Britain's small and still dwindling agricultural population of 5,000,000 contrasts strikingly with Germany's farming population of 18,000,000, which could be increased still further by a policy of settlement and internal colonization, and in addition to the brawny farmers the millions of men who have been trained to industrial occupations, such as metal workers and machinists, furnish the very best material for the army and the navy.

Of the many industrial establishments of the empire, one concern alone, the A. E. G. Electrical Company, sent 14,000 men into the field in the present war. No less than 800,000 members of trade unions are serving with the colors. What power of solidarity and strength of discipline are represented by these intelligent workers!

The new German activity impinged with painful effect upon some of the old and firmly established British industries. Witness the single example of coal-tar dyes, which completely superseded the British dyestuff industry, especially indigo, which Great Britain previously produced from vegetable sources in India for the supply of the entire world. All this became the more acutely felt when German economic life, turning like that of England toward the seas, reached out mightily for the oceans of the world.

Our Kaiser's word that Germany's future lies on the sea is more than true; for our present is on the water. In all zones German wares, ships, banks, and enterprises of all sorts came into contact with those of England. But, more important still, the challenge to British industrial dominion seemed to bring into question also the political supremacy of Britain.

Battleships are machines, the most expensive of all machines, and a nation can support them independently of any long coastline in the degree in which it succeeds in bringing the capitalistic centre of the world to its own territory. The Englishman began to fear that in peaceable industrial development the sceptre of sea dominion would slip from his hands through the shifting of the balance of economic power.

From this source came the ominous clouds which darkened our political sky for so many years. The question was forced upon us, Would not the Briton attempt at the eleventh hour to destroy by political means the rival who had outstripped him in the economic race? Didn't all the traditions of British history point to such a probability? Would Great Britain's supremacy, built up by war, be maintained by any other means than war?

Influential writers, and Mr. Garvin with especial brilliance, made it their life's work to impress upon their countrymen this doctrine: "What the Spain of Philip II., the France of Louis XIV. and Napoleon once were to England, Germany is today—the enemy. Tomorrow an invincible Germany will cast its shadow over Europe. Today we must see to it that the lesser Germany is crushed. If Germany were annihilated today every Englishman would be richer tomorrow."

The Monroe Doctrine as Germans See It

By Herbert Kraus

Herbert Kraus is an eminent German scholar whose book, "Die Monroedoktrin," is the German authority on the political relations of the Americas. During the war Dr. Kraus has been occupied as Zivilkommissar of Hasselt, Belgium. This article is part of a paper written at the request of The Atlantic Monthly, translated from Professor Kraus's manuscript by John Heard, Jr., and published by The Atlantic Monthly in August, 1915. It is here reproduced by permission.

ONE may unhesitatingly state that the Monroe Doctrine, at this moment, is passing through a stage of acute transition and evolution.

I. The Monroe Doctrine in the immediate present is engrossed by the idea of absorbing, controlling, and commercially restricting non-American States. The inception of this theory dates back to the Administration of President Grant. The episode of Magdalena Bay, when Japan for the first time came in contact with the Monroe Doctrine, demonstrated the fact that, under certain conditions, this doctrine could be made to apply to, and to restrict, private business relations with America. The well-known Lodge resolution clearly formulated this theory; and under President Wilson's Administration it has been widely extended. Judging from first appearances, President Wilson, in his departure from the Taft-Knox dollar-diplomacy, which incorporated this standard, was disposed to oppose the natural development of the Monroe Doctrine. In his speech delivered in Mobile on Oct. 28, 1913, and in his first annual message, in which he spoke of his oil-concession policy, he has proved the contrary. President Wilson contended that the grant of oil concessions to foreign promoters, through the agency of the weaker American States, was a menace to the Monroe Doctrine and upheld a principle antagonistic thereto. He thereby added weight and scope to various still questionable conceptions dealing with restrictions of foreign trade in America.

It becomes self-evident, without further discussion, that the "Wilson Doctrine" contains the power and the initiative to restrict without discrimination all trade between foreign nations and America. Basing her arguments on the same assumption of right—namely, the Monroe Doctrine—by which she opposes and denies the grants of oil concessions, through Mexico, Colombia, Nicaragua, or Ecuador, the United States can raise the same objections to beneficial contracts entered into between Americans and citizens of foreign countries. She can—to use another example—veto any or all Asiatic or European immigration into Central or South America. And here we are brought face to face with another contingency—the only one, indeed, which might eventually cause the Monroe Doctrine to militate against German interests. Germany has never yet made a serious attempt to establish colonies in America. The agitation of 1870, when it was claimed that she intended to acquire Porto Rico from Spain, was newspaper talk pure and simple; and the representations against such action which Mr. Cushing made in Madrid at that time were as unnecessary as they were groundless. Sticklers might call attention to the only other exception: in the year 1901 Germany made overtures for the purchase from Venezuela of the island of Marguerita in market-overt —if the term is applicable—but abandoned the plan immediately upon the expressed opposition of the United States. On closer examination it will be found that this was hardly a colonization project. It was an enterprise actuated solely by the desire not to see a naval supremacy established without, to a

moderate degree, following in the course arbitrarily imposed upon us. By her policy of naval supremacy, England continued to establish a cordon of naval bases around the whole world.* The heroic fate of the German cruisers on the high seas in the present war has demonstrated to every unprejudiced observer the justice of Germany's attempt.

In view of what has been said, the expectation should by no means be expressed that the commercial element of the Monroe Doctrine will cause friction between the United States and Germany. Such a contingency can arise only in the course of relations with England, whose every transaction has been actuated by underlying motives, and who, up to the present, has always made use of her political supremacy to advance her commercial influence.

Just so long as this undertone is absent—and it is entirely foreign to the relations between Germany and the United States—it would clearly contravene the principles of the United States to impose restrictions upon, or to seek to control, international commerce. This is especially true since she prides herself on being the parent and protector of the "Policy of the Open Door," even though, at this moment, she boasts but a precarious title to this honorable pretension.

II. Looked at under still another aspect, it must be admitted that the Monroe Doctrine is at present passing through a stage of transition and is undergoing a fundamental change. It is struggling to establish the United States as "international policeman of America." It is under this heading that the question arises whether, as a supplement to the other pretensions embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, the United States is bound to supervise, assist, and guarantee the good behavior of the other American republics in their relations with the other powers.

This conception of the scope of the Monroe Doctrine was enunciated for the first time—carefully, to be sure, yet quite distinctly—by Theodore Roosevelt. His message to the United States Senate on Feb. 15, 1905, afforded him the opportunity; in it he urged the acceptance of the contract already drawn up between the United States and the Dominican Republic, dealing with the Government debts of the latter State.

Since that time this idea has continued to influence and agitate American thought, although its fusion with the Monroe Doctrine has not yet taken place; there still exists some opposition; its justification and amalgamation with the Monroe Doctrine are still matters of debate, and the American Government has by no means adopted it. The attitude of that country toward the Mexican complications is proof positive; for in this respect she has shown more patience than she ever has, or ever would, in dealing with any of her powerful European neighbors, should they find themselves in the throes of acute anarchy.

The question naturally obtrudes itself, whether this idea will ever become incorporated in the Monroe Doctrine; and at the present time this question remains unanswered. To accomplish such a purpose, it will first be necessary for the Monroe Doctrine to emerge victorious from the conflict against the Pan-American agitation in which it is now engaged.

It is not in the opposition of Europe, it is not in the antagonism at present existing in the other American States, that the perpetuation of the Monroe Doctrine finds its most serious menace. It is rather in this Pan-American movement that the greatest danger lurks.

Fundamentally, the Monroe Doctrine and the idea of Pan-Americanism are based on diametrically opposed conceptions. On its own statement, the object of the Monroe Doctrine is to be a doctrine primarily for the benefit of the United States and incidentally for the protection of the weaker by the stronger States. It is a theory depending on a status of superiority and inferiority as a condition precedent. Opposed to this is the uncompromising hypothesis of the brotherly equality of the American republics

*It seems appropriate here to point out that the following islands, and groups of islands, are at the present moment in English possession: The Bay Islands, Galapagos Islands, Falkland Islands, Corn Islands, Tortuga, Trinidad, and Tiger Island.—The Author.

on which the Pan-American contention rests.

One can readily grasp that through the historical evolution of time Monroe's Monroe Doctrine has been metamorphosed from a doctrine for the protection of the United States only to one embracing the welfare of the whole of America. Today, unfortunately, the theory of brotherly equality is untenable when the pretension of an existing duty on the part of the United States to supervise the affairs of the other American republics oversteps the Monroe Doctrine proper. Such a pretension effectively abolishes the theory of equality between supervisor and supervised.

The outcome of this conflict between the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism cannot now be predicted. It is possible that the Monroe Doctrine will succumb to Pan-Americanism. It is possible that this newer agitation will continue to exist for some time, as it does today, hampered by the natural sterility of its conception, and will eventually die a slow and natural death. It is possible, and in fact probable, that the result will be a middle course by which the Monroe Doctrine will develop into a doctrine common to a number of the larger American States—one acceptable to the United States and to the A B C States—and will incorporate in itself the idea of guardianship over the smaller American republics. This could mean but one thing—the establishment of a concert of States. Such a concert, in the face of the total failure of a similar experiment in Europe, would arrogate to itself a supremacy over the lesser American States.

It is possible also that the ultimate result will be a modification of this arrangement, and that the United States will follow the old interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine in its bearing on Central America, including Venezuela and the West Indies, and will make that region a sphere of her special political influence. It is noteworthy that so far it is especially these States that have come under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine, which has, in fact, been but rarely applied to the other American nations. This is at most but a political pipe dream.

III. There is, however, a third question which is thrown into sharp relief by the interest of the immediate present—will the Monroe Doctrine ever be recognized by the other world powers? Repeatedly it has been pointed out that this has already been answered, especially by the attitude of the members of the two Hague Conventions toward the stipulations made by representatives of the United States. Actually no recognition of the Monroe Doctrine is to be deduced from this attitude, in the sense in which alone it would have any material value, namely, as implying that in the future the United States shall have the authority to enforce the pretensions of the Monroe Doctrine under all contingencies, even, if necessary, by the use of force. The silence of the members of The Hague Conventions as to the exposition of the demands of the United States Government should be interpreted as nothing more than giving a hearing to a declaration which the other participants in the convention did not care to discuss.

Had some of the nations whose interests were imperiled during the recent Mexican disturbances intrusted those interests to the United States—as, in fact, has been reported, more especially from England, in connection with which rumor one must bear in mind the Benton episode—such action would add weight and importance to the above assertion. Or had England, in the course of the present war, requested the United States to take steps against Venezuela and Ecuador for alleged breaches of neutrality tending to assist Germany, it would be exceedingly difficult not to interpret such a request as a complete recognition by England of the Monroe Doctrine.

Whether an implicite acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine by any or all of the world powers will ever be brought about depends entirely on the attitude of the United States toward the present war. Confidence and might must be co-existent, since together they form a sine qua non. The world must be convinced that it can safely rely upon the attitude of the United States in regard to international relations.

I will express no opinion as to whether the countenancing by the American Gov-

ernment of the exportation of war munitions should, or should not, be deemed a breach of neutrality. It is none the less as contrary to the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine as the present tone of the American press. All of this will make itself felt in the subsequent relations between the United States and Germany, and it will doubtless play a part unfavorable to the Union in the general accounting, when her attitude toward Germany's opponents is considered. Partiality in international crises has always brought its own reward.

Still more significant, when viewed in this light, is the passive position assumed by the United States in regard to the attack made by Japan (her natural enemy) upon defenseless China, in spite of her decisive and frequently enunciated policy of the "Open Door" in the Far East. Most important of all is her inaction in the face of Japan's latest efforts to gain a foothold on the Mexican coast.

How can the United States expect that in the future the world will place any weight upon her assurances, when in the critical hour she is not willing to bear the results of her policy; to insist upon her rights, or to perform the duties which she has undertaken? With this depreciation of the prestige of the United States, the chances of a general and international recognition of the Monroe Doctrine are necessarily lessened.

Side by side with this moral factor, a second stands in natural sequence—that of power. So far in this war the United States has stood aloof, posing as a disinterested spectator, wrapped in a garment of power. This is particularly true of her behavior in connection with Japan's attitude toward Mexico and China.

How can the United States expect that in future the world will respect, fear, or even heed her protests and demands, when she has demonstrated that she is not prepared to act when the gravest international interests are at stake?

The destinies even of the United States may be affected by this war. Let us hope that she may find what, just now, every nation of the world needs more than anything else—wise and far-sighted statesmen.

Russian Amazons

The Vilna correspondent of the Outro Rossii of Moscow gives the latest list of Russian women soldiers awarded the St. George's Cross of the Fourth Degree for conspicuous gallantry at the front. No official statistics as to the number of women volunteers in the Russian Army are available, but, according to the frequent newspaper reports recounting only cases of exceptional bravery, their number seems to be considerable. They represent all classes of the Russian community, and invariably assume male names and attire.

Thus, Maria Selivanova, aged 17, wore the uniform of a pupil of a Tula Gymnasia (high school) for girls as recently as December last, when she ran away and joined the army at the front under the assumed name of Stepan. She owes her distinction to carrying the wounded from front trenches.

Ekaterina Linevska, aged 23, was working at a Vologda cotton mill until January last, when she donned a soldier's greatcoat and cap, and under the name of Ivan Solovieff attached herself as a volunteer to a rifle regiment. She received her St. George's Cross for a daring reconnoissance of enemy advance posts, during which she was severely wounded.

Nina Rumiantseva, aged only 16, distinguished herself by saving an officer's life under conditions of extreme danger.

Another woman warrior, who had so sunk her femininity as to be known only by her male name of Matvey Koloboff, is a real veteran. She entered the army immediately on the declaration of war, and recently crowned a long chapter of daring adventures by capturing single-handed two Austrian scouts.

Germany's Peace Terms

Manifesto of the German Professors

A remarkable program adopted by a number of German professors and other intellectuals, at a meeting held on June 20, in the Berlin Künstlerhaus, for the purpose of its being presented in petition form to the German Imperial Chancellor, was published in Berne, Switzerland, on Aug. 10. It is called by the Berne correspondent of The London Morning Post "but one more link in the now long chain of German pro-annexation and pro-aggrandizement demonstrations, beginning with a speech of the King of Bavaria, and followed by a speech by the President of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, by demonstrations of the National Liberal and Conservative Parties in the Reichstag, and also by a petition of the six leading German commercial associations, including the Merchants and Manufacturers' Association and the Farmers' Association." The document is printed off in characters to resemble manuscript. Among the signatories are Friedrich Meinicke, Professor of History, Berlin; Hermann Oncken, Professor of History, Heidelberg; Herr von Reichenau, retired diplomat; Herr von Schwerin, Regierungs-president, of Frankfurt-am-Main, and Dietrich Schäfer, Professor of History, Berlin. A translation of the text appears below.

THE German people and their Emperor have preserved peace for forty-four years, preserved it until its further maintenance was incompatible with national honor and our continued existence. Despite her increase in strength and population, never has Germany thought of transgressing the narrow bounds of her possessions on the European Continent with a view to conquest. Upon the world's markets alone was she forced to make an entry, so as to insure her economic existence by peacefully competing with other nations.

To our enemies, however, even these narrow limits and a share of the world's trade necessary to our existence seemed too much, and they formed plans which aimed at the very annihilation of the German Empire. Then we Germans rose as one man, from the highest to the meanest, realizing that we must defend not only our external life but also our inner, spiritual, and moral life—in short, defend German and European civilization (Kultur) against barbarian hordes from the east and desire for vengeance and domination from the west. With God's help, hand in hand with our trusty ally, we have been able victoriously to assert ourselves against half a world of enemies.

Now, however, another foe has arisen, in Italy. It is no longer sufficient for us merely to defend ourselves. Sword in hand, our foes have compelled us to make enormous sacrifices of blood and treasure. Now we want to defend ourselves with all our might against a repetition of such an attack from every side, against a whole succession of wars, and against the possibility of our enemies again becoming strong. Moreover, we are determined to establish ourselves so firmly on such a broad expanse of securely won homeland that our independent existence is guaranteed for generations to come.

As to these main objects the nation is unanimous in its determination. The plain truth, for which there is the most absolute foundation, is this. Only one fear exists in all classes of our people, and especially is there a deep-seated fear prevailing among the most simple-minded sections that mistaken ideas of atonement (Versöhnungsillusionen) or even nervous impatience might lead to the conclusion of a premature and consequently patched-up peace, which could never be lasting; and that, as happened a hundred years ago, the pen of the diplomats might ruin what the sword has successfully conquered, and this perhaps in the most fateful hour of German history, when popular feeling has attained an intensity and unanimity which was never known in the past and which will not so easily recur in the future.

Let there be no mistake. We do not wish to dominate the world, but to have a standing in it fully corresponding to the greatness of our position as a civilized power and our economic and military strength. It may be that owing to the numerical superiority of our enemies

we cannot obtain everything we wish in order to insure our position as a nation; but the military results of this war, obtained by such great sacrifices, must be utilized to the very utmost possible extent. This, we repeat, is the firm determination of the German people.

To give clear expression to this fixed popular determination, and to convey such expression to the Government, to afford it strong support in its difficult task of enforcing Germany's necessary claims against a few faint-hearted individuals at home as well as bitter enemies abroad, is the duty and right of those whose education and position raise them to the level of intellectual leaders and protagonists of public opinion; and we make appeal to them to fulfill this duty.

Being well aware that a distinction must be drawn between the objects of the war and the final conditions of peace, that everything of necessity depends on the final success of our arms, and that it cannot be our business to discuss Austria-Hungary's and Turkey's military objects, we have drawn up the following brief statement of what, according to our conviction, constitutes for Germany the guarantees of a lasting peace and the goals to which the blood-stained roads of this war must lead.

1.—FRANCE.

After being threatened by France for centuries, and after hearing the cry of vengeance from 1815 till 1870 and from 1871 till 1915, we wish to have done with the French menace once for all. All classes of our people are imbued with this desire. There must, however, be no misplaced attempts at expiation, (Versöhnungsbemühungen,) which have always been opposed by France with the utmost fanaticism; and as regards this we would utter a most urgent warning to Germans not to deceive themselves. Even after the terrible lesson of this unsuccessful war of vengeance France will still thirst for revenge, in so far as her strength permits. For the sake of our own existence we must ruthlessly weaken her both politically and economically, and must improve our military and strategical position with regard to her. For this purpose in our opinion it is necessary radically to improve our whole western front from Belfort to the coast. Part of the North French Channel coast we must acquire, if possible, in order to be strategically safer as regards England and to secure better access to the ocean.

Special measures must be taken to avoid the German Empire in any way suffering internally owing to this enlargement of its frontier and addition to its territory. In order not to have conditions such as those in Alsace-Lorraine the most important business undertakings and estates must be transferred from anti-German ownership to German hands, France taking over and compensating the former owners. Such portion of the population as is taken over by us must be allowed absolutely no influence in the empire.

Furthermore, it is necessary to impose a mercilessly high war indemnity (of which more hereafter) upon France, and probably on her rather than on any other of our enemies, however terrible the financial losses she may have already suffered owing to her own folly and British self-seeking. We must also not forget that she has comparatively large colonial possessions, and that, should circumstances arise, England could hold on to these with impunity if we do not help ourselves to them.

2.—BELGIUM.

On Belgium, on the acquisition of which so much of the best German blood has been shed, we must keep firm hold, from the political, military, and economic standpoints, despite any arguments which may be urged to the contrary. On no point are the masses more united, for without the slightest possible doubt they consider it a matter of honor to hold on to Belgium.

From the political and military standpoints it is obvious that, were this not done, Belgium would be neither more nor less than a basis from which England could attack and most dangerously menace Germany, in short, a shield behind which our foes would again assemble against us. Economically, Bel-

gium means a prodigious increase of power to us.

In time also she may entail a considerable addition to our nation, if in course of time the Flemish element, which is so closely allied to us, becomes emancipated from the artificial grip of French culture and remembers its Teutonic affinities.

As to the problems which we shall have to solve once we possess Belgium, we would lay special stress on the inhabitants being allowed no political influence in the empire, and on the necessity for transferring from anti-German to German hands the leading business enterprises and properties in the districts to be ceded by France.

The manifesto speaks of the growing Russian peril, and says that the occupied part of Russia should become a rich agricultural country, where the surplus German population and the refugees who have found an asylum in Germany will be settled. It proceeds:

Russia is so rich in territory that she will be able to pay an indemnity in kind by giving lands, but lands without landlords. Peace with Russia, which would not diminish Russian power and increase German territory, would surely lead to a renewal of the war. Once the Russians are driven back beyond their new frontier we shall not forget the war which England has made on the maritime and colonial commerce of Germany. That must be the guide of our action. We must supplant the world trade of Great Britain. By her blockade of Germany, England has instructed us in the art of being a European power militarily and industrially independent of others. We must immediately seek to create for ourselves, apart from the empire of the seas, a Continental commercial enceinte as extensive as possible. Our friends Austria-Hungary and Turkey will open to us the Balkans and Asia Minor, and thus we shall assure ourselves of the Persian Gulf against the pretensions of Russia and Great Britain. We must also sign as speedily as possible commercial treaties with our close political friends. Then we shall devote our attention to recovering our overseas commerce. Our old commercial and maritime treaties must be renewed, and everywhere we must obtain the same treatment as Great Britain. In Africa we must reconstitute our colonial empire. Central Africa is only a huge desert, which does not offer enough colonial wealth. We therefore require other productive lands, and herein is to be found the importance of our alliance with Islam and the utility of our maritime outlet. Those who want to exchange Belgium for our colonies forget that not only are colonies the foundation of all European power, but that colonies without an opening to the sea would always be the slaves of the good or ill will of England. We need liberty of the seas, which was the real cause of war between England and Germany. To obtain it we must have Egypt, the connecting link between British Africa and British Asia, Egypt which with Australia makes the Indian Ocean an English sea, which joins up all the British colonies with the mother country, which, as Bismarck said, is the neck of the British Empire. That is where England must be shaken. The Suez Canal route will then be free, and Turkey will regain her ancient right.

THE PRESS.

But England also invades the universal press; we must take this monopoly away. Our best arm against English permeation is the liberty which, as leaders of Europe, we shall bring to the whole world. With regard to war indemnities, we shall demand an indemnity which as much as possible shall cover war expenditure, the repair of damage, and pensions for disabled men, widows, and orphans. We know that the question has been examined by the Government according to the financial capacities of our enemies. From England, which has been so niggardly in men, we can never demand enough money, because England raised the world against us with gold. It is our duty to crush the insatiable cupidity of this nation. However, we shall probably have to apply for a war indemnity to France in the first place, if not exclusively. We ought not to hesitate to impose upon France as much as possible out of false sentimentalism. As mitigation she might be offered

one of the sides of the Suez Canal, while we occupy the other. Should France refuse that, as well as the financial obligation that we should ask her, we should have to impose on her a policy which would satisfy us. We do not want a policy of culture without a policy of action. Germany must insure her political and commercial life before trying to propagate her spirit. Let us at first give a healthy body to our German soul.

The manifesto concludes with this saying of Bismarck:

Whenever, in any sphere of politics or elsewhere, one thinks one has touched an obstacle with one's finger, courage and victory no longer stand in the relation of cause to effect, but are identical.—*Reuter.*

How to Educate the Public

A Tragedy in One Act

[From The Westminster Gazette.]

Scene—The office of The Daily Depresser. Enter proprietor.

Prop.—Well, what news?

Editor—Rather good this morning; the British have taken a mile of trenches; and the French, in a most gallant counterattack, have repulsed two army corps, with enormous losses to the Germans.

Prop.—And the Dardanelles?

Ed.—There's no news at all today.

Prop.—And from Germany?

Ed.—Oh, the usual stuff.

Prop. (coldly)—Read it.

Ed.—The Crown Prince, in a conversation with a lady friend, is reported to have said if the Germans take Calais the capture of London will be easy.

Prop.—Most important. Put in largest letters, top of chief page: "Calais First, London Afterward." Go on.

Ed.—Count von Munchausen has told a journalist that there are two million fresh troops in Belgium waiting to attack the British lines.

Prop.—Head paragraph in big letters, "2,000,000 fresh Germans to attack British in Flanders."

Ed.—Good, and the Dardanelles?

Prop.—Large type, "No News From the Dardanelles," and you can go on, "The absence of news from the Dardanelles causes some reasonable anxiety," &c.

Ed.—And how about the reports from the Allies? There's French's victory—

Prop.—In smallest type, "Slight Advance of the British Troops."

Ed.—And the French great repulse?

Prop.—Same type, "The French Maintain Their Positions." You see, my dear fellow, the English public must know the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Germany's Economic Joke on Europe

By the War Committee of German Industries

AMONG Germany's enemies in the present war the English have without doubt assumed the intellectual leadership. They have developed the methods of business warfare always peculiar to them in a degree which would previously have been considered scarcely possible, in that they made it a point to break up completely Germany's economic organization and destroy the German capital invested abroad. In countless instances they have resorted to an annulment of the honestly acquired claims of Germans and to a breach of private rights and international law, and have placed the trade of the neutral nations in a condition of uncertainty and lawlessness the effects of which will be experienced long after the treaty of peace is concluded.

But the English have also succeeded in converting their allies to the same means of warfare. As shrewd teachers they have caused the French, Russians, and Italians to resort to methods which do not at all correspond to the past history of these people and do not conform to their natural dispositions.

The English have often enough publicly declared that for England the goal and methods of warfare are entirely commercial. Grey in the speech made in the House of Commons on Aug. 3, 1914, confessed himself to this view. He wished to make clear to his countrymen that England must take part in the approaching war because her heavy burdens would not be increased thereby. With this in view he said:

> We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war—all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle—they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not.

Grey, therefore, at that time justified England's participation in the war by the prophecy that English business would not suffer more by such participation than it would if England maintained, at least outwardly, a passive attitude. Only the commercial harm to England was a factor in his eyes. He gave not a thought to the enormous sacrifice of human lives that a nation must bring in war. Meanwhile the cold, hard facts will have reminded him fearfully of these sacrifices so entirely overlooked and forgotten by him.

But also the commercial prophecies which Grey in incomprehensible shortsightedness permitted himself to make on Aug. 3, 1914, have in the sequence been proved to be completely false. No one has shown that better than Lloyd George in the speech he made before the House of Lords on May 4, 1915. His starting point was the fact that Germany and England, in times of peace, have an enormous export trade that invariably shows an excess of imports over exports at the end of the year. Comparing the economic conditions of the two nations in war, he said:

> We have both got to maintain ourselves, feed our population, and feed our manufacturers, and that has got to be done either out of the produce of our own country or out of accumulated reserves of material or by means of imports from abroad. Germany cannot import from abroad. So she has to depend entirely on what she can produce at home or on accumulated reserves. Let the committee (the House of Lords had constituted itself a Committee of the Whole) observe the difference between the two problems. From the point of view of a War Minister, Britain is better off. From the point of view of a Finance Minister, our difficulties are greater for the time being. In a protracted war the British War Minister has great and increasing advantages over his German rival; but the German Finance Minister has not the same difficulty in financing purchases from abroad. I am now putting the financial position which is in front of us. The margin of imports over exports in an ordinary year is £130,000,000. The margin of imports

over exports this year will be £448,000,000 That does not include Government purchases abroad or the purchases of our allies abroad. We have got practically to finance the purchases of most of our allies abroad. That means that, instead of having to finance a difference of £130,000,000, we have to finance a difference between £700,000,000 and £800,000,000. Lloyd George continued with the query as to how England might be of the most use to her allies. She could maintain control of the seas. This she has done. She might keep a large army in the field and assume the financial burdens for the Allies and see to it that their armies are kept supplied with munitions of war. Of these three duties England could fulfill the first and third completely. But the number of English soldiers sent to the front would necessarily be limited by the fulfillment of these duties. In regard to this matter Lloyd George said: "I say, speaking now purely from the point of view of finance, that the time has come when there should be discrimination, so that recruiting should not interfere with the output of munitions of war and that it should interfere as little as possible with the output of those commodities which we export and which enable us to purchase munitions for ourselves and for our allies."

The heavy burdens which Lloyd George thinks the German War Minister has to bear we may fittingly leave him to carry alone. It has appeared that not the Germans but the English lack a sufficient quantity of good ammunition. And the Cabinet of which Lloyd George is a member has finally stumbled over the question of high explosive grenades. More important is what Lloyd George says about economic conditions in a field in which he is an expert. According to him, not only have the burdens of the war attained undreamed-of proportions for England, but England can fulfill her military duties toward her allies only at a further expense of her economic organization. And now the moment is clearly approaching when England will resort to compulsory military service, that invention of the branded and passionately combated militarism. But thereafter, according to Lloyd George's incontestable and competent judgment, Great Britain will not be in a position to carry the economic burdens of the war as hitherto. She will have learned that this war, for the outbreak of which she is not entirely irresponsible, not only demands enormous sacrifices of human life on the battlefield, but, considered merely as a business transaction, it is very poor business.

Germany stands second among the nations in the magnitude of her foreign trade. If, now, a country with an export and import trade amounting to $5,000,000,000 annually is suddenly cut off from the world market, the consequences will, of necessity, be keenly felt not only by the country in question, but also by all the countries standing in economic relations to it. This is in no small degree the case with the nations now at war with Germany, who assumed that Germany's economic dependence would force Germany comparatively quickly and easily to make peace.

What a rôle the trade with Germany played in the economic life of her present enemies the following table shows:

GERMANY AS PURCHASER.

There was taken of the entire exports of—	By Germany. %	By England. %	By France. %	By Russia. %	By Belgium. %
England	10.0	...	6.3	3.7	3.3
France	13.1	19.6	...	0.9	16.4
Russia	30.9	21.6	5.6	...	3.7
Belgium	26.0	16.0	19.0	2.0	...

GERMANY AS SELLER.

There was furnished of the total imports of—	By Germany. %	By England. %	By France. %	By Russia. %	By Belgium. %
England	9.9	...	6.1	5.5	3.2
France	12.2	12.4	...	5.5	6.8
Russia	40.8	12.9	5.0	...	0.6
Belgium	15.0	10.0	13.0	3.8	...

These figures prove what an important part Germany played in the economic life of her present-day enemies, especially of Russia and Belgium.

England concluded from this that Germany was hereby made dependent upon the world market and that she could easily and quickly be brought to her knees through the economic pressure brought to bear. This hope has not materialized. On the other hand, it has appeared that the other now hostile nations were in great measure dependent upon the purchasing and export power of Germany.

The Neutrals In This War

By Count E. Reventlow

[From the Illustrierte Zeitung]

THERE has seldom been a war throughout the duration of which, from the very beginning and without interruption, politics and its instrument, diplomacy, have played so great and extensive a rôle as in this world war. The well-known saying of General von Clausewitz, that war is nothing but a continuation of politics with different means, has only showed itself partly true in this war, only so far as political and diplomatic relations with the States with which we are waging war have ceased. Elsewhere, politics is more strenuously active than ever, and, indeed, it is active with regard to our enemies also, in so far as the work of German arms, frequently in accordance with purely political aims, is applied now on the one side, now on the other, more or less vigorously, as a principal or subordinate operation, that is, in accordance with what politics shows to be advantageous. Naturally, these possibilities of war politics are only present when purely military possibilities allow it. For example, the Anglo-French Dardanelles adventure was in reality subordinated to the political aim of blasting the Orient and the Balkans away from Germany and Austria-Hungary, and then directing them against us. After the war many such military operations and undertakings will get their true names, their aim being less the overthrow of the principal enemy than the winning at least of a change of sentiment from neutral powers.

Neutral powers in a war cannot often be carded with the same comb, for the reason that their neutrality has quite a different meaning for themselves and for the belligerents. The neutrality of the United States means something essentially different, for example, from the neutrality of Holland or Denmark, and the neutrality of Sweden depends on quite other considerations than that of Rumania, in the past, or now, while these lines are being written.

Unique in the present war is the fact that all the great powers except the United States of America are taking part in the conflict as belligerents; here we do not count China a great power. The United States of America is the most powerful of all the neutrals, and is therefore of high significance for both belligerent parties. But even this situation ought not to be possible, for according to the conception of neutrality a power is neutral when it favors or injuries neither the one party nor the other. Normally a neutral power ought to show the same face and practice the same conduct, in a certain sense, toward both belligerent parties. This would have been extremely easy for the United States, because of the large independence of its commercial and geographical position. The United States has not once needed to have its land and sea forces ready, or to keep them ready, as all the neutral powers in Europe have done for the last twelve months. The United States is commercially independent; it produces, or at any rate could produce, everything that it requires.

The war hits it only in its exports and its commerce with Europe. At the beginning of the war, ill-humor asserted itself in the United States, because it was foreseen that the war would disturb commerce in many ways. Then came the all-inundating import of the most infamous lies by our European foes into the United States. We could not parry them, because our means of communication were cut off by the war, as is well known. So things took their course, and chiefly for this reason a general feeling arose in the United States which swung wide from the spirit of neutrality, to the prejudice of Germany. Strong English sympathies and kinships, commercial relations, the possession of a common speech, ignorance of German life and aversion to it, did the rest. So matters stood, while the ever increasing supply of

munitions of war from the United States to our enemies aroused indignation in Germany. From America came the dry answer: We would sell war materials to you Germans also, but you have not sufficient command of the sea to be able to take delivery of the goods. We cannot undertake to deliver them "free at your house." This view at Washington was unneutral, for it gave support to one party at the expense of the other, it delivered to our enemies direct the means of carrying on the war, because they were short of these. It would have been really neutral on the side of the United States to forbid the supply of munitions or by pressure to compel our adversary to let through to Germany exactly the same supplies that it received itself. Then during the past Winter the German submarine war against British commerce got under way, and when the English Lusitania was annihilated, America raised the well-known complaint which the German Government answered a week and a half ago. We hope that the answer of the United States will show more equity and more understanding than its previous expressions of view to this capital.

The United States has put up with all England's violations of sea rights and all maltreatment of neutral commerce, although these were quite unprecedented. On the other side, the United States has ignored the fact that the German Government, at the beginning of the war, expressly declared that it would be ready to ratify all hitherto unratified agreements concerning maritime rights, in order to secure the rights of neutrals and neutral commerce in this war. But when Germany, through just necessity to defend herself against England's starvation war, launched her U-boat war against English commerce, after giving loyal notice of the fact, the United States assumed an attitude of bitterness against us. As already said, it is to be hoped that the spirit of equity and impartiality will gain the upper hand in Washington. Germany knows that she is defending her rights, and from the beginning of the war has been sincerely ready to care for and safeguard the rights of neutrals.

From the beginning of the war the United States was in a position to unite with the maritime neutral States and to enter into an agreement with them to defend neutral shipping and neutral rights trampled under foot by England. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland would have been grateful to America for this, and together they would have formed a powerful group which even Great Britain would have had to respect. For Great Britain is commercially dependent on the United States. But nothing whatever came of this, because of America's leaning toward our enemies, so that the minor maritime States of Europe have had to put up with severe treatment at England's hands. The English Government said to them: We regret if you suffer, but it is better that you should suffer than that Great Britain should suffer.

While the United States further reaps great advantages from the war, and will have wrested from Great Britain her commercial and financial supremacy to a great degree after the war, while North America will stand free and unexhausted after the war, with a mightily swollen check-book, the maritime neutrals of Europe have seen leaner days than ever before. Add to this, that Great Britain presses more hardly on each of them, to induce it to surrender its neutrality. Holland and Denmark would be the most useful to the Britons, and therefore the firm stand of these States up to the present is the more worthy of recognition. Quite true that neither in Denmark nor in Holland is this attitude the result of a leaning toward Germany; there is no question of that. But these small States have self-respect, and they comprehend that to join Great Britain would mean in fact the loss forever of their independence. Less important is Norway, which has always been strongly under English influence. The situation in Sweden shows itself very different from that in these three powers. Here we find outspoken sympathy for Germany and outspoken aversion and fear of Russia. Russia's purpose, prepared far ahead by the building of railroads, to inundate Sweden at a favorable opportu-

nity, to reduce her to a second Findland, and to win an Atlantic harbor on the west coast of Norway, has for a long time aroused growing anxiety in Sweden. The Swedish Government has, notwithstanding, preferred to remain conscientiously neutral, and we Germans esteem this decision, just as we recognize unreservedly the loyalty of Swedish neutrality. How here in these northern lands relations may be modified as the war progresses remains to be seen.

As soon as one of the belligerent parties has undoubtedly gained the upper hand, as soon as the other is irrevocably crushed, or when both belligerent parties have been brought to a certain degree of exhaustion, it will become impossible for many neutrals to maintain their present position, whether voluntarily or by constraint. In one extreme case the neutral seizes his arms in order to defend his independence; in the other, he joins the victor, under constraint, because the counterpoise on the other side is lacking, and resistance could only make his position worse. There is one neutral power in Europe which, in all human probability, cannot be threatened by such crises and dangers—Switzerland. Lying in the centre of the European Continent, without connection with the sea, in an almost unassailable position, always defensible, independent on all sides, Switzerland has always known how to incarnate the ideal of neutrality without detriment to herself. It is so also in this war. Yet Switzerland is suffering a great deal commercially because of the Anglo-Franco-Italian blockade of the coasts of Europe. Besides this, in the Swiss Confederation the sympathies and antipathies of the different nationalities toward the belligerent parties make themselves felt; but up to the present this is a phenomenon of minor importance, and we must take it for granted that hereafter, as heretofore, Switzerland will remain impartial in the full sense of the word, and will vigorously combat by force of arms every assault upon her neutrality by the belligerent parties. The neutrality of Switzerland is in every sense a thoroughly disinterested neutrality.

The very opposite of this disinterestedness is found in the Balkan peninsula. Here, almost since the beginning of the war, are visibly concentrated political questions of the highest moment. In the Balkan peninsula, the mutual and internal relations of the States, their complicated relations of race and nationality, their relations with the European great powers, and their efforts toward expansion, result in extraordinarily complicated relations. Within the frame of an essay we can only indicate these, and only from the point of view of the interests of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

In the Balkan peninsula we find two States openly hostile to us and our allies—Serbia and Montenegro. Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece are neutral. So long as Serbia is not crushed Rumania and Bulgaria form the land bridge, the general connection between Austria-Hungary and our third ally, Turkey. At the beginning of the war Rumania had been for decades a secret member of the old Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Rumania has fulfilled her treaty obligation as little as has Italy; nay, she has not even maintained a benevolent neutrality. This was shown by the fact that, at the command of her neighbor Russia, the Rumanian Government prohibited exports to Austria-Hungary, and likewise forbade the transport of munitions and other war material from the Hungarian frontier through Rumania, and then through Bulgaria. In Rumania, thanks to the efforts of our adversaries, the feeling against Germany and Austria-Hungary has been so strong for years that the King and the Germanophile statesmen have been able to do nothing against it.

This was aided by Russia's mighty halo of unconquerable and irresistible power. No one dared to act counter to a Russian prohibition, because every one believed that Russia would issue from the conflict victorious. To this was added the old Rumanian ill-feeling against Hungary, and the effort to absorb that part of Hungary which is predominantly peopled by Rumanians. It is true that there were and are also thoughtful Rumanians who know that Russia's victory would in-

evitably reduce Rumania to the position of a vassal State of Russia, and that therefore a union with the two central empires is the desirable thing, for the reason that these desire a strong and independent Rumania. Up to the present hour Rumania has not decided, and it is impossible to foresee what her decision will be. I should probably be right in saying that here also the question of superior force, in the one or the other sense, with this or the other means, will bring the decision.

With Bulgaria things are somewhat different. This State had, at the beginning of the war, intimate relations particularly with Austria-Hungary, had been crushed in the second Balkan war by her united adversaries in the Balkans, had been deprived of a large territory and was full of bitterness toward Russia. After the war had begun, our enemies tried to bring Bulgaria once more close to themselves, making great promises to her at the expense of Turkey and at the expense of Greece, if Bulgaria would draw the sword and would fight on the side of our adversaries, and particularly if she attacked Turkey. But Bulgaria's efforts are rather directed toward regions which Serbia in part deprived her of, and in part has long been in possession of. But in Bulgaria also the halo of Russian and British might is still living and active.

There are Bulgarians who still hope that Austria-Hungary may be beaten, and then the great powers would divide Bulgaria's territory among the Balkan States. So here also we see how only uncertainty and partisanships have hitherto maintained neutrality. Neither Rumania's nor Bulgaria's neutrality is disinterested. They cannot be so, but up to the present, however, Bulgaria's neutrality has been more loyal than Rumania's.

In the breast of Greece also there are two souls. The one is personified in the steadfast King Constantine, the other in the statesman Venizelos, so ready to serve the interests of France and England. The latter wished last Winter to push Greece into the war, particularly against Turkey. Islands and coast territory belonging to Turkey have been promised to Greece. On this pretext, France and Great Britain wished to send Greek troops against Constantinople and to Gallipoli as cannon fodder, and in return for this, promised to Greece things which had yet to be conquered. But the King intervened, Premier Venizelos was upset, and the neutrality of Greece was preserved. So the matter stands today, and so it will remain if the King remains in good health. This policy is without doubt the more far-seeing, since by it Greece risks nothing and makes sure of the active gratitude of the central empires after a victorious issue of the war.

From these brief indications it appears that the neutrality of the now neutral Balkan powers is in a condition of unstable equilibrium. On their decision very much depends for the progress of the war, while on the other hand it should be said that this very decision will be greatly influenced by the course of military events. There is a mutual interaction here which it is impossible to foresee. Our adversaries wish and demand that the three Balkan powers shall draw the swords for them. The German Empire demands only neutrality. The German Empire and its allies demand first of all a free connection between Hungary and Turkey. From this the rest will follow of itself.

Therefore the neutrals and their neutrality in this war are an important and complicated problem, because of their own efforts, feelings, and aversions, and because of the interests and efforts of the belligerents.

The Strange Child Heart of Germany

By J. George Frederick

New York, Aug. 7, 1915.

To the Editor of The New York Times:

MAY I ask we pause for a few minutes to peer into the inner chambers of the German heart, so that we may perhaps have light on what seems incomprehensible?

Yesterday a German of the highest representative type—with whom for months I have debated the issues of the war—despondently refused my week-end invitation and said with tears in his eyes that his dearest friend in Germany had recently fallen in battle, and his father was losing his mind over the war. He produced a letter written in Germany maintaining with almost fanatical insistence that Germany was an instrument in the hands of God, a "child of the infinite" for the salvation of the world. Like a deep religion, he devoutly believed it with the trusting faith of a child.

For the first time since the start of the war there flashed upon me a vision of the inner chambers of the German heart, the true composition of that world marvel of temperament which has confused us with a contradictory mixture of value and inhuman menace. I saw that its ideas came from those to whose authority it was obedient. I saw that the German heart was essentially a child heart; was stormed in soul with the swift and vindictive passions of childhood; now bubbling with friendliness, now rent with hatred. I divined in this German child heart an utter innocence of understanding of aught save the passions that racked him; whose argument was invective, not logic, yet who, for all that, was yearning behind that bitter mask to be enfolded in the comforting arms of a friendly, forgiving world. High-strung and proud beyond words, he was like a child who, half in innocence, has committed an atrocity; unable to bring himself to see or admit it or ask pardon for it, but cruelly torn in heart that he is made to suffer punishment and isolation for deeds whose significance he does not realize.

The German heart, it seems to me, in one sense, is being subjected to an unnatural and unfair strain, as of a child being compelled to meet the stern standards and judgments devised for adults—and this time adults not its own parents and masters in Germany, but strange new adults of the whole world. Precocious, imperious, self-conscious, and self-centred as any child inevitably is, it is spiritually a crime that Germany in these, her own hours of spiritual childhood, scars her body so badly because her juvenile incorrigibility must at last force upon her the elder parental discipline of the world's adult standards.

But, oh, that there had been some magic of pedagogy which might have kept her from the last resource of the international ferrule! Oh, that there had been more parental wisdom for the bending of the young nation to a gentler humanity! Germany, I protest, is naught but a child in every aspect of her history and character.

I beg that the German actions and words be henceforth viewed in this light (at worst) of willful childhood; that her folklore, her naïveté, her delightful holiday customs, and domesticity be remembered as signs of her innately juvenile heart, and that we understand even that her militarism is at worst a crude boyish strutting in armor, without the deeply sinister adult responsibility which similar actions on the part of older nations might imply. It is the grave—but do not let us say the vengeful—duty of the adult civilized world to teach and hold the child to high standards. But may we also remember the greater responsibilities of adulthood, and not forget to love in the midst of our mutual pain.

J. GEORGE FREDERICK.

"J'Accuse!"—A German to Germans

By William Archer

This review by the famous English author and critic of a book written by an anonymous German appeared originally in The London Daily News. The book attacking Germany was published in April, 1915, in Lausanne, Switzerland. An issue of the Journal de Genève which reached the United States in August announces that the Swiss Commander in Chief, acting under martial law, has suppressed the book, seized all copies for sale on the railway news stands, and has forbidden its transmission through the Post Office. Another Swiss newspaper reports that a widespread protest has been made against this suppression on the ground that it is a political and not a military act, and that, therefore, the military branch of the Government has exceeded its authority. At all events an appeal has been taken to the Federal Council, the national body in which supreme executive power lies.

"J'ACCUSE!' von Einem Deutschen" (Lausanne: Payot et Cie.) is a book which will certainly take its place in history. It is the work not only of an able but of a brave man. That such a book should exist in the German language is a great reassurance for all who cling to the hope that good may yet spring from evil and that the war demon may be hurled once for all into the abyss by the very triumph of his own infernal machinery. To that end it is indispensable that the German people should as soon as possible learn the truth as to the way they have been hoodwinked into the fatal adventure; and here is a man who not only tells them the truth with vigor and conviction, but proves his case by an extremely able marshaling of evidence. Published in Switzerland, the book is no doubt contraband in Germany, and will continue so for many a day. But it is the sort of contraband which Custom Houses cannot keep out. As soon as the paroxysm of the war is over Germans will insist on knowing what this eloquent and courageous German has to say to them.

When I went to procure the book I had almost followed the line of least resistance and bought the French translation. But I bethought me that in such a case, where doubts as to the genuineness of the author's alleged nationality are always possible, it is best to go to the original document. So I chose the German edition, and I did wisely. Not only is there no possible doubt that the writer is a German, but he is, if a foreigner may judge, a master of his native tongue. He writes clearly, vigorously, attractively. The clearness, by itself, might seem a suspicious circumstance; but it is evident that the author thinks in German and that his culture is that of the Fatherland. Therefore we may accept without hesitation the opening words of his "Epilogue":

> A German has written this book.
> No Frenchman, no Russian, no Englishman.
> A German who is unbribed and unbribable, not bought and not for sale.
> A German who loves his Fatherland as much as any man; but just because he loves it, he has written this book.

He might have added that he is no paradoxist, who is never happy unless he is in a minority of one, and no fanatic whose ruling principle is "My country, always in the wrong!" He is a man of the world, a man of sound, unparadoxical sense. His mind is robust rather than subtle, and he writes with a passionate sincerity.

The book falls into two main sections, headed respectively: "The Preliminaries of the Crime" and "The Crime." The propositions which the author sets forth to prove in the first part are:

> That the war had long been planned and prepared by Germany and Austria, not only from the military but from the political point of view.
>
> That it had long been determined to represent this aggressive war to the German people as a war of liberation, since it was known that only thus could the needful enthusiasm be aroused.
>
> That the object of this war is the establishment of German hegemony on the Continent, and in due course the conquest of England's position as a world

power on the principle "Ote-toi de là que je m'y mette."

The demonstration is largely founded on our old friend Bernhardi, whom the writer turns outside-in with great effect. This, indeed, is not difficult, since Bernhardi is a master in the art of giving himself and his country away. "Neither France, nor Russia, nor England," writes the General, "needs to attack us in order to enforce their interests." Yet here is Germany being driven to the sacrifice of millions of her sons (to say nothing of other people's sons) because she is assured, first that Russia, and then that England, had diabolically planned a murderous attack upon her!

As to the celebrated "place in the sun," our author enumerates the amazing triumphs of Germany's commerce and industry, shows how she has been rapidly out distancing all European rivals, how emigration has fallen to a very low figure while immigration is rising—and then asks what place in the sun she can possibly require that she does not already possess. He shows that it is not the commercial classes which make play with this catchword, but the Junker class, "for whom the economic prosperity of a country only exists in so far as it provides the means for military enterprises." "What we are really claiming," he concludes, "is not a place in the sun for ourselves, but a place in the shade for every one else."

With admirable fairness he reviews the political relations of Germany and England, and shows that England, far from having pursued an aggressive policy toward Germany, has made constant efforts to win her friendship, only stopping short of the sacrifice of her insular security and of her position as a power in the world. The neutrality convention proposed by Germany would have meant nothing less than the renunciation of England's rights as a free moral agent. The whole difficulty, as our author clearly explains, arose from the ill-starred ambition of the first military power in the world to be also the first naval power. "What would Germany and all Europe have said," he asks, "if England, being the first sea power, had suddenly set to work to make herself as strong as Germany by land as well?" A question which our English Junkers may well take to heart.

Germany is told that she is fighting for safety, freedom, the right to exist.

> The word "freedom" is now constantly on the lips of people who formerly would have crossed themselves three times if they had heard the tabooed term in the mouths of others. We have all suddenly, and without exception, turned into freedom lovers—especially those who were of old enthusiasts for "divinely appointed subjection." We have become so devoted to freedom that we want to confer it not only on our own people, but on all the other peoples of the earth (see the Chancellor's manifesto to America) * * * Social Democrats, clericals, progressists, Poles, Danes, Alsatians—all the former enemies of the empire are now pressed by the Prussian Junker to his sympathetic heart, on condition, of course, that they keep the truce, which means, as is well known, that they think, write, and speak as the Junkers do.

The people who make Russia the arch-enemy of Germany are as far from the truth as those who reserve that distinction for England:

> Where, then, is the truth? What do we really want? Against whom and for what are we fighting? These are questions which every one answers differently. We are plunged in a gigantic spiritual confusion, an ocean of lies and misrepresentations, which is, alas! of blood-red hue, and threatens to sweep away German happiness and German prosperity.
>
> The confusion arises from the fact that there is a tacit conspiracy among those who know not to tell the truth, while they have forgotten to come to an understanding as to what they are to substitute for it. So each lies as the spirit moves him, and the lies hurtle against each other in space like the wireless messages of different stations not tuned to each other. Jonathan Swift was right when he said: "As universal a practice as lying is and as easy a one as it seems, it is astonishing that it has been brought to so little perfection, even by those who are most celebrated in that faculty."

This part of the book contains a good many blank spaces, showing where passages have been cut out by the censorship—the Swiss censorship, of course. It would be interesting to know just where the censor drew the line; for the author speaks with very considerable freedom, even of such exalted personages as the

Kaiser, the Crown Prince, and (more particularly) the Imperial Chancellor.

By far the longest section of "J'Accuse!" is that devoted to "The Crime." It consists of a very acute and searching analysis of the evidence contained in the diplomatic documents published by the belligerent nations, and a crushing exposure of the falsehoods, concealments, evasions, misrepresentations, hypocrisies, and insolences whereby Germany has sought to throw upon Russia and England the responsibility for the outbreak of war. He tears to shreds the German White Book and the muddle-headed fallacies of the Chancellor's speeches. He perhaps attributes to Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg too much conscious villainy. I rather read in him a man of very mediocre ability, to whom clearness of thought is unknown and who is probably the first dupe of his own sophistries. To Sir Edward Grey, on the other hand, our author does neither more nor less than justice when he says: "The English Secretary of State had, from the outbreak of the crisis, the whole direction of the work for peace, and did all that any human being could have done to avert the calamity." He quotes, and makes his own, the eulogy which Mr. Asquith pronounced on his colleague in the House of Commons on Aug. 6.

On the question of Belgium our author's position is that of every man who does not hold that the moral code of the supreme State is, and ought to be, that of the wild beast in the jungle. The book was finished in February, so that the writer does not know how thoroughly the atrocity accusations have been proved. He accepts the very doubtful story that the Louvain outrage arose from shots fired by civilians from the houses. All the more telling is his denunciation of the theory that such incidents justify unlimited and indiscriminating incendiarism and massacre.

He tells of a visit to a "kino"—a picture theatre—in Berlin in the early days of the war, where the program illustrated the German perversion of ideas on this subject:

> Two war films were exhibited. The first showed the rising in Tyrol in 1809, under Andreas Hofer, the second a series of franc-tireur scenes in 1870. In the first the whole people is in arms against the French invaders; Andreas Hofer himself, the leader and hero, is no General, but an innkeeper, and the rest are peasants, handicraftsmen, and laborers, with their women and children, all armed and taking part in the fight. The sympathies of the author are, of course, on the Tyrolese side. The French are shot down from every sort of ambush, from behind houses, rocks, and trees. In due time it all ends in the victory and liberation of the people. Then comes the franc-tireur drama of 1870, and all is changed. Now the French defenders of their country have become scoundrels and criminals. Even their features show their evil instincts. They, too, shoot from ambush like the Tyrolese of 1809; but what was there a fight for freedom is here treachery and outrage. The punishment is not long delayed. German reinforcements storm into the village, the houses go up in flames, and, amid the shrieks of women and children, a dozen men and boys are ranged against the churchyard wall and "subjected to martial law." The distinction is obvious. Against the French, a people in arms! Against the Germans, criminals worthy of death. The same confusion of ideas everywhere, from the summits of German intelligence down to the lowest "kino" playwright!

Though the author is not in possession of the full evidence as to the deeds of his countrymen, he quotes from a German newspaper a letter from an officer headed, "A Day of Honor for Our Regiment," describing with hellish gusto a massacre of French wounded, and rightly calls it "a bestial document."

It cannot be said that the author has entirely avoided the dangers that beset the eager dialectician. He now and then loses his sense of proportion and runs an argument into the ground. Though never disingenuous, he is now and then (I think) not quite fair. But the flaws in his work are as nothing to the merits. It is a tremendous demonstration of the insanity of the whole world convulsion, addressed primarily to Germany as the nation which has made an idol of war, but well deserving to be taken to heart by all nations, belligerent or neutral. It leads up to the ideal of "a Peace League of Free Peoples," and one feels on laying it down that, if only this convulsion were once past, such an ideal need not be so very distant.

Poland's Gift to Civilization

By Kazimir de Proszynski

New York, Aug. 12, 1915.

To the Editor of The New York Times:

POLAND, where is your sympathy?" That is the question everybody puts to my fellow-countrymen during these days.

I am not authorized to speak on behalf of my country—no one has such a right when the national representation does not exist—yet I am sure that every thinking Pole, be he rich or poor, Prince or peasant, German, Russian, or Austrian subject, has only one indignant cry: "Go away, all! Go away from our home, barbarians that you are!" If I am mistaken let any one protest, but I am convinced that this is the sentiment of all Poles who are not of foreign origin.

Personally, I am not inclined to hate any living individual for political reasons; hatred is a feeling strange to a Pole, in spite of all the wrongs he suffers. Rather, we esteem those qualities of our enemies which deserve esteem. But imagine, if you will, the invasion of your home, your sanctuary, on three sides by three quarreling brutes who use it as the place of their quarrel in order to save their own homes; who destroy the products of your labor and your civilization, use your children as a shield against the enemy, and, when compelled to withdraw, burn and wreck everything or else carry it away with them! And on top of this to rob you of your name and your good reputation by falsifying your history and spreading over Europe false statements about your character, past and present!

Listen, all "free" nations. For 150 years you entirely forgot the debt you owe to your elder brother, to your unique ancestor of collective liberties and personal freedom. Your children grow up without the slightest knowledge of the existence of a people who cleared up the way to your freedom; who first, after the fall of Roman civilization, realized that all thinking men are equal in the sight of the nation; who through the centuries recognized the absolute freedom of speech, of conscience and religion. You forgot the nation that should be remembered by you as the unique example of peaceful evolution, the people that grew, progressed rapidly and reached individual rights not by revolutionary destruction, not through an outburst of the lowest instincts, but as the natural result of the free play of the human spirit. You forgot that this ancient civilization was continually defending you in your future civilization from the destruction and invasion of Eastern barbarians. Even lately, after Poland was conquered by three absolute rulers who were frightened at the ideas of popular liberty which were spreading from this country, the heirs of this spirit led the constitutional movements in every part of the world, personified by such individuals as General Kosciusko in America, General Mieroslawski in Germany, General Bem in Hungary, &c.

You have allowed yourselves to bury so deeply your gratitude that you are unconsciously helping in the movement to disgrace Poland's past and to obliterate the best efforts of Poland's present. In our sight this is an appalling thing to do; you are the destroyers of your own moral progress.

Shall I recall some of the fictions invented to excuse the conquest of Poland? There was the story of Poles oppressing peasants, and yet the real facts are that in an epoch of general oppression the lower classes of Poland enjoyed for those times the highest possible liberties; frequently whole villages of peasants, for the slight proof of their intelligence and loyalty, were rewarded with the highest freedom, i. e., with citizenship or "nobility," as it is called in Poland, these inhabitants obtaining even higher political rights than those enjoyed by citizens in the United States. You have assumed without question that

Poland was the focus of anarchy, of massacres—" pogroms "—while in reality Poland's history is not stained with a single attempt on the ruler's life; Poland was the single country which admitted all immigrants—such as Jews, Hussites, Huguenots, Presbyterians—expelled from the rest of Europe, and tolerated their religions, and this, too, at a time of inquisition and general persecution. You condemn the noblest Polish institutions such as the " Veto " without knowing that the highest material and spiritual development of Poland began with the introduction of the " Veto " and led through 150 years to the Golden Age of Poland, (in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries;) this highest expression of the personal control of the government of every citizen was never abused nor corrupted until the intervention of intruders, who succeeded in conquering Poland by force and destroying her freedom. The statement that the " Veto " was the cause of the downfall of Poland is similar to the position of a burglar who might point out the inferiority of the house since it lacked anti-burglar devices.

This is our answer to the question, " Poland, where is your sympathy? " In the light of our history can we make any other answer? To a person we believe that it is necessary to shake off the old despotism and to inaugurate a new era in our civilization. All the highest spirits of Poland, like Mickiewiez, Krasinki, and others, have firmly believed that the old Polish political ideals may be made to form the basis of future politics which will revive and spread over all the world from our once forgotten country.

Saving in War Time

[From The London Daily News.]

Millions of Britons who are eager to be making silver bullets for the destruction of Kaiserdom are doubtful how to begin.

They want to put by every penny possible, and hand it over to the Government in the form of war loan. But they are not certain where to start this great business of saving. " I am never extravagant," such a man or woman will say, " and I really don't see how it is possible for me to cut down expenses."

Here are some practical hints which will show that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred saving in order to buy five-shilling " silver bullets " at the Post Office is not only possible but easy. It is merely a matter of system. Finally it becomes one of habit. Some sources of saving may be roughly grouped under the following heads:

MEN.	WOMEN.	BOTH SEXES.
" Drinks."	Cookery.	Amusements.
Tobacco.	Coal and Lighting.	Week-ends.
Traveling.	Clothes.	

Of course, the list could be indefinitely varied and extended. It cannot be too clearly understood that the cost of every "drink" saved and handed over to the nation helps to shorten the war. Less labor and more foodstuffs are consumed proportionately in the manufacture of alcoholic liquors than in any other trade. Again, under the head "Traveling" a surprisingly substantial sum can be saved by many men on bus and tram fares.

In regard to women's expenditures, one of the first rules to observe is " Learn to cook." Shillings a week can be saved in any middle-class and many working-class households by more economical cookery. Some broad principles to follow are:

Cut down the meat bill.
Raise the vegetable bill.
Save every bit of bread.
Don't forget the soup.

Vegetables are cheap and good in spite of the war, and make excellent soup with or without the help of bones. If 30 per cent. more cooked vegetables (varied in kind and well cooked) and 30 per cent. less meat are served up, hardly any one will notice the difference—except the housekeeper when she makes up her accounts.

THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS

[French Cartoon]

The Hour of the Taube

—Drawn by Albert Guillaume, The Bystander, London.

How the French Show Their Contempt for the German Air Attacks: Awaiting the Coming of the Taube Aeroplane.

[American Cartoon]

Easy Marks

—From The New York Evening Sun.

Austria Follows Germany's Example in Making a Target of the American Eagle.

[German Cartoon]

Showing His Samples

—*From Simplicissimus, Munich.*

Wilson, the salesman, to the French Generals: "You understand, of course, that the more frightful the agony produced by my shells the higher the price of them."

[Dutch Cartoon]

German Satisfaction

—From a Dutch Post Card.

"Peace Reigns at Dinant!"

[Polish Cartoon]

A Word to Sweden

—*From Mucha, Warsaw.*

APROPOS OF GERMANY'S THREAT TO INVADE FINLAND THROUGH SWEDEN. John Bull (to Sweden): "Don't get your toys in the way, little boy, so that I can't close this door."

[German Cartoon]

John Bull Weeps



—From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.

In the hour of darkness and storm John Bull stands weeping over the buried hopes of the Entente Powers.

[English Cartoon]

By Way of a Change



—From Punch, London.

Uncle Sam: "I guess I'm about through with letter-writing!"

[German Cartoon]

John Bull's Tattoo

—From Jugend, Munich.

Fall in line, fall in line!
  Each hour you serve a shilling!
For every corpse a dollar is paid!
  Let every one help who's willing!

[American Cartoon]

Another Scrap of Paper?

—*From The New York World.*

And the Hesperians Are Still Torpedoed!

[German Cartoon]

The Exalted Overlord

—From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.

The Grand Duke Nicholas, as the chief victim, is dubbed by the Allied Powers "Generalissimissimus" ("Chiefest Commander in Chief.")

[American Cartoon]

Cutting Another Cable

—From The New York Times.

"If you say the word, Wilhelm."

[English Cartoon]

A German Breach of The Hague Convention



—*From The Sketch, London.*

Laughing-gassing the British Before an Advance in Close Formation.

[Dutch Cartoon]

"Hoch Kultur"

—From a Dutch Post Card.

Stricken from the Sky by a German Flier.

[English Cartoon]

The Answer

—*From Punch, London.*

"When duty whispers low, 'Thou Must,'
They all reply, 'I Can.'"

—EMERSON (*adapted*).

[American Cartoon]

After the War!

—From The Kansas City Post.

The German Nation's "Place in the Sun."

[English Cartoon]

Malvolio Wilhelm

—*From The Bystander, London.*

"So crammed as he thinks with excellences, that it is his ground of faith that all that look on him, love him."
"O Peace! Contemplation makes a rare turkey-cock of him: how he jets under his advanced plumes!"
"Very midsummer madness!"

(*Acts* 2-3 "TWELFTH NIGHT; *or* WIE SIE WOLLEN.")

[German Cartoon]

The Camel's Kick



—*From Simplicissimus, Munich.*

Tripoli (to Italy): "Adieu, Signor!" (Apropos of the reported condition of revolt in Italy's African colonies.)

[Spanish Cartoon]

As It Really Happened

—From Hojas Selectos, Barcelona.

Emperor William and King George go courting Miss Italy; and the Englishman walks off with the prize.

[German Cartoon]

An Excuse in Chorus

—From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.

The Allies' Generals: "Yes, I could do it—if you would support me!"

[English Cartoon]

A Little Difficulty

—From The Westminster Gazette, London.

Hindenburg: "I've crushed him!"
The Kaiser: "Then bring him in!"
Hindenburg: "I can't! He won't let me!"

[Australian Cartoon]

Ave Imperator!

—From The Bulletin, Sydney, Australia.

Disease: "Hail, master! I have slain my tens, but you have slain your thousands!"

[German Cartoon]

"Through Express!"



—From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.

Rumanian (to Bulgarian): "I think we'd better board this train, or we'll miss connections."

[English Cartoon]

Great German Naval Victory

—From The Bystander, London.

How the Commander of U-99 Won His Iron Cross.
By Lieutenant E. G. O. Buettler, R. N. V. R.

[German Cartoon]

Weather Report from the Isonzo

—From Jugend, Munich.

Cadorna telegraphs: "In spite of the severe rains and terrible thunder showers we hope soon to reach dry land."

Chronology of the War

Showing Progress of Campaigns on All Fronts and Collateral Events From August 12, 1915, Up to and Including September 12, 1915.

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EUROPE

Aug. 13—Germans advance toward Brest-Litovsk.

Aug. 15—Germans are approaching Kovno; Germans defeat Russians near Kubisko; Austrians advance along the Bug River; Austrians resume bombardment of Belgrade.

Aug. 17—Germans capture southwest front of Kovno, with 4,500 men and 240 guns.

Aug. 18—Germans take Kovno and 400 cannon; Vilna is being evacuated; two more forts of Novo Georgievsk fall; Mackensen's forces cross the Bug for the attack on Brest-Litovsk.

Aug. 19—Germans take two more Novo Georgievsk forts; Austro-German forces penetrate the outer defenses of Brest-Litovsk.

Aug. 20—Germans capture Novo Georgievsk, with 700 cannon and a huge store of supplies.

Aug. 23—Germans capture Ossowetz.

Aug. 26—Austro-Germans take Brest-Litovsk, the Russians evacuating it; Germans take Bialystok, also evacuated by the Russians.

Aug. 28—Austrians take offensive in Southeastern Galicia and pierce the Russian line at two points.

Aug. 30—Mackensen starts a turning movement in the far south, while Hindenburg pushes for Riga.

Aug. 31—Russians check Teutonic allies in Galicia.

Sept. 1—Austrians capture the Russian fortress of Lutsk; official German statement puts Russian losses since May 2 at 300,000 killed and wounded and 1,100,000 prisoners.

Sept. 2—Russians evacuate the fortress of Grodno and retire to the right bank of the Niemen River.

Sept. 8—Russian Grand Duke Nicholas shifted to the Caucasus; Russians recapture old positions in Galicia near Tarnopol.

Sept. 9—Russians win another victory southwest of Trembowla; Austrians take Dubno.

CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE.

Aug. 13—French take new offensive in Arras region.

Aug. 16—French win artillery fight near Soissons.

Aug. 18—Violent artillery duels are in progress along almost the whole front.

Aug. 22—Severe artillery fighting in the Arras region.

Aug. 26—Germans are again shelling Rheims.

Aug. 28—French artillery silences German guns at four points in the Argonne.

Sept. 8—Germans begin new offensive on western approaches to Verdun.

Sept. 9—German Crown Prince's army gains in Argonne district.

Sept. 10—Germans win trench at Schratzmennele with asphyxiating shells.

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.

Aug. 18—Italians take many Austrian trenches in the Tolmino and Carso regions with the bayonet.

Aug. 22—Italians gain ground on the Carso front.

Aug. 23—Italians evacuate the heights of Monfalcone; Austrians repulse Italians east of Polazzo.

Aug. 28—Italians are developing great movements against Trent and Trieste.

Sept. 3—Italians repulsed at Tolmino.

Sept. 7—Italians repulse Monte Nero attack.

Sept. 10—Italians are again repulsed at Tolmino.

TURKISH CAMPAIGN.

Aug. 15—Russians advance in the Caucasus.

Aug. 16—Turks recapture the town of Van on the Caucasian front from the Russians.

Aug. 17—Russians again take Van and make other gains.

Aug. 25—Allies advance on the Gallipoli Peninsula along a twelve-mile front.

Aug. 31—German reports state that the British have lost 50,000 men at the Dardanelles since Aug. 6.

Sept. 1—Allies now command the Buvuk-Anafarta Valley on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Sept. 11—Russians repulse Turks on several positions on Caucasus front.

Sept. 12—Turks are defeated near Olti.

NAVAL RECORD—GENERAL.

Aug. 17—Austrian fleet of twenty-one vessels bombards the island of Pelagosa, in the Adriatic; four Italian soldiers killed.

Aug. 21—Russian fleet defeats a German fleet which enters the Gulf of Riga.

Aug. 22—Two French torpedo boats sink a German torpedo boat destroyer off Ostend.

Aug. 23—British fleet of thirty ships shells Zeebrugge.

Aug. 25—German cruisers bombard signal stations near Riga.

Sept. 7—British squadron bombards German batteries on the Belgian coast.

Sept. 11—Italian, British, and French warships attack points close to Smyrna.

NAVAL RECORD—SUBMARINES.

Aug. 13—German submarine torpedoes and sinks British transport Royal Edward in the Aegean Sea, 1,000 men being lost.

Aug. 19—German submarine torpedoes and sinks, without warning, the White Star liner Arabic southeast of Fastnet; among the fifty-four persons lost are two American passengers.

Aug. 21—British Admiralty states that the submarine F-13 went aground on the Danish island of Saltholm and was attacked by a German torpedo boat, which killed fourteen of the crew.

Sept. 2—British submarines torpedo four Turkish transports in the Dardanelles.

Sept. 3—Authoritative Paris reports state that the Germans have lost fifty-four submarines; German submarines sink British steamers Roumanie and Churston.

Sept. 4—German submarine torpedoes without warning the westbound Allan liner Hesperian off the Irish coast; ten passengers and sixteen members of crew, one of whom was an American, dead or missing.

Sept. 7—Germans report loss of submarine U-27; German submarines sink French steamship Bordeau, British steamship Dictator, and Norwegian bark Storesand.

AERIAL RECORD.

Aug. 17—Zeppelins raid the outskirts of London; ten persons are killed and thirty-six wounded.

Aug. 25 — Austrian aeroplane bombards Brescia, killing six civilians; sixty-two French aviators bombard Dillingen, in Rhenish Prussia; sixty French, British, and Belgian aeroplanes bombard the Mont Huest Forest in Belgium.

Aug. 26—British Aerial Squadron Commander Bigsworth, single-handed, sinks a German submarine off the Belgian coast by dropping a bomb upon it, according to British announcement; Germans deny the submarine is sunk.

Aug. 28—French aviators repel six German aeroplanes which attempt to bombard Paris, destroying one of the machines; allied aeroplanes shell German positions in Belgian towns near the coast.

Sept. 6—Forty French aeroplanes bombard Saarbrücken.

Sept. 7—German airships raid eastern coast of England; ten persons are killed and forty-three wounded; French aviators attack Freiburg.

Sept. 8—Zeppelins again raid eastern coast of England and London district; twenty persons are killed and eighty-six injured.

Sept. 12—Zeppelins raid eastern coast of England; no casualities or damages.

GERMANY.

Aug. 15—German Embassy at Washington makes public a memorandum charging that British merchantmen in sixty-two instances have improperly flown American and other neutral flags.

GREAT BRITAIN.

Aug. 15—National registration day throughout the United Kingdom, every person between 15 and 65 having to fill out blanks giving personal facts to enable Government to gauge labor resources and the number of men available for military service.

Aug. 21—Great Britain issues a declaration, in which France joins, making cotton absolute contraband.

Sept. 7—Government is ready to release American-owned cargoes of German and Austrian goods.

HOLLAND.

Sept. 8—Sentries fire at Zeppelin flying over Dutch territory.

ITALY.

Aug. 17—Italy demands that Turkey immediately release reservists and other Italian subjects at Turkish ports.

Aug. 21—Italy declares war on Turkey.

RUSSIA.

Sept. 7—Czar Nicholas takes command of the army.

UNITED STATES.

Aug. 15—Text is made public of a note from the United States to Austria, in reply to an Austrian note of June 29, stating that the United States will not stop the shipment of munitions to Europe.

Aug. 16—United States sends note to Germany accepting plan for fixing damages for the William P. Frye and asking about future conduct toward American ships.

Sept. 1—Germany gives a written promise to the United States, in a letter from Ambassador von Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing, that she will sink no more liners without warning.

Sept. 9—United States sends note to Austria-Hungary asking that Ambassador Dumba be recalled for attempt to cripple American industries; Germany sends note to the United States defending sinking of the Arabic and suggesting arbitration of indemnity.

TSAR FERDINAND OF BULGARIA

A Recent Portrait. He Has Ranged His Kingdom in the War on the Side of the Central Powers

(Photo from P. S. Rogers.)

A RECENT PORTRAIT OF CONSTANTINE
King of the Hellenes and Brother-in-Law of Kaiser Wilhelm II.
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood.)

PERIOD XIV.

The Third Blakan War—Greece and Belgium—The Fighting in Champagne—Russia's Recoil—Two Millions of Lives—The Draft in Our Civil War—Darwinism and War—The Attitude of Holland—Russia Awakening—Argentina's Neutrality Plea—The "Ten Commandments" of Germany's War Loan—Tsing-tao and the Japanese—Modern Troops in Armor.

WORLD AFFAIRS OF THE MONTH

British Cabinet's Dissensions.

Simultaneously with the recall of General Sir Ian Hamilton from his command at the Dardanelles, announced on Oct. 19, came the news that Sir Edward Carson, British Attorney General, had relinquished his seat in the British Cabinet. The resignation of Sir Edward, the first open manifestation of the divergence of views known to exist among the Ministers, was the result, according to an authoritative statement, not of the controversy over conscription, but of the condition of affairs in the Near East. Sir Edward himself had made no statement, but it had been feared that he disapproved both the Administration's Balkan policy and its method of confiding the whole conduct of national affairs to a small "Inner Cabinet." On the day of his resignation John E. Redmond, the Irish Nationalist leader, declared that the position of the coalition Government was precarious; that a conspiracy existed among men ready to sacrifice national unity in the face of the enemies of Great Britain to further their own predilections and theories, and that a general election was possible. At the same time the leading London newspapers displayed marked signs of uneasiness over the Cabinet situation, declaring that before many days there might be "sensational developments" unless wiser counsels prevail. Other Ministerial resignations were freely talked about, and the very existence of the Administration seemed threatened. While the question of conscription seemed acute, the failure of the Dardanelles expedition and of British diplomacy with respect to Bulgaria, enabling Germany to begin a great campaign in the Balkans, seemed to be at the bottom of the British Cabinet dissension.

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Sir Edward Carson and Ulster.

Sir Edward Carson entered the Asquith coalition Cabinet on May 26, 1915, when the Liberal Cabinet of twenty members was superseded by twelve Liberals, eight Unionists, one Labor Party nominee, (without portfolio,) and one (Lord Kitchener) without any party associations; in addition, the Ministry of Munitions was created and placed in the hands of David Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the former Cabinet. Sir Edward was made Attorney General. Although he had served as Solicitor General for Ireland in 1892 and as British Solicitor General from 1900 to 1906, as Queen's Counsel at the English and Irish bars, and had been a Bencher of King's Inns, Dublin, and of the Middle Temple, London, he was little known outside of British legal and political circles until the home rule movement assumed its acute sensational stage more than two years ago. After the general election of 1906 Sir Edward, beginning to be known as "Balfour II." for his opposi-

tion to the Home Rule bill on behalf of the Conservative Protestant communities of Ireland, adopted Ulster as his protégé with a selfless passion that evoked the affectionate and unquestioning loyalty of the population of that province. Cable dispatches could hardly mention one of the many phases through which the Home Rule bill was passing without describing his work—the legal obstructions he placed in the way of the bill and finally his preparations for armed resistance to its promulgation as a law. His untiring energy and his enthusiasm enabled him to overcome physical weakness; his sombre eloquence inspired and his counsels curbed the passions of the most determined and perhaps the most pugnacious section of the population of the United Kingdom. When the war began his voice was at once raised and his influence exerted to turn the magnificent force of Ulster volunteers, whose potential strength had been his creation, into soldiers for the prosecution of the combat provoked by Germany. For ten months he labored with them, as did John Redmond, his sometime enemy, among the Catholic Nationalists, until he finally entered the Ministry. The most notable cases with which Sir Edward had to deal as Attorney General were the Board of Trade's inquiry into the sinking of the Lusitania and the proceedings before the prize court for the condemnation of American meat cargoes which had been seized by the British Government on the ground that they were destined for Germany.

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In Darkest London.

Describing "Zeppelins over London," a correspondent of the Neue Freie Presse says:

> At other times when a guest was awaited the doors were opened wide and out of all the windows flashed the bright rays of festal lights. Now London prepares every evening to receive a guest, but the town is still, the houses are close shut, and the light is extinguished.

Beginning Oct. 1 "no more than a subdued light" might be cast from London's windows, roofs, or doors, and in trams and omnibuses the lighting must be "no more than is sufficient to enable fares to be collected," while front and rear lights are extinguished in crossing bridges. The lights on the waterfront are kept screened. All illumination for advertising purposes is done away with. Night traffic has as a consequence been reduced, and the theatres have special problems to draw the public. But the severe raids of October seem to warrant the nightly obscuration of the world's greatest city as well as the appointment of Sir Percy Scott as Director of London's air defenses.

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"From Hamburg to Bagdad."

An Arabian Night's dream which the German General Staff is bent upon bringing to practical realization is described in Berlin correspondence of the Hamburger Fremdenblatt, headed "When the Final Fight Begins" and written when the German offensive began through Serbia toward Bulgaria, Constantinople, Arabia, Persia, and India began, with its implied menace to the Suez Canal and the trade of Britain's world empire. The map of Europe shows a continuous line of rails from Hamburg to Bagdad. With that secured and with the Balkan States included in a German Customs Union, assuring rich supplies to Germany's industries without danger of a blockade by sea, the Teutons would consider the war won. Count Reventlow has counseled that the Balkan powers would accept the German proposals "only if the central powers prove by their acts that their power and their prestige in all parts of the world are mighty and great enough to remove all doubt." Germany is now intent upon an exhibition of power in the Balkans.

* * *

War in the Garden of Eden.

A British success in Mesopotamia, with 1,650 Turkish prisoners taken and strong positions stormed, was conveyed in the report issued on Sept. 30 by the Secretary of State for India, giving an account of the operations on the Tigris. Kut-el-Amara, a hundred miles below Bagdad, was taken. A Turk-

ish army of 7,000 or 8,000 was put to flight. Through tribes of hostile plainsmen the British troops under General Delamain and General Hoghton have pushed their way toward Bagdad since their departure from Bombay a year ago. They proceeded up the Euphrates to Basra, fifty miles from its mouth; thence in April last to Shaiba and Kurna, forty-five miles further, when they put to rout an army of 10,000 Turks and 12,000 Arabs and Kurds, with losses of 6,000. Kut-el-Amara is two hundred miles above Shaiba and less than 100 miles from Bagdad, the British objective. At Kurna, the reputed seat of the Garden of Eden, two actions were fought, one of them during a time of flood, in which ships of the British Navy participated.

* * *

Turkish Revolution Unlikely.

A Paris dispatch to The London Morning Post has allayed the rumors that Turkey is on the eve of a revolution and that there is famine in Constantinople. Talat Bey, Turkish Minister of the Interior, and Enver Pasha, as head of the military power, have frequent meetings with Prince Hohenlohe, the German Ambassador, and the triumvirate rules the people with unquestioned power. The testimony is that of a Frenchman who was enabled to reside in Constantinople until September of this year. He says:

> We must firmly set aside all hope of seeing a new Government take the place of the one now in power, even in the event of the heir to the throne, Yussuf Izzeddin, favorable as he is toward the Allies, succeeding to the Crown.

* * *

Persian Disorders.

German reports that all is not well with British rule in Persia received confirmation in the House of Commons on Sept. 28 last when Lord Cecil, replying to some remarks by Colonel Yate, reported incidents of revolt in Persian cities. At Ispahan an attack made on the British Consul General had resulted in the withdrawal of the British and Russian colonies there. At Shiraz the British Consul General had been wounded and had died. At Bushire, then occupied by British troops, two officers had been killed. Lord Cecil hinted at German and Austrian intrigues and the use of German money as the cause of Persian disaffection and suggested as a means of allaying it that the British authorities had "evinced our willingness to ease the financial position of Persia," with "very considerable concessions of that kind, provided the effect was impartial administration."

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The Third German War Loan.

"Millions for fresh blows" is the characterization of the twelve billions of marks ($3,000,000,000) in the total of subscriptions for the third German war loan made by Dr. Karl Helfferich, Secretary of the German Imperial Treasury and otherwise known as the "Hindenburg of German finance." The German people have by this loan, equaling or exceeding the great second war loan of Great Britain, contributed a total of six and a quarter billions of dollars to their war. When its success was assured Emperor William on Sept. 24 sent a congratulatory telegram to Dr. Helfferich, as follows:

> I thank you for this great success of the financial warfare with which you have been intrusted. The German Nation, full of confidence in its own strength, has shown its enemies and the whole world that in the future it is unanimously united as one man, is unshakable, and will continue to a glorious end this war, obtruded upon us by criminal surprise, and make every necessary offer of blood for the security and liberty of the Fatherland.

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The Anglo-French Credit.

A credit loan of $500,000,000 for five years, issued at a net yield to the American investor of 5½ per cent. and at the popular denominations of $100 up, will give a net return to England and France of $480,000,000 in American trade. The money is to remain in the United States, to be paid in installments; its purpose is to stabilize exchange in pounds sterling and francs, with the result of maintaining adequate prices for American exports to the allied powers. The syndicate in charge of the half-billion loan is composed of groups

of bankers and financiers in the most populous sections of the country, with headquarters in New York City, where the local group consists of over forty banking institutions. After the contracts were signed in New York on Oct. 15 Lord Reading, on behalf of the foreign commissioners who negotiated the credit, announced that within a month or two additional credits would be established in this country for the British and French Governments. The first credit was heavily oversubscribed. Never before in modern history has Britain sought a foreign loan.

* * *

When Does a Hat Become a Hat?

Neither the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, nor the Customs House, nor yet the London Chamber of Commerce can define either hat or headgear. Discussing the proposed tax on imports of hats in Parliament on Sept. 30, Mr. Dennis asked Chancellor McKenna for "a clearly ascertained definition as to what was a hat." The statistical definition in the customs rules referred to "straw hats, felt hats, and hats of other material," while, as a matter of fact, in the straw hats were included pieces of straw made up in the shape of a bath mat. Pieces of felt, more or less circular, sometimes concave and sometimes convex, were classified as hats. Mr. Taylor protested that few of the honorable members would venture to say how many kinds of material were used in the making of ladies' hats, and as the Chancellor had included in the tax "all kinds of headgear," did that mean wigs and nightcaps? After some floundering about, Mr. McKenna decided to withdraw the proposal for a tax which might be easily evaded.

* * *

The Massacres in Armenia.

"There is only one power that can stop the Armenian atrocities, and that is Germany," is the English opinion expressed by Lord Bryce at a meeting in London on Oct. 15. Lord Bryce, who declared that the horrors of the massacre exceeded anything in the history of persecutions, is supported by the testimony of the eminent American Committee on Armenian Atrocities after its investigation in Turkish Armenia, published on Oct. 4. The deliberate extermination of an entire people is reported as the object of the Turkish Government. Secretary of State Lansing on Oct. 4 sent to Ambassador Morgenthau at Constantinople a message informing the Ottoman Government that the atrocities visited upon the Armenians would, if continued, tend to jeopardize the good feeling of the American people toward the people of Turkey. The State Department had already asked Ambassador von Bernstorff to bring the matter to the attention of the German Foreign Office.

* * *

German Peace and Annexation.

Dr. Umfrid of Stuttgart has contributed an article to the Friedenswarte entitled "Peace Guarantees," protesting against annexation by Germany of any foreign territory if she emerges victorious from the war. Dr. Umfrid says:

> The acquisition of territory is no guarantee of peace. The occupation of Alsace-Lorraine is proof enough of this. He who has really the best interests of his people at heart, he who for the future would spare his sons and brothers the fearful misfortunes of the present war must join with us in rejecting every attempt at exercising this violence (annexation) on any European population. Victory shall bring for us the fame of invincibility. After victory we shall stand as a united nation capable of defending its frontiers against a world of enemies, but also as a nation which sees its most enduring protection, not in the employment of iron force but in the irrefragable law of righteousness. Unscrupulous statesmen may act on the principle, "Apres moi le deluge"; we prefer to think that after us will come an empire of peace and justice.

This is doubtless in reply to the famous petition of German professors to Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg (printed in the October number of Current History Magazine) favoring annexation of conquered territory. A second manifesto, signed by professors and prominent men of Germany, has since been issued confessing this belief: "That the incorpora-

tion or annexation of politically independent races and races that have been accustomed to independence should be rejected."

* * *

British Submarines in the Baltic.

While a semi-official report from Berlin replies to statements made in London and New York that the losses of German submarines had reached an aggregate of sixty with the assertion that it "is less than a quarter of the above number," the news of German submarine warfare on floating British merchantry is notably less. A Washington dispatch of Oct. 1 last reported that the American Government was informed of the development by the British of a submarine telephone enabling them to detect hostile submarines from observation stations afloat and ashore connected with points on the mainland. Huge steel nets were employed in their capture. But the British have now carried the submarine war into the Baltic. Reports from Stockholm tell of seventeen German ore steamers missing, and the Swedish Government on Oct. 13 instructed its Minister at London to protest against the violation of Swedish neutrality by British submarines alleged to have sunk two German steamers in Swedish waters.

* * *

A German Offensive in the West?

By the time this page is before our readers it may be known definitely whether the German counteroffensive on the western front was destined to become a gigantic German offensive, with the intent to destroy the Allies' defensive system and break up and annihilate their field armies. The Rotterdam correspondent of The London Daily Telegraph announced two days after the onset of the Entente's great offensive, beginning Sept. 25, that evidence had accumulated pointing "unmistakably" in this direction. German men and guns were concentrating in tremendous numbers in Belgium. For ten days on end civilian traffic ceased on the Belgian railways, and the vast movements suggested nothing less, quite apart from the Germanic offensive in the Balkans, than a supreme effort to break through the iron barrier between the sea and the Alps. A grand rush, not a slow operation, in attempting which "armies of millions must bleed to death hopelessly," the Frankfurter Zeitung declares is the only means of reaching a western decision.

* * *

A Caldron of Mingled Bloods.

Gypsies, the Kutzo-Vlachs of Rumania, Albanians, Greeks, Serbs, and Turks, abetted by the Greek and Serbian Governments, have aided in evoking among the Bulgars of Macedonia the old Macedonian cry, "Come over and help us!" It does not help matters that the people of Bulgaria persecute the great numbers of Serbs, Greeks, and Turks within their borders with the same ferocity visited upon their congeners in Macedonia. Everywhere in the seething Balkans is bitter war against churches, schools, speech, customs of each among many alien races whose political and racial boundaries are far apart. The Treaty of Bucharest of Aug. 10, 1913, which fixed these artificial limits with the consent of Europe's powers, heated the caldron anew, which is now boiling over with ideas of "Big Bulgaria," "Greater Greece," and a "Serbian Empire"—which all seem pathetically fantastic.

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The Suffragette Is Now Britannia.

"Britannia will, when the next issue appears, become the name of this paper," Miss Christabel Pankhurst announces with succinctness in The Suffragette of Oct. 1. Why? The house of British liberty is on fire and in danger of being burned to ashes "before women's dream of entering into it has been fulfilled." Every house in Great Britain is a British man's castle of liberty, and the suffragettes had something to do in the way of burning them before the war. But let that pass. Perhaps with the name of their militant organ the Amazons are anxious to have militancy forgotten. Britannia claims the

right to the support of her sons and daughters against her foreign foe.

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Greece's Violated Neutrality.

Although the landing of the Anglo-French Balkan Expeditionary Force at Saloniki had not received official announcement on Oct. 3 and Premier Venizelos had uttered a formal protest against the landing as violative of Greek neutrality, the Greek press assumed that it was in process of becoming an accomplished fact. The Patris, the chief Government organ at Athens, declared that any attempt on the part of the authorities to resist the debarkation of the Anglo-French forces would not be approved by the Greek people. Greece is a maritime State. It depends on the Entente Powers, who control the Mediterranean and Grecian destinies. Moreover, Patris says that Greece's passive protest is consonant with the advice given by Germany to King Albert before the invasion of Belgium, when the Belgian King was blamed for not tolerating the contemplated violation of a neutrality expressly guaranteed by Prussia.

* * *

Plans for American Defense.

That the United States Navy is to lead the world in the speed of its war cruisers, which will carry the guns of a dreadnought and rival express trains; that the Naval Consulting Board on Inventions created by Secretary Daniels, with Thomas A. Edison at its head, has approved the plan of a big research laboratory for the navy which will cost $5,000,000 and $2,500,000 annually, and that $400,000,000 should be appropriated by the Congress this year for the combined army and navy budget, were announcements made by the President's advisers when the estimates were made up on Oct. 15. That is an increase of $140,000,000 over the last yearly budget. The plan includes a substantial increase in the American Army recommended by Secretary Garrison, probably from 87,000 to 120,000 men, and the creation of a reserve of about 400,000 men through short-term enlistment of citizens interested in military training.

* * *

Now for the Lusitania Case.

After the Arabic was torpedoed without warning President Wilson made it clear to Germany that there should be no further discussion of the Lusitania, Cushing, Gulflight, and Nebraskan cases until that incident was disavowed and indemnity promised. We print in this issue the text of the very full and frank German disavowal of the act of the submarine commander who sank the Arabic. Germany has already expressed regret and promised to pay damages in the cases of the Nebraskan and Gulflight. The settlement of the Cushing case awaits the American submission of evidence that the airmen who attacked the vessel were Germans. The American naval experts at Washington have decided, on examining pieces of metal found aboard the Hesperian, that she struck a mine instead of a submarine torpedo. In the case of the Lusitania the State Department at Washington urges that Germany's naval code, issued when the war broke out, guaranteed safety for civilian passengers and crews of merchant vessels subject to attack.

* * *

"Beef for Germany."

The conference on Oct. 4 of counsel for the Chicago packers with State Department officials in Washington resulted in a decision by the packers to appeal from the ruling of the British prize court in London, which condemns the cargoes of the Kim and three other Scandinavian vessels because, in the prize court's opinion, they were destined for a German port and to feed the German armed forces. Millions of dollars are at stake in the case. Although the cargoes were bound for Copenhagen, the English authorities point to abnormal imports into Denmark; to intercepted correspondence tending to show that Denmark was not the country to which the cargoes were ultimately consigned, and to the withholding of original documents by the packers necessary to prove a con-

trary destination. But the British decision that the beef was for the armed forces of Germany rests chiefly upon the fact that Germany is a "nation in arms"—a highly novel extension of the theory of conditional contraband.

* * *

Lloyd George's Preface.

The Berlin correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung seizes upon the preface written by the British Minister of Munitions for his book of speeches on the war, to say:

> His preface—if one disregards the first sentences, which are merely the confession of a typical Englishman, who judges the outer world only by hearsay and allows no sort of facts to disturb his prejudices—is the most brilliant recognition which one can imagine of the military and economic achievements of Germany and her allies. Or can anything be more shameful for our enemies than that the English Minister has to declare that, although the resources of England, France, Russia, and the whole industrial world are at the disposal of the Allies, the central powers possess, nevertheless, an overwhelming superiority in war material and equipment? This sentence contains nothing less than the confession that in its adaptability German industry has far surpassed the industries of all the countries wholly and partly allied against us.

Lloyd George's preface appears elsewhere in this number of Current History Magazine.

* * *

Conscription in England.

> As with you in the civil war, we shall, in my judgment, be obliged to adopt compulsory service and that before the end of the year.—Lord Northcliffe in a London cable dispatch to The Sun.

Possibly Lord Northcliffe, whose agitation for conscription in his newspapers, The London Times and The Daily Mail, has roused conflicting passions in Great Britain, was thinking of the full-bodied description of the experience of President Lincoln in the experience of President Lincoln in the American civil war that has appeared in The Nineteenth Century and After by Mr. J. Ellis Barker and which is largely reproduced elsewhere in this issue. The Union went through the same throes over conscription that are agitating Britain, and when adopted the method resulted in raising the huge Northern armies that won the war. Great Britain may eventually adopt it. Meanwhile conferences between Prime Minister Asquith, Earl Kitchener, and the chief labor leaders of Britain have been followed by extraordinary efforts during October to raise the recruits needed by voluntary methods.

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Psychology of "Slackers."

In view of the appeal of Lloyd George to trade unionists in Great Britain urging them to work long hours in the production of munitions it is remarkable to find that the scientists of the British Association attribute the unrest and "slackness" of British workers to sheer fatigue. Professor J. H. Muirhead presented at the Association's meeting in Manchester the report of a committee dealing with the question of fatigue from an economic standpoint. It is summarized as follows:

> 1. The importance of the rôle played by fatigue and other inner states of the individual worker. It is not a monopoly of mental work to be influenced in quantity and quality by the human disposition. For the efficient management and organization of factory and office, account must be taken of the human element just as much as of the material and the machine.
>
> 2. The importance of the rest-pause. A break in the work would seem to shed its influence all around; it causes a bracing excitement that avoids accidents beforehand and brings on after it a new lease of working capacity. More important than the length of working day seems the length of spell: the splitting up, the breaking up, of continuous periods of work.
>
> 3. The importance of the nature of the work in modifying the onset of fatigue. In uniform repetition work causing "subjective" feelings of monotony "objective" fatigue seems far less effective than in the nerve-taxing work of attending to a loom or of labeling and soldering accurately in place.
>
> 4. The importance of taking account of and studying fatigue and of adapting accordingly the hours of labor in each kind of work.

Professor Muirhead thought it quite right, he said, that Lloyd George should appeal to the unions to put aside restrictions which, on the whole, were in

the interests of a class. But that seemed all the more reason why he should keep the teaching of science before him and realize that it might be possible to combine the health of the industrial classes, on whom Britain's salvation depended, with the meeting of present demands. Secretary Florence of the committee suggested that it would be important to find out the scientific limit of work, otherwise in two months' time the whole working population might be crippled.

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A Deed for Humanity.

While millions may fall in battle, humanity's salvation is wrought by a few. Jenner and a handful of other pioneers in the treatment of infectious disease have saved many more lives than this war can lose. It is with peculiar interest, therefore, that the world will view the act of Marie Davies, a young Englishwoman who has been working in the pathological laboratories of the American Ambulance in Paris, and chose the dealiest strain of bacilli of the dreaded gaseous gangrene to inject into her own body in order that a normal human test might be made of the efficacy of quinine hydrochloride as a remedy. The experiment, performed at the imminent risk of death, was successful. Another disease, one which afflicted the soldiers in France, has been conquered.

* * *

Electric Detector of Zeppelins.

Despite the best efforts of Sir Percy Scott, London is still vulnerable to Zeppelin raids from Germany. Invading submarines have been detected by microphones at sea in time to repel them. Now Dr. Lee de Forest, the wireless inventor, has been called to London to apply his invention adapting the incandescent electric light to the detection of a faraway airship. By setting up several microphones in a geometrical arrangement and equipping them with the incandescent Audion amplifiers, the line of direction of an approaching Zeppelin can be calculated by its varying effects on the different microphones. A cone of vibration is determined, together with the distance to its apex, the Zeppelin propeller. Then the work of the defensive aeroplanes and airship guns begins.

* * *

Mr. Edison on Preparedness.

By machines, not men, Thomas A. Edison declared in his Chicago interview on Oct. 15, potential readiness for war may be had by this nation. While the nations are shooting off large amounts of powder on European battle fronts, build here great factories in which twice as much powder could be manufactured. Locate and store away the material, but don't make the powder. Have everything ready, so that in case of need the factories can begin producing it. Make shell machines instead of turning shells individually on lathes. Grease up the machines and store them away, together with enormous quantities of steel billets. America is the greatest machine country in the world. Prepare to turn out right along twice as much as is now used on the entire European battlefield—then don't make it until the time calls for the output. Then an enormous number of trained officers and drill sergeants is better than a big standing army.

* * *

A New Plant Fertilizer.

Food products, their relative values and their cost, are factors of such immense importance to nations' food supply at the present moment that the experiments conducted in the laboratory of King's College, London, by Professors Bottomley and Rosenheim are of more than ordinary interest. Peat forms the basis for the new fertilizing agency that is called "humogen." Of recent years evidence has accumulated that the most important element in soil fertility is the bacterial life in the humus—far more important, it is claimed, than many of the mineral plant foods in which gardeners once placed their faith. The King's College experimenters now treat peat in such a way as to make it give off an energy of unprecedented potentiality, especially where quick-growing plants are concerned. "Humogen" is said to have given excellent results in the growing of wheat and barley.

THE THIRD BALKAN WAR

Germany's New Quadruple Alliance

How Bulgaria Defeated the Quadruple Entente's Attempt to Reconstruct the Balkan League

Bulgaria allied with Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro to declare the First Balkan War against Turkey on Sept. 30, 1912; the war was ended by the Treaty of London on May 30, 1913, which compelled Turkey to grant to her opponents its European territory west from Midia on the Black Sea to Enos on the Aegean, together with Crete. The future of Albania, the Aegean Islands, and Mount Athos was left to be decided in future by the powers.

The Second Balkan War arose on July 29, 1913, over the division of territory ceded to the victorious Balkan States. Rumania intervened on July 10, 1913, to get from Bulgaria an extension of her frontier and to impose peace, which was signed on Aug. 10, 1913, in the Treaty of Bucharest, Bulgaria treating with Rumania, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro. By its terms the Rumano-Bulgarian frontier starts from the Danube above Tartukai, ending on the Black Sea south of Ekrene. Starting from Mount Partarica, the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier was fixed along the old Turco-Bulgarian frontier and the watershed between the Varda and the Sturma, but leaving to Serbia the upper valley of the Strumnitza, and ending at Mount Belashictza. The Greco-Bulgarian frontier starts on the crest of the Belashictza range, ending at the mouth of the Nestor River on the Aegean Sea. The dissatisfaction arising from this marking of the frontiers in the Treaty of Bucharest, by which Bulgaria, particularly, forfeited Macedonia with its largely Bulgar population to Serbia and Greece, have occasioned her new alliance with Turkey and the Teutonic powers and her declaration of war on Serbia —tantamount to a war on the Quadruple Entente.

France's Explanation

By Rene Raphael Viviani

Premier of France

In addressing the French Chamber of Deputies, which reassembled on Oct. 12, 1915, *Premier Viviani said that Russian troops on the next day would be fighting alongside French and British troops in the Balkans. France, Great Britain, and Russia were in complete accord, he said, and ample troops were available without weakening any front.*

The Premier's remarks were prompted by a resolution of the Finance Committee which read: "The committee is convinced of the necessity of a complete and immediate explanation on the part of the Government." The Socialist group adopted a similar resolution. M. Viviani's address follows:

THE country, owing to the grave events now taking place, must be informed, and the Government takes this opportunity to make a declaration of the situation and its policy.

The Balkan question was raised at the outset of the war, even before it came to the attention of the world. The Bucharest Treaty had left in Bulgaria profound heartburnings. Neither King nor people were resigned to the loss of the fruits of their efforts and sacrifices, and to the consequences of the unjustifiable war they had waged upon their former allies.

From the first day the allied Governments took into account the dangers of such a situation and sought a means to remedy it. Their policy has proceeded in the spirit of justice and generosity, which has characterized the attitude of Great Britain, Russia, and Italy, as well as France.

We have attempted to re-establish the union of the Balkan peoples, and in accord with them seek the realization of their principal national aspirations. The

equilibrium thus obtained by mutual sacrifices really made by each would have been the best guarantee of future peace. Despite constant efforts, in which Rumania, Greece, and Serbia lent their assistance, we have been unable to obtain the sincere collaboration of the Bulgarian Government. The difficulties respecting the negotiations were always at Sofia.

Bulgaria made claims upon her four frontiers at the expense of her four neighbors. We had hoped that Rumania, Greece, and Serbia, to whom magnificent perspectives opened elsewhere, would consent to the sacrifices, in exchange for which they would receive large compensation.

As to Turkey, which had thrown herself into the arms of Germany, there was no need for further consideration.

Our efforts with Rumania were partially successful. Rumania, the people of which country frequently manifested French sympathies, was not unfavorable to the re-establishment of the Balkan alliance. Her partial mobilization permitted her to repulse any threatened aggression—defend herself against all German pressure and observe with the closest attention events along the frontier, both Austrian and Bulgarian. Rumania knew, moreover, that only victory on the part of the Quadruple Entente could assure her independence and satisfy her national aspirations.

In their considerate desire to give the Bulgarian people satisfaction in their aspirations, the powers of the Quadruple Entente did not hesitate to ask valiant Serbia to make heavy concessions. Despite the cruelty of such a sacrifice, and desirous of proving their attachment to the Allies which were combating for their common independence, the Serbian people make this extraordinary effort and resigned themselves, hoping for compensations that the victory of the Quadruple powers would be able to give Serbia elsewhere.

The equivocal attitude of the Bulgarian Government led the Greek Government to maintain a waiting policy. Our diverse proposals received tardy response from the Bulgarian Government, which asked for additional details and at the same time carried on parallel negotiations with our enemies. Finally, at the moment when the Quadruple Entente informed Bulgaria of the important concessions Serbia was ready to make King Ferdinand signed an accord with Turkey and engaged himself definitely with Germany.

To our friendly question as to his intention the response was Bulgarian mobilization in connection with which the concentration of Austro-German troops on the Danube indicated united action against Serbia.

In the presence of this attitude we immediately declared null and void the advantages and guarantees that we had announced we were ready to offer Bulgaria, and we have resumed with the other Balkan States our liberty of action toward them. On its side heroic Serbia, whose three successive glorious wars have not had the effect of diminishing her courage, silently prepared to meet upon two fronts the concerted attacks of Berlin, Vienna, and Sofia.

From a moral standpoint and from the standpoint of military consequences we could not accept the isolation of Serbia, and the rupture of our communications with our ally and friend.

Our action must be energetic in order to meet the efforts of our enemies, who are dominated on the western front, checked on the eastern front, and who now try to obtain on a new front, with the aid of Bulgaria, a success thus far impossible to realize either in France or Russia.

In order to succor the Serbians we must go through Saloniki, and from the outset of the Bulgarian mobilization we have conducted negotiations toward that end with the President of the Council at Athens. These negotiations are most natural in view of the definite treaty concluded between Serbia and Greece after the second Balkan war in the event of Bulgarian aggression.

They say that we are violating the neutrality of Greece, and they even dare to compare our action to that of Germany in violating the neutrality of Belgium, perjuring her signature and plung-

ing that noble country into fire and bloodshed. The conditions under which we went to Saloniki, the conditions under which we debarked, the welcome we received suffice to demonstrate the stupidity of these accusations.

This energetic action Great Britain and France, in accord with their allies, have undertaken. They have weighed the difficulties.

Our principal preoccupation is the defense of our front, the liberation of our territory by mighty efforts, to which we owe the victories already won upon our soil with the valorous support of our heroic allies, with our forces, sacrifices, and our blood. No Governments could do otherwise in a duty so tragic, but so simple.

But without weakening our front, we have the further task of fulfilling duties which our interest and our honor impose upon us. We are in full accord with the General in Chief of the French armies. The understanding between the Governments of Great Britain and France is complete, and I cannot better express it than in the following form, namely, from now France and England, in accord with their allies, are completely agreed to go to the aid of Serbia to the extent she has asked our aid, and to assure to the profit of Serbia, Greece, and Rumania respect for the Treaty of Bucharest, of which we are the guarantors. The British Government and the French Government are in accord upon the importance of effectives conforming to the advice of their military authorities. Russia has decided to join with her allies to help the Serbian people, and tomorrow her troops will fight alongside of ours.

Gentlemen, we have done our duty toward our allies. Never has an accord been more direct and more complete between allies, and never have we had greater confidence in a common victory.

Britain's Explanation

By Sir Edward Grey

British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

The diplomatic rather than the military side of the situation was the subject of Sir Edward Grey's statement relative to the Balkan situation which he delivered on Oct. 14, 1915, *to the House of Commons. He said:*

I PROPOSE to confine myself to a résumé of our diplomatic objects since the war. At the outset we desired that the war should not spread, and in common with our allies we assured Turkey that if she remained neutral Turkey and Turkey's territory should not suffer. This situation was completely changed by the entrance of Turkey into the war, and all obligations on the part of the Allies then ceased.

We and our allies then concentrated upon securing an agreement among the Balkan States, and we used all our influence to secure an accord. Unfortunately, the feeling in the Balkans is not one of union, but of division. It was clear nothing but a decisive, preponderating advantage for the Allies would have enabled us to secure a policy of union.

We were given to understand in the course of the negotiations that except with regard to Thrace the central powers had offered to Bulgaria more to secure her neutrality than the Allies could in fairness offer. The promises which induced Bulgaria to declare war were given by the central powers at the expense of her neighbors and without any corresponding advantage to them.

We have remained throughout on friendly relations with Rumania, who has favored the policy of a Balkan union.

It is the policy of bringing about a Balkan war that the sovereigns and Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria—the sovereigns and the Governments—have succeeded in carry-

ing into effect. We were given to understand that in order to secure a Balkan union there were certain concessions Bulgaria would require, especially in Thrace and Macedonia.

The Allies were ready to do all in their power to secure these for Bulgaria, but to obtain the consent of Serbia and Greece it was an essential preliminary that Bulgaria take sides with the Allies against Turkey. In other words, if Bulgaria was to realize her hopes and aspirations she must co-operate in a common cause in which the hopes and aspirations of other neighboring States were engaged.

It will be enough to say that these reasonable hopes and aspirations were, in the main, founded upon opportunity to peoples of the same race, the same sentiments, and the same religion to join themselves to a State under a Government most akin to them.

Sir Edward praised the skill and courage with which Serbia had turned upon her foes and driven them out of her country as one of the outstanding features of the war. Once again, he said, the crisis was upon Serbia and she was meeting it with the same splendid courage. The entry of Bulgaria made a great difference in the situation and raised the question of treaty obligations between Greece and Serbia.

Regarding the attitude of Greece, he referred to the statements made by Former Premier Venizelos and the new Grecian Premier, M. Zaimis, and said it must be obvious that the interests of Greece and Serbia were now one. In the long run, he said, they must stand or fall together. Through Greek territory alone could assistance be sent to Serbia, and that this assistance was welcome was sufficiently proved by the reception accorded the allied troops. Great Britain was giving Serbia all the help in her power, freely and unconditionally. He continued:

In view of the treaty between Greece and Serbia, how can there be any other attitude on the part of Greece toward the assistance offered through her to Serbia? In the steps taken we acted in the closest co-operation with France, and the co-operation of Russian troops is promised as soon as they can be made available.

Serbia is fighting for her national existence, and with her the struggle is just now intense and acute, but the struggle is one and the issue is one, in whatever theatre of war fighting is taking place. All the Allies are fighting for national existence, and for all who are fighting the same issues arise. It is a fight for the right to live not under the shadow of Prussian militarism, which does not observe the ordinary rules of humanity in war, and to leave us free from the menance of oppression.

Tsar Ferdinand and the Opposition Leaders

The following telegram from The London Daily Telegraph's special correspondent at Milan, dated Sept. 24, appeared in that newspaper on Oct. 5, 1915:

ITALY is in close touch with her Balkan neighbors, and now it is the general belief that Bulgaria means to attack Serbia as soon as her mobilization is concluded, and that Tsar Ferdinand has resolutely thrown off his mask, and shows himself what he really is—namely, a Hungarian officer who boldly champions the cause of Austria and Germany, even in face of a sturdy warning from independent Bulgarians, who have spoken threats of revolution in his own palace.

"Mind your own head; I shall mind mine," are the words which he spoke to M. Stambulivski last Friday, when he received five Opposition members who had come to warn him of the danger to which he was exposing himself and the nation.

The Corriere della Sera today publishes a long wire from its special correspondent, Signor Civinini, at Sofia, with full and graphic details of this now his-

toric meeting. In order to give these details the correspondent had to cross into Serbia and wire his dispatch from Nish. The five members, MM. Gueshoff, Danoff, Malinoff, Zanoff, and Stambulivski, were received by the King in the Red Room at the Royal Palace, and chairs had been placed for them around a big table. The King entered the room, accompanied by Prince Boris, the heir apparent, and his Secretary, M. Bobcovitch. "Be seated, gentlemen," said the King, as he sat down himself as if for a very quiet talk. His Secretary took a seat at a table a little apart to take notes, but the conversation immediately became so heated and rapid that he was unable to write it down.

The first to speak was M. Malinoff, leader of the Democratic Party, who said:

> The policy adopted by the Government is one of adventure tending to throw Bulgaria into the arms of Germany, and driving her to attack Serbia. This policy is contrary to the aspirations, feeling, and interests of the country, and if the Government obstinately continues in this way it will provoke disturbances of the greatest gravity.

It was the first allusion to the possibility of a revolution, but the King listened without flinching. M. Malinoff concluded:

> For these reasons we beg your Majesty, after having vainly asked the Government, to convoke the Chamber immediately, and we ask this convocation for the precise object of saving the country from dangerous adventures by the formation of a coalition Ministry.

The King remained silent, and, with a nod, invited M. Stambulivski to speak.

M. Stambulivski is the leader of the Agrarian Party, a man of sturdy rustic appearance, accustomed to speak out his mind boldly, and exceedingly popular among the peasant population. He grew up himself as a peasant, and wore the laborer's blouse up till very recently. He stood up, and, looking the King straight in the face, said in a resolute tone:

> In the name of every farmer in Bulgaria I add to what M. Malinoff has just said, that the Bulgarian people hold you personally responsible more than your Government for the disastrous adventure of 1913. If a similar adventure were to be repeated now its gravity this time would be irreparable. The responsibility would once more fall on your policy, which is contrary to the welfare of our country, and the nation would not hesitate to call you personally to account. That there may be no mistake as to the real wishes of the country, I present to your Majesty my country's demand in writing.

He handed the King a letter containing the resolution voted by the Agrarians. The King read it, and then turned to M. Zanoff, leader of the Radical Democrats, and asked him to speak. M. Zanoff did so, speaking very slowly and impressively, and also looking the King straight in the face:

> Sire, I had sworn never again to set foot inside your palace, and if I came today, it is because the interests of my country are above personal questions, and have compelled me. Your Majesty may read what I have to say in this letter, which I submit to you in behalf of our party.

He handed the letter, and the King read it and still remained silent. Then he said, turning to his former Prime Minister and ablest politician: "Gueshoff, it is now your turn to speak." M. Gueshoff got up and said:

> I also am fully in accord with what M. Stambulivski has just said. No matter how severe his words may have been in their simple, unpolished frankness, which ignores the ordinary formalities of etiquette, they entirely express our unanimouse opinion. We all, as representing the Opposition, consider the present policy of the Government contrary to the sentiments and the interests of the country because by driving it to make common cause with Germany it makes us the enemies of Russia, which was our deliverer, and the adventure into which we are thus thrown compromises our future. We disapprove most absolutely of such a policy, and we also ask that the Chamber be convoked and a Ministry formed with the co-operation of all parties.

After M. Gueshoff, the former Premier M. Daneff also spoke and associated himself with what had already been said.

The King remained still silent for a while. Then he also stood up and said:

> Gentlemen, I have listened to your threats and will refer them to the President of the Council of Ministers that he may know and decide what to do.

All present bowed, and a chilly silence followed. The King had evidently taken

the frank warning given him as a threat to him personally, and he walked up and down nervously for a while. Prince Boris turned aside to talk with the Secretary, who had resumed taking notes. The King continued pacing to and fro, evidently very nettled. Then, approaching M. Zanoff, and as if to change the conversation, he asked him for news about this season's harvest. M. Zanoff abruptly replied:

> Your Majesty knows that we have not come here to talk about the harvest, but of something far more important at present, namely, the policy of your Government, which is on the point of ruining our country. We can on no account approve a policy that is anti-Russian. If the Crown and M. Radoslavoff persist in their policy we shall not answer for the consequences. We have not desired to seek out those responsible for the disaster of 1913, because other grave events have been precipitated, but it was a disaster due to criminal folly. It must not be repeated by an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria, as seems contemplated by M. Radoslavoff, and which, according to all appearances, has the approval of your Majesty. It would be a premeditated crime, and deserve to be punished.

The King hesitated a moment, and then held out his hand to M. Zanoff, saying: "All right; at all events, I thank you for your frankness." Then approaching M. Stambulivski, he repeated to him his question about the harvest.

M. Stambulivski, as a simple peasant, at first allowed himself to be led into discussion of this secondary matter, and had expressed the hope that the prohibition on the export of cereals would be removed, when he suddenly remembered, and said:

> But this is not the moment to speak of these things. I again repeat to your Majesty that the country does not want a policy of adventure, which cost it so dear in 1913. It was your own policy, too. Before 1913 we thought you were a great diplomatist, but since then we have seen what fruits your diplomacy bears. You took advantage of all the loopholes in the Constitution to direct the country according to your own views. Your Ministers are nothing; you alone are the author of this policy, and you will have to bear the responsibility.

The King replied frigidly "The policy which I have decided to follow is that which I consider the best for the welfare of the country."

"It is a policy that will only bring misfortune," replied the sturdy Agrarian. "It will lead to fresh catastrophes and compromise not only the future of our country but that of your dynasty, and may cost you your head."

It was as bold a saying as ever was uttered before a King, and Ferdinand looked astonished at the peasant who was thus speaking to him. He said: "Do not mind my head; it is already old; rather mind your own," he added, with a disdainful smile, as he turned away.

M. Stambulivski retorted: "My head matters little, Sire. What matters more is the good of our country."

The King paid no more attention to him, and took M. Gueshoff and M. Danoff apart, who again insisted on convoking the Chamber, and assured him that M. Radoslavoff's Government would be in a minority. They also referred to the Premier's oracular utterances.

"Ah!" said the King, "has Radoslavoff spoken to you? And what has he said?"

"He has said," replied the leaders, "that Bulgaria would march with Germany and attack Serbia."

The King made a vague gesture, and then said: "Oh, I did not know!"

The incidents of this famous interview are beginning to be gradually known in Sofia, and have created a deep impression in political circles.

Russia's Ultimatum

By Sergius Sazonoff

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Sergius Sazonoff, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, made this statement to The Associated Press correspondent at Petrograd on Oct. 2, 1915:

THE situation in the Balkans is very grave. The whole Russian Nation is aroused by the unthinkable treachery of Ferdinand and his Government to the Slavic cause. Bulgaria owes her independence to Russia,* and yet seems willing now to become a vassal of Russia's enemies. In her attitude toward Serbia, when Serbia is fighting for her very existence, Bulgaria puts herself in a class with Turkey. We do not believe that the Bulgarian people sympathize with the action of their ruler. Therefore the Allies are disposed to give them time for reflection.

If they persist in their present treacherous course they must answer to Russia. An ultimatum has not been presented yet, but I presume one will be within a short time.

It was announced at Petrograd on Oct. 3, 1915, that the Russian Minister at Sofia had been requested to hand M. Radoslavoff, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, the following note:

Events which are taking place in Bulgaria at this moment give evidence of the definite decision of King Ferdinand's Government to place the fate of its country in the hands of Germany. The presence of German and Austrian officers at the Ministry of War and on the staffs of the army, the concentration of troops in the zone bordering on Serbia, and the extensive financial support accepted from our enemies by the Sofia Cabinet no longer leave any doubt as to the object of the present military preparations of Bulgaria.

The powers of the Entente, who have at heart the realization of the aspirations of the Bulgarian people, have on many occasions warned M. Radoslavoff that any hostile act against Serbia would be considered as directed against themselves. The assurances given by the head of the Bulgarian Cabinet in reply to these warnings are contradicted by facts.

The representative of Russia, bound to Bulgaria by the imperishable memory of her liberation from the Turkish yoke, cannot sanction by his presence preparations for fratricidal aggression against a Slav and allied people.

The Russian Minister has therefore received orders to leave Bulgaria with all the staffs of the legation and the Consulates if the Bulgarian Government does not within twenty-four hours openly break with the enemies of the Slav cause and of Russia, and does not at once proceed to send away the officers belonging to the armies of States who are at war with the powers of the Entente.

ALLIES' ULTIMATUM.

The circumstances which attended the presentation of the notes of the Entente powers to Bulgaria are set forth in an official communication received on Oct. 7, 1915, at Paris, from Sofia. This announcement, filed in Sofia by the correspondent of the Havas News Agency, was issued by the Bulgarian Government before it made reply to the notes. The statement follows:

On Monday [Oct. 4] between 4 and 6

*The words of M. Sazonoff, "Bulgaria owes her independence to Russia," refer to the fact that when, on Oct. 5, 1908, the sovereignty of Austria-Hungary was extended over Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria having been informed by Russia of what Vienna was contemplating straightway declared herself independent of Turkey. Until the second Balkan war of June and July, 1913, Russia looked upon Bulgaria as the one Balkan State best calculated to extend Slavism in the peninsula under Russian guidance. The ambition of Ferdinand to dominate the Balkans after the defeat of the Turks in the first Balkan war, 1912-13, and his signing of an offensive treaty with Austria-Hungary in order to realize those ambitions turned Russia against Bulgaria and encouraged Rumania to invade Bulgaria the moment the latter attacked Serbia and Greece.

o'clock in the afternoon the President of the Council received a visit from the representatives of France, Russia, and Great Britain. The first two presented notes, not identical, of the character of ultimata, in which, giving a forced interpretation of the armed neutrality proclaimed by Bulgaria and of the object of Bulgaria's mobilization, it was insisted, under threats of the rupture of diplomatic relations, that Bulgaria break off openly within twenty-four hours its relations with the central powers and send away the German and Austrian officers said to be among the staffs of the different Bulgarian armies.

The representative of Great Britain presented a verbal note declaring that Great Britain would break with Bulgaria if hostilities should occur in the Balkans as the result of Bulgarian mobilization.

In consequence of the absence of instructions, the representative of Italy has not yet joined his colleagues in this action.

The Bulgarian Government today will hand to the representatives three notes, not identical, in which it will explain the spirit of armed neutrality of Bulgaria, while pointing out the danger that may arise from fresh encouragement given to Serbia. Rejecting categorically the accusation relative to the pretended presence of German and Austrian officers in the Bulgarian Army, it will declare it cannot drive away officers who do not exist.

At the same time the Government will present a response to two preceding notes of the Entente powers, of which their representatives have been advised through the French Minister.

The Bulgarian Government purposes to publish a Green Book on the conversations and negotiations with the powers of the Quadruple Entente.

Bulgaria's Defiance

An Associated Press dispatch dated at Petrograd on Oct. 8, 1915, *reported:*

BULGARIA'S reply to the Russian ultimatum was transmitted in the Bulgarian language, notwithstanding the fact that Russian is the traditional tongue in intercourse among the Slavic countries. The message was so badly garbled in transmission that the Foreign Office has not been able accurately to reconstruct the text, although extraordinary efforts have been made and the message has been repeated by sending points.

The message is described here as "bold to the verge of insolence." In substance, Bulgaria denies German officers are in the staffs of the Bulgarian armies, but says that if they are present that fact concerns only Bulgaria, which reserves the right to invite whomsoever she likes. Regarding acceptance of financial assistance from Germany, Bulgaria maintains the right to make loans wherever she pleases. As to the demand that relations be broken with the "enemies of Slavdom," the Bulgarian Government asserts it is its privilege to choose friends to suit itself and join with any group it prefers.

The general tenor of the reply is such as to indicate that the Bulgarian Government has no objection to withdrawal from Sofia of such foreign diplomatists as disprove its conduct.

BULGARIA'S MANIFESTO.

A dispatch from Berlin of Oct. 8, 1915, *transmitted by wireless to Sayville, N. Y.:*

The Frankfurter Zeitung asserts that the Bulgarian Government has issued a manifesto to the nation announcing its decision to enter the war on the side of the central powers. This manifesto, as quoted from the Frankfurter Zeitung by the Overseas News Agency, states that Bulgaria would commit suicide if she did not align herself with Germany and her allies.

The manifesto, as given out by the news agency, follows:

The central powers have promised us

FERDINAND, KING OF RUMANIA

His Kingdom Is Trembling in the Balance of the New Balkan Conflict

(Photo from Underwood & Underwood.)

GRAND DUCHESS MARIE OF RUSSIA

She Is the Third Daughter of the Czar, and Is Sixteen Years Old.

(Photo from Bain News Service.)

parts of Serbia, creating an Austro-Bulgarian border line, which is absolutely necessary for Bulgaria's independence of the Serbians.

We do not believe in the promises of the Quadruple Entente. Italy, one of the Allies, treacherously broke her treaty of thirty-three years. We believe in Germany, which is fighting the whole world to fulfill her treaty with Austria.

Bulgaria must fight at the victors' side. The Germans and Austro-Hungarians are victorious on all fronts. Russia soon will have collapsed entirely. Then will come the turn of France, Italy, and Serbia. Bulgaria would commit suicide if she did not fight on the side of the central powers, which offer the only possibility of realizing her desire for union of all Bulgarian peoples.

The news agency says further:

The manifesto to the people, which is not only a historical document but contains valuable material in regard to Bulgarian politics and economics, states that Russia is fighting for Constantinople and the Dardanelles, Great Britain to destroy Germany's competition, France for Alsace and Lorraine, and the other allies to rob foreign countries. The central powers are fighting to defend property and assure peaceful progress.

The loyal neutrality maintained by Bulgaria has been advantageous up to the present time, the manifesto says, and it is only now that military and economic preparations have been completed.

The manifesto states that Serbia, the worst enemy of Bulgaria, has oppressed the purely Bulgarian population of Macedonia in the most barbarous manner, the male population being compelled to die for Serbia's cause, the women being outraged, and the rivers running red with blood.

The Amsterdam correspondent of Reuter's Telegram Company on Oct. 9 sent further extracts from the manifesto issued by Bulgaria as published by the Frankfurter Zeitung. The correspondent says the document, which purports to explain the decision of King Ferdinand and Premier Radoslavoff to join the central powers, fills seven columns in the newspaper. It is stated that the manifesto has been widely circulated.

Defending Bulgaria's adoption of a policy of "strong and loyal neutrality," states the correspondent, the document says:

In the beginning none could foresee how events would develop and which side would be victorious. If the Government had resolved to participate in the great war it might have committed the fault of joining the side that would have been beaten, and thus jeopardize the existence of the present Bulgarian Empire. Neutrality has enabled us to bring the military material and preparedness of our army to such a pitch as never before has been reached.

A copy of the manifesto of King Ferdinand to the Bulgarians reached London on Oct. 16, 1915. The manifesto implies that Bulgaria has no quarrel with the Entente powers. It explains that they, like Germany, were prepared to give Bulgaria the greater part of Macedonia. It continues:

Our treacherous neighbor, Serbia, alone remained inflexible in the face of the advice of her friends and allies. Far from listening to their counsels, Serbia, in animosity, stupidly attacked our territory, and our brave troops have been forced to fight for the defense of their own soil.

In conclusion, King Ferdinand says:

The European war is nearing a close. The victorious army of the central empires in Serbia are advancing rapidly. We command our valiant army to drive the enemy from the limits of our kingdom and crush this felon neighbor. We shall fight the Serbs at the same time as the brave armies of the central empires.

Greece and Bulgaria

GREECE MOBILIZES.

At a session in the Greek Chamber on Sept. 30, 1915, Premier Venizelos characterized the summons to the colors of Bulgaria's forces a grave menace to peace, and virtually called on that power to demobilize. The late Premier Gounaris, amid great enthusiasm, extended unreserved support to the Government's policy and the House ratified the decree of national mobilization and authorizd a war loan of $30,000,000. As soon as the

Perspective Map of the Balkan States and Turkey, Arrows Showing Austro-Germanic Points of Attack on Serbia from the North and Points of Bulgarian Attack on the East Up to Oct. 15, 1915.

Chamber had assembled Premier Venizelos mounted the tribune and made the following declaration:

IN September of last year I explained to the House the policy of the Greek Government toward the international situation as created by the European war. In February last we considered that the time had come to change that attitude, but, having disagreed with the Crown, the Cabinet resigned.

After the recent elections, having again been called to power, I considered in view of the great changes that have taken place meanwhile in the international situation that we should return to our original policy; but this normal situation was suddenly disturbed by the Bulgarian general mobilization, to which measure Greece could make but one reply—by ordering mobilization likewise.

I must inform the House that after these two measures reassuring assurances were given by both sides. M. Radoslavoff, the Bulgarian Premier, declared to our Minister in Sofia that Bulgaria's mobilization had no purpose of attack either against us or our ally, Serbia, but was necessitated by Bulgaria's propinquity to the theatre of war and the object was to enable Bulgaria to maintain a policy of armed neutrality. We replied that so long as such was the significance of the Bulgarian mobilization our own must not be considered as having any other object than the same armed neutrality.

Despite these assurances, however, the situation must still be considered grave. Modern mobilization means such a serious dislocation of the country's financial and social life and entails such enormous expenditure that it cannot long be continued without serious danger to peace, and this danger is all the greater when one of the mobilized States does not conceal the fact that territorial statutes established by treaty between her and neighboring States are not considered worthy of respect.

I do not say this to depict the situation as being darker than it is in reality, but may not conceal the real state of affairs from the nation, for although everybody in Greece desires peace I know well the incomparable spirit of self-sacrifice with which the Greek Nation under arms is ready to defend both the country's territory and the nation's vital interests and oppose any attempt of any one Balkan State to acquire for itself a preponderant position which would put an end to the political and moral independence of the rest. Nevertheless, I should be happy if the quieting assurances given by the Governments of both the mobilized Balkan States should be followed by the simultaneous and prompt recall of mobilization and thus avert danger to peace.

The Premier's speech was received with prolonged applause by the whole House and galleries. M. Gounaris, as leader of the major Opposition, rose and in a few words stated that his party approved both the mobilization and other measures adopted by the Government, and in such matters Greeks of all parties were entirely as one.

VENIZELOS RESIGNS.

An Athens dispatch to the Havas Agency, dated Oct. 6, 1915, *said:*

Premier Venizelos has resigned,* the King having informed him that he was unable to support the policy of his Ministry.

After Premier Venizelos, in a session which lasted till 4:30 *o'clock on Oct.* 5,

* This was the second time within a few months that Premier Venizelos had resigned because of disagreement with the King, who is a brother-in-law of the German Emperor and has steadily opposed M. Venizelos's policy of co-operation with the Entente Allies. Following his former resignation general elections were held in Greece and his party was returned to power by a decisive majority. M. Venizelos was recalled by the King, with whom he effected a compromise and again became Premier.

King Constantine has insisted throughout the present crisis that Greece's treaty of alliance with Serbia was abrogated by the Serbians in offering concessions to Bulgaria. The order to mobilize the forces of the nation, issued on Sept. 30, was signed by the monarch with undisguised reluctance after M. Venizelos had had an all-day conference with him. During the conference it became rumored in Athens that the Cabinet had resigned, and the report caused intense indignation among the crowds which had gathered before the Foreign Office and the newspaper bulletin boards to await news of the latest developments.

1915, *had explained to the Chamber of Deputies the circumstances connected with the landing of allied troops at Saloniki, the Chamber passed a vote of confidence in the Government. The vote was* 142 *to* 102, *with thirteen members not voting.*

Answering protests made by the Opposition "in the name of Hellenism" against the occupation of Greek territory by foreign troops, the Premier gave a frank exposition of the attitude of the Government, after which he invited fullest discussion of the foreign policy of Greece. He said:

Some time has passed since the Entente powers have made requests of Greece. Today they ask nothing but this—they who offer Serbia, Greece's ally, succor in the event of circumstances which would require Greece herself, under her alliance, to give Serbia help. Great nations may with impunity treat treaties as scraps of paper. For smaller countries such a policy would be suicidal.

The wildest disorder broke out. As reported by The Associated Press, the Premier succeeded in dominating the situation, his voice rising above the tumult and the clang of the bell. He cried:

We have a treaty with Serbia. If we are honest we will leave nothing undone to insure its fulfillment in letter and spirit. Only if we are rogues may we find excuses to avoid our obligations.

"TO THE LAST DRACHMA."

In a statement to The Associated Press correspondents just before his resignation M. Venizelos said:

One thing is absolutely certain: Greece will abide by the terms of her alliance with Serbia, not only in letter but in spirit, to the last man and the last drachma. More, the Greco-Serbian treaty foresaw only the possibility of a Balkan war. When it was made, none could predict the present European conflict with all its widespread complications. But the spirit of the alliance was one of mutual defense, and because the dangers threatening our ally increased with unforeseen conditions there is no excuse for hiding behind the verbiage of the treaty to escape the responsibility of our pledge.

Though the entire available forces of the general empires be added to those of Bulgaria in an attempt to crush Serbia, Greece will unflinchingly remain true to her passed word. The honor of Greece is at stake. You may be certain it will not be betrayed.

Nor, indeed, has there ever been at the bottom the slightest wavering about the Greek people respecting their responsibility to enter the war in defense of their ally under the terms of alliance, although every desperate effort has been made to becloud the issue.

The spectacle of part of her press subservient to foreign influences has shamed and humiliated Greece. A people so eager to read—so much so that every bootblack, while he shines your shoes, is reading a book or newspaper—has been temporarily confused by an inspired and venal propaganda. But the feeling of loyalty to our national obligations has never for a moment been really affected.

What Greece has said she will do, she will do. She is ready to fight, and, if Serbia needs her, she will fight.

Respecting the landing of French troops at Saloniki, there is but one thing to be said—we have protested, of course, for we have wished to remain neutral in this European struggle, and we wish it now, if it were consistent with our rights and duties. But the Greek people cannot war on France, and would not if they could.

What France has done for Greece no Greek can forget. Comes now France, asking nothing of Greece, declaring categorically her sole intention to be to support Greece's ally in the case of a need wherein Greece herself would be bound to support her neighbor. It is something offered, not something asked. Indeed, since I have been Premier, I may say quite frankly that the Entente has asked not one concession of Greece.

Therefore, when France gives every guarantee respecting the integrity of Greece, when France's motives for landing troops on Greek soil are explained as in the nature of accomplishing the very purpose of Greece's treaty of alliance with Serbia, we can see no reason

Line Held by the Allied Attacking Forces at Gallipoli on Oct. 15, 1915.

why Greece should resist what she cannot help and what ultimately cannot fail to be to her advantage.

It must not be forgotten that, while no sacrifice has been asked of Greece to which her international obligations do not already impel her, the realization of the dream, which sleeps in the heart of every true Greek, has been held out to her without conditions.

For centuries the Greeks have wanted two things—a free and united Greece and freedom for Greeks wherever they might be. The former we have gained with

blood, heroism, and sacrifice, extended over thirty centuries. The latter, in a larger degree than we could hope to achieve unaided for centuries to come, perhaps, is suddenly made possible to us.

Whoever thinks what it would mean to Greece that those of our blood line on the opposite shore may one day soon come under our flag cannot be indifferent to the realization of a greater Greece for which we are asked to pay nothing save the keeping of our pledged word, to which our honor binds us in any case. This is the position of Greece today, which I am more glad to make clear to America because I have just been approached by William Hamilton of New York with a most generous offer of assistance for Greek refugees on behalf of the American Mercy and Relief Committee.

That help should be offered from America at this juncture is a source of most sincere joy to me. For don't forget that I am a Cretan. I remember the war for the liberty of Crete. No Greek, certainly no Cretan, could ever forget, whatever the destinies of Greece may be in the war upon which she is now embarked, that her debt to America is and will be unpayable.

A NEUTRAL CABINET.

On Oct. 10, 1915, *the Greek Chamber was informed by Premier Zaimis, who succeeded Premier Venizelos, forming a new Cabinet in agreement with King Constantine, in order the better to assure the vital interests of Greece, her neutrality "will for the present be armed," says a Reuter dispatch from Athens. The Premier added that the future course of the Ministry would be adapted to meet events as they occurred, and expressed the belief that the Government's course had the support of the people. In reply, Former Premier Venizelos said:*

No one could wish to create internal difficulties in the country in view of the present extremely critical situation. The Chamber will give its support to the Government as long as the Government policy does not alter the principles of my policy, upon which the Chamber already has given its votes. Even if there existed no treaty with Serbia, our interests would oblige us to depart from neutrality, as another States wishes to aggrandize itself at our expense.

The question is not whether we ought to make war or not, but when we ought to enter the war. In any case we ought not to allow Bulgaria to crush Serbia in order that she then may attack us with all her forces. The national soul says it is to the interest of Greece that Bulgaria should be crushed. If Bulgaria should triumph, Hellenism would be completely vanquished.

The Daily Chronicle's Athens correspondent gives the following passages from Former Premier Venizelos's speech in the Chamber. Referring to the probable result of the war, he said:

It is impossible to prophesy with accuracy, but logic must lead us to believe that to accept a victory of the central empires as certain, which the German propaganda endeavored to persuade the Greek people to do, is a dangerous attitude.

If Germany was not able to win at the beginning of the struggle, when she found her opponents unprepared, we must face the logic of the conclusion that victory is more than doubtful now, when her opponents have at their command much vaster resources in men and treasure to draw upon, and have command of the seas. Indeed, as time goes on, and if they can gain more time, reason points to the conclusion that England and her allies must win.

Referring to the new Cabinet the ex-Premier said that he believed it was inspired with a benevolent attitude toward the Entente, but in its policy of neutrality there could be no doubt that Greece was rendering an immense service to Germany. For that service she was entitled to ask for compensation. He said:

I have been told that Germany offers to guarantee our territorial integrity and to give us some extension of territory in Southern Albania. The Government should see that promise regularized in the direction of a declaration to the Government. The Cabinet should also see to it that the guarantee of integrity is not merely for the duration of the war,

which would be useless, but for a period, say, of ten years. Inquiry should also be made as to what territory has been promised to Bulgaria.

Take care, gentlemen, take care of that greater Greece which I have handed over to you. Take care that you do not hand over to your successors a smaller Greece. Gentlemen, I have finished. I feel that I have done my duty.

A REPUDIATED TREATY.

An Associated Press dispatch dated at Athens on Oct. 12, 1915, *reports:*

The Greek reply to Serbia's representations that the Bulgarian attack on Serbia completes the act of aggression contemplated under the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia, and asking if the Greek Army is ready to enter action against Bulgaria, was delivered today.

Beginning with the declaration that "the Royal Government greatly regrets that it is unable to accede to Serbia's request," the reply explains that the alliance of 1911, foreseeing Bulgarian aggression, was limited to preserving an equilibrium among the Balkan States.

"The preamble of the treaty," the reply continues, "defines it as of a purely Balkan character, not applying to a general conflagration. Both the treaty of alliance and the military convention completing it prove in the first article that the contracting parties contemplated only isolated attacks by Bulgaria against one of them."

The note argues minutely that the treaty does not cover the situation which has arisen today—a situation in which "Greece might destroy herself without hope of saving Serbia, which cannot wish such a result." It is added that "common interests demand that the Greek forces still be kept in reserve for a better use later."

The note concludes with the declaration that Greece intends to remain an armed neutral, and "assures Serbia that Greece will continue to give her every assistance and facility compatible with Greece's exclusively international position."

A dispatch by The Associated Press from London, dated Oct. 15, 1915, *says:*

In a note to the British Government received today Greece announces her definite decision not to intervene in the war on behalf of Serbia at present.

In the communication, which is of great length, Premier Zaimis of Greece presents his interpretation of the Greco-Serbian treaty. He concludes with the statement that the present Greek Government is of the opinion that the treaty with Serbia does not call for intervention by Greece in the present circumstances.

The Balkan Official Press

Comments on the Negotiations Between the Balkan Governments and the Two Opposing Groups of European Powers

The diplomatic negotiations between the Balkan States and both the Quadruple Entente and the central powers—negotiations which have reached their climax in the present crisis—are clearly reflected in authoritative comment and official interviews appearing in the press of the Balkan capitals, as shown in the subjoined translations from Bulgarian, Rumanian, Serbian, and Turkish newspapers.

Narodni Prava, a Bulgarian official organ, states:

THE Bulgarian Government, unwilling to waste the forces of the nation, continues to observe its neutrality, but it bears in mind that the disagreement after the war of 1912 has not yet been settled, and that the Bulgarian Nation shall no longer tolerate the violation of the principle of nationalities in the Balkans, and the yoke which lies upon 1,000,000 Bulgarians. In spite of this fact, the States which have to settle accounts with the legitimate claims of the Bulgarians continue to manifest unusual obstinacy, and are thus consciously preparing for a new conflict between the Balkan nations.

It seems as though the sparks, which come to us from the European fire, cannot be extinguished in the Balkans, especially since July 28, 1913, when a great quantity of explosive materials was accumulated in the peninsula. Each day brings with it greater chances of war and lesser hopes of peace. Events are unfolding themselves, due to inflexible laws and do not depend upon us.

Thanks to one year of beneficial neutrality, Bulgaria possesses today fresh forces and a reserve of national riches to meet approaching events. The spirit of the people is firm in the belief of the triumph of the Bulgarian cause.

The Bulgarian Government is convinced that the moment it has fulfilled its duty, which is the conservation of the energies of the country, the nation will then perform its duty to itself, to its future, to the ideal left it as heritage by the pioneers of our renaissance, and to our independence — its duty to realize a Greater Bulgaria for all Bulgarians.

Bulgaria is ready to face the future. She is not seeking adventures, but wants to take possession of what by right is hers.

L'Echo de Bulgarie, the Bulgarian official organ, published in French, has the following to say:

The appeal which the friends of the Balkan nations have made will have the same reception. At Athens and Nish the Governments will repeat for the hundredth time what has been proclaimed incessantly for the last two years: No concessions whatsoever are possible. The most ardent patriots will even say, not only that Macedonia must not be restored to her legitimate heirs, but even that the existence of Bulgaria near Serbia is a danger, or that the King of Greece's way toward Constantinople leads through Sofia.

There were, chiefly in Russia, sincere people who said to the Bulgarians in 1913: "Give your brothers what they claim in Macedonia, as long as they themselves will give it back to you when they take Bosnia and Herzegovina." And today the Serbs declare that they would rather give Belgrade to Austria than transfer Monastir to Bulgaria.

And the Sofia organ of the Government, Kambana, recalling Stephen Stambuloff's words uttered in 1888 *at Orhania, points out the great danger to Bulgaria if Russia wins the strait:*

If we consent to accept the yoke [said Stephen Stambuloff] nobody will be able to relieve us of it. If, on the contrary, we refuse to accept a foreign yoke, nobody will be able to impose it by force. Everything depends upon us, upon our Government and the nation.

Since the rule of Peter the Great, Russia has been aiming at the realization of her dream of conquering Constantinople. But whoever will possess Constantinople will be the master of the Balkans, and vice versa, he who is the master of the Balkans will have a say at Constantinople. Let us suppose that a son of the Czar will become Prince of Bulgaria and that Russia will rule at Constantinople. In such a case the Czar will be compelled to subjugate Bulgaria, even if it meant passing over the corpse of his own son.

Serbian Views of the Bulgarian Situation

PREMIER PASHITCH'S STATEMENT.

The Serbian Premier Pashitch made the following official statement in the Nish Parliament:

THE Quadruple Entente wants the assistance of Bulgaria. But Bulgaria will not give her support until she is assured that Macedonia will be hers. The fact that Greece has refused to accept the proposals of the Quadruple Entente does not affect the decision of granting Cavalla to Bulgaria. It is to be regretted that Greece has not followed the advice of accepting the proposals.

The Quadruple Entente is firm in its decision to satisfy the demands of Bul-

garia. Any answer which would prevent the realization of harmony with Bulgaria will be considered by the Quadruple Entente as an act of distrust.

SERBIAN PRESS COMMENT.

The organ of the Government, Odjek, published at Nish, states:

The representatives of the Quadruple Entente have appeated at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to solicit the Serbian answer to the Bulgarian demands. There is, of course, only one answer. We must satisfy the Bulgarian claims. There is a perfect understanding between the Government and the Crown in this matter.

Strja, however, makes a bitter attack on Bulgaria:

An understanding with Bulgaria is a chimera. Turn over the pages of our history, remember the date of June 16, 1913, and then begin to negotiate with her. The Bulgarians lack morality and spirit, and cannot be compared with the Serbs, who are faithful and loyal friends. For proofs, compare their history with ours. Their whole history is full of crimes and perfidy, our history is a ray of sunshine in the darkness. Our history is full of heroism, of grandeur, and faithful friendship. Why does the Quadruple Entente seek the friendship of such a State?

Rumanian Comment on the Balkan Question

The Bucharest pro-German Seara protests against Rumanian concessions to Bulgaria:

THE Russians, supported by our French friends and our Italian brothers, together with the English, insist that Rumania cede to Bulgaria the Quadrilateral, which was taken after the second Balkan war.

For this sacrifice on the one hand the Quadruple Entente demands from us sacrifices in other directions. So that on the one hand we must start out to rescue the Russians from their inevitable doom, a thing which not only implies immense sacrifice of blood and money, but risks the preponderant situation which we gained under the glorious rule of King Carol I., and even our national existence. On the other hand, the Entente tries to make us give up a territory which is necessary to our strategic position.

Adevarul, an influential independent Rumanian organ, pro-Allies, considers the situation:

The news from Sofia makes us wonder what will become of us if Austria and Germany succeed in their plan to win Bulgaria over to their side. Should Bulgaria, instead of fighting against Turkey and with the Quadruple Entente, join hands with dying Turkey, Germany will try to settle matters with us, too. She can demand that we declare in twenty-four hours which course we intend to take. Well-informed people say that she may even ask us to carry out the treaty of alliance, signed in 1913. It is possible also that she will only compel us to let ammunition pass to Turkey, and that will be worse, from a moral point of view. What will we do in case of such provocation?

We should then mobilize immediately on two fronts. But instead of taking the offensive against Bulgaria and the Teutonic allies, we would simply take the defensive. And then we will see how events will unfold themselves. Our immediate entrance into action, however, would surely hasten these events. In fact, it would attract a part of the German forces toward our fronts, would make possible the Russian offensive and perhaps the Serbian also. Our honor would be saved and our national aspirations realized.

The hypothesis that, not having anything better to do, we will have to go with Austria and Germany, is not impossible. The King and the Government may even desire it. This would mean, however, to commit suicide.

The official French organ of the Government, L'Indépendance Roumaine, characterizes the activity of both groups of powers in the Balkans:

The rôle of the Quadruple Entente is

to pacify the interests of the Balkan powers and make them accept sacrifices and compensations. The diplomacy of the central powers is simpler. It consists in mixing up the cards and in provoking discords.

Ignoring the fight between the foreign diplomats, they—the statesmen of the Balkans—will know, we are sure, how to decide in conformity with their essential interests, making even necessary sacrifices.

Turkey's Promptings in the Balkans

The Turkish Lloyd urges Rumania to join the central powers:

RUMANIA is hesitating and is glancing around to see on which side the bids are smaller and the chances of gain greater. She is right, of course, but there is a limit to this policy of hesitation. And this limit is reached when the vital interests of the greater powers are concerned. The press of the central powers did not follow the instance of the press of the Entente. She did not make promises which it will be impossible to keep, she did not even use blandishments, nor menaces. Events have an eloquence altogether different from the best articles published in the newspapers and the defeat of Russia forces Rumania to prompt and energetic decision. Nobody can compel a State to accept offers made to it, but in Rumania we must consider that events can very easily take a turn which would make the central powers less disposed to negotiate and more eager to act.

The hour of hesitations is past and a hypocritical policy becomes more and more dangerous. Rumania has now the chance to gather the fruits of her former friendly relations with the central powers, who for a long time have given her proofs of sincere friendship. Rumania has the chance to gather the fruits of this friendship, if she will have confidence in them and in herself. The great danger lies in indecision, in the standing between two roads and waiting for sunset before starting.

Tanin also sees the realization of Bulgarian and Rumanian national aspirations in their joining the Austro-Germans:

Logic and circumstances oblige the Balkan States, especially Bulgaria and Rumania, to change their policy of waiting into one of immediate action. If those two young nations are convinced that they have found the proper moment for the realization of their national aspirations, they must hurry. The Russians have endured successive defeats. National aspirations cannot be satisfied with vague promises. For their complete realization one must do positive work.

The victorious situation of the Teutons might be augmented by the entrance into the war of one million bayonets—and the world's peace will then be assured.

Even if one were not to take into consideration the different interests which bind the Rumanians and the Bulgarians to the central powers, not to mention the enormous profit which would result from the Russian defeat, it remains a well-known fact that the events which are now unrolling themselves must interest the neutrals to a high degree.

Even the enemies of the Teutons agree that they are victorious. To join the defeated and fight against the victors, especially when powerful Germany is at their head, would be an act of insanity. The Balkan States thus have no other way but to join the Teutons.

The official Tanin, on another occasion, criticises the attitude of the Bulgarian Russophile press:

There are many signs that our neighbor is about to decide. The nature of the offers of the Quadruple Entente, as well as the currents of opinion that are manifest at Sofia, are interesting symptoms. The Russophile newspapers are engaged in an active campaign against the Teutons and especially against us.

Balkanska Tribuna and Preporetz are filling their columns with false rumors

concerning Turkey. They give a very black appearance to our military and economic situation. It is obvious that they want to influence public opinion, and we believe that by this attitude they are rendering a great service to their country. The first duty of a Bulgarian newspaper is not to be Russophile nor Turkophile, but first of all upholders of truth and of national interests. For instance, to say that the situation of the Turks is precarious and to describe it in such sad terms, at a time when even the Anglo-French confess that they are facing immense difficulties in attacking the Dardanelles, is to create a wrong impression of Turkey in Bulgaria. When those letters appeared in Bulgaria the Turkish troops forced back almost 100,000 men whom England had brought from the four corners. We have been in war, and although we have had to endure continuous warfare in the last few years we are by no means beaten. We take the liberty which a victorious war of more than ten months confers upon us, and we may say that Turkey will not be defeated in the future. We grant enormous sacrifices and we know that we are suffering on account of deficiency, but at a time when even the neutrals have to accustom themselves to privations the Turks are determined—to create the basis of an empire truly independent, to do their duty to the end. We must complain of these newspapers which want to discredit us in the eyes of our neighbors.

If the Russophile newspapers of Sofia would have told the truth about us they would have rendered their country a lasting service.

Machines for Annihilating Distance

The following report appeared in The London Daily Telegraph on Sept. 13, 1915:

The war has robbed us of an address before the British Association dealing with the fascinating subject of mechanical locomotion, for that would have been his choice, Dr. H. S. Hele-Shaw told his engineering audience at Manchester last week, when delivering his Presidential address before Section G, had the war not intervened. As the President of the Engineering Section well reminded us, the subject would have afforded ample scope, as might be realized by considering what would have been the effect produced if that distinguished engineer, Sir William Fairbairn, who presided over a meeting of the British Association in Manchester just fifty years ago, had told his audience that within a comparatively short space of time our roads would be to a large extent occupied with self-propelled traffic; that electricity, then nothing but a toy, would play a most important part in our means of locomotion, not merely for driving, but for lighting; that it would be used for searching out and communicating with vessels far away from the land and from each other; that ships many times the size of the largest ones then in ordinary use would employ steam as Hero employed it 2,000 years ago, and obtain by this means a speed more than twice that of any existing ships; and that many ocean ships would be propelled against wind and tide by engines using no steam at all. If the President had further proceeded to predict that ships would travel under water for long distances as easily as on the surface, and that, above all, a safe pathway would be found in the air by means of machines flying at speeds far exceeding those of the swiftest birds, Dr. Hele-Shaw suspected that he would have lost a good deal of his reputation as a man of judgment and common sense.

The Allies' Great Offensive

Effort to Force the Western Front

British, French, and German Official Versions of the Drive, with Stirring Personal Accounts

KING GEORGE'S MESSAGE.

TO Field Marshal Sir John French, Commander in Chief, British Expeditionary Force:

Sept. 30, 1915.

I heartily congratulate you and all ranks of my army under your command upon the success which has attended their gallant efforts since the commencement of the combined attack.

I recognize that this strenuous and determined fighting is but the prelude to greater deeds and further victories.

I trust the sick and wounded are doing well. GEORGE, R. I.

The following reply was sent:

To his Majesty the King, Buckingham Palace, Oct. 1, 1915:

Your Majesty's forces in France are deeply grateful for your Majesty's most gracious message.

There is no sacrifice the troops are not prepared to make to uphold the honor and traditions of your Majesty's army and to secure final and complete victory.

J. D. P. FRENCH, Field Marshal.

EARL KITCHENER'S MESSAGE.

The Field Marshal Commanding in Chief has received the following message from Field Marshal the Right Hon. H. H. Earl Kitchener of Khartoum, Secretary of State for War:

Sept. 27, 1915.

To Sir John French, General Headquarters:

My warmest congratulations to you and all serving under you on the substantial success you have achieved, and my best wishes for the progress of your important operation. KITCHENER.

FIELD MARSHAL'S REPORT.

THE ORDER OF THE DAY.

General Headquarters, France, Oct. 3.

The following Special Order of the Day has been issued by Field Marshal Sir John French:

We have now reached a definite stage in the great battle which commenced on the 25th inst.

Our allies in the south have pierced the enemy's last line of intrenchments and effected large captures of prisoners and guns.

The Tenth French Army, on our immediate right, has been heavily opposed, but has brilliantly succeeded in securing the important positions known as the Vimy Ridge.

The operations of the British forces have been most successful, and have had great and important results.

On the morning of the 25th inst. the First and Fourth Corps attacked and carried the enemy's first and most powerful line of intrenchments, extending from our extreme right flank at Grenay to a point north of the Hohenzollern Redoubt—a distance of 6,500 yards.

This position was exceptionally strong, consisting of a double line, which included some large redoubts and a network of trenches and bombproof shelters. Dugouts were constructed at short intervals all along the line, some of them being large caves thirty feet below the ground.

The Eleventh Corps, in general reserve, and the Third Cavalry Division were subsequently thrown into the fight, and finally the Twenty-eighth Division.

After the vicissitudes attendant upon every great fight the enemy's second line

Line Held by the British Troops on Oct. 15, 1915.

posts were taken, the commanding position known as Hill 70 in advance of Loos was finally captured, and a strong line was established and consolidated in close proximity to the German third and last line.

The main operations south of La Bassée Canal were much facilitated and assisted by the subsidiary attacks delivered by the Third and Indian Corps and the troops of the Second Army.

Great help was also rendered by the operations of the Fifth Corps east of Ypres, during which some important captures were made.

We are also much indebted to Vice Admiral Bacon and our naval comrades for the valuable co-operation of the fleet.

Our captures have amounted to over 3,000 prisoners and some 25 guns, besides many machine guns and a quantity of war material.

The enemy has suffered heavy losses, particularly in the many counterattacks by which he has vainly endeavored to wrest back the captured positions, but which have all been gallantly repulsed by our troops.

I desire to express to the army under my command my deep appreciation of the splendid work they have accomplished and my heartfelt thanks for the brilliant leadership displayed by General Sir Douglas Haig and the corps and divisional commanders who acted under his orders in the main attack.

In the same spirit of admiration and gratitude I wish particularly to comment upon the magnificent spirit, indomitable courage, and dogged tenacity displayed by the troops. Old army, new army, and territorials have vied with one another in the heroic conduct displayed throughout the battle by officers, non-commissioned officers, and men.

I feel the utmost confidence and assurance that the same glorious spirit which has been so marked a feature throughout the first phase of this great battle will continue until our efforts are crowned by final and complete victory.

J. D. P. FRENCH,
Field Marshal Commanding in Chief,
British Army in the Field.

Sept. 30, 1915.

GENERAL JOFFRE'S ORDER.

Here is the text of General Joffre's order to the French Army announcing a general offensive:

Soldiers of the Republic: The general offensive has begun. The artillery opens; the infantry will follow; then will come the cavalry. The offensive will be kept up day and night. Remember the Marne!

Officers: All is ready in arms and ammunition. The general offensive has been decided upon. Inform your men, for he who dies for his country has the right to know where we lead him.

German Version of the Allies' Offensive

The German wireless press news sent out from Berlin on Oct. 4, 1915, *contains the following*:

GERMAN OFFICIAL STATEMENT.

"Main Headquarters report:

"The following Army Order of the French General Joffre has been known to the German Chief Army Administration for some time:

"'Main Headquarters of the Western Army General Staff 3. Bureau No. 8, 56, 565, 15-9-1915. Secret.

"'To the General in Command.

"'The spirit of the troops and their willingness to sacrifice themselves represent the highest conditions of the attack. The better he understands the importance of the movements of the attack wherein he participates, the braver the French soldier fights, and the more trust he puts in the measures taken by his leaders. It is therefore necessary that the officers of all grades from today onward explain the favorable conditions to their subordinates under which the next attack of the French fighting force will be conducted.

"'The following points must be known to all: 1. In order to drive the Germans out of France it is necessary that we shall commence the attack in the French theatre of the war. Not only will we liberate those of our countrymen who have been

suppressed for the last twelve months, but we will also snatch away from the enemy the valuable possession of the occupied territory.

" ' A number of batteries of heavy calibre have been got together and prepared with a view to an early attack. The number of shells required for each gun at our disposal exceeds the greatest supply which have been previously calculated.

" ' 2. The present moment is especially favorable for a general attack, first, because the landing of Kitchener's army in France has been completed, and, secondly, because during the last month the Germans have withdrawn from our front forces for use on the Russian front. The Germans have only few reserves behind their intrenched positions on the Dunes.

" ' 3. The attack is to be a general one. It will consist of a number of great attacks made simultaneously, and will be made over a large front. The English troops will take part with large forces. The Belgian troops will also take part in the attacking operations.

" ' As soon as the enemy has been shaken the troops then in front of the weakened portions of the front will then attack. In order to complete the rout and cause the enemy to flee in disorder, it will be a question for the attacking troops not only of taking the first line of trenches, but of continuing the advance right through the second and third line into the open territory. The whole of our cavalry will join in the attack, so as to take full advantage of the long distance from the infantry. The simultaneousness of the attack and its weight and extent will hinder the enemy from collecting (massing) his infantry and artillery reserves at any point as he was able to do at Arras. This condition will guarantee success. The notification of this order to the troops will not fail to raise their courage to the height of the sacrifice which is required of them, and it is therefore absolutely necessary that these instructions shall be carried out with cleverness and confidence. (Signed) J. JOFFRE.'

" A French regimental commander issues the following supplementary order:

" ' This command brings to the notice of battalion commander and company leaders the following, and begs them while on duty in the trenches and in camp to take advantage of every opportunity to give their men to understand that the efforts required of them may lead to such a success as will bring the war within a very short time to an end with one blow.

" ' In the attack every one must use their forces, energy, and bravery which are necessary to achieve such a great result. We must break through the German lines and advance. In spite of everything, (remainder cannot be understood.')

" This command of General Joffre's has been amplified by means of the following order of the commander of the English Guard Division which fell into German hands on Sept. 25:

" ' Division Command of the Guards Division.—On the eve of the greatest battle of all times the commander of the Guard Division wishes his troops much luck. He has nothing to add to the animating words of the Commanding General as given out this morning, but wishes his men to keep two things well before their mind: first, that upon the result of this battle the fate of the coming generation of Englishmen depends. Second, that the greatest things are expected of the Guard Division. From his thirty years' acquaintance of the Guard he knows that he need say no more.

(Signed) " ' LORD CAVAN.'

" From the nature of these orders other things are apparent. The object of the attack was to drive the Germans out of France. The result achieved is that the Germans on a front of about 840 kilometers, at one place 23 kilometers, and at another 12 kilometers wide, (and at this latter not by any soldierly qualities of the English attack, but by a successful surprise by gas attack,) have been pressed back from the first line of their system of defense into their second line, which is not their last.

" After a careful computation the French losses in killed and wounded and prisoners is at least 130,000, those of the English 60,000, and the German losses are not one-fifth of this number.

" Whether the enemy has still the idea of attaining his object need not be considered. Anyway, such a success fought with a superiority of 6 or 7 to 1 and prepared for after many months of work on war material in the factories of half the world, including those of America, cannot be styled a ' brilliant victory.' Still less can it be said that the attack has compelled us to do anything which was not in our plans, and especially to direct our advance against the Russian army toward him. Apart from the fact that a certain division which was to have been transported away from the western front when the offensive started was held back, and that another division was sent

away in its stead to the place where the former should have gone, the attack did not cause the German chief army administration to use a single soldier anywhere where they had not previously intended to be used, arrangements having long before been settled. Moreover, the attack has not been carried out without respite day and night; neither has our defense been pushed back at any point beyond our second line. Neither has the enemy hindered us from removing our reserve troops as safely and effectively as we were able to do during the May offensive to the north of Arras."

GERMAN OFFICER'S LETTER.

According to an Associated Press dispatch from Paris, dated Oct. 5, 1915, this letter, dated Sept. 26, was found on the body of a German officer who was killed in Champagne:

"One o'clock in the morning. At 7 it will have been seventy-two hours since, without interruption, we have been frightfully bombarded — seventy-two hours of endless, deafening uproar, which even the steadiest nerves can hardly endure!

"I was ordered into the trenches as an observer at 7 A. M. Naturally, telephone lines were broken. I reached the position of the reserves without much trouble, their trenches being destroyed only here and there; but there the difficulties began.

"Mines and bombs were exploding at brief intervals, interspersed with bullets from machine guns. From that point on the trenches were so damaged that we were obliged to crawl on all fours.

"I left my telephone operator and went ahead, amid uninterrupted cracklings, the bursting of grenades, the explosion of shells, the whistling of bullets, the howling of shell fragments, and fogs of smoke By holding my breath behind my respirator I got to a point where a trench had been repaired thirty-five times. The communication trench was completely leveled. Creeping closer and closer to the ground, I arrived at the second trench, ten yards behind the first. Of the latter nothing remains. The second trench is just deep enough to kneel in.

"Profiting from a period of relative calm, I cast a glance ahead. Our barbed-wire fences are destroyed. I signal our batteries, which resume a rapid fire. Then I creep back to get my telephone operator. It takes me four hours to cover ground which ordinarily could have been covered in twenty-five minutes.

"This is becoming frightful. An explosion throws me against a wall of a trench. A Lieutenant tells me a shell struck in his shelter, also. I rush out and see that all the bombproofs on the slope are burning. A shell striking an ammunition magazine causes a formidable explosion. The French keep on firing into the fire. How I hate them!

"How I admire the French artillery! They are the master gunners. We really cannot imitate them, I regret to say. Continuing to fire into the fire, the enemy provokes a more violent explosion than the preceding ones.

"God knows what they have blown up now! From this moment I have lost all sensation of fear."

French Version of the Allies' Offensive

The following account of the Champagne fighting was issued by the official agency in Paris on Oct. 3, 1915:

ON the evening of Sept. 25 the line we held in Champagne was so irregular in contour that it seemed almost paradoxical. On the map certain of our men were facing east and others west. During the 26th and 27th we succeeded north of Souain and Perthes in occupying a front facing north and in contact with the German second line along a stretch of seven and a half miles. The ground thus conquered represented an area of some fifteen and a half square miles, and was traversed by lines of trenches graduated to a great depth. The borders of the woods were

organized for defense, and innumerable subterranean passages, trenches, and parallels facilitated a resistance foot by foot.

We overcame all these obstacles, imposing our ascendency on the enemy, and progressing from trench to trench, and on our way seizing batteries, munition depots, and material. Our soldiers were out to conquer, and the joy of knowing that a powerful German fortress was crumbling in the face of their efforts spurred them forward with greater dash. Our Generals and Colonels took up their posts of command in the shelter of the German officers' huts, and the casemates on which there still hung notices " Stab Bataillons," " Kompagnie führer." The soldiers gayly made a rapid inventory of the dwellings and the rustic canteens installed in the woods.

Our artillery took up positions in the open country, as in the days of war of movement. Our advance progressed with success, for continuing which great honor is due to our troops, in particular the Franc-Comtois and Africains, who had assumed the task of taking a string of wooded hills stretching between Auberive and Souain to the north Roman road. The Epine de Vedegrange and Hill 150 are the only points which mark this district on the map 1-80,000. It was there that the Germans resisted with much determination in one of their systems of trenches. Our troops advanced by successive bounds, digging themselves in after each rush, so as to indicate that they had taken possession of the terrain. Thus they succeeded in reaching the enemy's second position at this point, which we have baptized the " parallel of the Epine de Vedegrange." This trench extends eastward unbroken toward Hill 193. Our military vocabulary furnishes many names for it—" Parallel of the wood of Chevron," " Trench of Lubeck." Up to the Navarin farm, further east, it is named " Trench of Kultur," " Trench of Satyrs," and " Trench of Pirates." On the evening of the 25th we had not attained the second line to the east of Navarin farm. The Germans were holding out in the pine woods which terrace the eastern section of the Souain basin, (Bois de Spandau and Bois de Camerun.)

The next day our troops, who had gone forward west to a point where the Souain-Tahure road traverses the woods, succeeded in joining hands with those installed on Hill 193. Thus the last defenders of the works in the woods were surrounded. Here we made nearly 2,000 prisoners.

Meanwhile our African troops were gaining ground toward the north, clearing the woods and taking possession of the " Camp of Sadowa," which contained large quantities of material, and the existence of which had already been revealed by our airmen. Further east we pushed forward our line, installing ourselves on the summit of Hill 201, facing the Butte of Tahure, on which the enemy dug a second line, named " Trench of the Vistula." An attack put us in possession of a little fort at the extremity of the latter.

Along the remainder of the front the pressure was kept up by violent bombardments, by grenade throwing, and by swift attacks. On the " Main de Massiges " ground was thus gained by a sustained action of the colonial infantry. Alternating the fire of the heavy artillery and the field guns with assaults by grenadiers, we succeeded greatly in increasing our gain of Sept. 25 along the northern portion of the promontory.

Germans surrendered in groups, even though not surrounded, so tired were they of the fight, and so depressed by hunger and convinced of our determination to continue our effort to the end.

A German trench stood in the way of our advance. Our artillery concentrated its fire upon it. Toward the end of the afternoon of the 26th, when the observation officer suddenly gave the order to cease fire, he saw the Germans stand up on the crest and put up their hands. " Seventy-fives! Send a screen of fire behind," ordered the General commanding the division, and immediately the Germans were to be seen running toward our lines, while our colonial infantry went off and installed themselves in the trenches. There they stuck up the pen-

nants with which they had directed our artillery fire and which on the crest torn by shells unfurled themselves like glorious standards.

"Failure of the Allies"

A Berlin dispatch by wireless to Sayville, N. Y., dated Oct. 2, 1915, said:

THE German General Staff recently invited a number of newspaper men from neutral countries—the United States, South America, Holland, and Rumania — to inspect the fighting line in the west during time of battle," says the Overseas News Agency. "They first went to Champagne, near Massiges, where they were permitted to question German soldiers returning from the battleground and captured French soldiers, and also to view field and trenches when under French fire.

"They are thus enabled to verify the reports from the German Headquarters concerning this greatest and most fearful battle fought on the western front since the beginning of the war. They are, accordingly, in a position to state that exaggerated statements are made in the reports from French Headquarters, and to confirm the facts that the Germans were outnumbered several times by the French; that the French suffered terrific and unheard-of losses, in spite of several days of artillery preparation; that the French attacks failed altogether, as none of them attained the expected result; and that the encircling movement undertaken by General Joffre is without tangible result.

"The neutral newspaper men left Champagne for the northern part of the line in continuation of their inspection tour."

A Berlin dispatch of Oct. 2, by wireless to Tuckerton, N. J., reported:

The following was among the items given out today by the Overseas News Agency:

"Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, in an army order telling of French attacks repulsed by two other German armies, declared to his troops that 'the world presently shall see the pompously advertised grand offensive broken by the iron will of our people in arms.'

"The Berliner Tageblatt publishes an interview with Crown Prince Rupprecht in which he dwells on the bravery and steadfastness of his troops and expresses his confidence in German victory as a result of the battles being waged. He pointed out that the nature of the ground made it possible for the assailants of the German lines to win local successes, but that they were already losing piece by piece the territory won. Referring to the attack of the Allies, he said: 'They are welcome to try it again if they like.'"

The London Times reported on Oct. 4, 1915, that the latest German newspapers continued to contrast the "failure," except in the first day's surprise attack, of the Franco-British offensive with the important "success" of the German counterattacks. The Frankfurter Zeitung explains:

Every step won on the hillocks to the north of Loos is a great gain for the German defense—not on account of the occupation of the ground itself, but because those positions extend to the town of Lens and conditions of space are somewhat narrow. In Champagne, too, the fight is developing favorably for us. Here, too, the enemy was unable to enlarge the gap. The little gain near Souain can hardly be counted, and, on the other hand, near Massiges the French did not get possession of the commanding heights which lie to the north of the place and which the enemy appears to be assaulting from the west or southwest. Here, too, the defense has hitherto brilliantly performed its task.

In a further article, headed "We Are Ready," the Frankfurter Zeitung remarks:

The violent struggle on the whole west front continues. French and English storming columns in unbroken succession roll up against the iron wall constituted by our heroic troops. As all hostile attacks have hitherto been repulsed with

Western Battle Front, Recording Net Changes of Line After the Onset of Sept. 25, 1915, in the Allies' Great Offensive.

gigantic losses, particularly for the English, the whole result of the enemy's attack, lasting for days, is merely a denting in of our front in two places. After the little partial successes of the first surprise attack, our adversaries have got no further. By their unsurpassable steadfastness and tenacity, our war-tried troops have rendered any further progress impossible. But the conflicts are not yet at an end. The decision is still to come.

The German people realize the frightful seriousness of the bloody struggle now being waged in the west. By every means in their power our adversaries are endeavoring, and will continue to endeavor, to break through the German front. That they are not disposed so soon again to abandon the object set before them is clearly evident from a speech of the English Prime Minister Asquith.

The French and English in the west are pressing for the decision. We are prepared for it, and can look forward with confidence to the continuation of the fight. It is not the German way to break out into light-hearted jubilation because we have hitherto succeeded in wrecking all these furious attempts to break through. On the contrary, the harder the fight the more German strength braces itself. Against this invincible German power of resistance all

the bombastically announced offensives have hitherto collapsed. The same thing will happen this time.

The article concludes by treating with derision the idea that the natural drawing of reserves to the threatened places on the front will thereby dangerously weaken other places.

Germany is not yet exhausted, as our enemies would like to believe. We have at our disposal sufficient free reserves who can be thrown in at any time and any place without our thereby weakening our front in any other place, whether in east or west. We shall force our adversaries to recognize this fact.

The German Counteroffensive

A REDOUBT LOST.

Following is the text of Sir John French's report, published on Oct. 4, 1915:

YESTERDAY afternoon the enemy commenced a heavy bombardment and delivered repeated attacks over the open against our trenches between the quarries and the Sermedes-Hulluch road. These attacks, which were pressed with determination, were all repulsed with severe loss to the enemy, and failed to reach our trenches.

Further to the northwest the enemy succeeded in recapturing the greater portion of the Hohenzollern Redoubt.

On the remainder of our front the situation is unchanged.

CROSSROADS RETAKEN BY GERMANS.

The French Communiqué of Oct. 4 reads as follows:

In Artois the struggle from trench to trench continued during the entire day. On the crests to the south of Givenchy the enemy was able to regain a footing at the crossing of five roads, but was repulsed everywhere else, notwithstanding the violence of his repeated counter-attacks.

The artillery and trench gun action was especially intense to the south of the Somme, in the sector of Lizons and Chaulnes, as well as to the north of the Aisne, in the valley of the Miette, and on the Aisne-Marne Canal, in the environs of Spaigneul.

An enemy aeroplane was brought to earth within our lines. The two officers manning it were made prisoners.

In Champagne the enemy again shelled our positions and rear guards with shells containing suffocating mixtures. Our artillery replied energetically.

On the western outskirts of the Argonne forest our heavy batteries took under their fire a hostile column marching from Baulny on Apremont, (north of Varenues.)

In the Vosges we repelled, after a spirited engagement, an attack by the enemy against our posts to the east of Celles-sur-Plaine. A bombardment, very violent on both sides, has occurred at Hartmannsweilerkopf.

This is the official German report issued in Berlin on Oct. 4:

Five monitors appeared early yesterday morning before Zeebrugge and directed a fruitless fire against the coast. Three Belgian inhabitants fell victims.

Our attacking operations against the British front north of Loos, whence a fruitless sortie was undertaken by the enemy during the night against our position west of Haisnes, made further progress.

South of Souchez Brook the French succeeded in obtaining a firm foothold in a small section of a trench on the hill northwest of Givenchy. South of this hill French attacks were repulsed. The forty-meter section of the trench northeast of Neuville [the capture of which by the French was announced in yesterday's German report] was recaptured by our troops.

Yesterday afternoon the French began an attack in the Champagne region, northwest of Ville-sur-Tourbe and northwest of Massiges, which was with-



Area of Operations in the West, Showing Battle Line on Oct. 15, 1915, Between Rheims and Verdun.

out result. Their accumulation of troops was subjected to our concentrated fire. A strong night attack against our positions northwest of Ville-sur-Tourbe broke down under our fire with heavy losses.

The railway station at Châlons, the chief meeting place of the rear guard of the French attacking troops in Champagne, was bombarded last night by one of our airships, with visible results.

ALLIED GAINS.

Field Marshal Sir John French on Oct. 9 broke silence for the first time since Oct. 4 to announce, through the British Press Bureau, considerable gains in the Loos sector, where, to the northeast of that village, near Hill 70, his forces had penetrated the German lines to points varying from 500 to 1,000 yards in advance of the positions previously taken. The report follows:

Since my communication of Oct. 4 the enemy has constantly shelled our new trenches south of La Bassée Canal and has made repeated bombing attacks on the southern portion of the Hohenzollern Redoubt, which is held by us. These attacks were all repulsed.

In spite of the enemy's artillery fire, we have pushed our trenches steadily forward northeast of Loos, between Hill 70 and Hulluch, and gained ground varying from 500 to 1,000 yards in depth.

Yesterday afternoon the enemy heavily bombarded the whole area we had recently won from him, and followed this by an attack in successive waves of infantry on the whole front from south of Loos to the Hohenzollern Redoubt. This attack was repulsed everywhere, with heavy loss to the enemy. We gained possession by a counterattack of a German trench 500 yards west of the Cité St. Elie. Great numbers of the enemy dead are lying in front of our lines. Our losses were comparatively slight.

The text of the French communication on Oct. 9 follows:

The reports of last night set forth that the German losses, in the offensive movement undertaken yesterday against Loos and the positions to the north and to the south of Loos actually held by our troops, were very heavy.

The assault was made by three successive and very dense formations of men, followed by detachments in column form. All these troops were cut down by the combined fire of our infantry, our machine guns, and our artillery. Only a few detachments of the Germans were successful in securing a footing in a trench recently conquered by us between Loos and the roadway from Lens to Bethune. Other local attacks, but equaling these in violence, have been repeated against our positions to the southeast of Neuville-St. Vaast, but they were completely repulsed. All the progress made by us in the last few days has ben maintained.

There has been a fairly spirited cannonading, in which both sides took part, in the sector of Lihons, as well as in the region of Quennevières and Nouvron.

In the Champagne district a German counterattack delivered last night at a point to the east of the Navarin Farm was definitely checked by a curtain of artillery fire.

The only action undertaken by the enemy against the advances made by us yesterday to the southeast of Tahure consisted of a violent bombardment, coupled with the use of shells which asphyxiated and caused irritation of the eyes.

On the western boundary of the Argonne the activity of French batteries put an end to the German cannonading directed against our trenches in the sector of St. Thomas.

In Lorraine several strong reconnoitring parties of the enemy took part in an attack against our advanced posts in the Forest of Parroy. All these endeavors were completely repulsed. On the front between Rellion and Leintrey, one of the German attacking parties, after having secured a footing in one of our first line positions, was in part driven out.

There has been no notable incident on the remainder of the front.

The Belgian official communication reads:

The enemy artillery has shown slight activity. We dispersed military pioneers at divers points along the front.

The War Office in Berlin on Oct. 9 gave out the following statement:

Northeast of Vermelles a strong English attack failed with heavy losses to the enemy. During a local German attack a little progress was made southwest of the village of Loos.

In Champagne the French attacked a position east of Navarin Farm, after a few hours of artillery preparation, and in certain places succeeded in penetrating our trenches. They were driven out again by our counterattacks, leaving one officer and 100 men in our hands, after a fruitless and sanguinary battle.

In French Lorraine the French lost the much-fought-for Hill of Leintrey. One officer, seventy men, one machine gun, and four mine throwers remained in our hands.

FRENCH LOSSES.

Following is the text of the Paris official report issued on the night of Oct. 13, 1915:

The enemy renewed today with strong forces his attacks to the northeast of Souchez, against the wood "le Bois en Hache," to the east of the road from Souchez to Angres; against our positions on the approaches to the five highways on the crest of Vimy; against the small fort, previously taken by us in the Givenchy Wood, and the neighboring trenches.

Despite the extreme violence of the bombardment, which preceded these attacks, despite the desperate nature of the renewed assaults, the enemy was able to penetrate only some parts of the trenches in the Givenchy Wood which had been completely shattered by shells of heavy calibre. Everywhere else we conserved all our positions and repulsed the assault of the Germans, who suffered very heavy losses.

Artillery actions of particular intensity are reported to the south of the Somme, in the sector of Lihons. In Champagne, to the north of Souain and Massiges, in Argonne, to the north of La Harazee, and between the Meuse and the Moselle, to the north of Flirey.

In the Vosges we dispersed by our fire an enemy attack against our positions in the valley of La Laucne.

The text of the French afternoon communication follows:

At the conclusion of the bombardment reported yesterday, the enemy last evening delivered an infantry attack against our positions to the northeast of Souchez. These attacks, like the preceding ones, were everywhere completely repulsed.

Last night saw artillery actions of great intensity, in which both sides took part, between the Somme and the Oise; in the region of Andéchy, and to the east of Rheims, in the direction of Moronvillers. Batteries of the enemy have delivered a violent cannonade in the region to the south of Tahure and to the east of Butte de Mesnil. Our artillery held this fire back effectively, and in the meantime we were making further progress from trench to trench at a point to the east of the earthwork known as "the Trapeze."

There has been fairly intense fighting with trench machines in the sector of Flirey, and more violent fighting, accompanied by artillery exchanges, in the suburbs of Reillon.

In the Vosges the enemy, after a complete check to his attack along the front from the Linge to the Shratzmannele, resumed his efforts yesterday evening. A second outburst of artillery fire along the entire front, in preparation for an infantry advance, was followed by a fresh attack which, generally speaking, resulted in failure. The Germans were able to gain a footing in our first line trenches at only one point, and this was to the south of the Linge hills. The trench they took was between sixty and eighty yards long. Our counterattacks made it possible for us to reoccupy a portion of this trench immediately.

A squadron of nineteen French aeroplanes has thrown down 140 shells on the railroad station at Bazancourt, whence movements of the enemy have been reported.

Another air squadron composed of eighteen machines has bombarded the railroad junction at Achiet-le-Grand, near Bapaume. Other machines have

bombarded the railroad tracks at a point near Warmerville.

The German official statement of Oct. 13, 1915, with regard to the fighting in Belgium and France, says:

British attacks northeast of Vermelles were easily repulsed.

East of Souchez the French again lost some portion of the trenches which they were able to keep on Oct. 11.

In Champagne a French attack yesterday afternoon failed south of Tahure. Repeated attacks on the same place early this morning with several groups of troops broke down completely.

In the Vosges the French lost a portion of their positions on the western slope of Schratzmannele.

BRITISH ATTACKS.

Renewed British attacks in force upon the German lines in the neighborhood of Loos on Oct. 13, 1915, resulted in the reported capture of several trenches, including the main trench of the Hohenzollern Redoubt, all of which gains Sir John French's troops retained. This is the text of the British official statement:

Yesterday afternoon, after a bombardment, we attacked the enemy's trenches under cover of a cloud of smoke and gas from a point about 600 yards southwest of Huluch to the Hohenzollern redoubt. We gained about 1,000 yards of trenches just south and west of Hulluch, but were unable to maintain our position there owing to the enemy's shell fire.

Southwest of St. Elie we captured and held the enemy's trench behind the Vermelles-Hulluch road and the southwestern quarries, both inclusive. We also captured a trench on the northwest face of the forest. We captured the main trench of the Hohenzollern Redoubt, but the enemy is still in two communicating trenches between the redoubt and the quarries.

GERMAN LOSSES.

By DR. GEORGE WEGENER.

[The Cologne Gazette Dispatches.]

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

ON THE GERMAN FRONT IN CHAMPAGNE, Oct. 12, (via Cologne and London, Oct. 14.)—Monday ended the third hardest-fought battle since the beginning of the new offensive here. The preparatory artillery fire began on Sunday evening. The thunder of the guns, among them those of the heaviest calibre, roared throughout the whole night.

Monday morning a comparatively small attack of the French began in the neighborhood of Tahure. The French forced their way into a short trench. The enemy's aeroplane attacks were driven off throughout the day by our defending aeroplanes. The artillery fire lasted the entire day, increasing between 6 and 7 o'clock to a violent cannonade on both sides. The positions behind the front were the most bombarded, as the first lines were too close together.

At 7 o'clock, after twenty-four hours' firing, a strong attack of the French north and south of Tahure ensued, which, however, was repulsed. One lost trench was immediately recaptured, with great losses for us.

Last night passed very quietly, as well as today, except for the new flying machines.

To the question put to prisoners whether hate against the Germans was still so great as at the beginning of the war we often heard the answer: "No; these two peoples should unite in peace; that would be a good thing."

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, Oct. 13.—The night passed quietly. Toward morning there was a heavy fog. Under this protection the French, about 5 o'clock, made a violent attack south of Tahure in close columns, presumably in the hope of taking us by surprise. It was repulsed. After an half hour's bombardment they made a second attack at 7:30, which lasted until 10:30 in the morning, advancing five times in several waves of assault, which were all, with the excellent support of our artillery, easily repulsed by our infantry.

That the battles in Champagne can be brought to a conclusion by attacks of this sort, which are still carried on by the use of great masses of troops, is hardly to be expected. The statements of captured prisoners confirm this view.

Zeppelin Raids on London

Official Reports of Recent Air Attacks from Germany

In the British press an authorized statement appeared on Sept. 17, 1915, to this effect:

"The following description of some of the effects of the Zeppelin raid in the London district has been drawn up by an impartial observer at the request of the Home Secretary, [Sir John Simon,] and is authorized for publication. While it is absolutely necessary, in the interests of public safety, strictly to maintain the rule that no unauthorized accounts should appear, the real character of these outrages may be the better understood by a collection of incidents, each of which has been verified on the spot, and is vouched for by the authorities as accurate. The Home Secretary takes this opportunity of stating explicitly that the total casualties resulting from these air raids are in all cases correctly stated, and are based on exhaustive inquiry by the police."

The official report appears below:

IN a letter which he addressed to a correspondent some weeks ago, the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Balfour) set forth the reasons which prevented his Majesty's Government from disclosing the exact localities in which damage had taken place in the various Zeppelin raids. These reasons remain valid, and there is no intention to depart from the rule which secures that no information can be made available for the enemy, either in regard to the route he has taken, or the places or buildings on which he dropped his bombs. The experience of the raids of last week, combined with the German official reports on them, demonstrates that the commanders of German aircraft are often grossly in error as to their movements, and have no means whatever of estimating the effect of their promiscuous bombardment either materially or morally. In every case where damage has been caused it is private property that has suffered, and in most cases this private property has been of the small residential kind. Almost all the unfortunate people who have been killed have not only been noncombatants, but noncombatants of a kind which it has been hitherto the honorable practice of civilized warfare to exempt from attack, that is to say, women and children, small shopkeepers, and working men, the sacrifice of whose lives can effect no military purpose whatever, either morally or materially.

The folly and futility of the raids which took place last week can be well imagined when it is remembered that the London district, which may be taken for convenience as the area administered by the Metropolitan Police, is just short of 700 square miles in area. It is by hastily dropping at random in the dark certain explosive and incendiary material somewhere on this enormous surface that the enemy professed to be accomplishing some important military purpose. In point of fact, no public institution of any kind was hit, nor any power station, nor arsenal. No damage was done which affects the use of any building connected directly or indirectly with the conduct of the war. It is true that two hospitals narrowly escaped damage, but it is only fair to say on behalf of the officers of an army which has done its best to destroy the cathedrals of Belgium and France that up to the present they have only succeeded in hitting one church. So far as the moral effect of the raid was concerned, it is to be feared that from the standpoint of Berlin it was a complete failure. If Count Zeppelin himself accompanied the raiding aircraft (as has been reported from Holland) he will be disappointed to learn that only a minority of the vast population of London was aware of the presence of his airship at all, and that among those who heard the guns fire or saw the Zeppelin the feelings everywhere aroused were of interest and curiosity rather than of fear.

That London and its suburbs as a community faces calmly the murderous efforts of the raiders is in no way a mitigation of the callous and purposeless brutality of their action, or of the tragedies which have followed.

Here are a few pictures of the effects

accomplished by the officers and crew of the last airship which visited the London district:

First—Somewhere in the area of London you can go to the corner of a little street; this one has a public house at the corner. Outside it on Wednesday evening last week after the place was closed a man and a woman were talking. The woman went off to buy some supper at a neighboring shop; the man stood there to wait for her, and while he was waiting there fell at his feet the first of the explosive bombs. It killed the man outright; it blew pieces of paving stone on to the surrounding roofs, it blew in the front of the public house, reducing the stock to a mere mass of broken glass, over which still floats an indefinable odor of assorted forms of alcohol; it took off the top of a grand piano on the floor above, twisted the iron bedsteads, injured a woman who was sleeping there, and reduced what had been the carefully kept living rooms of a small family to a mass of soot and dust and plaster and broken glass. In what conceivable respect did it contribute to the progress of the war?

Second—In another part of the area over which the airship passed, there is a big block of workmen's dwellings—places where men live who are away at their trades all day and often all night, and which day and night are crowded with children. A bomb dropped on the roof of one of these, and right under the roof was a little flat in which four children had been put to sleep. Two of them after being put to bed had got up surreptitiously to make tea in an adjoining room; you can see the bed that they left now, a mass of blackened and charred sheets with the mattress torn to pieces. They escaped by a miracle, but in the small bedroom next door to them the other two children were killed in an instant. These buildings are strong, and the bomb did not penetrate far; you would hardly notice the damage to the roof if you pass it in the street. That was all that was happening when the Captain of the German aircraft professed to think he was visiting the docks and vitally damaging the Port of London.

Third—In another place a bomb dropped through the roof of a stable yard; it was an incendiary bomb, and it set on fire a motor car on which it fell. The stableman and his wife, in spite of the fire, which was immediately serious, set out to rescue the eleven horses which were in the stable behind the fire, and they were carefully taken out one by one and let loose in the street. A dog which was kept to guard the premises was also carefully rescued, so was a caged bird kept on the first floor above the fire, though while she was bringing it down the stableman's wife was blown off her feet on the stairs by the blast of an explosive bomb which fell in a neighboring courtyard. The only casualty in this case was a bantam cock.

Fourth—In such a case as the last the futility of the enemy's attack was merely ridiculous; in others it was tragic. Somewhere in the vast area of London's suburbs there is a little block of houses standing almost by itself and divided up into small flats. On the ground floor there were sleeping a widow, her daughter, aged 18, and a young man whom they kept as a lodger. On the first floor was a family with three children, two of them girls, and on the second floor a workingman and his wife with five children, four of them girls and one a boy. The bomb dropped squarely on the roof of the house. As the laborer and his wife who were on the second floor described it, the whole partition wall beside their bed gave way and disappeared; the man pushed his wife out into the centre of the room and went off to find his children. Two of them, who slept in the room under the spot where the bomb fell, had vanished with room, bed, and everything, and their bodies were found two days later under the débris of the house. Of the others, the boy, aged 8, ran for safety to the staircase, which was blown away, and in the dark fell down into the hole where his sisters' bodies were buried in the ruins. Of the first floor inhabitants two were missing altogether, and their bodies were subsequently recovered. Of the ground floor, where apparently the worst effect of the explosion took place, it is sufficient to

say that part of the body of the man who occupied it was found 150 yards away.

Fifth—A bomb dropped in the street blew in the front of a shop, but spent the main force of its explosion on a passing motor omnibus. There were twenty people on board, including the driver and conductor. Nine of them were killed and eleven injured, among the injured being the driver, who had both his legs blown off, and died shortly afterward in the hospital.

These incidents alone account for nearly half the deaths which have been caused. They will suffice to show what is the real measure and nature of the success which has attended the enemy's attack on the London area.

In human life and limb the net results of the week's raids in the London district were 38 killed or died of wounds and 124 injured.

It ought not to be omitted from mention that two policemen and one Army Service Corps man appeared among the casualties; otherwise no person in uniform was either killed or injured.

A LATER ATTACK.

Fifty-five persons were killed and 114 *injured in the Zeppelin raid over London on the night of Oct.* 13, 1915. *Fourteen of the killed and thirteen of the wounded were military casualties, according to an announcement made later by the Official Press Bureau. The text of the announcement follows:*

The Press Bureau of the War Office announces that a fleet of hostile airships visited the eastern counties and a portion of the London area last night and dropped bombs.

Anti-aircraft guns of the Royal Field Artillery, attached to the central force, were in action, and an airship was seen to heel over on its side and to drop to a lower altitude.

Five aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps went up, but, owing to atmospheric conditions, only one aeroplane succeeded in locating an airship. This aeroplane, however, was unable to overhaul the airship before it was lost in the fog.

Some houses were damaged and several fires were started, but no serious damage was caused to military material. All fires were soon got under control by the fire brigade.

The following military casualties, in addition to the one announced last night, have been reported: Fourteen killed and thirteen wounded.

The Home Office announces the following casualties other than the military casualties reported above: Killed—Men, 27; women, 9; children, 5; total, 41. Injured—Men, 64; women, 30; children, 7; total, 101.

Of these casualties 32 killed and 95 injured were in the London area, and these figures include those announced last night.

The Globe, which has been conducting a campaign advocating reprisals, says today:

"The public knows now that the Zeppelin, choosing its own time and circumstances for attack, is practically immune against the ordinary weapons of aerial warfare. The only way to hit the enemy is to strike at him as he strikes at us—to bomb his sleeping towns."

At a meeting today of theatrical managers for discussion of a proposal to substitute matinées for night performances it was decided to continue the latter.

London's Aerial Defense

By Arthur J. Belfour

First Lord of the British Admiralty

Speaking in the House of Commons on Sept. 15, 1915, Sir H. Dalziel put the question whether the Admiralty were satisfied with the aerial defense of London. Were they satisfied that the guns were of the right kind, that they were powerful enough, that the men in charge were fully qualified for the responsible task which had fallen on them? Why on a recent visit of Zeppelins to London were no aeroplanes apparently called into requisition? He understood there were plenty waiting. Had the Admiralty made a definite study of the

defenses of Paris, against which flying machines seemed to have been unable to make any headway? Who was in charge of the aerial defense of London before Sir Percy Scott? Sir Percy Scott's appointment had, he thought, been received in all quarters with great satisfaction, but he could not understand why it was necessary to wait until the Zeppelins had visited London before calling for Sir Percy Scott's advice. His appointment did not mean that if the present system was imperfect it would immediately become perfect. He supposed the whole question was the provision of the proper gun. Too much must not be expected till Sir Percy Scott had had time to review the whole situation, and probably to secure the guns which would be required. Mr. Balfour's reply to these questions appear below.

THE right honorable gentleman who has just sat down made a pointed and perfectly legitimate appeal to me to say something about the defense of London. He asked me questions about the guns, the provision of guns, the character of the guns, and their sufficiency in point of number, and their sufficiency in point of quality, and he also asked me various questions about the organization of the defense of London, which, as he truly observed, is not a thing which can be brought to perfection merely by appointing officers. In order that the House may really judge of the situation fairly they must remember that nobody foresaw, when the war broke out, the full development of aerial war, whether on our own part or on the part of our opponents. This is a branch of war which has never been tried before, and on which there has been no experience until this war which counts for anything, and, therefore, it is inevitable when you have to deal with a situation of that sort that before your eyes the situation changes, and the organization which those responsible before the war might naturally have thought adequate is proved by experience to be quite inadequate.

If we had set to work, let us say, three or four years before the war with a full knowledge of the development of aerial warfare; if the Government of that day had set to work with that knowledge to organize the defense of London, I have no doubt it would have been organized on lines different from those which now prevail, but you really ought not to criticise the Minister then in charge because it is not done. That is not a fair way to look at human effort. The Naval Aerial Service has, I think, quadrupled since the war commenced—I rather think I am under the mark in saying that. An organization which might have been adequate and was adequate when the war broke out and responsibilities seemed relatively slight in regard to the defense of the internal parts of the country, gradually became more and more inadequate, and has been supplemented, and is still in course of being supplemented, day by day. I hope the organization intended to meet this danger is improving and is growing far more rapidly than the danger itself. That is my hope and my expectation.

The right honorable gentleman asked why Sir Percy Scott, whose appointment he is good enough to approve, was not appointed before. The answer to that is really the answer to all this particular class of attack. There are things which were foreseen before the war, there are things which were not foreseen, and which I do not think could have been foreseen before the war. One of them was the peculiar development of this method of warfare. The appointment of Sir Percy Scott is not the only great change of organization which it has been found necessary to effect in consequence of the development of aircraft warfare. I now find it absolutely necessary to bring the whole air service more into harmony with the general practice of the Admiralty, to greatly increase the staff at the head of affairs, and to make arrangements to deal with the enormous amount of work which is now thrown upon those responsible for the air service. The naval air service is now an immense service. The number of fliers is very great and the number of machines is very great. There are responsibilities as regards the design of machines. There are responsibilities for arranging the whole system of coast defense, and the organization which was not inadequate when the war broke out I found completely

inadequate soon after I assumed responsibility as First Lord of the Admiralty. I hope, as regards the organization, that it is now either complete, or in a fair way to completion. The changes have been very great, and they have all been in the direction of fitting the office to deal with new and great responsibilities, and I hope as time goes on their adequacy will more and more make itself felt.

If the right honorable gentleman asks me whether I think that at this moment everything has been done that can be done or will be done for the defense of London, I do not think so. I think the thing is still in progress, and still in process of development. If he asks me whether I think it possible within a reasonable time to provide an adequate defense of London, I should give him a much more reassuring answer. Let me frankly say I should give him a more reassuring answer in no small degree, because I have a great belief in the organizing capacity and the energy and resource, the openness to new ideas, which has always characterized the distinguished Admiral who now has the defense of London immediately under his control. [Cheers.]

The right honorable gentleman mentioned Paris. Pains have been taken to make ourselves acquainted with the methods of the defense of Paris, and much, no doubt, has been learned, and will be learned, from studying their example. But let not the House be carried away with the idea that the problem of London is identical with the problem of Paris. ["Hear, hear!"] I am sure the right honorable gentleman does not fall into that error. Nor, if I may say so, is the problem of one who has got to try and defend London at all similar to that of the Minister who has to try and defend Paris. Paris starts with being under a single military government, and it starts with being a great military fortress, and therefore, being a military fortress, it is supplied with a great mass of guns and with great defensive arrangements. London is not a fortified town. London is, as everybody knows—and nobody knows it better than the Germans—a city which should not, under the laws of civilized warfare, be the subject of this kind of attack. But we take our enemies as we find them. ["Hear, hear!" and cheers.]

We perfectly recognize that a nation which is prepared for any degree of brutality at sea is not likely to show undue humanity when it comes to deal with land. ["Hear, hear!"] Therefore we do not for a moment suppose that London, or any other undefended place in this country, is to derive more consideration from the laws of humanity or the laws of nations. But I hope and believe, although I cannot promise immunity from attack to any part of the United Kingdom—in war immunity from attack can be rarely promised by any responsible Minister or General—but I think I can promise the House that everything is being done to develop and to organize such defenses as are possible against aerial attack. I think I can tell the House, without being unduly optimistic, that, lamentable as have been the results of these German attacks on undefended places, the actual number of persons killed and injured and the actual amount of property destroyed has been relatively insignificant, although the hardship inflicted on particular individuals has been tragic beyond expression. If you turn your eyes away from the cases of individual hardship, cruelty, and suffering, and consider simply how much injury to this country, either as a great economic unit or as a great fighting force, has been done by these aerial attacks, I can truly say that so far that damage has been insignificant, and, although immunity cannot be promised for the future, I have every hope that Sir Percy Scott and all the other naval authorities who are devoting their minds to this problem will be able to diminish the dangers in the future, to increase the security, and to enable his Majesty's lieges to sleep comfortably in their beds. ["Hear, hear!"]

Russia's Recoil

Czar's Resumed Offensive Strong and Well Supplied

By a Military Expert

WHAT was generally regarded in early October as a temporary check to the Germans on the Russian front while the Teuton leaders were making redispositions of their forces bids fair to become permanent. In fact, the German offense seems to be paralyzed. From Riga to Bukowina Teuton reports have told of but little except their ability to repulse Russian attacks. It seems that the initiative has passed to the Russians and that, even in front of Dvinsk, the Germans are now on the defensive. The combination of the rainy season, of marshes, of long lines of supply and inability to maintain a continuous flow of heavy shells, has brought the Germans to a halt. Once operations in the east, by reason of difficulties in transportation, are reduced to a matter of rifle fire, the Germans no longer can run over the Russian armies, but, meeting them on an equal footing, can make but little headway against them.

Germany has up to now literally blasted her way through Poland by concentrating her superiority of heavy guns at carefully selected points and blazing the trail for the infantry to follow. Against this the Russians had no defense. Their own guns were outranged and outmunitioned, and when the German infantry reached the Russian trenches it was to find an enemy thoroughly shaken, almost demoralized, whose resisting power was almost gone. As the German advantages, however, disappear, from whatever cause, whether through inability to bring up their own heavy guns or through increase in the Russian supply of munitions, the Russian defense becomes as strong, if not stronger, than the German attack.

The Russian soldier, though for the most part uneducated, is, nevertheless, an excellent fighting man. If properly officered, in fact, he is almost the par of any other soldier of Continental Europe. Consequently, when the game is reduced to the infantry rifle and the machine gun, it becomes largely a question of numbers. On such a basis the Teutons cannot hold their own. The demands made on them from all points are so great that everywhere except in the recently begun operations in Serbia, they are outnumbered. They can, it is true, by clever use of railroad lines, effect rapid concentrations at selected points, but it is always at the expense of some other parts of the line. The net result is that, after an almost inconceivable sacrifice in men and an expenditure of enormous supplies of shell in order to accomplish a given object—the forcing of Russia to a decisive battle—Germany faces a Winter in the interior of Russia, with her object as far removed from accomplishment as it was months ago. This means stagnation, and time works to the benefit of Russia more than to that of Germany.

The Riga section during the week ended Oct. 17 was extremely quiet, but south, in the Dvinsk region, there was violent fighting. Yet, in spite of all their efforts, the Germans seem no nearer to capturing Dvinsk. Small gains at some points have been more than offset by the losses at others. From Dvinsk to the Dniester the Germans have been hard put to it to hold the Russians in check without attempting an offense of their own. As a matter of fact, the Russians have made a number of gains at different points—unimportant, it is true, but indicative of the reviving striking power that enabled Russia to sweep through Galicia a year ago.



Germanic War Area in the East, Showing the Battle Line on Oct. 15, 1915.

What the Hour Demands

By David Lloyd George

British Minister of Munitions

In the book published by Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton, entitled "Through Terror to Triumph: Speeches and Pronouncements of the Right Hon. David Lloyd George, M. P., Since the Beginning of the War," Mr. George has expressed in the preface his estimate of the need for British service during the three months preceding December, 1915. His words appear below.

AFTER twelve months of war my conviction is stronger than ever that this country could not have kept out of it without imperiling its security and impairing its honor. We could not have looked on cynically with folded arms while the country we had given our word to protect was being ravaged and trodden by one of our own co-trustees. If British women and children were being brutally destroyed on the high seas by German submarines this nation would have insisted on calling the infanticide empire to a stern reckoning. Everything that has happened since the declaration of war has demonstrated clearly that a military system so regardless of good faith, of honorable obligations, and of the elementary impulses of humanity constituted a menace to civilization of the most sinister character; and despite the terrible cost of suppressing it the well-being of humanity demands that such a system should be challenged and destroyed. The fact that events have also shown that the might of this military clique has exceeded the gloomiest prognostications provides an additional argument for its destruction. The greater the might the darker the menace.

Nor have the untoward incidents of the war weakened my faith in ultimate victory—always provided that the allied nations put forth the whole of their strength ere it is too late. Anything less must lead to defeat. The allied countries have an overwhelming preponderance in the raw material that goes to the making and equipment of armies, whether in men, money, or accessible metals and machinery. But this material has to be mobilized and utilized. It would be idle to pretend that the first twelve months of the war have seen this task accomplished satisfactorily. Had the Allies realized in time the full strength of their redoubtable and resourceful foes—nay, what is more, had they realized their own strength and resources, and taken prompt action to organize them—today we should have witnessed the triumphant spectacle of their guns pouring out a stream of shot and shell which would have deluged the German trenches with fire and scorched the German legions back across their own frontiers.

What is the actual position? It is thoroughly well known to the Germans, and any one in any land, belligerent or neutral, who reads intelligently the military news must by now have a comprehension of it. With the resources of Great Britain, France, Russia—yea, of the whole industrial world—at the disposal of the Allies, it is obvious that the central powers have still an overwhelming superiority in all the material and equipment of war.

The result of this deplorable fact is exactly what might have been foreseen. The iron heel of Germany has sunk deeper than ever into French and Belgian soil; Poland is entirely German; Lithuania is rapidly following. Russian fortresses, deemed impregnable, are falling like sand castles before the resistless tide of Teutonic invasion. When will that tide recede? When will it be stemmed? As soon as the Allies are supplied with abundance of war material.

Two Millions of Lives

War's Cost in Human Beings Estimated by a Military Expert

A special dispatch to THE NEW YORK TIMES, *dated at West Point on Oct. 7, 1915, presented the following report:*

SINCE the great war in Europe started more than 2,000,000 men have been killed; the wounded number nearly 4,000,000, while the total number of prisoners and of the missing is more than 2,000,000. These are conservative minimum figures compiled from the best available data, and were made public in Cullum Hall here tonight by Brig. Gen. Francis Vinton Greene, U. S. A., retired, in an address on the war, delivered before the members of the New York State Historical Association.

General Greene is an honor graduate of West Point of the Class of '70 and the author of many standard works on military history. He gave his hearers the benefit of what he called an "intelligent guess" as to the casualties of the war, and submitted a table showing the increase of the national indebtedness of the European belligerents. The increase over 1914, approximately, is $20,000,000,000. How much of this is war debt, of course, is problematical. The combined wealth of the Allies is estimated at $204,000,000,000, while that of the Teutonic allies, with Turkey included, is estimated at $108,000,000,000.

General Greene also discussed the changes in the art of warfare that have made the great struggle not only the most frightful but also the most interesting, from a military point of view, of any war in history. Incidentally, the speaker indicated what, in his own opinion, is required to make adequate the national defense of the United States.

In the present decade, he said, there had occurred more important changes in the art of warfare than in the previous fifty years, and in those fifty years more than in the five preceding centuries; in other words, since the first use of gunpowder in warfare.

What these changes in the art of warfare mean is learned by a study of the tables of casualties, financial expenditures, &c., compiled by General Greene. One of these gives the population, based on official figures, of the various countries concerned in the war. These figures are taken from official reports. Summarized, they show that on the side of the Allies there are in Europe 266,500,000 people, as compared with 122,200,000 population of the Teutonic nations and their ally, Turkey. The colonies of the Allies have a population of 472,500,000 people, as compared with 32,800,000 in the colonies that now or did belong to Germany, Austria, and Turkey. The total population upon which the Allies can draw is 739,000,000, as compared with 155,000,000 who owe allegiance to Emperor William, Franz Josef, or the Sultan.

Another table gives the "armed strength" of the various belligerents, the estimates being based on figures to be found in various standard works. General Greene describes the figures as "approximate only," but "probably sufficiently accurate for comparative purposes." This table, which gives both the army and naval totals of the powers at war, follows:

ARMED STRENGTH.

	Armies.		Navies.	
	Peace.	War.	Ships.	Tonnage.
Great Britain ..	156,000	700,000	545	2,700,000
France	800,000	2,780,000	368	900,000
Russia	900,000	2,600,000	241	680,000
Italy	270,000	1,500,000	183	500,000
Belgium ...	45,000	170,000	...	.....
Serbia	25,000	100,000	...	.....
Total..	2,196,000	7,940,000	1,337	4,780,000
Germany ..	800,000	3,500,000	304	1,300,000
Austria-Hungary..	340,000	1,400,000	124	350,000
Turkey	220,000	360,000	41	(?)100,000
Total....	1,360,000	5,260,000	469	1,750,000

The most interesting of the tables is the one that gives the casualties in the present war. The figures are based upon

official reports made in the House of Commons from totals printed in the newspapers and from data gathered from other sources.

"They are not much more than intelligent guesses," said General Greene tonight, "but I have used minimum figures." This table follows:

LOSSES IN BATTLE.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Gt. Britain	86,000	251,000	55,000	392,000
France ...	400,000	700,000	300,000	1,400,000
Russia ...	500,000	800,000	900,000	2,200,000
Italy	5,000	15,000	5,000	25,000
Belgium ..	25,000	40,000	15,000	80,000
Serbia ...	20,000	40,000	10,000	70,000
Total..	1,036,000	1,846,000	1,285,000	4,167,000
Germany .	600,000	1,000,000	300,000	1,900,000
Austria ..	400,000	700,000	700,000	1,800,000
Turkey ...	30,000	80,000	20,000	130,000
Total..	1,030,000	1,780,000	1,020,000	3,830,000

General Greene's figures dealing with the financial situation in Europe are as follows:

FINANCES.
(In Millions of Dollars.)

	National Wealth.	Nat'nal Debt. 1914.	1916.	Per Cap.	P.C.
Great Britain.	$85,000	$3,485	$11,000	260	13
France	50,000	6,345	9,500	237	19
Russia	40,000	4,540	6,500	47	16
Italy	20,000	2,850	3,000	85	15
Belgium	9,000	825	825	110	12
Serbia	500	125	125	41	8
Total	$204,500	$18,170	$30,950		
Germany	80,000	3,735	9,985	153	12
Aus.-Hungary.	25,000	1,050	2,000	39	8
Turkey	3,000(?)	675	675	188	22
Total	$108,000	$5,460	$12,660		

"The figures relating to Great Britain and Germany," said General Greene, "are accurate. The others are approximate only. The estimates of the cost of the war vary from $40,000,000 to $50,000,000 per day, which will bring the total cost on Jan. 1, 1916, to nearly $25,000,000,000, of which probably 80 per cent. has been borrowed."

In his discussion of other phases of the war General Greene laid stress on the important part played by the aeroplane, the automobile, the submarine, and wireless telegraphy, which are for the first time effectively useful in warfare.

"From Napoleon's time to the present the art of war has benefited by all the wonderful improvements in the mechanical arts and sciences, all of which are the servants of war as well as of peace. Instantaneous communication of intelligence, marvelously rapid transportation of troops, the ability to feed and supply unheard-of numbers in the field, flying through the air to detect the enemy's movements, swimming under water to destroy the enemy's ships, hurling projectiles of unprecedented size to destroy his forts, caring for hundreds upon thousands of wounded, which but for the automobile would have perished upon the field—these are some of the more important methods of warfare now.

"The fabled stories of the countless hordes who crossed the Hellespont with Xerxes and Alexander have been far surpassed by the actual numbers of the forces engaged in the present conflict. The figures are certainly startling. In Europe 78 per cent. of the population at war, in all the world 56 per cent. of the population involved in the conflict; 13,000,000 men actually under arms; 2,000,000 killed, nearly 4,000,000 wounded, more than 2,000,000 prisoners. We cannot grasp these figures, but we can get some idea of what they mean by comparing them with the results of previous wars. We were accustomed to speak of our civil war as the greatest conflict of modern times, but apparently it was only one-tenth the magnitude of the present conflict.

"At no time did the number of men actually under arms, North and South, exceed 1,300,000, and the total number of those killed in battle and died of wounds on the Northern side was 110,070, and on the Southern side probably not more than 80,000; so that in four years of war then the destruction of life was less than one-tenth of the destruction of life during a little more than one year at the present time. In the Napoleonic wars, from 1796 to 1815, the largest army ever assembled was that which Napoleon led into Russia in 1812, and this numbered somewhat in excess of 500,000. The German armies fighting today in Russia on the east and in France on the west are more than six times as large."

Case of the Arabic

German Official Disavowal of the Submarine Commander's Act

THE German-American crisis arising from the destruction of the British liner Arabic by a German submarine and the killing of two Americans and about forty other persons was ended on Oct. 5, 1915, completely to the satisfaction of the American Government when Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, sent a letter to Mr. Lansing, the Secretary of State, expressing the German Government's regret and its disavowal of the act of the submarine commander. At the same time Count von Bernstorff assured Mr. Lansing that the Kaiser's instructions to his naval commanders had been made so stringent that incidents like the sinking of the Arabic could not recur. The Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, accepted liability for all damages to American citizens resulting from the destruction of the Arabic, and announced his willingness to negotiate amounts due.

The language of Count von Bernstorff's note makes it plain that the long and bitter controversy arising from the German submarine campaign is near an end. At the State Department it was said officially on Oct. 5 that the results of the less formal communications between the Ambassador and the Secretary of State, which ended in the Ambassador's satisfactory letter of that date, indicated that better and quicker results probably could be reached without additional exchanges of formal notes.

This is taken to mean that the German answer to the last American note on the general submarine question, originating from the destruction of the Lusitania, may never reach Washington. Such a note had been prepared, and one sentence from it, giving Germany's promise not to attack unresisting liners without warning, was quoted in a short letter from Count von Bernstorff to Mr. Lansing shortly after the attack on the Arabic. But the body of the note, it was understood, probably would give place to informal conversations between the two diplomats, although at the end of their discussions, when a full agreement is reached on all the remaining minor details, this settlement may yet be made public in the form of a letter.

"It is a diplomatic victory for the United States," Ambassador von Bernstorff remarked to a friend, referring to the Arabic settlement, "but credit must be given to Germany, I believe, for nobly accepting the word of the British officers that they did not intend to ram the submarine."

This point, it was learned, at one time threatened to interrupt the proceedings, as the German Government at first wished to arbitrate the conflicting evidence.

The promptness with which Count von Bernstorff altered the original draft of the letter demonstrated that he had been empowered to negotiate a complete settlement of the case, and it was assumed that he naturally did not finally accede until the American Government made known its unalterable determination not to relinquish any of its demands.

The results of American diplomacy under the guidance of President Wilson may now be stated with something like completeness. They include:

1. Germany's acknowledgment of the right of American ships to sail through the war zone unmolested, with the accompanying acknowledgment of full German liability for any damage inflicted by German naval vessels to these American craft.

2. German acknowledgment of liability for American ships sunk anywhere by German war vessels, even if the American bottoms are taking contraband to Germany's enemies, as was alleged in the case of the William P. Frye.

3. Germany's promise not to sink American ships carrying conditional contraband to Germany's enemies, even when it is impossible to take such ships into a German port.

4. Germany's offer to arbitrate the German claim of right to sink American ships carrying absolute contraband to Germany's enemies.

5. Germany's acknowledgment of liability for damages to American citizens injured by German attacks on merchant ships, even of Germany's enemies, when these attacks are delivered without warning and without the assailed ships attempting resistance or escape.

6. Germany's promise not to attack unresisting liners, even of her enemies, without warning and without providing for the safety of the passengers and crew.

7. Germany's disavowal of the sinking of the Arabic and an expression of regret at the incident, with notice to the offending submarine commander of this action.

8. Germany's statement that hereafter the mistaken impression of a German submarine commander that his boat was about to be rammed by an enemy merchantman would not be regarded as diminishing German liability for damages inflicted upon American citizens.

All that is left of the points in dispute are minor details that promise an easy settlement. There may be some conversations necessary before the final chapter of the Lusitania controversy is made public.

German Disavowal in the Arabic Case

Ambassador von Bernstorff's letter disavowing the act of the German submarine commander in sinking the steamship Arabic, which was sent to Secretary Lansing on Oct. 5, 1915, *follows:*

Washington, D. C., Oct. 5, 1915.

My Dear Mr. Secretary:

Prompted by the desire to reach a satisfactory agreement with regard to the Arabic incident, my Government has given me the following instructions:

The order issued by his Majesty the Emperor to the commanders of the German submarines, of which I notified you on a previous occasion, has been made so stringent that the recurrence of incidents similar to the Arabic case is considered out of the question.

According to the report of Commander Schneider of the submarine which sank the Arabic and his affidavit, as well as those of his men, Commander Schneider was convinced that the Arabic intended to ram the submarine.

On the other hand, the Imperial Government does not doubt the good faith of the affidavit of the British officers of the Arabic, according to which the Arabic did not intend to ram the submarine. The attack of the submarine was undertaken against the instructions issued to the commander. The Imperial Government regrets and disavows this act, and has notified Commander Schneider accordingly.

Under these circumstances, my Government is prepared to pay an indemnity for American lives which, to its deep regret, have been lost on the Arabic. I am authorized to negotiate with you about the amount of this indemnity.

I remain, my dear Lansing, Yours very sincerely, J. VON BERNSTORFF.

Munition Workers Opposed to Women

An Associated Press Dispatch dated Oct. 5, 1915, *reported:*

Mrs. Emmeline Pankhurst, at a Women's Social and Political Union meeting in London this afternoon, openly denounced as traitors representatives of organized labor who, she said, were opposing the employment of women in the present crisis.

"I asked the Government to set up factories to train women in munitions work," she said. "Mr. Lloyd George was willing, the women were willing, but this training of women was opposed by unionized skilled workers. This is nothing short of treachery, and those who stood in the way were traitors."

The German and British States of Mind

By John Galsworthy

A version of this article originally appeared in The Chicago Tribune. It has been specially revised by Mr. Galsworthy for its appearance in more permanent form in CURRENT HISTORY.

TO talk about this horror is like whispering in a hurricane. If one must whisper, let it be on the psychological aspect of the War, as it concerns Germany and England. White Papers, Grey Books, and so forth are only evidence of the National Positions and States of Mind behind Diplomacy. Let me, then, take the National Position and State of Mind of Germany first.

Germany arrived late on the European stage. She arrived when other Powers, and notably Britain, had attained all the territorial expansion which their wildest dreams could desire. Germany is geographically pinched between races, the Slav and the Frank, and at sea the Briton, with whose spirits the Teuton spirit does not feel itself in accord. This geographical position, coupled with the hate left in France by the wresting of Alsace and Lorraine, or, as the Germans would phrase it, the restoration of those provinces to Germany, inspired in Germany the feeling that for self-preservation she must be mighty in armament. She duly became so mighty as to infect every other country with fear of her intentions. Germany has, since her Unification, developed a highly efficient and remarkable autocracy, and definite national ideals of life and culture, which she believes to be the best in the world. The Military, Bureaucratic, Professorial, and Journalistic circles in Germany, inheriting from Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and other leading spirits, the philosophy that in international affairs "Might is Right," have sedulously fostered it in the people at large, together with a patriotism pervading every thought and action.

To bring these doctrines to full fruition the German Nation has made for two generations great efforts and sacrifices, perfecting and consolidating a Military, Naval, and Social Machine of stupendous power, the consciousness of which, to judge from demeanor and utterance, has filled all Germans with a sincere belief in their superiority to the rest of the world. Germany, moreover, has expanded commercially with a rapidity and success that might well turn the heads of any people.

To sum up: The modern German state of mind is, We were handicapped by our late arrival. We have a racial and philosophic conviction that we have as much, even more, right than those who happened to arrive before us to World Empire and World Leadership, and though we have no wish to disturb Peace, we cannot afford to let anything endanger the full preservation of our national prosperity or hinder the full realization of our national dreams.

I hope this is a fair statement of the German position and state of mind—a position and state of mind based, not on the usual quiet belief in their own country that all peoples feel, but on a frank assumption of national superiority, to be asserted at all costs. Take for illustration the saying, not of an Emperor or Military Bureaucrat, not even of a Professor, but of the leading German poet, Gerhart Hauptmann: "Our victory will guarantee the perpetuation of the Teutonic races to the betterment of the world."

In a word, modern Germany is a throw-back to the epoch before the ideas of Internationalism and Democracy had established themselves; and so mighty and self-confident a throw-back, that she is in danger of dragging the whole world back with her to the point which in her present mood she believes to be the summit of the Universe.

The British Position and State of Mind

is more complicated. Britain is a very curious blend of aristocratic (not autocratic) and democratic feelings; a blend that absolutely cannot be understood by any one who has not lived the English life from his birth up. Britain is and always has been extra-Europan, something strange to the other nations of Europe. This, and the fact that politically she is the oldest and most-settled Western country, are the natural results of her being an island, and having had the chance to develop for centuries at leisure, without foreign interruption, and attain a sort of common sense, live-and-let-live plane of existence. She has long had everything she wants, and cannot therefore claim any credit for not wishing to disturb the world. She is (because she has no reason to be anything else) fundamentally a peace-lover, fundamentally satisfied with things as they are, or, rather, were.

It is something of a rule (to which there are, of course, exceptions) that only when the well-being of a man or nation is guaranteed, can one expect altruistic sentiment to come into play. By the accident of her position Britain has been able to begin to feel sentiment in the matter of World Politics, to assume a championship of Peace, of little nations, of the sanctity of Treaties. And these assumptions have in turn reacted on the English till they really have a certain feeling for the weak, for their pledged word, and so forth. Let any man examine his friends and acquaintances and he will see precisely the same process going on, the same softening altruism progressing in those who have reached a certain point of security, such as has been reached among the nations by Britain, and, more rapidly, by America. This state of mind in that curious country, Britain, has been and still is somewhat clouded to the outside gaze, by a fringe of noisy, imperialistic drum-beaters, who claim for her before the world precisely what the Germans now claim for Germany, that Britons are inherently superior to others, and are in fact what the Germans also think they are—God's own people! To men with any sense of humor and proportion, the claims are equally absurd. But these drum-beaters are less than ever typical of Britain. It may be taken as certain that no British Government could now wage a deliberately aggressive war in Europe, and remain in Office a day.

No British Government (for instance) would ever have received sufficient support to enable it to *initiate* an attack on Germany for the sake of destroying her growing commercial prosperity and naval power as Germans, with a naïve sincerity, believe. Britain, as a whole, has neither fear nor jealousy of German commerce; she has arrived at a point of wisdom or unwisdom which believes that Commerce best takes care of itself, and before this war began anti-German feeling in Britain, apart from a certain mutual dislike of each other's manners, dated only from the initiation of the German Naval Policy, and was due to genuine fear that Germany intended in the long run to attack. Whether or no Germany was acting with that view, or merely, as she said, to safeguard her commerce from attacks that would most assuredly never have been made on it, is now an academic question which can be left to those whom it amuses.

If Germany had not declared war on France, but had waited without offensive movement for an attack on the Franco-German border, Britain would now be neutral. I have no authority for this statement, but it is my deliberate conviction. For, in such circumstances, the British Government, even if so inclined—would not have received a mandate from Parliament, and most surely not from the electors of Parliament. This is one of the many points on which Germany cannot understand Britain. German Ministers are responsible to their Emperor. British Ministers are responsible to Parliament and the electors of Parliament. In Germany there is no connection whatever between the arbiters of national policy and the nation; in Britain there is through Parliament *a very real* connection; so real that our diplomacy in this crisis was even obliged to take a certain tentative character; apparently mistaken, in Germany—where no such check on diplomacy exists—for chicanery. The fact is, Democracy and Autocracy cannot

lie down together, and whenever they try there is misunderstanding to the point of disaster.

When the thunderbolt of the Austrian demand on Serbia was discharged from the blue, the very last thing Britain was thinking about was a European war. The suggestion that she cooked up this devilish hash secretly is the final word in fantasy. The deciding factor for Britain was, without any question whatever, the violation of Belgium's neutrality—one of the most cynical and dire blunders ever made by any nation; and the fact that, through the violation Britain's friend, France, was hit below the belt. The profound disbelief with which this simple reason for British intervention has been received in Germany is but another proof of the impossibility that modern Germany finds in understanding modern Britain. They have got on to different planes of ethical thought. Modern German thought says in effect: "What! You went into this great war for the sake of a broken treaty—a mere scrap of torn-up paper—because you considered your honor involved? Oh! no! You know perfectly well that if it had suited you, as we thought it suited us, you, too, would have broken that treaty. Might is Right! Self-assertion is paramount. One must hack one's way through! Circumstances have given you the chance of your life to destroy us whom you have been longing to destroy ever since we began building our fleet. Hypocrite! Treacherous hypocrite!"

That is the perfectly sincere belief of modern German thought. If I am any judge whatever, if I have a psychological insight at all into the life, thought, and feeling in my own country, I say unreservedly that this belief is an entire misconception not of every individual Briton—by no means—but of the vast majority of Britons, that is to say, of collective modern British thought; and collective modern British thought does, in a way that Germans apparently cannot understand, govern British policy. However unfavorable to Britain the circumstances or combinations might have been, I feel certain she would have gone to war with Germany over the violation of that little country's guaranteed neutrality, and the foul blow it dealt to a friend. I say it, as a hater of war, a despiser of war—*There was nothing else to do!* A treaty is a treaty; honor is honor! Whatever our past, and like all nations we have done some pretty bad things, we do not now indorse this modern German philosophy: "Might is Right." That common little expression, "Playing the game," has come to have a real significance in our country; come to be recognized as a standard, more or less perfectly observed, in every class.

The phrase expresses in minimum terms—and it is our national genius to minimize the expression of everything, in direct contrast to the national genius of Germany, which is to maximize the expression of everything—the phrase expresses, I say, a real national philosophy. Judging from two recent instances — the restrained behavior of American troops fired on by civilians at the occupation of Vera Cruz, and the honorable repudiation by the American Government of a doubtful position over the Panama Canal duties—it has become also the national philosophy of America. Neither England nor America has any right to claim credit for having this national philosophy; nor must it be taken as one that governs their conduct in relation to races that they esteem inferior.*

Thus, so far as Britain is concerned, this war is a struggle between two main states of mind; one taking rise in an autocratically governed country; the other in a country that grows day by day more democratic; one based on naked self-expression, the other on recognition of others besides self. The Germans have qualities of which we British might be proud, just as we have qualities of which the Germans might be proud; but, in so far at all events as European Politics are concerned, the two peoples are head-

*Here is, perhaps, the point of reconciliation between the British and the German national philosophy. They both believe that "Might is Right" in connection with inferior races; but Germany includes in that expression the whole world. Britain no longer does so.

ing in opposite directions. In Germany ends justify means; in England they do not. There never has been, and is not now, any way of reconciling those hostile states of mind; and now that they have come to grips, the one has got to eat the other.

In the eyes of modern Germany we are apparently a decadent people, riddled by liberty, sloth, sentiment, selfishness, and Pharisaism, and for all that very dangerous or we should not be so hated.

In our eyes the Germans have given their souls into the charge of a tyrannous machine; and have become thereby both domineering and servile, and dangerous to the liberties of others. The bitterness between us is the bitterness of strong peoples, each serving with all its might an irreconcilably different ideal of existence.

There are individual Germans—I know some—to whom this "Might is Right" doctrine, Militarism, Culture by rule of iron, and raw nationalist patriotism are abhorrent. There are individual Britons—I know some—who believe in these things, hate Democracy and despise Altruism. A few swallows make no Summer. The main currents and divergences are plain. And the crash has come.

So far as Britain was concerned, the violation of Belgium's neutrality made intervention in this War a terrible matter of course. But the general conflagration seems to have been inherent in the state of perpetual fever that hangs over countries armed to the teeth and controlled by despotic Bureaucracies. I believe it to be in truth a case of the spontaneous combustion of an atmosphere sulphurous for years, and at last overcharged.

In justice to Germany, there is in her attitude a real element of fear for her position, wedged in between strong allied Powers. But she has done her best for years by what, in our deplorable way of minimizing, we should call "gas," to disguise this fear from the world. She should not now be hurt that others do not credit her with an anxiety which has played no small part in precipitating this most ghastly conflict. A queer mixture of arrogance and nerves has done the job. And what a job! What a damnable job!

Confidence

By VINCENT OSWALD.

What's that, my friends? Ye tell me that the Germans in this land
Would be against us—would support the Kaiser if his hand
Tore, ruthless, at the Stars and Stripes?—the flag of those dear shores
Whose great, all-loving voice, in welcome glad, threw wide the doors
Of Opportunity to men of every clime on earth,
And cried: "Join me in Heart and Spirit and forget your birth!"

Say, friends, ye 'maze me! Know ye not that Germans who are here
Chose once for all, with crystal minds—mayhap, though, with a tear—
'Twixt Land and Life, 'twixt Bond and Free, 'twixt Might and human Right?
Why, friends, these be the grandsons of the heroes who durst fight
'Gainst tyranny within the confines of the fatherland
Itself—brave revolutionists, who then sought a freer strand;
These be the sons of men who fought the Fights of Fights—and died!—
That so our nation and those Stars and Stripes might still abide!

And think ye, friends, that men like this would fail in lesser test?
Ye know them not! They've given us themselves, their all, their best.
For weal or woe, they're one with us. My friends, in war's grim blight,
You'd find the Germans at your side, fighting, like you, for RIGHT!

France

By Rudyard Kipling

The subjoined extracts from a private letter of Mr. Kipling, written during his last visit to France, recently appeared in the British press.

* * * I thought I realized something of what was being done by France. I see now that I am only beginning to understand what France is. I can only plead in self-defense that I doubt if France herself knew twelve months ago. France is not merely fighting this war, she is living it, and living it with a gayety and a high heart that, when you get to close quarters, doesn't for a second hide the cold, deadly earnestness and tenacity of her purpose.

I have been in their towns, &c., and I can testify that they bear themselves, men and women, equally resolute—without parade or self-pity. We had tea the other day in a town which the Bosches shell daily, because it is full of women and children and has a fine old church. The cellars of the house were a hospital. But not one word around that cheery table upstairs, where not one shade of daily etiquette was missing, suggested, or even hinted at, the perpetual strain under which they live. They were French; and so long as work was to be done they worked. And they do work! As far as I can see there is not a single action of any individual from one end of France to the other which is not colored and guided and soaked through by their strong determination. * * * We shall come to this ourselves in time, but at the present moment we haven't wholly realized the way in which the French, as I have said, are living this war. We English must be made to understand this for our own sakes as well as for theirs, and the example that the French are setting us can't be rubbed in too often or too hard.

Of course, you know the state of affairs as well as any stranger can; but have you ever really conceived France as a country where there is not one single young or middle-aged man except at the post of duty assigned to him by the military authorities, nor a woman who is not, in her own way and walk of life, engaged in duties directly connected with the war? There is no questioning about woman's action in France. No woman has any doubt of what is expected of her. None of them have time for anything except the war, and still they lose nothing of their charm and their grace. * * *

If it is hard for us to understand the French, it has been harder for the French to understand us. I don't blame 'em! For example. You remember S. talking about that hellish business of ours last April? Couldn't be got to say any more than that it was "damned unhealthy." And he is like all the rest of us. Well, what on earth are the French to make of this sort of thing which they have known now for the past year? And we are just as inarticulate as we were at the beginning. Yet there isn't much difference really between us. Our hostess at the tea party said, with a delightful smile, that, on the whole, bombardment "does not add a zest to life." It might have been S.'s own sister speaking. And it's the same with their men all along the line. But behind the laugh and the outrageous understatement of things there is the spirit that moves mountains. * * *

The readiness and endurance, and again the light heart, among their men is marvelous. They don't stop to argue about things. They are agreed that the only good Bosch is a dead Bosch, and they joyously and zealously do their best to make it so. I think their abundant health and poise (it's a vile word, but you know what I mean) and "devil" struck me most. Next to that was the state of their trenches, which are built and drained and kept as though the war was going on for the next five years.

The trenches are full, too, of useful little ideas and gadgets, which I mean to talk over with you when I come back. * * *

I had the luck to see a very rare thing in this war—the review of an army—40,000 on parade. There was no ceremonial. It was simply the passing of hard-bitten fighting men, and that made it all the more impressive. Once more, it was their radiant health and fitness that made me so happy. Also, I have watched the 75's. They, too, do not deal much in ceremony, but their work is beautiful, and the breech mechanism is a dream of simplicity and efficiency. So, too, is the sighting. Their officers are a cheerful folk, who can work to thirty yards' clearance over their own infantry. * * *

But when all is said and done, it is the men and the women who are the wonders. I could fill a book with details of the life behind the lines and up to the lines—how would you like to graze a cow under big-shell fire?—and the patience and the fervor and terrific industry of all the land. But you must see it to believe it; and when you have seen it you must testify, as I hope to, that nothing that England can do is enough to keep abreast of such an ally.

The Unexpected

By M. E. BUHLER.

One mocked at death, for being strong
of limb
And fearless, death no terrors had for
him:
"From out my course I shall not move
a jot,
Let him approach at will; I fear him
not!"

Yet, when the conqueror whom he
thought to meet
As man meets man, erect upon his feet,
Came creeping in long twilight shadows, he
Fell on his knees and writhed in agony.

Another, not self-confident but frail,
Feared death from his youth upward;
e'en would quail
At every shadow which upon his path
Seemed pointing toward him in its sombre wrath.

Yet, when death came, not wrapped in
lengthened gloom
As all life long this man expected doom,
But sudden in the sunlight, not a trace
Of fear remained; he met him face to
face.

How the United States of America Became a Nation in Arms

A Record of One-Man Rule and of Compulsory Service in Arms During the Civil War

By J. Ellis Barker

Stating that ninety-nine out of every hundred well-educated Englishmen ignore the means whereby the United States raised millions of soldiers at a time when its population was very much smaller than that of the United Kingdom at present, Mr. Barker presents in The Nineteenth Century and After for September the first complete story of conscription in the civil war and of President Lincoln's dictatorial part therein to serve the nation. The article is invaluable as a study showing a precedent for the British democracy during the present war and for the light it throws on the psychology of both voluntary and compulsory service in arms as applied to an intensely democratic people. Somewhat abridged, and omitting largely the documentary quotations needed for establishing his case with completeness, this article from one of Great Britain's most influential reviews appears below, with the express permission of the Leonard Scott Publication Company.

WHEN the South struck its blow for independence there certainly was confusion in Washington and throughout the States of the North. In describing the condition of the country in 1861 the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War reported: "There was treason in the Executive Mansion, treason in the Cabinet, treason in the Senate and the House of Representatives, treason in the army and navy, treason in every department, bureau, and office connected with the Government." The position of affairs was more fully described in the First Executive Order in Relation to State Prisoners, which was issued on behalf of the President by Edwin M. Stanton, the Secretary of War, on the 14th of February, 1862. He wrote:

> The breaking out of a formidable insurrection, based on a conflict of political ideas, being an event without precedent in the United States, was necessarily attended by great confusion and perplexity of the public mind. Disloyalty, before unsuspected, suddenly became bold, and treason astonished the world by bringing at once into the field military forces superior in numbers to the standing army of the United States.
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> Every department of the Government was paralyzed by treason. Defection appeared in the Senate, in the House of Representatives, in the Cabinet, in the Federal courts; Ministers and Consuls returned from foreign countries to enter the insurrectionary councils or land or naval forces; commanding and other officers of the army and in the navy betrayed the councils or deserted their posts for commands in the insurgent forces. Treason was flagrant in the revenue and in the Post Office Service, as well as in the Territorial Governments and in the Indian reserves.
>
> Not only Governors, Judges, legislators, and Ministerial officers in the States, but even whole States, rushed, one after another, with apparent unanimity into rebellion. The capital was besieged and its connection with all the States cut off.
>
> Even in the portions of the country which were most loyal political combinations and secret societies were formed furthering the work of disunion, while, from motives of disloyalty or cupidity, or from excited passions or perverted sympathies, individuals were found furnishing men, money, and materials of war and supplies to the insurgents' military and naval forces. Armies, ships, fortifications, navy yards, arsenals, military posts and garrisons, one after another, were betrayed or abandoned to the insurgents.
>
> Congress had not anticipated, and so had not provided for, the emergency. The municipal authorities were powerless and inactive. The judicial machinery seemed as if it had been designed not to sustain the Government, but to embarrass and betray it.
>
> Foreign intervention, openly invited and industriously instigated by the abettors of the insurrection, became imminent, and has only been prevented by the practice

of strict and impartial justice with the most perfect moderation in our intercourse with nations. * * *

Extraordinary arrests will hereafter be made under the direction of the military authorities alone.

At the touch of war all the factors of national strength, the army, the navy, and the civil administration, had broken down. Consternation and confusion were general. At the head of affairs was a quaint and old-fashioned country attorney from the backwoods, possessed of a homely wit and infinite humor, ignorant of national government, surrounded by treason and besieged by a mob of clamorous office seekers who blocked the anterooms and the passages at the White House, sat on the stairs, and overflowed into the garden. Congress was not in session. Washington was isolated and threatened. It was questionable whether the two houses of the Legislature would be able to meet in the Federal capital. Many people in the North sympathized secretly with the South. Few officials could be trusted. The position was desperate. Everything had broken down except the Constitution. In the hour of the direst need the American Constitution proved a source of the greatest strength, and it saved the country.

The American Constitution had been planned not by politicians but by great statesmen and soldiers, by able and energetic men of action who had fought victoriously against England. They had wisely, and after mature deliberation, concentrated vast powers in the hands of the President, and had given him almost despotic powers in a time of national danger. President Lincoln unhesitatingly made use of these powers. It will appear in the course of these pages that the Southern States were defeated not so much by President Lincoln and the Northern armies as by the Fathers of the Commonwealth, who in another century had prepared for the use of the President a powerful weapon which would be ready to his hand in the hour of peril.

Believing that the United States were likely to be involved in further wars, the founders of the American Republic wished to strengthen the State by making the President powerful and independent, by giving him almost monarchical authority in time of peace, and by making him a kind of dictator in time of war. The United States Constitution states: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States and of the militia of the several States when called into the active service of the United States." In time of danger State rights were to disappear, the military independence of the individual States was to come to an end.

Unlike the British Prime Minister, the American President is free from popular and parliamentary control. He can at any time repudiate a majority of both houses. He can veto any act of Congress, even if it is supported by large majorities, and he has frequently done so, for he is supposed to act solely in the interests of the nation and in accordance with his own conscience, without regard to party majorities and party intrigues. He can place at the head of the army and navy any man he chooses or he can command in person and no one can question his action. His Cabinet, the Secretaries of State, are nominated by him, and they are his subordinates. They are the President's, not the people's, servants. They have no seat and no voice in Congress. They are supposed to stand, like the President, outside and above party, to be servants of the nation as a whole. The Ministers, like the President, cannot be removed by a chance majority. The President and his Secretaries of State are not so constantly hampered in their actions by the fear of losing popularity and office as are British statesmen. The founders of the Commonwealth gave to the President a vast and truly royal authority because they believed that a National Executive could be efficient only if it was strong, and that it could be strong only if it was independent of party ties and intrusted to a single man.

Hamilton, Jay, Gouverneur Morris, John Adams, and other leading men of the time were so much in favor of a strong Executive that they advocated that American Presidents, like British Judges, should be appointed for life and should be removable only by impeachment.

The doctrine that a Government, to be

efficient, requires not many heads but a single head, that a one-man Government, a strong Government, is valuable at all times, and especially in time of national danger, was more fully developed by Hamilton in the seventieth letter of The Federalist.

Great Britain is ruled by a Cabinet, by a number of men who are nominally equal, and the Prime Minister is their President, he is primus inter pares. The British Cabinet Ministers take resolutions collectively and they act, at least in theory, with unanimity. As they act unanimously, there is no individual, but only collective, responsibility for Cabinet decisions. At the present moment twenty-two Cabinet Ministers are collectively responsible for every important decision, even if the decision requires high expert knowledge which few, if any, of them possess, or if it concerns only a single department—such as the army or navy—with which twenty Ministers out of twenty-two in the Cabinet may be quite unacquainted. An anonymous author wrote some years ago of the British Cabinet that it had many heads but no head, many minds but no mind. Government by a crowd is a danger in war time. Hamilton clearly foresaw the weakness and danger of governing by means of a committee of politicians, especially in time of war.

War is a one-man business. To the founders of the American Republic it seemed so essential and so self-evident that only a single hand could direct the army and navy efficiently and "with decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch" that they thought that the paragraph of the Constitution which made the President Commander in Chief of both services was unchallengeable and required neither explanation nor defense. That paragraph is curtly dismissed by Hamilton in the seventy-fourth letter of The Federalist, as follows:

> The President of the United States is to be "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States." The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents of the State Constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even those of them which have in other respects coupled the Chief Magistrate with a council have for the most part concentrated the military authority in him alone.
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> Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength, and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.

At the outbreak of the civil war, when all the factors supporting the Government's authority had broken down, President Lincoln fell back on the Constitution. He rather relied on its spirit as it appears in The Federalist than on its wording, and he did not hesitate to strain his powers to the utmost in order to save the State. On the 15th of April, immediately after the bombardment and fall of Fort Sumter, he called upon the Governors of the individual States to raise 75,000 men of State militia, in proportion to their inhabitants, and to place them in the service of the United States and under his command. These 75,000 men were called upon to serve only for three months, not because the President or his Cabinet believed that the war would last only ninety days, but because, according to the act of 1795, the President had authority which permitted "the use of the militia so as to be called forth only for thirty days after the commencement of the then next session of Congress." A musty law circumscribed and hampered the President's action, but it did not hamper it for long. Very soon it became evident that that preliminary measure was totally insufficient, that energy and novel measures were required to overcome the dangers which threatened the Northern States from without and from within. Relying on the spirit of the Constitution and on his duty to defend the Union at all costs, President Lincoln, to his eternal honor, did not hesitate to make illegal, but not unscrupulous, use of dictatorial powers. On the 27th of April he directed General Scott to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus, if necessary, in order to be able to deal with treason and with opposition

in the Northern States. On the 3d of May he decreed by proclamation that the regular army should be increased by 22,714, or should be more than doubled, and that 18,000 seamen should be added to the navy. At the same time he called for forty regiments, composed of 42,034 volunteers, to serve during three years.

At the beginning of the war the Northern States were almost unarmed. The Government had completely neglected the army and navy. In the country was only a scanty supply of arms and ammunition. Under Buchanan's Presidency an incapable, if not a treacherous, Secretary of War, who later on joined the Southern forces, had allowed large numbers of arms to be removed from arsenals in the North to arsenals in the Southern States, where they were seized by the Secessionists. For the supply of muskets the Government depended chiefly on the Springfield Armory and upon that at Harper's Ferry. The capacity of the private manufacturers was only a few thousand muskets a year, and after the destruction of the arsenal and armory at Harper's Ferry, on the 19th of April, 1916, which contained 15,000 muskets, and which otherwise might have fallen into the hands of the Confederates, the resources of the Government were seriously diminished. The want of arms limited the call of the President on the 15th of April to 75,000 men, and many regiments were detained for a long time in their camps in the different States until muskets could be imported from Europe. Orders for weapons were hastily sent abroad, and many inferior arms were imported at high prices. The Springfield Armory, the capacity of which was only about 25,000 muskets per year, was rapidly enlarged, and its production, assisted by outside machine shops, was brought up to about 8,000 muskets per month at the end of 1861 and to about 15,000 per month shortly afterward. The United States had to pay for their neglect of military preparations in the past. Everything had laboriously to be created. Meanwhile confusion was general. The army which had been collected was merely a mob of ill-armed men. During 1861 the State of Indiana, for instance, had raised and sent into the field, in round numbers, 60,000 men, of whom 53,500 were infantry. The following statement, taken from Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, shows what arms they received during the year:

Muskets and Rifles.

Prussian muskets	4,006
United States rifles	5,290
Padrei rifles	5,000
Belgian rifles	957
New percussion muskets	7,299
Altered percussion muskets	8,800
Long-range rifles	600
Springfield rifles	1,830
Short Enfields	960
Long Enfields	13,898
Saxony rifles	1,000
Austrian rifles, .54 calibre	3,822
Mississippi rifles, .54 calibre	362

In their need, anything that had a barrel was used to arm the troops. The Southern States even fell back upon shotguns and ancient fowling pieces. Gradually order was evolved out of chaos. The inborn energy and talent for organization of the race asserted themselves. The North was far superior to the South in population, wealth, machinery, and appliances of every kind. In the course of time, a large, well-organized, and well-equipped army arose.

At the beginning of 1862 the Southern States were threatened with invasion by large armies. A great forward movement of the Northern forces was ordered to begin on the 22d of February, and rapid progress was being made. Forts Henry and Donelson were rapidly captured from the rebels, Bowling Green and Columbus had to be evacuated, and Nashville surrendered. The entire line of defense formed by the Southern States toward the west was swept away, and a march by the Northern troops into the heart of the Southwestern States seemed imminent. Consternation seized upon the Southern people. The Southern Army of 1861 was composed chiefly of volunteers who had enlisted for twelve months. The voluntary system had yielded all it could yield. It became clear that the Southern States could not successfully be defended by volunteers against the North, that national and compulsory service was needed. The Southern Government was aroused to action, and without hesitation

President Jefferson Davis sent a message to the Confederate Congress in which he laid down that it was the duty of all citizens to defend the State and in which he demanded the introduction of conscription for all men between 18 and 35 years.

He demanded not only conscription but practically the total surrender of State rights. He wished the confederation of Southern States to fight like a single State, recognizing that concentration increases strength. A conscription act was rapidly passed on the 16th of April, 1862.

As conscription for all men from 18 to 35 years did not suffice to fill the depleted ranks of the Southern Army, it was made more rigorous. An order by Brig. Gen. John H. Winder, dated the 1st of August, 1862, stated:

> The obtaining of substitutes through the medium of agents is strictly forbidden. When such agents are employed, the principal, the substitute, and the agent will be impressed into the military service, and the money paid for the substitute, and as a reward to the agent, will be confiscated to the Government. The offender will also be subjected to such other imprisonment as may be imposed by a court-martial.

As desertion from the ranks had weakened the Southern Army, the press appealed to the citizens of the South to assist in the apprehension of deserters and stragglers. All men and women in the country were exhorted to "pursue, shame, and drive back to the ranks those who have deserted their colors and their comrades and turned their backs upon their country's service." Still further exertions were required to prevent the Northern troops invading the Southern States in force. Hence, in September, 1862, the Confederate Congress passed another act of conscription, which called out for military service all men between the ages of 35 and 45.

Years of fighting reduced the ranks of the Southern armies. They could hold their own against the overwhelming numbers of the North only by extending the age limit of compulsory military service still further, by making conscription still more rigorous. In February, 1864, a general military act was passed which enrolled all white men from 17 to 50 years in the army.

The American civil war had begun in April, 1861. At its commencement the people in the North had believed that, owing to their overwhelming superiority in numbers, in wealth, and in resources of every kind, they would be able to subdue the insurgent States by armies raised on the voluntary principle within a reasonable time. However, the war dragged on interminably. Enthusiasm for volunteering diminished, men became cool and indifferent. Owing to the reduced number of workers, wages rose very greatly throughout the Union and men turned rather to the factory than to the army. Week by week the expenditure in blood and treasure increased. At last the people in the North began to see the necessity of abandoning the voluntary system and of imitating the Southern States by introducing compulsory service. It will be of interest to see the way in which public opinion veered around. In his report of the 17th of March, 1866, the Provost Marshal General, James B. Fry, the head of the great recruiting department of the Northern armies, described this change in opinion under the heading "Public Recognition of the Necessity of a General Conscription," as follows:

> During the latter part of 1862 the necessity for a radical change in the method of raising troops in order to prosecute the war to a successful issue became more and more apparent. The demand for reinforcements from the various armies in the field steadily and largely exceeded the current supply of men. The old agencies for filling the ranks proved more and more ineffective. It was evident that the efforts of the Government for the suppression of the rebellion would fail without resort to the unpopular, but nevertheless truly republican, measure of conscription. The national authorities, no less than the purest and wisest minds in Congress, and intelligent and patriotic citizens throughout the country, perceived that, besides a more reliable, regular, and abundant supply of men, other substantial benefits would be derived from the adoption and enforcement of the principle that every citizen, not incapacitated by physical or mental disability, owes military service to the country in the hour of extremity. It would effectually do away with the unjust and burdensome dispro-

portion in the number of men furnished by different States and localities.

But it was not easy to convince the public mind at once of the justice and wisdom of conscription. It was a novelty, contrary to the traditional military policy of the nation. The people had become more accustomed to the enjoyment of privileges than to the fulfillment of duties under the General Government, and hence beheld the prospect of compulsory service in the army with an unreasonable dread. Among the laboring classes especially it produced great uneasiness. Fortunately the loyal political leaders and press early realized the urgency of conscription, and by judicious agitation gradually reconciled the public to it. When the enrollment act was introduced in Congress in the following Winter the patriotic people of the North were willing to see it become a law.

Early in 1863 the bill introducing conscription was placed before Congress at Washington, and was discussed by both houses. The debates were brief and the speeches delivered are most interesting and enlightening at the present moment, when the principle of conscription is hotly discussed, not only in Great Britain but throughout the British Empire. Let us listen to the principal arguments in favor of conscription.

Mr. Dunn, Representative of Indiana, urged the necessity of conscription in the following words:

The necessity is upon us to pass a bill of this character. We have many regiments in the field greatly reduced in numbers. * * * It is due to the gallant men remaining in these regiments that their numbers should be promptly filled up. This cannot be done by voluntary enlistment on account of the influence of just such speeches as are made here and elsewhere denouncing the war; many make a clamor against the war as an excuse for not volunteering. Moreover, a draft is the cheapest, fairest, and best mode of raising troops. It is to be regretted this mode was not adopted at first. Then all would have shared alike in the perils and glories of the war. Every family would have been represented in the field, and every soldier would have had sympathy and support from his friends at home. The passage of this bill will give evidence to the rebels that the nation is summoning all its energies to the conflict, and it will be proof to foreign nations that we are prepared to meet promptly any intermeddling in our domestic strife. The Government has a right in war to command the services of its citizens, whom it protects in war as well as in peace. We, as legislators, must not shrink from the discharge of our high responsibility.

Mr. Thomas, Representative of Massachusetts, stated:

For the last six or nine months a whole party—a strong party—has deliberately entered into a combination to discourage, to prevent, and as far as in it lay to prohibit, the volunteering of the people of the country as soldiers in our army. Members of that party have gone from house to house, from town to town, and from city to city urging their brethren not to enlist in the armies of the nation, and giving them all sorts of reasons for that advice. * * *

Mr. Speaker, this is a terrible bill; terrible in the powers it confers upon the Executive, terrible in the duty and burden it imposes upon the citizen. I meet the suggestion by one as obvious and cogent, and that is that the exigency is a terrible one and calls for all the powers with which the Government is invested.

The powers of Congress, within the scope of the Constitution, are supreme and strike directly to the subject and hold him in its firm, its iron grasp. I repeat what at an early day I asserted upon this floor, that there is not a human being within the territory of the United States, black or white, bond or free, whom this Government is not capable of taking in its right hand and using for its military service whenever the defense of the country requires, and of this Congress alone must judge. The question of use is a question of policy only. * * * It is, in effect, a question to this nation of life or death. We literally have no choice.

The views given fairly sum up the opinion held by the majority of the American people in the North and by that of their representatives at Washington, who passed the Conscription act without undue delay against a rather substantial minority.

In each district a Provost Marshal, acting under the Provost Marshal General, an examining surgeon, and a Commissioner constituted the Board of Enrollment. The enrolling officers were directed to enroll all able-bodied persons within the prescribed ages and to judge of age by the best evidence they could obtain. They were required to make two classes in their returns, the first of all men between 20 and 35 years and the second of all between 35 and 45 years. If we wish to learn how the conscription act worked in the unruly North, where an enormous percentage of the population liable to military service consisted of

immigrant foreigners who often were ill-acquainted with the English language, we should turn to the report which the Provost Marshal General made to the Secretary of War on the 17th of March, 1866. We read:

When the bureau was put in operation the strength of the army was deemed inadequate for offensive operations. Nearly 400,000 recruits were required to bring the regiments and companies then in service up to the legal and necessary standard. Disaster had been succeeded by inactivity, and the safety of the country depended on speedy and continued reinforcement of the army. The insufficiency of the system of recruitment previously pursued had been demonstrated, and the army was diminishing by the ordinary casualties of war, but more rapidly by the expiration of the terms for which the troops had engaged to serve. To meet the emergency a new system of recruitment was inaugurated. The General Government, through this bureau, assumed direct control of the business which had heretofore been transacted mainly by the State Governments. * * *

The following is a condensed summary of the results of the operations of this bureau from its organization to the close of the war:

(1) By means of a full and exact enrollment of all persons liable to conscription under the law of March 3, and its amendments, a complete exhibit of the military resources of the loyal States in men was made, showing an aggregate number of 2,254,063 men, not including 1,000,516 soldiers actually under arms when hostilities ceased.

(2) 1,120,621 men were raised at an average cost (on account of recruitment exclusive of bounties) of $9.84 per man; while the cost of recruiting the 1,356,593 raised prior to the organization of the bureau was $34.01 per man. A saving of over 70 cents on the dollar in the cost of raising troops was thus effected under this bureau, notwithstanding the increase in the price of subsistence, transportation, rents, &c., during the last two years of the war.

(3) 76,526 deserters were arrested and returned to the army.

The vigilance and energy of the officers of the bureau in this branch of business put an effectual check to the widespread evil of desertion, which at one time impaired so seriously the numerical strength and efficiency of the army.

(4) The quotas of men furnished by the various parts of the country were equalized and a proportionate share of military service secured from each, thus removing the very serious inequality of recruitment which had arisen during the first two years of the war, and which, when the bureau was organized, had become an almost insuperable obstacle to further progress in raising troops. * * *

The introduction of compulsion acted as a powerful stimulus to voluntary enlistment throughout the Union,* and, in consequence of this revival of voluntary enlistment, the number of men compulsorily enlisted was not as great as it might have been, especially as the compulsory system was not exploited to the full. Only a comparatively moderate number of those who by law were declared to be liable for military service were called upon to join the army. On the other hand, the moral effect of the passing of the conscription act was very far-reaching and salutary.

The conscription act of 1863 was a most beneficial measure, but it had several grave defects. It failed to place upon the men liable for military service the duty of coming forward without delay. Hence the Government had to search them out.

Enrolled men whose names had been drawn from the wheel for service and who failed to obey the call were liable to the extreme penalty.

Deserters were proceeded against with great energy. Death sentences for desertion were not infrequent, but in many cases they were commuted. Still, from the table given later on, it appears that 261 soldiers of the Northern Army were excuted. Among these were a good many deserters.

The Union Government had made the unfortunate mistake of allowing men who had been enrolled as liable for military duty and who had afterward been "drafted" for service to escape their duties by the undemocratic expedient of finding a substitute or of paying $300. That provision was naturally much resented by the poorer classes, and especially by alien immigrants in the large towns. The opposition made the utmost use of its opportunity, denounced the Government, and incited the masses to resistance. The Provost Marshal General's report tells us that the people were incited against the Government "by the

*This was due to the fact that the individual States vied with one another to fill their quota so as to make compulsion unnecessary.

machinations of a few disloyal political leaders, aided by the treasonable utterances of corrupt and profligate newspapers * * * by a steady stream of political poison and arrant treason." While the Government was obeyed in the country, these incitements led to sanguinary riots among the worst alien elements in several towns, especially in New York, Boston, and Troy. A large part of New York was, during several days, devastated by the mob, and the suppression of the rising cost more than 1,000 lives. When order had been reestablished, Mr. Horatio Seymour, the Governor of New York, expressed doubt whether conscription was constitutionally permissible, and asked President Lincoln to obtain a judicial decision on that point. The President replied on the 7th of August:

> * * * We are contending with an enemy who, as I understand, drives every able-bodied man he can reach into his ranks, very much as a butcher drives bullocks into a slaughter pen. No time is wasted, no argument is used.
>
> This produces an army which will soon turn upon our now victorious soldiers already in the field, if they shall not be sustained by recruits as they should be. It produces an army with a rapidity not to be matched on our side, if we first waste time to re-experiment with the voluntary system, already deemed by Congress, and palpably in fact, so far exhausted as to be inadequate; and then more time to obtain a court decision as to whether the law is constitutional which requires a part of those not now in the service to go to the aid of those who are already in it; and still more time to determine with absolute certainty that we get those who are to go in the precisely legal proportion to those who are not to go.
>
> My purpose is to be in my action just and constitutional, and yet practical, in performing the important duty with which I am charged—of maintaining the unity and the free principles of our common country.

Shortly afterward conscription was enforced throughout New York with the energetic assistance of Governor Seymour, who clearly recognized the pertinence of the President's arguments.

Let us now consider the principal facts and figures relating to the civil war.

It began on the 12th of April, 1861, with the bombardment of Fort Sumter; it ended on the 9th of April, 1865, with the surrender of General Lee and his army to General Grant at Appomattox Court House. Except for three days, the war lasted exactly four years. The history of the civil war is at the same time inspiring and humiliating. It is inspiring because of the patriotism, the heroism, the ability, and the resourcefulness which were displayed by both combatants. Both showed that it was possible to improvise huge and powerful armies. It is deeply humiliating because the civil war is a gigantic monument of democratic improvidence and of unreadiness, of governmental short-sightedness and of criminal waste, of bungling, and of muddle. The North possessed so overwhelming a superiority in population and in resources of every kind, and had had so ample a warning of the threatening danger long before the trouble began, that the war would probably never have broken out had the Northern statesmen exercised in time some ordinary foresight and caution, as they easily might have done and as they ought to have done. If some precautions had been taken and if, nevertheless, the Southern States had revolted, their subjection might have been effected within a few months at a comparatively trifling expenditure of blood and treasure. How crushing the numerical superiority of the North was over the South will be seen from the census figures of 1860, which supply the following picture:

American Population in 1860.

Population of Northern and Western States		22,339,978
White population of Southern States	5,449,463	
Colored population of Southern States	3,653,880	9,103,343
Total		31,443,321

If we compare the total population of the antagonists, it appears that the North had twenty-five inhabitants to every ten in the South, both white and colored. However, as the Southern negroes did not furnish soldiers during the war, we must deduct their number. Thus we find that for every ten possible combatants in the South there were no fewer than forty in the North. In 1860 the

Northern States had two and a half times as many inhabitants and four times as many men able to bear arms as had the Southern States. In addition, the Northern States possessed infinitely greater wealth and infinitely greater resources of every kind than did their opponents.

From the official statistics available it appears that the wealth of the Union was in 1860 about fifteen times as great as that of the Southern States, which were merely producers of food and raw materials. In the course of the war the economic supremacy of the North increased very greatly, for while the manufacturing power of the Northern States expanded rapidly, the economic position of the Southern States deteriorated continually. Northern warships blockaded the coast of the South, and the Southerners could neither sell their staple products—especially cotton and tobacco—nor import the machines, weapons, and manufactures of every kind which they needed. While the North was self-supporting and could freely import from abroad all it required, the South was thrown on its own resources, and before long the people lacked even the most essential things. Hence their sufferings were terrible, while the people in the North lived in relative comfort and affluence.

The people, both in the South and in the North, made a most gigantic military effort. The Secretary of War laid before Congress information from which it appeared that the Northern States furnished altogether the gigantic number of 2,653,062 soldiers. If this colossal aggregate is reduced to a three years' standard they furnished no less than 2,129,041 men. If we compare this figure with the total population of the Northern States given above we find that the North sent to the army 10 per cent. of the total population. The official figures relating to the military effort of the South are incomplete and not reliable. Estimates vary. However, when we draw the average of the various estimates it appears that the Southern States furnished to the army about 1,000,000 men, or approximately 20 per cent. of the white population.

The war entailed colossal losses in men and money. According to the accounts furnished in the Official Record, the war losses of the Northern Army were as follows:

Losses of Northern Army.

Volunteers.	Officers.	Men.	Total.
Killed in action	4,057	61,654	65,711
Of wounds received in action	2,164	39,912	42,076
Of disease	2,688	218,806	221,494
Accidental (except drowned)	141	3,869	4,010
Drowned	102	4,749	4,851
Murdered	36	468	504
Killed after capture	14	89	103
Suicide	24	340	364
Executed by U. S. military authorities.	..	261	261
Executed by enemy	4	60	64
Sunstroke	5	301	306
Other known causes.	61	1,910	1,971
Causes not stated	28	11,987	12,015
Aggregate	9,324	344,406	353,730
Losses of Northern regular army	260	5,538	5,798
Grand aggregate — regulars and volunteers	9,584	349,944	359,528

These figures are considered by many authorities to be an understatement. Some estimate that the Northern States lost approximately 500,000 lives through the war. Through death, the Northern armies lost about 20 per cent. of their men, and the losses come to about 2 per cent. of the whole population. The war loses of the Southern States were approximately as great as those of the North. Apparently about one-half of the Southern Army died, and the deaths caused by the war equal almost 10 per cent. of the white population of the South. Altogether, the American States combined lost between 700,000 and 1,000,000 lives in four years' warfare.

The economic losses caused by the war were enormous. Estimates vary, but the most reliable one gives the figure of $10,000,000,000, or £2,000,000,000. The war bill of the United States continues mounting up through the payment of pensions which entail at present an expenditure of about £30,000,000 a year. The civil war crippled the North financially for many years, but it ruined the South. Between 1860 and 1870 the taxable wealth of Virginia decreased from $793,249,681 to $327,670,603; that of

South Carolina from $548,138,754 to $166,517,591; that of Georgia from $645,895,237 to $214,535,366, &c.

Let us now consider the principal lessons of the civil war:

If the American statesmen had exercised merely reasonable caution and foresight the war would probably never have occurred. The principal towns of the South lie near the sea border, in spacious bays or up-river. They were protected against an attack from the sea by strong forts. By adequately garrisoning these forts in time, as General Scott, the head of the army, had advised President Buchanan, the American Government could have dominated the rebellious towns, and could have cut their connection with the sea as had been done with the best success at the time of the nullification troubles of 1832. Unfortuntely, President Buchanan paid no attention to the views of his military experts.

Washington said in his fifth annual address: "If we desire to avoid insult we must be able to repel it. If we desire to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war." He and many of the founders of the Republic had pointed out in The Federalist and elsewhere that it was dangerous for the country to rely merely on an untrained militia, and had urged the necessity of maintaining an adequate standing army. Unfortunately their warnings were not heeded by the short-sighted and unscrupulous politicians. Had the United States possessed a small standing army ready for war, the Southern States would scarcely have dared to rise, and had they done so their power could easily have been broken. In the opinion of many American military experts a standing army of 50,000 men would have sufficed to end the war in a few months. The disregard of the views of the military experts, and the criminal levity and recklessness of self-seeking politicians cost the United States approximately a million lives and £2,000,000,000. They paid dearly for their previous improvidence and their neglect of military preparations.

When the bombardment of Fort Sumter began, when the army, navy, and the whole administrative and judicial apparatus broke down, the dissolution of the great Republic seemed inevitable. The Union was saved by a man of sterling character but of merely moderate ability, by a great citizen but scarcely a statesman of the very first rank. Abraham Lincoln was animated by an unwavering faith in the Union and in the righteousness of its cause. Undismayed by disaster, he rallied the waverers, encouraged the downhearted, and created harmony among the quarreling parties. When matters seemed desperate, he mobilized the country, raised a huge army, and saved the State by his exertions. Had a Buchanan or a Johnson been in power the Union would undoubtedly have been lost. He did not hesitate to exceed his constitutional powers and to act as a dictator when the fate of his country was at stake. In Lord Bryce's words: "Abraham Lincoln wielded more authority than any single Englishman has done since Oliver Cromwell." One-man rule undoubtedly saved the United States.

The British Constitution is unwritten, is fluid, is adaptable to the necessities of the moment. It has been created by gradual evolution, and it lends itself easily to the creation of a one-man Government for the duration of the war. The Prime Minister need only be made solely responsible for the conduct of the Government in all its branches during the war. By thus increasing the power of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Ministers would be made responsible merely for their departments. They would be responsible to the Prime Minister and he to Parliament. Cabinet Ministers could therefore devote themselves practically entirely to their administrative duties. They would become the Prime Minister's subordinates. He would assume sole responsibility for important decisions. He would consult the Cabinet Ministers, but could no longer be hampered in his action by the opposition of one or several of his colleagues. The direction of affairs would no longer be in the hands of an unwieldy body, such as could not successfully direct any business. The State would possess a managing director, as does every business, and thus foresight,

unity, energy, dispatch, and secrecy in action might be secured.

Many Englishmen extol the voluntary system and oppose compulsory service because in their opinion compulsion, conscription, is undemocratic. Most of these are quite unaware that the greatest, the freest, and the most unruly democracy in the world gladly submitted to conscription half a century ago, and appear to forget that France and Switzerland recognize that the first duty of the citizen consists in defending his country. If the United States found conscription necessary to prevent the Southern States breaking away and forming a Government of their own, how much more necessary is the abandonment of the voluntary system when not merely the integrity but the existence of Great Britain and of the empire is at stake!

While the Southern States armed their whole able-bodied population at an early date, the Northern States were late in introducing conscription. Besides, conscription was with them only a half measure, as has been shown. They introduced it only on the 3d of March, 1863, two years after the outbreak of the war, and as they failed to arm all available men the war dragged on for two whole years after conscription had been introduced. The fourfold superiority in able-bodied men and the fifteenfold superiority in wealth would undoubtedly have given to the Northern States a rapid and complete victory had they acted with their entire national strength at the outset.

The United Kingdom and the British Empire have made enormous efforts, but greater ones will be needed. The United States have provided this country with a great and inspiring precedent. The Northern States placed 10 per cent. and the Southern States 20 per cent. of their entire population in the field. If Great Britain should follow the example of the Northern States she alone would be able to raise 4,500,000 men. If she should follow the example of the South she should be able to provide 9,000,000 soldiers. The British losses during the first year of war have been appalling, but they are small if compared with those incurred by the Americans in the civil war. If Great Britain should lose men at the same rate as the Northern States her dead would number about 1,000,000. At the proportion of the Southern States her dead would number about 4,000,000. Great Britain and her daughter States have an opportunity of demonstrating to the world that they have as much energy, resourcefulness, patriotism, and vitality as the men who laid down their lives in the terrible campaign of 1861-5. If the United States were ready to make the greatest sacrifices for preserving their Union, the United Kingdom and the Dominions should be willing to make sacrifices at least as great for the sake of their existence.

At the dedication of the Soldiers' Cemetery in 1863, Abraham Lincoln pronounced the following immortal words:

> It is for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain, that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

These words are known by heart by every American schoolboy. They may well serve as a memento and as a motto to Englishmen of the present generation and inspire them in the heavy task which lies before them.

"*Facts from the*

Frankfurter Zeitung"

"One Year of War"

"Territory Occupied on the Eastern Front"

The Territory Occupied by Central Powers. (Light Shading)
The Territory Occupied by Russians. (Dark Shading)

Middle of August, 1914



First of August, 1915

"Cost of the War"

"Cost of the First Year of the War to England"



"The Savings of English Industry in a Year of Peace"

[Frankfurter Zeitung's Charts]

"Territory Occupied on Western Front"

Enemy's Territory Occupied by Germany. (Light Shading)
Aug., 1914 Enemy's Territory Occupied by Allies. (Dark Shading) Aug., 1915



"Possession of Conquered Territory From Month to Month"





- - - - - - - French Curve ——— German Curve ..... Russian Curve ——— Curve of Central Powers

"The first chart displays the varying fortunes on the Western front, the second chart those on the Eastern front. It will be noted that after the first two and one-half months of war, the positions on the Western front remained stationary. On the Eastern front, however, the Russians at first made large gains which later were entirely wiped out and reversed by German successes."

[Frankfurter Zeitung's Charts]

"Comparisons Between English

Germany	July 15, 1915
Imperial Bank Notes	*M* 5415 Mill.
Currency Notes	" 240 "
Public Deposits	" 751 "
Other Deposits	" 1852 "
Total	*M* 8258 Mill.
Gold Reserve	" 2392 "
Proportion of reserves to liabilities . .	28.94%

[Frankfurter Zeitung's Charts]

"Savings Deposits of the German People"

The Savings Capacity of the German People Before and During the Year of the War

Before the War



"Shortly before the war, German savings had passed the proud sum of twenty thousand million marks. Although the depositors had, in the meantime, subscribed more than two thousand millions of war loans, at the end of the first year the deposits showed an increase of more than two hundred millions."



and German Money Standards"

England	July 15, 1915
Bank Notes	£ 34.5 Mill.
Currency Notes	" 49.3 "
Public Deposits	" 53.0 "
Other Deposits	" 146.7* "
Total	£ 283.5 Mill.
Gold Reserve	" 53.1 "
Currency Notes Reserve	" 28.5 "
Total Gold Reserve	£ 81.6 Mill.
Proportion of reserves to liabilities	28.79%

* £ 158.0 Mill., deducting 11.3 Mill. on behalf of Currency Notes Redemption Accounts of the Bank of England.

[Frankfurter Zeitung's Charts]

"Industrial Col

"The Portions of industrial France either oc

Coal: 68.8%



Iron Ore: 90%

"Increased Cost of Living in England"



"The curved lines on the left show the increased cost brought about by the war in two of the most important commodities on the English market, grains and meats, as well as the products of the mines. The basis for these calculations is to be found in the London Economist. This publication calculates the average prices of the more important commodities, based on the average prices from 1901 to 1915; this average for grain and meats shows an index figure of 500, and for products of the mines 400. The deviation from these figures since the beginning of the war are indicated on the chart."

lapse of France"

cupied by Germans or included in the war zone"



Pig Iron: 85.7% Textile Industry: 68.7% Total Industry: 43%

"Captured Guns 6,000"



Impeachment of German-Americans

By Professor Hugo Muensterberg

of Harvard University

THIS is not written in my own defense. Whenever during this year of displeasure Germanophobic voices have thundered against me the crushing question, Are you an American or merely a German-American? I have answered every time with a clear conscience: Neither. I am a German and have never intended to be anything else.

I did not leave Germany because I liked it less. I was professor at a German university when Harvard invited me to develop here the interest for experimental psychology. I accepted the invitation at first for a short time only, and under the condition that I might stay here as citizen of my Fatherland. Later, when many a European summons called me back, I resisted every temptation and stayed on not only because the American scholars urged me to continue, but chiefly because I had become fascinated by the hope to help toward international amity.

I have always proclaimed—the history of the war has proved the complete truth of this conviction—that not the practical interests but feelings and emotions control the political events. The feelings between nations depend upon their mutual understanding. The harmony between Germany, England, and the United States at which I aimed could thus best be furthered if I helped to interpret the German ideals to the English-speaking lands and the Anglo-Saxon ideals to Germany. I might have continued my psychological researches in Germany as well as here, but for this task as interpreter I had to stay in America.

For more than twenty years I have toiled for this peaceful end. I feel that I succeeded at least in retouching the absurd picture of the American which alone was familiar to the Europeans, and all my efforts over there crystallized in the Amerika-Institut, which I organized in Berlin. It was only the natural counterpart that when, during the last year, American sentiment rushed into the anti-German camp, I remained loyal to my aim of interpreting the other side. I did not attack the enemies of Germany, but tried to show that Germany was not to be blamed either, that every country fulfilled its historic duty.

This was, of course, resented by those who denounce the Germans as culprits, and I have been blamed for my belief in German virtue just as I had been often attacked in Europe on account of my incessant preaching that the Americans are not materialists but at bottom idealists. All this, however, had not the least to do with actual politics. I never have participated in a political action of the German-Americans, I never have signed a motion. I knew that I was an invited guest with the duties of a guest, even if the host sometimes forgot the guest's privileges.

But just because I stand entirely outside of German-American politics, I may be permitted to testify on the witness stand in the solemn trial which the whole nation has opened in these Summer days against those millions of American citizens who emphasize their German descent. The first indictments referred only to the zeal with which they worked against anti-German agitation. The gross offense of which they were accused was that of German propaganda when in a neutral land they resisted the effort to tarnish and stain the land of their parents and grandparents.

But the charge has become much more serious since large meetings in the big cities, assemblies and congresses with resolutions, have indicated that under the whip of the war the Teutonic masses have decided to strengthen their front, and to insist on a forceful influence upon the national life of the country. This was a much more dangerous crime than the mere propaganda for the German bel-

ligerents. This was the forming of an alien party on American soil, of a State within the State, of an anti-American army. This must have results which reach far beyond the time of the war. It is a crime against the spirit of true Americanism. Is it surprising that the indignation has risen to a high pitch and that men who were born on German soil have become alarmed, uncertain whether this movement of the German-Americans may not contradict their oath to the great Republic?

But the case is too grave to be dismissed with the haste of a Georgia jury. What are the real issues and what are the facts? Perhaps no arraignment has been more vehement than that which Oswald Garrison Villard, himself born of a German father in Germany, made in a forceful address delivered at Stockbridge. With flaming words he denounces the political traits of the country which his father left: "The distance between the two countries politically is surely as great as the ocean between their shores. Let those who will proclaim as the objective of all human development the intensely centralized all-wise, all-seeing State. True Americans will have none of it, not King nor Kaiser, nor military autocrat, nor aristocrat, nor government from above, not even if it makes the cities beautiful, cares for its sick and dependent as no other political system, develops education as none before and conquers the industrial world by wedding science to industry. For there is something nobler and better than efficiency, something far more worth while than good government, and that is self-government. No such blessing as this exists today in Germany, where the right to vote not once but several times at each election is the privilege of property owners, as in Prussia, where there is no responsible Ministry in the Reichstag to be changed by the popular will, where autocrat and Junker control the Government, while Agrarians dominate its fiscal policy even to the extent of putting taxes on food to grind the poor."

Is this really still a time when such a verdict can be accepted by thinking Americans? Freshmen debaters may still wrangle about the question whether the monarchical or the republican State form is the better one in general. Those who have learned to think historically know that State forms cannot be arbitrarily made and that a republic for Germany would be as ludicrous as a monarchy for the United States. Each State form has its shadows as well as its lights.

But is it true that monarchical Germany is really less self-governing than republican America? A year ago we heard that the Emperor made war against the will of the nation. Today the world knows at least that people and Emperor were one in this war from the hour in which Russia mobilized her troops, while Americans learned that their President indeed has the power to decide upon war or peace in lonely reflection.

And what became of the fancy that the King and the aristocrats are the war-makers, while the quiet citizen is pacifistic? Do we not know now that the Kaiser and the Chancellor and the aristocratic diplomats are in favor of compromises and concessions and conservative peace conditions, while Tirpitz, the man of the middle class—he got his nobility only as Admiral—and the industrial associations and the Chambers of Commerce are the ones who insist on the sharper warfare and on annexations in France and Russia?

It is true that Agrarians dominated the fiscal policy "even to the extent of putting taxes on food," but are those Agrarians not part of the people which governs itself, and is Mr. Villard not aware that this Agrarian policy was one of wisdom and has saved the country? If the anti-Agrarians had prevailed with their tax policy in the interest of industry German agriculture would have faded away as that of England did, and the German Nation would have been completely dependent upon imports, while it can now live on in the midst of the English blockade.

And is it fair to denounce the German rights of voting by pointing to some antiquated methods in the election for the Prussian Diet, that is, for a single State? What has the Diet of Prussia to do with

German politics? Does Mr. Villard not know that the vote for the German Reichstag is based on the freest manhood suffrage known in any country in Europe, incomparably freer than the vote in England? Is the Ministry really not responsible to the Reichstag? The Emperor cannot veto a bill, and, more important, every figure in the budget of the Government is dependent upon the vote of the Reichstag. The Reichstag can withhold the salary of the Chancellor and the Secretaries and can stop the whole machine of government by refusing the appropriations.

Yes, the German Nation governs itself just as much as the American. Misuses may disfigure the system there as well as here, but both lands are lands of freedom. Yet does this mean that there is no essential inner difference? Certainly not. In full freedom and mature self-government the German people aim toward different ideals and organize their life with different beliefs from those of the Anglo-Saxon race.

The fundamental issue has often been shown in this year of excited discussions. If all the absurd misunderstandings and willful distortions be disregarded and the pitiful declamations about Treitschke and Nietzsche be set aside the real difference comes clearly to light—the Anglo-Saxon system is controlled by the belief in the individual as such and the Teutonic ideals are bound by the belief in the overindividual soul.

The greatest happiness of individual men on the one side, the growth of cultural value, independent of the happiness which they bring, on the other side; that is the world contrast. Everything else necessarily results from it. The overemphasis on the State as the bearer of the cultural values on the German side, the submission of the State to the perfection of the individuals on the Anglo-Saxon side, are the necessary consequences.

Like two great religions, these two groups of ideals are blessing Western mankind, both strikingly different from ideals of the East. Different virtues must be emphasized, different defects must be censured, when the State is made to serve the individuals and their happiness, than when the individuals are to serve the State as the bearer of the national culture. This difference must not be minimized. We must keep it steadfastly before our eyes.

But what follows from it, if the German-Americans really proclaim that they wish to spread in this country a belief in those German ideals? Does it mean in the least that American citizens become disloyal to the country of their choice? Does it mean that they transact the business of Germany if they feel from the bottom of their hearts that an admixture of German ideals and German instincts ought to become the goal of the whole American Nation?

Surely this would be disloyalty if it were taken for granted that the American Nation can have only the one destiny —to be the embodiment of Anglo-Saxon ideals. But this is a postulate which the German-Americans absolutely decline to accept. There was never a land which, by its whole historic development and by the very conditions of its birth and its growth, acknowledged so frankly that it was not to depend upon a ready-made code of traditions, but that it was to develop its inner life by the will and the purpose of its inhabitants.

A European who was admitted to American citizenship was welcomed to a community of men who felt themselves bound together not by a common past, but by a common future. America does not mean a reminiscence, but a task. The immigrant, from whatever nation he comes, pledges by his oath of allegiance fundamentally only that he will contribute the very best which is in him to the development of the United States. It is not his duty, it is not even his right, to deny the ideals which are living in him in order to imitate the behavior of others who are filled with a different faith. It was necessary that the Anglo-Saxon ideals should have prevailed for a long while and that the newcomers who were disorganized should have become assimilated to the philosophy of public life which they found around them.

But this spell has been broken. Even the masses have firmly grasped the fun-

damental fact that not England but all Europe is the mother country of the United States. Those of low, selfish aim who have no interest but success in their private affairs may have yielded to the superficial dogma that the German and the Scandinavian, the Irish and the Italian, ought to accept the Anglo-Saxon ideals which those of English descent brought to these shores. Those who sought not profit and comfort alone, who wanted to work for the good of the Commonwealth, had to choose a less convenient way. They had to struggle for the recognition of their own ideals and to make them blend with the traits of the nation. They recognized the greatest mission of America, the mission not to be only England over again or any other European land, but by the joint forces of men of all the countries to fuse contrasting ideals into a harmonious whole which should truly express the faith of all its citizens.

The Norwegian and the Greek, the Dutch and the Italian, the Irish and the German, who come here are poor Americans if they come only to take and not to give, if they come only with the desire to profit from that which the others have accomplished and not with the persistent will to bring their own best traits and their own inherited virtues into the service of all. The Italian whose only ambition is to forget Naples and to garb himself in English physical and mental and moral costume is on the debit side of American life. He had better stay at home. But if he comes to bring into the colorless American life the Italian feeling for color and beauty, of sense enjoyment and enthusiasm, he enriches the country of his new allegiance and makes himself worthy to be an American. He does not serve Italy by that, he fulfills his duty to his new country if he keeps all which was noble and glorious in his native land living in his own heart and in those of his children and spreads it in his community.

This is the spirit in which the German-Americans felt it their sacred duty to keep warm the memories of their racial past and to foster the German ideals and the German virtues in their American homes and in their American cities. That in itself has nothing whatever to do with help to the German Nation. It does not even necessarily involve a desire for special friendship between America and Germany; it proclaims only the firm conviction that the land of their hope will be a better and a nobler country if the ideals of their fathers are merged in the public life.

The Germans felt this duty perhaps more than others from the European Continent just because their national ideals are so strongly contrasting with some Anglo-Saxon creeds. Had it been only the love for music and flowers, for Christmas trees and gardens, for folk songs and fairy tales, it would have been insignificant, and they might have sacrificed it with a clear conscience.

But endlessly more important impulses were at stake. Their whole devotion to the overindividual ends, their faith in the State as bearer of the ideals, their trust in thoroughness and discipline, in purity and loyalty, were involved. They had become almost unconscious of this contrast in the routine of everyday life. But the great struggle about the war has awakened the burning consciousness of the tremendous issue. They suddenly have felt with shame that they had not done enough to bring these German ideals into the American life and to arouse understanding for their eternal value. Now they suddenly knew that they would disgrace themselves as Americans if they were disloyal to their foremost American duty. They pledged to keep the fire of the German belief alive on their hearth forever.

Is our time unfit for this message of German idealism? Is American life not in need of this gospel of thoroughness and discipline? Is it really better for the American future if those impulses which speak the soul of Germany are eliminated in order that the Anglo-Saxon instincts alone keep control of the land?

American politics has profited from the balance between the centralizing and the decentralizing energies in the country between the power of the nation and the power of the States. It would have been disastrous if only the one or the other

had determined the fate of the country. Is not just this balance needed between the individualistic Anglo-Saxon impulses and the overindividualistic German ideals? In the week in which Mr. Villard blamed the Germans for insisting on the right of their ideals, Mr. Metcalfe wrote: "That dramatic art is in a condition of deterioration is not to be denied. That is also true of our literature, of our painting, of our sculpture, of our education, of our journalism, of our politics, of our business integrity, of our statesmanship, of our religion, of our patriotism, and of all the things where idealism counts. We are practical; we are commercial; the great god graft is our divinity."

I do not think that this diagnosis is true either. There is certainly too much graft, but dishonesty is not a fundamental fault of the American make-up. Who is the true enemy of American life?

On the morning of July 24 every one in the United States found on the first page of his newspaper the note in which the American Government told Germany that it would consider it an unfriendly act in the ominous sense of diplomatic language if the further pursuit of German warfare against English ships should lead to the drowning of an American citizen. Millions who were clamoring for an American war in the interest of the Allies read the message of that July morning with fervent enthusiasm. Other millions to whom the horrors of war without a national life necessity appear sinful read it with fear. Still other millions to whom a war between the United States and Germany appears a ghastly disaster read it with despair. But all asked in highest tension, What will be the answer? Will Germany really prove to be the first enemy which America faces in this twentieth century?

But a higher power than human diplomacy gave the answer without waiting, right in the hour in which the question was asked. On the same morning on which Secretary Lansing's message was heard around the world, not one, not ten, not a hundred, but nearly a thousand American citizens were drowned and found a death of horror in the waters.

Who was the enemy who dared to sink the American ship with her living freight? Who killed the many hundred joy-seeking Chicago people without warning? We all know that it was the spirit of carelessness and recklessness which torpedoed the pleasure boat, the same spirit which sank the Slocum with a thousand victims a few years ago. That is the true enemy today and has been the enemy for many a year, an enemy which cunningly and wantonly destroyed American life, the only real enemy which ought to be fought with the united force of the nation.

Can we forget the losses which the people have suffered—railroad accidents ten times more frequent than in Europe, murders almost a hundred times more numerous than in the leading countries of the Old World? But this enemy within the American borders has not only maimed and killed hundreds of thousands every year. It has devastated the natural treasures in the people's possessions, wasting the forests and the mines and the rivers, destroying the timber and the coal of future generations. It has even crippled the moral life, making education superficial and shallow, emptying the churches and filling the dance halls and saloons, undermining the family life and driving mankind to senseless chase for wealth and luxury and mere pleasure. Even the belittlers of Germany have never denied that the German mind is devoted to thoroughness and seriousness, to carefulness and lawfulness, to reverence and self-discipline. This German belief in training and expert judgment, in authority and efficiency, is the one weapon which can overcome the dangerous happy-go-lucky carelessness of American life.

May it not be said that the enmity against Germany which has taken hold of wide circles in America and the resulting war excitement have had no more treacherous effect than the sudden interruption which they brought in the struggle against this spirit of recklessness and lawlessness in the land? The fight against it had begun in many lines. The big crackers on the Fourth were forbidden, steel cars were built and many a grade crossing abolished, the country-

ISMAIL HAKKE PASHA

Late Grand Vizier of Turkey, Who Was Sent to Berlin to Effect the New Turco-Teuton Entente.

(Photo © by American Press Assn.)

GENERAL DANGLIS

Chief of Staff of the Greek Army and New Minister of War of Greece

(Photo from Paul Thompson.)

wide movements for the conservation of the national resources began, the work against infant mortality and race suicide, against vice and intemperance had started, more and more old-age pensions and accident insurance were introduced, the schools were improved, child labor was reduced, some City Governments were cleaned. The spirit of carelessness and recklessness was at least threatened by a new spirit of thoroughness and conscientiousness.

The nation began to feel that instead of the go-as-you-please method traditions of healthy discipline must be gained. The child must learn to do his duty even if it is unpleasant. Self-discipline is more valuable than smartness, the respect for the expert more needed than the boldness with which every one feels ready to judge about everything. Unselfish endeavor and true religion are a greater glory than the power to buy the world. Haphazard whims were to be replaced by the methods of efficiency. All was in the midst of noble development, and all this was suddenly interrupted and threatened with wholesale destruction.

The reckless spirit of dash seemed to take command of the masses again. All the cheap instincts must be let loose when the cry is raised, "The enemy is beyond the ocean!" The real enemy at home must then be forgotten. All suspicion and fear, all boast and anger turn against the imagined enemy far away. Firecrackers burst again, the passions sway, the fire-eaters shout, and where yesterday the sober advice for "safety first" was still heard, reckless voices were outdoing one another in the demand to carry the gruesome war from distant Europe into the quiet land of America. It was exactly as President Lowell said to the Harvard students at the end of the last academic year: "Do not forget that we are hysteric people."

If hysteria takes hold of the national mind, the process of wholesome discipline must be stopped. It is easy to make a hero out of Harry Thaw, and to make a criminal out of William II., but it cannot be done without serious harm to the conscience of the whole people. If America turns against Germany, it is a misfortune; but if this enmity against the Germans destroys the influence which Teuton ideals had at last gained in this country, if the spirit of thoroughness is subdued again, the misfortune is much greater. The duty of the German-Americans to interpret the ideals of public life in the sense of their Teutonic traditions was never more important for the progress of America.

The overwhelming mass of the people from the Atlantic to the Pacific seem in this hour united by the belief in the need of military preparedness. This, too, may perhaps be hasty. The ideal of peace at any price is surely not unworthy, and a persistent refusal to enter into the race for armament may truly be an effective means to work toward lasting peace. Yet it cannot be denied, however noble the pacifistic ideals are, their promoters have not succeeded as yet in proposing a single plan by which war would be abolished and yet at the same time possibilities be given for the healthy growth of progressive peoples and for the historically necessary reduction of decadent nations.

As long as such a scheme does not exist the American Nation is probably wise in doing like the others and in preparing for the possibility of a defensive war. But is this really possible with any hope for success as long as those ideals of the German-Americans, as long as expert judgment and thoroughness are ridiculed, discipline and authority denounced, and every free American believes that he may act as he pleases and that he may rely on smartness and dash?

Remember the Eastland! The training of an army can never begin in Plattsburg camps; it must begin in the nursery and in the little schoolroom. However the European war may end, at its beginning Russian and French armies felt sure that they would soon enter the Brandenburg gate of Berlin; and today no foreign soldier is on German soil. Germany has so far won on land over a threefold superiority.

Who has done it? Hindenburg had his share, but German parents who taught their children discipline, German school teachers who taught their pupils thor-

oughness, have won the war up to today. If America believes in preparedness, it cannot buy it in the munitions factories; it can gain it only by developing those virtues which give meaning to the German-American creed.

Yet preparedness for and triumph in war are only a fraction of the national life. Every other phase, in education and morality, in art and science, in industry and law, demands the same contribution. The German-Americans cannot be blamed for insisting on gaining more influence when the needs of the time are so crying and when they feel that they can contribute exactly what is needed.

It is easy to denounce the hyphenated citizens. He who sees deeper must recognize that the hyphen is a symbol of honor and that the German-Americans and the Irish-Americans, the Italian-Americans and the Norwegian-Americans, and the Anglo-Americans may all be equally proud of their hyphen if it is to them a sign of the pledge to contribute their racial ideals to the glorious fabric of the American Nation.

German-Americans and the United States

By Professor Albert Bushnell Hart

of Harvard University

IN setting forth his new Teutonic doctrine Professor Hugo Müensterberg elaborately discusses what he calls "The Impeachment of German-Americans." This "indictment" or "solemn trial" of the Germans he refers back to three supposed charges: (1) "The zeal with which they worked against anti-German agitation"; (2) "The farming of an alien party on American soil, of a State within the State, of an anti-American army"; (3) "An attempt to introduce into American life and the American State German principles of arbitrary government." Professor Münsterberg candidly excludes himself from the German-Americans and asserts himself to be a German and a German only, who may, therefore, study the question with detachment.

The text of the article is measured and courteous. No one can take exception to the tone or the language used, which is the more reason for carefully going into the doctrine thus laid down, for it comes from a German who for eighteen years has been an alien resident of the United States and has strong views with regard to the rightful influence and future activity of his blood-brethren who have elected to become Americans. It may appear before we get through that Münsterberg's agreeable words express a doctrine which till a year ago was novel to Americans, and which involves a theory of race relations which would be of immense harm to the Republic.

Till recently nobody except registers of voters concerned themselves with the status of a man who was German in appearance, spoke German, perhaps as his only language, and called himself a "German." He might be either one of four things: (1) A German citizen sojourning in the United States for a brief time; (2) a German citizen established here for life; (3) a former German citizen, now naturalized in this country; (4) a native-born citizen, descended from German ancestry.

They were all welcome. They bore a national character for industry and public spirit. Many of them married with Americans of other race descents. They were a valuable and valued element in the population of many cities and many States.

Actually there is a serious difference between the German-born or person of German descent who is still a German subject and one who has become an American citizen. The former is under many obligations and restrictions which do not apply to the latter. In many

States he cannot vote at all and in the others only if he has taken steps looking toward naturalization. He is subject to the call of his own Government in case of war, as hundreds of thousands have realized during the last year. He is entitled to the aid and protection of his own Government in this country if he needs it. He has no claim to remain in the country if Congress chooses to enact that he shall depart.

On the other hand, he is entitled to the protection of the laws and courts, and city, State and National Governments. He receives some privileges which his own Government would not dream of bestowing upon foreigners. For instance, Hugo Münsterberg has for many years been a professor of an American university; while in some German States, and probably in all, no one can possibly become a regular professor except by naturalizing himself as a German.

The alien resident has all the privileges of free speech and a free press possessed by citizens. Yet as a guest and sojourner it would be a monstrous breach of breeding for him to endeavor to build up political parties in this country, or to take part in movements for putting pressure upon the United States Government.

One of the equally serious "indictments" against the Germans is that many of them who owe allegiance only to the German Empire have taken advantage of this hospitality of the United States to make trouble for the Government, and to rouse all whom they can influence against the measures of the Administration.

It is they who have most persistently accused American business men and the whole Government of encouraging kinds of business which aid the Allies, and are therefore unfavorable to the German armies; hence, in the view of these favored aliens, they are contrary to good morals and to international law. Even a man of so much experience, weight, and good intentions as Bernhard Dernburg discovered that his usefulness in America was at an end when he defended the killing of the Americans on the Lusitania, for which the Administration demanded redress as a wanton attack upon the lives of noncombatant Americans.

The naturalized German and his descendants are on an entirely different footing. In the eyes of the law, he is a complete citizen in every particular, except that the United States by treaty with Germany has consented that two years' residence in the original home country, without showing any intention to return, may cause the forfeiture of American citizenship and a return to German citizenship. The naturalized citizen must not only pay taxes and obey the laws like the aliens, he must also serve his country if called upon in time of war.

On the other hand, if he goes abroad he is entitled to something that the alien never has, namely the protection of the United States Government. President Taft went so far as to put an end to a treaty with Russia which had lasted nearly a hundred years, because Russia refused to give the ordinary privileges of travel to Jewish-American citizens.

The alien German and the naturalized German have this in common, that they both came to the United States in order to better themselves. Nobody compelled them, nobody paid them. They made their own choice. If they ever accepted Professor Münsterberg's argument that Germany is much better governed; if the German education, social life, civic spirit, governmental efficiency really seemed to them so much higher than ours, then why in the name of the Temple of the Thousand Gods have they not all gone home long ago?

Every German who comes to this country as anything except a passing visitor thereby expresses his opinion that he does not like Germany enough to live there. If there is truth in one-tenth of the passionate adoration of all German methods, which has been so plentiful in the ultra German-American press, we must make up our minds to lose several millions of our most esteemed fellow-citizens as soon as the war is over and the German steamers begin to run again.

Professor Münsterberg seems to suppose that most of the permanent resi-

dents or temporary residents have, like himself, come over in order to bring a higher and nobler civilization to America. It would be safe to say that forty-nine-fiftieths of them came here to raise not us, but themselves; because wages were higher, or the conditions of life easier, or the opportunities for their children better, or because they "did not like to be bossed" in Germany.

Many of the German immigrants have been highly educated people, who have contributed to the intellectual life of America; but the last thing they intended to import was the political ideals of their Fatherland. Some of them fled for their lives from those ideals. Many of them, such as Carl Follen and Carl Schurz, brought with them democratic ideas which were tabooed in Germany and which they hoped to find welcome in America. There is absolutely no gainsaying the fact that the Germans are here because they like America as they have found it better than they liked Germany when they lived in that country. Upon what, then, does Professor Münsterberg found his dictum that "the Germans felt this duty perhaps more than others from the European Continent just because their national ideals are so strongly contrasting with some Anglo-Saxon creeds?"

Other Germans who have lived longer in America than Professor Münsterberg and have adopted it as their own land refuse to take part in such a movement. Who can fail to see that it would be the worst thing that could happen to the German-Americans? If any of them want a different type of Government, they are free to go elsewhere and find it. If they want their fellow-Americans to feel that they are a people of capacity they will not produce that impression by starting a political party.

Some hotheads count upon a combination with the Irish, which is very unlikely because no people in the world are such successful politicians as the Irish, partly because of their unrivaled habit of standing together and partly because they never attempt the impossible.

The impossible in this country is to form a successful political body which is avowedly composed of members of only one race, or of two races. There is probably not a State, certainly not a large city, in the United States where a professedly German ticket would not be snowed under at the first election by a combination of the other races. The thing is as plain as A B C. If nobody but Germans are going to vote for the ticket, nobody but Germans would be elected if it were successful, and nobody but Germans would get any of the good things of office.

Under such circumstances the utmost that can be done must be to elect a few specially tagged German members of City Councils, Legislatures and Congress, powerless to do, but sometimes in a position to prevent action. If Germans can do that, Poles, Scandinavians, and Italians may do the same. The net result of such an attempt to interject European race problems into American politics would be to cripple the Legislatures and to put the Germans in the position of malcontents.

The writer can never forget the impression made on his mind by sitting in the gallery of the Reichstag in the old Bismarck days and noting the subdivision of the members on the floor into religious and other groups, a subdivision which made real popular government impossible.

Or is this movement intended to be a punishment to all the Americans who have sympathized with the Allies in the present war? In his book, "War and America," a year ago, a distinguished German, professor in an American university, did not hesitate to warn his hosts that German voters are going to take a hand in this. "Their national German-American alliance with two and a half million voters as members, their intellectual leaders and their economic captains of commerce and industry, their farmers and their workingmen, old and young, men and women, first generation and second and third, every religious sect, North Germans and South Germans, Austrians and Swiss—they will be united and will show a crushing power of which the reckless torchbearers of German hatred did not dream." The same writer, who

earnestly pleads for friendship between Germany and the United States, sees a possibility of still severer retribution. "There is no inkling of the neutrality which the President upholds as long as the press indicts and convicts Germany and the Emperor without evidence, from mere passionate prejudice. * * * The Germans do not preach hatred against their neighbors, but they insist that it would be a gigantic calamity if this war were to cut the ties of the American and German nations."

All that is a bugaboo. When this dreadful war is over, the passions and resentments and distrusts among Americans will die out, for whoever is responsible for the war we surely are not.

We cannot expect German-Americans to be fiercer than the German Emperor, who has had the sagacity to take backwater on the question of the drowning of American citizens which so aroused the American people. Where does that leave the hotheads who were saying in public that the 100 Americans on the Lusitania got what they dedeserved? It leaves them just where they will be left if they ever try to found a German-American political party.

It is well for some of the alien journalists who have so misused our hospitality that they are not staying under an "overindividual" or a Supreme State. What would the German Government do to Americans in Berlin who tried to induce Americans who had become naturalized Germans to start a political propaganda against, let us say, monarchy?

The Americans have received, welcomed and liked their German visitors and fellow-citizens because they came to this country and accepted it as a haven, because they have entered into the national life more readily than any immigrant race, except the English, Scotch and Welsh. They have nowhere formed "quarters" in the great cities like those of the Italians and Bohemians, the Poles and many other races. They have diffused themselves among the population. As farmers they have settled in race groups less than the Scandinavians, many of them frequent their own church, schools and colleges; but a large part of the young Germans who have enjoyed higher education have found it in State and endowed universities, in which a majority of the students were not of the German race.

To claim that the Germans, consciously or unconsciously, have been furnishing their countrymen with political ideals superior to those which they found here, or will furnish a supply of such ideals is, to speak mildly, a great presumption. They are not agitators or propagandists. They have shared and shared alike, glad to accept the kind of society and government which they found here.

So far from German political ideals being invoked to supplant inferior and weaker conceptions inherited from our Revolutionary and later times, it is the American ideals which have filtrated into Germany. The German imperial federation would probably never have been brought about but for the success of the American federation in proving that it could govern a great nation and hold a great people together. The manhood suffrage for the Reichstag can be historically traced to the success of widely diffused suffrage in the United States. The precept and example of the United States are largely responsible for even the limited degree of democracy in the German Empire, in many cases transmitted by Germans who had lived in this country.

Why not? The sublime conception of "government of the people, for the people and by the people" is longer lived than Abraham Lincoln, broader than the United States and higher than the German Empire. These ideals belong to mankind. The true German-Americans are a democratic folk, most of whom would be unhappy under an imperial system of government, no matter how wise, fatherly and protective. That is one of the main reasons why they are not subjects of a monarchical empire.

What the self-appointed leaders of the German-Americans in this country (among whom Professor Münsterberg is not meant to be included) are after is so to arouse the national feeling of former Germans as to cause them to adhere together in a race group. Naturally,

Germans born and children of Germans born, when their former country entered into war, believed in its aims and hoped for its victory. Blood is thicker than water.

The author of this article is proud to count among his forebears a Swedish pastor who was an immigrant to the United States. Because of that connection, he is interested in Sweden and the one-time home of the family; he is prone to think well of Swedish literature, of Swedish society, of the Swedish people. He wishes safety to the Swedish Nation. He thinks there are good things about Swedish society which Americans would do well to take into account. He is Swedish-American in the sense that he recognizes both the Swedish and the English contributions to the make-up of his country; but an American first and Swedish afterward.

That seems to be the point of view of most of the persons in the United States who go back two or three generations to German ancestors. It ought to be the frame of mind of every born German who has chosen to be an American. When it comes to political parties and to State policy, woe to the country in which the races group together and keep alive a sense of solidarity against all other races!

The fearful suffering of the Near East is largely due to the existence of just such race units. Turkey has been for six centuries a hodge-podge of peoples, Greeks, Armenians, Syrians, Arabs, Bulgarians, Serbians, Rumanians, Montenegrins; every one keeping up its religion, language, traditions, and national spirit, however widely diffused. The Balkans for three years have been a blood bath, because the Greeks in Bulgaria consider themselves still Greeks, and the Bulgarians in Macedonia are still Bulgarians. So with Austria-Hungary, which may possibly be patched up again, but is doomed to final collapse, because no policy can satisfy the race units which are adherent to each other. What can you do for a so-called nation when it is "first a Bohemian and then a subject of the empire!" "First a Hungarian," "first a Slav." What a spectacle for mankind and what wretchedness for the people in the composite empire!

The Turks appear at last to have discovered the only way of stopping the complaints of subject races, and that is to exterminate them.

The United States possesses as many races as Austria-Hungary, or Russia, or the Turkish Empire, and yet up to this time we have not been conscious of any race difficulty, except that of the negro. One main reason why that is so serious is because the greater part of them are grouped in a limited area and are recognizable at sight as members of a special race. The Scotch, the Germans, the Scandinavians, the Slavs, the Jews are all diffused through many States and cities. Until the great European war came they lived on comfortable terms with each other, and never dreamed of national race parties. If the Germans, as Münsterberg advises, are "to keep the fire of the German belief alive on their hearth forever," of course the Irish, the Swedes, the Greeks, the Italians, the Hungarians, the Slovaks, the Bohemians, the Poles, the English, the Turks, the Egyptians, the Albanians are entitled to do the same thing.

Our hope as a nation is that each of the scores of nationalities who have come to us for the same flattering reason that the Germans have come will give up its traditional ways and practices so as to allow a national feeling to grow up, such as Germany cultivates.

We are assured by Professor Münsterberg that "the German mind is devoted to thoroughness and seriousness, to carefulness and lawfulness, to reverence and self-discipline. This German belief in training and expert judgment, in authority and efficiency, is the one weapon which can overcome the dangerous, happy-go-lucky carelessness of American life." Suppose we take a leaf from that book. Let us see what the especially thorough, serious, expert, careful nation does to race groups which attempt to do what Professor Münsterberg advises his countrymen to do to us.

Germany is one of the most homogeneous countries in the world. Nevertheless, it has several non-German and dis-

contented race elements. In the Mazurian Lake region, where so many hard battles have been fought in the last twelve months, there are 400,000 Slavs who cannot speak German at all, and in Poland there are 3,000,000 Poles who can not or will not use the imperial language. With these exceptions, the German Government has succeeded in compelling every man, woman, and child in its dominions, except alien residents, to know German. What would be the effect if the United States Government should make the attempt to compel everybody to speak English?

There are in the empire about 4,000,000 Poles, nearly the whole of whom live in the same province and preserve their Polish spirit. Does efficient Germany, whose former subjects are called upon by Professor Münsterberg to teach us the significance of race groupings, encourage this state of things? Does the German Government recognize that the Poles were there before the Germans came? Does the German Government encourage the Poles to "keep the fire of the Polish belief alive on their hearths forever"? Not precisely. Every effort has been made short of actual physical force to Germanize the Poles, to break up the use of their language, to destroy the cohesion which is among them, to quench the memory of the glorious days of what was once a brilliant kingdom.

At the other end of Germany is another group, in Alsace and Lorraine. The people are German in origin, but some of them as distinctly French as the people of Bordeaux. Have they been allowed in the last forty-five years to "keep the fire of the French belief alive on their hearths forever"? Not precisely. In the northwest of the empire is another group of Danes—Danish in blood, in sympathy, in language. Are they making a contribution to the common life of the empire? Not precisely. The whole theory and policy of the German Empire is that every person within the empire and subject to the empire shall be German, join the German Army, think German, and preach German.

Of course the explanation is that the State is superior to the Individual; that the future of Germany as a great power depends upon the unity of her people; that the Polish, French, and Danish cultures are inferior to the German and must give way to a higher Kultur. The three or four million non-Germans must bend to the sixty-one or sixty-two million Germans.

Carry the principle over! Here in America, where we have not three, but thirty race elements, shall we encourage any one of these elements to maintain itself on the ground that it represents a higher civilization which is to be a lesson to the rest of the country? Shall we permit what Germany would be horror-struck to allow in order that Germans who prefer to leave their own country may unite as a permanent political force in the country of their adoption?

What are the advantages which the American Nation is to gain from a tightening up of Teutonic feeling among several million of its citizens, and a conscious effort to make them a distinct and separate section of the American people? Münsterberg tells us that "the Anglo-Saxon system is controlled by the individual as such, and the Teutonic ideals are bound by the belief in the overindividual soul." Elsewhere he admires in the Germans in America "their whole devotion to the overindividual ends, their faith in the State as bearer of the ideals, their trust in thoroughness and discipline, in purity, and loyalty."

This is a somewhat vague and colorless statement of the philosophical theory that the State is a thing, an existence, a force, a unit, a whole, which is made up of multitudes of men, but is not human. The same conception is often applied to the Church. Mere human beings know both the Church and the State only as a combination of other human beings acting through human beings.

There may be an oversoul, though no photograph of it has yet been obtained; but there is no State which is not made up of men, organized by men, and carried into effect by men. If the overindividual will speak through Gabriel's trumpet, we will bow the knee. If he

speaks through the vocal organs of a man issuing orders, or through the pen of a Secretary, or the megaphone of a Commander in Chief, we Americans think that the Emperor, or the Minister, or the General is only a man like ourselves, capable of error and of injustice.

People talk about "the State" as though it were the ark of the covenant. In fact it is only an organization similar in kind, though far superior in power, to the club or the order or the National Church. The purpose of the State is to make and execute common decisions for the common welfare. The real crux in government is, Who makes the decisions? The Germans who compare the United States with Germany seem to think that they are made here by individuals, and in Germany by "the State." In both countries they are made by the men who for the time being are in power.

When we say that in Germany people work for the State we mean that they work for the maintenance of a particular organization which came about in part by design and in part by accident.

If the people of Germany are satisfied with it, no one can deny their right; but what they are satisfied with is not the delegation of the power to make the decision of life and death for the nation, to some persons elected by their fellows, but to permit the chief powers of government to spring from a man, able indeed, but selected by the accident of birth, that man aided by members of certain families possessed of certain properties to whom it is the traditional habit of the nation to defer.

However efficient and masterful that system may be, it has no ground for claiming that it is the only normal and desirable system for other parts of the world. We have our own notions about the nature of government. Our chief interest is in the people who are not in office; the Germans are more concerned with those who are. We look upon the State as the servant of the community; the Germans look upon it as a God-given master.

Nobody can possibly quarrel with the German people for thinking that they have a good thing for which it is worth while to make many sacrifices. Shall they, therefore, hold up the German principle of the supremacy of the State as an ideal so incalculably important that the Germans in America are to band together as a sort of guild of State-makers? The only thing that will ever shake the people of the United States out of the idea that the welfare and happiness of the individual is the proper end of the State will be a disastrous war with a nation which is founded on the State-for-the-State theory.

Most of the Germans in this country do not hold to that doctrine and could not teach it, for they are here to cultivate their own individuality and to allow their children to grow up under that influence. No race group in the country is more genuinely democratic than the German.

German Estimate of Allies' Losses

A Berlin dispatch by The Associated Press via London, dated Oct. 4, 1915, *reported*:

A supplement to the German official statement says that the French losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners in the recent fighting were at least 130,000, and those of the British 60,000, while the German losses were not one-fifth of this number.

The German official statement of the loss by the Allies of an aggregate of 190,000 men follows within a few days an official estimate of German casualties made by the French War Office, which asserted in its statement of Wednesday, Sept. 29, that the Germans had lost since the beginning of the allied offensive a total in killed, wounded, and prisoners of "more than the effective strength of three army corps," or about 120,000 men.

Romance of a London Square

By May Sinclair

This article appeared originally in The London Daily Chronicle.

I OWN that I was a little depressed by my friend's invitation. It was that I should go at once to 13 Kensington Square and see the work done by the War Hospital Supply Depot, and write an appeal for it "in the papers." Friends are always inviting you to do this sort of thing in the pathetic belief that everything you send to "the papers" will infallibly get in, (whereas in nine cases out of ten it doesn't.) Sometimes the theme is inspiring and romantic; sometimes it is not. This time I accepted with virtuous resignation. The Kensington War Hospital Supply Depot did not sound in the least romantic or inspiring. Besides, I had a suspicion that I was not by any means the first to be invited. It would be easy enough if you ever were the first.

At the very beginning the secretary presents his paralyzing report; long lists of articles and reeling rows of numerals running into four and five figures, to be "boiled down" for the appeal. When told that you propose to write (besides the desired appeal) something a little more thrilling, more decorative, he says that nothing is easier. Talk of inspiring! By way of inspiration he will tell you how one writer has described his sensations on coming out of the busy High Street into the quiet square, with the trees and the birds and the rest of it, and catching sight of the War Hospital Supply Depot; and of the charming fancy of another—how (talk of romance!) the ghost of a little eighteenth century lady, the guardian of the house, gives up her place to the army of white-robed, white-veiled volunteers, and retires into her powder-closet; and of the happy thought of a third—but I am sworn not to anticipate or give away that happy thought, and I would die rather. So the secretary goes on amiably inspiring till he has taken all the wind out of your sails. It always happens that the best things have been done already. There was nothing left for me but to become a volunteer and know what it feels and looks like.

That is the way to capture the authentic thrill, the secret of the house in Kensington Square. You do not need any decoration or any little ghost to make you feel it. The reality is even better than that charming dream.

You cannot miss it—the house, I mean. It faces you from High Street. As you go down Young Street you see, first, an enormous "PLEASE," then, over the porch the grouped flags of the Allies, then an enormous "HELP"; then, through the front windows, crowds of women in white overalls and white veils. They might be novices in a convent. There are three thousand of these volunteers. They fill four houses in the square, and one in Kensington Court, and yet another house in Cromwell Road. And in the garden behind there are the carpenters' workshops, where a hundred men volunteers work. The secretary's report tells you that "it is the aim of the council to attain a very high standard of efficiency for all the work carried out by the depots." This is putting it modestly. The work is said to be the very best yet supplied to the hospitals. The experts who control it are always contriving new methods and improving upon old. No process is too laborious that insures perfection.

Take the making of a mere surgical swab. If you ask a trained nurse how to make a surgical swab she will probably say: "Oh, you take a bit of medicated cotton wool and roll it three or four times round your finger, or a piece of antiseptic gauze and fold it till it's thick enough. There isn't time to make them any other way." And you reply proudly, "That isn't the way they make them at the depot." There are two large workrooms where the volunteers, with all eternity before them, are making nothing else. It is a delicate process that

may take any time from seven to twenty minutes. First, yards and yards of gauze must be folded into squares and cut to regulation size. Then the sheets of cotton wool must be torn and split to a fine web, and the web must be teazed out to the fineness of feathers, snowflakes, thistledown, then gathered up and patted into a ball so light that a breath will blow it away; the ball must be placed on the very centre of the gauze square, the corners of the square taken up crosswise and made fast, the first pair in a single tie that compresses the puff-ball into a cocoon, the second pair gathered together in the centre and secured by a sailor knot; the cocoon is then squeezed back into a ball, a ball that, to be properly absorbent, must have the right degrees of resistance and elasticity and no other. Then, and not till then, you have a surgical swab that is as good or better than any sponge.

Packed by tens in a muslin bag, these swabs go straight from the workrooms into the sterilizers. Nobody is allowed to bring as much as one needle into the workroom, lest it should get into a swab, and thus into a wound. The guarded and perfect thing, that has taken so much time and labor to produce, has a working life of about one second. It may travel hundreds of miles to dab a wound once and be thrown away. For this brief purpose seven thousand will be sent from the depot in a week.

You might think that bandages were a simpler matter. But no; when the stuff is measured out, when two of the nun-like ladies have risen up and engaged with furious energy in the tug-of-war that tears it into strips, each strip must be plucked for the loose threads at either edge, then rolled three times over, first by hand, then on a wooden machine that winds it tight, finally on a metal machine that screws it up to the extreme pitch of perfect tightness. Or so it was until the other day when the head of one of the bandage rooms invented a machine that does away with the clumsy hand-rolling altogether. The stuff is passed on to the bar that rolls it between two V-shaped wooden flaps that hold it absolutely straight and on the stretch, their tension being regulated by two light spring clamps. You keep the V in the middle of your strip; you turn the handle of the bar; and in a few seconds your bandage is ready for the final rolling. And the thing fascinates you; it tempts you to work overtime; you turn and turn the handle in an ecstasy of increasing speed; you are torn from it reluctantly, and go home dreaming of tomorrow, when you will get back to it. Thanks to its inventor, the depot can now turn out more bandages in a few minutes than it could formerly in half an hour.

And in the carpenters' workshops the hundred are making all sorts of hospital furniture, bed rests and bed tables and cradles and trays and trolleys; and splints, some carved delicately to the shape of a leg or arm—the last word in splints—and crutches, hundreds of crutches. One head of the carpenters' rooms is a barrister, who in his holiday moments will make exquisite jewelry or build a canoe (he would no doubt build a 200-ton schooner if you gave him holidays enough); now, at the War Hospital Depot, "his swift and fair creations issue like worlds from an archangel's hands." The whole band of war carpenters are working as if their lives depended on it. They are at it on Saturday afternoons and on Sundays; they are given over to it with an austere and sacred passion, as if it were golf.

At 20 Kensington Court, another army of women volunteers are turning out hospital garments—shirts, pajamas, pneumonia jackets—and sheets and pillow slips and sandbags—not for the trenches but for the beds. These, made of strong linen or fine canvas, serve to keep at rest a wounded hand or foot or limb when splints are not needed. The two top floors are given up to the slipper makers.

Nothing is wanted at the depot, the "uppers" of the slippers are made out of remnants and scraps of any suitable material you care to send, cretonnes or unglazed chintzes, no matter the gayety of the design. The old linen you send may be full of holes, but out of one worn sheet somebody will make a draw sheet, out of a torn towel a smaller towel, out

of the cuttings squares that the surgeons can wipe their instruments on and throw away. The very ends snipped from the swabs and the loose threads from the bandages are gathered up and saved to stuff pillows with. The German Government could not practice a profounder thoroughness, a more inexorable thrift.

These things go to the Dardanelles, to British East Africa, to Serbia, to France, and Belgium, and all over the United Kingdom by hundreds and by thousands, and the hospitals are asking for more and more.

And eight months ago there was not any depot. Barely eight months ago it began with four persons and three five-pound notes. Then, by some miracle, it grew. And the romance of that miracle would be enough, if Kensington Square had no little ghost in her powder closet to work it. Still, we must not leave too much to the supernatural. A volunteer supply depot is always in need of help—help in money, in material, in volunteers. This is not an appeal; but it is a broad hint.

Washington—and After

By ELLA A. FANNING.

Home! and some tired, I'll allow—
  Sort of a buzz in my head!
I've got the old army grit,
  Neighbor, or else I'd be dead!

Marched? With the best of them, yes!
  Just as I did at Seven Oaks!
Say! when I think of that line,
  Somethin' right here kind o' chokes!

Me! keepin' step through them streets,
  After th' years that's gone by!
Me! once in army blue brave,
  Broad-shouldered, quick, keen of eye!

Seemed like the ghost of myself,
  Marchin' with more shadders there!
Just sort o' comradin' on—
  Not mindin' how long, or where!

Then came the word, an' we knew
  Wilson was watchin' our line!
If we wuz feeble or stiff,
  None of us gave any sign!

We just briskened up like young sprigs—
  Walked right along with new vim,
Felt that our swing an' our style
  Must seem consolin' t' him!

He an' this Nation well know—
  Though some wild talk has been said—
If he but needed t' call,
  Others would march where we led!

The Soul and Stones of Venice

By Gabriele d'Annunzio

This article, by the poet of belligerent Italy, who is now at the battle front, appeared on Sept. 14, 1915, in The London Daily Telegraph.

IN belligerent Venice, that reinforces her airy arches, her delicate triforae, with rough walls of bricks, cement, and beams; in the Venice which has transformed her hotels, formerly sacred to leisure and love, into hospitals full of bleeding heroes; in the dark and silent Venice, whose soul is in intense expectation of the roar of the far-away guns; in courageous and determined Venice, which hourly awaits the apparition in the sky, where there still linger Tiepolo's and Veronese's soft clouds, of winged death-bearing craft; in the Venice of the greater Italy, the Land of Abraham Lincoln has today an extraordinary representative and admirable witness, whose mission has assumed unexpected importance.

This representative is an American woman, who has consecrated herself to our Saint Francis of Assisi. I like to think of her as one of those saints who bear in the palm of their open hand either a tower or a church or a palace. She was sent to Venice many years ago to execute miniature plaster copies of the most artistic buildings. If the stupid Austrian ferocity should ruin one of St. Mark's domes, a wing of the Procuratie, a lodge of the Ducal Palace, a nave of SS. John and Paul's Church, the choir of the Frari, or the gentle miracle of the Ca' d'Oro, there will remain a souvenir of the beautiful things destroyed in the plaster models of the patient artificeress.

The Venetian knows her well under the name which I myself bestowed on her years ago, the Franciscan sister of the Giudecca. The Ca' Frollo, where she resides, is a yellow structure overlooking a large garden bordering on the Lagoon. A steep oak stairway leads up to the living room. Above the entrance there is an iron shield, with ornamental edges closely resembling a frying pan, which in ancient times was used to dish out polenta. It is Miss Clara's coat-of-arms.

She comes and meets me smiling on the threshold. On her face a smile multiplies as a ray of sun on a rippled water surface. I have the immediate and strong impression of finding myself before that strange phenomenon represented by a person truly full of life. She wears a bluish cassock, like an artificer. Her hair is white, of the brightest silver, raised on the forehead and thrown back. The eyes are sky blue, shining, innocent, infantine, and in them the internal emotions ebb constantly like flowing water. She has the strong, rough hand of the workingwoman.

Her attic is very large. The massive beams fastened with iron are as numerous as the trunks of a forest, moth-eaten, with all their fibres exposed, of a golden brown color. Along the walls plaster casts of architectonic details are disposed: capitals, arches, tailpieces, cornices, bas reliefs. There is a complete fireplace by Lombardo, the very fireplace of the Ducal Palace. There are Madonnas, busts and masks. Suspended on two ropes is a model of an ancient Venetian galley, a hull of which the lines are most beautiful.

"I rescued it at Chioggia with a few cents from a fisherman who was in the act of burning it to cook his polenta," Miss Clara told me.

On one side the windows look out on the Giudecca Canal, which shows the Ducal Palace, the Piazzetta, the library, and the anchored ships, and on the other they look into the garden and the Lagoon. At intervals a rumbling is heard in the distance. Miss Clara sits by the window.

"With the hands of a saint, with religious hands," I tell her, "you have copied the most beautiful churches and palaces of Venice. Now these beautiful things

are threatened, are in danger. We expect to see them in ruin any day. There will at least live the copies that you have sent beyond the sea."

Her blue eyes suddenly fill with tears and the horror of war, the horror of blind destruction, draw all the lines of her face.

"My God, my God!" she murmurs, joining her hands. "Will you allow such a crime?"

"What does it matter," I venture to say, "if the old stones perish, so long as the soul of Italy is saved and renewed?"

She stares at me intently with profound sadness, shaking her white head, over which there plays the purest light of sunset.

"Have you seen the blinded Ducal Palace?" she asks me, meaning the lodges which the curators have had immured.

We have before us the plaster model of the Palace, on which she has been working for several years. With infinite care she has modeled every arch, every column, every capital, every smallest detail. Her work is an enormous toy, built for an infant nation. She removes the roof and bends to look into it, resembling in the proportions the image of a gigantic saint in the act of guarding a refuge which she protects. Nobody knows better than she the structure of the edifice which incloses the blackened paradise. In my presence she dismounts the copy piece by piece, organ by organ; almost, I would say, limb by limb, even as an anatomist would do with the parts composing the human body in order to learn to know their number, their form, their location, and their relation to each other.

As the shadows begin to invade the attic, she lights an old brass lamp with four arms. The wicks crackle, diffusing a smell of olive oil, which mixes with that of the wax. In the attic the prints of the many matrices pile up, and it seems to be as if an impalpable sentiment of vigor rises from the concave matrices whence the copies of the beautiful things emerge.

Miss Clara works there together with a few workmen, who also compose her simple family. She eats with them the polenta, at the same table. She takes me by the hand and leads me into her kitchen, where there is a single hearth, with a rack full of common but decorated dishes. Truly there breathes the spirit of St. Francis. She is a kind of nun in freedom who has passed from contemplation to action. Before all those beams I think of the worn-out, splintered wood of the Santa Chiara choir. Before the ears of corn which I see in a rustic vase my mind goes to the cluster of brown ears which I saw at the top of the reading desk in the choir of St. Bernardino of Siena.

"I am very poor," she tells me.

Whole treasures of goodness, indulgence, and love shine at the bottom of the flowing waters of her blue eyes. There is in the structure of her head something virile, and at the same time tender, something intrepid and meek. As the lines of her face seem rays, so her work, her solitude, her poverty are transfigured into divine happiness.

"I am very poor," she says, and she shows me her naked hands, strong and pure, the only source of her daily wealth.

I know she distributes all her earnings; I know that on more than one occasion she suffered hunger and cold. Today she had not even a bag of plaster for her work. Sitting by the window, she talks to me of her perennial joy, of the joy of working from dawn to sunset. Slowly the garden grows dark in the dusk. Night begins to fall on the Venice that no longer lights her lamps, not even the lamps before the Virgins watching over the deserted canals. The nocturnal horror of war begins to expand on the Lagoon. In the distance a rumbling is heard coming, perhaps from Aquilega or Grado, where they are fighting for redemption. The vast attic illuminated by the four-armed lamp becomes alive with shadows and quiverings.

Sitting by the window, simple, candid, sweet, she searches my innermost soul, then she observes my hands, too white, and my nails, too polished, and, lo! poverty appears to me as the nakedness of force, as the sincerest and most noble statue of life.

"I also work," I tell her, as if ashamed of hands too white and my nails too pol-

ished. Then I speak to her of my discipline, of my nights spent at the desk, of my patient researches, of my constancy in remaining bent over my desk for fifteen, twenty hours at a stretch, of the enormous quantity of oil I consume in my lamp, of the pile of paper, bundles of pens, of the large inkstand, of all the tools of my trade. Then I show her a tangible proof; on my middle finger, deformed by the constant use of the pen, a smooth furrow and a callosity. She is immediately touched. All her face expresses a maternal tenderness. She takes my finger, examines the sign. Then suddenly, with a gesture of human grace which I shall never forget, she gently touches it with her lips.

"God bless you," she says.

The flowing water ebbs between her eyebrows, glittering, rippling, ever new.

"God keep you ever."

My heart is full of tender gratitude. I am going to the war, and the blessing of this pure creature will bring me back. My hands shall become rough and dark. I shall work for the God of Italy, fight for the God of Italy.

"God keep Italy ever," she adds.

In leaving I stroll by the plaster models of the churches, palaces, lodges, belltowers. The American nun, holding my hand, escorts me to the threshold. As I descend the oak stairway she vanishes in the shadow.

Night is already falling on Venice as an azure avalanche. As I raise my head to spy the appearance of the first star, I hear coming over from the deserted sky the rumbling of an aeroplane approaching from Malamocco.

"May God keep the stones of Venice."

And it seems to me as if Miss Clara weeps, over there, in her attic amid the images of the beautiful things over which there hangs the threat of destruction.

A Prophet on Bulgaria

By THEODOR WOLFF

In an article which, The London Daily News declares, reveals considerable foreknowledge of what has since occurred, Herr Theodor Wolff of the Berliner Tageblatt discusses the Balkan situation and makes a bid for Serbia's friendship. In view of the author's rather close acquaintance with high diplomatic quarters in Berlin, the article deserves attention. He writes:

Those whose senses are not blinded by prejudice cannot deny that the Serbian Nation has fought bravely, and has given proof of passionate patriotism and tenacious vitality. It used to be represented, in light-minded irony, as an opera-bouffe nation; at its own cost, and, unfortunately, Europe's, it has shown in a very convincing manner that it is ripe for a tragedy. * * * There are but few people who suffer from the desire to see Serbia wiped out from the book of nations. We only need in the Balkans, now and afterward, an unimpeded connection with the friendly Turkish Empire and a pacific consolidation all around, which can best be secured by the annexation of Macedonia to Bulgaria. Apart from this, most of us know that forcible strangulation and suppression has never yet brought anybody any profit. We wish every nation plenty of breathing air and opportunities for development.

At the same time the Serbian people, and Nicholas Pashitch, who has been directing the storm-tossed boat ever since September, 1912—and has gone through a good deal—must themselves understand the signs of fate. Possibly their soul is still, like the soul of Iphigenia, seeking the land of the Greeks.

Perhaps the wise and discreet Venizelos, leaving aside his honest and pronounced sympathy for the Entente powers, for which we must not blame him, will consider whether he could not better serve his friendly neighboring nation by some other policy than that which seeks a solution of all questions by the sword. The advice of such an experienced statesman might well prove more wholesome than the often incalculable deed.

Is Britain a Degenerate Nation?

By C. W. Saleeby, M. D., F. R. S. E.

This article, by a famous English eugenist, on Britain's million men rejected for military service, appeared on Sept. 17, 1915, in The London Daily Chronicle.

IN round numbers, perhaps three millions of men may have been accepted for British service in the past year, and one million have been rejected. The figure is appalling, not least now, when we should feel happier to know that all those men had been found fit and were serving today. Is it, then, as the Germans and many Americans say, that, in Byron's words, "History, with all her volumes vast, hath but one page," and that, like Babylon and Egypt, Greece, Rome and Spain, we must make way for a "young and vigorous race" across the North Sea or the Atlantic? No instructed German, at any rate, would have the face to suggest that this shocking proportion of defectives is a symptom of national senility, for he would know—and the fact is of good omen for the duration of the war—that his own country's figures are far worse.

Two years ago this month, visiting Munich for Wagner and Strauss, I found what its third most noted product, beer, is largely responsible for. The city is one of clean façades, wide, well-watered streets, clear air, free from smoke, for all the work is done by electricity made by "Iser, rolling rapidly." I wrote home to a contemporary on this cleanest of cities, but noted that I had not looked up its vital statistics. Home again, I did so. They are disgraceful. Consumption stands at a rate almost incredibly high. Just behind those fine places, made for show, are slums and vice and neglected childhood. Like a fine lady of the past, who washed and scented her face alone, but did not know that real cleanliness is of things not seen, Munich and modern Germany in general abound in physical deterioration, of which the first index is a national infanticide twice as high as ours. So much for the "young and vigorous race" theory.

Are our rejected million due, then, to the theory popular among those amateur eugenic societies whose activities are so continually embarrassing—that we have been breeding from our worst stocks, while the good and beautiful and strong have declined the task of parenthood, and are, therefore, somewhat disconcertingly, to be also labeled as selfish and unpatriotic and wrong? Or can that dilemma be avoided, as few advocates of class eugenics are clever enough to do, by saying that the middle classes have been compelled to deny themselves the bouncing boys they would so much prefer to motor cars or spare bedrooms because Mr. Lloyd George has taxed them so abominably for maternity benefit and other inducements to the multiplication of the unfit?

As a lifelong student of the subject, after years of research prepared for by years of training, I wish to announce the important discovery that the rejected million were once younger. It may be that, if we accept this theory, and inquire into their personal history, we shall find the clue to their present state. I well know that I am running counter to the opinion of many public men in this respect. They are quite content to assert that, there being youths of eighteen or so in the country, they should be conscribed, drilled, exercised, and that, if perchance any of them should have lost a molar or two, these would sprout again in a few months. Such men as are now typical of the movement to "take the men before the money" have never, since the Boer war, lent their names or their influence, in Parliament or the press, to anything but the mammon-worship which, selfish of course, is also so colossally stupid as to suppose that you can neglect a living being through all its years of growth and development and then undo all the damage by a little drill.

Let me tell the reader the true history of how the origin of adults was discovered in this country. The rejections during the Boer war were shocking. The late Sir Frederick Mourice commented upon them. A Royal Commission on Physical Training was appointed for Scotland, to find, I presume, the kind of dumb-bell best calculated to restore lost molars and smashed ear-drums. But some one, in the course of its inquiries, asked the question of the answer to which I have hinted. Have not these recruits once been younger, and what was happening then? So my friend, Dr. Leslie Mackenzie, now Medical Member of the Local Government Board for Scotland, was asked to inspect the children in an Edinburgh school. We had had national education for a generation, but this was the first time that a doctor had been employed even to look at the children, let alone treat them. He found the facts too dreadful for belief, but when other schools in Edinburgh, in other Scottish cities, and in England were examined, the same was found.

Hence, directly flowing from the revelations made during our last war, came the medical inspection, and now, to some extent, the medical treatment of school children. The necessary dumb-bells were not forthcoming, after all, and lately, instead, Mrs. Leslie Mackenzie took me over the admirable dental clinic, where the chilren of Edinburgh are having their teeth saved for the years ahead of them and us.

Those who have fought this movement by every means in their power, the political party on the London County Council which has resorted to every futile expedient rather than establish school clinics, the glass-eyed politicians who, in all their years of public life, have never said a syllable for better housing, infancy, cleaner milk, or the care of adolescence—such men may be the only seers in our midst today; but if so, the age of miracles is not yet past.

Today we have Sir George Newman, at the Board of Education, issuing his invaluable reports, but who compels the authorities to act? I suggest that there is no more poignant national fact today than this—that those who would most freely spend the men are those who have done least to save the children.

Not much can be done now for the immediate emergency. We may have to use some of our unfit, as Germany has long been using hers. But what of the future? In large measure our million rejected are the results, by simple, inevitable natural causation, true today as then, of our neglect of infancy and childhood round about the nineties.

Two-thirds of the children who first enter our London schools are then suffering from preventable defects. The school child, also, has once been younger. From one to five it was what I desire to call the home child, much neglected by the State hitherto, though the chain of life is as weak as its weakest link, and the future soldier may be ruined because we tempted him with drink and evil books at sixteen, or neglected his measles at three, or let his mother work in white lead before he was born. In our now urgent economies let us be sure whether the money under discussion is to buy life or death. Particularly I plead for the universal adoption of those clauses of the Notification of Births (Extension) act which enable us to do something for the home child.



ALEXANDER ZAIMIS

New Prime Minister of Greece, Succeeding Premier Venizelos

(Photo from Bain News Service.)

ADMIRAL VON HOLTZENDORFF

Late Commander of the German High Seas Fleet, Now Head of the German Naval General Staff, Succeeding Vice Admiral von Bachmann

(Photo from Paul Thompson.)

Darwinism and War

By Sir E. Ray Lankester

Eminent zoologist and ex-President of the British Association, Professor Lankester speaks with authority on the subject of the so-called warlike proclivities of man and the animal kingdom. The subjoined article appeared on Sept. 14, 1915, in The London Daily Telegraph.

DARWIN gave as the title of his epoch-making book, published in 1859, "The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection; or, the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life." He explains that he uses the terms "struggle for life" and "struggle for existence" in a metaphorical sense, and that, although there is necessarily a competition inevitably imposed by and following from the high rate at which all organic beings tend to increase, there is little or no fighting and individual muscular contest. This, indeed, is obvious when we reflect upon the fact that the whole world of quietly growing plants and thousands of weaponless non-aggressive kinds of animals are included in the so-called "struggle," or "competition."

Nevertheless, from time to time, heedless writers, snapping up, as they imagined, the latest scientific pronouncement in regard to their own pet views as to human conduct, have asserted (as I pointed out in my Romanes lecture at Oxford in 1905) that Darwinism justifies violence and brutality on man's part as a law of nature—the survival of the strong. Others again have denounced Darwin for this justification which he never made, but expressly denied. The most flagrantly foolish of these false prophets of Darwinism is the superficial pamphleteer, the German General Bernhardi, who, writing in defense of the aggressive militarism of his master, (the Kaiser,) says: "Wherever we look in nature we find that war is a fundamental law of development. This great verity, which has been recognized in past ages, has been convincingly demonstrated in modern times by Charles Darwin." Elsewhere he says: "The natural law to which all the laws of nature can be reduced is the law of struggle. * * * From the first beginning of life war has been the basis of all healthy development. Struggle is not merely the destructive, but the life-giving principle. The law of the stronger holds good everywhere. * * * Might is the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is to be decided by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since its decision rests on the very nature of things."

There is no basis in fact for this absurd and pernicious statement. It is not true that warfare or any thing resembling it is universal among living things, and that it is the law of nature. Still less is there, as I will show directly, any ground for arguing even if warfare were the general law of animal life that this fact would justify a nation of human beings in carrying on aggressive plunder-seeking war against others, or in adopting the principle of "Might is Right."

I cannot, in passing in review what is known as to animal life, find any instance of habits or procedure on the part of animals which resembles warfare, except the attacks made by certain ants on the nests of other species of ants when they carry off the immature young of the attacked species and rear them as workers in their own habitations. The carnivorous animals, beasts, birds, reptiles, fishes, insects, and worms, which prey upon other species—usually herbivorous creatures—cannot be said to make war on these their natural food, any more than a herbivorous animal makes war upon the grass, shrubs, or fruit trees which it consumes. Frequently the food organism possesses powerful horns or kicking hoofs if an animal, or sharp spines and poisonous juices if a plant, which render the task of seizing and devouring it no easy or simple mat-

ter. There is a natural limit to the destruction of these food species by the predatory species. The supply must not be seriously checked, or the predatory animal would starve. A balance is naturally established which results in many cases in the sickly or feeble members only of a herd being eaten, a result which tends to strengthen the stock by the elimination of weaklings. In much the same way, it appears that in many cases a limit is, in the long run, put upon the destructive action of parasites. In any case, though destruction by predatory animals is one of the "molding" causes among many other dangers and obstacles by means of which selection in nature and survival of the fittest are brought about, yet the destructive agencies, whether predatory beasts or storms or drought or other such dangers, are not parties in the struggle for existence—the keen and close competition which Darwin described. It is the unconscious competition between the superabundant individuals of one and the same species—even of one and the same family—to secure safety, nourishment, and mating, and to be the one to escape the destructive noxious agency, whatever its nature, while others perish, which Darwin spoke of as "a struggle for existence."

Actual combat between individuals of the same species is rare, except in regard to the "mating" of certain species of animals, by no means a majority. Stags fight with their antlers for the possession of the does, the fur seals use their teeth in such combats, and the natural weapons, such as large fangs, claws, and horns, possessed by the males only, in many animals, are used as frequently for duels with rival males as for protecting the female and her young from the attacks of carnivorous enemies of totally distinct species. Even some few male fishes fight others of their own species for the possession of the females. On the other hand, where one species has been brought by human traffic from its own area for that inhabited by another species, and has multiplied and to some extent superseded the original native species, as the Continental sewer rat has multiplied in this country and is now more commonly seen than the native black rat of barns and old houses, there is no evidence that there has been any "fighting" or warfare between the old species and the newcomer. The same is true as to the various species of cockroaches introduced by shipping into this country. They do not attack one another, nor do they attack the native smaller species. In Australia the thylacine or marsupial wolf has vanished and given place to the dingo, a wild dog brought in by the present "black fellows" in prehistoric times. But there is no evidence of "fighting" or "warfare" between the dog and the thylacine, either in Australia or Tasmania. Peaceful penetration, followed by survival of the fitter species, resulting after a long lapse of time in the complete or, perhaps, only partial dying out from the invaded area of the species less favored by the conditions of that area, is what occurs. There has been "competition" and deadly rejection by inexorable Nature of the less fit, but no "struggle" in the sense of fighting, biting and killing one another on the part of the competitors or "candidates for selection."

We now come to the further question as to whether any behavior of certain animals, if shown to lead to their predominance over other animals and to what we may, without prejudice, call the success and prosperity of certain species or tribes of animals, can and should be for that reason adopted by man. It is asserted, as we have seen falsely, that constant warfare, the subjection and destruction of the weak by the violence of "the strong"—not the variously well-fitted who in thousands of diverse ways find their home in the large bosom of Nature, but the mechanically destructively "strong"—is the law of the living world. Even if this were true, which it is not, there is ample reason for rejecting the application to man of a principle arrived at by the consideration of the behavior of the animal world.

It is true that man has slowly developed from ape-like ancestors, which were not "man," and differ from him as all animals differ from him in the absence of a certain life-dominating mental

quality, which is absolutely peculiar to him. From the earliest days of written history man has recognized this difference between himself and animals—"the brutes which perish." Man does not perish because his tradition, his thought and reasoning are handed on by him from generation to generation by oral or by written word. He is not only observant and inquiring, but he has developed in this way an immense memory, a record of the observation and knowledge of past generations of men—what I have called (in the Encyclopaedia Britannica article "Zoology") the Great Record.

But it is not merely this vast memory and still vaster record which distinguishes man. It is that absolutely peculiar and indefinable activity of the mind which we call "consciousness." Without consciousness memory ceases to have more than a limited significance; without memory consciousness is a momentary fleeting thing of no account. But conscious memory gives to man the sense of continuity and of freedom of choice. It is conscious memory which gives man the power of being at once the actor, the spectator, and the critic. It enables man to distinguish between self and not self, and brings with it the sense of responsibility and of reality. It is this which has created that "moral law" within us of which the philosopher Kant said that it and the starry vault above us were the two things which filled his mind with ever-renewed wonder and awe the more often and the more deeply he dwelt on them. Animals do not possess this consciousness except in the most rudimentary way. We have but little knowledge of its gradual development in our ape-like ancestors, in virtue of which they ceased to be brute beasts, and became conscious men. But in the most primitive of existing savage races of man—the Australian blackfellows—we find it in an imperfectly developed state, imperfect in proportion as the power of memory in that race is defective and undeveloped. On the other hand, we can watch (without at present understanding) its graduated but rapid development in a human infant as it passes from the blank negative condition of birth to the dawning intelligence of childhood.

The qualities acquired by each individual as he grows up in the community into which he is born, through the use and education of his conscious memorizing brain, distinguish the nationalities of mankind from one another. Man receives no knowledge, and only the most elemental mechanisms of instinct, by direct inheritance from his parents. He has to learn everything afresh. On the contrary, animals are born with elaborate instinctive mechanisms, which work when the appropriate stimulus acts upon them, as do the penny-in-the-slot machines when the penny is applied. The new-born foal runs skillfully round his native field; the human infant has to learn by experimental effort even to walk, and later to run. In man what is inherited, that which we say is "in the blood," determines the quality of the rough material, but "training"—education, whether designed or enforced by environment—is the all-powerful and necessary producer of all mental and bodily characteristics and behavior. On the contrary, in lower animals, and to a very large extent in higher ones, all behavior and habits are inherited. Every behavior and accomplishment which we know in our own experience is for us the result of observation, experience, thought, and choice, is in them inherited unconsciously and ready-made—as a trick or mechanism of which the performer has no understanding, and in regard to which it has no choice.

It is this which renders it impossible to interpret or to justify man's behavior whether of individuals or of nations—by a comparison with the unconscious "instinctive" proceedings of animals. The inaggressive frugivorous apes from which man has sprung have not—emphatically not—transmitted to him a compulsory instinct to destroy his fellow men by warfare, nor, on the other hand, have they endowed him with the love of truth, justice, and beauty. It is his own conscious intelligence which has gradually built up a record external to his bodily substance, which is ever increasing, and comprises the noblest thoughts

as well as the memory of the basest deeds of mankind. The knowledge of this great record is given to each generation afresh by the education administered by its elders and leaders. It is on this, and the reasoning based on it, that man has to depend, and not on bodily inheritance of habits and instincts slowly selected by survival of those endowed with them in the blind competition for survival. The "moral law" is an essential and integral part of the deliberate educative process of man. "It is," as Dr. Chalmers Mitchell writes in his admirable essay, "Evolution and the War," "as real and as external to man as the starry vault. It has no secure seat in any single man, or in any single nation. It is the work of the blood and tears of long generations of men. It is not in man, inborn or innate, but it is enshrined in his traditions, in his customs, in his literature and his religion. Its creation and sustenance are the crowning glory of man, and his consciousness of it puts him in a high place above the animal world. Men live and die, nations rise and fall, but the struggle of individual lives and of individual nations must be measured, not by their immediate needs, but as they tend to the debasement or perfection of this, man's greatest achievement." The Imperial Government of Germany has, to suit its own ambitious purposes, deliberately directed and perverted the education of the German people so as to implant in them a false conception of duty and a debased morality. Such an influence cannot finally prevail. There is in mankind a sense of obligation (due to age-long experience and tradition) to a moral law founded on truth, justice, honor, and loving kindness, which no system of repression and perverted education can permanently eradicate from a population of seventy millions. It rejects absolutely as a vile thing hostile to human progress and happiness the doctrine that "Might is Right."

German Substituted Foods

(From The London Daily Chronicle, Sept. 24, 1915.)

Something instructive regarding the condition of things in Germany may always be learned by a study of the advertisements in a widely circulated newspaper like the Berliner Tageblatt. Let us take the advertisements as we meet them. A wholesale dealer in Frankfort-on-the-Main wants large consignments of wooden boot soles. He will pay cash for immediate delivery. The presumption is that leather soles are growing scarce.

One is surprised at the number of substitutes (Ersatz) offered for sale. Artificial jam and marmalade are frequently advertised. A "chemical factory" in Dresden offers to supply fifteen tons of the stuff every week, and seeks travelers to push it. We are not told what artificial jam is. A substitute for "whipped cream" is advertised by another chemical factory in Berlin. The sale of the real cream is forbidden.

When the war broke out beans roasted in a certain way with coffee were largely used as a substitute for coffee. Making a virtue of necessity, the German dealers pointed out how neurotic people might drink a decoction of bean coffee without ill-effects. Now we have a substitute for bean coffee—beans being no longer procurable—called "Krieg-kornfranck." A pound packet of it costs only 6d., and it is highly recommended as "going far" and as very cheap. "It is incumbent on us all to be economical," says the advertiser.

"Gondar" cheese, made of skimmed milk, is a substitute for real cheese. One dealer advertises fifty tons of it. It is slightly flat and crushed, a defect which enables him to offer it at 7d. a pound. Gondar cheese, we are told, is excellent for working people and the poorer classes generally, as it has quite a cheesy taste. We have a substitute for oil for polishing oak floors. It is not oil at all, but it gives a high polish. The same dealer advertises substitutes for glycerine and other household oils.

The pity of advertising in Germany a cheap substitute for beer! And yet this is what "Kulmet" professes to be. There is no alcohol in it. It has a pleasant reminiscent taste of malt, and is the color of the best Munich beer.

Magazinists of the World on the War

Condensed from the Leading Reviews

The remarkable article by J. Ellis Barker on how the United States raised a great conscript army during the civil war, reproduced from The Nineteenth Century and After, has received a separate place in this number. But among the reviews of the month are articles by many writers of great distinction, with a good balance between those by advocates of the Entente Powers and those of the Germanic Alliance.

Will the Present War Be the Last?

By Georg Brandes

Dr. Georg Brandes, the noted Danish critic, in "Ukens Revy," published at Christiania, Norway, discusses the European war with main reference to the smaller countries, and answers his own question whether the world war of the present may be the last war. That the author of "Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature," "Shakespeare," and numerous other works of international renown holds no illusions in that respect may be seen from his article which reads in part:

THE positions of the three Scandinavian countries cannot be considered identical during the unforeseen world war of the present time.

It is quite true that they are neutral, but that is largely because nothing else would do under the circumstances. Participation in the war would at once endanger their very existence, and from no quarter has there been offered them sufficient compensation to risk taking part.

In Norway, where from olden time sympathy for England and France has been pronounced, it is possible that the leaning toward these powers is the most pronounced. Nevertheless, not a few of the intellectuals, whose books are published in German, champion passionately the cause of Germany. That Sweden fears Russia, which has torn to pieces Finland's Constitution and has overrun the Swedish land with Russian spies, is little to be wondered, and the sympathies of Sweden are almost entirely with Germany.

Denmark stays neutral for the simple reason that it is but a short run from Kiel to Danish territory, and we Danes, in case peaceful relations were broken off, might expect the German fleet in front of Copenhagen in a couple of hours. Only at the risk of committing suicide can Denmark, with its two and a half million inhabitants, challenge a world power like Germany. That stands to reason without any further explanation. And let us not forget that it is just fifty years since Denmark took up battle with the two powers that now, as then, are allies, Prussia and Austria. Denmark fought for half a year without the slightest aid of a single European power. It shows the lack of foresight on the part of diplomatists that England and France permitted Germany to seize the Kiel harbor and to tear from Denmark two-fifths of the country's area without as much as raising a finger to prevent this.

Since then, North Schleswig has been governed as Prussia governs all foreign nationalities — through prohibiting the use of the Danish language in church and school; prohibiting the employment of Danish national colors, even in women's costumes; exiling many; with numerous annoyances that even went so far as to take children away from their parents in case they were suspected of educating the children with a view of making them incline toward Denmark. The German Reichstag has voted considerable sums toward buying up Danish land in Schleswig, exactly as in the case of Polish soil

in Posen. And now the young Schleswigers must fight and bleed in the German ranks of a country by which they are treated as scapegoats.

Strong reasons, therefore, prevent Danish sentiment from being friendly to the German cause. On the other hand, admiration for Germany's efficiency is very great. If it is a fact that the intellectuals are no more inclined toward the Entente Allies than toward Germany, then it is because the allied powers in no wise can be considered an entity, no matter what may be the exertion to disprove the differences that separate them.

The understanding and the intuitive insight of the masses has never been anything but a democratic legend. The masses generally believe anything that is presented in a skillful manner.

Regarding the question whether this is to be the last war, it is of interest to examine the newspapers of France during the war of 1870-71. The striking feature of the journalism of that day was that "it was comforting to know that this war would be the last." Since then have followed a dozen bloody wars, until now the biggest of all wars has lasted for more than a year. And again we hear the imbecile refrain in article upon article, in country after country, "it is comforting to know that this war will be the last." Therefore, we are to believe that very soon human nature will change entirely; its overwhelming stupidity will turn into quiet good sense, its immense degree of wildness will become co-operative good-will.

The war reveals everything. Beneath the superficiality of civilization is found a wild man who in all essentials compares with what the Stone Age might exact. During the intervals between wars mankind imagines that the world is settled in peace and that wars are no longer possible. Since it is considered necessary to maintain an optimistic attitude in order to endure existence, optimism is made a chief virtue for the purpose of keeping courage and strength alive. Mankind does not seem to desire to look the facts squarely in the face. If, notwithstanding all optimistic denials to the contrary, wars break out, then optimism tries to comfort the battling ones with the words that the present struggle will bring with it the reign of justice and that therefore the war must be the final one.

"Cannon! Munitions!"

By Charles Humbert

IN La Revue, Paris, double number for Aug. 15 and Sept. 1, Charles Humbert, Senator from the Department of the Meuse, has an important article, entitled "Cannon! Munitions!" Senator Humbert, as a member of the Senatorial Commission on the Army, was one of the leading forces in changing the policy of the Government from one of concentrating attention on the size of the army to that of bringing its equipment, particularly in the matter of artillery, to a point of superiority over that of the enemy. He says:

> The character the present war has taken has been a surprise and a disappointment for many minds, quite particularly for professional strategists. * * * We are past the day of romantic struggles, of the determining ability of the great captains, of brilliant onslaughts, and the decisive charges in which, formerly, the fate of a country was decided. War has become a colorless and mechanical work, accomplished by its reinforcement of machinery. It obeys elements that no one dreamed of before. * * * Between the battles of the time of Louis XIV., those of the first empire and those of 1870 there is certainly much less difference than between the last named and those of 1914-1915. * * * Every day brings in some innovation. The Germans have recently introduced the employment of flaming liquids and asphyxiating gases, and I see in them no other dishonesty than that of using them after they had engaged themselves not to do so; they are not arms more terrible or more destructive than those that the usages of war have authorized. * * *
>
> It is quite true that in this terrible con-

flict Germany had taken a considerable lead over her adversaries. She believed in the war, because she wanted it, and had prepared for it with minute care. She had certainly understood it better than we, and imaged it to herself with greater exactitude. * * * Since 1911, especially since the events of Agadir, she had been working with a sort of frenzy to renew her heavy artillery completely; she had planned to introduce on the battlefield mortars and long cannon of great range. * * * Happily, despite all her minuteness and foresight, Germany had calculated her aggression badly.

The writer continues by describing the interior policy of Germany after the unexpected check she received in her attack on Paris. Putting herself on the defensive, she gave her main attention to war industries and "by a prodigy of discipline and organization" was able to renew and augment her artillery and reach a production of shells calculated as being between 250,000 and 400,000 a day! Meanwhile, France had realized that her problem would be the same, but she had done so less clearly. Much therefore remained to be changed after the war was in progress. He adds:

Today the re-arrangement is made, and all our workshops and arms factories, all our accessory industries are awaking as fast as one could desire them to. * * * The coalition of the forces of the countries at war with Germany can leave no doubt of their success, but one must not imagine that the work to be accomplished is a matter of a few weeks. * * * The united metallurgical industries of England and France can assure us a superior production of munitions to that of Austria-Germany. * * * All the trumps are in the hands of the Allies in this terrible game. Only a shameful incapacity could prevent their playing them victoriously to the end.

Reconstruction of Destroyed Cities

By Frantz Jourdain

IT has been claimed for Germany that while the Allies are preparing for further war, she is preparing for peace. In La Revue, Paris, Aug. 15-Sept. 1, one of the most distinguished of French architects, M. Frantz Jourdain, shows that in one of the fields in which his country is pre-eminent, France is already thinking out her future. M. Jourdain is President of the Salon d'Automne. He says:

The mystic symbol of the phoenix reborn from its ashes softens despair and rocks human distress as in a cradle. Since death engenders life, since the flowers opening on the tombs drive sadness from the cemeteries, we have the right to think that the frightful cyclone that has prostrated our gentle France can give a new youth to the country, and that this time, once again good will come out of evil.

The dwellings, factories, school houses, and churches must be rebuilt. At first the work seems overpoweringly complex and difficult; it will not be found so if a "clear and rational program" is followed.

First of all, it is a time for us to get rid of the dangerous pedagogy which, for more than a century, has falsified temperaments, reduced imaginations to one level, destroyed initiative, imposed a foreign influence contrary to the instincts of our race and tried to replace originality with the lesson learned by heart. * * * Let us think of our ancestors of the Middle Ages, who went begging neither to Greece nor to Italy when they wanted to strew our soil with the most luxuriant flowers of granite and stone that humanity has ever beheld.

Before the vast problem to be solved the way must be left open for work suited to each of the different localities of France, so different in their characters. No one model should be established, but as much as possible the architects and artisans of each place should dictate the forms. "Centralization, like speculation, would work irreparable disasters."

Our duty will be not only to repair but to prepare for the future. It is here perhaps that we come to the most delicate point in the question, for logic will probably impose some painful sacrifices on archaeology. For example, to widen a road which was more than sufficient for the carts and infrequent carriages of former days, but dangerous for the incessant traffic of automobiles, shall we not find ourselves compelled to suppress a farm, or a cottage whose charm delighted the

tourist? Once more, we shall encounter cases for which our artists will certainly know how to find the happiest solution. * * * They will not wall themselves in, clumsily, with an uncompromising fetichism which would forbid them, against public interest, to suppress the smallest building-stone, devoid of any aesthetic interest, solely because that stone is old and saltpetered. * * * Let us remember the aphorism pronounced by Michelet, the great French writer: "Evolve or perish."

On the Eastern Front—In Mesopotamia

By H. Denin

IN the Revue Hebdomadaire, (Aug. 21,) M. H. Denin, a French traveler who knows accurately the wild country of which he writes, describes at considerable length the commercial and military value of the ancient lands on the Euphrates and Tigris, running down to the Persian Gulf.

* * * If the loss of men, on one side and the other, is very small because of the numerical weakness of the contending armies, (in Mesopotamia,) the importance of the stake is enormous; for it is a question, for England, of adding to the future possession of Arabia, coveted by her: First, the conquest of 55,000 square kilometers of land, which can be brought back to their legendary fertility by irrigation whose estimated cost is 500,000,000 francs, (note, these 55,000 square kilometers make up only about one-tenth of the land England will claim when peace is signed;) second, the exploitation of petroleum wells extending over a length of more than 400 kilometers and to an average depth of 70 kilometers, the exploitation being subject to; third, the organization beforehand and necessary populating of vast regions which are desert wastes at present. The advantage for the security of India is inappreciable, but it must be foreseen.

* * * Although the fate of this English campaign in Mesopotamia is in no doubt and it is not bold to predict already its successful ending, it will never be more than an operation subordinated to those of Europe. * * * It will show, in any case that: First, legitimacy of possession is refused to peoples who can not or will not make use of their agricultural and mineral resources; they must make way for others in the general interest; second, that the Mussulmans are very much in this state; and third, that a population of 50,000,000 men may live in Mesopotamia, whose inexhaustible food resources are guaranteed by the natural fertility of the soil, and whose buying capacity is assured to its people by the regularity, healthiness, and value that labor will have there.

International Law and Naval Warfare

By E. Bertin

IN the Revue des Deux-Mondes for the 15th of August, M. E. Bertin of the Académie des Sciences has a long and carefully documented article on the future of international law. He takes up points in its history relating to naval warfare and considers the effect of the events of the present war on the work of The Hague Conventions.

Among the ruins made by the war, there is one that should be repaired without more delay. It is the ruin of international law, for which the conferences of The Hague worked to raise a monument on the base laid down sixteen years ago by the Emperor of Russia, for the honor of humanity and the common interest of peoples. The restoration is urgent; it must be made while the cannon roars because it will thus assure to the edifice the solidity and stability it lacked and which —we can say after experiment—the work accomplished during the leisure of peace is powerless to give it. The task of restoration is incumbent on the neutrals, and on them alone. They are the judges of the camp. It is for them to declare what the signatures of nations at the foot of international acts are worth. Their declaration will prevail for the present and the future.

M. Bertin goes on to examine in detail the questions of piracy and of blockades. He reviews the provisions made at The Hague for the visiting of ships

in war time, shows wherein violations have occurred and how the advent of the submarine has rendered necessary the changing of certain definitions and policies of naval combat. He then proceeds to the question of contraband, particularly cotton. For a long time Germany has had to depend entirely on reprovisioning through neutral countries for cotton, from which to manufacture explosives. The international problems resulting from the stopping of such traffic are obvious. Without effective measures to strengthen an international tribunal, the work done at the Congresses from 1899 to 1907 will be lost and its principles will have to be abandoned. M. Bertin believes that the war itself will keep the world from permitting so sombre a misfortune:

> If the conventions have succeeded neither in softening the rigors of warfare nor even in keeping it within the limits recognized for centuries, the setback is due solely to their silence on one capital point, that of sanctions. In the eyes of the professional jurist the absence of the sanction may even annul a law. Did the delegates to The Hague fear to raise a doubt of the resolution of their respective Governments to honor their signatures? Such an illusion would have been surprising; it is dissipated, in any case. There will be no more conventions without sanctions suited to make them respected. It is here that neutrals can assure the future by saying their final word now—which they have never said before. * * * Whoever has faith in international law is following with passionate interest the diplomatic duel engaged between Washington and Berlin. (M. Bertin then speaks of the tone of President Wilson's notes with respectful admiration, and sees in his attitude great hope for the future.)

The Trentino and the Northern Boundary

By Giovanni Oberziner

IN the Nuova Antologia for Aug. 1, Giovanni Oberziner, who has been studying the questions of the Trentino for more than thirty years, gives the first paper of a series on "The Trentino and the Northern Boundary of Italy."

> It is not simply a platonic affirmation of ancient and modern geographers, nor a rhetorical concept of poets, that the high summit of the Alps is, all through the north, the boundary of Italy. But it is now, and was from ancient times so firmly rooted in the popular consciousness, that as long ago as 183 B. C. the Roman Senate, with this in mind, ordered certain barbarians—who had descended from the north and wanted to found a city in the region of Friuli—to recross the Alps immediately. Titus Livins observes, (39, 54,) that the Roman Senate took its energetic decision not because, already, it was afraid of this handful of barbarians, who came in humble mood to seek an asylum, but because it wanted the world to know that in Rome the Alps were considered the true defense of Italy, as a barrier not to be crossed under any circumstances by the peoples living on its northern slope.
>
> There are now, however, points where the natural boundary does not coincide with the political boundary. This is the case in the Canton of Ticino, in Poschiavo, the basin of the Upper Adige, for the Trentino with the contiguous upper valleys of Cordevale, (Livinallongo,) and Bolte, (Ampezzo,) not to speak of the region of Gorizia and Istria, where regions geographically and linguistically Italian have the grief of being cut off frim the body of the common mother.

The writer proceeds to examine, with a wealth of detail, the historical status of the localities above mentioned in ancient and mediaeval times. His second chapter is on the ethnographical aspect of the question, but before touching on this he gives part of a speech made by Mazzini in 1866, observing "current events demonstrate, as nothing else could, the truth in these fateful sentences of the great Genoese thinker":

> Accepting then, oh, Italians, the peace with which you are threatened, you will not only place a seal of shame on the brow of the nation, you will not only vilely betray your brothers of Istria, of Friuli, and the Trentino, you will not only cut off for many years any future worthy of Italy —condemning it to be a third-rate power in Europe, not only will you lose all the confidence of the nations and all initiatory influence with them, but you yourselves will hang over your heads the sword of Damocles of foreign invasion. And this sword of Damocles means for you the impossibility of diminishing your army; which brings with the impossibility of

economy the uncertainty of everything, absence of confidence on the part of the capitalists, absence of all peaceful, secure development of industrial life, progressive diminution of credit, progressive increase of disadvantages, impossibility of remedy, economic ruin and bankruptcy; it means—for not all of you will resign yourselves to this—perennial, increasing agitation; party discord more angry than ever; civil war in a more or less remote time—but an inevitable one.

The Raising Up of Belgium

By Maggiorino Ferraris

IN the Nuova Antologia, Senator Maggiorino Ferraris, director of the admirable review, has an article on "The Raising Up of Belgium." He gives a detailed study of Belgium, its civilization and place in the family of nations, and tells why Italy has an especial sympathy with her.

Emile Vandervelde, the illustrious chief of Socialism in Belgium and one of the greatest personalities of the modern social movement, has made a brief visit to Upper Italy, speaking especially at Turin and Milan. * * *

"We were a small people," Vandervelde said splendidly at Turin, "and in the manner of the happy peoples, we were almost without history. We asked to live in peace, as we had the right to. We had to choose between peace and honor. We preferred honor."

At the beginning of the war, and in spite of the reservedness counseled by neutrality—which our country always loyally kept—the national conscience was almost unanimous in judging Germany's invasion of Belgium as a grave and unjustifiable violation of international law, of the liberty and independence of peoples. Today, while our brave troops are fighting in the Alps by the side of the allied nations, there is only one sentiment throughout the Italian people as regards this war, from which there should arise for Europe a more intense era of liberty, and law among nations, and social well-being for the peoples. Only at this price should we face to the end the brutal conflict, and on the ruins of imperialism and militarism take up, indefatigable and unremitting, the tormented question of international repairs and the uplifting of the people.

At the head of these noble ideals of right, of civilization and thought stood Belgium, before the war. The small, quiet laborious, housekeeping country seemed to have consecrated its undaunted moral energies and its great material riches to an intense work of labor, peace, and social regeneration. From the fruitful fields, proud of a magnificent agriculture celebrated by Lavergne—the great agrarian economist of our youth—to commerce, to the offices, to the soil furrowed by innumerable railways and interminable canals—all seemed inextricably mingled in a hymn to progress. * * * Such was Belgium before the war, * * * and from the smoking ruins, today, arises—unquenchable—the cry for political and civil redress which our epoch cannot abandon without belittling itself before the greatest and noblest traditions of right and civilization.

Italians and the War

By G. Prezzolini

LA VOCE of Florence is certainly the favorite review of the important group of philosophers, poets, and critics who demand above all progress and independence as the keynote of Italian thought. Sig. G. Prezzolini, one of the most powerful of these writers, has a letter to the editor of La Voce, which is published under the title of "We and the War."

Dear de Robertis:—I write you immediately after reading the last Voce, the same evening. What a fine number, and how much good it did me to read it—in war time! It reminds me of certain people who said to me, "why keep up a literary review in war time, at such a serious moment!" as if art were not a serious thing, and thought—and liberty!

Sig. Prezzolini draws up a list of themes to be dwelt on in the review:

Third Point—To prepare, order, and win

a battle is a work that demands genius, and there is no doubt that a great General is a genius, as a statesman is; but it is well to recall in these times that a great poet, a great critic, or a great painter is not less great or less necessary to a nation than a great General, if it wants to count for something in the history of the world. And these commonsense truths, always true, are so much the more true, I make bold to say, now; because one is more tempted to forget them. Hence the utility of a "literary" review today, and the laudable courage to keep it up in this moment when it is easy to take for lack of patriotism this recalling of superior values.

Fourth Point—Down with the Germans! surely; but let us not fall, as today the French are tending to, into a facile contempt—and let us not throw ourselves into a still more facile driving out—of everything German. I read in a newspaper the letter of a man who wanted German operas taken from our repertory, as the Germans have taken from theirs the works of the Italians—Giordano, Puccini, and Leoncavallo. I don't know that man, but he can have only a mean and low spirit. Such passions, which gross and barbarous nationalists express, are the kind that would diminish us and impoverish our patrimony. Those who harbor them are often the very people who but yesterday were on their knees before "Kultur." These are dangerous phenomena to which our people, fortunately, does not seen inclined. I do not see bestial hate in Italy. Our war has been the finest one of Europe because it was an act of liberty, of choice, of judgment. It was not born of the drunkenness of pride, like the German war, nor from necessity as was the case in France. We must not let it degenerate. Let us know to distinguish between the bestial Germany of today and the teacher of mankind of yesterday. The thing is elementary. Luther, Kant, Hegel, Goethe, belong to the patrimony of the spirit. We want to kill the Germans. We do not want to kill ourselves. We are forced to fight with our bodies. We do not intend at all to humiliate our minds—nor those of the others either. The war we are carrying on will be of profit to us, and let us hope that profit to Germany will come of it as well. We should hope that she will face about and make amends and return to her origins and re-create herself. * * *

Fifth Point—In the effort for harmony and confidence that we must make, let us take care not to lose certain virtues we have and which some insatiable idiots would have pass for defects; I mean the spirit of criticism and individuality. Yes, I am glad of organization, discipline, &c., but I do not think for that reason that we should lose our right to examine either what the Government has done or what it ought to do. * * *

"D'Annunzio Has Spoken"

By Giuseppe de Robertis

THE editor of La Voce, Giuseppe de Robertis, in an article entitled "d'Annunzio Has Spoken," expresses the sentiment of the generation which has outlived the taste for d'Annunzio's style, and reproves the rhetoric he indulged in at the outbreak of the war.

* * * Let us not mention Carducci, who was a master in everything, who spent his life in educating, directing, and forming Italy, and who gave it conscience again and a sense of discipline, which we have put in the scales today, to be weighed. He spent his life in the work and used up so much strength in it that he was sometimes worn out when he turned to his poetry, and so was punished in his art.

Had he not written the great historic odes, we should have known just the same where to find the master of our youth, the man to form our first consciousness as a nation and to give us wise discipline. We should have seen the master through the example of his life, through his having accepted his place and his part in the world, his having reconstituted the sense of living things—which helped us at that time to recognize ourselves, to discover ourselves as men, as persons present to ourselves with a solid beginning of elementary orientation.

The difference between him and a d'Annunzio is clear to eyes even of blind men. D'Annunzio gives us literary felicity, with less of passion and torment than of grammatical and erudite experience. He was a dandy, and when he wanted to be a barbarian the essential and elementary qualities fled away from him—to the exaggeration of the other more low and degenerative ones. * * *

We knew that d'Annunzio was waiting to come to Italy, almost in triumph. There was lacking to his first day here that solemnity which his pride had perhaps led him to hope for—with the King, Salandra, and all the ancient Senate. But he made up for the humiliation. Instead he talked ten times. He can consider himself satis-

fied—Italy has acclaimed him the poet of her greatest war. * * *

And we wanted to enter it without rhetoric, modestly, without waking the customary ancient memories. We wanted to do it as one who knows he must measure with short steps his patience and sacrifice, gaining ground point by point, conquering by mind more than by heroism. It is a war of intelligence—our war.

We did not expect from d'Annunzio any words like these. We only hoped he would keep silent. A man such as he has nothing to say in such matters, of which he has never known anything. And once again he has forgotten his place—and just to say something, to accompany the events —like a guitar, with the most banal and hackneyed chords. * * *

He has to go back to the Greeks and the Romans. * * * He recalled the accustomed names, and Garibaldi and the Garibaldians—from whom we are so far in this mathematical war. He called the commonest men heroes. He has denied the best part of himself. * * *

We have become more expert, more precise, we have interrogated ourselves so often; and we have thrown away the things we are through with. We see things in their universal relations. We are fighting not for Trento, Trieste, and all Dalmatia, but for civilization.

Sensitive Holland

By Paul Rache

Paul Rache, who is the Amsterdam correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt, points out in the article translated below wherein Germany has failed to appreciate the position of the Dutch people as an independent nation.

THE expression, "Holland is Dutch," may at first glance look like a cheap joke, or at least seem superfluous. But only at a first glance. It is advisable that we in Germany view Holland as it actually is, and as it wants to appear, and not in the light that we have observed it during the past twenty years.

This would be to our own interest, and to the interest of Holland. Very often the old by-word, which annoys Holland and the Dutch people, no matter how well it is meant, has caused suspicion and caused them to withdraw themselves. The ancient expression about "kindred" Holland, with its language in "reality German," or "as good as German"—which leans upon its big brother—this expression ought to be thrown upon the junk heap. One can do the German cause no greater harm than by reminding the Hollander, as is being done constantly today, that as a matter of fact he "belongs to us."

We can only reach a better understanding with Holland, and Holland will then only approach us in a more friendly spirit, when we accustom ourselves to appreciate better the characteristics of the Dutch people, and to emphasize this; to accept the individual nationality; to look upon them as Hollanders, and not as Low Germans, or as of German kinship. This may not be so easy. It may go against the German grain. But it is absolutely necessary; it is nothing more nor less than political wisdom.

We must reckon with the fact that just at this time, when German nationalism finds such widespread expression, the nationalistic feeling of others must be considered. We should know why just on this account Holland finds itself injured, when, no matter how well intentioned the purpose, it is looked at in a different light. Holland is, it is true, neither English nor French. But neither is it German. The country is nothing less than Dutch, and that to the marrow.

We must know the Dutch with their justified pride in their glorious past; their great historical rôle, their splendid culture; one should understand how today the national consciousness is so deep-rooted in order to comprehend why they are nothing else than Dutch. Exactly because Holland has ceased to play a conspicuous part in world politics the country lives more in the glory of the past. The people are sensitive when rudely reminded that this is a

changed world. It is necessary to enter into the other's position and feeling to find out why the German approaches do not find the readiest acceptance with the Hollander. It is also essential to take into consideration that there has been entirely too much foolish talk and writing by our nationalists. In illustration of what is being done to injure us can be cited the flood of pamphlets of a certain sort concerning Dutch relations. This, notwithstanding the fact that it has been made public in Holland that in no sense has this kind of literature any connection with Germany's national politics.

To bring about a better feeling between the two countries we must get to know each other better. We must appreciate to a much greater extent than in the past the characteristics of the Dutch; they will then get accustomed to look upon us as we really are. Then there will be no longer any foolish fear of annexation. The outstretched hand will be grasped heartily, and not suspiciously, as now.

It may not be amiss at just this time to call to mind our attitude toward the Boers during their war of liberation against England. We at that time, let it be said, much to the surprise of the Dutch, made the Boers' cause our own, and with our whole soul we threw ourselves into the battles that were fought by General Botha; the same Botha whom the English and the Boers now glorify as the conqueror of Germany's Southwest African possessions. That war taught us a great many things; showed us just how far we ought to go with politics built on sentiment. This experience should not be lost on us in our present and future dealings with Holland.

How ill-informed Germany in reality is regarding the attitude of Holland is shown in an article by Julius Bachem in the Algemeinen Rundschau, where it reads that one of the "saddest surprises" for Germany has been the fact that during this war Dutch public opinion has evidenced so little friendliness; in fact, has been quite unfriendly. Here, again, we may refer back to the old by-word about kinship. In Germany it was taken for granted that Holland, considering the relationship, could not be other than pro-German; hence, the "surprise." There is no present need for recalling what impression was made on Holland when the Germans entered Belgium; an impression that had nothing to do with the campaign of falsification that was being conducted by the English and the French, and which caused the acceptance of every story about German misdeeds.

No, Holland is not pro-German; that is, in so far as it concerns the masses; no more so has it ever been anti-German. And this is something that we always seem to forget. I can only repeat, the Hollander is too specifically Dutch in his nationality to permit his sympathy or antipathies to carry him either one way or another. We should not be misguided because, perhaps, the French war pictures in the moving picture theatres are heartily applauded, or because the handorgans in the streets of Amsterdam play "Tipperary" to the accompaniment of singing or whistling by young girls and boys. Such superficial observations ought not to be considered criterions.

Holland is not pro-German, but, on the other hand, neither is it anti-German; at least the Germans in the country are not aware of the fact. The Hollander knows how to keep his feelings to himself. He is, besides, scrupulous in his idea of what hospitality stands for. Under what may be considered the most painful circumstances, the Dutch Government has seen its way to maintain its neutrality in a most masterly manner. The average Hollander has supported the Government in that respect. This fact must be acknowledged by the Germans. Even if now and then there has appeared a "war party," the Dutch are not inclined that way. It is true that for a while there was some talk in the newspapers whether it would not be just as well for Holland to take an active part in the war as to remain passive until the end and confront the consequences. But now there

is hardlly a sound heard of that sort of talk. The people are preparing for the future.

In Germany it is taken for granted that after the war Holland and all Dutch interests will take a more intimate turn toward the Fatherland. Holland is not quite ready to admit all this, but if we expect to have our desire realized we must first of all begin by appreciating the Dutch nationality, the individualism of the people.

Turkey and Her Partners

Skillful Diplomacy in Constantinople and Berlin

The semi-official Turkish newspaper, Tanin, of Constantinople, recently contained an editorial article dealing with the mutual benefits expected as a result of linking the interests of the Osman empire with Germany. It has been reproduced by the Kölnische Zeitung.

IN sending Prince von Hohenlohe to Constantinople to replace Baron von Wangenheim, who is ill, and also by dispatching the former Grand Vizier, Hakki Pasha, to Berlin, as the new Ambassador, both Governments give positive proof that they attach the utmost importance to having representatives of the first rank in the respective capitals.

At the time the Constitution was introduced in Turkey, Germany's influence met with a considerable amount of opposition. It was not unnatural, considering that previous to the adoption of the Constitution, a close intimacy existed between German interests and those high personalities who, with the deposition of the Sultan, no longer counted. Through this transition, greater importance was given English and French friendship, but, where a clever diplomacy might have brought itself profit by taking immediate advantage of the ticklish situation in the empire, the English preferred to meet the Turkish approaches with cold indifference. Neither did the politics of France tend to improve the opportunity.

A further hindrance to Turkey's friendship for Germany rested in Austria-Hungary's absorption of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Tripoli affair, involving Germany's other partner in the Triple Alliance, Italy, did not help matters. Yet, all these handicaps have been overcome by German friendliness, until gradually this attitude has won its way and led up to the present alliance.

We regret that this attachment has arrived so late, and are of the opinion that the same feeling exists in both Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Osmanic Government realized fully its precarious position in relation to the two powerful groups in Europe, and it has felt its isolation. This must be assigned as the reason why first it leaned toward the Triple Alliance, then toward the Triple Entente. But as its indecision remained, neither the former nor the latter group looked with any special favor on joining hands with Turkey. It appeared, indeed, as if the Turkish Nation was looked upon as a disturbing element which, under the existing conditions, would prove a burden instead of a benefit to any one entering into a compact. Whatever wish Turkey may have had to connect itself one way or another, the unspoken answer was something to the effect that the time was not yet ripe.

There is no question that, so far as Turkey is concerned, an arrangement with powerful partners has been a necessity. In no other way could it expect to solve the internal problems, to set in order its own house, to gain strength with which to elevate itself. So long as Turkey stood alone it would not be possible to establish needed reforms, to get the money necessary for carrying out its plans. If today the Turkish Nation is

unable to offer its allies the greatest amount of assistance possible, this is because the country has not had the opportunity to get ready. In spite of the fact that Turkey was entirely unprepared to enter the alliance, in four theatres of war it is confronted by close to a million soldiers, and yet it is able to lend valuable aid to the Germans, the Austrians, and the Hungarians.

The time when Germany and Austria-Hungary should have turned to Turkey and reaped the advantage of such a move was when the Balkan war gave the Osmanic nation its greatest trial. Then German and Austrian diplomacy would have amounted to much. But evidently, no one realized the slumbering power inherent in the people. At any rate, no one thought that the Turkey of the future held any promise. When the fateful wars brought the country to its knees no one cared.

All this is now a matter of the past. But the past must teach us how to gain profit from experience. That the affairs of great countries now rest in the hands of skillful diplomats in both Constantinople and Berlin is a token of the earnestness with which the future is anticipated. It is necessary that we look on this as something of the greatest significance.

When Turkey joined the Teutonic people it had not had the benefit of a long period of peace. But we give readily of what we have to offer now, trusting that when the war is over we also will reap some benefit. To build for the future we must begin now on a foundation that shall strengthen the bonds between the parties. After the war it follows that the economic and financial connections will grow in importance. Let be that Turkey has its own interests in view. It will remain true to its friends and offer itself in the service of them all. It is to be hoped that nothing will happen to shake the mutual confidence of the present. It is a favorable sign that, in the eyes of the Germans, Turkey is now looked upon as an equal in the bond that has been created.

Social Democracy and the Great War

By Gustav Bang

Belief is strong that Social Democrats in all countries will reunite quickly following the present conflict. Gustav Bang, writing in Social-Democraten, the official mouthpiece for the party in Denmark, tells what ought to be done to conserve the interests of Social Democracy in Europe, now and later.

THE period that sets in with the closing of the war will exact much of Social Democracy in the now warring countries, as well as in those maintaining their neutrality. Greater problems than any that have heretofore confronted Social Democratic parties will then have to be met and solved.

It is to be observed that in many and different directions opportunities will present themselves for a strengthened, a suddenly developed social, political, and cultural advance in close agreement with the interests of the working classes, the aims of Social Democracy. It is easy to name three widely separated issues where such development may be expected. It is beyond dispute that militarism, which during recent decades has sucked the very life blood of the European nations, will be greatly limited, and, if not at once, in a not far distant future, will be completely eliminated. There can be no denial that not only must Russian autocracy—that fastness for all reaction in Europe—at last go down, but that elsewhere in the European countries constitutional rights must be thoroughly democratized and political influence placed squarely in the hands of the common voter. Again, it is indisputable that among those people where united action among the proletariat is as yet a

new thing there will arise a critical examination of present methods of production, and a strong respect for, a lively sympathy with, Social Democratic ideals undoubtedly will assert themselves.

In all these directions are visible manifold possibilities. But each such step ahead brings with it consequences the effects of which no man can foretell. We know, however, that the working classes must gain both moral and material benefit from that which is in prospect, and that the class system cannot prevail against such assembled forces.

But let us not forget, all this is but a tendency; possibilities, realization of which depends upon the efficient work, the amount of energy, solidarity that Social Democracy will be able to marshal when this war comes to an end. No historical development ever took place automatically, but through the carefully planned, secure aims of individual classes that knew what they were after. Development creates at various periods a more or less favorable condition for the advancement of ideals. To what extent a condition may be made use of depends on the amount of material and moral strength that the class in question can command. Immense opportunities will be at the disposal of the masses at the end of the war, opportunities for the workers in all fields and in the direction of politics, economics, and education. But, if at the last moment the commonalty halts, if it stands hesitatingly weak and vacillating, because of inner differences, the chances will be lost. What Social Democracy must do while the war lasts is to make ready for the greatest possible development and assertion of its power after the war.

The first essential that, with no uncertain sound, calls for notice, is the re-establishment of international co-operation between the economic and political organizations in the different countries. Of course, only at the conclusion of the war will it be possible to gather the torn strands. But wherever it is possible to keep the common interest alive this ought to be done. It is the duty of Social Democracy in all the neutral lands to prepare the ground for a quick and complete reuniting among themselves and the countries at war and between the warring nations themselves.

It is to be granted that there will be difficulties in the way for the re-establishing of the relationships that existed before the war, but we must not overestimate these difficulties. Instead of the artificial nationalism that this war has created, class distinction will come to the fore. Without regard for country, workers everywhere will be compelled to stand shoulder to shoulder. Chauvinistic sentiment may get time in which to spend itself, but in so far as it concerns the great majority of the working people, the moment they are confronted with problems that concern them alone all interests will centre in the battle for existence.

It is not so impossible that even while the war continues, that is, when the outcome will become somewhat better visualized, the position of the proletariat will undergo a change in the one or other country now party to the struggle. This has happened before. Take the war of 1870. In the beginning the war was popular among the German working people. In France, the workers and others with liberal tendencies appeared cool to the demands for a great war. But the moment the French Empire fell and Germany no longer hid its plan to annex Alsace and Lorraine, sentiment on both sides of the Rhine changed about. The French workers entered with enthusiasm in the struggle for the defense of their country, while, on the part of the German workingmen a strong protest arose against the continuance of the war. Similar changes are not at all impossible while the present war is on.

At any rate, it is misleading to say that because of what happened to the old "Internationale" after the Franco-German war we also ought to conclude that the identical fate awaits similar organizations of the present day. When the International Workingmen's Association wrote finis to its existence at The Hague Congress of 1872, this was not due to the preceding war, but as a result of the internal dissolution that a long time before had set in owing to the gradually

A RECENT PORTRAIT OF DR. KARL HELFFERICH
Secretary of the German Imperial Treasury, Who Negotiated the Third German War Loan
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood.)

GENERAL VON EICHHORN

Of the German Army Staff, Who Assailed the Forts of Kovno on the Dvina Line

(Photo from Paul Thompson.)

increasing differences between Socialists and Anarchists—a dissolution which pointedly showed that this form of organization had seen its best days and had fulfilled its mission. The aim of the old "Internationale" was to awaken the workers in the various countries to the meaning of class distinction, to an understanding of class consciousness. When this problem was solved the organization simply went to pieces of itself. The new movement, however, is an outgrowth of the working people's need to stand together for strategic purposes. Its roots lie deep down in the proletarian cause the world over. Steadily the tree has grown during the first twenty-five years that have passed since the International Workingmen's Congress. Not even a hurricane can tear the tree from its foundation.

Not only outwardly—in its relations to the fellow-workers in foreign countries—will Social Democracy immediately upon the conclusion of the war stand confronted with great issues. Internally, in each country where inner politics are at stake, a variety of questions will ask for answers the nature of which may mean exceedingly much to the communal life. Here Social Democracy must proceed with the greatest energy to take advantage of every opportunity. We have already mentioned the question of militarism, what should be done toward strengthening constitutional privileges; whether it may not be well to preserve some of the features for supplying the populace with food articles, methods that have proved so valuable while the war is on. The new taxes that will be demanded to cover direct and indirect losses due to the war will be burdens for the workers everywhere to consider. Let no one imagine that such taxes will be of only temporary character. The war tax placed on coffee, tea, sugar, tobacco, &c., here in Denmark to cover the expenses of the war of 1864 did not disappear until the change in the customs law in 1908. Social Democracy should have a say in whatever new tariffs are to be established to make good the financial losses brought about by this great war.

The organizing of many new workers that will enter the industrial and transportation fields at the close of the war will call for great efforts. It is a historical experience that after every war there follows a period of great activity. There will be violent rises in productivity and consumption to make good the losses created by the destructiveness of the conflict. The great industrial upward movement during the first half of the seventies, it is true, was not produced exclusively as a result of the Franco-German war immediately preceding, but it is a fact that it was greatly accelerated through this war. Not only in Germany, where the French milliards gave the industrial movement a special feverish character, but everywhere in Europe, even in France, was this revival of marked effect. Lafargue speaks of the French industrial development in the years following the war as follows:

> The mechanical industry which, since the treaty with England in 1863 had grown but slowly, suddenly took a colossal upward swing. * * * In all parts of the country factories shot up like mushrooms, destroyed the smaller industries, and thus created an industrial proletariat. * * * Ten years after the war the whole of France had become an industrial proletariat.

After every war participated in by the European nations following the Franco-German struggle similar movements have been noticed. The present world combat may be expected to give the fullest expression to the tendency making for increased trade and production. But while the necessity for such expansion is unquestioned, we must also expect a reaction within not many years after the period immediately following the war calls for feverish activity in all branches of endeavor. The subsequent economic crisis, then, is what must be guarded against.

Demand for wage earners is sure to come with the signing of the peace agreements. This demand will continue for a time, there will be a rise in wages, while it is probably also true that whatever may be the increase in earnings will be more or less offset by the increased cost of living. It is possible that there will be a turning of many agricultural workers toward the cities, for the reason that farm

products are likely to be among the first articles to reach a normal level with the coming of peace in Europe.

The Social Democratic elements in all countries will have to meet all these problems face to face. Social Democracy gained its first real advantage at the conclusion of the Franco-German war. From a number of weak and narrow groups, often quarreling among themselves about trifles, the Social Democratic followers almost in the twinkling of an eye were transformed into a strong and big party, increasing in power year after year. The conditions that will be present when this world war ends will permit of further advances and influences leading up to final victory.

Critical Moments

By L. Slonimski

In Wjstnek Europe (The News of Europe) for July L. Slonimski, one of Russia's most widely read authorities on international problems, publishes an article entitled "Critical Moments," in which he considers the attitude of the Allies to Germany.

IT is quite clear that the war was deliberately prepared by the German leaders, and that Germany has been and is still in the exceptional position of occupying herself at once with culture and with armament.

What other countries considered an inevitable evil, forced on them by international relationships, Germany considered as a very important problem, an object of great anxiety, whose interest lay in itself. The other countries did not notice sufficiently what was going on in Germany, her militaristic tendencies, and how for forty years she was perfecting an organization equipped with the most modern and scientific arms known to warfare.

Other nations were forced to arm, but Germany alone aimed for the active preparedness that would permit her to attack her neighbors at any moment. This was something the other powers of Europe did not expect. They considered German militarism as something extraordinary, indeed, but to be disposed of by the matter of fact explanation of traditional custom. But what was looked on as part of a political system developed, to the surprise of the rest of Europe, into a system of war. The spectacle of Germany's preparedness was the first lesson of the war. We found out then what Germany, armed for attack where others were armed for defense, had accomplished without one of her neighbors being aware of it. It is only now that we realize that it was for the purposes of her Generals that Prussia expended 480,000,000 marks on her railways in 1912.

The most notable feature of Germany's preparedness, however, was her production of arms and ammunition. In this she had no rival among all the other nations, and it is now our task to catch up with her on her own lines. With sufficient stores of ammunition in the hands of the Allies, the war would quickly be transferred from their territory to that of their enemy—and ended there.

Germany set aside her people's money before the war, and stored up her ammunition before the war. The Allies have to answer their questions of finance and armament with the war actually in progress—their success will depend entirely on the effort they can put forth to arrange these essential matters under redoubled difficulties.

At the beginning of the war the importance of these material problems was not sufficiently realized. The press was mainly occupied with analyzing and examining the ethical causes of Europe's unexpected catastrophe. On this account the discussions of foreign and Russian writers concluded with the idea that the Allies would win through the strength of their righteousness. * * *

Emil Bodrero, the philosopher, predicts the fall of Germany on historical

grounds. "Germany is doomed because her mission in the history of civilization is ended. The quota of her great services to humanity having been completed, she must yield her place to others. Not only militarism will perish, but the entire era will take on a new aspect—the down-trodden masses replacing the men who hold the power in our civilization today. From this broader viewpoint, then, let us not desire the downfall of Germany, remembering that to the minds of her patriots the work of England and France is as much ended as we think hers is." Each nation naturally exaggerates its ethical superiority over the others. We are no exception to the rule, and one of our great problems for the future must be the abolition of narrow-minded nationalism.

Warsaw and Kovno

By K. Shumskavo

As an example of the type of war correspondence published in Russia, we give an extract from an article in No. 32 of Neva, (The Field,) a weekly of Petrograd. K. Shumskavo, the author, is Neva's special representative at the front.

AS is well known, the fortress of Warsaw was vacated almost immediately after the Japanese war, and to have defended the old fortress at present would have been utterly disadvantageous for us.

When the enemy reached a point seven versts from Warsaw he began to bombard the city. Prince Luitpold of Bavaria commanded the German forces. On our side a decision was quickly reached that it would be better not to defend the capital than to suffer the damage it would incur from prolonged shelling.

So the evacuation of Warsaw was begun. The departure of our troops was extremely difficult, as the northern German army was hurrying down from Lomsha and Ostrow. The southern army, headed by Mackensen, rushed on to Brest. Our rear guard fought stubbornly against enemies attacking from both north and south. Meanwhile a new line of defense was calmly being formed between the Niemen and the Bug, with two strong supporting points on the wings. Brest on the left wing and Kovno on the right wing.

When the enemy pressed on toward the new line to surround the Kovno region, he met with vigorous resistance and was stopped. It then became evident that Germany's one means of succeeding was to storm Kovno itself. The adventure was a serious one, for Kovno is a fortress of the first class, and the number of lives it cost the Germans was enormous. Nevertheless they did take the chain of forts surrounding Kovno, though the weakening of their field armies which this necessitated was attended with grave consequences for them. It is evident that the wider the circle of forts the more troops must be sent to surround them. Hence a violent effort was made by the enemy at Kovno to narrow the ring, as he was continuously subjected to attacks from Novo Georgievsk and Brest.

A few words will make clear the reason for the final abandonment of the fortress of Kovno. If the commander cannot preserve the forts from destruction, it is more reasonable to preserve the garrison at least for the field army, and not allow a siege in which the garrison might be lost, as in the case of Przemysl, where 170,000 Austrians were forced to capitulate.

A fort has to hold out at least till the return of the field army. When the latter shows no sign of approaching in time, and the fort is bound to fall, strategy demands the evacuation of the fortress and the garrison retreats. In general, one of the questions which modern military art has to consider most carefully is that of continuing the defense of a fortress or of withdrawing its garrison in time.

"The Balkan Bag"

The difficulty of getting articles showing the true state of feeling among Russians is caused by the censorship of the Russian press, which goes to lengths of repression and to severity of punishment unknown in any other country. We accordingly give an article published by the Nowe Mere, (New World,) one of the most important Russian journals of America. "The Balkan Bag" is an editorial which appeared on Oct. 9, 1915.

NOT long ago a conference of representatives of the Social Democrats of all the Balkan States was held in Bucharest. In brotherly agreement, though debating with great animation, they defined the best plan for development among their nations. Among the Balkan peoples, they affirmed, there is no enmity. They have no reason for war among themselves, except those furnished them by the treacherous politics of the classes who try to make the Governments extend their boundaries over the land of their neighbors. And even this only occurs through the submission of the Balkans to the shameful yoke of the great European plunderers. This is the true voice of the conscious proletarians of the Balkan States.

Bulgaria betrayed unhappy Serbia with hellish cold-bloodedness. But at the same time she betrayed her own national weakness: the inability to resist the greedy appetite of the great plunderers. The Balkan Social Democrats had that in mind when they said that the politics of the dominating classes was treacherous. Did the Bulgarian Nation do this? Does it sympathize with the politics of treason? Once for all—no. The power of the King and that of the reigning party of the capitalists are responsible. It is quite consistent for the desires of the capitalists of Bulgaria, making for economic superiority, to be so in harmony with the plans of King Ferdinand, who dreams of ruling the Balkan Peninsula. The small nations will not be able to resist their destruction, as the selfish aims of the dominating classes separate them into hostile camps. It is the rivalry of these nations (which should be allies) which throws them together like cats in a bag—to destroy one another.

In this darkness there is only one possible ray of light: proletarian self-consciousness. Between the persecuted, between victims, there can be no enmity. The proletarians of the Balkans said so on the very eve of the war.

The Opponents' Losses and Gains

In an article on "High Finance and a Premature Peace," appearing in The Nineteenth Century and After for September, Edgar Crammond says:

AT the end of twelve months of war the central powers find themselves in the following position:

(a) They have occupied 70,000 square miles of enemy territory.

(b) They have captured 7,000 to 8,000 guns and 2,000 to 3,000 machine guns.

(c) They claim to have captured 1,695,000 prisoners of war, (in all probability a great number of civilians are included in this total.)

(d) They have inflicted losses upon the enemy aggregating about 5,800,000 men, including prisoners of war.

On the other hand, the Central Powers

(a) Have lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners at least 5,700,000 men.

(b) They have lost the greater part of their Colonial Empire aggregating 1,000,000 square miles.

(c) They have lost their entire Overseas commerce.

We know the distress and agony of mind caused in our own immediate circles by the death and maiming of our loved ones. We also know that the British losses up to July 18 aggregated 329,895. Allowing for the difference

between the population of the German Empire and that of the United Kingdom with the Overseas Dominions, the German losses are about eight times as large as the British. It is impossible to believe that these frightful losses are not having a terrifying effect upon the mind of the German people. They are learning in blood and in tears that war is bad business. In addition to the loss of 3,000,000 men and the destruction of her Colonial Empire Germany has pretty well used up the war material accumulated during the past forty years. She has added already £1,000,000,000 to her national debt. She has aroused against her the active and abiding hatred, so far as this generation is concerned, of nearly one-third of the people of the world. This hatred is certain to find expression in the restriction of future trade with Germany. Above all, the central powers, after making all these sacrifices and incurring such frightful losses, have not been able to obtain a decision in any theatre of the war, and they find ringed around their frontiers many millions more armed men and better equipped men than they had to contend with at the end of the first month of the war.

The prolongation of the war through another Winter will destroy Prussian militarism. Germany's supplies of raw materials for her manufactures are approaching exhaustion at the same time that her supplies of certain indispensable war materials are running out. Her reserves of men of military age are also within sight of exhaustion. When the facts of the situation are realized by the great mass of the German people the whole economic fabric, which is based upon belief in the success of German arms, will collapse, the war spirit of the German people will be broken, and there will be an economic upheaval in Germany such as the world has never witnessed.

The rulers of Germany are not fools. They recognize the danger of her position. They are past masters of the game of "bluff," and they are trying to "bluff" the world. They know that it would be against the interest of "High Finance" that Germany should be crushed, because many profitable channels of intercourse between the different countries of the world would be eliminated. For these reasons I am convinced that "High Finance" will exert all its influence to prevent Germany from being completely crushed.

In order to show the suffering and destruction which Prussian militarism has already brought upon the world I have prepared the two following tables. The first shows the estimated number of killed, wounded, and missing, including prisoners, in the first twelve months of the war, and the second table shows the losses and destruction in terms of money during the same period:

ALLIED POWERS.

Power.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing and Prisoners.	Total.
Russia	900,000	1,600,000	1,000,000	3,500,000
*France	400,000	700,000	300,000	1,400,000
†Great Britain	69,713	196,994	63,188	329,895
Belgium	47,000	160,000	40,000	247,000
Serbia	64,000	112,000	40,000	216,000
Italy	.....	.....	.....	60,000
Total for Allies	1,480,713	2,768,994	1,443,188	5,752,895

CENTRAL POWERS.

Power.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing and Prisoners.	Total.
Germany	900,000	1,800,000	400,000	3,100,000
Austria-Hungary	600,000	1,100,000	800,000	2,500,000
Turkey	46,000	100,000	30,000	176,000
Total	1,546,000	3,000,000	1,230,000	5,776,000
Grand total	3,026,713	5,768,994	2,673,188	11,528,895

*Figures based on official appeal of the French Relief Society.
†Official figures, including navy lists, Aug. 22, 1914—July 18, 1915.

DIRECT AND INDIRECT COST OF WAR JULY 31, 1914, TO JULY 31, 1915.*
(In thousands of pounds, 000s omitted.)

Power.	Direct Expenditure of Government.	Destruction of Property.	Capitalized Value of Loss of Human Life.	Loss of Production and Other Losses.	Total.
Belgium	£36,500	£250,000	£40,000	£200,000	£526,500
France	568,900	160,000	348,000	625,000	1,701,900
Russia	600,000	100,000	404,000	400,000	1,504,000
Italy	253,000	.....	.....	200,000	453,000
British Empire	700,000	.....	300,000	250,000	1,250,000
Total	£2,158,400	£510,000	£1,092,000	£1,675,000	£5,435,400
Austria-Hungary	562,000	100,000	435,000	600,000	1,697,000
Germany	1,026,000	.....	1,014,000	740,000	2,780,000
Total	£1,588,000	£100,000	£1,449,000	£1,340,000	£4,477,000
Grand total, both groups	£3,746,400	£610,000	£2,541,000	£3,015,000	£9,912,400

**Vide* paper on "The Cost of War" read before the Royal Statistical Society, March 17, 1915.

In twelve months Prussian militarism has caused the death or maiming of nearly 9,000,000 of men and the destruction of about £10,000,000,000 ($50,000,000,000) of the world's wealth. If Germany had been the winner of this war she would have known how to make the losers pay. The question which it is very much in the power of the British people to decide is whether Germany is to be punished or whether she is to be allowed to escape the penalty of her crime against the world because her punishment cannot be accomplished without inflicting further enormous losses upon certain great financial interests. It is our duty to sweep aside all influences and considerations which stand in the way of the destruction of Prussian militarism. At an immense cost we have transformed our industrial organization from a commercial basis to a war basis, and we are only just beginning to reap the full benefit of this tremendous effort.

Our greatest danger now is that we may allow ourselves to be "bluffed" into a premature and inconclusive peace. We hold the winning position, and all we have to do is to stand fast with our allies.

A Year of War's Emotions

By Simeon Strunsky

(From The Atlantic Monthly for October.)

IF I were to attempt anything like a formal account of the first year of the war, the subject would naturally fall apart into campaigns and "phases," bounded by dates of day and month more or less precise. It would be the campaign in the west and the campaign in the east, the war in Belgium, the invasion of France, the battle of the Marne, the Russians in East Prussia, the Russians in Galicia, the Germans before Warsaw, the Germans across the Vistula, and so on, in orderly textbook fashion. But when I think back upon the past months as a man and not as a war expert, the chronicle does not present itself as a succession of events and phases, but as a succession of moods and states of mind. The record I most clearly visualize is less of what was going on in Europe than of what was going on in me, and millions like myself, in reaction to the news from the battlefields and the capitals. It is a record of what people in this neutral country thought and talked about, the fluctuation of their hopes and fears, their pities and indignations, their speculations of the world-issues at stake, and their

wagers as to whether the war would end before November, 1916. For a review of this kind, maps and charts, names and dates, are of little help, though the concrete event and time underlie, of course, what may be called the psychic chronicle of the war. Such a psychic record, too, falls apart into phases and movements, but they are not always chronologically definable.

The first of the mental periods we lived through was the period of Belgian achievement as distinguished from the period of Belgian suffering. To the extent that chronology can bound a psychological state this phase ran for something like four weeks, from the first gun at Liége to Cambrai and St. Quentin. It was a time when men's hearts glowed with the vision of righteousness apparently prevailing against might, and of the unconquerable soul of man. During the first three weeks of August, it seemed as if David and Goliath had returned and the colossus of Europe had been shattered by a pigmy. * * *

There followed a period of severe psychic reaction which I think of as the Sayville or von Kluck period. After four weeks of isolation, Germany was in touch with her wireless towers on Long Island, and the first news she gave to the world was that force, after all, was having its own way against righteousness. Already we knew that Brussels had fallen, but that, we said, was largely for strategic reasons, or, at worst, because of a delay in the approach of French and British reinforcements. We had some hint, too, that the French were not doing as well as they should have done, measured by Belgium's showing, but we were not yet adept in translating the official language of the dispatches, with their vague regroupings and retirements and their confused geography.

Then, in the last days of August, Germany, by way of Sayville, announces victory on every hand—victory in Alsace, in Lorraine, in Belgian Luxemburg, victory at Charleroi, and at Mons. The iron ring is drawing tight around France, and von Kluck shoots up in the headlines. For two weeks after that the world re-echoes to the iron-shod tramp of von Kluck. The Uhlan of the early Belgian period retires into the background and the invincible right wing sweeps on toward Paris. * * *

I think of the period which followed as the Time-against-Germany period. By this time people were aware that the work of von Moltke and Bismarck was not undone, that the German Army was what forty-five years of preparation should have made it, that the Germans were apparently winning. Only they were not winning fast enough. Time ran against the Kaiser, and we spoke of the Russian steam-roller. The Russian steam-roller came to grief in the mud of the Masurian Lakes; and, after a painful process of extrication, started lumbering back to the Niemen. But just then came the battle of the Marne, and in a trice we were again portioning out the German Empire and exiling the Kaiser to St. Helena. The formal history of the war may yet show that at the Marne the German cause failed definitely, and that the swift rebound of spirits that followed the "strategic withdrawal" of the German right wing was justified. * * *

Up to the fall of Antwerp we had not lost our faith in the human quality as against the Krupp quality. Those were the days of Joffre and Sir John French and the beginning of the four weeks' race between Joffre and the Germans for Antwerp and the shores of the North Sea. Like a child stringing beads Joffre strung territorial battalions and cavalry brigades in a chain that seemed destined to reach the Belgian fortress before the heavy German guns.

But the German guns won the race, and for months after that we were under the shadow of the 42-centimeter. German generalship had been outwitted, but German brute strength was in the ascendant. Sixteen-inch guns, caterpillar wheels, motor traction, we saw little else. Just as during mobilization days the imaginative correspondents saw endless lines of troop trains pouring across Cologne bridge or shunted back to East Prussia, so now they followed the itinerary of the Krupp howitzers. Where the guns came they would conquer. How

soon would the Germans have them before Verdun? * * *

While Kitchener was gathering his millions for the Spring drive and the armies lay watchful but inert in the ditches, the deadlock gave us leisure for a campaign which I believe has impressed itself on the mind of the world more vividly than the strategy and casualties of Galicia and Flanders, and which to a great many of us will be the real war years after dates and names have sunk into obscurity. Who now can place Liaoyang and Mukden within their month or even the year? Who was Kodama? Who was Nodzu? Who, to answer instantaneously, was Kuroki? But we still remember Samurai and Bushido, Japanese loyalty and superstition, hara-kiri, Emperor worship, Elder Statesmen. So in the present war what will be longest remembered, I dare say, are not the battles and campaigns, but the passions far behind the battle line. While Kitchener was drilling his men there raged the Battle of the Multi-colored Books—white books, yellow books, orange books, blue books, green books, red books—these being the Truth as revealed to the Foreign Offices of the various nations. * * *

Simultaneously with the battle of the books there raged the battle of the professors and the poets. In this Kultur campaign the Germans displayed their characteristic organization, discipline, and determination, but on the whole it was a defensive fight. The assault was delivered by the Allies. It was they who began the attack on Kultur after Louvain, and Professors Ostwald, Haeckel, attacked. The allied bombardment was attacked. The Allied bombardment was first directed against Fort Bernhardi, as I have shown in a former article. When that position was in a fair way of being demolished and the paper editions of Bernhardi, as I have pointed out, were selling as low as 10 cents, the allied fire was trained against Fort Treitschke. The Germans in Fort Treitschke held out rather well, but the Allies masked that strong position and concentrated the fire of their batteries on Fort Nietzsche. That position is still under siege. * * *

It was sapping tactics that were chiefly brought into play by the Allies in the battle of Kultur. The entire German position was undermined. "Let us see," said the allied scientists, professors, historians, scholars, "what are the real claims of these German professors, technicians, text-editors, dictionary-makers, and coal-tar specialists, whose authority we have hitherto acknowledged without question, and whose example we have humbly tried to imitate." And it at once appeared that German science and learning, was a Kultur of mediocrity, a middleman, parasitic, sweat-and-grub Kultur, which made its profits by working over the tailings thrown up by the pioneer delvers of other nations, which rushed in its disciplined Teuton hordes only where some great alien had shown the way, which originated little and borrowed everywhere. The roll of the great discoverers and inventors was called, and nearly every time it appeared that it was an Englishman, or a Frenchman, or an Italian, or even a Russian, to whom we owed the basic ideas of progress. All of German progress was coal-tarred with the same brush of imitation. Bacon, Harvey, Newton, Descartes, Lavoisier, Faraday, Pasteur, Becquerel, Benedetto Croce, Mendeleef, were found to be the real foundation of German greatness. * * *

As I write, phase after phase of the great conflict suggests itself, almost without end, and always they are phases of emotion, phases of mind, attitudes, hopes, fears, exultation, depression. There was the period when Germany was to be starved into surrender, and the period when England's empire was on the verge of ruin. There were months when neutrality held us absorbed, the neutrality of Rumania, of the Balkans, of Italy, of the Balkans again, of Rumania once more. There were the days when we lay under the pall of the Lusitania, as dry-wrung of emotions as no event to come can conceivably leave us; it will not yet bear thinking about or writing about. There is the phase which is dominant at this moment of writing—the munition phase. * * *

But there is one psychic phase of the

war which rose to consciousness after the first weeks, which maintained its poignancy throughout the vicissitudes of months, and which, though not so often talked about now or written about, needs only be mentioned to reassert its grip on our hearts. This is the sorrow of Belgium. Though the end of the war may bring about the reconstruction of Europe, though empires may fall and nations lose their existence, the great chapter in the chronicle as it will present itself to the men of the future will be the story of how Belgium suffered. After a year of war, and 10,000,000 men in the casualty lists, and dramatic swayings of the battle line across ruined countrysides —Flanders, Galicia, the blood-soaked plains of Champagne; after Zeppelin and submarine, yes, even after the Lusitania, which to so many of us came as a lurid precipitant of doubts and opinions, one need only mention Louvain to find the emotional centre of this dreadful year. The treaty of peace may perhaps bring about a clearing of judgment on all other questions, an agreement of minds, a dissipation of misunderstandings. Peace will come presumably on the basis of give and take. But there is one clause on which there can be no compromise between the German mind and the mind of the world, and that is Belgium.

What many of us have said about the limitations of German imagination may be wrong. But the behavior of the German mind with regard to Belgium is something which can never be disposed of in any reconciliation. We may put aside and forget the one mad act in a clean life, the one puerile weakness in a great mind. The invasion of Belgium might be such an act of aberration if it were not for the persistent German apology for the treatment of Belgium. Only it is not apology: it is a sort of puzzled wonder on the part of Germany why the world should feel as it did, as it does, about the sufferings of a nation. The invasion of Belgium and the violated scrap of paper might have been forgotten and forgiven, but Germany's persistent plaint that she has been misunderstood about Louvain, misunderstood about francs-tireurs, about ransoms of cities, cannot be forgotten. If by this time the German mind cannot understand the world's feeling about Belgium, it never will.

Areas Conquered by the Germans

An Associated Press dispatch from Washington Sept. 22, 1915, *said:*

A German estimate of the physical results of the first year of the European war was received by the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce today, in a report from the American Association of Commerce and Trade of Berlin. The report said:

"It is of interest at the close of the first war year to record the amount of hostile territory occupied by the belligerents. In regard to prisoners taken only German data are available. The territory occupied by the Allies consists of: In Galicia, 3,861 square miles; in Alsace-Lorraine, 405 square miles; a total of 4,266 square miles. This territory is about the size of the State of Connecticut.

"The territory occupied by the central powers consists of: In Belgium, 11,197 square miles; in France, 8,108 square miles; in Russia, 50,197 square miles; a total of 69,502 square miles. This territory is about the size of the State of Missouri and about one-third the size of the German Empire."

The estimate fixed the number of prisoners taken by the central powers at 1,694,869, of which 8,790 are officers, and the number of guns captured at 8,000 field pieces and 3,000 machine guns.

The Spirit of Russia

By M. Rodzianko, President of the Russian Imperial Duma; P. L. Barck, Russian Minister of Finance, and M. Goremykin, President of the Russian Council of Ministers

The subjoined addresses made at the last convention of the Imperial Russian Duma were translated in The London Times of Sept. 18, 1915. Referring to them editorially, The London Times said: "All these utterances recognize the difficulties with which Russia is faced in her hour of supreme trial; all pay touching and well-earned tribute to the noble self-sacrifice of the armies and fleets of the Czar; all breathe the same quiet spirit of confidence in the ultimate success of his arms. More particularly we would direct attention to the speech of the President of the Duma, M. Rodzianko, which should be read and pondered by all who wish to understand the spirit of the Russian people. The war, which has inspired many noble utterances from the statesmen of the allied nations, has produced none more lofty than this. As a masterpiece of unstudied eloquence, not even the magic oratory of M. Viviani has surpassed it. But it is more to us than a great emotional appeal to the members of the Duma, and through them to all the subjects of the Czar, whom they represent. It is more than a message of serene confidence to us and to our other allies. It is a manifestation, a revealing of the innermost heart of Russia, an unfolding of the psychology of the people, in which all who have understanding may read the reasons—those qualities of heart and head which led to the discomfiture of Napoleon, and that long line of tyrants before him, who sought to enslave a great, free people, and which will as surely lead to the overthrow of the Kaiser and his grandiose schemes of conquest."

Russia's Heart

By M. Rodzianko

President of the Imperial Duma

Opening the Imperial Duma on Aug. 1, 1915, M. Rodzianko made this address:

Members of the Imperial Duma!

TODAY has passed a year of most sanguinary war, replete with arduous sacrifices. The bloody conflict of the nations has not yet ceased and nobody yet can know when it will cease. This war is unprecedented in difficulties and sacrifices, but the greater the danger the greater grows our determination to carry it to the only possible conclusion—our decisive victory over the foe. For the solution of this problem is now demanded from the entire country the utmost exertion of strength and complete unity.

In these days of unrest and danger our great Emperor, meeting this entire national need half way and wishing to listen to the voice of the Russian land, has commanded the Imperial Duma to be convened, with firm faith in the inexhaustible strength of Russia. His Majesty expects from Government and public institutions, from Russian industry, and from all the loyal sons of our native land, without distinction of views and position, united harmonious labor for the needs of our valiant army. On this sole all-national problem, as written in the Imperial Rescript, must hereafter be concentrated all the thoughts of a Russia united and invincible in its unity. In the complete and clear understanding of the profound meaning of this great imperial summons, the Imperial Duma embarks upon its responsible labors.

To the reconstructed Government you will speak your truthful word, which will be indispensable for the elucidation of the facts, and all our debates, perhaps even stormy ones, will lead to a salutary end—the elimination of difficulties that have arisen. And in our most heated discussions I am sure we shall not forget that there on the field

of battle, the living sword of our native land, menacing the foe and humble before God, in all its majestic tranquillity stands the Russian Army, harmonious, strong in will and spirit, and that it will not permit the Russian soil to be defiled. Our brave fleet will not yield to it in this. Let our antagonists know of this and let them not console themselves with transitory successes. For an entire year, without leaving the battle line, the rain of shells and the hail of bullets, the army has proudly borne aloft the sacred Russian standard, and with its blood is defending the honor of our native land under the onslaught of the foe. Stand fast, our dear warriors, for the faith, the Czar, and holy native land, and let our prayers and blessings be with you. The crafty and heartless foe well appreciated your might and power and, now directing the principal portion of his hosts against us, knows no bounds to his malicious inventiveness in the means of destruction. But you have not been intimidated by these infernal efforts, and more than once already have given brilliant proof of this. Profound reverence to you, our own brave warriors!

Greetings also to you on today's anniversary of the war, our faithful allies! Twelve months of war have still more closely consolidated our friendship and strengthened our trust and mutual understanding. We send the salute of the Russian land also to our new ally, the heroic Italian people. May success and glory accompany them in the field of battle and may their standards be crowned with the unfading laurels of victory!

It is also our duty to send words of sympathy and consolation to our brother Poles, who have received to a considerably greater degree than the inhabitants of other regions the blows of the cruel foe. Deprived of their dwellings, ruined and reduced to beggary, remaining true to their great Mother Russia, with redoubled energy they are helping our valiant troops wherever they can. It is our duty, gentlemen of the Duma, to note this civic valor and to tell our brothers in blood that the shocks and horrors of the war borne in fraternal unity have united us strongly together and that we shall help the Government in every way in those measures which shall make them forget the grief and suffering undergone.

The war through which we are passing is no longer a duel of armies, but imperatively calls for the participation therein of all our people. And in their common endeavor and harmonious, united organized labor lies the pledge of the success of our troops over the insolent foe. Holy Russia has lived all this year with a single desire—the desire for a living and indissoluble tie with the army which has drawn fiery inspiration therefrom. The work of our public efforts for the past year, intense but restricted within certain bounds, was favored with notable appreciation from the summit of the throne, and if these labors have actually lightened our army's difficult task of conflict with a cruel antagonist, then it must be said here with pride and a feeling of profound satisfaction that for this difficult and responsible time the public forces of Russia have indited a splendid page in the history of their national existence. But these, their efforts and labors inspired with love for native land, are still far from sufficient. The needs of the war are constantly growing, and from the summit of the throne has resounded afresh the summons to increased labors and new sacrifices. Our duty, sparing neither strength nor time nor means, is to set to work without delay. Let each one give his labor into the treasury of popular might. Let those who are rich, let those who are able, contribute to the welfare of the whole country. Both the army and the navy are setting us all an example of dauntless fulfillment of duty; they have accomplished all that was in human power; our turn has now arrived and the now united public strength, working ceaselessly, I am sure can supply the army with all that is necessary for its further martial exploits. But for the success of these responsible public labors, in addition to the benevolent attitude of individuals, placed at the head of departments, a change of the spirit itself and the administration of the ex-

isting system is necessary. I firmly believe, gentlemen of the Imperial Duma, that at the present arduous time the reconstituted Government will not hesitate to place at the basis of its activity a trustful and responsive attitude toward the demands of public forces, summoning them thereby to common harmonious labor for the glory and happiness of Russia.

Gentlemen of the Imperial Duma! Such are the great tasks which have risen up before us in their full stature. Do not forget that upon the issue of our labors for the assistance of the army depends the greatness of independent, absolute, and resuscitated Russia, while in the event of their failure, both grief and humiliation may threaten her. But no, our great Mother Russia will never be the slave of anybody! Russia will fight till the last, till the complete downfall of the contemptible foe. The foe will be defeated, and until then there cannot be peace. Gentlemen, national representatives, at this great and terrible hour of trial we here must display the mighty national spirit in all its greatness. The country is awaiting a reply from you. Away with unnecessary doubts! We must fight to the end and to the last soldier capable of bearing arms. We must be strong in profound faith in the mighty Russian warrior.

We trust in thee, Holy Russia, in thy inexhaustible spiritual resources, and let this encouraging voice of the entire Russian soil penetrate thither into the glorious Russian Army and into the midst of the gallant fleet, and let our glorious defenders, the army and navy, know that Russia, harmonious, united in one with her army, burning with a single wish and a single thought, will oppose to the hostile attack the steel breasts of her sons.

Gentlemen of the Imperial Duma! Here among us are present the hero leader of this war, the valiant, revered by all, Adjt. Gen. Ruszky, and many wounded heroes.

The Trials of the War

By M. Goremykin

President of the Russian Imperial Council of Ministers

At the sitting of the Imperial Russian Duma on Aug. 1, 1915, *M. Goremykin delivered the following address:*

GENTLEMEN of the Imperial Duma, his Imperial Majesty has graciously commanded me to appear before you in his name with greetings and the wish for the complete success of your forthcoming responsible and important legislative labors for the welfare of our deeply-loved Russia.

At these words the members of the Imperial Duma rose in their seats and the strains of the national hymn filled the hall.

On the proposal of the President, the Imperial Duma unanimously resolved to send his Imperial Majesty a telegram with the expression of its loyal feeling.

The President of the Council of Ministers continued:

The day of the renewal of your labors coincides with the anniversary of our declaration of war. On the occasion of the prorogation of the labors of the Imperial Duma, at the beginning of the year, till November, the Government foresaw that in accordance with the course of events, the convocation of the legislative institutions might prove indispensable before that date. The time for the same has now arrived. The trials sent us by the war have torn you from your service in the army, from work in the Red Cross, public activity in the provinces, and, in short, from your private affairs. We will look the truth squarely in the face and frankly recognize that the war threatens to be protracted and requires ever fresh efforts and sacrifices. Having decided without any hesitation to make them, the Government, nevertheless, deems it its duty and feels the moral need finally to select

this path in complete accord with the legislative institutions. This need, besides all other grounds, explains your summons now, in order to inform you of the true position of affairs and together with you elucidate all methods for the speedy subjugation of the foe.

Since the time of the national war (1812) Russia has not undergone such days. "A ferocious, bloody, ruinous war, * * * in magnitude of armaments and in vicissitudes of circumstances unlike any of the wars hitherto known in history." These words of the historic manifest of Emperor Alexander I. might relate in their entirety to our own time. Then—the year 1812—opened for Russia, after unprecedented shocks, also new and unprecedentedly wide paths to life and glory. The subsequent course of the present war and its end are as yet hidden from us, as from the whole world. Nevertheless, true to the great past of Russia, we gaze into the future with tranquil firmness. The present situation is only a moment of our history.

But, besides firmness and tranquillity, the course of the war requires from us a tremendous, an extraordinary, uplifting of the spirit and strength. The war has shown that we had insufficiently prepared for it in comparison with our foe. Having accumulated, under the treacherous guise of friendship and peace, illimitable stores of military equipment, he threw himself upon us at the most convenient time for himself in the panoply of war technique. Our allies are mighty, but, like ourselves, are peace-loving powers, who have gone far beyond us in the sphere of industrial technique, and yet they, too, proved to be taken unawares in this stupendous conflict. The complete exertion of the national forces is indispensable in order to repulse and crush such a foe. That which we have hitherto succeeded in doing is insufficient. Fresh efforts, the efforts of the entire people, are necessary, and, in the imperial words, the whole country is now summoned to intense public labor. To your consideration the Government, in its turn, will submit only measures evoked by the needs of the war. Remaining legislative proposals, large and small, whose object is the improvement of the peaceful conditions of Russian life, are temporarily set aside.

The first of these measures relates to the conscription of the opolchenie of the second category—a measure adopted by all the belligerent countries, and one which, under the existing extraordinary circumstances, is only natural. If we have not hitherto had recourse thereto, this is but an extra proof of how great are yet the stores of our human strength. The second measure also evoked by the war and the endeavor to reinforce us for a long struggle relates to the expansion of the note-issuing powers of the State Bank. The third measure has for its object to unite in a single institution and materially to extend the share of the representatives of the legislative assemblies, public institutions, and Russian industry in the business of supplying the army with munitions, the guarantee of industrial fuel, and the co-ordination of measures for the feeding of the army and the country. Experiments have been made in such enlistment of public forces for the task of defense, and have proved their vitality and suitability. This has moved the Government more extensively and strongly to weld the internal forces of the country in the task of guaranteeing the military equipment of our army and the organization of our rear. At the present time, gentlemen, there is no more fruitful task; we must all become worthy of our great, heroic army.

In this sphere, which now forms the very heart of State labor, extensive activity is assured us hereafter. Even heretofore many of us have been giving our strength to the service of the army, but only as separate individuals. Hereafter the members of the legislative institutions, elected and authorized by the Imperial Council and the Imperial Duma, are summoned to constant direct labor in the strengthening of defense through the equipment of the army, the support of industry, measures for dealing with the cost of living, i. e., to a business constituting the greatest and—for the time of war—in fact, the sole task of authority.

For routine speeches on general poli-

tics this is not the time. Work for the betterment of the peaceful conditions of Russian life lies ahead, and it will be accomplished with our direct participation. I deem it my duty today, however, to refer only to one question which, as it were, stands on the boundary between the war and our domestic affairs; this is the Polish question. Of course, this question also can be settled in its entirety only after the war. Poland now awaits first of all the emancipation of her soil from the heavy German yoke. But in these days it is important for the Polish people to know and believe that their future organization was conclusively and irrevocably predetermined by the proclamation of the Generalissimo announced with the imperial consent during the early days of the war. The knightly noble, fraternally faithful Polish people, steadfastly enduring in this war innumerable trials, evoke in our hearts the most profound sympathy and a tribute of respect which nothing can obscure. His Majesty the Emperor has deigned to authorize me to announce to you, gentlemen of the Duma, that his Majesty has commanded the Council of Ministers to draft a bill to confer upon Poland after the war the right of free organization of her national, cultural, and economic life on principles of autonomy, under the autocratic sceptre of the Russian rulers, and with the retention of a single imperial authority.

But in the composition of the great empire with its many nationalities not alone the Poles have displayed in this year of war and general trial loyalty to Russia, and in reply thereto our internal policy must be imbued with the principle of impartial and benevolent attention to the interests of all true citizens of Russia without distinction of race, language, and religion.

Let us then unite in one common labor to which in these days of military menace our Autocratic Head summons us. Let us all think of one thing—the expulsion of the enemy from our territory and his defeat, to the glory of the Emperor and Fatherland. And that victory sooner or later will be ours the Government unfalteringly believes, and this belief you share, as do all beyond the walls of the Tauris Palace throughout the expanse of illimitable Russia.

The commencement of war operations was signalized here within these walls by a general outburst of enthusiasm and unprecedented unanimity. The days which have now dawned, the Government is convinced, will still more closely and deeply unite us all. May there be in Russia for the entire time of the war no parties save one—" the party of war till the end "—no program save one—to conquer. From you, gentlemen of the Imperial Duma, history awaits the answering voice of the soil of Russia.

Russia's Economies

By P. L. Barck

Russian Minister of Finance

At the sitting of the Duma on Aug. 1 *the Minister of Finance, P. L. Barck, delivered the following speech:*

THE past year of the greatest conflict of nations in world history clearly convinces us that success in this struggle rests upon two fundamental bases—on the valor of the army and navy, which with unlimited self-denial are defending the honor and destiny of the fatherland and of the entire civilized world, and on the strength of the national and State economies necessary for satisfying the diversified material needs of each of the belligerent powers.

These needs include not only the principal and primary factors of equipment and supply of the army, but also the

extension of aid to the families of reservists left without their breadwinners, the treatment and general care of sufferers in the war, and the relief of the more acute wants of the population of localities which have experienced the destructive force of the war. At the same time, the various requirements and demands of State life have to be maintained as far as possible in normal channels.

The successful fulfillment of these varied demands, in view of the unprecedented numbers of the armies in the field and the exceptional intensity with which the conflict is being conducted, imposes upon all the nations participating in the present war enormous financial burdens, and involves a series of profoundly difficult and complicated problems which their Governments have to solve in the search for indispensable resources. We succeeded, however, not only in solving these problems, but also in finding in sources of popular labor an abundance of means for the replenishment in the State budget of the shortage caused by the surrender of one of our largest classes of State receipts—the liquor revenue—a surrender which, following the magnanimous call of our Emperor, we made calmly and without doubts, firmly believing in the inexhaustible working power of the Russian people.

Let me first of all present you data regarding the scope of the demand for money called forth by the war, in finding which there were not, and could not be, either hesitation or insuperable obstacles.

Our appropriations for military needs from the commencement of the war operations to July 15 (28) of the current year amount to 6,971,000,000 rubles (£735,000,000); there has been expended of these appropriations up to July 1 (14), according to preliminary calculations, 5,456,000,000 rubles (£576,000,000), or on an average at the rate of 15,700,000 roubles (£1,657,000) actual outlay per day, while in the future we shall have to reckon on a daily expenditure of not less than 19,000,000 rubles (£2,000,000).

The war, which has caused this previously unknown extraordinary outlay, could not but cause an appreciable reduction in the receipts of revenue. In the fulfillment of the State budget for 1914, notwithstanding the curtailments effected under expenditures, an excess of expenditures was shown over receipts to the amount of 478,200,000 rubles, or £50,000,000, (covered by the free cash reserve,) without, of course, counting the outlays evoked by the circumstances of war time which are effected by special arrangement.

The deficit of revenue for the past year, in comparison with estimate proposals, amounts to 673,600,000 rubles (£71,000,000). The figures are enormous. Nevertheless, a big budget deficit for the time of the war has become the lot of all the belligerent powers.

The largest share of the deficit in 1914, amounting to 432,800,000 rubles (£45,600,000) against the estimate proposals, relates to the receipts from the State liquor operations. As the result of the measures adopted during the first half of the past year for the inculcation of temperance among the population, the liquor revenue, instead of its usual rapid growth, showed a reduction for the first six months of 1914, while the complete suspension of the sale of State liquor on the commencement of the war necessitated almost the entire exclusion of receipts from these operations from the budget. The principal portion of our deficit was thus the consequence, not of elementary causes, but the fruit of conscious will—a deficit the appearance of which under such conditions cannot and must not disquiet us.

The effect of the same factors lowering the receipts of ordinary revenue of necessity asserts itself during the current year also. In drafting the budget for the present year there was discounted, on the one hand, the increase of revenue from taxable resources, and, on the other, the expenditures were computed with special reserve, thanks to which, for the balancing of the budget, both under ordinary and extraordinary heads, it was necessary to assign 60,800,000 rubles, (£6,417,000,) on account

of credit operations. For the first third of the present year the receipts of revenue amounted to 753,000,000 rubles, (£79,450,000,) or 31 per cent. less than during the same interval of the preceding year. The figure includes 79,000,000 rubles from the introduction of new and the increase of existing taxes. The receipts from other sources amounted to 674,000,000 rubles, (£71,150,000.) Taking into consideration that the receipts for the first third of the year ordinarily constitute about 29 per cent. of the annual total, it may be assumed that for the entire year the receipts from previous sources will amount to about 2,308,000,000 rubles, (£243,617,000,) or 89 per cent. of the sum computed for the State Budget of 1915, while the receipts of new taxes will reach 488,000,000 rubles, (£51,510,000.) Thus we may expect a total of 2,796,000,000 rubles (£295,021,000) of ordinary revenue for the current year, 336,000,000 rubles, (£35,466,000,) less than was entered in the budget. It should, nevertheless, be noted that of this anticipated deficit 160,000,000 rubles (£16,888,000) falls to non-receipts of revenue from the State liquor operations and the liquor excise. But since to cover the deficit for 1914 a balance of 81,000,000 rubles (£8,550,000) for 1915 was carried forward from the free cash reserve, while of the ordinary expenditures in the 1915 budget 496,000,000 rubles, (£52,354,000,) for the feeding the army and navy is now assigned to the War Fund, on the basis of expected revenue, the ordinary budget for the present year may conclude without a deficit and even perhaps give a small balance. Thus by means of credit operations will be covered the outlays on the maintenance of the army and navy and on other war needs.

As regards forthcoming war expenditures besides those already effected, with the constant numerical growth of the armies and of the outlays on replenishment, and the creation of new means of material equipment of the armed forces, both our allies and foes and we ourselves will have to experience a further increase of the demands made upon the State Treasury. Under such conditions our war expenditures from June 1, 1914, till the end of the current year, according to an approximate calculation, may amount to 4,066,000,000 rubles, (£429,188,000,) and a total of 7,242,000,000 rubles, (£764,233,000,) for 1915, or with the addition of the disbursements already effected, more than 9,500,000,000 rubles, (£1,002,700,000.)

Our financial mobilization was undertaken calmly. Having at our disposal a stock of free cash exceeding half a milliard rubles, (£53,777,000,) amassed during years of peaceful prosperity, we were able to cover the expenditure required to place the army on a war footing and then to undertake the creation of extraordinary resources for the satisfaction of the continuously growing State outlays. The foremost place in the ranks of these measures belongs to credit operations, since the steps simultaneously made in the direction of the curtailment of the granted appropriations and the increase of customary receipts from taxable sources necessarily acquired preponderant importance as means to cover the deficit in our revenue budget. The effected reduction of credits sanctioned by the budgets of 1914 and preceding years and the most careful possible computation of the expenditures under the budget of 1915 were nevertheless inadequate to square without a deficit a budget which contemplated peace time expenditure. It was necessary to reckon with an unavoidable deficit in our receipts, chiefly owing to the surrender of the liquor revenue. To make good this deficit the simplest method was to have recourse to State credit. Preserving, however, our accessible sources of borrowing for the satisfaction of our military needs, we sought means for the reduction of the deficit under the ordinary budget in the increase of receipts from taxable sources, with the conviction that to the call to such sacrifice—a call which in war time both we and other States not infrequently have been compelled to address to the population—the Russian Nation would respond, as always, calmly, in entire readiness to serve the welfare of their native land. The Government had in view the fact that this sacrifice



ALEXANDRE RIBOT
Finance Minister of France

REGINALD McKENNA

British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Who Reported to Parliament the Greatest War Budget of History of $7,950,000,000

(Photo from Bain News Service.)

for the bulk of the population would be lightened, thanks to the retention among the people of the milliard rubles, (£107,550,000,) which was formerly paid to the Exchequer in the form of liquor revenue.

In resorting to the utilization of taxable sources for the increase of the resources of the Treasury we had necessarily to forego the idea of combining the execution of this work, urgent as it was, with the simultaneous introduction of fundamental amendments into our system of taxation.

The measures urgently introduced in war time and of necessity adapted to the existing taxation system are not free from defects, and can retain their effect only until we are able to replace them with a more complete and full taxation reform. The Ministry of Finance is now drafting proposals for the reform of our taxation system, but in order to bring them into force it is essential that the legislative institutions should definitely declare their attitude toward the income tax, a bill for which was introduced into the Imperial Duma in 1907. The Ministry of Finance considers that the income tax must be the cornerstone of taxation reform, the lasting foundation whereon must be reared the more complete edifice; without this foundation, the Finance Department is convinced, no serious reform can be effected.

[The Minister then proceeded to give an account of the credit operations effected—short-term Exchequer bonds and long-term bonds.]

Let me dwell upon the growth of deposits in the savings banks. The growth of deposits in the State banks, (on account of monetary deposits and interest-bearing paper of depositors,) for the year of war amounted to (in millions of rubles):

Monetary Deposits. 1914.		1915.		Interest Bearing Paper (Securities) of Depositors.
July.....	— 41.7	Jan.	+ 55.9	
Aug.....	+ 10.9	Feb.	+ 44.5	
Sep.....	+ 29.5	Mar.	+ 46.0	
Oct.....	+ 26.2	Apr.	+ 47.8	Jan.-May 82.7
Nov.....	+ 38.8	May	+ 50.8	
Dec.....	+ 44.8	June	+ 55.0	
	+108.5		+300.0	+82.7
			+382.7	

+491.2+85.6 per cent. added to deposits=576.8

The average annual growth for the last decade amounted to 48,300,000 rubles, (£5,098,000.) The growth noted during the war is undoubtedly the result of the establishment of temperance among the people. If we compare the decline of the liquor revenue with the growth of deposits in the savings banks for the six months of 1915, we obtain the following figures:

Liquor Revenue. (In millions of rubles.) In 1915 less by—		Growth of Deposits in Savings Banks. (In millions of rubles.) 1915.
January ...	— 77.6	+ 55.9
February ..	— 77.0	+ 44.5
March	— 53.5	+ 46.0
April	— 66.8	+ 47.8
May	— 69.8	+ 50.8
June	— 61.1	+ 55.0
Total	—405.8	+300.0
Interest paper from Jan. 1 (14) to July 1, (14,) 1915.....		+ 82.7
		+382.7

If savings continue on the same scale we shall have for the year a growth of between 600,000,000 and 700,000,000 rubles, instead of the usual 40,000,000 to 60,000,000 rubles. With the object of further attracting popular savings into the State savings banks and their further rapprochement with the population, we have in view at the present time, with the expansion of the scope of the banks' operations, a considerable increase of their number. The principal measure in this respect must be the opening of postal institutions under volost boards, invested with the functions of savings banks.

Let me recall that in my explanations of the budget in April, 1914, I noted the tasks of the Ministry of Finance for the fulfillment of the imperial rescript of Jan. 30, (Feb. 12,) 1914, concerning the establishment of temperance among the people, in the following words: On Jan. 1, (14,) 1914, we had 8,500 savings banks and 25,300 State wineshops. The Ministry of Finance will exert all its efforts to close the wineshops and in their place open savings banks. And when the ratios are reversed 25,300 savings banks, with the same animated monetary turnover as in the wineshops, and 8,500 State wineshops, then the problem set before us will have been solved.

By command of his Imperial Majesty, all the State wineshops are now closed, and here we see what a sober Russian people means: the country is unrecognizable; shirking has diminished in the mills and the working capacity of the employes has increased; in families where not infrequently the reek of intoxication used to manifest itself in the most horrible forms the inmates breathe freely; crime has diminished; an entire revolution has taken place in the popular psychology. The greatest reform achieved by command of the Czar must now be strengthened by an entire series of measures of an ethical character in the spiritual educational sphere, where the measures of the Government, however, can bring benefit only if public institutions and organizations extend to it support in this sacred cause.

Upon the Ministry of Finance devolves the duty of guarding as far as possible the foundations upon which our pecuniary savings rest. The principal one of these is indisputably our gold security. For its protection, following the example of the majority of the belligerent States, during the first days of the war we suspended the exchange of credit notes for gold. Sight was not lost of the necessity of promoting the further attraction of gold into the coffers of the State Bank. To this end were adopted such measures as the sale of foreign exchange on easy terms by the Special Chancellory in the credit section in case of payment for the same in gold, and also measures for the facilitation of the influx of gold coin from circulation into the State Bank.

Concurrently with the above the Government entered into consideration of the question of the possible encouragement of the extensive development of our gold industry by means of the grant of tax exemptions, the facilitation of the acquisition abroad of the necessary implements for obtaining gold, and the creation of easier conditions for occupation in this industry in comparison with those under the existing law. In particular, the State Bank ameliorated the conditions of credit for gold miners. Further, an imperial ukase of Nov. 15, (28,) 1914, established material restrictions, and by a succeeding provision of the Ministers of Finance a complete embargo was imposed upon the export of gold in popular circulation.

The influx of gold into the coffers of the State Bank for 1914-15 was as follows (in millions of rubles):

	From Jan. 1 to July 8, 1915.	From Jan. 1 to July 8, 1914.	Balance for 1915.
1. By assignment	5.7	13.6	— 7.9
2. Ingots from private banks—			
(a) Acquired	11.5	1.2	+10.3
(b) Accepted for safe-keeping	9.3	....	+ 9.3
	26.5	14.8	+11.7
Receipts of coin in exchange for foreign currency and from circulation	4.0	....	+ 4.0
	30.5	14.8	+15.7

[The fall in the exchange value of the ruble was next discussed by the Minister.]

Foreign trade forms the Gordian knot by which is constricted the fate of our exchange question. To find a sword to sever this knot is not so easy, and only the resumption of normal conditions of international trade can unravel it. This, of course, does not absolve us from the necessity of adopting all accessible measures for the amelioration of the unfavorable state of things created in this sphere which, nevertheless, does not constitute the lot of Russia alone in this war. The measures which we have adopted for the possible mitigation of this phenomenon—for the satisfaction of the demand for foreign exchange—were directed to the acquisition of the greatest possible stock of currency by means of the realization of a series of loans on foreign markets to an amount exceeding one and a half milliard of rubles, (£158,330,000,) which were applied to cover payments on account of military orders and foreign loans, and also for the satisfaction of the needs of trade and industry.

Moreover, with a view to the speediest redemption of the ante-war indebtedness of our private credit institutions and commercial and industrial enterprises on the Paris money market, our State Bank

entered into an agreement with the Banque de France for the opening by the latter of credits amounting to 500,000,000 rubles (£52,770,000) in favor of our private credit institutions and individual commercial and industrial enterprises. A similar agreement for the opening of credits for the needs of trade and industry up to £10,000,000 was reached with the Bank of England also.

Such are the totals of what has hitherto been done in this sphere. We were able to attain these results thanks to the close financial unity which was established between the powers of the Quadruple Entente and strengthened by the agreement which took place in January this year in Paris between the Ministries of Finance of the three allied States. Postulating the common principle that all three allied powers, while availing themselves first of all of their own resources, must come to each other's help wherever this is most necessary, with the assets of which each country disposes in the greatest degree, the agreement opened for us a path for the utilization of credit in France and England, with a view to the unhindered execution of orders essential to national defense and for settlements on account of the indebtedness of our trade and industry.

The unity of aims and interests of the allied powers and their readiness to meet each other in the task of mutual support, which have found expression in the Paris agreement, serve as a pledge that in future we shall find in our allies complete preparedness to extend us needful co-operation in the business of satisfying our demand for the means of payment abroad.

Nevertheless, we also on our part must apply all measures not to increase orders abroad without extreme necessity. Unfortunately, our industry is not yet sufficiently strong to serve all our military needs, and for the fulfillment of the latter we are compelled to appeal to foreign markets. But, concurrently with this, in the huge sphere of private demands we are accustomed to buy a great deal abroad, and among the latter a large quantity of articles are far from being of primary necessity. Now, during the heavy labor of war, every extra ruble spent abroad aggravates our payment balance, increases our foreign indebtedness, and weakens the foundations of our currency. We must remember this, and in every way strive to obtain at home in Russia all that we Russian people require. But in the task of satisfying our demands with the means available inside the country it is necessary at the present exceptional time to observe the utmost thrift. I cannot refrain from recalling the words of the British Premier, Mr. Asquith, who appealed to his fellow-citizens in private life to observe persistent thrift just now. If such a summons has resounded in England, a wealthy country, where for centuries have been amassed large stores of private capital, then all the more necessary is this summons among us in Russia, a land poor in capital. Let us be thrifty at home, let us remember that all means must be directed to one end—to create everything indispensable to crush the foe encroaching upon our native land.

In dwelling upon another phenomenon which is engaging public attention in the sphere of economic interests, the rise in prices, it must be pointed out that the increased cost of the bulk of commodities under the influence of the war constitutes a phenomenon common to both the belligerent and many neutral States. In England the prices of grain products have risen 55 to 80 per cent., sugar 72 per cent., and coal 50 to 80 per cent. In France the price of cereals has risen 9 to 42 per cent., sugar 35 to 50 per cent., and meat 20 to 30 per cent. Even in the United States grain products have gone up in price from 30 to 85 per cent., copper 44 per cent., and sugar on several markets almost to 50 per cent. The explanation of this universal phenomenon of contemporary economic life, especially as regards the belligerent States, must be sought primarily in the disturbance of commercial transactions and industrial activity under the influence of the war in general and, in particular, owing to those extraordinary measures which the belligerents are obliged to adopt for the uninterrupted equip-

ment of their armies. These causes have exerted their influence among us also; nevertheless, the rise in prices observed among us on the whole does not exceed the bounds with which our allies are required to reckon. Besides the aforesaid natural, elementarily operating, and insuperable factors which are evoking this phenomenon, it is also developing under the influence of several artificial causes the necessity for the abrogation of which is an object of the special attention of the Government, whose measures, however, can lead to definite results only in case the Government finds the friendly support of public institutions and organizations.

In adopting measures for the discovery of means indispensable for the satisfaction of the demands called forth by the war, the Government must at the same time concern itself with the extension of suitable credit aid to trade, industry, and agriculture, in the shape of support of the economic life of the country in war time.

[Having referred to the operations of the State Bank, the Minister proceeded.]

Special financial measures were required for the maintenance of the productive capacity of the population of localities directly subjected to the influence of the war. In addition to active support in the way of food, seeding, and the repair of destroyed dwellings, a special organization was created to render pecuniary aid to the inhabitants of the Polish provinces and contiguous districts in order to restore the husbandry destroyed by the war. For this cause the sum of 50,000,000 rubles (£5,280,000) was assigned from the Treasury on easy, but strictly credit terms, and the State Bank was also allowed to open supplementary credits on easy terms for credit institutions of the Polish and contiguous provinces.

Attention must also be paid to the task of utilizing the curative properties of many localities of our Fatherland so lavishly endowed in this respect, principally for the treatment of sick and wounded soldiers. Besides the issue of means for the equipment of State sanatoria and the grant of loans to private companies and individuals to encourage the development of the existing and the construction of new sanatoria, it was proposed to enlist also the loan capital of the land banks and the resources of urban and Zemstvo credit.

If to what has been said is added reference to a series of measures for the creation of easy conditions in the payment of rates and taxes for the men enlisted, and for the population of the localities suffering from the war, the establishment of reduced railway tariffs for the conveyance of military freight, the families of reservists, the removal of inhabitants of the affected localities and laborers to regions requiring the same, a general idea will have been given of the scope of the assistance extended by the State to the popular economic needs arising out of the war.

In conclusion, I cannot refrain from mentioning the allowance received by families of reservists called to the colors.

The law of June 25, (July 8,) 1912, placed the care of soldiers' families upon lasting foundations. Not only the family of the enlisted man, his wife and children, but also his near kindred, father, mother, grandfather, and grandmother, brothers and sisters, if they have been supported by the labor of the recruit, enjoy a monetary guarantee to the extent of the cost of the food required for normal and healthy subsistence.

Since the beginning of the war up to July 15, (28,) of the current year, about 500,000,000 rubles have been disbursed from the resources of the Treasury on alimentary aid, and careful observation testifies that, thanks to extensive State assistance proceeding hand in hand with special solicitude for recruits' families displayed by the public, inspired by the lofty example of her Imperial Majesty the Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, who personally directs the activity of the High Council for the care of sufferers from the war, and their families, and of other members of the imperial household, the dependents of our soldiers, who with unexampled heroism are shedding their blood on the battlefield, are not experiencing privation.

Many other responsible tasks will be

brought to the fore in the economic sphere by the war with all its varied influence on the domestic order and the external relations of our economic state. Their fulfillment lies ahead. At present we may note with satisfaction that, however onerous the trials to which the war has subjected our peoples' husbandry, these trials have not ruptured our material forces, which in the forge have only been tempered and strengthened.

It is impossible to doubt that the Russian people will be lacking in good-will to come to the aid of the State with their resources in the hour of difficulty. There is no need to remind you that upon each of us who remain in the rear of our brave army and with trepidation follow its martial exploits, lies the sacred duty of serving the common cause according to his strength and intelligence. But one method of serving this cause is open to the majority of us. Without hesitating to restrict personal needs and requirements, oblivious to luxury and comfort, let everybody lend his savings, however small they may be, to the State, remembering that the means confided to the Treasury in small streams will flow into a wide current from which will be drawn forces for the maintenance of the martial might of our warriors. Subduing self, subordinating personal aims to the benefit of the State, we will conquer the foe who has encroached upon the honor and majesty of our native land.

Germany's Ten War Loan Commandments

A new set of ten commandments, compiled for the encouragement of actual or potential subscribers to the third war loan, has appeared in the chief German newspapers. The commandments run as follows:

1. Thou shalt let no day pass without reflecting that money is needed to carry on the war.

2. Thou shalt not forget that thy brothers in the field, who are shedding their blood for thee, have the right to demand that thou shalt make their victory easy.

3. Thou shalt constantly remember that victory can only be won if the State be freed from all pecuniary anxiety.

4. Thou shalt bear in mind that the duty to pay is the lightest sacrifice called for by the war.

5. Thou shalt be thankful that the State offers thee in return for thy money so valuable a consideration as the 5 per cent. war loan.

6. Thou shalt bear well in mind that a 5 per cent. bond of the German Empire represents a rare opportunity, for the like of which thou wilt have to pay a much higher price later than during the period ending on Sept. 22.

7. Thou shalt appreciate the fact that with the German Empire as debtor the security of the war loan is guaranteed, and that there is no stronger guarantee in existence.

8. Thou shalt preserve the conviction that the power of the empire and its economic strength form the unshakable foundations of its credit.

9. Thou shalt make thy resolve the easier by the certain knowledge that in subscribing to the new war loan thou art not compelled to hand over any ready money.

10. Thou shalt leave thy money at the Post Office, or with some deposit or savings bank, earmarked for the war loan, and shalt thereby discover how simple a process it is made for every German to have his share in the subscription.

Latin America as It Is Today

By Julius Moritzen

WHETHER for peace or war, all signs point in the direction of co-operative measures between the republics of the Americas. With the strengthening of the commercial bonds a new political relationship is already in sight. Subjoined will be found various expressions by leaders in their respective countries and spheres of influence. Europe's position today, as contrasted to what obtained before the war, also is brought out by what leading publicists abroad have had to say about the entrance of the United States in the world markets opened up south of the Panama Canal.

While for the present intercourse between Germany and South America has come to a standstill as a result of the European war, and the consequent disappearance from the two oceans of German warships and merchantmen, there is accumulating evidence that Germany has no intention to let go a trade which has been won through hard work only, and in the face of great competition.

One of the best evidences that at the end of the war Germany expects not only to regain its former foothold, but will strive to enlarge its field of operation is contained in the reports that come from such commercial centres as Hamburg and Bremen. In Berlin, likewise, there is considerable activity in the direction of keeping South American customers of Germany interested until the close of the war, when the Germans expect again to purvey on a large scale in tropical America.

German optimism regarding its foreign trade following the titanic struggle that centres around the continuance of Germany as a world power with colonial ambition is fairly well expressed by what Dr. Herbig, an expert on international commerce, recently wrote in the Koelnische Zeitung, as follows:

OPTIMISM PREVAILS.

Germany's economic outlook after the war will be far better than any of her enemies will admit or expect it to be. While there is great suffering at present through the loss of life and the destruction of material values of tremendous importance, the Fatherland will emerge in a far better condition than any of the other belligerents.

No one can interfere with the wonderful German organization and discipline which have always been the parents of German success in every field of human activity, despite the effort of England to destroy them. But these efforts will fail, for the same forces will continue to work and advance in the ways which England wanted to bar.

Before the war we saw the course of our economic development rising steadily. All that is needed is that the same conditions should continue in order that our development should proceed in the same way and more rapidly than that of our English cousin, who saw in the encircling policy and suppression by military force the only means of stemming the expansion of Germany.

HAMBURG EXPORT TRADE.

Regarding exports to South America, Hamburg admits that business has been reduced to nil. The Berliner Tageblatt discusses the situation frankly in the following manner:

In times of peace the Hamburg exporters were very free in the giving of credits; as a consequence, capital is locked up in the belligerent hostile countries or in neutral countries where a moratorium has been declared. Many Hamburg exporters are, therefore, short of working capital.

It is difficult at present to judge the prospects of the export trade. Export circles in general are confident that after a certain period—though it may be some years—Germany's export will not be much worse off than before the war; in other words, that the exporters will be able to renew their old relations. In the transition period the export trade will have to contend with difficulties.

In judging the extent of the turnover after the conclusion of peace a distinction will have to be made between the products which other countries urgently require from Germany—such as dyes, Kali, sugar, semi-manufactured goods, &c.—and articles which can partly be produced elsewhere.

It may further be taken into account that consumption in all countries is restricted at present, and that on the conclusion of peace, England and North America will not be able to rely on their own productions. The sale of German machinery may be difficult for some time to come, especially in English territory. However, against eventual losses a compensation will be found in the fact that probably exports to the East and the Mohammedan world will be more extensive than before. In South America, economic conditions are gradually being restored.

COMPLAINT OF ANTI-GERMAN PROPAGANDA.

Advices reaching the Berliner Tageblatt from its correspondent in Rio de Janeiro are to the effect that since the organization of the "Liga Brazileira pelos Alliados"—Brazilian League in Favor of the Allies—marked hostility has been shown German residents who have not heretofore felt themselves wrongly placed in the capital, which, generally speaking, is in favor of the Quadruple Entente. It says:

The well-known Brazilian politician, Ruy Barbosa, is at the head of this Brazilian anti-German league. He, with Irinen Machado, have made themselves the mouthpieces for the public opinion of Brazil. They have seized upon the visit of the special commission headed by M. Baudin of France as an occasion for making an accusation against Germany. It may be added that the mission, according to German-Brazilian newspapers, was far from being the success that the French papers made it out to be.

During one of the sittings of the commission from France the following was stated and sanctioned by the "Liga Brazileira pelos Alliados": The German Government violated the neutrality of Belgium; destroyed churches and libraries; levied tribute on cities; shot prisoners of war; massacred old men, women and children; has sunk merchantmen.

The Liga further accepts as fact that while Austria and Hungary and Turkey are fellow-conspirators with Germany, the latter is chiefly to blame for all that is taking place. It advises all neutrals to line up with the allied powers.

The Liga must shoulder the responsibility for these accusations. It will hardly succeed, however, to convince the public, which is now receiving the real facts about the war through daily wireless messages.

BERNHARD DERNBURG ACTIVE.

By combining the German-Argentine Central Association with the German-Brazilian Commercial Association, the German Economical Association for South and Central America has been created as a most striking evidence that German commercial interests propose to keep up their fight for a conspicuous place in "the sun" of tropical America.

According to the Amsterdam correspondent of Reuter's, as telegraphed to London, the speech of Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, when elected President of the German Economical Association for South and Central America, was in part as follows:

At the present time Germany has but a few friends in the world. Sentiment in South America is divided, and the real neutrality of North America is doubtful. It is not uninteresting to remember that Viscount Haldane, then Lord High Chancellor, explained to the merchants of Manchester that now was their chance to snatch from Germany forever commercial supremacy.

Continuance of the war will compel us to find new openings, for the commercial recapture of markets, now lost, will become more difficult. Without coal and iron South America will always be dependent on industrial States. Therefore, the investing of more capital in South America would be well worth while with a view of gaining lost ground. Besides strengthening our economic, it would be important also to obtain the moral, influence, which hitherto has been greatly underestimated.

We have failed to understand not only the sentiment in Southern America, but even that of other peoples, and, therefore, find few friends among the neutrals. This is greatly the fault of the Germans, who must learn to understand peoples and to introduce German achievements in science and technics among them with more discretion than heretofore. Only too often the German merchant shows the lack of friendly disposition toward merchants abroad, which is of special weight with the Southern peoples.

Bearing on the same subject, Herr Maschke, President of the German-Brazilian Association, said that the new enterprise was intended to prepare during the war for future developments, and that Germany's connection with South and Central American countries, which played a most important part in the nation's commerce, would be closer rather than otherwise after the war.

South America, as United States Consuls View the Situation

THE improvement in United States Consular representation which has been noticeable within recent years, as a result of the greater efforts put forth by the State Department, has proved of exceptional value touching the Latin-American republics, where European competition in past times has been a considerable handicap to the gathering of correct information concerning business matters. The great war abroad, however, found American Consuls in South America fully equipped, and statistics now regularly furnished Washington may be relied upon to show with measurable exactness just how conditions are shaping themselves in the southern republics.

Recent reports to the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce are subjoined:

Consul General L. J. Kenna, Valparaiso, Chile.—The past week recorded the first sale of any importance of Chilean nitrate in which payment was accepted by the producers in New York exchange. The sale, to an American firm, represented 4,000 tons of nitrate, and the draft on New York in payment was in the neighborhood of $155,000 United States currency. London exchange has always been the preferred exchange in the nitrate fields, because it was the custom, because it is regularly quoted, because nitrate freights are quoted in English currency and are payable in London exchange, and all market prices of nitrate are quoted in sterling. The war has, however, made possible the exchange of bills on New York in payment of some nitrate purchases.

Consul Homer Brett, La Guayra, Venezuela.—That Venezuelan merchants are adapting themselves to changed commercial conditions is evidenced by the fact that while the imports at La Guayra for the last six months of 1914 were only 7,169,990 bolivars—a bolivar is equal to $0.193—for the first six months of 1915 they amounted to 16,000,000 bolivars. For the first-named period merchandise to the value of 3,237,129 bolivars came from the United States, while the corresponding value for the second period was only slightly less than 10,000,000 bolivars. During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1915, 160,606 sacks of cocoa and 141,793 sacks of coffee were exported from La Guayra.

Consul General Goding, Guayaquil, Ecuador.—Ecuador has a timber area of about 90,000 square miles, 10,000 of which are on the west slope of the Andes and below the 5,000-foot elevation. The total area of the republic has been estimated at 116,000 square miles—equal to the combined area of the States of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. The average price per thousand feet of the common lumber, such as roble, laurel, suche, figuerosa, &c., in Guayaquil is from $40 to $50 in United States gold.

Consul Madin Summers, Sao Paulo, Brazil.—As rice and beans are the most common articles of food in the Sao Paulo section of Brazil and might be called the national dishes, the crops of both have received special attention from the agricultural authorities. The present rice crop in the State of Sao Paulo, however, appears to be very short, and there is a possibility that large quantities will have to be imported from abroad. The municipalities producing rice, in order of their importance, are Iguape, Monte Alto, Taubate, Barretos, Guaratingueta, Franca, Igarapava, and Pindamonhangaba. The average prices are as follows: No. 1 Agulha, (needle,) clean, $8 to $9; No. 2, $7 to $7.50; No. 3, $6.50 to $7; Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Cattete, same as Agulha, possibly a little less.

Consul General W. Henry Robertson, Buenos Aires, Argentina.—The Bureau of Agricultural Statistics and Rural Economy of the Ministry of Agriculture has issued a new estimate of the production of wheat, flax, and oats for the season 1914-15. The yield is a total of 4,585,000 tons of wheat, 1,125,500 of flax, and 831,000 of oats. The yield is given in metric tons of 2,204.6 pounds each. Compared with previous forecasts for this same year, the estimate indicates a decrease in each case, due to heavy rains and inundations in various parts of the grain belt, which very seriously retarded thrashing operations as well.

Consul William W. Handley, Callao, Peru.—Boilers of practically every well-known class and make are employed in Peru by the several breweries, sugar industries, ice plants, gas and electric plants, and public buildings of various kinds. The Cochrane vertical cross-tube appears to be the type most commonly found for the smaller installations, while the Lancashire model is most extensively used in the sugar refineries and similar large plants. The water-tube boilers in sections are commonly demanded in the mines and interior places by reason of the mule and llama back mode of conveyance that has to be provided in certain out-of-the-way parts of the republic. The Babcock and Wilcox and a large number of upright boilers are also employed. The size and working pressure called for vary according to the individual requirements along these lines. Boilers, without distinction of classes, &c., are admitted into Peru free of duty.

Consul Ross Hazeltine, Cartagena, Colombia.—The establishment of a Pan-American literature exchange, sufficiently equipped and carefully organized, would no doubt prove to be a commercial as well as an artistic success. Such an exchange would mark a distinct advancement in the cultural relations of the United States with Latin America, constituting a co-ordinate step with the exchange of professors and students, and ultimately leading to a more sympathetic understanding between the republics of the Western Hemisphere. The temperament and natural instincts of the Latin Americans are essentially artistic. The percentage of potential writers, orators, and artists is very high. This continual striving, especially in the field of literature, occasionally produces a work of unquestioned merit, of which little or nothing is known in English-speaking countries. This is, for obvious reasons, more often the case with fiction and poetry than with the drama. The contrasts between the character of North American and South American literature is notable, but the appreciation on both sides is keen, even if not widespread. Acquaintance with Spanish literature in the United States is, on the whole, decidedly limited. It is perhaps confined to such well-known writers as Cervantes, Calderon de la Barca, Alarcon, and Quevedo.

Argentina's Neutrality Plea

In its effort to maintain strict neutrality the Argentine Republic has had the co-operation of the leading political and economic organizations. The Museo Social Argentino, including in its membership many of the most influential men in the country, has placed itself on record by issuing the following manifesto, framed as a communication addressed to Dr. José Luis Murature, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

THE exercise of the right to destroy or capture merchant ships under an enemy's flag in a state of war which comprises so many nations leaves American commerce exposed to unforeseen dangers of great magnitude, since a great part of such commerce is done in foreign vessels, necessarily and unavoidably.

It is not sufficient for its security that neutral freights be exempt from confiscation, since delays and transshipments, together with the damages incurred, would occasion losses which, at

times, would be irreparable, to say nothing of the increase in freights, insurance and other shipping expenses.

There is no reason whatever why the inter-American commerce should be obliged to suffer the contingencies emanating from these circumstances, because they are not a necessary and inevitable consequence of the war itself. Traffic taking place between American ports exclusively in reality does not harm nor favor the belligerents. It may be stated from a military point of view they can have no actual interest in destroying the vessels under an enemy's flag, and still less in taking possession of their neutral cargoes, which they must restore to their owners in accordance with the principles of international law.

Such vessels are not giving any direct or military service to the country whose flag they carry; they are occupied in a neutral service, so that their destruction does not respond to the immediate necessities of war, but rather to the purpose of inflicting upon the enemy a more remote and indirect damage, by the loss suffered by the respective merchant marines.

Based on such considerations, the Museo Social Argentino considers that it might be indispensable to promote what might be called the pacific isolation of America, requiring the recognition of a new formula of international law, which might be expressed in the following or similar terms:

1. The maritime commerce between the American countries shall be considered as inter-American coasting trade, providing it be directly effected between the ports of non-belligerent American countries, and that the vessels do not depart from routes to be determined within the continental waters of America. 2. The merchant vessels which are occupied in inter-American coasting trade must be considered as neutral, although they may be sailing under the flag of countries which are in a state of war.

To recapitulate: The Museo Social Argentino desires to obtain the adhesion of the Government, of the press and of the United States to the idea of proceeding in accord with the other American States to demand from the belligerents in the present European war the strict observance of the principles and conventions which guarantee the liberty and safety of the maritime commerce of neutrals in general. And to procure the recognition of a principle guaranteeing the neutrality of inter-American coasting trade for the benefit of peace and commerce of our continent.

Latin-American Brevities

THE Government of Argentina estimates receipts and expenditures for 1916 at $144,876,786 in cash and $849,200 in bonds and obligations. As against the budget for 1915, a saving of about $17,000,000 is expected next year.

The schools of the American Institute at La Paz and Cochabamba, Bolivia, are modeled after the preparatory schools for boys in the United States, and have literary societies, athletic clubs, Boy Scouts, &c. The Directors are George M. McBride at La Paz and John E. Washburn at Cochabamba.

A wireless telegraph station is under construction at Durango, Mexico, with equipment sufficiently powerful to communicate with wireless stations at Torreon, Saltillo, Mazatlan, Juarez, Chapultepec, and the City of Mexico.

The excellent showing of the Argentine Republic at the Panama-Pacific Exposition is due in large measure to the liberality of the South American Government, which appropriated $1,700,000 for the purpose of adequately displaying the country's resources.

With the Hon. W. Cameron Forbes receiver for the Brazil Railway Company, the affairs of this enterprise are expected to advance, following the recent statement given the bondholders in England and in the United States.

During the last fiscal year 40,530 immigrants entered Cuba. Of the total, 31,821 came from Spain. The cash brought into the island by the new arrivals amounted to $1,073,070.

President Manuel Estrada Cabrera of Guatemala has appointed the following to act on the boundary commission with Honduras: Claudio Urrutia, Chief Engineer; Felipe Rodriguez, Domingo; Conde Florencio Santizo, Salvador Castillo, and Eugenio Rosal, assistants. Marcial Preu is legal adviser.

Santiago, Chile, is making preparations toward the organization of a Latin-American workmen's congress. Labor organizations throughout South and Central America have been notified, but no exact date has yet been fixed for the gathering.

The Congress of Costa Rica has decreed a new national holiday, April 11, in honor of the patriot, Juan Santamaria, and in remembrance of the important battle of Rivas.

A new Colombian city is to be built on the Girardot railway line near Esperanza station. The city is to be called La Magdalena, and the location is considered one of the most advantageous, both from a commercial and hygienic standpoint.

Following a recent consignment of 6,000 steers to packing houses in St. Louis, Mo., ranch owners in Honduras are getting ready to export cattle on a large scale.

Japanese exporters, with the assistance of the Japanese Government, have established a permanent trading exposition in Santiago, Chile, with a view to capturing the German business in the republic. The prices are made so low as to meet competition from any quarter.

Buenos Aires newspapers take considerable interest in the visit of the Argentine Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Romulo S. Naon, who has been named as a possible candidate in the next Presidential election.

San Salvador, capital of the Republic of Salvador, has elected a new Mayor in the person of Dr. Enrique Gonzales Serrano, one of the progressive men of the country, who considers it essential that trade relations with the United States should be increased.

The three important packing establishments in Paraguay are located in the Department of Concepcion, in the centre of a district with 2,000,000 head of cattle. The La Fonciere ranch has over 100,000 head on its grazing lands.

The University of Havana has appointed Dr. Antonio S. Bustamente and Dr. Fernando Sanchez de Fuentes to represent Cuba at the Pan-American Scientific Congress, to be held at Washington from Dec. 15 to Jan. 8, 1916.

A new executive decree of Peru provides that in order for a trademark or label to be entitled to national registry a part of the inscriptions or legends must be in Spanish and the name of the factory be shown.

Mexico and the Land Problem

By Luis Cabrera

In view of the fact that General Venustiano Carranza has won the recognition of the United States and the Latin-American Governments concerned in the conferences having to do with Mexican peace, the following statement by Luis Cabrera, Minister of Finance in the Carranza Government, contained in an address, has a peculiarly significant and timely bearing on the situation in the neighboring republic.

MEXICO has a population of 15,000,000 inhabitants, 15 per cent. of which are Indians, 75 per cent. mixed or "mestizos," and 10 per cent. of European descent. Each one of these groups presents different characteristics, and even the mestizos cannot be said to be homogeneous, since there are various racial types among them.

Mexico, however, has no real race problem. Properly speaking, there are no insoluble conflicts between the various elements of the nation, because the Indians are easily assimilated by the mestizos, and, as a matter of fact, when the Indians receive education or mix with the mestizos they immediately become identified with them. A full-blooded Indian who has received a certain amount of education is always sure to keep it, and he never shows any retrogressive tendencies, so that we can say that the effects of education upon the native Indians of Mexico are of a permanent character.

On the other hand, the mestizos element of the population of Mexico intermarry very easily with the Europeans, particularly with the Spaniards and French, and as soon as they have received a proper education or have acquired some economic welfare they can be considered on practically the same level as any of the European residents.

The principal causes of revolution in Mexico are undoubtedly of an economic, and chiefly of an agrarian, character. The colonial policies followed by the Spaniards when they conquered Mexico consisted in taking possession of the greatest part of the lands of New Spain to grant them to the Spanish conquerors. Extensive land concessions were granted, now in favor of the Church, now in favor of the Spanish soldiers, leaders, chieftains, or mere settlers.

Together with each one of these large concessions granted in favor of the Spaniards a large number of Indians were also assigned to them, with the apparent object of educating and Christianizing them, but with the real purpose of obtaining slaves, or land serfs, to cultivate and develop the lands granted.

INDIANS IN BONDAGE.

With regard to the Indian towns already existing at the time of the conquest, they were theoretically respected, together with their lands. New towns were also laid out as Indian reservations, providing them with sufficient lands, which were called "egidos" and "propios," for the common use of all the inhabitants. The colonial policies of Spain resulted, therefore, in the formation of a wealthy class of landholders, as against the Indian population, which found itself either assigned to the estates as land serfs or concentrated in Indian towns.

In 1810 the freedom of the slaves and Indians was officially decreed by Hidalgo, but the independence of Mexico having been accomplished by the wealthy landholders, the situation of the Indians was not materially changed, and the lower classes still remained in a state of actual servitude, although, theoretically, slavery had been already abolished.

We can safely say that up to 1856 the only real estate property of any importance which was not in the hands of the Spanish great landholders was the property of the Church and the "commons" of the Indian towns.

The Church had been acquiring large territorial property, obtained either by direct concessions from the Government or by donations and foundations from private sources.

The towns still were owning their communal lands, granted to them, as stated

above, for the purpose of grazing, timbering, farming, and watering, and which were called " egidos." The characteristic aspect of the agrarian questions in Mexico was for nearly two centuries the obstinate defense made by the towns against the great landholders who always tried to invade the communal lands. From 1856 to 1859 certain laws were enacted, and the liberal administration of Juarez, for political reasons, was compelled to deprive the Church of its properties and to begin to appropriate them to private individuals who wished to acquire them at low prices. As a consequence of the laws, the " egidos " of the towns began to be divided up and apportioned in small parcels among the inhabitants, for the purpose of creating small agricultural properties, but through ignorance and lack of means those lands were immediately resold to the great landholders whose properties were adjacent to the " egidos."

LARGE LAND HOLDINGS.

About 1876, at the beginning of the " Porfirista " régime, the real property of the Church had already passed into the hands of private individuals, and the communal properties of the towns were beginning to be divided among the masses. There still remain, however, large estates owned by old wealthy families of Spanish origin, and which are now responsible for the present agrarian conflict.

The " Porfirista " régime—the administration of General Porfirio Diaz—can be defined by saying that it consisted in putting the power in the hands of the large landholders, thus creating a feudal system. The political, social, and economic influence exerted by landholders during General Diaz's administration was so considerable and so advantageous to them that it hampered the development of the small agricultural property, which could otherwise have been formed from the division of ecclesiastical and communal lands.

The communal lands, or " egidos," used to be a means to ease to a certain extent the conditions in which the small agriculturists found themselves, by affording them the opportunity of increasing their income out of what they could get from the use of the commons. But the condition of actual servitude in which the peon has always been was accentuated and aggravated when the "egidos " disappeared, because, on the one hand, he was no more in a position to resort to the products of those communal lands, and, on the other hand, the great influence of the landholders was used as a political means to make peons work on the haciendas and keep them in an actual state of slavery.

The largest part of the inhabitants of towns where " egidos " have disappeared, being necessarily compelled to live on the wages they get from working on the farms, and these wages being not enough to cover their expenses, it had become the common practice to advance money to the peons as a loan on account of future wages. This system of lending the peons small amounts of money had resulted in accumulating huge debts on their shoulders. These debts were used as a pretext to keep the peons always at the service of the land owners, and the peon himself has been under the impression that he was legally bound to remain on the farm as long as he had not paid up his debts. These debts, as a rule, were transferred from father to son, thus creating in the rural population of the farm, not only an actual condition of slavery, but the moral conviction among the peons themselves that peonage was a necessary evil which the laws authorized.

Germany's England

From the "England-buch" of the Taegliche Rundschau

I. Vice Admiral Kirchhoff: England's Policy of Plunder
II. Professor Dr. W. Dibelius: The Shopkeepers' War
III. Dr. Otto Kuntzemueller: The English, God's Chosen People

I.

England's Policy of Plunder

By Vice Admiral Kirchhoff of the German Imperial Navy

IN the third part of Alfred Stenzel's "History of Maritime Warfare" the concluding views of the War of the Spanish Succession, two hundred years ago, from 1702 to 1713, are introduced with the following words: "Thus the Peace of Utrecht was primarily a great success for England, whose position as a world power was now firmly established; England was now the sea power, the world power." A consideration of the manner in which England has kept this position in the last two hundred years should be very opportune.

Even while the peace negotiations were going on at Utrecht, England, the ally of Holland, by whose potent aid she had crushed her chief adversaries, France and Spain, showed herself in her true light; that is, faithless and ruthless in all and every relation. From now on England became Holland's keenest antagonist, the Dutch fleet having been almost destroyed in the long war. The Dutch had learned too late that only those could safely ally themselves with England who are sufficiently powerful to stand up against her effectively at any moment. England had finally accomplished the weakening of all her rivals on the sea, her tyrant fortresses (Gibraltar, later Malta, Aden, and so on) soon dominated every part of the world, her policy knew thenceforth only one goal, openly and secretly, by any and every means, to prevent the rise of a second strong sea power. Now, after two hundred years, it will be seen whether this most insatiable of all countries is at last played out, as far as concerns her dominance on the sea.

The perpetually ambiguous system of England made its appearance in the Baltic as early as 1720. The English squadrons brought it to pass, at the end of the long northern war, by skillful underhand management, that neither of the chief adversaries, Russia and Sweden, was in a condition to crush completely or to annihilate the other. The northern war is a particularly illuminating example of the complete dependence of military aims in sea warfare upon political aims.

A few years earlier an act of unexampled arbitrariness had been carried out by the English fleet, in the Mediterranean, when the Spanish fleet was annihilated by Admiral Sir George Byng at Cape Passaro, at the southwest corner of Sicily, on Aug. 11, 1718. Although there had been no declaration of war, and Admiral Byng's instructions read, "In case Spain sets foot in Italy, if circumstances demanded it, he should intervene with armed force," Byng engaged the equally strong enemy fleet as soon as he approached it, and annihilated it, thus finally disposing of an enemy that might possibly become dangerous later on. In this way England's naval supremacy in the Mediterranean was once more made secure.

Hardly a century later England, with

the help of France and Holland, in time of peace, brought it about that the maritime ambitions of the German Emperor Charles VI. should come to nothing. The Ostend Company, founded by him in 1722, with its headquarters in Antwerp, which had already sent nearly a score of ships to Eastern Asia, and had there established many settlements, he was first forced to suspend in 1727, and five years later was compelled to dissolve it. In a single day its shares fell from 1,228 to 470.

From 1741 to 1748, during the War of the Austrian Succession, as well as before it, a series of acts of English ruthless arbitrariness follow each other: English smuggling in the West Indies, the destruction of Spanish galleys in a French harbor in the Mediterranean, although there was no open state of war; the dispatch of a squadron of English ships against Naples, the four months' blockade of a Spanish fleet in Toulon Harbor by the English fleet, without a declaration of war between France and England, and so on.

In the Seven Years' War, which soon followed, England for the first time successfully introduced in a brilliant manner her future policy of intrigue, inciting the chief Continental powers against each other, while she herself annihilated her enemies on the sea, and continuously enriched herself by maritime warfare, while the great land war was frightfully wasting the wealth of the Continental powers. Her great Prussian ally was the first who had to experience this, as the dispatch of small squadrons to the Baltic would often have been of the greatest advantage to him. But at the same time England, without any justification, permitted attacks by privateers on Prussian merchantmen. In the great war, with the exception of a brief apparition at Hastenbeck at the beginning, England sent no land forces to the Continent, for the first time, but contented herself with supporting the land fighting of her allies with money; the maritime war she kept exclusively for herself. As a result, her commerce flourished everywhere, and for this reason she remained indifferent to the main question in the Baltic.

In the Russo-Turkish wars, from 1768 to 1774, and 1787 to 1792, England was once more successfully employed, in Southern Europe, in preventing any of the combatants from becoming too powerful. The Black Sea also remained a mare clausum like the Baltic Sea.

The great "League of Armed Neutrality," which came into existence in 1780, brought up new and important questions for England to solve. The definition required by it was taken up with great reluctance, and thwarted by every possible means, because English privateering suffered greatly through it.

During the American War of Independence, in the years 1774-1782, the neutrality of foreign States was repeatedly violated by English ships. Thereafter the first period of the coalition war against the French Republic, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, is extremely rich in violations of right of every kind. In every direction England seized islands belonging to foreign countries, and points of support, beginning with many islands in the West Indies. The English were continuously successful in injuring the war navies and commercial navies of foreign countries, even of neutrals and allies, while English privateers and cruisers carried on their operations more successfully every year. And in spite of all considerable losses, England's navigation and commerce developed brilliantly, becoming more than 100 per cent. greater than in the preceding time of peace. Smuggling was very cleverly carried on, and where on foreign coasts it brought England profit it was not only tolerated but was successfully promoted. England grew fat on maritime war, while the great war on land wasted the strength of the Continental powers, as before. For England began the period of her monopoly of sea power, which has been unassailable for more than a century.

One of the most notorious violations of right of all time was England's action toward Denmark in the year 1801 and later in 1807. At present many hypo-

critical voices in England try to show that our action toward Belgium is a far worse case of violation of neutrality; history has already pronounced judgment on this.

The "armed neutrality" was revived in a new form at the end of the eighteenth century, because of far more serious arbitrary acts of England toward neutral shipping, so that England was compelled to reform. Denmark's sharp measures taken against the right of visitation of convoys claimed by English warships led finally to a break. The State which Kant called "the most powerful, the most ambitious, the most provocative State," went ruthlessly forward, primarily against Denmark.

By what silken threads Nelson's victory in the battle of Copenhagen Roads on April 2 was suspended, only recently investigations have revealed. The Danes, although the final victory would undoubtedly have belonged to them, allowed themselves to be completely deceived and fooled by Nelson's conscious speeches in his two truce letters.

Even more ruthless was the removal of the Danish fleet in 1807, after Denmark's resistance had been broken by a several days' bombardment of Copenhagen. During the latter more than 1,600 inhabitants of the city were killed by the shot of "humane" England, and more than 1,000 wounded. Let us recall the outcry of England when we bombarded Paris in 1871.

The energetic war which England waged from 1805 to 1810 against the commerce of the whole world was throughout not only the consequence of Napoleon's Continental system. To the tyrant of the sea all means and all ways were now right, if only they were profitable. Smuggling once more burst forth into brilliant bloom; England's shopkeeper spirit and unscrupulousness showed themselves in ways that defy imitation. False flags, false ships' papers and bills of lading, pretended seizures by bribed French privateers, all these means were employed in order to gain a permanent hold of commerce.

The English showed themselves very inventive with the so-called license system, under which foreign ships were permitted to trade in English wares on payment of permit money, thereafter remaining secure from English cruisers and privateers. In 1810 the number of licenses rose to 18,000.

To relate once more how England managed, during the war against Napoleon, to erect her tyrant fortresses in every corner of the globe, and to appropriate the best lands as colonies, for the most part with unbounded arbitrariness, equally whether belonging to friend or foe, would be to "carry owls to Athens," (Malta, Heligoland.)

How England was further able to deprive Prussian Germany of the due reward of victory need only be mentioned here to complete the subject. A hundred years ago the dominion of the world fell unconditionally to England, with the uncomprehending help of all nations, "which saw in England the champion of the rights and independence of Europe, while England never defended any rights but her own," as Goethe strikingly expressed it. During the naval war England injured neutrals and her allies, appropriated large territories, and gained a formal monopoly of commerce and industry. The mighty influence of sea power, which slowly manifested itself, grounded on economic fact, was as yet recognized by no one. Naval warfare remains far from most people, its immediate traces are only casually remarked by the inhabitants of coastal regions. It is otherwise now—steam and telegraph have worked a transformation. We Germans of today know what constitutes England's being and power up to the present; but the recognition of this came to us very late, after the appointed men finally opened our eyes to it.

An attempt which England made in January, 1807, to remove the Turkish fleet as she had removed the Danish, miscarried completely. Admiral Duckworth, after a short bombardment of Constantinople, withdrew through the Dardanelles to the Aegean Sea in ignominious fashion, which bordered on cowardice.

In like manner England's war against the United States, which broke out in

THE EARL OF DERBY

At the Request of Lord Kitchener He Has Assumed Direction of Recruiting the British Army

(Photo from P. S. Rogers.)

SIR PERCY SCOTT

Appointed to Take Charge of London's Defenses Against Aircraft Attacks

(Photo from Paul Thompson.)

1812 because of acts of unexampled arbitrariness by the commanders of English ships, who impressed sailors from Americans ships, turned out unfavorably for her.

England's action during the war for the liberation of Greece took peculiar forms. Enthusiastic friends of Greece, with Byron at their head, had driven the Government to active intervention. From a great naval demonstration suddenly developed the battle of Navarino Bay, on Oct. 20, 1827, in which the Turco-Egyptian fleet was completely annihilated by an Anglo-Franco-Russian fleet. The despotic action of Admiral Codrington serves as a fascinating example of the peculiarity of English esoteric policy. A storm of indignation was raised in the country and in Parliament, but this was principally from fear of Russia.

During the second Turco-Egyptian war the arbitrary and tyrannical action of the English Commodore, Napier, was successful in robbing the victorious Mehemed Ali of all his gains. The energetic with its brilliant results was finally recognized by all the powers. A rare example of extraordinary arbitrariness of a subordinate commander in naval warfare. But—it happened because of the Turkish fleet of the enemy, therefore, as always, England alone got the benefit of it.

Soon after the war against the French Empire, England began a course of action in Africa, East India, and Eastern Asia, which was ruthless and filled with self-seeking, often taking the mask of a champion of Christian culture and humanity, a line of action which has been profitable in many ways. Especially were English ships active continuously against the slave trade; but England never for a moment relaxed her efforts to extend still further her territories everywhere on the globe, and laid hold on everything she could, in order to enrich herself and strengthen her power. Among her baser actions, carried out like all the rest, under a mask of false piety, was her repeated action against China in the opium question. But it is just to admit that England, by putting down piracy in every port of the globe, by the many battles of her ships against Moorish, Central and South American, Chinese and Malay pirates, has accomplished much for the navigation and commerce of all peoples, but always only because her own interests were primarily furthered thereby.

How England showed herself hostile to Germany in the two German-Danish wars is generally known and has been repeatedly explained. This was the occasion of Palmerston's arrogant words concerning the new German fleet in the North Sea.

The Crimean war introduced the new international law of naval warfare, from the acceptance of which England at first expected to profit. But when she saw that this was not so, even that the effect of her own fleet was substantially narrowed by it, an effort was made to render it nugatory. In just the same way England has not yet been brought to recognize the last Declarations of London. From this time forward, the keywords, prohibition of privateering, neutral property, neutral ship, effective blockade and so on, are constantly heard; England explained them all in a sense favorable to herself. These questions form a specially large section of English arbitrary action, as in the present war we must experience anew every day.

England received the first painful blow as a result of her action during the American War of Secession; her dealings with both parties were regardless of justice and insidious, according as English separate interests seemed to demand. England did not show herself sensitive about declaring that the Union must not fit out any privateers, but that such abstinence could not be expected of the South, since this was one of her principal weapons. Commentary is superfluous! The open support of the privateers of the Southern States England was compelled to pay for, to the Union, as the result of a subsequent arbitration award, an evidence that the evil deeds of England also are punished.

In the second German-Danish war England tried several times, by diplomacy, to interfere vigorously, but without success so far as the two allied great

powers were concerned. The most arrogant proceeding was the demand addressed to Austria, that the latter's ships should not sail into the Baltic, but should only guard the German coasts of the North Sea. Consider that this was the definite demand of a neutral State! A quite unheard-of interference with rights! The battles of Dueppel and Alsen made a difference!

From this time forward the unrelaxing efforts to prevent the growth of Germany's commerce and navigation, and, later, Germany's naval growth, began.

While England ruthlessly subjugated one extra-European people after another, her missionary societies scattered millions of translations of the Bible and tracts broadcast among these poor non-Christian peoples, and the English preachers babbled about the blessings of peace. So it came that, during Queen Victoria's long reign of over sixty years, there was not a single year in which England's mercenaries did not rob and plunder in the most barefaced way. The fundamental impulses of English political action have always and everywhere been the same, and remain so today. Might goes ever before right and justice.

How England proceeded in the case of India and the lands near it; how she appropriated Egypt and won Cyprus for herself; sowed discord openly and secretly in the Balkans; how she attacked the Boers, whose final conquest was attained only by bribing one of their leaders; how England brought the quarrel between Russia and Japan to open hostility; all this lives fresh in our memories.

This short summary of England's arbitrary actions during centuries should show that England's time is come. For the first time she now has an opponent who unites insight, will, and power.

II.

War of the Shopkeepers

English Piratical Attacks on the Economic Life of the Germans

By Prof. Dr. W. Dibelius

SINCE the beginning of the war our enemies across the Channel have been employing every possible means for injuring German trade. German mail sacks have been dropped into the middle of the ocean; German patent rights have been declared valueless; payments due German firms are not allowed. In all earnestness the hope is uppermost that Germany, with the end of the war, will be pushed out of the ranks of leading commercial and industrial nations.

Especially significant, as indicating the purpose of using every agency at the command of modern barbarism, is a series of articles in the English periodical, The Engineer, a leading technical journal devoted to industry on a large scale, and which has standing, not only in England, but throughout the world.

The author hopes that as a result of this war, Germany's political and industrial power will be reduced to nothing. He is quite convinced that following this war, no such Germany as now exists will be in evidence. "Humanity," he says, "has decided that this must happen, let the cost be what it may, and the German people, likewise, will never again consent to be governed as has been the case for the last thirty years."

Probably Poland will once more rise up as a vassal to Russia; Bavaria, Hanover, and other German States of lesser size will enter a new phase of their political history as independent countries under international protection! With the destruction of political Germany, Germany as a factor in trade and industry must fare similarly. This will have the

effect of purifying the entire commercial atmosphere, for Germany has not gained its world position through its own efforts, but by employing many sorts of methods of the basest kind. Typical of the German system were "long credits and low prices, diplomatic coercion, bribery of the press, false invoices and a systematic campaign of lies against all competitors." In passing it may be remarked what a wonderful combination is here presented; to the author low prices and long credits apparently are on a par with questionable methods like falsifying and bribery when it comes to opposing British competition.

In the course of the investigation other standpoints are to be considered about the purpose to blot out German industry, and these are entirely Great Britain's concern. The author continually complains, in language replete with touching words, of the backwardness and deficient energy of his own country. The English plants are on the whole too small; labor costs too much, and they give themselves unnecessary competition. Of course, he will not recommend the "unmoral methods of the German syndicates that mainly aim at getting bigger prices from the consumers; nevertheless, this matter is worth the attention of the English."

The Germans, further, proceed in a much more systematic fashion abroad. Their diplomatic representation, their big banks, and the industrial corporations work in unison; while only recently in England the Government began, to a very limited degree, to support the industrial enterprises away from home, while the banks waved aside every effort for working together with industries. At home, in fact, the Government is nothing less than the enemy of the local industry, because, owing to the lower prices, large orders go to Germany, and because, entirely aside from the damage done home production, there is introduced systematically a whole army of spies, ostensibly employed in the delivery and setting up of machinery, &c., but who in reality get opportunities for spying out England's means for defense.

Above all, the author does not tire of blaming his countrymen for their ultra-conservatism. All innovations for improvement are spurned by them. Every time it is a question of far-reaching enterprises abroad, English capital excuses itself; money only becomes available when the sums asked for are comparatively small, and when the prospects for a big profit are seen in the immediate future.

All of these complaints have been heard again and again during the last ten years. They have become typically English; but typically English also is the complete incapacity to arrive at the correct conclusion regarding the matter. When the English industrial methods have become back numbers; when English capitalists no longer feel like taking chances; when diplomacy, finance, and industrialism fail to co-operate, it follows as a matter of course that England finds itself superseded by Germany abroad. However things stand, Germany is once for all the land of brilliant organization, and our industry and our financial circles, with due regard for being cautious, know how to venture as must be the case when a new rival tries to gain for himself a place in the world market.

Here will be found the reason for Germany's success; a success which, nevertheless, has not been so great that England need fear for its own existence. The average Briton, however, does not understand these very simple reasons, but listens to wild stories about German espionage and German badness, when, as a consequence, every little incident of the past is magnified out of all proportion, and the big planks in their own eyes, as against the splinters in the eyes of their brethren, are entirely forgotten.

The series of articles in The Engineer carry a twofold appeal to the English people. The author proposes that immense capital shall be got together for the purpose of completely modernizing English industrialism. But as he fears that the absence of the spirit of venture characteristic of English capital will again dispel the beautiful dreams of the one making the proposal, he concludes

with an idea that should not be overlooked.

"There is a way," he says, "that is very simple. It consists in the well-planned, organized destruction of German industries, big and little, and in this organized disturbance the German iron and steel works must share. The occupation of German territory by the allied troops must be accompanied by the destruction of all important industries in the occupied land. We may believe that when it becomes known here and in France that such a plan for organized destruction is to be put in motion, then capital will flow in the direction of home industrialism. What the Germans have done to the towns and villages in France and Belgium has aroused public feeling and thus blazed the way for making this method a legitimate weapon in the hands of industrial warfare and a powerful instrument for justice and retribution."

It would seem that such an appeal to man's baseness would be enough, but one more word appears to be essential. It is markedly evident of the honorable author's hypocrisy that he adds: "We do not wish to associate ourselves too rigidly with this proposal. Not alone for moral reasons may it be necessary to do this, but in the hope that in time Germany's big economic interests may be affected thereby. It may also be that the destruction of German industrialism will follow of itself as a result of the war alone, and this may prove enough for the English purpose."

Therefore, the iniquity of this proposal does not give the author concern, yet he hopes that it may be possible to reach the goal along some other channel. Should this not be feasible, then—one can read between the lines—the first mentioned method for organized destruction must be employed. Any one who can even propose such a mean thing should be responsible for his action.

We know now to what lengths the English will go in this trade war. We know now that where it is possible for this Englishman to say what so many of his countrymen are thinking, then the English troops will act as incendiaries and destroyers in Germany. Maybe they will still remain gentlemen and we Huns.

We can only be thankful to the author of the articles in The Engineer that he has lifted the veil. Fortunately, our arms still have the last word, and the question of destruction touching German industrialism along the Rhine and in Upper Silesia is therefore not a pressing one.

III.

The English As God's Chosen People

By Dr. Otto Kuntzemueller

IN his book, "The Foundation of the Nineteenth Century," published in 1899, Houston Stewart Chamberlain makes reference to the devastation of Israel's kingdom by the Assyrians in the year 720 before Christ, and the carrying into captivity of the inhabitants who "in a short time became intermixed with the natives and as a consequence disappeared entirely."

In a footnote he adds: "They vanished so completely that many theologians even in our century are bothering their heads with the question what has become of the Israelites, since they cannot believe that the five-sixths part of the people whom Jehovah had promised the whole earth should have disappeared without any ado. A shrewd mind even gathered from this that the ten supposed lost tribes are the English of today! He was, besides, not at a loss to account for this discovery; this is the reason why five-sixths of the earth's surface belongs to the British; the balance to the Jews."

Chamberlain points to two English

works treating of this question—" H. L. Lost Israel, Where Are They to be Found? " and " Our Israelitish Origin," which are responsible for the fact that there are Anglo-Saxons who trace their genealogy back to the time of Moses!

Chamberlain has known how to relegate this theological chimera to the realm of nonsense. And it is also nonsense that in England this should be taken for gospel truth.

To what an extent this has been the case the writer of this experienced during his stay at Cairo toward the close of 1887. Here the well-known Arabian courier, Mohammed Hassan, showed him a letter that he had received from an English manufacturer of armaments, George Nelson Walsh, of Sheffield. Mohammed Hassan had served this Englishman during the latter's stay at Cairo, and, following his departure, had written him a letter which Mr. Walsh answered and which contained, among other things, the following:

" Now I will tell you something that concerns in particular the future of the Arab and the Englishman.

" God—Allah, as you call Him—is so good that when He saw how the world was being ruled by badness He grieved very much. He decided to show humanity the good and right way. For this purpose He chose Abraham, one of the best persons that ever lived, and commanded him to teach men to love God, to neither lie nor cheat nor act dishonorable in any shape or manner. Abraham did his best —but what can a person do in a world full of bad people?

" God now decided that Abraham's descendants should be charged with teaching His will. Among other sons, Abraham had Isaac. And God commanded that Isaac's descendants should be teachers. Isaac had two sons, Esau, from whom all the Arabs have descended, and Jacob. God decreed that Esau and his kin to come should continue to live a free, unrestrained life in the desert and be under no ruler. But Jacob was to be the teacher of righteousness.

" Jacob had twelve sons. All became teachers and all their offspring became teachers of God's will. These twelve sons, again, had large families, that increased to such an extent that from each family sprang a people, and in this way there came into existence twelve peoples. Ten of these twelve peoples withdrew from the others, and called themselves Israel. The other two combined and called themselves Judah. In this way there came about two peoples, those of the kingdom of Judah and those of the kingdom of Israel.

" These people were destined by God to teach all mankind to love God and to treat their neighbors honorably. But instead of doing the will of God, they became bad and cruel, and while God sent many prophets they did not want to give up their sin.

" Then God became very angry. He drove the people of the Kingdom of Israel into captivity and declared that in the course of time they should forget that they were the children of Israel. He did promise them, however, that He would not entirely withdraw His favor from them. He would send them on wanderings and lead them to an island where they should find their home. After they had reached this place they would become the mightiest people on earth, learn to love God, and teach the same to other nations. And then He would reveal to them. that they were the long lost people of the ten tribes of Israel.

" The other kingdom, composed of the two tribes of Judah, were just as godless as the people of Israel. For that reason God sent the Romans to punish them and destroy Jerusalem, with its magnificent temple. More than a million Jews, which is the name borne by the people of the Kingdom of Judah, were killed. The remaining were sold as slaves throughout Europe. But God promised them that after a while they would once more be restored to Syria and Palestine.

" And now comes the remarkable part of my story. Scholars who have searched the Book of Daniel and other books where all these things are written, have found that the time for the realization of this is nigh. They have discovered that the English, as the great teachers of human-

ity, are the true and rightful descendants of the ten tribes of Israel; that they live on an island; that they are the mightiest nation on earth, as had been prophesied would be the case. It reads further in the book of which I speak, that so soon as those of the Kingdom of Israel assume another name and drop the former—as was prophesied and has happened; namely, the term 'English'—they should reveal themselves to the effect that they are the descendants of Israel and the brothers of Judah, and that they would then take steps to regain Palestine. And as soon as they had obtained it they would have their brothers, the Jews, taken back to Palestine, and then the Jews and the English would become a great nation and would rule the world, and justice and righteousness would be spread unto the ends of the earth.

"The beginning for this wonderful change on earth is already made. England obtained its protectorate over Palestine nine years ago; then that over Egypt. Within a few years, perhaps in two or three years, it will have the ownership of Egypt and Syria. A great war will take place in Europe through which all nations except England will suffer. The Jews will be driven from all countries and will place themselves under the protection of England. The English will receive them with open arms as their long lost brothers; equip them with everything, and send them to Palestine in large ships for the purpose of having them establish themselves in their own land. And God has said that after they have once returned to their country they will never again be driven out of there.

"In those days—remember the time is near—the English, together with the Jews, will rule the whole world, and honor, peace and contentment will be everywhere present. The Jews will be the first to rejoice through their connection with the English, and the Arabs the next."

The writer has had occasion to discuss with many Germans married into well-known English families, as well as with English acquaintances, this remarkable letter of Mr. Walsh, and he has had confirmed that there is a general belief that the English are the descendants of the lost people of Israel and that they are God's people, chosen to rule the world.

Alarum

By JOHN B. KENNEDY.

Out of the East the trumpet comes,
And the roll of drums—the dreadful drums;
Cries of glory and heroes' crowns;
Choking smoke of the tortured towns;
Wails of women, and children's screams;
Tales of terror unknown to dreams;
The halitus of the corpse-clad waste;
A death-dish cooked to the devil's taste.
Above the havoc of matter and mind,
As the fathers curse and the mothers weep,
The soul of the dead men charge the wind,
Whisper: "We see, but ye are blind;
We are awake, and still ye sleep!"

The eagle mimics a dream-drunk dove
And coos of love—illusive love;
Ink-thumbed soldiers and paper guns;
Barnyard battles and ceaseless suns;
Naughty navies to rule—the ink
(Yet the coast-lines will never shrink;)
Saucy armies to welcome war
(Still we wonder what strength is for;)
Purse-proud power to play Mars' tricks
(Was there ever a "Seventy-six"?)
Mark the meaning of Europe's fall;
Asia still has a truth to tell!
Cease for a moment the caterwaul,
Heed for a moment the future's call—
Cain still grins in the core of hell!

Tsing-tao Under the Japanese

A German View of the New Regime

In the subjoined article a correspondent of the Hamburger Nachrichten sends his impressions of the former German colony in China since Japan took possession.

THE situation in Tsing-tao since it fell into the hands of the Japanese is not any too promising. Even seen from the outside the defects are very pronounced. As for the streets, that used to be so well kept, there are deep cavities in many places, caused by the bombardment. In addition, the heavy rains during the Summer of 1914 brought more damage to the thoroughfares, which was not attended to. What the Japanese have done to make good in that respect amounts to almost nothing.

This can be said for everything else they have undertaken to restore in the colony to what it was before the siege. It may be a fact that the plans of the Japanese are on a big enough scale, but they lack the means with which to accomplish anything worth while. There is not wanting the desire to have the place put in order. But at times they have not had enough money with which to pay the wages of the men. It is taken for granted that in such circumstances there can be no progress. And standing still means nothing less than going back.

It really amounts to this—that the military in charge of affairs at Tsing-tao have their hands tied. It is a fact that some of the officials are quite anxious to go ahead and have made valuable propositions for the improvement of the place, but the instant Tokio is informed about what is wanted, the reply is in the negative. Every such proposition is looked upon in the capital as a friendly act toward the Germans. The leading men in Tokio are so thoroughly guided by what England wants that there is an effort to annoy and embarrass the remaining Germans in Tsing-tao just as it has been done in Hongkong.

On the other hand, it is known that a portion of the influential Japanese in Tokio do not look with favor on proceeding too antagonistically against the German interests. They are afraid that before they know it Japanese influence will wane and that Tsing-tao may become some kind of English sub-station in that part of China and thus endanger Japan's prestige in the whole of Shantung Province. Not alone that the Japanese may have some secret desire to show the civilized Western nations that she can be magnanimous in her victory, but that there are real economic reasons for her attitude of going slow against the Germans. Somehow there is a feeling that England has some design not yet expressed; apprehension is there, and the shrewd Oriental wants to be on his guard.

The military supervision of Tsing-tao and the ruling officials in Tokio confront each other like opposite poles. The remaining Germans in Tsing-tao are made to suffer through this pulling apart. About 200 Germans are still in the place, mainly women and children, and the main reason for their stay is that they are holding on to their properties. The leading merchants, as well as most of the less important traders have gradually disappeared, either of their own free will, or as a result of mistreatment at the hands of the Japanese, some even being taken to Japan in view of their military fitness. It is natural, therefore, that almost all commerce has come to a stop. The Chinese have also left the place, while threatening that they will remain away. Japan's attitude toward China since last January has not helped in the situation, and the feeling of distrust has spread throughout the province. The railroad that runs through Shantung is for that identical reason becoming of less and less importance. Whatever business goes over the line at the present time is only a trifle as compared with the former traffic.

The many Japanese that came streaming into Tsing-tao after its fall and expected to find a rich harvest ready for them have been sadly disappointed. Many of them are in great distress. A considerable number of criminals have also sought the place, and public security has been threatened by their presence. The reputation of the place has suffered so severely that there is fear that Tsing-tao will lose its importance as a seaside resort.

In Japanese capitalistic circles the opinion seems to have been fixed from the start that Tsing-tao would prove a costly prize and an experiment, and that it would not for long remain a possession of Japan. The solution of the problem cannot come until after peace is declared, and China and Japan settle the question. But whatever may happen, the Japanese have made a good beginning just the same. They showed considerable acumen in selecting the future residential quarters between the Chinese town of Tapau-tau and the former German section near the harbor, where trade was getting to be quite flourishing. The Japanese quarter has the advantage of easy access to all the most important trading points; the Chinese stores in Tapau-tau, the European houses in the business centre, the large and small harbor as well as the belt railroad.

It is still a question whether Tsing-tao has much of a future before it. There are signs in plenty that trade is going to Tien-tsin, and also to Tschifu. In the latter port they are working with feverish haste to complete the connecting railroad lines. Here the English are laboring incessantly, and it may be noted that they do not at all mind that their own plans run counter to those of the Japanese. In case the activity at Tschifu continues and Tsing-tao remains as it is for any length of time, the prospects for a restoration of the latter to its former greatness are but slight. Whoever will be the future master of the place will have to make enormous sacrifices in order to give it back its recent importance. Although its loss may be a big blow to the German interests, there is the gratification that nobody else will derive any profit from the place.

To War Bards

By ELIAS LIEBERMAN.

Please note, my friend
Of lyric trend,
That cannon " boom "
To " gloom " or " doom ";
But when they " roar "
They roar of " war ";
That balls will " burst "
To rhymes like " curst ";
That men will " fall "
When countries " call ";
That flowing " blood "
Suggests a " flood ";
That " hopes of peace "
Will go with " cease."

But try to sell
The stuff, and—Well,
You'll know instead
What Sherman said.

Dual Nationality in Time of War

By Richard W. Flournoy, Jr.

Mr. Richard W. Flournoy is the Chief of the Bureau of Citizenship in the Department of State at Washington, but this expression of his views on the interesting subject of dual nationality, printed in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Sept. 12, is not an official declaration. Mr. Flournoy is giving his opinion in his personal, not his official, capacity.

COLONEL ROOSEVELT has contributed to the June number of The Metropolitan Magazine an article entitled "When Is an American Not an American?" in which, with characteristic ardor, he has undertaken to censure the Department of State because of statements in its letter of April 2, 1915, to P. A. Lelong, Jr., of New Orleans, concerning his citizenship and liability in France for performance of military service. He goes so far as to characterize the department's letter as "dangerously close to treason to the United States."

This is surely a serious charge to make against the Department of State in any case, and especially so in such serious times as these. The fact that this criticism was made by one who has held the highest office in the Republic and published broadcast throughout the country surely warrants a careful consideration of the question.

Mr. Lelong, in a letter of March 27, informed the department that he was born in the United States on June 18, 1880, of a native French father, who had emigrated to this country when he was about 20 years of age, and he inquired whether, in case he should visit France, he could be held liable for military service in that country. The Department of State, without entering into a discussion of the moral rights of Mr. Lelong, replied briefly concerning his apparent legal status as follows:

> Under the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States. Section 1, Article VII. of the French Civil Code states that the following are Frenchmen: "Every person born of a Frenchman in France or abroad."
>
> It thus appears that you were born with a dual nationality and the department cannot therefore give you any assurance that you would not be held liable for the performance of military service in France should you voluntarily place yourself within French jurisdiction.

It will be noted that the department did not discuss the question of the right of the French Government to summon Mr. Lelong from this country to France to serve in the army, but merely stated the position in which he would find himself in case he should voluntarily enter France. Moreover, the department did not say that no action would be taken by this Government to obtain Mr. Lelong's release in case he should be actually held in France for military service, under the conditions stated. It merely informed him that, as he was born with a dual nationality, (French under French law as well as American under American law,) the department was unable to assure him that he would not be held liable in France for military service under the law of that country.

It appears that the use of the term "dual nationality" found peculiar disfavor in the eyes of Colonel Roosevelt. This simple legal term, which has been innocently used by writers on international law from time immemorial to describe the actual status of persons born in certain countries of parents who were citizens of other countries, Colonel Roosevelt has not only relegated to a position of contempt, but he has found the words so ugly that he is determined to abolish the term altogether. He says:

> I hold that it is the clear duty of the National Administration, speaking for the American people, immediately to repudiate the doctrine thus laid down by the Department of State that there are in our country citizens—and as a matter of fact this ruling would apply to millions of citizens—who are "born with a dual nationality."

It seems incredible that the Department of State can promulgate the doctrine of dual nationality promulgated in its letter above quoted.

The United States cannot with self-respect permit its organic and fundamental law to be overriden by the laws of a foreign country. It cannot acknowledge any such theory as this of "a dual nationality"—which, incidentally, is a self-evident absurdity.

Colonel Roosevelt seems to be laboring under the impression that the term "dual nationality" has recently been coined by the Department of State, and he appears to be unaware of the fact that the term is not only recognized and used by all of the leading writers on private and public international law, American as well as European, but has been recognized and used by the Department of State for many years, and notably during his own Administration.

The peculiar condition of dual nationality is the unavoidable result of the existence of two distinct principles upon which the nationality laws of different countries are based. According to one principle a person is born a citizen of a country because of the fact that his father is a citizen thereof. This is known as jus sanguinis, and was embodied in the Roman law.

According to the other principle a person is born a citizen of a country because of the mere fact of birth within its territory and jurisdiction, without regard to the nationality of his parents. This was the feudal principle and is known as jus soli.

It is difficult to say which principle is the more reasonable or which has prevailed to the greatest extent. The great jurist, Vattle, held the jus sanguinis to be the natural and right principle, but this is a matter of opinion. The jus soli prevailed in Europe long after the feudal system had ceased to a great extent to exist.

The jus sanguinis was adopted in France in 1807, through the Code Napoleon, and later adopted in the other countries of Continental Europe. The jus soli remains to this day the basic principle of the British law of nationality, although the other principle was partially engrafted upon the British law as long ago as the year 1350.

The original British law of nationality (jus soli) was inherited by this country, but it was not until the passage of the Act of Congress of April 9, 1866, that the matter was fixed by statute as follows:

All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States.

Later the following statement was included in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.

Meantime, on April 14, 1802, and Feb. 10, 1855, Congress had passed acts embodying the principle of the jus sanguinis.

The eminent Judge who delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the well-known case of the United States vs. Wong Kim Ark, the leading case on native American citizenship, said that "it is the inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own Constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship," (169 U. S., 649, 668.) This is simple enough, but how to accommodate the conflicting claims of different countries to the allegiance of the same persons is a matter which has never been satisfactorily settled, and can only be settled through international conventions.

John Bassett Moore, whose pre-eminent standing among the authorities on international law needs no comment, makes the following statement in his monumental "International Law Digest" (Vol. III., Page 518):

The doctrine of double allegiance, though often criticised as unphilosophical, is not an invention of jurists, but is the logical result of the concurrent operation of two different laws. In the absence of a general agreement for the exclusive application according to circumstances, of the one or the other of such laws, the condition that actually exists is described by the term double allegiance. An undisputed example of it is furnished by the case of a

child, who, by reason of his parents being at the time of his birth in a foreign land, is born a citizen of two countries—a citizen of the country of his birth jure soli, and a citizen of his parents' country jure sanguinis.

A conflict, however, is obviated by the rule—which is indeed but the practical formulation of the doctrine itself—that the liability of the child to the performance of the duties of allegiance is determined by the laws of that one of the two countries in which he actually is.

Oppenheim, in his recent work entitled "International Law," makes the following observations in his chapter headed, "Double and Absent Nationality," (Vol. I., Pp. 363 and 364):

An individual may own double nationality knowingly and unknowingly, and with or without intention. And double nationality may be produced by every mode of acquiring nationality. Even birth can vest a child with double nationality. Thus, every child born in Great Britain of German parents acquires at the same time British and German nationality, for such child is British according to British, and German according to German municipal law.

Individuals owning double nationality bear in the language of diplomatists the name sujets mixtes. The position of such "mixed subjects" is awkward on account of the fact that two different States claim them as subjects, and therefore their allegiance. In case a serious dispute arises between these two States which leads to war, an irreconcilable conflict of duties is created for these unfortunate individuals.

Oppenheim closes this chapter by observing that difficulties arising from "double nationality" can be done away with only through the adoption of a proper international convention.

To come to Colonel Roosevelt's own Administration, it may be observed that those who served under him as Secretaries of State innocently used on various occasions the expression which is now the subject of his most severe criticism. For example, Secretary Hay, in an instruction of Feb. 23, 1904, to the Minister at Montevideo, said, the reference being to a work by Van Dyne:

The question of granting passports to persons having a dual allegiance is treated in Chapter XI., Page 42 et seq. of the same work. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1904, Page 854.)

Acting Secretary Bacon, (later Secretary of State under President Roosevelt,) in a note of Nov. 20, 1906, to the German Ambassador, inclosed a memorandum prepared in the State Department, of which the first paragraph reads as follows:

Assuming that Alexander Bohn never became a citizen of the United States, Jacob Bohn was born of German parents in the United States. According to the Constitution and laws of the United States as interpreted by the courts, a child born of alien parents in the United States is an American citizen, although such child may also be a citizen of the country of his parents according to the law of that country. (Foreign Relations, 1906, Page 657.)

On July 3, 1906, Acting Secretary of State Bacon, upon the recommendation of Congress, appointed a board composed of James B. Scott, Solicitor of the Department of State; David Jayne Hill, Minister to the Netherlands, and Gaillard Hunt, Chief of the Passport Bureau, to inquire into the laws and practice regarding citizenship of the United States, expatriation, and protection abroad, and to report recommendations for legislation to be laid before Congress. The report, which covers 538 pages, and is a most valuable work, was sent to the Speaker of the House with a letter from Secretary Root of Dec. 18, 1906, in which he said:

I beg to commend it to the consideration of the House as a very clear and thorough exposition of this most important subject, upon which it seems to be generally agreed legislation is much needed.

The report of the board, excellent and carefully prepared as it was, did not cover in its recommendations every phase of the intricate subject of citizenship, and did not prescribe a plan for settling questions of double nationality, beyond recommending a statute requiring persons born abroad of American citizens, who should elect American citizenship rather than that of the country of their birth, to make a formal declaration to that effect before an American Consul upon reaching the age of 18 years, and to take the oath of allegiance to the United States upon reaching majority.

The report, approved by Secretary Root and presumably by President Roose-

velt, did, however, contain the following statement:

> Inasmuch as our Government declares that all persons born in the United States are citizens of the United States, and also recognizes, as well as adopts on its own part, the rule that children of citizens resident abroad are citizens of the country to which the parents owe allegiance, there arises, as will be seen, a conflict of citizenship, spoken of usually as dual allegiance. (House Document 326, Fifty-ninth Congress, Second Session, Page 74.)

It might be considered strange that Colonel Roosevelt, while President, allowed his Secretaries of State to use so freely the now objectionable term "dual allegiance," and, stranger still, that he failed to avail himself of his unusual opportunity to abolish not only the term but the "self-evident absurdity" which it describes—that is, the condition itself.

Colonel Roosevelt is surely not ignorant of the fact that the law of the United States contains a provision very like the provision of French law under which Mr. Lelong was born a French citizen. He must realize that a person born in France of American parents is born an American citizen, although under certain conditions he may be claimed under French law as a French citizen. In his wide and varied reading his eyes surely must have fallen upon the provision of the Act of Congress of 1855, which, as embodied in Section 1993 of the Revised Statutes, reads as follows:

> All children heretofore born or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their birth citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States.

Under this statute the Department of State almost daily issues passports to persons born in France. If Colonel Roosevelt, just prior to the birth of his youngest son, had gone to England with his family, and his son had been born there, that son might have been considered an American citizen under American law, as well as a British subject under British law, whether or not the British Government would afterward have actually claimed his allegiance.

Senator Lodge in his letters to the Department of State of June 5 and June 16, 1915, concerning the detention in Italy for military service of Ugo da Prato, used practically the same arguments as Colonel Roosevelt used. Ugo da Prato was born in Boston, Aug. 25, 1895, of Italian parents, and went to Italy in 1912, that is, when he was 17 years old, to study architecture.

The department asked Senator Lodge to send proof that young da Prato's father had been naturalized as a citizen of this country before the birth of the son, in order to show that the latter was not born with a dual nationality and could not be claimed as an Italian subject under the law of Italy. Senator Lodge sent the proof, but argued that it was superfluous, denying the possibility of dual allegiance and contending that da Prato could not have been claimed as an Italian subject even if his father had not been naturalized in this country before his (the son's) birth.

The department replied at some length in a letter of June 9, which was later given to the press, and Senator Lodge again presented his views in a letter of June 16, which has also been given to the press. In this letter the Senator, referring to the conflicting nationality laws of Italy and the United States, said:

> But the fact that there is a conflict of laws is very different from admitting that the law in conflict with our own is valid.

The solution of the conflict of laws proposed by Senator Lodge has the merit of simplicity, it must be admitted, but, from an examination of the works of Story, Dicey, and other writers on the intricate subject of conflict of laws, it does not appear that they have found this solution entirely satisfactory. It is indeed a simple matter, when a law of a foreign country conflicts with a law of the United States, for this Government to decline to admit the validity of foreign law. But suppose that the foreign country insists that its own law is valid, and suppose that the person who is the subject of the controversy is at the time actually within the territory and jurisdiction of the foreign country—what then?

The conflict still exists, and something more than a mere flat denial of the validity of the foreign law is necessary. The contention of this Government, to be of any avail in a given case, must be based upon the ground of natural right and justice, or what appears to be such, and certain peculiar facts and circumstances in view of which American law should prevail, particularly the fact that the person concerned is domiciled in this country and, having reached his majority, has made a practical election of American nationality.

Various solutions of the problem of double nationality have been suggested, and some of them are embodied in the laws of various countries. Some day, it is to be hoped, the matter will be settled through general international conventions. A simple and, apparently, satisfactory rule would be that a person born with a dual nationality shall, after reaching majority, bear the nationality only of the country in which he is domiciled at the time of reaching majority, or, if domiciled in a third country at such time, he shall bear the nationality of that one of the two countries claiming him in which he last had his domicile. Such a rule would obviate the necessity of a formal declaration.

It is unfortunate that Colonel Roosevelt undertook to discuss in his article on dual nationality the provision of the German law of nationality of Jan. 1, 1914, under which Germans who acquire naturalization in foreign countries may, under certain conditions, retain their German allegiance. The impression has been given, whether intended or not, that this Government concedes that Germans and other aliens who are naturalized in the United States may retain their original allegiance and thus have a "dual nationality."

This is quite untrue. The Government of the United States has made no such concession. In its letter of June 9 to Senator Lodge the Department of State said:

> The cases of persons born in the United States of alien parents should not be confused with the cases of persons born abroad who have obtained naturalization as citizens of this country. In the former cases the department is obliged to recognize now, as always heretofore, that the persons concerned are born with a dual nationality. In the latter cases the department does not recognize the existence of dual nationality in view of the fact that persons who obtain naturalization as citizens of this country are required to renounce their original allegiance.

Senator Lodge's attention was also called to printed circulars of the Department of State, issued during and since the administration of President Roosevelt, in which naturalized American citizens are informed as to their status in their countries of origin. Particular mention was made of the circular entitled "Notice to American Citizens Formerly Subjects of Italy Who Contemplate Returning to That Country," and especially to the following statement contained in it:

> Naturalization of an Italian subject in a foreign country without the consent of the Italian Government is no bar to liability to military service.

The final paragraph of Secretary Lansing's letter of June 9 to Senator Lodge contained the following general statement:

> In closing allow me to say that this Government has not receded from the position taken many years ago as to the natural right of men to make a voluntary change of nationality, commonly known as the right of expatriation. Nevertheless, the Department of State deems it proper to continue the practice which it has followed for many years of informing naturalized American citizens of the position in which they will find themselves in case they voluntarily visit their native countries. For the same reason the department deems it proper to warn persons having a dual nationality of the claims which may be made upon them by the other countries concerned. It is believed that the department would not be performing its full duty in this matter if it should fail to give this information.

Unity Beneath the Present Discord

By Prince Eugene Troubetzkoy

Formerly Professor of the Philosophy of Law in the University of Moscow

This article by Prince Troubetzkoy is taken from an article appearing originally in the Hibbert Journal.

AN attempt to penetrate the inner meaning of events which have not yet completed their course may seem premature and audacious. Are we equipped with the force of mind which alone can raise us above the mighty torrent which is sweeping us along? Are we sufficiently calm to be able to interpret its direction and its meaning?

In spite of the seeming justice of these objections, there are reasons which compel us to press the question now. The exceptional circumstances of the present crisis have produced throughout the whole world an exaltation of mind which cannot last for long. When we return hereafter to our ordinary life we shall not be what we are at the present moment. Once the war is finished, that elevation of soul, that unusual keenness of perception, that exceptional clearness of insight which belong to the great moments of history, and are now present, will exist no more.

Among the characteristic features of our present state of mind there is one especially which admits of no mistake. The great European war has brought a wonderful increase to the intensity of life both in the individual and in humanity at large. The chief result of the war has been to double the energy and active force of the general life.

In times of war the whole world displays extraordinary activity. This holds of individuals, of social groups, and of whole peoples. The question, "To be or not to be," presents itself with the same penetrating force to all alike, and life becomes more intense just in proportion as it has to provide for its own preservation and to meet the challenge of the powers of death.

This is not the day of bourgeois vices and respectable virtues. It is the day when all the contradictions of human life leap into the light and clash together in their most irreconcilable forms, the day when all oppositions are pushed to the very extreme. There is war to the knife between heaven and hell; war without truce and without rest. The object of the strife is the possession of the human soul; and for that reason the two principles appear in man in all their majesty and power. It seems as though the god and the beast attain these immense proportions in man at one and the same moment; so that we see on one side the appearance of a monstrous criminality—of men who might be reincarnations of Caesar Borgia and his contemporaries; while on the other side we see a train of martyrs and saints who also seem to return to us from another time, remote in the distance of the past.

This abnormal force of hatred, now let loose, provokes and quickens into activity an equally abnormal force of love; so that, for the time being, the most astonishing heroism is looked upon as an almost everyday occurrence, and the supreme act of self-surrender becomes an ordinary event. Most remarkable of all is the fact that this sublime heroism has ceased to be the exceptional quality of a few individuals—the heroic spirit possesses whole masses of men; it is shown even in those who, up to the present moment, seemed "insignificant"—mere expressionless and negative personalities.

At such a time the human heart expands; one might say it is transformed by a profound revolution. A new type of humanity comes into being, more powerful and more wonderful to behold. Man augments his stature; and therewith the feeling of his own value gathers

force within him. When the human heart permits a glimpse to be taken of all its inner wealth, which has hitherto been hidden and unguessed, then it is that man begins to inspire his neighbor with a deeper reverence and with feelings which issue in a more vigorous moral activity. Love is reacting against the hatred which is invading the world; and for that reason it burns in all its forms with a splendor and force such as we see at no other time. This ardent flame of love we may now behold in a vast variety of situations.

In all such scenes the most moving figure is that of the woman, standing beside the husband, son, or brother, who is going off to the war. As the train or the steamer moves away, one may hear the soldiers saying to one another, "Why do the women weep while our eyes are dry? Not because our sorrow is less than theirs, but because our hearts are made of sterner stuff."

This exalted passion of love and of pity may sometimes be seen forcing the heart to rebellion against the pitiless powers which impose the peril of death upon its dearest objects. At the beginning of the war the Russian papers published a letter which had been intercepted by our troops, written by a young German girl to her lover in the army: "What does this cruel Kaiser want with our poor bit of happiness, which is so dear to us?" Every loving heart, especially if it is a woman's, has the same feeling in similar circumstances. And yet in this woman's love there is an aspiration of a higher order, which imposes silence on the spirit of rebellion. The letter which I have just quoted contains also this phrase: "Return covered with glory; be my victorious Siegfried."

Here we see another feeling familiar to every human being—the anguish of love, well known among men of every race.

In all true and sincere love there is this inevitable conflict of two powerful aspirations—first, the desire for the preservation of the being beloved, the desire to snatch him from death at all costs; and then, along with this, the dream of seeing his brow encircled by a crown which cannot be won save by an act of heroism, often at the cost of his life. My hero—this lover, this husband, this son—as he departs for the war, is for me a unique being in the universe, the one object worthy of all possible sacrifices. What in all the world could ever compensate me for his loss? How impossible, then, must it ever remain to adjust our minds to the idea that in war tens of thousands of these infinitely precious existences are sacrificed in order to get possession of a single trench!

And yet this same pathos of love bears witness that life has another content beyond its personal interests, a higher meaning which alone has power to give a purpose to human existence and clothe it with absolute value. Love is not satisfied by merely perceiving the presence of the being beloved; it must also reverence him; its object must justify its devotion. And love is deeply conscious that the individual human being who inspires it is nothing if abstracted from the great human whole to which he belongs. Individual existence becomes empty and meaningless just so far as it ceases to serve that larger whole. And that is why love is always ready for the supreme sacrifice. For those who desire before all else to be proud of the beings they love, the death of these is always preferable to their dishonor.

Hence arises the living bond which unites these two feelings—the love of the individual and the love of country. And most of all in times of war, when the vital force of the will redoubles its energy, these two feelings nourish and kindle each other by their mutual contact.

The feeling of the individual for his country must be extraordinarily powerful when it leads him to sacrifice not only his "self" but that which is far dearer to him—to wit, everything that he loves. And yet, in the historic crisis through which we are now living, this sacrifice becomes habitual; we see it ten thousand times repeated every day. And the greater the sacrifice, the more does this bond with the nation as a whole, for which the sacrifice is made, deepen and assert itself within the human heart.

To nations as to individuals, the same question is presented: "To be or not to be." And, when presented, it yields an identical result in both cases—the more precious the value that is threatened, the more lively and passionate are the feelings it inspires.

What we here behold is a manifestation of that vital force which reacts on the instant when the need arises to do battle against the powers of death and destruction. Its action, which always has the same effect—that of affirming or reaffirming the integrity of nations—reached the height of the miraculous at the beginning of the present war. At that moment a mighty revolution was effected in the minds of men. Suddenly the strife of parties was seen to stop; no more disintegration, no more discord; in every country the union of the nation was re-established and affirmed. These were the typical facts equally conspicuous in each of the opposing camps. Lost in time of peace, the guiding motive of life asserts itself unmistakably in time of war; each nation comes to itself and gathers its forces to a unity under a single idea and a single act of will.

This phenomenon appeared in all the countries involved; and if I confine myself here to its Russian aspect, it will be through no partiality for my own country, but merely because I have made no personal observation of other lands. With us it was the first appearance of the wounded which produced the greatest of the miracles of which I am speaking.

Never shall I forget the moving sight of which I was a spectator in our province last August. Kalouga, a town of 60,000 inhabitants, was preparing to receive from 150 to 300 wounded. But the great battles in Austria and Poland having begun much sooner than was expected, these calculations, like so many others, turned out wide of the mark. One day, without any word of warning sent in advance, 2,700 wounded reached Kalouga in a single convoy. For some hours the confusion was great. There was neither straw nor linen; proper food was absolutely wanting; there were no coverings for the planks on which the wounded men were stretched. But at the end of two days they were all comfortably lodged, well fed, and supplied with the best of medical treatment. Accommodation was freely given; unknown people supplied the straw; others, also unknown, brought mattresses, bed linen, and pillows; unknown peasants from the villages around brought in all kinds of eatables in sufficient quantity. Ladies of position and their daughters became nurses. Everything was done with a spontaneous élan, and without any organization. It was just the instinctive and irresistible movement of a mass of human beings. And throughout the whole of our country the same movement was manifest, taking the same form, producing the same miracle, whenever the need arose. It is only at moments like these that the inner unity of Russia becomes visible and tangible. In Russia, as elsewhere, life has only to resume its daily form and immediately the unity of the national self is lost and dispersed in a confused chaos of contradictory phenomena.

This renaissance of human solidarity is one of the most paradoxical and yet typical features of the war. Nor is it merely among living contemporaries that these bonds of union come into being. In these grand moments of history we see the centuries draw near to one another, the past joins hands with the present. And then it is that this past grows very dear to our hearts, because, when war threatens, the past represents an ancient glory for which we are fighting, a heritage of our fathers of which some one would rob us, the tradition of a culture which we are defending against the enemy. It is precisely by this link with the past that we become a nation. To be conscious of it is to feel that our fathers are with us; for our country is precisely "the land of our fathers."

In this rebirth of nations their historical continuity comes forth into the light; the link between the generations, broken or forgotten in times of peace, reconstitutes itself and rises into consciousness. Through this very exaltation of national sentiment the living generation is conscious of itself as forming one historic whole with the generations which have passed away. Now, more than ever

LORD READING

Chairman of the Anglo-French Financial Commission, Who Negotiated in the United States a Credit of $500,000,000

MAJOR GENERAL LEONARD WOOD, U. S. A.
Commanding the Department of the East
(© *Photo by Harris & Ewing.*)

before, the unity of our history comes into view. We are conscious of it even at those very points where until now it seemed most obscure, where the breach between past and present seemed final, when a great gulf divided the fathers from the sons.

This change is seen, for example, in the new feeling evoked in us by the ancient monuments of our national culture. We have always admired them—these beautiful cathedrals—as worthy representatives of our past; but till now our admiration was æsthetic merely, and cold. Despite our appreciation of them the ancient temples of our fathers seemed foreign and not wholly comprehensible; they spoke to us of a culture no longer ours, of thoughts we do not share, of emotions which stir us no more. But now, does it not seem as though the old walls, dumb so long, were addressing us with their ancient eloquence; as though that which has been dead for centuries were coming to life again? How the distance has shrunken which separates contemporary France from the cathedral of Rheims or of Notre Dame! Is not Westminster Abbey dearer than ever to the hearts of Englishmen? And that is so not merely because these precious monuments are threatened by great guns and Zeppelins, or shattered by shell fire. Beyond all this, an inward change has taken place in the relations which connect the living generation with the past embodied in these buildings.

Historic days such as these, when all recognized values are undergoing a complete revision, lead with the certainty of fate to a thoroughgoing depreciation of that practical materialism which, as I have said, seemed on the eve of the war to be dominating civilization. But now, when men, by a voluntary sacrifice, are going forth in masses to die for their country, we are beginning to feel ashamed of our excessive preoccupation with comfort and enjoyment. Hence it is that gifts for the wounded and for the victims of the war pour forth in a flood. Men who renounce everything that they may give their goods to the poor have ceased to be rare exceptions, and among those who have no goods to give away there are multitudes who willingly sacrifice their labor for the common cause.

Confronted with death, which is raking in its victims by tens of thousands, the value we set on wealth is totally changed. To those who risk their lives wealth is worthless, and those who lose their nearest and dearest, or know they may lose them at any moment, ask themselves again and again—To what purpose, and for whom, do we guard our riches and labor to increase them?

When great world movements impose these thoughts on man, the quest for the means of existence ceases to be his sole preoccupation and no longer leads him to forget the goal. When once the life of the spirit has begun to stir, wealth returns to its secondary rôle as an instrument destined to serve the high and holy end of our existence. It is little surprising that the modern man begins, under these conditions, to draw near in spirit to the ancient shrines, in which even luxury ennobled itself by becoming the transparent expression of spiritual experience. Thus approaching one another the generations join hands across the centuries, forming one nation continuous in time.

The truth is that we are coming into relation with a new world, which has been unknown to us hitherto. Spiritual powers, invisible until now, have appeared in our midst. I say "invisible," only because their action is hidden from man so long as he is immersed in the cares of material well-being. And now at the very moment when the world is deluged with blood, and a hurricane of fire, which destroys everything in its passage, is threatening to turn our well-being into dust and ashes—behold, the blind see and the deaf begin to hear! Dimly we foresee the coming victory of mind over chaos. One might almost say that a flash of lightning, leaping from the universal tempest, has suddenly revealed to us a new aspect of the world. It behooves us to be quick in fixing upon our memory the momentary vision; for soon it will fade and vanish completely in the common light of day. But when it has gone we must cherish the recollection of it, for we shall find it indispensable as a source

of encouragement in the tremendous work of organization and creation which must begin when the war is over.

When, after this time of tempest, we enter once more on the long-drawn-out succession of common and monotonous days, we shall again feel ourselves oppressed by the pettiness of an existence so seemingly flat and meaningless. But let no man fold his arms and abandon himself to despair! Let him rather recall this fair vision of the future humanity, of which he has already had a glimpse; let him reflect on the heroism, hidden deep in man, which, in great moments, triumphs over the seeming insignificance of his nature. To the spectacle of division and discord, as it will then return, let him oppose this memory of the nation which found its unity in the act of raising itself above the earthly interests of common days. And when the rivalry and jealousy of the nations bring new clouds on the horizon, let him remember how, one day, the rolling thunder of a universal tempest announced to him the unity and solidarity of all mankind.

Kalouga, Russia.

The Great Blue Tent

By EDITH WHARTON.

Edith Wharton has written the following poem for THE NEW YORK TIMES, *cabled from Paris on Aug.* 24, 1915:

Come unto me, said the Flag,
  Ye weary and sore opprest;
For I am no shot-riddled rag,
  But a great blue tent of rest.

Ye heavy laden, come
  On the aching feet of dread,
From ravaged town, from murdered home,
  From your tortured and your dead.

All they that beat at my crimson bars
  Shall enter without demur.
Though the round earth rock with the wind of wars,
  Not one of my folds shall stir.

See, here is warmth and sleep,
  And a table largely spread.
I give garments to them that weep,
  And for gravestones I give bread.

But what, through my inmost fold,
  Is this cry on the winds of war?
Are you grown so old, are you grown so cold,
  O Flag that was once our star?

Where did you learn that bread is life,
  And where that fire is warm—
You, that took the van of a worldwide strife,
  As an eagle takes the storm?

Where did you learn that men are bred
  Where hucksters bargain and gorge;
And where that down makes a softer bed
  Than the snows of Valley Forge?

Come up, come up to the stormy sky,
  Where our fierce folds rattle and hum,
For Lexington taught us how to fly,
  And we dance to Concord's drum.

O flags of freedom, said the Flag,
  Brothers of wind and sky;
I too was once a tattered rag,
  And I wake and shake at your cry.

I tug and tug at the anchoring place,
  Where my drowsy folds are caught;
I strain to be off on the old fierce chase
  Of the foe we have always fought.

O People I made, said the Flag,
  And welded from sea to sea,
I am still the shot-riddled rag,
  That shrieks to be free, to be free.

Oh, cut my silken ties
  From the roof of the palace of peace;
Give back my stars to the skies,
  My stripes to the storm-striped seas!

Or else, if you bid me yield,
  Then down with my crimson bars,
And o'er all my azure field
  Sow poppies instead of stars.

Russia's Gift to the World of Literature

By J. W. Mackail

Professor of Poetry in Oxford.

The following article by Professor Mackail, which is here printed with his permission, appeared in a pamphlet entitled "Russia's Gift to the World," and issued by Hodder & Stoughton.

RUSSIA is, for the mass of people in England, an unknown country. It is separated in many ways —by distance, by language, by social organization and habits. It is at the other end of Europe, so that the journey from one country to the other is long, expensive, and rather laborious. Not only the language but even the alphabet is different from ours, and the ways of common life are in many respects strange and take some pains to understand. To these difficulties in the way of intercourse has to be added, not only the national English dislike of foreigners, but the alienation caused by past hostility. The Crimean war, one of the greatest blunders of English statesmanship, drove a wedge between the two nations just when they might have begun to understand one another. Then there followed a long period of jealousies over our Indian frontier and conflicting interests in Southeastern Europe. Twice we were on the brink of war with Russia, once over Constantinople in 1877-8, and again over Afghanistan in 1884-5. Then the Franco-Russian alliance was formed at a time when Great Britain was on uneasy and almost hostile terms with France. It is only in recent years that we have come to regard Russia as a neighbor and tried to understand the Russian Nation and the Russian life.

Instances of the greatness of our ignorance are the common beliefs that the Russians are an Asiatic race, and that they speak a barbarous language. The facts are quite the contrary. The Slavs are, like ourselves, pure Aryans; they are cousins of the Latins and the Celts and the Germans, and have exactly the same claim as these other nations to be counted European. The countries occupied by them used at one time to extend all over Northern Germany as far west as the Elbe, and even now there are Slav peoples in large numbers in the heart of Central Europe. So, too, about their language. The Russian language, which is spoken (with some varieties of dialect) by more than 100,000,000 people, is one of the richest and noblest of human languages. It provides as valuable a mental discipline as any other modern language, perhaps even as Greek or Latin, and it is a language in which many great works of literature, as we shall see later, have been written.

In any account of Russian literature, two kinds of it have to be considered which are historically separate, though the one to some extent grew out of and is founded upon the other. There is the early popular literature of tales, ballads, and poems which grew up among the people, was handed down by memory, and very often was not committed to writing at all until modern times. There is also the regular literature of books, which begins when language has been studied as an art and reduced to rules. This latter is the form which literature takes in modern times. In both forms the record of Russia is extraordinarily rich.

From very early times Russian as a spoken language produced a copious treasure of tales and ballads, epics and songs. The old Russian fairy tales now recovered and written down are of the highest rank in their wealth of fancy, their freshness, and beauty. The "epic songs" or "heroic songs" going back to the early Middle Ages, from the tenth to the thirteenth century, are no less important. They have been collected and

printed in modern times by Danilev, Rybnikov, Sakharov, and many others. They are not only of immense historical interest, but reveal a power of imagination and expression not excelled by anything produced in Western Europe. To the same period belonged the prose epics, nearly all now lost. One of these, "The Raid of Prince Igor," was rediscovered in 1795; and both in matter and style it is a masterpiece, to be set alongside of the French "Chanson de Roland" or the great Icelandic Sagas. The production of this early popular literature received a severe check from the conquest of Southern Russia by the Mongols (a race akin to the Huns) in the thirteenth century. Ages of devastation followed, during which Russia sank back into something approaching barbarism. But the instinct for the popular epic survived, and put forth fresh and vigorous growths during the period which was in England that of Shakespeare and Milton.

Regular Russian literature, in the modern sense of the term, is hardly more than a century old. It began in the result partly of the introduction of Western education, partly of the rediscovery of their own older literature. Both took effect when the Russian Empire had been consolidated in the eighteenth century. Lomonosov, by his work on the Russian language, paved the way for style and composition. He was a man of immense learning, and the University of Moscow was founded (1755) under his influence. At first the books written were in the French manner, which was then dominant in Europe. The great impulse toward a truly national Russian literature was given by the national war of 1812, and the first really great work which that impulse produced was Karamzin's "History of Russia," published in the year after Waterloo. For its period it was a remarkable achievement merely as history, but its chief importance was in its larger aspect as literature. It established interest among the educated classes in the history of their own country, and it also established Russian prose as a fine art, and became a classic on its literary merit. About the same time there were writing a number of poets who, though not of the first rank, helped to do for verse what Karamzin had done for prose.

All this work was pioneering in unexplored regions. It may help us to understand Russian literature to think of it as like English literature starting with Scott and Byron if these authors had had no predecessors except the ballads, chronicles, and romances of the Middle Ages, and if in the beginning of the nineteenth century they had had to make their language as well as write in it.

The new movement rapidly bore fruit, and it took shape in the works of Pushkin, the real founder of modern Russian literature. He was both a poet and a prose writer of the romantic school; he corresponds broadly to both Scott and Byron in this country. He was much influenced by Shakespeare, but his genius was quite individual and also quite national. His narrative poem, "Evgeny Onegin," his historical tragedy, "Boris Godunov," and his prose stories of Russian life are all masterpieces. He remains not only a founder but a model. He was more of an artist than a thinker, but his writings have a purity and sincerity of the highest and most lasting value. Like Scott, he was a romantic who did not lose touch with reality, and who gave voice in his writings to the life of his nation. Through him Russian literature was able to claim a place with French and German, English and Italian, among the national literatures of Europe.

That claim was established, that place secured, by the three great imaginative writers of the next generation. Pushkin and his contemporaries, indeed, have only become known largely outside of Russia in the reflected light of those successors, who compelled the attention and won the admiration of the whole world. Turgeneff, Dostoyevsky, and Tolstoy are by common consent among the greatest writers of all ages and countries. It would be needless to labor a point which no one would deny. Taken together, they sum up a production comparable in largeness, force, and vital truth to those of Elizabethan or Victorian England. Of this great trinity but few words need be said.

Turgeneff is above all things a consummate artist. For easy and complete mastery of his art he stands at the head of all European writers of his time. His early training was largely German, and afterward he lived much in France; and so he writes of Russian life from a broad European point of view, and his fame became as great throughout Europe as it was in his own country. Through him Europe came for the first time, with a shock of surprise and admiration, into contact with the Russian soul. Writers so distinguished as George Sand and Flaubert acknowledged him as their master. In "Dmitri Rudin," "Fathers and Sons," and other works hardly less famous, he combined truth to nature with purity of outline and sense of proportion, and with complete harmony between thought and expression. His work is almost unequaled for perfection of style and for restrained power; Taine hardly went beyond what most would admit when he said that there had been nothing like it since Sophocles.

He wrote of a life which was rapidly becoming a life of the past; in his last important work, "Virgin Soil," he is seen trying, in some perplexity, to keep pace with the movements of a new generation. His fame is not so great now as it was thirty years ago, when he had a position, somewhat like Tennyson in England, of unquestioned supremacy. But the strength and charm, the insight and suavity of his art still remain; and his work stands secure, not only by its beauty but by its strength and truth. In his self-imposed exile he remained a patriot. The Russian language was to him a symbol of Russian life. "When I fall into despair," he wrote, "at the sight of all that is being done at home, I cannot but believe that it is to a great people that such a language has been given."

Turgeneff represents the Russia of the older time; Dostoyevsky represents, in strong contrast, the growth, the unrest, and the agonies of the new democracy. His scenes of life are the garret and the street, with their monotony of poverty and suffering. He cannot be read for amusement; his books are disquieting and distressing, but compelling in their power and truth. The typical Russian qualities of patience and humility became in him a passion, almost a fever. His "Crime and Punishment" had an effect, in Russia and throughout Europe, as great as that of Richardson's "Clarissa" a century before. They are alike in their slow, inevitable movement, their crushing truth, their insight into the dark places of the human soul, and the way in which they work out, relentlessly and in cruel detail, the doctrine of expiation through suffering. Later books, "The Idiot," "Devils," "The Brothers Karamazov," are no less powerful and no less awful. The image of life which he places before us would be horrible but for the sense throughout it all of controlling and overwhelming pity. He searches for the soul of goodness in evil, and so finally leaves a message of dim hope.

Tolstoy was probably the most remarkable single figure in the world of his time. He is the one Russian writer whose name, and some at least of whose works, are known everywhere. Turgeneff is a supreme artist; Dostoyevsky rejects art in his consuming passion for humanity; with Tolstoy, "art happens," he cannot help being a great artist. No modern writer, hardly any one ancient or modern, has approached him in two things. One of these is his power of creating people and situations that are not so much like life as they are life itself. The other is his power of stirring thought and awakening conscience by going straight to the heart of things, and to the human heart itself. In his narrative, one feels not only that things happened so, but that they could not have happened otherwise; it is as though Nature herself took the pen and wrote for him. This is the effect produced by all his work; alike in the vivid descriptive work of his earlier years, like "The Cossacks" and "Sevastopol"; or in his vast historical epic of "War and Peace," which paints or rather sets out in the solid, in flesh and blood, a whole civilization and a whole generation of the world's history; or in "Anna Karenina," where Russian society comes to life on a large canvas; or in his autobiographic

writings, like "Childhood, Boyhood and Youth"; or in those exquisite short stories, like "What Men Live By," "Master and Man," "The Two Pilgrims," "Where Love Is, There God Is Also," where he gives us life in its simplest elements, among poor peasants and artisans, and which are full of infinite fragrance and beauty, of incomparable truth and tenderness and power.

He thought little of his own art, for he was too deeply concerned with life, with religion, and with the salvation of mankind, to care about other things. Fame came to him against his will. In his later years, his house at Yasnaya Polyana became a place of pilgrimage from all Europe, like Ferney in the old age of Voltaire, like Weimar in the old age of Goethe. He was not only an artist but a prophet, and not only an artist and a prophet but a child, with the child's terrible simplicity and insight. In all these qualities he is unique, but yet characteristically Russian.

All the three were alike in their passionate love of Russia, as well as in their power of interpreting Russia to mankind. But their love of Russia worked out differently. The patriotism of Turgeneff reached out toward accepting and assimilating the influences of the West. That of Dostoyevsky rebelled against these influences; it was more self-confined, but more intense. That of Tolstoy was not patriotism at all in the ordinary sense; his love of Russia was an instinct, and he wrote of Russia because he found in it a symbol of the whole of humanity. And so he drew more and more from the life of the Russian peasantry, (who are nine-tenths of the nation,) because in them he found the nearest approach to practical Christianity, to the attitude of little children which is inculcated by the Gospel, and in which he discerned the secret of life.

These three great writers tower up among a mass of others, who, by themselves, would make Russian literature remarkable. Most of them are hardly known in England except among Russian scholars, and it would be idle to give a long list of mere names, but a few of the more outstanding poets and prose authors may be mentioned. In prose we have to take special note of Gogol, the novelist and playwright, who has been called the Russian Dickens; he was the founder of realism in Russian literature, and his work is full of fun and humor. These qualities are rather rare in Russian art, which is habitually serious—sometimes almost oppressively so to the Western mind. In them he is akin to English writers. The French critic, Prosper Mérimée, put this in a pointed way when he called him "one of the best English humorists." With him may be named Belinsky, the creator of Russian literary criticism, who was powerful in molding the great generation of Russian writers; Vladimir Solovev, the essayist and thinker; and Yakovlev, (better known by his maternal name of Herzen,) a Christian Socialist whose influence was immense in directions that he neither desired nor foresaw, and who is known in literature by his brilliant "Memoirs." Three more have been, in part, translated into English, and are better known: Chekhov, the literary descendant of Turgeneff, who drew Russian middle-class life with great accuracy and also with a sense of humor; Gorky, "the Russian Kipling," who introduced a fresh naturealism into Russian letters, and Merezhkovsky, the author of powerful works of historical fiction.

In poetry likewise may be named Krylov, the fabulist, who, before Pushkin, gave the first impulse to national self-expression; Lermontov, a poet of the school of Byron, but with a lyrical gift akin to that of Shelley; Koltsov, "the Russian Burns"; the delicate and charming lyrics of Alexis Tolstoy, and Nekrásov, the most popular in Russia of all their poets. Nekrásov might be compared to Longfellow in his simplicity and direct appeal to ordinary people; but he is in the strongest contrast to Longfellow's cheerful serenity, for his poetry, in its uncompromising realism, is often bitter, and nearly always full of gloom. Yet this temper issues finally in enthusiasm for the people and faith in their ultimate victory.

At the present time, as is natural and inevitable, Russian literature seems to be

in a time of slack water after the period of the great writers. But it is full of the stirrings of fresh life. As in England, there is large and eager production, manifold experiment, belief in the power of literature to interpret life; and this gives hope, in both countries, of a new birth and another great age.

"Martyred Birds"

By JEROME K. JEROME.

To the Editor of The London Daily News:

Monks Corners, Marlow Common, Bucks, Aug. 11, 1915.

IT was back in the Winter. There was published in the English papers a letter from a young cavalry officer fighting in Flanders. He spoke, in a casual way, of the discomforts of the cold, of the two feet of icy water in the trenches where he and his handful of men—for it was before the days of rapid relief—lived for weeks at a time, of the annoyance of not being able to put your head for an instant above the parapet without fear of a bullet, of the inconvenience of bursting shrapnel. But these things were more or less what he had expected. What was worrying him most was "a little black dog." Half a mile behind the trenches lay a shattered farmstead. Some of its inhabitants had been killed, the others had fled. All but this wretched little black dog who went about there day and night with a low, whimpering cry, seeking its people. They had taken it food. The silly fellows had risked their lives crawling through the night. They had tried to bring it back with them to the trench. It would have been safer there and they comforted it; they felt so sorry for it. But it would not go with them. It wanted its own people.

And then he reflects that there must be hundreds of such cases. That this is not the only "little black dog" whimpering among its dead. "Poor little devils," he concludes, "it's awfully pitiful!"

One shudders to think of the indignation with which so many of our fierce stay-at-homes must have read this letter. "Sickly sentimentality," I can hear them spluttering. "Maudlin humanitarism—and in a soldier." "What is the world coming to?" And yet, strangely enough, kindness has always gone with the true soldier spirit. One remembers the story of the Emperor Maximilian, the fierce, ruthless conqueror. How the birds built their nest within his silken tent. And how, when the order came to move forward, and the orderlies stretched out their hands to shatter the little home, the Emperor forbade them: "Leave it standing"—one can picture the twinkle in the grim, gray eyes. The Emperor will have to sleep in less commodious quarters. The day pavilion. Pity claims it, and the Emperor bows.

From what I know of them I do not believe we could give our boys at the front any greater pleasure than this little gift of Mercy, such as my friend, Francis Cox, proposes to the sweet singers of our lanes and fields. To worry about caged skylarks while a hundred miles from our coast is being waged the fiercest war of history may seem to lack proportion. For our fighting men to worry themselves about sad little dogs while the wings of Death are beating the air above them, and each moment may be their last, is hardly logical. But that is human nature; a thing our denouncers of sentiment know very little about. To even think about birds' lives when men's lives every day are being crushed out of them by the thousand may not appear fit and proper to those who have never felt the mysterious current of brotherhood that runs through all things living.

I want to see Prussian militarism crushed and democracy triumphant; and at the same time the thought of brave little thrushes condemned to beat out their gallant hearts, to pour forth their great song of courage for the pleasure and profit of a pack of ruffians maddens me. The two things, to me, are part of the same whole. If, as Mr. Cox suggests, this act of mercy could be done by an order from the Home Secretary, he would be heartening the cause of freedom and humanity throughout Europe by issuing it without a moment's delay.

We hear of how this war is to lift up and purify the nations. How we are to emerge from it braver, truer, kinder. God grant it may be so. Meanwhile, might we not begin with this little thing that to many of us would mean so much? We are fighting for liberty, for justice. Cannot our hearts be big enough that even our little fellow-artists, the birds, shall have their share in our triumph?

Henry James a British Citizen

By Professor J. William White, of the University of Pennsylvania

To the Editor of The London Spectator:

I HAVE been asked so frequently during the last fortnight as to the real meaning of Henry James's recent renunciation of American citizenship that I feel inclined to make public my own interpretation of that act. I have no authority to speak for him, but I have ample reason to believe that, in addition to the very genuine feelings and motives he has already made public, there was another and probably a controlling factor that made him reach his decision at this juncture. This was intense dislike for and disapprobation of the official attitude of America since the beginning of the war.

He has watched with increasing disapproval the loss of opportunity after opportunity to assert and defend, not only the rights of all neutral nations, but the principles of civilization and of humanity.

He has watched our Government—with such extraordinary politeness that it involved the entire disregard of truth—notify Germany that her war zone decree, issued early in February, involved "an indefensible violation of neutral rights," and that the United States would hold her to "a strict accountability for such acts" as those indicated by the decree.

He observed the answer to be the murder of an American citizen on the Falaba; then attacks upon two American vessels; and then the killing and drowning of more than one hundred Americans on the Lusitania, many of them women and little children.

He has then watched our Government again notify Germany—and again with great politeness—that the attacks upon Americans are "absolutely contrary to the rules, the practices, and the spirit of modern warfare"; that no plea of "military necessity" or of having given "warnings" could palliate "an unlawful and inhumane act"; that the attacks upon Americans must cease, and that America expected the Imperial German Government (1) to disavow the acts; (2) to take immediate steps to prevent their recurrence; and (3) to make such reparation as might be possible.

He saw that in answer Germany did not do one single one of the three things demanded. She did not disavow the acts; on the contrary, she defended them. She did not take steps to prevent their recurrence; instead, she savagely and without warning attacked another merchant ship, the Orduna, carrying American passengers, and torpedoed an American ship, the Nebraskan. As to reparation, she did not even allude to it, but made lying statements about the Lusitania and her cargo and her murdered passengers, statements which were in themselves an insult to America because, if they had been true, they would have convicted our own Government of gross negligence or incapacity in the discharge of its duty as a neutral.

He has then watched the American Government once more politely reiterate "very earnestly and very solemnly" its former demands, and with equal earnestness and solemnity lay down the fundamental principles governing the issue, principles which involve "nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity" itself. And he has waited again for a reply from Germany, which, when it came, contained no disavowal, no offer of reparation, no pledge for the future, but instead a flat denial of Germany's willingness to conform to either the customs of civilized warfare or the regulations of international law, coupled with an impudent proposal to let Americans use the high seas in safety, provided they should use certain ships and obey certain rules laid down by Germany; the reply actually, with unprecedented insolence, naming to a great power the number of ships it would graciously be permitted to have its people sail upon—and live.

And then after another delay he has

seen still another note—almost as polite as the first one—sent by his country to Germany, the gist of which was that if she murdered any more Americans it would be regarded as an "unfriendly act." Ascribing the weightiest possible significance to that term as used in the devious and obscure language of diplomacy, it seemed to him so far from meeting the requirements of the situation, so far from upholding the honor and dignity of an outraged and insulted nation, that he did not desire any longer to bear even the one-hundred millionth part of either the responsibility or the shame. Who can blame him? As one of our papers has said:

> Between the German and the American Governments there lie not only arrogant provocation and dishonored laws and contemptuously disregarded "scraps of paper," but the bodies of more than one hundred American citizens treacherously and foully slain. When wholesale murder becomes a fit subject for arbitration, and when admitted, defended, and boasted acts of official assassination can be put aside in favor of diplomatic discussion of irrelevancies, a reply in kind may be sent to Berlin. Until then the indictment for causeless murder stands, and all the sophistry, evasions, and impertinent "justifications" of a desperate Government cannot erase one red word of it.

I wonder how many Americans, abroad and at home, who have thought over this record of the last six months have felt ashamed for their country. Not many, of course, have the collateral reasons, the long residence in England, the daily association and intimate friendship with its people, the acquirement of property, the formation of cherished social ties that underlie Mr. James's action. But it is safe to say that unless acts, not words, are soon to characterize America's policy toward Germany there will be millions of Americans who, though they would not follow his example, would understand and sympathize with his desire to throw in his lot with a country that is at least fighting, not talking.

I hope and believe, however, that the Americans who are "too proud to fight" mostly wear petticoats, and that there are very few, even of them. I believe that "neutrality" is rapidly becoming a term of reproach. I believe that Mr. Wilson's admonition to be "neutral even in thought," which was at first merely inane and ludicrous, now seems hateful. I believe, in other words, that the great mass of our people—say, 80 to 90 per cent.—agree, with Life, that "A neutral is the ignoblest work of God," and that their feelings are well expressed by the lines in the same American periodical:

> When murder, arson, and rapine
> Are worthy of the laurel green—
> Then I'll be Neutral.
> When drowning children in the sea
> Is charter to nobility—
> Then I'll be Neutral.
> When killing mothers with their young
> Becomes a deed by poets sung—
> Then I'll be Neutral.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> When my own sense of wrong and right
> Has faded into hopeless night—
> Then I'll be Neutral.
> Or—blank of mind—I do not know
> The good and true from sin and woe—
> Then I'll be Neutral.

That voices, I think, the sentiment of the American people. They lined up solidly behind the President when he issued his first "strict accountability" message to Germany. They have supported him since in each successive manifesto because, taking his words at their face value, they seemed to promise results for the good not only of America but of all civilization. But Americans at home and abroad have noted with apprehension the continued disposition to narrow the scope of his efforts, to substitute only "American citizens" for all noncombatants in his insistence upon safety at sea; to magnify the warning of two ships and the setting of their crews and passengers adrift in open boats into a disposition on the part of Germany to comply with our "earnest and solemn" demands; to submit still longer to the insolent behavior of the "Imperial German Government," the impudence and mendacity of its official representatives in Washington, and the treasonable propaganda of its German, pro-German, and German-American advocates in the United States.

Some of us have lost all faith in any spontaneous action on the part of our Administration which shall properly represent and transform into deeds the

best and highest impulses of our people. Others are more hopeful. But when an American, hitherto as loyal and as representative as Henry James, feels impelled to renounce his citizenship, and when hundreds of others abroad—and millions at home—cannot avoid a sense of shame at the position of their country in this greatest of all crises in the history of the world, it is time for thinking and earnest Americans to bestir themselves and to try to find some way of transmuting their profound beliefs into honorable and worthy performance.

I do not for a moment want to imply that the action of Mr. James is of itself of great national or international importance. He would himself be horrified at such a suggestion. I do think, however, that as an index to the feelings of myraids of his former fellow-countrymen it is of high significance, and that by reason of his very modesty and shyness and dislike of notoriety there is a possibility that it may not convey to Americans the message and the portent which are implicit in it and which constitute its claim to be properly interpreted to them.

I hope I have not misrepresented him. This has been written without a word of consultation with him, although I have seen him frequently. If I am wrong he may set me right if he cares to do so. I am, Sir, &c.,

J. WILLIAM WHITE.

The Heavenly Twins

[From The London Daily Chronicle.]

("All is done by dream and daring."—
The Rev. W. Major Scott, M. A.)

These twin angels, Dream and Daring,
  Standing by the Great White Throne,
Vowed their vow, and hither faring,
  Heard Creation's travail groan.

Dream flies over wold and city,
  Strewing stars about the night,
Waking Chivalry and Pity,
  Dressing Duty in Delight.

Daring looks from maiden lashes
  In the eyes of common youth;
Haunted by her glance, he dashes
  Foremost up the steeps of truth.

Sojourn with us, Dream and Daring,
  Light and lead us, Heavenly Twins;
Never halting, never sparing,
  Heaven's reward your lover wins.

Where your royal Order wanders
  Knightly deeds like flowers spring,
Darkest thunder-clouds of Flanders
  Cloak a guardian angel's wing.

A. W.

The Mobilization of Hope

By Sir James Yoxall

Sir James Yoxall is a member of the British Parliament and a well-known author and contributor to magazines. This article appeared originally in The London Daily News.

THE old clock yawns, then strikes; I look out into the dark garden and think of the men in the trenches. The wind is changing, and a frightened poplar gives the alarm.

I feel the weakening which night brings in her shadows. Are we winning yonder? Or are we losing? They fought in a labyrinth yonder; are we all wandering in a labyrinth, having lost the clue?

We are winning so slowly, people say. Yet we may take courage even from that. For quick success is usually deceptive; the Germans had quick success as far as the Marne; poor Warneford had quick success. The tragic part is not that our cause should have failed awhile; every great cause fails at first. What seems to be the tragic part is when the fighters for a cause do not live to see it triumph. But I think they foresee.

We can mobilize hope. Earnest hoping is a powerful way of asking, and a part of the faith that foresees. Arthur Hugh Clough foresaw, for Italy, though in 1848 he witnessed her failure against Austria, and in 1861 at Florence he "died without the sight." He recognized facts meantime, as by Bishops, Deans, dons, scientific professors, and scare-leader writers we are daily dunned to do; at Peschiera he saw "the tricolor, a trampled rag, lie dust and dirt"; in the moldering cities of the Quadrilateral he saw the ruin left by Austria linger on, as you may see it linger there still, as it will linger on in Trieste. But he was not disheartened; he sang his "Say not the struggle naught availeth," all the same.

How the Brownings and he, how Meredith and the other English mobilizers of hope for Italia liberata, would rejoice today! What songs they would sing for the red, white, and green flag that presses onward into Italia irredenta and into the pleats of the Alps! But there is Belgica irredenta, too, today, to sing for and to mobilize hope for. Our soldiers who have died in Flanders felt the tragic part of that, the ruin and the temporary ignominy for Belgica irredenta, and more keenly than we do; but, depend upon it, in the prophetic hour of battle they foresaw the vindication that is coming, and for Belgica liberata their hearts sang.

Clough, in his singing robes of vision, gave us a hymn of hoping, four verses which offer the refreshment sinking spirits need today. "Stand fast, don't be depressed, don't say it is all no use," he began.

> Say not the strugle naught availeth,
> The labor and the wounds are vain,
> The enemy faints not, nor faileth,
> And as things have been they remain!

Yet that is what the impatient and short-sighted among us—the impervious, the nickeled, with no pores to their minds—are saying today. I look at the vane above my neighbor's garage; it points steadily to the true wind. All other weathercocks than men point the same way in the same wind; why cannot we? O ye of little faith, it is the scares you read and the prophets you heed who depress you—but why do you so read and heed? What the Right Rev. Dr. Feeble-Faith, Principal Pangloss, half-pay Major Fetter-People, and Mr. Pick-Fault, M. P., are doing is to organize and mobilize despair.

But who are these false prophets for a people? What virtue have they in a crisis, who could not be wise even when life was calm? The sin of these panic patriots is mental treason; they are the true pro-Germans, they ought to be interned. For they delay our victory. "In

war all is mental," Napoleon said. He defined the virtues of a leader as not to worry, to keep a clear mind always, to show no change of countenance, to exhort the timid, to augment the brave, to rally the wavering; none of these things do our panic patriots achieve. But the poets foresee; listen, else, to Clough's second verse:

> If hopes were dupes, fears may be liars;
> It may be, in yon smoke concealed,
> Your comrades chase e'en now the fliers,
> And, but for you, possess the field!

Yes, but for us, if we herd with the baaing flock of the tremulous, if we follow scared bellwethers in the wild leaps they try to take; yes, but for us, if we join in bleating out great breaths of despondency toward officers and men at the front. There is, there cannot but be, a telling influence in a big, simultaneous, psychical movement; big psychical movements are the long-range ordnance of the mind and spirit; that was why the Germans organized against us an orgy of national hate. Against them in arms let us organize faith and mobilize hope. The longer one lives the more one perceives that true power is not mechanical, that the abiding forces are not logical, but instinctive, that the springs and appeals of them do not lie within the region of argument and proof. So that even if half the statements made by the pessimists were rational they might all be wrong.

But they cannot half be true, for they arise out of vitiating prejudices and mental faults; anybody could trace the diagram of the dicta to be expected of the men from whom they come. They come from indurated cynics, from disappointed ambition, from vehement crudity, from effervescent nullities, ardent jealousies, and—to use Milton's phrase for inappropriate Bishops—from "blind mouths"; from no judges, from oracles that ought to be dumb. Like most of us, they have only mind and soul enough for themselves; it is the poets who can feel and know for others. These praters cannot keep silence, however; though silence is, as Quakers know, though some Bishops do not, the most eloquent way of praying. They prate of what they call facts, but facts, brief facts, are something superimposed, a fleeting photograph, a changing picture upon a camera-obscura screen. They shout the apparently obvious, too; though only the reticences are worth listening for. Silently the Quakers wait for the reticences, and we may wait as calmly for manifestations of great, slow laws and immanent forces of nature at work; doing meantime the best we may to keep our cause in tune with those calm powers.

"God's in His heaven," sang Browning; "Germany's force is material, not moral," says Bergson; "which means that she is living upon material reserves alone." Poetry, theology, and philosophy concur, you see. "On the German side there is force spread out upon the surface; but on our side there is also deep force, resident in the depths."

Deep answers unto deep; but the enemy can only expect superficial aid. They are strong, but their strength is limited to itself, because they have put themselves out of tune with the great, slow forces, and into antagonism with the eternal laws; that is why they were in such a hurry, knowing the great slow force of time to be against them. Therefore in the end they must fail and fall, as a dozen tyrant empires have done.

As an English Mystic Sees the War

By W. S. Thayer

Hotel Champlain, Aug. 10, 1915.

To the Editor of The New York Times:

SOME months ago the writer sent to a distinguished member of the British expeditionary force in France a copy of President Eliot's essays upon the war. The answer, which sets forth with such force the true essence of the cause for which France and England and Russia and their allies are fighting today, seems to him so fine that it deserves to be given to a larger public. It expresses in language of rare beauty the thoughts of many who appreciate the real significance of that for which this country has stood from the day of its birth; who know too well how utterly foreign, how fundamentally opposed are the prniciples for which Prussia is contending today to those ideals and aspirations which are dearer to us than life itself.

W. S. THAYER.

THE LETTER.

——, May 9, 1915.

My Dear Thayer: Thank you very much for sending me Eliot's book. It breathes a fine spirit, and takes the right view ("orthodoxy is my doxy, heterodoxy is the other man's doxy") of the course to be pursued. I think him hopelessly unworldly in projecting an international control under any conditions that we can yet foresee. Indeed, the present war is in a sense an attempt at it. Our side is fighting that treaties may be kept, and arbitration (Serbia) substituted for force. We are trying, like the police, to keep the peace. The only possible chance is that other nations, more than at present, should join in doing so.

You cannot prevent a nation becoming strong, nor will you ever get other nations to make war upon it for building too many dreadnoughts or enlisting too many battalions. Yet war is the only "sanction." You can only stop breaches of agreement by punishing them. You cannot then have any other police than the battalions and ships of other nations. At the same time, war being what it is, it is hopeless to expect that any nation will engage in it who does not fear great loss or hope great gain. They will always be swayed by the influences which are now swaying Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania. No desire of justice would lead those countries to join us. I doubt if it would justify their rulers in declaring war.

An international police, therefore, will not in any measurable distance of time be anything else than it now is, the nations in arms; and the cry is that of an unworldly man who thinks that the world can save itself trouble by an agreement. The world could save itself trouble, but it is obvious that not much help can be obtained from agreements.

I am, however, surprised to find a very charming compatriot of yours speak hopefully of Eliot's idea. He dined with me two nights ago, and we discussed it.

I will tell you another way in which Eliot does not satisfy me. I, skeptic though I am, am, like every Englishman, a mystic. I see in this war almost literally a fight between God and the devil. All is at stake that we think highest and noblest. If you ask yourself what is highest and noblest, what is the real meaning of progress and civilization, you will give up all material things as unimportant. You will find that what we call intellectual growth is only a summation of items, not a real advance of the individual intelligence, and that the things that matter are moral. I think they are the ideals of justice, freedom, and pity, and I am not sure that they cannot all be resolved into the latter. Christ taught it, but it was not new even then. I think it has been taught more forcibly by the masses of the poor and oppressed, who have taught it by deed rather than by word, and have compelled respect by hard fighting. But

without religion I am certain it would not have had the vogue it has.

It is easy to see its weakness. We English are a set of sentimentalists, and have lost in our worship of pity much of the sternness that leads to health. The sense of this extravagance has led short-sighted Germans, like young men in revolt against the ideals of their elders, to declare all pity mere idleness. Pity, they say, is a decadent nation's excuse for not polishing its sword.

By our unwillingness to compel we have fostered selfishness. We have said the man is the greatest. Do you remember your Aristotle? He must have free play. He must grow as he pleases. The State will grow with him, and since we know less about the State than about the man, we must legislate for the man, and so the State will come by its gain.

The German does the opposite, and has a noble ideal of his own, but a narrow mind to worship with.

Now, with all my soul I believe that the ideal of pity is the noblest thing we have, and that its denial which waves on every German flag is the denial of all that the greatest men have striven for for centuries. I see in this war the colossal strife between the doctrine which I call good and der Geist der stets verneint. You see, I am almost borrowing the language of the Kaiser. I feel that the two enormous spirits that move this world are showing their weapons almost visibly, and that never was the garment of the living world so thin over the gods that it conceals.

I am not much elated by the thought. I have little opinion of Providence as an ally, and I am surprised at the weakness that the Kaiser shows for his pocket deity. What we have to do, in my opinion, we do ourselves, and our task is none the lighter that we defend the right. But I am hardened and set by the thing I believe. We feel that we are fighting for the life of England—yes, for the safety of France—yes, for the sanctity of treaties—yes, but behind these secondary and comparatively material issues, for something far deeper, far greater, for something so great and deep that if our efforts fail I pray God I may die before I see it.

The words of Eliot, interesting, true, and graceful as they are, sound not in me with the terrific ring that this war merits. I see in every skirmish the fight between heaven and hell, between the thing that I blindly worship and the thing that it despises and abhors. *A toi.*

X.

Vale

By GEOFFREY DEARMER.

[From The Westminster Gazette.]

Not the slow mourners nor the measured tread
Shall blind our passion, silent, still, and free,
Vast as the winds that stir the vagrant sea,
Strong as the bonds of Love. No mortal dread
Bedims our vision. Yet, thou drooping head,
Where lies the splendor of our victory,
When all the beauty which encompassed thee
Lies buried with the great impassioned dead?
Oh, idle thought, for man's triumphant will,
Unmoved by Greed, unfettered by Desire,
Beats stronger than the body sacrificed.
Mother, behold thy son—Death cannot kill
One who passed scathless through embittered fire
To prove the eternal certainty of Christ.

Venice in War Time

By Ernest W. Smith

This article appeared originally in The London Daily News.

IF it had not been what it was, a bright moonlit night, I don't think I should have recognized Venice in war time. The train, with its carriage windows closely curtained, (for you must not look out on the country when you are passing through the war zone,) crept like a spectre over the bridge spanning the lagoon into Venice. Soldiers were sleeping in the darkened station awaiting their trains to the front. The two or three passengers who looked like tourists had to run the gauntlet at the barrier of a dozen gilt-braided porters, each anxious to impress upon you that his hotel was still open.

If it were not that they followed you clamoring outside the station you might think you had stepped out into a city of the dead. There was not a gondola in sight in the first bend of the Grand Canal—indeed, I found out afterward that no gondolas are allowed to be on the canals after 8 o'clock, except the privileged hotel omnibus gondolas, which meet the night train for the convenience of passengers. As you were paddled silently over the water until you came in sight of the Rialto Bridge, where the gondolier who knows his Venice will take you a short cut through narrow canals to the landing near the Place St. Mark, you were conscious of passing through a curious Venice, which, if it had not been that the moon lighted it up as bright as day, would have been a weird Venice. As it was, it was more natural to take an interest in what you missed than in what you saw.

The banished gondola! The old-time conveyance of conspirators against the republic, painted black so that it should be able to creep unseen through darkened waterways—just as tonight you could have imagined Venice three or four centuries ago if it were not for that spoil-sport moon. The gondola was the black steed of revolutionaries; it is retained as the black steed of Venetians up to the present time as a reminder of the intrigues its invisibility favored in the Middle Ages. Hotel keepers have put a few gaudily painted ones on the canals as advertisements, and my old friend Don Carlos used to send a bright yellow gondola to the station to take me to the Loredan Palace when I occasionally visited him in exile at Venice.

All light and electric power is cut off from 8 o'clock at night until 4 o'clock the next morning. Where a gleam of light did peep through the shuttered windows overlocking the canal it was the dim ray of a candle or an oil lamp. If you don't dine before 8 you cannot have the benefit of the electric fan to keep you cool and blow mosquitos down into your soup.

When you set foot on the Piazzetta and pass behind the two columns with St. Theodore still standing on the crocodile and the Winged Lion of St. Mark still engrossed in the Book, you see in the corner just where St. Mark's forms an angle with the Doge's palace two tiny dim lights. They are in a pillared exterior gallery of the cathedral, and even if they were not such feeble glimmers being hidden away at the back of the gallery they would never attract the attention of an areoplanist. These two lights have burned nightly in Venice for centuries.

The legend is that in the time of the republic a murder was committed in Venice for which a little baker boy was convicted and executed. Afterward it was proved that he was innocent, and as it was a crime which had impressed the Venetians of the period, the citizens were horrified at the terrible blunder, and to warn juries to be more careful in the future they furnished the money to provide heralds to enter the Venetian Assize Courts whose duty it was to ring out a trumpet call before the jury retired to consider a capital crime, and proclaim the

words, " Remember the little baker boy! " That Venetians should be reminded for ever of this miscarriage of justice it was ordained that these two lamps should be lighted every night over the Piazzetta. The death penalty, except for military offenses, has long been abolished in Italy, so the heralds' task has fallen into abeyance; but the twin lamps are always there, though it is doubtful if one Venetian in a thousand knows why their dim glimmer relieves the darkness of this untenanted gallery.

Daylight reveals a quite unfamiliar façade of St. Mark's. The four famous bronze horses, brought to Venice by Doge Dandolo in 1204, have been removed from above the portals, where they have stood for nearly a century—since Dec. 13, 1815, to be exact. This time they are simply hidden away and not taken into captivity, as when Napoleon carried them off to Paris to decorate the arch in the Place du Carrousal. They came back to Venice then, thanks to that conqueror's good-will, and they will come back again this time. A Venetian managed to snapshot one of them as it was being swung down by a derrick, and some of his fellow-citizens are the proud possessors of a picture post card of the scene inscribed " Off to the front."

The left doorway as you enter the cathedral is blocked right up to the top with sandbags to protect mosaics which, even if they were only peppered by the bullets of a bomb exploding in the Place St. Mark, would be ruined forever. From this it is apparent that the mosaics over the centre and right portals are not so precious. Inside the scene is strange. All the statues are padded and shrouded in canvas. The votary chapels are hidden behind sandbags, which protect their ornate altars. One solitary figure of Christ is raised in the centre of the church, around which worshippers kneel. There are heaps of sand piled around the pillars—whether to protect their bases or for use in case an incendiary bomb sets fire to the cathedral I did not ascertain.

The Doge's palace is safeguarded in a different way. The destruction of one of the pillars supporting the arches around it might bring about the collapse of those world-famed walls above the Piazzetta. So engineers have bricked in all the archways in order that, if an accident happens and a column is blown away, the weight of the walls will rest on the brick buttresses. In other ways the outward aspect of Venice has been changed. The mention of these will reassure lovers of art and antiquity that the Italians are not blind to air risks.

The people have taken the aeroplane raids very calmly. Very few personal injuries have been caused, and some Venetians will tell you that they were inconvenienced more by the loss of their breakfast milk on the occasion of the last visitation than by anything else. Venice receives its meat, vegetables, and milk in barges from the mainland. An enterprising aviator who dropped darts on the city instead of bombs made a dead set on the milk barge with such success that he punctured enough large milk cans to cause the supply to run short that morning.

The Pope to East Prussia

What purports to be a letter of sympathy sent to the people of East Prussia by Pope Benedict, through the Bishop of Frauenburg, is printed by the Bayerische Kurier, says a telegram from Munich of Aug. 14, 1915, *to The Associated Press in Amsterdam. The letter, which was sent through the Papal Nuncio at Munich, is given as follows:*

The Holy Father deplores with sincerest sympathy the sad position of the population of the Baltic provinces, who, in fact, for their loyal Christian views deserved a better fate.

At the same time the Holy Father welcomes most heartily the wonderful readiness of all Germany to make sacrifices in order to assist the stricken provinces. As a sign of his fatherly and loving care, he sends this gift of 10,000 marks ($2,500) for the relief of sufferers.

Modern Troops in Armor

By Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

Writing recently to The London Times on the proposal that the British troops be equipped with armor, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle said:

SUCH actions as that of May 9, where several brigades lost nearly half their numbers in endeavoring to rush over the 300 yards which separated us from the German trenches, must make it clear that it is absolutely impossible for unprotected troops to pass over a zone which is swept by machine guns. Therefore you must either forever abandon such attacks or you must find artificial protection for the men.

It has always seemed to me extraordinary that the innumerable cases where Bible, cigarette case, watch, or some other chance article has saved a man's life have not set us scheming so as to do systematically what has so often been the result of a happy chance.

Your correspondents have mentioned the objection that any protection may itself be broken and that splinters of it may aggravate the wound. One answer to that would be to arm only those points where a wound would in any case be mortal. These points are really very few, and no great weight of metal would be needed to protect them.

Sir Arthur suggests that each man should wear, first, a helmet; secondly, a curved plate of highly tempered steel not more than a foot in diameter over the heart, and, thirdly, a similar plate coving the abdomen. He adds:

With these three precautions the death rate should be greatly reduced from rifle and machine gun fire, as also from shrapnel. Nothing, of course, will avail against a direct shell burst, but, granting that, individual life would be saved.

This does not bear upon the capture of a position, since so many would fall wounded that the weight of attack would be spent before the stormers reached the trenches. For this armor which will give complete protection is needed, and, since the weight of this is more than a man can readily carry, it must be pushed in front upon wheels.

I picture a great number of plates held together like the shields of a Roman tortoise, and pushed by men who crouch behind them. Others are fixed sideways upon their wheels, and are used upon the flank of the advance to prevent an enfilading fire. There is not one tortoise which would attract the concentrated fire of artillery, but each company or platoon forms its own. These numerous armor-plated bodies rush with small loss over the space which has already been cleared as far as possible of obstacles, and so have some chance of reaching the enemy's line, not as an exhausted fragment, but as a vigorous storming party, with numbers intact.

ARMOR IN THE TRENCHES.

Sir Arthur's suggestion was preceded by the following article printed in The London Times:

One of the most remarkable features of this war has been the return which has been made in various directions to older, if not to ancient, methods. The steel fort has been discredited and the earthwork justified; the strength and direction of the wind has become a leading factor once again, as it was in the days of bows and arrows, since aeroplanes are affected by the wind and gas attacks determined by it; hand grenades and bombs have assumed real importance. Finally, the question of armor for the fighting man himself has come up for consideration.

It was inevitable that this question should arise, and the astonishing thing is that discussion of it in this country has been so long postponed. Early in the war visitors to the Belgian front saw a form of shield which was used

by the soldiers. This shield was fixed in the ground when in use and the man lay behind it and was protected by it. It was employed by cavalry and, it is understood, answered the purpose for which it was intended.

The idea grew in popularity on the Continent; in a shop window in Calais a breastplate was exposed for sale many months ago for which it was claimed that it would turn aside bullets and pieces of shrapnel. A shield of this kind was tested very carefully by a group of private inventors and was finally submitted to the authorities of several of the nations at war. During the private tests a revolver was emptied at the shield while it was being worn. The shield was also subjected to rifle fire with, on the whole, good results. The results were certainly so good as to merit more extended trial.

In The Times of Oct. 28, 1914, there appeared a message from Reuter's correspondent in Paris to the following effect:

> A Rennes newspaper says that the shield which has been placed at the disposal of the French infantry in Argonne is a protection against bullets which has already been adopted by the Russian Government, and of which the French Government is at present having a large number made by the works at St. Hilaire-du-Harcourt, which have the monopoly of the shield. Work is proceeding actively at the factory.

Since that date references to the use of armor have appeared from time to time in medical communications from the front, and almost invariably these references have been of a favorable character. The high velocity of modern bullets causes them to ricochet from the shells, while pieces of shrapnel, which often inflict large surface wounds, are turned away, or at any rate have the force of the impact broken. Metal shields for the back and legs have from time to time been mentioned in connection with trench warfare, it being in these regions that soldiers are frequently hit by exploding shrapnel shells.

The latest contribution to the armor question is of an exceedingly interesting character, because it deals with the results secured by the use of this protection. Dr. Devraigne, says The Lancet, has now systematically studied the value of headpieces of metal issued some time ago to the French troops in the trenches. He has found the value of these *calottes métalliques* to be considerable. He examined 55 cases of head injury, in which 42 of the wounded men had no headpiece and 13 wore helmets.

Of the 42, 23 suffered fracture of the skull, and most of these died. The remaining 19 had scalp wounds only. In the case of the 13 armored men, eight were suffering from "cerebral shock" of a more or less severe character, but none of them died, while the remaining five had merely slight superficial wounds or scratches.

Other soldiers who wore helmets had received no visible head wounds at all. The Lancet comments:

> These figures do not, of course, prove that the *calotte* is an absolute safeguard against fractures of the skull by bullet wound or shell wound in the trenches, but, as a matter of fact, in the series of cases studied there was not a single fracture of the skull among the protected men, and Dr. Devraigne concludes that the value of the metallic headpiece has been absolutely demonstrated and that it should be much more generally employed.

That this conclusion is a sound one seems to be fairly obvous. The objection to the use of armor has been to a large extent founded upon the fact that it was heavy and difficult to make; but modern conditions of warfare have discounted the question of weight to a great extent. Any one who has visited our British hospitals knows that head wounds are very frequent indeed. We should certainly reduce the incidence of these wounds if we followed the example of our allies and gave our men helmets similar to those served out to the French soldiers. We have already had eight months in which to consider the question.

Volunteering or Conscription in Britain?

By Edward Carpenter

This article by Edward Carpenter, the democratic author and poet, appeared originally in The London Daily Chronicle. It opposes the propaganda now carried on in Great Britain in favor of a conscript army.

THE present hour, when the above subjects are being discussed on all hands, is peculiarly a time when the people of Britain should make up their minds on the great question of voluntaryism and compulsion.

The magnificent response to the call for defense of the motherland—response not only of our home peoples, but of our colonies and dependencies all over the world—has surprised ourselves. It has astonished Germany, and brought to our allies an unexpected satisfaction—since they, indeed, looked to our navy for help, but never supposed a Continental army of any magnitude would be forthcoming. I say "defense of the motherland," for it is clear, I think—whatever various theories may be held about the origins of the war—that the idea of defense, not of offense, has been the great deciding urge and inspiration of the enthusiasm.

France, curiously, seems to be not quite satisfied, and to be of opinion that Britain is not bearing her full share of the brunt of this contest; and even M. Romain Rolland, in a late letter to me, while protesting against the war, takes the view that if the other allied nations have conscription it is not quite fair of us not to adopt it also. But this opinion, I think, we can trace to the sinister influence of the Northcliffe paper in Paris. We cannot regard it as justified. Britain may, as usual, have been rather slow in making up her mind, but that she is putting all her forces and all her resolution into the work now cannot be doubted.

In the face of this great object lesson in the value and power of the voluntary principle when the heart of a nation is once roused, it is more than probable that the outcry in favor of conscription which we are hearing in some quarters is really an anti-democratic political move, having in view the scotching of the rising power of the masses.

For the arguments against conscription (as regards our country, at any rate) are really so strong that for every sincere person they must, one would think, be convincing.

In the first place, it is contrary to the genius of our people, who, though slow and deficient in capacity of rapid organization, are very persistent in the determination to grow, as it were, out of their own roots, and in the dislike of being pushed into things against their will.

In the second place, it is intolerable to our sense of freedom, and it ought to be intolerable to our Christian sentiment, to be compelled to fight. For while service of some kind to the State might reasonably be regarded as compulsory, organized and professional murder is so revolting to the feelings, the consciences, and the temperaments of some people that to force them into it would seem the height of wickedness. It would also be the height of folly, for nothing is more certain than that a number of such people compulsorily enrolled in a force do seriously lower the general standard of courage, efficiency, and determination in that force.

Thirdly, at the present juncture, when the voluntary response has had such great material result, and exercised so fine a moral influence, by showing forth the heart of the nation, and what can be done by the principle of freedom—to

cloud and ruin all this result and influence by compulsion would be foolish indeed; and all the best that England stands for in the eyes of the world—and has stood for so long—would be negatived and made of no avail.

In the fourth place, it is hardly possible to exaggerate the danger which conscription brings with it—the danger of putting into Governmental hands a weapon which at any future time may be easily used not only for carrying on an iniquitous war abroad, but for repressing the democracy at home. In view of the notorious way in which private cliques in the modern nations are able to "collar" Governments, and run them for their own ends, this danger is of the most serious order; and no institution which would tend to increase it should be allowed.

This fourth argument seems to me final. Whatever may be said for conscription in France or Germany, or elsewhere, or might be said in the case of our having a true citizen army under a thoroughly democratic régime, cannot well be held to be applicable here and now in this country, where government is still so much a matter of class, and the democratic principle—especially in our foreign policy—is still so little assured.

Let us, then, resist the conscription idea to the last, and hope, indeed, by standing out to dissuade the other nations of the world from it—a conclusion which would immensely assist the general cause of peace.

But it will be said, and is said, "Surely every man is morally bound to help his country in the hour of need—his country to which, consciously or unconsciously, he owes an incalculable debt." And here is an argument to which we must certainly attend.

We do not want to be hounded or compelled into anything if we can help it; but we certainly must all acknowledge that we owe a duty to our country—a duty all the more stringent in a time of crisis or distress. And not only every man, but every woman also. Let us then acknowledge this duty, openly and heartily, but at the same time insist, each of us, on our right of choice as to what our active contribution shall be.

Here is a great free principle which may be applied all around, whether to militarism or industrialism, whether to man or woman, whether in a time of crisis like the present, or whether under normal and permanent conditions of peace. It is manifestly absurd, if you adopt a military conscription and force people to fight in the supposed interest of their country, not to force them also to grow food for it, and to engage in other things at least as important as fighting. If you have military conscription the logical conclusion is industrial conscription, and Prussianizing all around. And the only way out of this conclusion is the acceptance by everybody of the duty to qualify himself or herself for useful work of some kind, and the actual performance of such work when needed—on the condition of each person retaining a free choice as to what his particular activity should be.

This may sound a little vague and general in statement, but perhaps it is best to keep it so for the present. What we want is the general acknowledgment of duty and the general insistence on free choice.

So far the acknowledgment of duty of this kind has been a thing utterly neglected in our social life. Indeed, one may almost say that the evasion of such duty has been one of the chief objects of life. However, it may have been in the old feudal organization of society, in the modern commercial order the sense of solidarity and communal duty has been broken up, and nations have resolved themselves into whirlpools of individuals, each seeking to "get on" and succeed at the expense of the other individuals. The whole system of the employment of labor, the payment of dividends, the production of "goods," and the current ideals of "respectability" and "success," have been founded on the principle of evasion, and have gone to create a society of parasites, in which each member, instead of actively contributing to the welfare of the others, makes it his chief business and object to live by preying upon the others. It is obvious that such a "society" cannot possibly hold together very long.

It is like a swarm of bees when the queen has departed from among them.

It would seem that now, even possibly in the present crisis, there must come a complete volte-face and reversal of our current ideals; and the call for national service, if rightly understood, may lead to this, and to the regeneration of our social life.

Yet even here—even while urging that every boy and girl in the future should be taught some downright manual trade, and so be ready at some later time, and qualified, to help in the national life—I would avoid direct compulsion. Education, public opinion, collateral pressure of various kinds, may bring about an equivalent result, without the damage to the national sense of honor which compulsion implies. In Germany, on various sacred lawns and stretches of grass, one sees the threat "Das Betreten ist streng verboten." "To trespass is to be arrested and severely fined." In Hyde Park and Kensington Gardens, well kept and orderly as they are, one is charmed to see no trespass boards at all. With extraordinary good sense the same result of protecting the grass is arrived at without legal threats and insults, but by the simple device of placing obstacles here and there to free passage—an iron hurdle at one point, a low railing at another. The public can surmount these obstacles if it likes, but it is clear that only a small fraction will care to do so. The public appreciates the object aimed at, and is all the more ready to co-operate in sparing the grass because it is not "ordered" to do so. The moral is plain. Happy would it be if we could get a similar general principle established in this and many other matters connected with our national life, and if, instead of hard and fast laws and learned wranglings over them, and set punishments for their infraction, we had a simple system of obstacles and inducements by which the path of wrongdoing in a perfectly natural way was made difficult, (though not, of course, impossible,) and the path of the public welfare and advantage easy and attractive. In that way much could be done, and without the irritation and resistance which law and compulsion in general excite.

Zeppelin Insurance

[From The London Daily News.]

We have received a claim, under The Daily News Zeppelin scheme of free insurance, for damage done to a house at Romford, Essex, by a British naval balloon in its accidental descent during a thunderstorm last Saturday. The house is 14 King Edward Road, and is the property of the claimant, Mrs. Mary Gilbert, who lives at 22.

Under the scheme of The Daily News, which was the first daily paper to give free insurance against aircraft attacks, and is now the only one continuing these benefits, an insured reader is compensated in the event of his or her residence being damaged by a shot or shell fired by an enemy warship or by a British anti-aircraft gun, or by an enemy bomb. Hitherto no compensation has been granted for accidental damage done by British naval or military balloons.

But in the case of Mrs. Gilbert, who is a widow, and whose property has been damaged considerably through a mishap due almost entirely to a thunderstorm, we have decided to make a substantial grant, although her case does not come within the actual scope of our scheme.

Mrs. Gilbert viewed the broken chimney pots, dislodged tiles, and smashed windows of her house with philosophic complacency. "That balloon was on my roof for six hours before they dragged it off," she told a Daily News representative yesterday morning. "I happened to be in the garden wondering where the balloon was going to drop, never dreaming that in a few minutes I should see a lot of naval men clambering on my roof and cracking the slates. The people came rushing in hundreds to see the aerial visitor, which I am told weighed 1 ton 11 cwts. One of the officers was hurt in the scramble to get a hold, and a man on the roof was partially gassed. In its descent the ropes of the balloon twisted themselves around some of my fruit trees, completely uprooting one, and a fence was smashed in."

THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS

[German Cartoon]

John Bull in a Dilemma

—(C) Fliegende Blaetter.

"Now it's high time I were finding a new alliance."

[Dutch Cartoon]

America's Hesitations

—From Die Niewe Amsterdammer.

WILSON: "Hold me, hold me, else I will commit a murder!"

[American Cartoon]

The Balkan Goat

—*From The New York Evening Sun.*

"He will make a fairish meal!"

[English Cartoon]

The Advance That Failed



—*From Punch, London.*

THE KAISER: "Have you had enough?"
THE CZAR: "No. Have *you?*"

[American Cartoon]

The Arabic Disavowal

—*From The New York World.*

Saluting it.

[Dutch Cartoon]

Adoration of the Magi

—*From a Dutch Postcard by Louis Raemakers.*

The Wise Men offering their gifts.

[American Cartoon]

A Reminder

—Rogers in New York Herald.

"Yes, Father, I remember you said the war would end in October."

[German Cartoon]

The Glozing Painter



—*(C) Lustige Blaetter.*

Poincaré paints his dear liege brother always in the rosiest colors.

[English Cartoon]

The Indelible Stain

"German sailors are gallant men, and gallant men do not like being put on to a coward's job."—MR. BALFOUR.



—From The Bystander, London.

The Ghosts of Submarine Officers (to Admiral von Tirpitz): "Our lives we gave; but you have taken our honor, too!"

[American Cartoon]

Ambassador Dumba's Departure

—From The New York World.

"Having regard to the self-willed temperament of the President."

[German Cartoon]

The Iron Age at the Königsplatz



—*(C) Lustige Blaetter.*

The Iron Chancellor drives the first iron nail for the iron Hindenburg.

[English Cartoon]

"No Possible Doubt Whatever"

—From The Bystander, London, by Captain Bruce Bairnsfather.

SENTRY: "'Alt! Who goes there?"

HE OF THE BUNDLE: "You shut yer —— mouth, or I'll —— come and knock yer —— head off."

SENTRY: "Pass, friend!"

[Dutch Cartoon]

Cain's Retribution



—From a Dutch Postcard by Louis Raemakers.

The sacrifice which is not pleasing to the Lord.

[German Cartoon]

Good Friends

Lloyd's, England, takes bets on Russia's submergence backdown.

—(C) *Fliegende Blaetter.*

RUSSIAN: "Help, help! I drown!"

ENGLISHMEN: "I bet you he gets waterlogged in five minutes." "Well! I'll bet twenty pounds he waterlogs in eight minutes."

[English Cartoon]

The Imps of War

—*From Punch, London.*

KAISER: "After all the trouble I've taken with you I must say that, as little terrors, you disappoint me."

[American Cartoon]

The Great Drive

—From The New York Sun.

"Now the machine is in good trim."

[French Cartoon]

The Red Cross Danger

—*From the Salon des Humoristes by Forain.*

"Cache done ton drapeau! Tu vas te faire tuer!"
(The French soldier says to the driver of the ambulance wagon: "You had better hide that flag. They're sure to kill you.")

The Aniseed Bag

—*From The New York World.*

They're in full cry after the quarry.

[German Cartoon]

The Czar's Nightmare



--(C) Jugend.

The Czar beholds the funeral procession of the fallen Russian fortresses.

[English Cartoon]

Grit

—*From Punch, London.*

The morning after the Zeppelin raid in our village.

[German Cartoon]

The Little Father's Duma

—*(C) Jugend.*

Wouldn't it be simpler henceforth to convene the Duma in Siberia?

Chronology of the War

Showing Progress of Campaigns on All Fronts and Collateral Event From September 12, 1915, Up to and Including October 12, 1915

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EUROPE

Sept. 13—Hindenburg reaches the Rovno-Petrograd Railway between Vilna and Dvinsk.

Sept. 14—Russians take offensive in South Russia.

Sept. 16—Mackensen's army occupies Pinsk; Hindenburg drives the Russians across the Dvina north of Pinsk.

Sept. 18—Austrians are withdrawing in the sector of the Volhynian triangle of fortresses northeast of Lemberg.

Sept. 20—Germans occupy Vilna, and Hindenburg's forces reach Vileika; German artillery shells Serbian positions on the south bank of the Danube near Semendria.

Sept. 21—The Russian Vilna army, which has been threatened with annihilation, escapes.

Sept. 25—Russians retake Lutsk; Russians repulse repeated assaults on the city of Dvinsk.

Sept. 26—Germans suspend attacks on Dvinsk and become active east of Lida and Vilna.

Sept. 27—Russians repulse Hindenburg's armies.

Sept. 28—Linsingen recaptures Lutsk and crosses the Styr; the German drive at Dvinsk is resumed; Austrians in Galicia are driven back.

Sept. 29—Anglo-French troops, intended for service in Serbia, are being landed at Saloniki, Greece; large forces of Austro-Germans are advancing on Serbia.

Sept. 30—Russians drive back Germans in the Dvinsk region.

Oct. 1—Russians check German offensive along the whole front from Riga to Pinsk.

Oct. 2—Russians gain on the Vilna front.

Oct. 3—Seventy thousand French troops have been landed at Saloniki; Russians are rolling back Hindenburg's armies.

Oct. 4—Russians retake many villages, driving Austro-Germans back both in the north and south.

Oct. 6—Russians attack Austrians along the Bessarabian frontier.

Oct. 7—An Austro-German army of 400,000 attacks Serbia, and forces the passage of the Danube, Save, and Drina rivers.

Oct. 8—Serbians check the Austro-Germans, inflicting considerable losses; Russian armies attack along the whole line.

Oct. 9—Hindenburg makes further progress toward Dvinsk.

Oct. 10—Teutonic allies under Mackensen capture Belgrade and drive Serbians back along the Danube; the Entente allies are rushing up troops.

Oct. 11—Serbians force back the German right wing across the Drina with heavy loss, but the main invading force pushes on.

Oct. 12—Austro-Germans complete the crossing of the Danube in force and are sweeping into Serbia.

CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE.

Sept. 18—French artillery severs at St. Mihiel the "great bridge" across the Meuse.

Sept. 20—Artillery duels in progress along most of the front.

Sept. 21—French make gains in Champagne and Lorraine.

Sept. 24—French make gains at several points.

Sept. 25—Entente allies attack on a 300-mile front; British gain ground near Loos, while French advance in Champagne.

Sept. 26—Allies continue a general attack, taking the offensive from the sea to Verdun; they smash twenty miles of German front; the greatest advances are made in Champagne and north of Arras; Souchez and Loos are taken.

Sept. 27—Allies' offensive continues and they hold their gains; British are fighting east of Loos; French attack in Champagne; Allies have taken 70 guns and 23,000 prisoners; Berlin says the allied drive is a failure.

Sept. 28—Allies continue the offensive.

Sept. 29—Allies continue the offensive in Artois and Champagne.

Sept. 30—French make further gains in Champagne, piercing the second German line; 121 guns have been taken in five days by the Allies.

Oct. 4—Germans gain ground by counter-attacks near Lens and near Givenchy.

Oct. 6—French take Tahure in Champagne, in the second German line.

Oct. 8—French make more gains in Champagne.

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.

Sept. 22—Italians dislodge Austrians from the Dolomite Valley.

Sept. 23—Austrian garrison evacuates Monte Coston, after holding it for months.

Sept. 28—Italians check several Austrian attempts to advance.

Sept. 29—Austrians attacks in the Tolmino zone are repulsed; Italian attacks near Dolje are repulsed.

TURKISH CAMPAIGN.

Sept. 16—Official British figures show British casualties at the Dardanelles to have been 87,630 up to Aug. 21.

Sept. 23—It is reported that 110,000 more French and British soldiers have been sent to the Dardanelles.

Sept. 29—British defeat Turks on the Tigris, the Turks retreating toward Bagdad.

Oct. 3—Russians advance in the region of Van, in the Caucasus.

NAVAL RECORD.

Sept. 19—British squadron shells Belgian coast defenses; one German submarine sinks another by mistake.

Sept. 21—Strict orders have been issued to commanders of German submarines that, in case of doubt as to intentions of liners, they are to take the safe course and permit the ship to escape rather than run the slightest risk of error; Russians sink a German submarine in the Black Sea.

Sept. 23—In a new note to the United States on the Frye case, Germany declares that visit and search will be made hereafter, and that she will not molest American ships carrying conditional contraband.

Sept. 24—German submarines sink five British steamers.

Sept. 25—Russian squadron bombards German land positions on the Gulf of Riga; British squadron shells Zeebrugge.

Sept. 27—American sailing ship Vincent is sunk by a mine off Cape Orloff, on the White Sea coast of Russia, four seamen being injured.

Oct. 1—Official reports to the United States Government show that between fifty and seventy German submarines have been sunk by the British through new devices.

Oct. 4—Austrian submarine sinks a British steamer off the coast of Greece.

Oct. 5—Germany disavows the sinking of the Arabic and promises reparation; German submarines sink two British steamers.

Oct. 7—Russian cruisers are bombarding the Bulgarian port of Varna, so unconfirmed reports state, this, if done, being the beginning of hostilities as to Bulgaria.

AERIAL RECORD.

Sept. 13—German aeroplane bombards the coast of Kent.

Sept. 19—Italian dirigibles drop forty bombs on Aisovizza.

Sept. 22—French aviators bombard Stuttgart, killing four persons and wounding others.

Sept. 23—French aeroplane squadrons attack German bases in Lorraine and the Argonne.

Oct. 3—French aeroplanes bombard the railroad depot and military buildings in Luxemburg.

Oct. 9—Italian aeroplane squadrons bombard several Austrian positions.

ARMENIA.

Oct. 7—Lord Bryce tells the British House of Lords that 800,000 Armenians have been killed by the Turks.

BULGARIA.

Sept. 16—Entente allies present a note to Bulgaria demanding that she declare herself as between them and the central powers.

Sept. 21—General mobilization is ordered.

Sept. 28—Great Britain warns Bulgaria that the Allies will attack if she attempts aggression.

Oct. 3—Russia sends a note to Bulgaria stating that she will withdraw her Minister unless Bulgaria breaks with the central powers within twenty-four hours.

Oct. 5—The Russian, French, British, Italian, and Serbian Ministers demand their passports, Bulgaria's answer to the Russian ultimatum being unsatisfactory.

GERMANY.

Sept. 24—The total subscriptions to the third German war loan are $3,000,000,000, so it is stated by Finance Minister Helfferich, which makes the total war loan subscriptions $6,250,000,000.

Oct. 2—Prussian casualties now total 1,916,148.

GREAT BRITAIN.

Sept. 21—Greatest war budget in the world's history is introduced in the House of Commons; the war is now costing Great Britain nearly $25,000,000 daily.

GREECE.

Sept. 25—Greece orders mobilization of her army and navy, in reply to the Bulgarian mobilization.

Oct. 6—Premier Venizelos resigns, when the King informs him he cannot support his war policy.

UNITED STATES.

Sept. 17—Austrian Ambassador Dumba, in a letter to Secretary Lansing, protests that he has been treated unjustly.

Sept. 27—Austria agrees to recall Ambassador Dumba.

Sept. 28—It is officially announced that arrangements have been completed between an Anglo-French financial commission and a syndicate of American bankers for a short-term loan of $500,000,000, as a direct obligation of the British and French Governments.

Oct. 5—Ambassador Dumba sails from New York for home.

SIR EDWARD GREY

A Recent Portrait of Great Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

KITCHENER OF KHARTUM

Britain's Greatest Living General, Has Gone to the Near Eastern Theatre of War

PERIOD XV.

Problems of Small Nations—The Limits of Sea Power—Allied Troops at Saloniki—Britain's Conduct of the War—Serbia's Defeat—France and Catholicism—Bulgaria and the Germanic Powers—The Execution of Edith Cavell—America's Defenses—Roosevelt's Army Program—The German War and Democracy—British Supremacy on the Seas.

WORLD AFFAIRS OF THE MONTH

Earl Kitchener's Departure

Is Kitchener of Khartum, the real creator of England's Egyptian empire, destined to lead the last campaign that will settle its fate? the Berlin Gazette asks. On Nov. 16 Kitchener landed on the Island of Lemnos. Artificer and guardian of England's great jewels of Egypt and India, builder of her modern fortunes in the Orient, has he gone to his fall? The Teutonic press declares that he will be made the scapegoat of this war, and deservedly. On Lemnos Mammon fell, who upreared the palace of Satan—

> from morn
> To noon he fell, from noon to dewy eve,
> A Summer's day, and with the setting sun
> Dropt from the zenith, like a falling star.
> On Lemnos, the Aegean isle.

England, in German eyes the most avaricious and luxurious of earth's powers, announced on Nov. 6 that the man who led the Nile expedition, governed Suakim, fought the battles of the Sudan frontier, commanded the Dongola expeditionary force and the Khartum expedition, became chief in the South African war and Commander in Chief in India, had gone in person as director of the warring British Empire on a secret mission to the Near East. The Germanic powers in their victorious Balkan campaign had challenged Britain on the route of her world empire. The defection of Bulgaria to Germany was the first great blow, and it wrought the ruin of Serbia.

[Vol. V., P. 409.]

On Nov. 18 came the news that Rumania threatened by active preparations to join the Teuton forces. King Constantine of Greece had overridden his Constitution to dissolve a Parliament friendly to the Entente. Would he disarm the defeated Serbian army if it sought refuge in Saloniki, and turn their forfeited weapons against the Allies? And what of the Dardanelles? Were the Turks, satisfied that the British attempt to conquer Gallipoli must be abandoned, already deflecting forces from its defense to strike the fatal blow at Suez? Anarchy reigned in Persia. Was Hyderabad, England's richest province in India, really in revolt, deposing its loyal Prince? Whatever brought the great soldier and administrator east it must be upon a fateful errand for Britain.

* * *

The German War

Since the day of Napoleon no such utterance of successful warfare has been given to the world as this from the Kölnische Zeitung:

> Neutrals will again observe with astonishment the coolness, the strength, and the organization of Germany, who, without wavering, withstands an enormous offensive on one front, and on the other front herself prosecutes an offensive in the widest sense; who holds in east and west territories as large as European States, and administers them in exemplary fashion; who has begun in the Balkans an enterprise of the most far-reaching

significance; who deals successful blows by sea and air; and who, during this time, has realized from her own economic resources the greatest loan in financial history. Four great armies and four navies are opposed to us, while the money and munitions of a fifth great power have been staked against the new Triple Alliance—all without being able to prevent it from solving its military and political problems in its own way. The strength of the new Triple Alliance has pointed the way to the Balkan peoples as the lighthouse guides the sailor across the darkness of the sea.

* * *

A Franco-British War Council

Announcement was made on Nov. 17 that for the purposes of this war France and Great Britain would be governed by a Joint War Council. The council met in Paris on that day, attended by Prime Minister Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, David Lloyd George, and A. J. Balfour. Earl Kitchener, the fifth member of the British "inner cabinet" foreshadowed in Mr. Asquith's speech in the House of Commons on Nov. 2, was absent on his secret mission East, having left the Island of Lemnos, his first stopping place, for Gallipoli. In his outline of plans for a joint staff, given in the House of Commons on Nov. 10, Mr. Asquith said that for the better consummation of military projects he hoped that not only France but Italy and Russia would be included. It was announced on Nov. 1 in London that the British Government during two months past had been engaged in the creation of a new General Staff to supervise the armies in the field, and to confer with the small War Council of the Cabinet. The old staff Lord Haldane condemned on Nov. 4 as inferior to the German staff. In the interest of quick decision and executive efficiency, it appears, a small committee of ultimate resort representing all the members of the Entente will soon be directing its forces.

* * *

A French Ministry of Many Talents

A Ministry representing all the history of France since the fall of Napoleon III. was formed by Aristide Briand on Oct. 29, following the resignation of Premier Viviani, whose Cabinet represented only a few political groups. The present Ministry includes five of France's Elder Statesmen, M. Ribot, M. Meline, M. Combes, M. Leon Bourgeois, and M. de Freycinet, all ex-Premiers, besides Premier Briand, who has occupied his office on two occasions, M. Viviani, the outgoing Premier, and M. Doumergue, who was Prime Minister from December, 1913, to June, 1914. For the first time in its history France has a true coalition Ministry, following closely the recent innovation of forming a British coalition Cabinet of Conservatives and Liberals.

* * *

The Berlin-Bagdad Prospect

The German cry of "Berlin to Bagdad" has been sounded lately with reference to the approach of the Anglo-Indian expedition along the lower Euphrates and Tigris to a point within striking distance of Bagdad. Doubt is expressed by the Kölnische Zeitung whether the British will seize this terminal station for the supply of Germany from the rich Orient, or whether the Turkish expeditionary force now on the way to Bagdad will arrive at the right time. At any rate, this newspaper holds, the British occupation will not be for long, as the victorious Turkish armies, newly strengthened by forces released from the Dardanelles, will advance to Irak, forcing the invaders out of Mesopatamia.

* * *

Corrupt Persia

Lord Robert Cecil's somewhat cynical advice in the House of Commons that if the British authorities in Persia should evince a willingness to "ease the financial position of Persia" the killings of Consuls and other administrative officials would cease seems to have been taken. At all events, the Persian Shah on Nov. 16 received the British and Russian Ministers, declaring that Persia would henceforth side with the Entente. Seats in the Shah's Cabinet have been given to Russophile Ministers. But Persia is frankly in the market for either German or English gold. The spirit of "graft" has rotted the national fibre to such an

extent that, as a Persian frontiersman has expressed it, Persia is "like a decayed sheep of which the leg comes off in your hand when you wish to drag the corpse from the road."

* * *

GREECE'S "VERY BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY"

No sooner had Stephanos Skouloudis been appointed on Nov. 7 by King Constantine to the Greek Premiership, succeeding Alexander Zaimis, overthrown by the Venizelist party, than he announced an attitude of "very benevolent neutrality" toward the Entente powers, following this with a vigorous statement declaring that Greece knew where her "real interests" lay, and officially acknowledging that they lay under the protection of the Entente. The King, whose wife is a sister of Emperor William of Germany, on Nov. 12 dissolved the Chamber of Deputies, fixing Dec. 19 as the date for new elections. At the same time the Greek General Staff announced that it would call to the colors all citizens who had not done military service, augmenting the Greek Army to half a million officers and men. Greece rejected in October the offer of Great Britain to cede the island of Cyprus on condition that she enter the war on the side of Serbia, in accordance with M. Venizelos's interpretation of her treaty with Serbia. The Greek reply was that the treaty was framed in the event of a Balkan war, whereas this war is European.

* * *

ANXIETY FOR PEACE AND THE TERMS

A London cable dispatch to THE NEW YORK TIMES, dated Nov. 16, declares knowledge "from an extremely well-informed source" that the central empires are contemplating a definite move in the direction of peace, if not actually preparing to treat with their opponents. Possibly President Wilson or the Pope could verify the report. Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and, during the past month, Japan have jointly agreed not to negotiate peace without the consent of all. As indicative of Great Britain's temper, the Right Hon. C. F.-G. Masterman, who is believed to represent that Government's views, on Nov. 15 again quoted Prime Minister Asquith's Guildhall statement:

> We shall never sheath the sword, which we have not lightly drawn, until Belgium recovers in full measure all, and more than all, that she sacrificed; until France is adequately secured against menace of aggression; until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed. That is a great task worthy of a great nation.

"The words of the Prime Minister still hold good," Minister Lloyd George said in response to queries in the House of Commons on Oct. 28; "we should not think of entering into any peace negotiations except in common with our allies, in accordance with the agreement of Sept. 5, 1915." Pressed further, the Minister denied emphatically that "unofficial exchanges or negotiations" had been carried on.

* * *

SUPPRESSION OF THE VORWAERTS

A bold plea for peace and for a definite statement by the German Chancellor of the objects which Germany seeks in continuing the war occasioned the suppression on Nov. 5 of the Vorwaerts, the organ of the German Social Democratic Party. The Vorwaerts has repeatedly complained of the rising prices of foodstuffs in Germany, causing hardships endured by great masses of the population. In this article it quoted Prime Minister Asquith's Guildhall speech, noting its lack of definiteness, and said:

> It is not France and England alone who veil the conditions of peace, for the German Government is just as reserved. We like to have regard for Germany's intentions. For twelve months we have been listening to what is not true. Surely we cannot be taken amiss if we express a desire to hear once what is true and what the German Government really considers as its object in this war. This cannot go on forever, that battle after battle is fought and our troops carried to new theatres of war. The people, through all this complexity of the war, never get to know what is happening, or what we are striving to attain in order that the bells of peace may be heard.

Not until England is brought to her knees will Germany sheathe the sword is the conclusion of a staff correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES in Berlin, after

diligent inquiry. Mr. Masterman, in an article in The London Daily Chronicle, interprets—possibly for the benefit of Vorwaerts—as the minimum of Mr. Asquith's purpose the establishment of terms assuring Belgium complete independence and an indemnity large enough to restore her ruined cities and industries and compensation for her dead; the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France and a defensive boundary on the Rhine; the restoration of Schleswig to Denmark; Poland united in one kingdom under the Czar; the Trentino and Italy Irredenta for the Italian Kingdom; Serbia restored by Austria and indemnified; each nation of the Balkans united; Germany's colonies forfeit, and the German fleet sunk or parceled out among the powers of the Entente.

* * *

A Policy of Holy Egoism

Sacred selfishness—"holy egoism" is another rendering—is the policy frankly avouched by Bulgaria in an addendum to the manifesto of Premier Radoslavoff, 20,000 copies of which were circulated throughout the country before war was declared on Serbia. A generous abstract of the manifesto appears elsewhere in this issue. The addendum is quite as frank as the original statement in its confession that Bulgaria waited until she was convinced that Germany would win, and then accepted her offer to relieve Bulgaria of her supplies of grain at high prices, and to give her a permanent trade route westward along the Danube.

* * *

Impregnable with Sand

General Brialmont's mighty fortresses in Belgium were easily blasted to pieces by the gigantic shells of the German "Berthas." A like fate was visited upon the great concrete forts which Russia had erected against invasion from the west. But when the Austro-German army reached Dvinsk fortress, built chiefly with yielding sand, the tremendous exploding projectiles became ineffectual. Captain von Kueschuetzky, correspondent of the Vossische Zeitung, reported to his newspaper that the fort had been reduced one-half in size by continued shell fire without affecting the strength of the remainder. Permanent trenches made proof against shrapnel and shell fragments and connected with "fox-holes" formed a mutually outflanking system which exposed assailants to the enfilading fire of machine guns. Reversing the lesson of the Biblical parable, Dvinsk stood because it was built upon sand and its walls were of sand.

* * *

Minister Churchill's Resignation

Having imparted to Britain's War Council the knowledge of current operations which he possessed when forced from his position of First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Spencer Churchill announced on Nov. 12 his resignation from the Chancellorship of the Duchy of Lancaster to take part in operations on the western front as Major in the Oxford Yeomanry. Mr. Churchill, who had among other things committed the crime of being a young man—he is 41—has been subjected to a bitter fire of hostile criticism since the war began. With courage and dignity he explained in the House of Commons on Nov. 15 his own and others' share in the responsibility for the loss of Rear Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock's fleet in the Pacific; for the destruction by submarines of the British cruisers Cressy, Hogue, and Aboukir; for the sending of the naval brigade to Antwerp, and for beginning a naval attack in the Dardanelles without military support. He stated what seemed inherently probable, that at no time had a civilian's plan been foisted on reluctant officers and experts. In the Antwerp episode he had not even been apprised of the sending of a relief expedition until plans had been far advanced. Even Lord Fisher did not oppose the naval attack in the Dardanelles, and this plan was undertaken with the utmost deliberation and with a "great volume of expert opinion behind it."

* * *

Lord Derby's Scheme of Recruiting

In his great speech of Nov. 2, reproduced in full in this issue, Prime Minister Asquith said that upon the question of recruiting he was "determined to stick at nothing." He was determined

that Britain "shall win this war." Therefore, while a believer in the voluntary system, rather than not win the war he would, if necessary, ask Parliament for an act to compel Britishers to enlist. On Nov. 11 the Earl of Derby, Director of Recruiting, strongly intimated that if young men medically fit, unmarried, and not indispensable to any business of national importance did not under the stress of national duty come forward voluntarily, compulsory means would be taken before married men were called upon to serve. The canvass under Lord Derby is in the hands of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee and the Joint Labor Recruiting Committee, aided by organizations of the political parties and civic authorities.

* * *

British Suffragism Again Rampant

A patriotic meeting with the intent of stirring up sentiment to save Serbia while there is yet time, by kicking Sir Edward Grey and Prime Minister Asquith out of the Cabinet, and organized by the British militant suffragettes under Mrs. Emmeline Pankhurst, was to have been held in the Royal Albert Hall in London on Nov. 18. The plan came to grief. The hall management canceled the engagement when Mrs. Pankhurst published the purpose of the meeting. Britannia, the organ of the Woman's Social and Political Union, bristles with headlines that "Sir Edward Grey has Betrayed Serbia," and that "Asquith Shrugged His Shoulders" when the matter of sending British troops to Serbia was broached. Manifestly Serbia has received its death warrant from the executioner of British suffragism. But Mrs. Pankhurst vows that the "inspired attempt to deprive the British Nation of its right of protest will not succeed."

* * *

London's Zeppelin Problem

The Zeppelin attacks on London will continue. That is the plain inference from an identical article appearing in the German newspapers of Oct. 31 declaring that, by their results—the destruction of military plants, the rendering useless of transit facilities, and the fear they inspire, which is productive of all sorts of measures which do damage to England's economic life—these acts are justified by way of reprisal for Great Britain's blockade. The blockade, it is admitted, compels "not hundreds of thousands but millions of human beings in Germany" to "limit their consumption of food and make not inconsiderable sacrifices." Meanwhile Lord Alverstone in a letter to The Times of London advises that no reprisals for the air attacks be visited upon Germany, that they would simply involve the British "in being party to a line of conduct condemned by every right-thinking man of every civilized nation" without in any way serving to shorten the war. The suggestion to confiscate private securities of the German Emperor or of German Princes held in London as a measure of reprisal was rejected by the Prime Minister in Parliament on Oct. 28.

* * *

Five Millions of Lives?

That 5,000,000 soldiers have been slain on all sides in this war is the estimate published in Basle on Nov. 13 by Colonel Heussler, statistician in the Swiss military service. At the close of the first year of the struggle Prime Minister Asquith said in the British House of Commons that 2,228,000 had been slain, basing the estimate on German and British calculations. The monthly average was 186,000, omitting Japan, and, of course, Bulgaria. Adding the Austro-Italian casualties, unofficially estimated at 140,000, the total to date should be something over 3,000,000. But the gigantic offensives on each side during the late Summer and Fall have doubtless accelerated the rate of casualties.

* * *

Sufferings

Imagination shrinks and refuses to body forth the scenes occasioned by the onrush of hundreds of thousands of men in one battle, preceded by the discharge of millions of high explosive shells. One soldier subjected to this ordeal left on his dead body this brief description of his experience in a single trench:

We were 118 hours without food in a

trench not two feet deep. Hell couldn't be worse. Six hundred more men just arrived; they will only replace the killed and wounded of the past five days.

When men fall like flies, and trenches are nothing but débris, there is no room for description. It remains only to count the dead.

* * *

SINKING OF THE ANCONA

While Americans aboard vainly waved the American flag in token of their presence, and as the panic-stricken crew and passengers lowered boats from the Italian liner Ancona, outward bound in the Mediterranean from Naples and Messina for New York, an Austrian submarine is officially reported by the Italian Government to have delivered the blow which sent the vessel and over 200 of her passengers, including several American citizens, to the bottom. Official accounts conflict. Foreign Minister Sonnino of Italy reports that the Ancona hove to almost instantly after the submarine fired its first shell. The report continues:

> The transatlantic liner Ancona was bombarded while the boats were being lowered and hundreds of passengers were still on board. It now appears that the submarine was German; thus it follows that Germany intended to open hostilities against Italy without any declaration of war.

The statement issued by the Austro-Hungarian Admiralty asserts, on the other hand, that the Ancona fled at full speed after the submarine fired a shot across her bow, and stopped only after being hit several times; that the submarine allowed forty-five minutes for passengers and crew to abandon the steamer, but panic prevented the lowering of more than a small number of boats, and after fifty minutes the approach of another steamer dictated the submersion of the submarine and the delivery of her torpedo. The report denounces as mendacious the accusations of passengers that the submarine fired upon the Ancona's lifeboats. Secretary Lansing has instructed Ambassador Penfield at Vienna to get a detailed report of the incident. In a letter to THE NEW YORK TIMES, M. de Lapradelle, Professor of International Law in the College of France, cites precedents to show that Germany and Austria-Hungary should be regarded in this case as forming a single responsible military unit. That is, their alliance in the war binds each as responsible for the acts of the other.

* * *

PRAISE FROM DR. DERNBURG

The entire first page of the Berliner Tageblatt was occupied on Nov. 12 by an article written by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, late German Colonial Secretary of State and head of the German propaganda in the United States, expressing friendship and admiration for President Wilson. Dr. Dernburg offended when he justified the sinking of the Lusitania, and that was the occasion of his leaving this country. The President's policy is inspired, he now says, by a determination to force the belligerents to respect the ante-bellum principles of maritime law, especially as laid down in the Declaration of London. On this account Germany yielded:

> Apart from the fact that she shared America's consideration for humanity, Germany apparently gave in principally for the reason that a nation which wishes the freedom of the seas should not contribute to shatter the principles which hitherto had been maintained even in an incomplete form, and that she had no right to expect the United States would hold Great Britain to an observance of the maritime law without also following the same policy toward Germany. A submarine campaign defended on the ground of the modernity of the weapon was, however, irreconcilable with the application of the London regulations.

Commenting on the American note to Great Britain denouncing the blockade of Germany, Dr. Dernburg concludes that the President will be as insistent upon its terms as upon those laid down in the case of the Lusitania. Incidentally, it is to be remarked that only the Arabic case was settled by a German disavowal. The Lusitania case is still in abeyance.

* * *

AMERICAN DEFENSE

While Lord Rosebery on Nov. 16 expressed himself as disheartened at the announcement that the United States is

" about to embark upon the building of a huge armada destined to be equal or second to " Great Britain's, and while men like Lord Cromer, Viscount Bryce, and Professor Nicholson—whose article on " President Wilson's Patience " appears elsewhere—are trying to show Britishers that the United States ought not to leap into this war, ex-President Roosevelt is telling the people of France how ashamed he is that the Democratic Administration at Washington should be so backward in measures of preparedness. Mr. Bryan, on the other hand, belabors President Wilson for advocating a " citizenry trained." Meanwhile Mr. Wilson is appealing to Congressional leaders of both parties to support him in the program laid down by the Secretaries of War and the Navy and outlined in his speech before the Manhattan Club, which we present in full in this issue. Mr. Joseph H. Choate, speaking in New York on Nov. 9, declared that if in the coming Congress the Republicans tried to make political capital out of this vital issue he for one would be heartily ashamed of his party.

* * *

War on American Industries

That organized warfare is being conducted against a number of American industries is generally inferred from the frequency and regularity of explosions and incendiary fires like those which within twenty-four hours on Nov. 10 and 11 visited four different factories in as many parts of the country—the Bethlehem Steel Works, the Midvale Steel and Ordnance Company, the Baldwin Locomotive Works at Eddystone, Penn., and the John A. Roebling's Sons Company at Trenton, N. J. Hostile strikes in industries having to do with the making of munitions have been frequent. Indictments under the American piracy laws were brought on Nov. 8 against six Germans who, as alleged by the Government, conspired under the leadership of Robert Fay to destroy at sea vessels carrying munitions from this country to Europe. While they were under arrest the incendiary fires at sea systematically continued. On Nov. 12 Federal officials acted on the statement published by Dr. Josef Goricar, late of the Austro-Hungarian Consular Service, accusing representatives of Austria-Hungary and Germany in this country of fomenting plots in violation of the neutrality laws.

* * *

German Needs After the War

An admirable instance of German foresight is shown in an article printed by the Hamburger Nachrichten, which was once Prince Bismarck's organ, discussing the needs of German finance and industries after the war. The State must look for new sources of income. Pensions for dead and disabled soldiers, the rebuilding of houses and factories, filling of gaps in war supplies while the standing army is strengthened, and the payment of interest on loans and provision of a sinking fund are all considered. The remedy of increased taxes is rejected because families whose breadwinners have been at the front cannot bear them, and industries cut off from their markets must be left in position to wage war against foreign competition. An increase of State monopolies is contraindicated, since men now fighting will insist on their economic freedom, and since the millions of money they have invested in Germany's leading industries would involve too vast expenditures by the State to acquire them. But there is no reason, the article says, " why new and rising industries should not—before it is too late—become sources of income for the State." These should be fostered to render Germany, so far as necessaries are concerned, completely independent of the foreigner.

* * *

Another Cavell Case

Convicted of harboring persons who had taken part in Monmouth's rebellion, and after a vain appeal to the clemency of the British King, Lady Alice Lisle was sentenced by Judge Jeffreys at the Bloody Assizes of 1680 and beheaded, meeting her end " with serene courage." As Edith Cavell had attended to the wounds of French and German soldiers alike, so Lady Alice, whose sympathies were with the Parliamentary Party in the British civil war, " had protected and relieved many cavaliers in their distress,"

befriending and feeding Royalists fleeing from the pursuing Roundheads. Macaulay tells her story, remarking that, "if Lady Alice knew her guests to have been concerned in the insurrection, she was undoubtedly guilty of what in strictness is a capital crime." He continues:

> It is evident that nothing but a lenient Administration could make such a state of the law endurable. And it is just to say that, during many generations, no English Government, save one, has treated with rigor persons guilty merely of harboring defeated and flying insurgents. To women especially has been granted, by a kind of tacit prescription, the right of indulging, in the midst of havoc and vengeance, that compassion which is the most endearing of all their charms. Since the beginning of the great civil war, numerous rebels, some of them far more important than Hickes or Nelthorpe, [the adherents of Monmouth who were sheltered by Lady Alice Lisle,] have been protected against the severity of victorious Governments by female adroitness and generosity. But no English ruler who has been thus baffled, the savage and implacable James alone excepted, has had the barbarity even to think of putting a lady to a cruel and shameful death for so venial and amiable a transgression.

* * *

A Field Marshal of Business

Walther Rathenau, son and heir of the "electrical king," Emil Rathenau, is described by Frederic William Wile, in The Continental Daily Mail, as the super-business man and super-German who brought about Germany's industrial and financial mobilization for the war. Until it broke out he represented his father's colossal electrical company involving interests worth a billion dollars, the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. Rathenau taught Germany to keep its money at home by spending none of it abroad, and, directing the energies of the chemical and engineering forces of Germany, created substitutes for practically every essential of war except cotton. The Germans, barred from the outside world by land and sea, have followed Rathenau's lead in their effort to become independent of foreign sources of supply.

* * *

China Going Back to Kings

"God said, I am tired of Kings," Emerson sang a generation ago. Now China, after a brief experience with republican government, is apparently going back to Kings. The "Great Pure Dynasty" of the Manchus was extinguished on Feb. 12, 1912, with the abdication of Kuang-Hsi, who thereafter, nevertheless, retained for life the title of Manchu Emperor. Yuan Shih-kai was elected President of the new republic for a term of five years. The Parliament was dissolved on Jan. 11, 1914, since which time the President has ruled with the aid of a Constitutional Council and a Council of State. Now the British, Russian, and Japanese Governments have officially taken note of the movement to change the Constitution adopted last year in order to establish a monarchy over China. On Nov. 2 Japan sent a note expressing the allied Governments' misgivings that their Asian interests would be disturbed by the change. Yuan Shih-kai replied on the same date saying that five provinces had already declared for a constitutional monarchy, the ancient form of rulership being held more suitable to a country of such immense size and low standard of education, and that the Government was powerless to stay the new movement. The German Minister at Peking was instructed immediately to recognize the proclamation of a new Chinese Emperor.

* * *

Booker T. Washington

Ancient civilization was upreared on the institution of slavery, and Booker Washington, born a slave, inherited the curse of Aesop. More than any other member of his race he has sought to lift it to the level of a civilization which has stamped out slavery, making instead the forces of nature its servant. It was his mission to teach them that they, too, must gain this technical power over nature, which would destroy the stigma of servility more thoroughly than the parliamentary action of a Brougham or the proclamation of a Lincoln. Toussaint l'Ouverture, "the Buonaparte of St. Domingo," wrought for his race with the sword, Frederick Douglass with the word of freedom, Booker Washington with the

wheel and plowshare. Skilled industry was his watchword. The age of agitation for the rights of the negro is past; in realizing this truth, in preaching to his people the gospel of labor and skill, Washington contributed serviceably toward solving the gravest internal problem of this nation.

* * *

A Rebuff to General Botha

The recent elections in the Union of South Africa meant, the Vossische Zeitung predicted, a settlement of "the future and the fate of South Africa itself." They turned out not to be so decisive as that. But the disaffection of twenty-seven Dutch constituencies won by General Botha's opponent, Hertzog, left him the support of fifty-four districts, districts peopled mainly by English-speaking voters. General Botha's own people rejected him, standing on a Nationalist platform which, The Times of London editorially says, represents "a policy of race-hatred" and a political faith predicated on the "deep-dyed iniquity of Great Britain." The Dutch Nationalist Party opposed the campaign against German Southwest Africa. It declared against helping England at all in the war and against uniting the British and Dutch in South Africa. The conqueror of German Southwest Africa must now relinquish his independent policy and join in a coalition Government with the British Unionists, whose seating of forty members will assure him a majority against his own countrymen.

* * *

Health of British Women

That woman is not naturally delicate and fragile, that she is tough and resistant, is shown in the fact that under the strain and hard work put upon the women of Britain their health is improving. That is the testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Sloan Chesser in an address at the London Institute of Hygiene on Nov. 2. "Where are all the neurotic women today?" Dr. Chesser asked. The leisured, protected, economically useless woman has disappeared, and the neurotic woman of old time is now cheerily "doing her bit" in hospitals, depots, canteens, and munition works.

* * *

The Nizhni-Novgorod Fair

Russian sable, arctic fox, and other furs and lambskins have for a year past glutted the Russian markets, and have just come into demand at this year's Nizhni-Novgorod Fair. That great world market has been cut off by the war from the elements of foreign control which made its furs and jewelry merchantable. The Germans possess the manufactories of jewels in Poland, leaving only the Moscow jewelry. The Petrograd correspondent of The Times of London reports that this year's fair is being conducted with a shortage of all other manufactured goods in face of an increased demand, directly and indirectly due to the war. There are but about 1,500 firms represented, a dwindling of one-fourth from last year, but because of keener trade conditions the fair is peculiarly brisk and animated.

* * *

New York City's Growth

Fast becoming the financial centre of the world, how long will it be before New York is its largest city? Every year for eighty years past the greatest city on this continent has added 100,000 persons to itself, gaining more than proportionately in wealth. A report of the Central Mercantile Association of New York calls attention to this yearly increment, noting its increase to 135,000 a year during the last decade. What will be its future as the American Nation develops in comparison with the weakened powers of Europe?

* * *

Things Awry in the Philippines

Dissensions in the Colonial Government of the Philippines are revealed by the resignation of General Clinton L. Riggs, who was Secretary of Commerce and Police, just accepted by President Wilson. That the conduct of affairs by Governor General Francis Burton Harrison will be the subject of Congressional attack this Winter is shown by charges already made by Congressman Miller of

Minnesota, and by the fact that several other Republican members of the House of Representatives have lately visited the Philippines. That an anti-American spirit has been fostered in the islands; that "graft" has prevailed; that sanitary reforms have lapsed, resulting in epidemics of cholera, and that Governmental chaos has followed a breakdown of the civil service system will be the lines of attack. Doubtless it will be proved that the United States has still much to learn in the way of colonial administration.

* * *

Woman Suffrage Elections

In the eighteen and nineties a referendum to the women of Massachusetts resulted in an overwhelming condemnation by their own sex of the suffragists' propaganda. Since then the question has never been referred to the women of a State for a choice. The men of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts have this Fall decided for a quarter of the population of the United States that the privilege of the ballot shall not be extended to women. In the past four years Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Missouri, Nebraska, and North and South Dakota have rejected woman suffrage, comprising with the four States that opposed it this Fall almost two-fifths of the nation. In fourteen States of the South, comprising 27,000,000 people, there is no suffrage propaganda on account of the race question. The eleven States whose Constitutions grant suffrage to women are all west of the Mississippi, and contain but a tenth of the entire population. Besides these, the Legislature of Illinois permits women to vote for such offices as are not mentioned in the Constitution. Nevertheless, the agitators for suffrage point out that their movement in the East is growing, and that it enlisted 1,000,000 voters in November.

* * *

Colorado's Coal Strike Settlement

Comparing the attitude of President Wilson in refusing to settle the coal strike in Colorado with President Roosevelt's intervention in the Pennsylvania strike of 1902, ex-President Taft, in his Columbia lecture of Nov. 4, praised the Wilson principle. Let the people of Colorado take care of the things that are Colorado's is the essence of the principle. Mr. Roosevelt felt charged with the duty not only to suppress disorder in Pennsylvania, but to furnish coal in New York and New England, Mr. Taft said, and he proposed to do this with the aid of United States troops. This is a big country. An Executive at Washington who charged himself with the conduct of local affairs would soon have his hands full. Why not let the people in every district and State control themselves in their affairs? But reasoning in this wise would never have brought a Republican ex-President under the condemnation of Thomas Jefferson.

* * *

More Taxes for the Nation

With a program for national defense that will undoubtedly be expensive, Congress meets this month to survey the field of possible new taxation. Despite the war tax levied by the last Congress, the revenues have fallen behind half a million dollars a day; additional revenue would have to be raised in any circumstances. The regular annual appropriations for this fiscal year are the highest on record. The Sixty-third Congress, which appropriated $2,231,000,000, exceeded by $177,000,000 the expenditures of the last Republican Congress, and by $113,000,000 the Democratic Congress of the last two years under President Taft. The program of Secretary of War Garrison calls for army appropriations of $183,000,000 for the first of three years' expenditure, as compared with $102,000,000 for the present fiscal year. During the second year the allowance would rise to $212,000,000, and to $228,000,000 for the third year, leaving a military system that alone will cost $182,000,000 a year regularly. But there is no question that the program for defense is popular, and that it is bound to be largely adopted.

England! Whither Now?

By Sir Gilbert Parker

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[*In this article Sir Gilbert Parker frankly adopts the German principle of Kultur in his searching and almost bitter criticism of extravagance in British social life during the war. "The reason the Germans have borne the enormous pressure of this war fairly easily, though shut off from many sources of imports, is the scientific way in which their social life is organized," he says, and he holds up the ideal of Kultur to the British Nation. Inferentially, we should say, his article is also a criticism of American social life.*—Editor CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE.]

IF this war does not bring about a better adjustment of life in the English Nation it will not deserve to live as an independent unit. In such case a period of tribulation, under the heel of a despot, might do it a world of good.

By nature I am an optimist. That does not mean a belief that all will come right in this war, no matter what the daily situation, because as a people we have had great luck in the past. I am not that kind of optimist. Optimism is only warranted where all has been done that can be done to secure an end. It is a good thing to hope for the best, to keep a smiling face turned to tremendous difficulties; but this must be associated with indefatigable purpose, energy, organizing power, and a deep and devoted enthusiasm. I have stated in a war book of mine, called "The World in the Crucible," that when this war is over England will be, and this empire will be, wholly changed, and that, in the same sense, things will never be again as they have been. But coincident with this statement was a setting forth of what our enormous problems will be and how they will tax every individual in the nation to his and her utmost, but adding that if the individual sees the end and does his duty the nation will not fail.

When the war broke out, England was not in a healthy state, socially or politically. A few men saw the external and the internal troubles ahead and tried to warn their fellow-citizens; but the warning as to the European menace on the one hand, and as to duty in regard to domestic and social evils and the necessity for better organization of the national life on the other, together with a greater sense of personal responsibility, went unheeded, or largely so. We were as little fitted to enter upon a great war in August, 1914, save for our splendidly organized navy and our perfectly organized small expeditionary army, as any nation has ever been. We were not prepared for the terrific responsibilities of a great land war, to be fought in the Persian Gulf, the Dardanelles, Egypt, Serbia, Belgium, France, and West and East Africa and South Africa, yet the people generally had a blind faith that somehow all would come right, as when, in the South African war, fighting against two small States, we "muddled through."

A year of war has produced good, if not adequate, results. There has been a growing sense of what all this hideous world business means. It has come home to vast numbers that, though our island may not be occupied by enemy troops, we can still be defeated, impoverished, broken. A very large proportion of the people understand the magnitude of our task; the hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded, the mutilated and the crippled, the blind and the maimed, have taught a great lesson. On the whole nearly all of us know at last that our liberties and our lives are at stake. The Zeppelins over our homes and the warships bombarding our coast have startled us into understanding; but we have not

learned either all the truth or all of our duty yet. One big lesson, which is for now and for after the war, has been imperfectly learned. As a nation we are living on credit; that is to say, there would be miserable poverty in this country today were it not for the money being spent for war purposes; the hundreds of millions which must be wiped out, in part now through exhausting taxation, borne without a murmur—in the future through still heavier taxation. Yet it must be remembered that it is the credit of the country, drawn upon for unproductive purposes, which is supplying us indirectly and directly with the money to meet the present demands of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the need of the army and navy.

On this matter of economy we have not yet really begun to learn our lesson. The proportion by which individuals generally have cut down their expenses is not large yet. You will be told, however, that there are not so many people in the restaurants or in the theatres. That is true; but there have been withdrawn from our theatres and our restaurants an immense foreign population, particularly the population of the United States. The theatres and music halls of the more popular class have been full until very lately; and the restaurants of the more popular class have been extensively frequented. Going to a restaurant, you would hear music and you would see dancing and all the popinjay business of a numbing luxury, going on as it went on before the war. I say deliberately, from close observation, that most of the economy pursued during the past year has been the result of necessity and not of deliberate will, and therein lies the deep danger for this land. The wife of a friend of mine who holds a high position in the public life of this country was at a popular Northern watering place six weeks ago. She is a woman not given to exaggeration, of quiet, observant habits, and great tolerance of mind. She said that in the big hotel filled with people where she was staying the display of diamonds and expensive gowns, with bottles of champagne at dinner every night, made her ashamed of her fellow-countrymen.

This luxury means that there are people making much money out of the war, even with the hands of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on their profits. They are making more than they made before the war, and they and their women folk forget the horrors of Flanders and the slaughter of the Dardanelles in the self-indulgence of the table and the theatre. We all should be Puritans in this time of crisis in our fate as a people, and we should not be ashamed to own the name and to practice Puritan habits. Cheerfulness, friendliness, sympathy—God knows we need them, need them badly, and God knows we should practice them freely, hopefully, constantly; but that can still go with a decent and grave understanding of the crisis that is on us, with a conservation of energy and resources, with frugality, and the pleasures that do not depend on purely material things. We can for the nation's sake, and we should for our own, cut down to the lowest limits these material pleasures. If we do, we shall gain in self-respect, in a better habit of mind and body. We shall see more clearly the happiness in doing the things that matter, and the demoralization that comes from self-indulgence and show and social display. If we do not, then the reconstruction period—an iron age it must be—will find us confounded, abashed, and helpless; we shall not have trained ourselves for that exacting time when the whole national life must be reorganized.

I will freely admit that many people are sanely and wisely economizing, and calmly and carefully organizing their lives to the changed conditions. There is a quiet in the land which no one alive has ever known or seen before. That is largely due to imposed restrictions of Government as to the lighting of London. People go out less at night. The theatres are now less frequented; the restaurants do their greatest business at lunch time. It is enforced economy and self-denial. We need the willing sacrifice, the spiritual determination to strip our lives of luxury, to subsist on the minimum, to forget ourselves in the duty of thinking and enduring for a cause.

It is incumbent on all in this country

to ask themselves what they can do without; and whenever they can do without they should do without. Of course, it is impossible to say to the man who has a large house or an estate, "You must now change the plane on which you live and descend to a lower plane. Instead of the house with forty rooms, you must have a house with ten rooms." If he owns the house with forty rooms, he can only cut down expenses to a certain point, no matter how hard he tries; otherwise, the house is not cared for, necessary work which keeps it in condition is not done, and he does not maintain his position decently. He cannot leave his house because he cannot sell. If every able-bodied man with a big house and estate were to say: "I am going to a lower level and to live on a much smaller scale," values would extensively disappear, and credit, which is only money invisible, would decline.

I do know people living in large houses who have closed one-half their premises, but they can close no more, since the house requires a certain number of servants simply to keep it clean and for the ordinary household work. These people are mostly living in a very simple way—two courses at a meal, no wine, no spirits, game abolished, no kickshaws, and, so far as they themselves are concerned, no waste in regard to food, and rigidness of diet preserved. They cannot, however, control waste below stairs in the same way, and there are scores of thousands of servants who have no idea either of the necessity for preventing waste or any desire, if there is the necessity, to prevent it. A boy in my household broke four tumblers in one day, and a tradesman who saw him break two challenged him about it. His reply was: "Oh, they've plenty of money!" His view was that because his master could replace the tumblers, there was no need for care. I trust that wherever he is now he has a better mind. He is not with me.

Great numbers of people are economizing without system. A friend of mine at the time of the Baring crash years ago, when asked if it had hit him hard, said: "Oh, yes, I've got to economize. I'm doing it. I've given up hansoms; I drive my wife's brougham."

There is a good deal of economy of that kind at the present time. I know people who take penny buses, but do not deny themselves the theatre, which costs them ten-and-sixpence a ticket. Go into Bond Street, or let your wife go and report on what she sees at the fashionable shops. She will tell you that hats costing £30 are exhibited for sale, and they are bought, too, at the present time! Expensive furs are being bought, but as an affectation of economy buyers take the tube! A man I know discharged a servant to cut down expenses, but he smokes two cigars at a shilling each every day. Our economy lacks proportion, understanding, and the real touch. When need grips us a little we shall begin to study a real economy. Self-indulgence should be entirely eschewed when the very existence of the State depends upon the conservation of such wealth as there is. To give more to the country and to those who suffer for what they have given to the country is an imperative duty. There has as yet been no *extensive* heroism of self-denial in the land, though a large number of people with wisdom and conscience have shown a true understanding of duty. In the history of many a country women have sold their jewels in order to provide the sinews of war, and great ladies have lived on the food of simple laborers and dressed accordingly. We have not come to that yet. It is, however, in the horizon. And even that heroism is as nought beside the heroism needed to offer a life for your country and to save those who do not fight.

It is not enough for the man who is in what is called the higher position of life to retrench and economize. As I have said, he cannot at a moment's notice get out of a big house into a little one. To lose money by heroic effort to reduce expenses, to alter the whole level of his life, is no economy. To cut down expenditure, however, on his own particular level, to sacrifice the savings for the good of the nation's cause, is just as heroic as for the workman who has always earned and lived on the scale of £3

a week to pay a little more taxation as his contribution to a nation's needs. As the Prime Minister has said, every man, no matter what his position, should contribute his full share. There are homes, of course, where little retrenchment is possible; where, with the increased cost of living, economy cannot be employed; yet wages in most of the working trades are double what they were before the war began, and the price of living has not doubled.

No man, high or low, should find himself better off because of this war. As for waste, the waste in the homes of our working people is appalling. It is largely not the fault of the people themselves. In our fanatical individualism we have never organized our social life properly; the poor have never been taught how to cook, to make clothes, to conserve their humble resources, to make the best use of what they have. Providence and thrift have not been widely encamped in the homes of the workers. The moral responsibility for this state of things comes in part from duty undone on the higher levels; for people there have been taught and do know, or should know, by instinct and intelligence what was needed; but they have not concerned themselves with a true, a humane and essential social reform, or else have done so without proper organization. If we had ever organized scientifically in our public departments and social life, we should not now have the scandalous waste going on in the military life of the country. Probably as much is wasted in our military camps, at the front and at home, as would represent 25 per cent. of what is used. But no more of that here.

This brings me to the point that after this war this question of prevention of waste and economy of resources for making use of everything material, the development of the science of utilizing by-products, will have to take place. The reason the Germans have borne the enormous pressure of this war fairly easily, though shut off from many sources of imports, is the scientific way in which their social life is organized. Waste in Germany, except among the higher classes, during the last quarter of a century has been reduced to a minimum. In provincial France, ever since the war of 1870, thrift, economy, the determination not to permit waste, have been universal, and nowhere so extensively as in the kitchen.

Our Education Department has done something in this direction, but it has been on a small scale and it has not been a deep-going business of conviction, a national thing in the true sense. How to run a household, an organization, a shop, an office, with the least waste possible and with perfect economy as to energy, time, &c., is a delicate but it is a paying business. The time is coming when necessity will compel the commercial world to overhaul its system. The loss of men, in itself, will be one of the factors. Now in new countries like the United States, Canada, or Australia, men do not go to their offices at 10:30 o'clock and leave at 4:30. Only the aristocracy do that, and the aristocracy in those countries is, or was when I frequented them at all, the bank clerk; he was regarded as the one leisured member of the community. Men go to their offices in those new countries at 8 o'clock or from 8 to 9 o'clock in the morning. The shop shutters are down at 7 o'clock, Winter and Summer. Men in all trades and professions have a very short time for luncheon. They work late. They work, in other words, till the evening. They are not compelled to do so; no law requires it; it is a free-will offering; it is business. The clerk finds that he cannot get through his work with all he has to do in a thriving business if he saunters in at 10:30 o'clock and saunters out at 4:30 o'clock.

I do not wish to say, and I could not say, that the people on the lower levels in our mercantile world do not work sufficient hours; they do, some of them, particularly in the shops and in certain offices, work much too hard. It is the people a little higher up who are the the cause of waste and of England's bad reputation for production. This much must be said for the industrialists and the labor class, that they do get up early and that they do work their honest eight hours a day, or at any rate their

eight hours a day. There is a vast population, out of the factories and in the commercial and mercantile world and public employ, who could, by two hours' work more a day, add immensely to the nation's wealth and serve the cause of economy and set free the labor of others.

In the field where I have worked for sixteen years, that is, the House of Commons, there is a great room for reorganization. I have always been shocked at the enormous waste of time spent in causing some momentary delay in the passage of a bill or in the general business of the House. While I am a strong friend of debate, and of long debate rather than short debate, on things that matter, that is, on things of policy and conscience, on amendments of importance to a bill, &c., I am strongly opposed to the miserable waste of time, of mental energy, of intelligent capacity, both in the chamber and in committees. I think the business of Parliament could be much better organized if both parties would contend tooth and nail on all matters of principle, but would not degrade Parliament, as it is often degraded, by childish and, to my mind, somewhat contemptible warfare on petty points which are only brought forward to give the enemy his daily stumble over an obstruction, while the enemy takes his revenge by forcing through measures of vast importance with the closure at the gallop. He feels justified in doing so in the face of the obstruction, the futile devices, which have prevented him from doing the ordinary business of the House.

We have had a vast deal of intellectual dissoluteness and mental dissipation in the law making and public life of this country. It has been too much of a game, and a futile game at that. We should pull ourselves together and "sober down." God knows we shall need to do so! I could enlarge my arguments in a dozen other and greater fields, where discipline, organization, and economy are necessary, where the frugal and cheerful spirit will find happiness in making the material his servant, having emancipated itself from its tyranny; but I may not do it here and now.

Exterminating the Armenians

In a dispatch dated Tiflis, Transcaucasia, Oct. 19, 1915, *this report appeared:*

The estimate is made by the Armenian newspaper Mshak that of the 1,200,000 Armenian inhabitants of Turkey before the war there remain not more than 200,000. This residue, the Mshak says, may disappear before the end of the war, on account of the Turkish policy of extermination. The figures of the Mshak are based on the estimate of the Armenian Patriarch at Constantinople that 850,000 Armenians have been killed or enslaved by the Turks, in addition to which 200,000 Armenians are believed to have fled to Russia. The Mshak suggests that a Pan-American conference be held at Etchmiadzin, Transcaucasia, the ecclesiastical capital of Armenia, under the direction of the head of the Armenian Church, for the consideration of the future of Armenian vilayets of Turkey after the war. It is thought here that if satisfactory conditions could be established Armenian emigrants to the United States and the Balkans might return to Turkish Armenia.

An Appeal to the British People

BUCKINGHAM PALACE.

TO MY PEOPLE.

At this grave moment in the struggle between my people and a highly organized enemy who has transgressed the Laws of Nations and changed the ordinance that binds civilized Europe together, I appeal to you.

I rejoice in my Empire's effort, and I feel pride in the voluntary response from my Subjects all over the world who have sacrificed home, fortune, and life itself, in order that another may not inherit the free Empire which their ancestors and mine have built.

I ask you to make good these sacrifices.

The end is not in sight. More men and yet more are wanted to keep my Armies in the Field, and through them to secure Victory and enduring Peace.

In ancient days the darkest moment has ever produced in men of our race the sternest resolve.

I ask you, men of all classes, to come forward voluntarily and take your share in the fight.

In freely responding to my appeal, you will be giving your support to our brothers, who, for long months, have nobly upheld Britain's past traditions, and the glory of her Arms.

George R.I.

This letter from the British King "to my people" is intended to give inspiration to Lord Derby's great scheme of voluntary recruiting.

KING PETER OF SERBIA

This Is a Late Photograph of the Serbian King Seated in His State Office

SIR BRYAN MAHON

Major General of the British Army in Command of the British Troops in Serbia

(Photo from P. S. Rogers.)

Problem of Small Nations in the Crisis of Europe

By Dr. T. G. Masaryk

Late Professor of Philosophy in the Czech University of Prague and Member of the Austrian Parliament; Lecturer in the New School of Slavonic Studies in King's College, University of London.

[*Welcomed by Prime Minister Asquith as a "teacher the influence of whose power and learning is felt throughout the Slav world," and by The London Times as being "known throughout Europe and in the United States as the foremost representative of the Slav spirit," Dr. Masaryk delivered on Oct.* 19, 1915, *the inaugural lecture at the opening of the new School of Slavonic Studies in King's College, London. With his personal approval* CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE *herewith presents to the American public Dr. Masaryk's analysis of the radical causes of the war.*—Editor CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE.]

IT would help us greatly if I could show a good map of the European nations; but no such map exists. This deficiency of ethnological geography is very significant of the scientific situation in this branch of sociological studies, which during this war and as a direct result of it has become so important. Still more significant is the fact that, in spite of the war and the steady discussion of the different nationalities, you cannot buy a map showing the extent of the different nations; you will find political maps, maps of railroads, and so on, but no ethnographical ones. Think of it! The very question of this war is graphically not represented, though day by day for over a year past endless discussion, alike in the press and on the public platform, turn upon the question of nationality. Only a few specialists realize the situation and give us in their treatises and books a few all too scanty ethnographical data.

So inveterate is the conception of the *State* as the only entity which counts in the political world! But today we are forced to acknowledge the existence of *nations* and we are obliged to make a distinction between States and nations; and that, of course, involves a true grasp of the incongruity of political and ethnographical boundaries. An Englishman, speaking of his nation, identifies the nation and the State. Not so the Serb or the Bohemian, because to his experience State and nation do not coincide, his nation being spread over several States or being in the State with other nations. We Slavs very keenly discriminate the State from the nation; but the Englishman will do the same if he uses expressions such as "the spirit" of "the culture" of the German and English Nations.

In the Statesman's Year Book for 1915 we find in Europe twenty-eight States, if we treat Austria-Hungary and Germany each as a single State; we must count fifty-three States if we separate Hungary from Austria and divide Germany into her twenty-five Federal units.

If we take one of the few better ethnological maps—alas! a German one—we find sixty-two nations or nationalities. In other words, in Europe we have more than twice as many nations as States, and that means that the existing States are nationally mixed. States must be composed of more than one nation. And that means, further, that there are in Europe far more dependent than independent nations. Only seventeen nations are independent, or, rather, possess their own State organizations; but portions even of these independent nations are dependent upon other States. In fact, there are only a few States which do not contain more than one nation—only seven

out of the twenty-eight. But if there are seven national States, that does not mean that these seven States are formed by seven nationalities; for some States contain the same nationality, and, in other cases, the same nationality is divided among different States.

And, be it noted at once, these national States (national in the strict sense of the word) are all small, some of them the smallest States, namely, Andorra, Denmark, San Marino, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Holland, and Portugal. The Papal State in Rome is omitted.

The middle-sized States, and, still more, the large States, are all mixed, though they vary in type according to the proportion, the numbers, and, of course, the cultural quality of the several national units of which they are composed.

As a rule, one—the ruling—nation is in the majority; in different States this majority is differently scaled. But we have at least one instance where the minority tries to rule—the Germans in Austria and, side by side with them, the Magyars in Hungary.

Austria-Hungary represents a unique type of the mixed or poylglot State—a comparatively high number of different smaller and small nations forms a single State. The Balkan federation, of which so many idealists, and even politicians, have dreamed, would of course belong to the same type.

For our present purpose it is not necessary to give an elaborate classification of the mixed States; any real, sociological treatment of the problem requires an exact description of the national units in each individual State; only then is fruitful comparison possible.

If we take the States directly involved in the war, we find that all of them are mixed, though in varying degrees. Germany, in addition to her sixty million German inhabitants, has six other nationalities, two of them in considerable numbers, that is, the Poles and Frenchmen; the other four, the Lusatians, (Serbians,) Danes, Czechs, and Lithuanians, forming only tiny minorities. Austria-Hungary contains ten nationalities; Turkey in Europe three, and a few fragments of other nations in addition—Turks, Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, and so on. Asiatic Turkey is, of course, extremely mixed. Bulgaria is mixed, for there is a large Turkish minority, to say nothing of fragments of Rumanians, and so on.

The States of the Allies also are mixed, but for the most part in a different manner. Great Britain has considerable remnants of non-English nations, and so has even France of races which are not French; even Italy, which is often proclaimed as the example of a national State, contains a few Slav, German, and Albanian fragments. Serbia has non-Serbian minorities, Bulgarian and Albanian. Even Montenegro, the smallest State, is mixed.

Russia is ethnologically a unique State. I speak of European Russia; the British Empire, of course, contains in its various transoceanic dominions and colonies many more nations and fragments of nations and races, but Great Britain is in the main English, whereas Continental Russia, though the Russians are in an overwhelming majority, contains many nations, of which several are in large numbers, being, moreover, nations which possess their own culture and traditions.*

Comparing the national composition of the European States, we perceive a striking difference between the east and the west of Europe. If we bisect Europe by a line drawn from the Adriatic to the Baltic and extended up to the head of the Gulf of Bothnia, we find in the west nineteen nations; nine are embodied in twelve States—Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, and Switzerland; the remainder are in the main national splinters.†

The "State-nations" in the west are of all magnitudes; a few great, some of medium size, and the rest small ones; there is a kind of national equilibrium.

*On a special ethnographical map of Russia (Aïtoff, Peuples et Langues de la Russie, Annales de Géographie, 1906) one can enumerate eighty-five nations of several different races, and besides the author mentions nameless nationalities.

†Basques, Bretons, Welsh, Irish, Gaels, Rumanians, Lapps—and to these should be added the Slavs, Albanians, and Germans in Italy.

The east of Europe offers quite a different spectacle. There we have one great nation—in fact, the largest nation in Europe—the rest are all smaller and small nations, some few possessing independent States of their own. But in Eastern Europe—and this applies especially to Russia—we have a very great variety of national and racial fragments.

The east and west differ also in respect of the number and size of States. Whereas the west has eighteen States, the east has only eight, two belonging partly to the west, partly to the east. For the west and east are not divided sharply and by a straight line; Germany and Austria belong both to the west and to the east.

Speaking of the east and west of Europe and saying that both halves are not sharply cut, we find a peculiar ethnological zone in what is often called Central Europe. From Trieste, Saloniki, and Constantinople, up north to Dantsic and Petrograd in a line not straight, but curved in the direction of Berlin, in whose neighborhood live the Slav Serbs, is a greater number of smaller nations, which were and still are under the dominion of Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Russia. This zone, composed of East Prussia, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and the west of Russia, is the real and proper centre of national antagonism. Here the nationality question and the language question is the political *vis matrix*.

It was here that the present war broke out; here is the quarter from which come continual unrest and disturbance for the whole of Europe. This zone is the real kernel of the so-called Oriental question, this zone supplies the most urgent and clamant cause for remodeling the political organization of Europe. In this zone the smaller nations are continually striving and fighting for liberty and independence. It is this zone which has confronted the statesmen of Europe with the problem of small nations; and it is the Allies, more especially, whom this war is forcing to apply themselves to its solution.

II.

We are always speaking of smaller and greater, of small and great nations. What, then, is the proper definition of a small and of a great nation? What makes a nation great? What is the problem of a small nation, and how does such a problem come to exist?

The very notion of greatness and smallness is relative and correlative; the more so, if the number of the population, or the extent of the territory of a State or a nation is taken as the principle of classification.

The most numerous population is in Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, and the Russians and Germans are in this sense the greatest nations; the English, French, Italians and Spaniards—we are not considering the nations outside Europe—are smaller. Some sociologist will perhaps put the Russians, Germans, and English as one class, (86-45 millions,) the French, Italians, and Spaniards (40-20 millions) in a middle class. A third category would be formed by nations under 20 millions, say, the Poles, Rumanians, Serbo-Croats, and Czechs, then would follow the Portuguese, Swedes, and so on, and finally would come what might be described as the fragments or splinters of nations.

I hardly need to point out that such a classification is based upon mere numbers and their effects; nor will any one seek to minimize the decisive material value of these mathematical calculations. We all know *now* what a greater or smaller army means.

But the numerical greatness of a nation is variable and changing. Since the ninteenth century almost all nations are growing in number; all nations, then, are getting larger, and statisticians can calculate when the population of the various nations will be doubled. Through this process of growth the numerical relation of the different nations will be changed, owing to the fact that some increase more rapidly than others. The most striking instance, and one which provides a partial explanation of this war, is the slow increase of the population in France compared with its quick growth in Germany. Till 1845 France had a larger population than Germany; indeed, at the end of the eighteenth and at the begin-

ning of the nineteenth century the Frenchmen were practically the largest nation. A good deal of the French history of that time can be explained by this fact, just as recent German history will become clear if we consider the numerical increase of the population. The Germans themselves boast of this increase as one of their claims to greatness.

We touch here upon the intrticate problem of decadence and degeneration; the fact that the annual birth rate in many countries or parts of countries has been falling in recent years, the fact that changes in the development of the birth rate are experienced very often and often very suddenly, these facts, I say, force every thinking man to abstain from general indictments and condemnations.

The German extreme nationalists have no right to condemn France and other countries in which the increase of the population in slower than in Germany. For not merely is the birth rate falling in Germany also, but it should be remembered that the overwhelming majority of German economists accept in their theory of population the leading ideas of Malthus and are not inclined to see in the precipitate augmentation of the population an undoubted proof of physical and moral vigor.

But let us assume for a moment that the increase of the population, the surplus of the birth rate over the death rate, can be applied as a standard to physical and even moral health and strength. In that case the populationistic principle applies as much to Germany as to other countries. Students of the question know that England during the ninteenth century is the only instance of a country where the population was trebled; and it is equally worth noting that in the Bohemian countries the Czech population increased more rapidly than the German population. Will the German ultranationalists admit the consequences of their own logic in these and other cases?

To sum up the argument: physical greatness and strength, being, *ipso facto*, always relative and correlative, is no warrant, no foundation of right and of prerogatives; seventy is certainly far more than ten, but have the seventy the right to deprive the ten of their bread? Have they the *right* to use force?

The German jingoes appeal to history. History, they argue, shows that small States are slowly but surely disappearing and serving as a material for the big ones. Compare the hundreds of small States in the Middle Ages, and even in modern times—they are absorbed and swallowed up by the bigger ones; Prussia herself is an instance of such absorption, but France, Italy, England also—in a word, all big States—were formed out of small ones. History then proves that the law of political development makes the formation of great States and nations unavoidable. Small nations and States, under the most favorable circumstances, have only a temporary duration, historical development favors and promotes the growth of big nations and States; the German Nation, Germany, is big, bigger than the rest with one exception, which is more apparent than real; therefore her legitimate aim is: world policy, world power!

Let us probe to the bottom this Pan-Germanic imperialist theory. It is quite true that many hundreds of small States —city-States—were absorbed by one State growing bigger and bigger. But in France, Italy, &c., partly even in Prussia, this process was a gathering of the same people, of the same nation, not a subduing of foreign nations—though, of course, Prussia and other States subjugated foreign nations, too.

If history proves that small States and nations are emphemeral, it proves the same of big States—remember the Oriental empires, Alexander the Great, the Greeks and Romans, the Franks, the old German Empire, Napoleon. All these States—not nations!—were provisional also. The real meaning of these political, unnational formations is misunderstood by the Pan-Germanists, and the arguments which they base upon are false.

History is a process of integration, but at the same time of disintegration; the double process appears as the strengthening of individualism, and simultaneously collectivism is growing stronger, too. History tends not toward

uniformity, but toward variety, toward organized variety, which very often is misrepresented as barren, monotonous, indiscriminate uniformity.

Speaking politically, the centralizing tendencies in social life are steadily counterbalanced by the striving for autonomy and federation in all its variety; centralized absolutism is everywhere checked by freedom, the centralizing tendencies of aristocracy are weakened by the individualistic tendencies of democracy. This double process pervades all departments of social life.

History then refutes the Pan-German argument. History shows that national States develop in Europe, and history is in favor not only of big but also of medium-sized and small national States.

History is in favor of all individuals, of individualism in general; nations are natural organizations of homogeneous individuals, and States, being more artificial organizations, are more and more adapted to the nations. So general is this tendency that the numerical strength of the nations does not play a decisive part.

History shows that since the eighteenth century the principle of nationality has grown stronger and received more and more political recognition. National individualities, their language and culture have steadily gained ground all over Europe, and linguistic rights have been gradually codified. These rights have been and still are advocated by Italy, by the Austro-Hungarian and Balkan nations, and they are advocated by Germany herself. How, then, can Germany or any other nation claim for herself this right and at the same time refuse it to others?

How strong and how far-reaching national feeling and ideas have become in modern times is proved by the revival of oppressed nationalities in all States. The Renaissance of the Bohemian Nation is a specially striking instance and a confirmation of the general national principle.

History further shows that the strengthening of national feeling does not prevent the growth of internationalism and internationalization. I am not playing with words when I draw a sharp distinction between inter*nationalism* and inter*statism*. (I hope that philologists will pardon the word.) True nationalism is not opposed to internationalism, but we abhor those nationalist jingoes who in the name of nationalism oppress other nations, and we reject that form of internationalism and cosmopolitanism which in fact recognizes only one, its own nation, and oppresses the others. True internationalism is not oppression, but neither is it a-nationalism nor anti-nationalism.

We learn from history that the warlike spirit tends to diminish, that militarism is getting more and more defensive after having been offensive; we learn from history that peoples and nations are more and more ready to work for themselves, without depending on the labor of others. Idleness, the oppressive form of aristocracy, whether in individuals, in classes, in nations, and in races, is diminishing. History finally shows that brute force and quantity is less and less esteemed. In all nations the best men are agreed in prizing spiritual and moral forces—humanity is the effective watchword of the champions of all nations.

It is true, and history confirms it, that mankind strives for unity, but it does not strive for uniformity; world federation, not world power; *consensus gentium*, not slavery of nations and races; the organization—not the conquest of Europe.

If I am not mistaken, this war is a revelation of this historic truth. No *Herrenvolk*, but national equality and parity; *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité* among nations as among individuals.

The Pan-Germans appeal in vain to history; the facts are against them. History most assuredly is *vitae magistra*, the teacher for life; but there is history and history. History, in fact, does not prove anything, for all facts are equally historical—history gives as many examples of brutality as of humanity, of truth as of falsehood. The Huns also are historical. The real question has always been, and always will be, whether we are to bow unquestioningly before all his-

torical facts or whether we are resolved to master them. I am an adherent of realism; but the spiritual and moral forces in society and their growth are not less real than the Prussian Generals; we can and must accept political realism, but we never can approve of the *Realpolitik* of Treitschke, Mommsen, Lagarde, of Bernhardi and the rest, who have converted anthropology into zoology. I say that, though I am speaking in the country of Darwin and his theory of the survival of the so-called fittest.

III.

Smaller and small national States could exist very well; in fact, they do exist—out of the twenty-eight States, at the very most seven can be classified as great or greater; in other words, the small States outnumber the great by four to one. On a basis of mere size we then are not surprised to hear that there is only one great State, only one great nation, entitled to world power.

But the conditions of political independence for smaller States are the same as for the bigger ones.

Small and big States have the same natural frontiers—mountain chains, (Pyrenees, the Bohemian Mountains;) great rivers, &c. The big and almost all small States are on the sea; only Switzerland and Serbia are landlocked, but then it is just Switzerland which provides eloquent proof that a small State can flourish without a coast line. Many of the smaller nations (Czechs, Magyars, &c.) are without the sea.

States and nations, even when small, have been able to protect their independence; take, for instance, small Montenegro and the other Balkan nations against Turkey, Holland against Spain, Switzerland (in its smaller size) against Austria, and so on. The physical, mental, and moral qualities of smaller nations are just as good as those of their greater neighbors and oppressors. Are the Serbians less brave than the Austrian Germans; the Czechs less energetic and strenuous for having conserved and strengthened their nationality against the Germans? Denmark is probably the most cultured country in Europe, Bohemia has fewer illiterates than the Austrian Germans.

Such instances could easily be multiplied; but I am ready to concede that, on the other hand, small nations labor under certain disadvantages. A small nation has a more limited number of hands and heads; the division and organization of labor, physical and mental, is less adequate. There is a smaller number of specialists, wealth and comfort are more restricted. But here, too, there are exceptions; take Holland, Switzerland, and Bohemia, as examples. Some small nations are apt to acquire a peculiar form of timidity, a lack of daring and enterprise; occasionally even a kind of cringing want of frankness. But are these qualities not due to the effect of prolonged oppression? To be sure, these and other drawbacks, in so far as they exist, exist only under given circumstances, under the pressure of the existing system of rapacious militarism and economic exploitation. Let the smaller nations be free, do not interfere, leave them alone, and these drawbacks will soon disappear.

But small nations have also some advantages over greater nations; both drawbacks and advantages are relative.

A smaller nation develops a certain many-sidedness; every individual force and talent is valued and used, labor and effort and, indeed, the whole working system are intensified. It is a well-known fact that small farmers produce relatively much more than do large estates. The whole nation is, so to speak, well-kneaded. Palacky, our great Bohemian historian, exhorted his nation to treble and even to increase tenfold its labors; small nations are indeed nations of workers. In a smaller community there is a more intensive intercommunion of men, ideas, and feelings; people know each other, they can more easily be united, though of course this intimacy also has its drawbacks. Mr. Fisher, the Vice Chancellor of Sheffield University, in his essay on "The Value of Small States," brings out the fact that democracy, the direct participation of the people in the Government, can be best developed in small States. He adduces many instances; and

it was certainly this idea that inspired Rousseau's proposal to divide the big States into small communities. Sociologists and historians know that the administrative machinery of the modern State grew out of the small administration of cities. The great cities in big States are a remedy against indefinite expansion. I will not conceal the fact that small nations also can be decoyed by tempting imperialist ideas; notable instances are the Magyars, and perhaps the Bulgarians. The poet Kollar, the great apostle of humanity and national reciprocity, rightly observed that small nations can be very intolerant.

The German imperialists often tell us that small nations cannot produce great men; great men require, we are told, a great environment, the communion of many and great spirits. I do not believe it, and I take the instance of my own country—the whole world knows and esteems John Huss, the whole world has learned from the educationalist Comenius, Zizka is the founder of modern strategy, our nation was the first to break the spiritual centralization of the Middle Ages and to dare the Reformation.

The bravery and the heroism of small nations has been mentioned. Hussite Bohemia faced the whole of Central Europe. Historians report that the Germans fled on hearing the Hussite battle-song. (Would that the Allies could compose a similar song!) But whatever shortcomings or even faults small nations may have, they love their country and their people, and this love prompts them to energetic action in the field of politics and culture.

I speak of culture. That is a difficult and intricate sociological factor. I will only express my point of view. Culture is not the product of any one nation, big or small; there are various types and different degrees of culture. I am no blind follower of Rousseau or mere admirer of the primitive stages of culture, but it is a very great disability not to accept the various forms and degrees of culture as represented by the many nations and parts of nations and not to understand that each nation must work out its culture alone and independently and not simply take that of another nation, even if it be called a higher culture. Passive acceptance of this kind may be convenient, but it is dangerous and detrimental.

Mr. Fisher, speaking of the rude and valiant Serbian peasant, very aptly alludes to the ballads which sing of the battle of Kosovo, and to their great educational influence on the Southern Slavs. During the last war against the Turks I happened to be in Serbia, and a Serbian officer told me of his experiences on the battlefield. When at the head of his regiment of peasant soldiers he reached the plain of Kosovo, the famous "Field of the Blackbirds," a deathlike silence seized the whole detachment; men and officers, without any command, uncovered their heads, crossed themselves, and each of them tried to tread softly, so as not to disturb the eternal sleep of their heroic ancestors.

Here my friend, quite lost in the remembrance of that great experience, unconsciously imitated their gait, and his voice fell to a whisper as he recalled the silence of his soldiers. Many of the weather-beaten faces were bedewed with unconscious tears as was my friend's face while he spoke. I, too, was deeply affected by the recital of his experience. How many of the German professors who today are raving against Serbia do you think are worth one tear of these illiterate peasants?

If time permitted I might analyze the drawbacks of great nations. Germany herself, who claims to be the greatest of all, is tormented by a perpetual unrest. Greatness imposes a duty—to protect the smaller brothers and at least to help them to join and organize their federations. The Balkan peoples tried it, but no help came to them from Europe. In all nations the need of social reforms is recognized; the weak are to be protected by the strong and by the State. An analogous principle holds good in the relations of big to small States. As there is no superman, so there is no superright of great nations. The great nation has no right to use its smaller neighbors as the tools of imperialistic fancy and of an inordinate craving for power. On the other

hand, the small nations must not try to imitate the great; they must be satisfied to go their own way.

Great Britain came into this war to protect little Belgium, and now with her allies she is faced by the task of protecting Serbia. This evolution of the war is almost logical, for Germany's aim is and was Berlin-Bagdad—the employment of the nations of Austria-Hungary as helpless instruments, and the subjection of these smaller nations which form that peculiar zone between the west and east of Europe. Poland, Bohemia, Serbo-Croatia, (the South Slavs,) are the natural adversaries of Germany, of her *Drang nach Osten;* to liberate and strengthen these smaller nations is the only real check upon Prussia. Free Poland, Bohemia, and Serbo-Croatia would be so-called buffer states, their organization would facilitate and promote the formation of a Magyar State of greater Rumania, of Bulgaria, Greece, and the rest of the smaller nations. If this horrible war, with its countless victims, has any meaning, it can only be found in the liberation of the small nations who are menaced by Germany's eagerness for conquest and her thirst for the dominion of Asia.

I will conclude with a confession. I prepared this lecture at the very moment when Serbia was about to be attacked by Germany and her baggage porters, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. But more than once the skeptical thought has struck me: Is this the time for *talking* about small nations, when the vital thing is simply to afford protection to one of them? Feeling this incongruity, I will comfort myself with the saying of a Slav thinker: "A good word is a deed also." I can at least promise that all the lecturers at the new School of Slavonic Studies will spare no effort to make it a success and through it to contribute, however imperfectly, to drawing closer the relations between Britain and the Slavonic world.

The Note to Germany

By O. C. A. CHILD

Insistent that the Nation's voice be heard,
Searching his soul for every measured word,
He strives to make grave lines with peril fraught,
Maintain Fair Peace, not peace with honor bought.

Upon the page where stern intent he writes
Appear dread visions, weird, uncanny sights—
Ships sunk in sea and fields of ghastly dead—
Before his eyes the paper turns to red.

Yet he will write what duty bids him say,
Steadfast and sombre take his lonely way,
Still strive for understanding, peace, accord,
And fear? nay, not one whit, the naked sword!

Shall Germany Hate?

By Rudolf Eucken

This article by the great Jena Professor of Philosophy appeared originally in Die Woche of Berlin.

HOWEVER united we Germans may be today in our strong resistance to our foes, our opinions differ widely on the question of our psychical attitude toward them, and our native conscientiousness compels us carefully to weigh the right and wrong. We are especially at variance as to whether hate of a hostile people is or is not allowable. Some demand such hate as vehemently as others reject it. Let us hear first what is argued pro and con.

One party reasons thus: We Germans have been attacked in a manner unparalleled in the world's history. We were attacked not because of some single point in dispute but in our whole selves, in our national existence; we were attacked not only with the honorable weapons of open combat but with the poisoned weapons of slander. We are particularly angered by the boundless untruthfulness with which we are accused of starting the world conflagration. After intrigues stretching over years—proofs of which are given now in the reports of the Belgian diplomats — had finally brought about war by means of endeavors at isolation and calumnies, some have the audacity to accuse us, with the help of a lying press, of being the disturbers of the peace, and to bring us into disrepute before the entire civilized world as a savage people filled with the lust of conquest. This misrepresentation continues as the war progresses; as we cannot be beaten, we can at least be shown up as wicked. The conspiracy of half the world against us, moreover, brings us into terrible peril, which we may ward off only by exerting all our strength, all our soul. Must not our feelings overflow likewise, is not the highest emotional violence justified, nay, is it not demanded? Must not such emotion discharge itself as hate, as hate against those who would destroy that which is dear and holy to us? In such a line of reasoning hate becomes an expression and test of energy in the fight for the Fatherland.

The opposite view is based on the following: From early times religion and morality have interdicted hate and impressed the idea of its rejection on the human soul. They had in view primarily the relation of individuals, but the basic idea applies also to nations, all the more so since the historical development of the different nations has made them more and more members of a single human race. Therefore a hate directed against a whole nation is not possible except in conjunction with much injustice against individuals, who differ so greatly from each other and hold greatly differing opinions toward political and national movements. Must the innocent suffer with the guilty? The awakening of feelings of hate is likewise undesirable for our own people. Our soul may easily deteriorate if it harbors such feelings, and obscure for us the images of things. Thus hate may easily bring more weakness than strength.

Opinions, then, differ radically on the subject. The conflict is certainly not a mere matter of words nor of differing temperaments of individuals, but involves differences in the manner of regarding life. Yet there is a good deal of wordy war in it, due to an ambiguous conception of terms, and in reality we are often nearer agreement than our words suggest.

Judging emotions has always engendered much dispute. As an example of this let me cite an instance which exercised men's minds deeply in the early Christian days. Men argued as to whether God's anger was conceivable or not. Some declared such a conception indispensable, since, without this anger, an

entirely serious moral world system was unimaginable; others rejected it with equal determination since such emotion most emphatically contradicted the pure spirituality of God. Saint Augustine bridged the difficulty with the explanation that this anger was a mere emotion, a disturbance of the soul-equilibrium, which was to be kept entirely apart from the conception of God, but that it was impossible to dispense with it as an expression of the seriousness of Divine judgment. Thus, in the problem confronting us, in analyzing the emotion, discard the blindness and dimness of a mere ebullition of hate, but hold firmly to that which expresses the strength and warmth of the psychical attitude.

This requires a distinct separation of hate and anger. The difference between them is shown already by the usage in language; it takes account of a noble anger, even a holy anger, but not of a noble or holy hate. Anger applies more to single acts; hate involves the whole being. Anger cannot only be combined with respect, but, in its noblest form, it arises from love; hate recognizes nothing, rejects absolutely. Parents may be greatly angered against their children but will not hate them for that reason. Hate belongs to the weak and impotent, it is their only possible means of resistance; anger, on the other hand, goes very well with strength.

As to nations, we may most emphatically repudiate a particular sort of political attitude, but that should not lead us to hating the nation as a whole. How different is the part taken by individuals in engendering a conflict, how much are they persuaded by others merely, how greatly are they influenced by cleverly engineered appeals to the mass, and swept away without much personal judgment or thinking of their own? In such circumstances they are honestly convinced that they are serving a good cause, and to sacrifice themselves for their country must seem to them also honorable. Even if we deplore the meagre spiritual independence of human beings, weakness is not wickedness and does not justify hate.

Moreover, the opposition engendered by conflict must not lead to depreciation and repudiation of the culture possessed by a nation; that would be, in truth, blind hate. That portion of the spiritual creations of a nation in the course of history which has reached splendid heights is one thing, the component parts of a nation at different times are another. The miserable fellows who are now inciting nations against us have little in common with the spiritual creations of their nation; what has Grey to do with Shakespeare, Poincaré with Descartes, Salandra with Dante? The spiritual treasures brought to view by those thinkers and poets rise superior to the changes and wanderings of time, wherefore we should rejoice, not to please others, but for our own sake. For we Germans have the power of attracting what is great in all peoples and periods to ourselves and thus giving an inner breadth to life which is attained nowhere else and makes us capable of the highest achievements. That this is no mere characterless plagiary of what is foreign is shown best of all by Goethe, to whom all peoples and times were inwardly near, yet who remained before all else a good German.

But if we are to avoid unfairness and narrowness, of which hate of one people for another is a concomitant, this does not at all imply favoring a weak psychical state, a soft and unmanly attitude. Individual instances of this in our people we must combat with determination. There is a disagreeable weeping and wailing to the effect that the ties between nations are now broken and one is urged to do nothing that may antagonize others and make the task of restoring these ties more difficult. The present split between nations is, to be sure, a great misfortune; nobody can feel that more deeply than those whose lifework turns to man as such

But we Germans have not caused the split, therefore we need make ourselves no excuses because of it. If our entire existence is at stake in the fight, we cannot bother much as to whether the energy developed by us in the conflict is comfortable and agreeable to our opponents. During such a tremendous conflict all we have to do is to think

of victory, on which depends the continuation of our existence. When the victory is won and peace restored, then a way will be found to bind again the ties between nations, which will undoubtedly depend less on wise teachings and sentimental assertions of the homogeneousness of all that is human than on the compulsion of labor that will first develop the external relationships of nations and will then surely turn inward. But how this is to be done must be left to the future; we have enough to do just now at our present task. We Germans are not to be blamed if we are for the moment disgusted with the ideas of internationalism and world peace. To be sure, a number of personages of idealistic mind worked and are working in this direction, but even these must pause somewhat when they consider that the Governments of those very nations in which the peace progam found special favor incited and stirred up the present war. From Russia came an eloquent peace manifesto some years ago, yet Russia it was who by her mobilization made war inevitable.

A lately published report of the Belgian Envoy, Baron Greindl, dated May 30, 1907, is especially valuable on this point. He says, after telling of the lust of conquest of England, France, and Russia: "They are the same powers who, together with the United States, scarcely emerged from its robber's war against Spain, appear as ultra-pacifists at The Hague."

Pacifism proposes an international tribunal as a panacea for all wrongs. For secondary questions this undoubtedly has a certain value, but questions on which national existence is staked cannot be intrusted by us to such a tribunal for the very reason that, given the closely knit interests of all nations, this tribunal lacks the requisite impartiality, and the judge therein would necessarily be a party to the case. Would we Germans, no matter how conscious we might be of the justice of our cause, leave the decision thereof to an international Areopagus, perhaps under the leadership of the Americans?

We must also reject as a weakening of the problem the propositions of neutrals—such as those of a stately group of Dutch savants—submitted to us as well as to the other belligerents, exhorting us to demand peace from the Governments most urgently, to subdue all lust of vengeance by higher humanity, to respect our enemy even as ourselves. That is assuredly based on noble sentiments, but it also betrays a certain misapprehension of the real situation. Such a warning cannot be pronounced without considering all the combatants as swayed by a similar war lust. But we Germans cannot permit the differences in the case to be ignored in this manner. A nation that was peacefully at work and was forced into war much against its wish and will has no reason to excuse itself for fighting to the best of its ability.

Let us take a corresponding case from private life: A peaceful, ceaselessly active and successful citizen arouses the envy and greed of others and is murderously attacked by them. If, while he is using all his strength to defend himself, a third party puts in an appearance and exhorts both sides to show peaceableness and mutual respect, will not the attacked party be compelled to reject being thus placed on an equal footing with the aggressors; will he not find that this exhortation would be more appropriate elsewhere? Let us show all possible respect for humankind, but let us remember that it is more a problem than a finished reality, and that enormous developments lie on the road toward its heights.

The Imperial Chancellor spoke of our problem recently in the best possible way. The German people feel no hate against other nations, but all sentimentality has been crushed out of it. In these words is to be found the right road away from aberrations.

There must be no dim and blind emotion, but also no faint and weak sentimental drivel. There must be strength but not violence, justice but not obliteration of moral differences. What applies from this in individual cases must be worked out by each for himself.

Limits of Sea Power

By Count E. Reventlow

This article by Count Reventlow, declaring that "not only the land power of Russia, but also the sea power of Great Britain has been shipwrecked—at the pivot of the Orient, the Dardanelles," appeared in the Hamburger Nachrichten of Oct. 12, 1915.

FOR more than a year Great Britain has closed to us our imports from overseas. The unfortunate configuration of the German North Sea coasts allows Great Britain to control the exits from this sea to such an extent, and so far from the bases at the German corner of the sea, that the cutting off of our commercial ocean routes has followed and has been maintained without involving a decisive battle with the German fleet as a preliminary. I shall revert to the two reasons for this: the inferiority of the German high seas fleet and the resemblance of the North Sea to an inland sea closed by the British Isles as with a long barrier. Today I shall content myself with reference to the latter reason and with the further task of showing that the ultimate purpose of this closing of the sea exits by Great Britain for a period of fourteen months—namely, the placing of the German Nation hors de combat by asphyxiation—has not been attained.

The fact that Great Britain and her allies still cling to the belief that this purpose will eventually be realized, that success will eventually be won and German power be crushed by the "silent, irresistible pressure of the British fleet" is of actual importance only in so far as this partly real, partly imaginary, conviction tends to contribute materially to instilling into our foes courage and the required confidence for continuing the war. As to how genuine these are will not be investigated in this article. It may be stated as beyond doubt that the great majority of the English and French are entirely convinced of ultimate success along this road. This must be admitted as a "moral victory" as long as it persists. On the other hand, the longer the struggle lasts, the more will the belief in such success be shaken and exposed to the danger of becoming transformed into its opposite.

As a matter of fact, the British stoppage of German sea trade has not influenced German power of fighting and resistance in the slightest degree. This is shown only too clearly and brilliantly by German success on the mainland, and requires no further proof. To give it a general application, what has occurred means that even the strongest navy in the world is not in a position to influence war on land, if it can neither strike a telling blow on its enemy's coasts nor destroy his navy nor starve him out by cutting off his importations of foodstuffs and raw materials. That this closing of the oceans is not a matter of indifference to Germans goes without saying. Naturally, the stoppage of a trade running into billions cannot be without effect on a country and people. But that does not concern the actual situation of our country, especially in so far as it comes into the present discussion.

All we are considering here is whether, during the past fourteen months, British closing of the seas to us has impaired German power to fight and resist, and whether it threatens this power within a predeterminable time. These questions may be answered in the negative.

Events prove that, except for the power to inflict a certain amount of damage, even the greatest fleet is powerless against a nation that is not dependent on foreign imports for its existence and possesses enough sea power to keep the enemy's fleet away from its own coasts and harbors.

Another side of this powerlessness of even the strongest fleet in relation to

war on land may be found in the Anglo-French undertaking against the Dardanelles. The allied fleets commanded the Mediterranean Sea, in a sense. But they were not able, either with naval guns or military expeditions, to gain possession of the Dardanelles, the southeast focus of the world war. Except for the possibility of a Bulgar-Greek attack on Constantinople, the forcing of the Dardanelles was possible from the land side only with the help of the fleet. Had the Allies succeeded another instance important in world history of the influence of sea power would have been chronicled, since the forcing of the strait would not only have sealed the doom of the Turkish Empire, but would have been of the greatest and to a large extent decisive importance on the course of the land war, especially in view of the present developments in the Balkans.

The valor and skill of our Ottoman allies and the energy of the German submarines have since March foiled all endeavors and onslaughts of our enemies. Today we may say without exaggeration that the Dardanelles campaign has failed.

In that failure is seen, far more than in the first case, the failure of British sea power. Assuming that the forcing of the Dardanelles is now impossible, it may be stated that Great Britain is now powerless to influence the development of military events in the southeast and the development or transformation of Balkan and Oriental conditions. The Dardanelles were the only point in this region where sea power could and must drive in the wedge. It was not strong enough to unhinge Turkey, for which reason we are confronted with something that contradicts all the historical precedents of the last two centuries, viz., that apparently the Dardanelles problem will finally be solved from the land side. In former times Russia and Great Britain confronted each other by the strait over a weak Turkey, obedient first to one and then to the other. Today, when they are allied for the purpose of strangling Turkey together, they find themselves compelled to relax their grip from exhaustion, because for the first time Turkey is strong and defends herself successfully without aid, and because Turkey, also for the first time, is allied with Continental powers who wish her to be not weak and obedient but strong, capable of resistance, and free. Against this alliance not only the land power of Russia but also the sea power of Great Britain has been shipwrecked—at the pivot of the Orient, the Dardanelles.

The two facts, brought forth by this war and touched upon above, which show the limitations of an insular power in conflict with a strong mainland opponent backed by sea power, cannot, of course, be established in their full and great importance at the present stage of the war. This is impossible for all sorts of widely different reasons. But, even at this stage, one can and must draw attention to the strength and great value for the future of the new combination, viz., Constantinople-Sofia-Berlin-Vienna, in a military, political, and economic sense. The powers and potentialities in this combination sought vainly for a long time to come together, and it was only natural that the foresighted statesmanship of our opponents did everything possible to hinder their union. All the more significant is the success now attained.

The late American writer, Homer Lea, told the English in the strongest language that the world power of their island would end or fall into decay just as soon as the coasts of the Continent became the limits of British power. That applies to the North Sea and the English Channel just as well as to the historical strait of the Orient. We who take the Continental point of view are of the opinion that most of the devastating European wars and their ruinous economic consequences have arisen from British power and influences on the Continent. The inference for the future is easy, also the further inference that the German Empire, together with its friends and allies, can and must conquer secure freedom of the seas only with such a secure Continental position as a foundation. The means for this conquest must be sea power; its

foundation, secured Continental position —Continental power, in other words. The Continent can win the freedom of the seas against the greatest sea power only with the weapons and foundations of sea power, never by international exchange of fine phrases.

The stronger the German Empire is on land the stronger it must become on the sea, for, on the seas, land power reaches its limits. No German will endure the thought that closing the oceans to the German Empire and people, isolating their colonies and robbing them of these colonies, may be possible again in the future.

English Soldiers in German Eyes

The Berliner Tageblatt gives prominence to an account of the outward appearance of English soldiers, written by its war correspondent with the German armies in the west. The correspondent had observed closely a number of British prisoners taken in the recent struggle in the neighborhood of Loos, and spoke with several of the men. He says:

Yesterday, when I saw these Englishmen come, dirty and torn, out of the battle they looked like a gang of criminals. Today, after a liberal use of soap and water, their real faces can be seen. There is still a number of them with the typical countenance of the rascal and the blackguard—men whose homes are in darkest London, Whitechapel boys—but the majority look as soldiers really look, simple, blunt, and good natured. They have the peculiar characteristics of their race: leanness, little, stumpy mustaches, the bad English teeth, cold eyes very close to each other, and narrow heads. They smoke their short pipes, spit in their peculiar manner, and speak for the most part a terrible English. There are elderly men among them, and many youthful faces. They are good soldiers, unquestionably; they are brave and tough fellows, admirably fitted for trench warfare, but I doubt if they could be used with success in mobile warfare. Any one who assumes, however, that Kitchener's army has been recruited from the rabble commits an unpardonable error. There are very many volunteers and respectable men in it who joined out of pure patriotism, though a large number, it is true, entered the army because they were out of work and had no prospect of obtaining work.

Eating by Government Order

A wireless dispatch from Berlin to Sayville, L. I., dated Oct. 23, 1915, *reads:*

The German Federal Government today decided to assume control of the price and supply of victuals throughout Germany. Up to the present time the State provincial authorities had been considered competent to handle the food situation. The German Government now considers it necessary, the Overseas News Agency says, to equalize the position of the various sections of the empire as to the distribution and the price of victuals, which are abundant, but under different conditions in the various States and provinces of Germany. New regulations will be made in order to avoid differences and to distribute in an equal manner food throughout Germany, thereby assuring for the coming months full supplies at reasonable prices in all districts.

Elimination of the English Fleet

By Captain L. Persius

This article, by the noted German naval writer, declaring that Britan's failure to force the Dardanelles has resulted in the practical elimination of the British fleet as a factor in the decision for world empire, appeared originally in the Berliner Tageblatt of Oct. 20, 1915.

GREAT BRITAIN owes the birth of her power to her fleet. The domination of the seas by this fleet strengthened and increased her power for centuries. One after another the rest of the sea powers were defeated. In the sixteenth century the English overcame the fleet of Philip II., in the seventeenth century the Dutch fleet, in the eighteenth the French, the Spanish, and once more the Dutch; in the nineteenth the French-Spanish and Danish fleets. All who confronted England were crushed because the fight was fought out on the element where British superiority could win.

It would be wrong, to be sure, if one were to attribute the creation and duration of English power solely to the glorious deeds—and the violent acts—of English Admirals and ships' Captains. Without Aboukir, Trafalgar, and the rest, the star of English sea power would never have risen, but it was English diplomacy and the political schooling of a large part of the English Nation that knew how to derive the right advantage from naval victories and thus crown the navy's work.

England ruled the seas because her fleet was surpassed by none in fighting men and superiority of ships. Since Trafalgar, the Briton has been living on his reputation of invincibility which he has sought to secure during the last 110 years less by warlike deeds than by building ships. Our foremost authority on naval history, Captain Stenzel, writes:

> Mistress of all the seas after 1805, British sea power has looked with pride on its achievements and with contempt on all other navies; it has paid little heed to technical progress in other lands, and even less to the tactical and strategical changes necessitated by this progress. Therefore it has occasionally lagged behind in all departments.

In the use of torpedoes, the building of submarines, and so on, England followed the suggestions of France. Even the basic idea for the dreadnought type of ship is not English, but originated with the Italian Cuniberti. Only the richest sea power could stand the huge increase in building cost made necessary by the change in the type of warship, and the English Nation willingly stood it. For Nelson's saying "only numbers can destroy" was the god whose worship drove the nation to ever greater efforts to surpass any nation venturing to compete in number and size of ships. British war science lacked inventive genius. Sheer mania to surpass ruled, and brought into being the dreadnought ship of the line, the dreadnought cruiser, and the gigantic naval building program. The masses of the English people were intoxicated by the tremendous figures and staked the security of the empire on the Goliath-like ships whose invulnerable armor was to protect alike the sea-girt British isles and the colonies, whose huge cannon were to assure the success of any attack on the enemy. There was only scorn for the occasional warnings addressed to the Admiralty regarding the dangers to which dreadnoughts and superdreadnoughts were exposed, or pointing out that submarine, mine, airship, and aeroplane would some day be formidable antagonists of the great battleships.

The British Admiralty boasts of having entirely fulfilled all the tasks imposed upon it. For instance, the loss of colonies is placed to the credit of the British fleet. But is Great Britain justified in assuming so confidently that the seizure of "some" of our colonies will result in permanent occupation? Under the pretext of attacking England, Napoleon went by the sea route to Egypt. At Aboukir, Nelson annihilated the French fleet and thus cut off the land army's

communications with France. For the purpose of liberating Egypt from arbitrary English rule the passage of the Mediterranean is today unnecessary. It will be difficult for British warships to prevent the crossing of the Suez Canal. And in whatever direction one turns from Egypt, east or south, one sees the impotence of British sea power—everywhere the road is open to an army!

At the present time the influence of sea power on history may be different than in the past, on account of the relationships between nations, the closely limited theatres of war, the undeveloped means of communication on land, and the duels between nations.

British sea power has failed so far in small as well as important matters. How different was the naval record of Albion in other wars! Thanks to its superiority it destroyed or captured hundreds, even thousands, of hostile vessels. During the Napoleonic wars the English took 260 large and 980 small warships, and from 1801 to 1812 they took each year from 2,500 to 4,000 merchant vessels. How different nowadays! It may be said that the losses of our enemies are far greater than ours. England has so far lost about fifty warships, displacing about 300,000 tons, and 420 merchantmen of a tonnage of 680,000, in round numbers. The loss of warships, to be sure, has been fully offset by the building of new ships during the war. For instance, before the outbreak of war, there were fifty-seven British ships of the line having a tonnage of 1,017,000; now there are at least sixty-two, with a tonnage of 1,238,400. The British Admiralty still pins its faith to the saying "only numbers can destroy." The keels of huge ships are laid without pause, although all the dreadnoughts and superdreadnoughts, anxiously guarded, are rusting on their anchor chains in harbors.

Public opinion in England, however, is beginning to doubt the truth of the old watchword. To the fear of the submarine peril and of the Zeppelins worry over the Balkan situation is now added. The fleet cannot save Serbia nor hinder the march of the central powers to Constantinople nor build a wall around Egypt. The fleet has failed to destroy the German Navy and starve out Germany. It has failed to force the Dardanelles in order to give its Russian ally a breathing spell and, above all, in order to obviate the further perils of a menace to Egypt, which signify also the economic relief of the central powers. The proclamation of the King of Bulgaria regarding the declaration of war on Serbia begins with the words "The European war is approaching its end." Let us hope that this prophecy may be fulfilled. It would mean the elimination for a long period of the English fleet as a factor having important influence on the destinies of nations.

Thousands of British Officers Lost

In correspondence of The Associated Press, dated Oct. 15, 1915, *the following appeared:*

The severity of the fighting on the western front recently is indicated by the officers' casualty lists for the fortnight ended Oct. 11, which show that the British Army lost 383 killed, 646 wounded, and 107 missing—a total of 1,136 in that period. The proportion of killed to wounded is rather higher than of late, and losses among officers of high rank have been severe. Major Gens. Thesiger and Capper, two Colonels, and ten Lieutenant Colonels have been killed or have died of wounds, while two Brigadier Generals are reported wounded and one missing. Losses of officers since the beginning of the war total 18,210, of whom 5,559 have been killed or died of wounds, 11,115 wounded, and 1,536 missing.

Britain's Conduct of the War

By H. H. Asquith

Prime Minister of Great Britain

As an utterance from the heart of its Administration made at the greatest crisis that has threatened the British Empire, the subjoined address by Prime Minister Asquith, delivered in the House of Commons on Nov. 2, 1915, serves as a historical document of the first magnitude. Without apologetics, and vigorously asserting his position as the head of the Government, Mr. Asquith states the dispositions made for the preservation of the empire, at the same time crediting the British Nation with "a proper sense of perspective, a limitless stock of patience, and an overflowing reservoir of both active and passive courage." The speech is presented hereunder in full.

THE statement which I am about to make to the House has been delayed in point of time by circumstances which I regret, but which I could not control. The delay has had one consequence—perhaps I ought to call it an advantage—that it has enabled me to receive from every possible quarter injunctions, counsels, exhortations, warnings, [laughter,] as to what I am and as to what I am not to say. I am afraid I am doomed to disappoint many expectations, but not least the expectations of those of my many advisers who seem to think that it is my duty to appear here today in the guise either of a criminal in the dock, making the best defense he can for a somewhat doubtful past, or even of a white-sheeted penitent with a couple of candles, one in each hand, doing penance and asking for absolution. [Laughter.] I do not propose to adopt either the one attitude or the other. I am going to speak to the House today as the head of the Government, and in that capacity to describe, so far as possible, our actual and prospective situation to a nation which, as I believe, is as determined today as it has ever been to prosecute this war to a successful issue ["Hear, hear!"] and which trusts the Government—however and by whomsoever that Government may be composed—to use every means, and to exhaust if need be every resource, in the attainment of our common and supreme purpose. ["Hear, hear!"]

It is true that today some parts of the horizon are overcast. This war, like all the great wars of history, has been fruitful in surprises and disappointments to all the combatants engaged. For us here in this country it seems to me at this moment to call in an exceptional degree for three things: a proper sense of perspective; ["Hear, hear!"] a limitless stock of patience; and an overflowing reservoir of both active and passive courage. ["Hear, hear!"] I do not think our people as a whole—I need not pay the compliment of more than a passing notice to the small coterie of professional whimperers who keep us supplied and keep our enemies supplied ["Hear, hear!"] with a daily diet of falsehoods—show any lack or any falling off in any of these qualities. All they desire, so far as I can discern and appreciate their minds, is to be told, to the extent which diplomatic and military exigencies permit, how our cause stands, and to be assured that in the maintenance and the defense of that cause we as a Government and as a people are playing a worthy part. ["Hear, hear!"] The wish for the fullest possible information is natural and is most legitimate, nor can there be possibly any greater mistake than to suppose that the Government has any interest of any kind in concealing anything that is known to themselves, subject to the one overruling condition, that its disclosure does not assist the enemy.

SIR J. FRENCH'S FORCE

How do we stand today? When we began the war in August of last year we were prepared to send abroad, and, without hitch or delay, we sent abroad, in August and the early part of Sep-

tember, six infantry and two cavalry divisions. In the operations which are described by Sir John French in the dispatch which is published today—in those operations of the last week of September and the early part of October of the present year, he had under his command not far short of 1,000,000 men. To these, of course, must be added troops employed in the Dardanelles, in Egypt, and in the other theatres of war, as well as our reserves and our garrisons for the defense of the United Kingdom and of the outlying parts of the empire. How has this gigantic force been got together, by a nation which has never aspired to be a military power, whose main reliance, both for defense, and, if need be and should occasion arise, for aggression, has always been upon its navy—how has it been composed? First and foremost, of course, of the manhood of this United Kingdom.

In the course of the last fifteen months—I leave for the moment the navy out of account—we have recruited for the purposes of the army, regular and territorial—an enormous number [laughter]—I do not like for the moment to give the precise figures—an unprecedented number of men. The contribution of India is splendid and well known. There are one or two figures I should like to give to the House, and through the House to the country and the empire, which show the assistance we have received from the dominions of the Crown. Canada has contributed 96,000 officers and men to the expeditionary force, Australia has sent 92,000. [Cheers.] New Zealand has sent 25,000. [Cheers.] South Africa, having completed the reduction, after a most successful and brilliant campaign, of German Southwest Africa, [cheers,] has supplied important contingents for service in Eastern Central Africa, and, in addition, has furnished 6,500 men for service in Europe. [Cheers.] Newfoundland has sent 1,600 men, in addition to her substantial contributions to the royal navy. The West Indies has supplied 2,000, and contingents have been provided by Ceylon and Fiji.

In these figures, remarkable and significant as they are, I have included only the forces furnished in the shape of complete units. No account is taken in these figures of the preparation made for the maintenance of these units in the field, the future expansion of contingents already supplied, nor of the very large number of men from all parts of our empire who have made their own way to the United Kingdom. [Cheers.] I should add to complete that aspect of the story that in Rhodesia, East Africa, and the West African colonies important additions to the existing local forces have been placed in the field, while in the other colonies and dependencies more remote from active military operations all defensive organizations have received a profound stimulus

NAVY'S AID TO THE ARMY

I have said nothing so far of the navy, but while I am dealing with our military forces, for I am certain it will interest the House and the whole empire, let me add an account of the service which the navy has rendered in the transport of our troops. Since the war began the transport department of the Admiralty for the army alone have carried 2,500,000 officers and men and 320,000 sick and wounded and nurses. They have carried, further, 2,500,000 tons of stores and munitions and 800,000 horses, mules, and camels. These operations have involved thousands of voyages through seas which at one time—happily that time has now long since passed—were subject to the raids of German cruisers, and even now, to some extent, though I believe a rapidly diminishing extent, are infested by submarines. [Cheers.] Up to the present, and I think this is a most remarkable fact, the loss of life in the whole of these gigantic oversea operations has been considerably less than one-tenth per cent. [Cheers.] I do not think that anywhere in the history of the world can any nation under any condition produce a comparable record. [Cheers.] Of course, these figures, as the House will understand, are exclusive of millions of tons of stores, mainly coal and oil, which have been carried by the navy for allied Governments.

For the moment I will leave the actual service of the navy itself out of the account. But has there ever been anything comparable to it in history? There they are, our men of the grand fleet, living—as I told them when I had the honor a couple of months ago to address them myself—in those dim and distant spaces, in the twilight, so far as public observation is concerned, unnoticed, unadvertised, performing with an efficiency and vigilance that it is impossible to describe or even to appreciate service to the whole empire which makes not only us here absolutely secure against invasion, but which has cleared the whole high seas from one end of the globe to the other of the cruisers of our enemies and of the whole of the German mercantile marine. [Cheers.] Where is that great fleet on which so much thought, so much science, and so much money was expended, which was to be a perpetual menace to us here in the United Kingdom? [Cheers.] Locked up in the Baltic, it dare not show its face upon any sea where it can be met and dealt with, and the whole effective maritime military resources of Germany upon the seas, after fifteen months of war, are reduced to the sporadic and constantly diminishing efforts of a few furtive submarines, which have sent to the bottom far more innocent, unoffending civilians than any armed enemies. I think figures such as these are more eloquent than columns of rhetoric, and I can conceive no better medicine for people, if there are such outside a very few small and selected areas in this country, who attempt to be downhearted and doubtful that the empire is playing its part in the greatest struggle in history.

I am not going to apologize, [cheers] or to assume an attitude of excuse or defense [cheers] for all the people of this empire who have borne their part so magnificently [cheers] or for the Government of this country, which from the beginning of the war up to this moment has to the best of its ability, I doubt not with many shortcomings and mistakes, ["Hear, hear!"] but to the best of its ability, and I believe with the confidence of the great mass of our fellow-countrymen, controlled and organized and directed this great effort. [Cheers.]

Having said something of the forces which we have brought into being, and the debt we owe to our fellow-citizens all over the empire, I pass to the very important and relevant question, what are we doing with all this vast apparatus of destruction and defense? I will say nothing, or hardly anything, of the western theatre of war, which for the last year has absorbed by far the larger part of our army. Our total casualties in France and Flanders up to the present moment, or at any rate up to a week ago, were 377,000 men—that is to say, considerably more than twice the total number of the expeditionary force which was dispatched in August and September of last year, though happily the very large percentage of the recoveries from wounds makes the net permanent wastage on a much smaller scale. Sir John French's dispatch published today described the latest achievements of his gallant army, and for the moment, so far as that sphere of war is concerned, I have nothing to add on the part of the Government except that so far as I know, in this western theatre, the Germans have not on balance gained one foot of ground since April of the present year. Indeed, that is, I believe, a very great understatement of the case.

MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN

I turn for the moment to he eastern theatre. Though I am going to deal exclusively or mainly with the rôle played by our own troops, I cannot pass to that theatre without pointing out to the House the supreme fighting qualities of the Russian soldier [cheers] which have never been more splendidly or more conspicuously manifested than during the recent retreat, and assuring our great ally there, that we, here in this country, have the greatest confidence in his capacity ultimately and before long to roll back the tide of invasion, and to reverse the past. But as I have said, I am concerned today and for the moment with the doings of our own forces in that quarter of the war. First,

I would like to say two or three words on the important and highly successful campaign, which has not, I think, attracted the attention it deserves—namely, the proceedings of our troops in Mesopotamia. The object of the expeditionary force, which originally consisted of only one division, the Sixth, in the Autumn of last year in Mesopotamia, was to secure the neutrality of the Arabs, to safeguard our interests in the Persian Gulf, to protect the oil fields, and generally to maintain the authority of our flag in the East. The history of what has taken place can be very easily summarized. In November last General Sir Arthur Barrett fought a battle with the Turks occupying Basra. In January a further advance was made, which resulted in the capture of Kurnah, a place which, as the House probably knows, lies at the junction of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Two or three months later, in April, a second division was added to the force, and the command was assumed by General Sir John Nixon. After a brilliant series, and an absolutely uncheckered series, of land and river operations, the Turks were driven back both up the Euphrates and up the Tigris. In July their final positions on both rivers were captured, with heavy casualties, and General Nixon's force is now within a measurable distance of Bagdad. [Cheers.] I do not think that in the whole course of the war there has been a series of operations more carefully contrived, more brilliantly conducted, and with a better prospect of final success. [Cheers.]

THE DARDANELLES

I come now to what is not so uncheckered a chapter in the story of our operations in the eastern theatre of war; I mean that which has gone on at the Dardanelles. In the first few months of the war we were still at peace with Turkey; but, owing to causes which are now well known and to which I need not go back, a state of war between ourselves and the Turkish Empire came into existence in the first week of November, 1914. From that moment it was no longer possible, either from a strategic or from a political point of view, to concentrate our entire energies upon the western theatre. The Turks threatened our allies, the Russians, in the Caucasus. They threatened, if not directly, remotely and indirectly, ourselves in Egypt. They were able to close the Black Sea and in consequence of that our source of supply of Russian wheat from the Russian ports. And the advent of Turkey as an ally of Germany and Austria produced a great, and in some respects a lasting, effect upon the attitude of the Balkan States. When that condition of things was brought about the Government had to face a question in the Near East which was not merely strategical. I will venture to say here, because it applies to a great many operations, past, present, and future, that in a great war like this you cannot determine your policy or your course of action entirely and exclusively by military and naval considerations. ["Hear, hear!"] There are other elements that come in. It is the duty of the Government—of any Government—to rely very largely upon the advice of its military and naval counselors; but in the long run a Government which is worthy of the name, which is adequate in the discharge of the trust which the nation reposes in it, must bring all these things into some kind of proportion one to the other, and sometimes it is not only expedient but necessary to run risks and to encounter dangers which pure naval or military policy would warn you against. You must take all those things into account.

Now, in regard to this matter, from the first moment that a state of war began to exist between Turkey and ourselves, in November of last year, we had to consider, in consultation with our naval and military advisers, what was the best and most politic course for us to take either aggressively or defensively in that part of the globe. In January we had not sufficient military force available, having regard to the requirements of the western theatre, for service in the east to do more than provide for the local defense of Egypt against the impending Turkish attack, which was delivered and ultimately defeated on

Feb. 2. The Government then had brought under their notice the possibility of a naval attack on the Dardanelles.

After full investigation and consultation with naval experts, including the Admiral commanding in that part of the Mediterranean, notwithstanding—I am betraying no secret in saying this—notwithstanding some doubts and hesitations which undoubtedly there were in the mind of our principal naval adviser at that time, Lord Fisher, the Government felt justified in sanctioning a naval attack. People who think and who say that that attack was initiated without due consideration and without a full review of all its naval possibilities are entirely mistaken. It was most carefully considered and developed in consultation between the Admiral upon the spot and the War Staff of the Admiralty here; and before any final decision was taken it was communicated to the French Admiralty, who entirely approved of it and agreed to take part in it, and it was enthusiastically—I do not think I am using too strong a word—received and acclaimed by the illustrious Grand Duke, the then Commander of the Russian Army, who rightly anticipated that it would assist him in the Caucasus in his operations there.

The matter was carefully reviewed over and over again in the War Council, and in answer to a question which I see was put to me, although all the operations were contrived in secrecy and in confidence, I may say that before any shot was fired or any actual step taken it was communicated to and approved by the Cabinet. In the circumstances of the case in which we then stood the operation conceived was a purely naval operation. We could not afford at that time—Lord Kitchener said and we all agreed—any substantial military support; and it was, therefore, decided to make the attempt with the navy and with the navy alone. I take my full share of the responsibility for the initiation of that operation—my full share. ["Hear, hear!"] I deprecate more than I can say the attempt to allocate the responsibility [cheers] to one Minister or another, or to suggest that in a matter of this kind some undefined personality of great authority and overmastering will controlled and directed the strategy of the operation. That is not the case. For the initiation of this enterprise in the Dardanelles no one is more responsible than I. [Cheers.] I thought then, as everybody must have thought who knew the whole circumstances and surveyed the whole situation, that we ran great risks. But, on the other hand, we had very great and, for the prosecution of the war, capital objects then in view. We could influence the whole Balkan situation in a sense favorable to the Allies. We could open communications with the Black Sea and relieve what was then a very pressing necessity of this country—the necessity for a freer and fuller influx of wheat and other supplies—and, if we could, strike a blow at the very heart of the Turkish Empire. As I have said, in its first conception and initiation this was a purely naval affair. The naval attack took place toward the end of February. The outer forts gave way and were completely subjected. Those naval operations were continued systematically for a month, and they culminated in the attack on the Narrows on March 18, which resulted in a setback and the loss of or damage to several important naval units.

We had then to consider whether and to what extent this operation should be continued, and it was the opinion of those who advise us—and so far as I can, looking back upon the past, bring myself again to resurvey the situation, it seems to me that it was if not a sound at any rate a very tenable opinion—that by the aid of an adequate military force the attack might still be driven home and become a success. Sir Ian Hamilton was selected to command the expedition and left London early in March. He was present at the naval attack on March 18, and a few days later, after conference with the Vice Admiral on the spot, he reported to us that they were in agreement that a joint naval and military attack was necessary. The actual plan of operations was left, as I think it ought to be left, to the judgment of the commanders on the spot, although

so far as I know there was never any disagreement between them and the opinion of the General Staff here at home. I will not go into the intermediate stages of the operations until we come to the beginning of August. We had then assembled at the Dardanelles a very large naval and military force. The actual operations which took place have been described and are now familiar to the House and to the public.

I will not attempt at this moment—it would be quite irrelevant to my purpose—to attach either praise or blame to this man or that, or to this unit or that, but I will say this for myself, that in the whole course of the war, with its ups and downs, I have never sustained a keener disappointment than in the failure of this operation. The chances of success, as it seemed to us and to those on the spot, were not only great but preponderant, while the consequences of success, if success had been attained, were almost immeasurable. ["Hear, hear!"] It would have solved the whole situation in the Balkans. It would have prevented the possibility of that which unhappily now is the realized fact, the adhesion of Bulgaria to our opponents. It would have laid the capital of the Turkish Empire open to menace and possibility to capture, and throughout the whole of the Eastern world it would have been acclaimed as the most brilliant and conclusive demonstration of the superiority of the Allies.

We did not succeed, notwithstanding the magnificent exhibitions, never surpassed, of gallantry and of resource on the part of our troops [cheers] and by none more conspicuously than on the part of our Australian troops. [Renewed cheers.] Nor ought the House to forget the extraordinary and magnificent service rendered throughout these operations by the whole of the royal navy. [Cheers.] Nothing has been more conspicuous than the service of our submarines. Let me just mention this fact—it is a most significant and most encouraging fact as showing how the old spirit of the British Navy, its adventure, its gallantry, its resource, pervades those who have to manipulate these strange modern machines just as much as it did those who served under Drake, Hood, and Nelson. Up to the 26th of last month British submarines operating against enemy vessels in the Sea of Marmora have succeeded in sinking or damaging two battleships, five gunboats, one torpedo boat, eight transports, and no less than 197 supply ships of all kinds, whether steamers or sailing vessels. [Cheers.] That is a wonderful chapter in the history of the British Navy. The arrival of German submarines took place in May, and, of course, added an enormous danger to the situation. The navy showed themselves quite equal to it. Safe harbors were selected and prepared, where ships could run in securely. Small craft were assembled in great numbers to maintain the communications of the army. And, finally, a number of specially constructed vessels, largely due to the inventive genius of Lord Fisher himself, which had been built by the Admiralty in anticipation of such requirements as this, went out to the Mediterranean and have done from that day to this most magnificent work. The navy throughout this campaign has risen superior to all difficulties, and has been able to maintain the communications of the army intact.

But, as I have said, the result of the series of attacks made in August has been disappointing. I admit it to the full. I am telling the House the whole truth about this matter because I think the country ought to know it; but when you come to form a judgment, and I think it is premature yet to do it, of whether this attack on the Dardanelles was an operation which ought to have been undertaken, you must consider what would have happened if it had not been undertaken. It is at least probable that the Russians, who were then already beginning to retreat before the Germans in Poland, might have had a serious setback in the Caucasus. In all probability a great attack by the Turks might have been organized against us in Egypt. The Mesopotamia expedition might have been swept out of existence, and Bulgaria would almost certainly have allied herself with the central powers months

before the time when she actually did. And during the whole of this time and up to the present moment, do not forget that our force on the Gallipoli Peninsula has held up and is holding up a force of something like 200,000 Turks, and preventing them from doing incalculable mischief in other parts of the eastern theatre. I am not on behalf of the Government going to say more as regards the future of this particular sphere of the theatres of war, because I think, as I said a moment ago, it is too soon to pronounce a final judgment.

The situation at the Dardanelles is receiving, I need not say, our most careful and anxious consideration—not as an isolated thing, but as part and parcel of the far larger strategic question which is raised by the whole of the recent developments in the eastern theatre of war.

THE BALKAN POSITION

I will now say a few words, and they shall be very few, because they must be very carefully chosen, on the situation in the Balkans. Ever since the beginning of the war, and especially since Turkey entered into it, we, and by "we" I mean not only ourselves, but the allied powers, who have always acted together, have not ceased or slackened in our efforts to promote united action among the Balkan States and Rumania. The efforts of diplomacy ever since August and September last in that direction have been ceaseless and untiring. The result, I again make this admission, so far as the promotion of Balkan unity is concerned, has been disappointment and failure. And it is not surprising, perhaps, that there are critics who think that by greater firmness at one point and by greater adroitness at another a more successful gain might have been made. But, Sir, if I might for a moment say a word to these critics, there are two or three points which are often left out of account and which ought to be taken into account when you are dealing with this tangled and thorny chapter in diplomatic history.

The first is this: That unity of direction is as important an asset in diplomacy as it is in strategy. Throughout the whole of these proceedings Germany has had that advantage, for Austria has always been a mere cipher and appendage to German diplomacy. With the Allies, on the other hand, every important step has had, naturally and necessarily, to be taken in consultation and in concert between three, and latterly four, different powers. With the best good-will in the world and with the most genuine common purpose there must be differences of angle and of point of view in an operation of that kind. Another point which is equally relevant and important in this particular connection is the mutual animosities—I am not using the word in any censorious sense—of the Balkan States themselves, an unhappy and a still unliquidated legacy of two Balkan wars, and especially of the treaty of Bucharest. ["Hear, hear!"] It is an easy thing, it has been throughout an easy thing, for Germany to make lavish promises to Bulgaria of Serbian and Albanian and, perhaps secretly, even of Greek territory. But we, the Allies, could not barter away the property of our allies and friends behind their backs [cheers] without their consent or without an assurance, at any rate, of adequate compensation, which has been a source of infinite complication and controversy.

GREECE AND SERBIA

Further, when the Allies are reproached, as they are in some quarters, with being too late in providing active help for Serbia, it must be remembered that up to the very last moment there was the strongest reason to believe that Greece would acknowledge and act upon her treaty obligations to Serbia. When, on Sept. 21, after the Bulgarian mobilization had begun, M. Venizelos, who was then Prime Minister of Greece, asked France and ourselves for 150,000 men, it was on the express understanding that Greece would mobilize also. Greece did, in fact, mobilize under his direction on Sept. 24, but it was not until Oct. 2 that M. Venizelos found himself able to agree to the landing of British and French troops under the formal protest, a merely formal protest, which he had already made to the French Gov-

ernment. On Oct. 4—I wish these dates to be borne in mind—M. Venizelos announced what had happened to the Greek Chamber, and at the same time declared that Greece must abide by her treaty with Serbia. The next day the King repudiated the declaration and then M. Venizelos resigned. The new Government which succeeded declined to recognize that a casus foederis had arisen between Greece and Serbia, in spite of our constant insistence that Greece should make common cause with Serbia, and the new Greek Government, while declaring their desire to remain on friendly terms with the Allies, declined to depart from their attitude of neutrality. Those are facts which ought to be taken into account by the people who criticise the alleged inertia of the allied Governments. I make no comment upon that for the moment. It is better not to do so. The result is that Serbia, without Greek support, was left to bear the brunt of a frontal invasion by Germany and Austria and a side attack from the King of Bulgaria.

I have to say this, and I say it on behalf of the Government and of the people of the United Kingdom—we here in this United Kingdom, and I know it to be also the opinion of our French and our Russian allies — we cannot allow Serbia to become the prey of this sinister and nefarious combination. [Cheers.] The General Staffs of the French Army and of our own have been in close consultation—consultations which culminated with the very welcome visit to London at the end of last week of the illustrious Commander in Chief of the French Army, General Joffre. [Cheers.] The result, I am glad to say, is complete agreement between us, not only as to the ends but as to the means. The House will not expect me to say, and I ought not to say, by what method or in what form that common policy will be pursued. But this I will say, our cooperation will be close, cordial, and in full concert, and Serbia may be assured, so far as I am able to do so, and I give her that assurance on the part of the British Government today, that her independence is regarded by us as one of the essential objects of the allied powers. [Cheers.]

BRITISH DEEDS AND DUTIES

I am sorry to have kept the House so long with these matters, but I set forth with the object of telling them everything that I could well do, and I now proceed to ask myself and to ask them the further question, after this review of the various theatres of operations. What are we doing and what ought we to do in addition to all that we have done, first as a community and then as classes and as individuals? We have, as my right honorable friend the Minister of Munitions said in May last in a speech which I wish was widely read—he said, and he never said anything truer: "We have in this war, as partners with our great allies, three special co-ordinate functions to discharge. First of all, there is the supply of men—an adequate supply of men for the army; then there is the provision of the munitions of war, not only for our own troops, but for the forces of our allies; and, thirdly, there is the burden which we have taken upon ourselves, and to the utmost of our ability shall endeavor to discharge, the burden of common allied finance. One of the things which we have to consider is how we are to co-ordinate and to adjust the different functions, the object being that we here in the United Kingdom and in the British Empire should contribute most fruitfully and most effectively to the common cause."

THE SERIOUS FINANCIAL POSITION

I will say just one word, first of all, as to the third of those points—namely, the question of finance. The financial position today is serious. The extent to which we here in this country are buying goods abroad in excess of our exports is more than £30,000,000 per month, against an average of about £11,000,000 per month before the war; and at the same time we are making advances to our allies and to others which were estimated by my right honorable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his budget speech to amount to a total during the current financial

year, to say no more of what is to come, of £423,000,000.

We have also, be it remembered, alone among the belligerent countries maintained our free market for gold, and indeed have exported large amounts to all parts of the world, and it is certain we are making purchases and undertaking commitments to provide credits abroad to an extent that can only be paid for by the further export of gold or by the further sale abroad of securities and of our own debt. I only bring these facts, which are familiar, into this context and to the recollection of the House in order to say once more that this is a burden which, rich as we are, resourceful as we are, we cannot go on discharging unless there is on the part of the Government, as well as on the part of individuals, the most strict and stringent rule of economy, the avoidance of unnecessary expenditure, the curtailment of charges which under normal conditions we should think right and necessary, and, if I may use a homely expression, cutting our coat according to the cloth with which we have to make it. I am not a pessimist in this matter. I do not think our position compares unfavorably with that of the Governments who are opposed to us. The consumption of the German Government and the German Nation has been far in excess of what they have been able to produce or import, and their stocks of available commodities are, from all we hear, rapidly diminishing and dwindling. Further, the standard of life of the greater part of the population of Germany has been depressed to a point at which there is little or no margin of reserve. We, in these respects, no doubt apparently and ostensibly stand in a better position, but I would once more say, with all the emphasis of which I am capable, that we cannot sustain the burden which this great war has laid upon us unless as individuals, as classes, as a community and as a Government, we make and are prepared to make far greater sacrifices than we have hitherto done in the direction of retrenchment and economy.

There is another point in that connection I should like to mention before I deal with the question of men, and to this for a moment I desire to call the attention of the House, and that is the cost of the army. The average cost of the regular army in peace time, on a very rough and approximate estimate, used to be reckoned, and is reckoned, as about £100 per head per annum. I am quite certain that I am using a very moderate and more than moderate figure when I say that in the condition which now prevails the complete cost per head of the army, the vastly increased army which we are now maintaining, is somewhere between £250 and £300 per head. I do not want to go into details. I purposely said it was an approximate and very rough estimate. That is a fact which everybody ought to bear in mind.

NATIONAL SERVICE

I come to the question of men. I lay down for myself one very simple proposition, and it is this: Under the conditions in which we are now placed every man in this country, without any distinction of any kind, ought to be doing the thing for which in view of the purposes of the war he is best fitted. I make no exception or qualification of any kind. The difficulty, of course, is to find any system under which you can say what each particular man or class of men should do, and my right honorable friend the President of the Local Government Board introduced the national register, of which Parliament approved, with the very object of providing the material upon which a system of that kind might be based. I will go a step further. I am speaking my own views, though I have no reason to think they are seriously dissented from by any of my colleagues; where in the course of the argument I think they are I will draw attention to possible points of dissent. My next proposition is this: After you have made, by the best system of examination and classification that you can adopt, adequate provision for all the other necessary national services, among which I need not say I do not include merely the fabrication of munitions, but also the maintenance of industries which are essential to the life of our country, the carrying on of indus-

tries which are essential for the production of our exports, when you have made adequate provision for all those national interests the residuum—not, perhaps, a very happy word to use, I will say the reservoir—which is left of men of military and recruitable age ought to be fully explored and exhausted. [Cheers.]

Now I approach thornier ground. There have been and probably are differences of opinion as to whether that recruitable reservoir can be fully made use of by what is called the voluntary system without resort to some form of compulsion. I will let the House for once into a Cabinet secret. So much has been said and written of what goes on in the Cabinet—

Sir E. Carson [Dublin University]—Some of them true. ["Hear, hear!"]

Mr. Asquith—Very few. Some of them are true, but very few. Things are said to go on in the Cabinet which those of us who sit in the Cabinet have never heard or dreamed of in our lives. But I will let the House into a Cabinet secret, without breaking any obligation of secrecy or any confidence, and that is that there have been differences of opinion [laughter] among the members of the Cabinet as to what we need—whether, in other words, what I call the full exploitation and employment of the recruitable reservoir can or can not be obtained without resort to some form of compulsion. I will state my own view. In the first place, I have no abstract or a priori objection of any sort or kind to compulsion—in time of war. ["Hear, hear!"] I have nothing at the back of my mind which would make me go to the stake, or some less severe form of penance, in defense of what is called the voluntary principle.

I think that in time of war we must get rid of all these predilections, both on the one side and on the other. [Cheers.] It is a pure question of practical expediency—how are we going to bring the war to a successful conclusion? I will make a further admission, if admission it can be called, and that is that I think our system of voluntary recruiting, which does very well, or well enough, under normal conditions in time of peace, operates, as it has been hitherto practiced, in a haphazard, capricious, and to some extent unjust way, both with regard to individuals and classes. ["Hear, hear!"] It is like a net with very irregular meshes. It lets through some things which ought not to be allowed to escape, and it holds and keeps some things which had better be let through.

My objection to the employment of compulsion for the purpose of recruiting the army under existing conditions has not been based at all upon abstract attachment to a priori principle or upon blindness or indifference to the imperfections and defects of our existing methods of voluntary recruiting. It is based upon entirely different grounds, namely, that the employment of compulsion under existing conditions would forfeit what I regard to be of supreme and capital importance, namely, the maintenance of the national unity. [Cheers.] That again is an abstract objection, for when translated into concrete terms it means this: If you are to apply—I do not speak of any particular method, but any method of coercion or compulsion without something in the nature, I will say of universal but of general assent, you would defeat your own purpose. ["Hear, hear!"] It would not be a practicable or workable method of making good and filling up the gaps left by the defects of the voluntary system. I am speaking my own view—entirely my own view.

My proposition, if I were to formulate one, would be this—not that I rule out compulsion as an impossible expedient, but that compulsion, if resorted to, ought only to be resorted to, and can from a practical point of view only be resorted to, or, in other words, be made a workable expedient for filling up the gap which you have to supply, with something in the nature of general assent. [Radical cheers.] I am glad to say that, to a large extent, these are not for the moment practical or relevant controversies. Lord Derby's scheme, the details of which are familiar to the House and to the country, is being worked, I believe, with the hearty consent and co-

operation even of the most ardent supporters of compulsion, certainly with the good-will and active co-operation of organized labor, the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, and all the various agencies in the country which are seeking to supply this great national necessity.

If you ask me how many men ought we to aim at getting under that scheme, or under any scheme, my answer is that you ought to aim at securing everybody who is left of military age and capacity, after you have completely supplied the other national necessities to which I have referred. I would much rather state the requirements of the Government and of the nation in those general terms than by reference to any particular set of figures. It covers everything. It covers everybody who remains over and who ought to be made available, wherever he may be or whoever he may be. ["Hear, hear!"] If you ask me again when I should form my conclusion as to whether the voluntary system as organized by Lord Derby, and worked by his co-operating friends, had reached a result which would enable us to say whether it was successful or not, my answer is—I think he has fixed Nov. 30 as the date on which he will close the list—my answer is, as soon after that date as it is possible to classify and arrive at the results which his labors have achieved. Then, and not before then, and not later, can we say whether or not the experiment of voluntary recruiting is a success. I hope I shall have the assent both of those who, like myself, are strong voluntarists and of those who are disposed to favor a system of compulsion, when I say that I think it would be much better to leave it like that and come to a decision when we have arrived at that point of actual experiment, than to lay down hard and fast lines in terms of numbers as to this or that principle. ["Hear, hear!"]

I believe myself that the result will be wholly satisfactory. I have not the least fear of there being any necessity to resort to anything beyond this great organized effort, which is being carried on with the good-will of all parties in the State and the hearty co-operation of the leaders of organized labor. But if when every just allowance has been made for other necessary work, and the whole of this machinery has been in operation and has achieved what it can, there should still be found a substantial number of men of military age not required for other purposes, and who without excuse hold back from the service of their country, I believe that the very same conditions which make compulsion impossible now—namely, the absence of general assent—would force the country to a view that they must consent to supplement by some form of legal obligation the failure of the voluntary system. [General cheers.] As far as I myself am concerned, I should be prepared to recommend them to take that course, but I dismiss it as a contingency which I do not think is ever likely to arise. [Radical cheers.] I am determined—I stick at nothing—I am determined that we shall win this war. Sooner than not win the war, if I find—I do not believe I shall—such a situation as that, I should come down without the faintest hesitation or doubt to all my friends, those who like myself are what I call strong supporters of the voluntary system, and say, "We have done what we could, we have not obtained the results we hoped for. We must do what is still necessary by other means." [General cheers.] Now, let me say one word in this connection.

I am told by Lord Derby and others that there is some doubt among married men who are now being asked to enlist whether they may not be called upon to serve, having enlisted, or promised to enlist, while younger and unmarried men are holding back and not doing their duty. Let them disabuse themselves of that idea. So far as I am concerned I should certainly say the obligation of the married man to enlist ought not to be enforced or binding upon him unless and until—I hope by voluntary effort and, if not, by some other means—the unmarried men are dealt with first. ["Hear, hear!"]

It is not because I myself have any

doubt—I have far too much confidence in the patriotism and the public spirit of my fellow-countrymen to doubt for one moment that they are going to respond to that appeal—that the young men, unmarried men with whom the promise of the future lies, are not going in this great emergency to shirk the task and to leave the fortunes of their country and the assertion of the greatest cause for which we have ever fought to those who have given hostages to fortune. But I think it is only fair, just, and right to the House of Commons that we should face every contingency.

A SMALL CABINET

There is one other matter to which I must refer. I have spoken of finance, I have spoken of the provision of men, but I am told there is great anxiety in some quarters as to what is called the higher direction of the war. We have a Cabinet of twenty-two members. (An honorable member — "twenty-one.") Twenty-one at the moment, but I wish it were twenty-two. [Here the right honorable gentleman looked across the table and smiled at Sir E. Carson.] But call it twenty-one, if you please. Some people seem to think that a Cabinet of twenty-one members is incompetent to conduct the affairs of a great empire in times of emergency like these. ["Hear, hear!"] Mr. Pitt when he carried on the great war against France more than 100 years ago had, I think, a Cabinet of seven or nine, but the exiguity in size of that Cabinet did not prevent it from committing great blunders [laughter and "Hear, here!"] and the country from suffering from many strokes of ill-fortune. For myself I do not think there is any numerical specific against either want of foresight or want of good luck. That is a very mechanical way of looking at the matter. I do not propose to change the size of the Cabinet, but of course there is a great deal to be said in time of war for having one, or it may be more—at any rate one comparatively small body of men who will deal with the daily exigencies of the State. We realized that—although it may seem very strange for some of our censors—in the first few weeks of the war. I do not think any Prime Minister has ever had to a greater degree than I have had the delegation of work, which in normal conditions is done by the Cabinet as a whole, to committees and smaller bodies. I believe from first to last, since the beginning of the war, we have had something like fifty different committees and advisory bodies, all framed out of the Government, sometimes with material aid from outside, to which special departments of activity brought into prominence or urgency by the needs of the war have been relegated, subject always to ultimate Cabinet responsibility. In particular, we have had since a very early period of the war a body fluctuating in number from time to time, and which has varied in name—sometimes it has been called a war council, sometimes a war committee, sometimes it has gone by other designations—a body to which either general questions of State or questions of strategy in particular areas and arenas have been by the consent of the Cabinet referred.

I have come to the conclusion, after now some fifteen months of experience, that it is desirable to maintain that system, but to limit still further the number of the body to whom what I may call the strategic conduct of the war is from time to time referred. I think, and my colleagues agree with me, that the committee, or by whatever name it may be called, should be a body of not less than three and perhaps not more than five in number, but with this important proviso, that whether it be three or five it should, of course, have power to summon to its deliberation and to its assistance the particular Ministers concerned, with the particular departments whose special knowledge is needed or is desirable for the determination of each issue as it arises. I think further that the relations between any such body and the Cabinet as a whole should be of an elastic kind; and at the same time that it should be understood that the Cabinet, which as a body has the ultimate responsibility for questions of policy, should be kept not only constantly informed of the decisions and actions of the committee, but in all questions which involve a change, or a

new departure in policy, should be consulted before decisive action is taken. It is only on these lines that you can successfully conduct a war like this. I entirely agree with those who say—and I have had plenty of experience—that it is very undesirable that decisions which have to be taken very often at very short notice should not become effective until they are referred to the Cabinet as a whole. That is perfectly true. I think a committee such as I have indicated ought to be clothed with power to take such decisions and to act upon them. On the other hand, I am very jealous of the maintenance of collective Cabinet responsibility, for large changes and new departures in policy, and I believe that in practice it will be found perfectly possible to work the two things together. That is what we propose to do.

I hope that before many days are over we may be able to announce to the House who are the members who will compose the committee, whatever the size that we ultimately decide upon. In conjunction with that, but still in connection with the subject of what is called the higher direction of the war, I attach very great importance first of all to a more complete and intimate co-ordination between the staffs of the various allied powers—and we have had a very happy illustration of the advantage of that in our recent deliberation with General Joffre—and also a more intimate and regular interchange of views by some form of combination with the staffs not only of the War Office and the Admiralty, but with those who conduct our diplomatic affairs. It is impossible to carry on these things in watertight compartments. You must have co-ordination, contact, close, constant, practical, continuing. Those are the general outlines—these are the views I desire to express to the House in regard to our position.

I have tried to tell the House this afternoon the whole truth. I am not aware, I do not think, I have kept back anything known to us which ought to be known to the House. I have made no attempt to conceal anything in the past history of the war, its conduct, its failures, shortcomings if you like, and if I may, I would say before I sit down one or two words with regard to my own personal position. When the war broke out I was the head of the Government. I take my share—and no one has a larger share—of responsibility at that supreme moment in the attitude and policy of this country. A terrible responsibility it is, measured by what has happened and by what is still to happen. Much of our best blood has been spilled, thousands of young lives have been cut short in the very promise of their youth; the cry goes up in ever-increasing volume day by day and week by week from torn hearts, from mutilated homes. Every morning there is not a home that does not tremble to think of what message of direct and personal loss may not be in store. And we might have stood aloof, spectators and not actors, in this the most moving tragedy in the history of man. We might have stood aloof; but is there one even of those who are enduring unspeakable anguish—childless parents, widowed wives, desolate comrades and friends—is there one who wishes that Great Britain had acted otherwise? I do not believe there is. Searching, if the House will allow me to say so, the utmost depths of my own heart and conscience, I would not unsay or undo that great decision. We have from that moment to this labored with the unceasing and devoted aid of my loyal counselors and colleagues to uphold the common cause, to bring to its support every resource in men and money, prudence and courage, in unity and self-sacrifice that this kingdom and this empire can provide. That there have been errors and shortcomings, failures of judgment, lack of foresight in the conduct and direction of our policy I am the first person in the United Kingdom to acknowledge; but that there has been anything of sloth, indifference, self-complacency, unwillingness to face unpalatable facts, a desire or even a disposition to conceal from our fellow-countrymen the truth I challenge any one to prove. I am as confident as I was fifteen months ago that we are going to carry a righteous cause to a triumphant issue, and I am not going to

shift the burden which has been laid upon me until I am satisfied that I cannot bear it, or that it can be borne better by others.

So long as I enjoy, as I am proud to think and I hope I do, [" Hear, hear! "] the confidence of my sovereign, the House of Commons, and the country, I shall not surrender the task, heavy indeed and beyond the power of myself, or any other man, but as noble and as inspiring as any in history. [Cheers.]

If there be moments, such as come to all of us, when we are tempted to be faint-hearted, let us ask ourselves what year in our history has done more to justify our faith in the manhood and the womanhood of our people? It has brought us, as we cannot at this moment forget, the imperishable story of the last hours of Edith Cavell. [" Hear, hear! "] It has taught the bravest man among us the supreme lesson of courage. Yes, Sir, and in this United Kingdom and throughout the Dominions of the Crown there are thousands of such women, and a year ago we did not know it. We have great traditions, but a nation cannot exist by traditions alone. Thank God we have living examples of all the qualities which have built up and sustained our empire. Let us be worthy of them, and endure to the end. [Loud cheers.]

Edith Cavell

From The London News.

By EDEN PHILLPOTTS.

" Than patriotism there are greater things ":
Even so spake she, when to her vision clear
The prison shadows limned and Death drew near
To hide her graciousness for ever with his wings.

Her woman's heart, burning with brave design,
Forgot the law, and when a man desired
To play the man, her woman's soul was fired
To help him join again his country's battle line.

For that she died; the hands that she had healed
Took her rare life; the heads that she had bound
Plotted the giving of her own death wound.
Not womanhood could save; not womanhood could shield.

Her ministry is broken, and the blow
That laid her dead on the night-hidden earth,
Shall sound upon this present grief and dearth
With louder thunder far than deep-mouthed ordnance know.

Her woman's gentle voice above this strife
Wakes echo from the secret, golden bell
Called conscience, so that time to come shall tell
How that most honored death helped men to nobler life.

" Than patriotism there are greater things ":
O ye who still unwitting desolate
Your hearts with futile passion, curse and hate,
Harken while her last word a moment chimes and rings.

Soul of her land, before the solemn plea
Of human honor, stunned at this black shame,
Pray steely reason guide and guard your aim,
Lest brute awaken brute, to mar humanity.

The Defeat of Serbia

Teutonic Forcing of the Route to Constantinople

THE first junction of Bulgarian and Austro-German patrols was effected on Oct. 26 in the Dobravoda Mountains. From the headquarters of the army of General von Gallwitz in Serbia came the announcement of "a moment of world significance"; that the "Orient and Occident have been united, and on the basis of this firm indissoluble union a new and mighty vierbund comes into being, created by the victory of our arms." The road from Germany through Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria to Turkey lay open.

In London it was admitted on Oct. 28 that the German army which crossed the Danube at Orsova had joined hands with the Bulgarians who had invaded Serbia near Prahovo. On Oct. 29 the French, according to German dispatches, had already landed 150,000 men, with 100 guns, at Saloniki, and Sir Bryan Mahon, who relieved Mafeking in the Boer war, was leading a small British army to their support. Following the bombardment of Bulgarian ports, it was reported on Oct. 31 that a Russian army was crossing the Black Sea to effect a landing in Bulgaria. But on that day the Serbs lost Milanovac, followed by the decisive battle in the campaign in which the chief arsenal of Serbia, Kraguyevac, surrendered. The Serbian fortress of Pirot, the key to Nish, also passed into the hands of the Bulgarians, and on Nov. 5 Tsar Ferdinand's men reached the outskirts of Nish, which fell on Nov. 7.

Meanwhile twelve white buffalo had dragged the motor car of Duke Adolf Friedrich of Mecklenburg across the Timok River—the first Teuton over the opened route to Sofia. At the same time the main Bulgarian and Teutonic armies effected a junction at Krivivir, northwest of Nish. An exchange of telegrams between General Jecoff, Bulgarian Commander in Chief, and Premier Radoslavoff of Bulgaria upon the capture of Nish was reported by the Overseas News Agency, which quotes General Jecoff, as follows:

> After fierce and sanguinary fighting the fortress of Nish has been conquered by our brave, victorious troops, and the Bulgarian flag has been hoisted to remain forever.

The Serbian army retreated beyond Krusevac, which General von Gallwitz entered on Nov. 9, breaking the branch railway line to Uzice, near the Bosnian frontier. Troops and a quantity of munitions and motor cars for the army of Field Marshal von der Goltz were landed at the Port of Rustchuk on the same day, while other convoys flying German and Austrian flags passed down the Danube bound for Bulgarian ports.

But on Nov. 8 the Franco-British troops advancing to Phares formed a junction with the retreating Serbian army, presenting an unbroken line from Prilep, Gradsko, and Krivolak to Dorolobo on the Bulgarian frontier. The Bulgarian army, descending into old Serbia to invade Macedonia by way of Veles and Prilep, was defeated on Nov. 6 at Izvor at the entrance of the Babuna Pass. An attack by four regiments of Bulgarians upon the French headquarters at Strumitza had been repulsed on Oct. 24. Large British forces were landing at Saloniki, so that on Nov. 10 the newspapers of Berlin reported reinforcements of the Entente allies to a total of 300,000. The Bulgarians had extended their grip on the Belgrade-Saloniki railway north and south of Nish, occupying Leskovac, to the south, and Alexsinac, to the north. The Austro-Germans, also marching southward, had reached the most difficult part of Serbia, the mountainous region, where the natives might offer the strongest resistance. On Nov. 12 the defile leading northward to Strumitza, a fortified town in Bulgaria, passed completely into the hands of the French, and French cavalry patrols had surrounded Veles, which the Bulgars

held. A new British division under General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro was then spreading out toward Strumitza, and with the approaching arrival of Field Marshal Earl Kitchener, dispatched east on a secret mission, a further development in the campaign affecting the army at Gallipoli was expected.

During the Austro-German and Bulgarian advance the dispatches from the front on Nov. 13 claimed the capture of 54,000 Serbian prisoners, 40,000 of them by the Austro-Germans. The aged King Peter of Serbia, his automobile breaking down, took flight in a country wagon followed by the Crown Prince. On the western bank of the Morava River the Serbians made their stand, and, as reported Nov. 15, had recovered the town of Tetovo, besides effecting the junction with their allies to the south.

On Nov. 12 the Kaiser was reported as passing through Orsova on his way to Sofia, on a visit to Tsar Ferdinand, with the intention of proceeding thence to Constantinople.

The Troops at Saloniki

By the Marquis of Lansdowne

Member of the British Cabinet Without Portfolio

At the sitting of the House of Lords of Oct. 26, 1915, Earl Loreburn asked whether the dispatch of troops to Saloniki was determined upon by his Majesty's Government with the approval of their highest naval and military advisers; and whether his Majesty's Government could give an assurance that full provision had been made for the communication of this force and for its supplies of men and material to the satisfaction of their naval and military advisers. Other questions were put by the Earl of Cromer, and the Marquis of Lansdowne replied in the speech presented below.

I LISTENED with satisfaction to the statements that if we on this bench appear sometimes to be a little reluctant to give full information to your Lordships' House our action is not to be attributed to any desire to screen ourselves. But my noble friend is much too well versed in public affairs to be ignorant of the undoubted fact that there are moments when it is impossible in the public interest that questions relating to the conduct of a great war should be freely discussed in the houses of Parliament.

We have to think not only of the effect of what may be said upon our enemies, but, what is not less important, of the effect of what may be said at certain moments on our allies. I can assure my noble friend that if we have been a little slow to respond to the invitations which have from time to time been made to us, it has been solely from the conviction that we could not speak as fully and frankly as we should desire for reasons of that kind.

I might strengthen my argument by reminding the House of what happened not many nights ago in this place. We had a short discussion, in the course of which Lord Morley of Blackburn addressed your Lordships. He, too, complained that the House was not taken sufficiently into our confidence, and he mentioned several points on which he personally would have been glad to have had information. What were those points? The number of the troops that were likely to be employed in these Balkan operations, the terms upon which we expected to obtain Russian and Italian co-operation, and, finally, what was the prospect of obtaining Greek and Rumanian adhesion. I venture to say that upon every one of these points it would, particularly at that moment, have been absolutely out of the question to make a full and complete statement without giving to the public information which we had no right to give them. [Cheers.]

I know Lord Cromer does not expect me to follow him into the question—not, perhaps, strictly relevant to the one on

The Battle Ground in the Balkans

See key above for relative positions of the Austro-German, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Franco-British forces on Nov. 15, 1915.

the notice paper, but one of very great interest to all of us—as to the proper strength of an efficient Cabinet. I will take my courage in both hands, and I will tell him that up to this point I agree with him—that personally I am strongly of opinion that the efficiency of any body of that kind is apt to vary inversely with its numerical strength. [Laughter.]

I pass to the interrogatories which Lord Loreburn addressed to me. He wishes to elicit whether we have been advised that operations in progress, or in contemplation, in the Balkans are practical military operations, and whether we have been told by our naval and military experts that that is their opinion. There is an impression in the minds of some people that we civilian politicians are in the habit not only of devising great strategical plans and combinations of our own, but of imposing those plans upon persons to whom we ought to look for advice upon naval and military problems.

I suppose most of us have indulged in the amusement of making plans of our own, but I can assure Lord Loreburn that certainly not in this Government, nor in any Government with which I have ever been connected, has it been the practice, or would it be possible, for amateur strategists to impose their plans upon the responsible professional advisers of the Government of the day.

I would add that in this Government in particular it is especially unlikely that anything of the kind should have occurred. The present Cabinet includes in its members Lord Kitchener, who was called to the office of Secretary of War almost by public acclaim.

Lord Kitchener is present at every meeting of the Cabinet. He is a party to all its decisions, and, to my mind, it would be almost grotesque to suppose that he allows himself to be deflected from his course by the pressure of his civilian colleagues.

But quite apart from that, the present procedure of the Government by committees and councils is of a kind which gives far greater opportunities to the military and naval experts of asserting themselves and making their views known than was the case in the days when I first entered public life.

There is another consideration which your Lordships will, perhaps, bear in mind. These great problems which from time to time confront the Government of the day are, as a rule, what might be described as mixed problems. They are problems into which political as well as naval and military considerations enter. It seems to me just as necessary, having that in view, that the expert advisers of the Government should have opportunities of considering the political aspects of the case as that the civilian members of the Government should take into account the naval and military side of the problem. In deciding whether an operation should be undertaken at all, or whether one operation is prefarable to another operation, or whether, as the war goes on, it is desirable to modify the plans originally arrived at—those are all questions which have to be considered not only purely from the naval and military point of view, but from the point of view of broad moral and political considerations with which they are connected.

But I should like to enforce this further point, that, whatever opportunities you give to your naval and military advisers, the ultimate responsibility for the decision must rest with the Government. [Cheers.] I have heard that question discussed more than once in your Lordships' House, and so far as I am aware the view has always prevailed—and I think rightly prevailed—that no Government can be allowed to shelter itself behind the advice of its military and naval experts. [Cheers.]

Let me now say a word with regard to the Saloniki expedition. I can quite enter into the apprehensions which possess the mind of Lord Loreburn. I can quite understand that, having before him our commitments in the western theatre of war, the position in which we find ourselves in the Gallipoli Peninsula, and our interests in Egypt and in other possessions of the empire, it should be to his mind profoundly distasteful that matters should be complicated by our enter-

ing into new entanglements in a new theatre of war.

Earl Loreburn—I never said that or anything about that. I abstained from expressing a view, because I am not in possession of the facts. I did not wish to say for a moment that this is right or wrong, but merely desired to know whether the Government has not sufficient military and naval opinion to justify it in entering into it.

The Marquis of Lansdowne—I did not mishear Lord Loreburn when I thought he told the House that he remembered how we had become involved in the entanglement in Gallipoli, and that he was afraid we might inadvertently find ourselves involved in a new entanglement of the same sort. That is the argument to which I wish to address myself. I can understand that Lord Loreburn and others should dislike the idea of what might be described as a dispersive effort on our part at a time when we are making so many efforts in different parts of the world.

Under what circumstances has this little British force been sent to Saloniki? I should like to recall the position in which, let us say in the month of September, the central powers found themselves in the different theatre of war in which they were engaged. In the western theatre they had made no progress for a long time. They had, indeed, been successfully attacked and pushed back at several points.

On the Russian front their advance, at first so triumphant and overwhelming, had received a serious check, certainly at some points. The Italian forces were pressing their offensive hard, and in the minor and remoter theatres of war—Mesopotamia, for example—success was resting with our arms. That being the situation, the central powers naturally looked about them to discover some new direction in which to seek for a decision satisfactory to themselves, and their choice fell, as it obviously was likely to fall, upon a great attempt to make a push to the southeast through Bulgaria, threatening our forces in Gallipoli, threatening Constantinople, and perhaps Egypt, to say nothing of vaster aspirations which perhaps lay behind.

That great project became doubly attractive to the central powers from the moment that, most unfortunately, Bulgaria threw her influence on their side. To such a thrust to the southeast there was one obstacle and one obstacle only. The key of the situation lay in the northeastern corner of Serbia, and accordingly we found Serbia threatened by a formidable concentration of troops on the enemy frontier.

It is impossible to think or speak of Serbia without a tribute to the wondrous gallantry with which that little country withstood two separate invasions, and has lately been struggling against a third. [Cheers.] She repelled the first two invasions by an effort which, I venture to think, will form one of the most glorious chapters in the history of this great war. [Cheers.]

It was in these circumstances that Serbia made a direct appeal to us for help. I do not think Lord Loreburn will differ from me when I say that there is not a man in this country who, if there had been a good chance of coming to the rescue of Serbia, would not have risked a good deal in order to help. [Cheers.] But it was not only Serbia who invoked our military co-operation. Greece was bound to Serbia by geographical propinquity, by common interests obvious to all, and by treaty obligations. Moreover, it was only through Greek territory that help could possibly reach the Serbian people. It was only by the use of Greek ports that a base could be provided for any troops intended to take the pressure off Serbia.

In these circumstances, the good-will of Greece was obviously of the first importance to us, and we had at that time every reason to feel assured that we had that good-will.

M. Venizelos was still in power, and it was at his instance that we undertook to provide a force for the purpose of enabling Greece to fulfill her treaty obligations to Serbia.

It was in compliance with that twofold appeal that we sent such troops as were available to Saloniki. It was a

small force, because only a small force could be collected at the time.

The French Government on their side dispatched the force which is now on the spot, and which is apparently at this moment engaged with the Bulgarian enemy on the eastern frontier of Serbia. At the same time a larger force was prepared for service in Southeastern Europe, and transport was taken up for the purpose of conveying it to its destination.

I suggest to your Lordships that these steps, incomplete no doubt, but taken with great promptitude, because promptitude was of the utmost moment, were the only proper steps which could be taken to relieve the position in Serbia.

These steps were taken after full deliberation and consultation on the part of the Cabinet with its military and naval advisers. But the small British force which we sent to Saloniki—I think 13,000 in round numbers—was regarded as the precursor of a larger force which was put under orders at the same time.

Lord Loreburn may, perhaps, desire me to tell him how we propose that that larger force, when it arrives, shall be used. My answer to that is that the use to which that force is to be put must depend on the situation which exists when it arrives on the scene.

The noble and learned Lord spoke of the new enterprise, and asked me whether it was a practicable military operation.

I cannot answer that question, because the character of the new operation or enterprise has not been decided, and cannot be decided until we know more of the situation in Southeastern Europe. Events have moved very rapidly, and are moving very rapidly in that part of the world.

There have been two recent developments which profoundly affect the military as well as the political situation. The first is to be found in the change of attitude of the Greek Government. We all know that M. Venizelos resigned, and that Greece has arrived at the deliberate conclusion that her treaty engagements with Serbia do not require her to come to the rescue of that country in the present momentous crisis. That is one fundamental change which the situation has undergone.

But apart from that, and I say it with great regret, I am afraid we must admit that the progress of the campaign in Northern Serbia has been such as to render it highly improbable that the Serbian Army will be able to withstand for any great length of time the attack to which it is exposed from the Austro-German forces on the north, aided by the stab in the back which Serbia is receiving at the hands of Bulgaria.

My answer to the question of what we are going to do with the larger military force is that the military plans must depend upon the military situation. But I might add that upon this point the Allies are all of one mind.

These matters have been discussed, and both the French and British Governments realize that when further reinforcements reach the Eastern Mediterranean it will be necessary to take careful stock of the position.

It will be necessary that the military and naval advisers of both Governments should consult, and should endeavor to come to a conclusion.

It cannot be until these consultations have taken place that we can be in a position to say that we intend to use the British force either for this purpose or for that. What we shall endeavor to use it for will be to counter the movement of the central powers across Bulgaria, but the precise mode of countering that attack must obviously be left for further and very careful examination.

Discussions are at this moment proceeding with regard to this point, and I may add that the General whom we have just sent out to the Southeastern Mediterranean—Sir Charles Monro, who, I think, arrives in that part of the world today—has been instructed to report as soon as possible his opinion upon all the aspects of the case.

I therefore say, when Lord Loreburn asks me whether I can give him a general indication of our intentions, or whether I could describe the general outline of the new enterprise, I am obliged to tell him that I can do nothing of the

kind—that is a question which is being considered by those who have the best right to consider it.

For the moment it is quite impossible for me to add anything to his knowledge on the subject. But if he will take it from me, I can assure him that he need have no apprehension that in this matter, or in any other matter of the kind, we are likely to be led into precipitate action, owing to some hurried impulse or some vague sentiment, or some desire to achieve this object or that.

At every step we shall take the best naval and military advice obtainable, and that advice will have reference not only to what he calls the new enterprise, but to all subsidiary questions in regard to the safeguarding of the communications of our forces and the supplies of men and material. That is all the information I am able to give, and I trust Lord Loreburn will acquit me of any desire to avoid any of the points he raised from an undue tendency to reticence or secrecy. [Cheers.]

Attitude of the Greek Government

ALL the evening papers of Athens on Oct. 21, 1915, published an identical note, said to be an exact representation of the Government's view in the situation. The note expresses surprise at the intervention of the powers in the relations between Greece and Serbia, the faculty of interpretation of the treaty of alliance of those countries belonging exclusively to the contracting parties, the accord having been freely concluded without the intervention or guarantee of a third party.

It must not be forgotten, the note adds, that Greece is an independent nation that disposes of its fate in full sovereignty. The note goes on to say that the Austro-German attack on Serbia releases Greece at least from the obligation of armed intervention, and that independent of that attack it is materially impossible for Serbia to give Greece the support of 150,000 men stipulated in the treaty in case of war with Bulgaria, and that the Entente powers have not furnished a contingent equivalent. The note adds that the specialists best qualified consider that the Balkan expedition would require at least 400,000 men, and that under these conditions Greece would ruin herself without even the consolation of saving Serbia.

On the other hand, Greece offers all the service she can render in allowing the free passage over its territory of the Allies' troops going to the Serbian front, and in maintaining her own army on a war footing.

The note further expresses the gratitude of Greece for the offers made, though not yet concrete, and thanks England for the offer of Cyprus. It recalls the Greek sympathies for the Entente and the benevolence of the neutrality maintained thus far.

CABINET'S FALL

Quite unexpectedly as a result of a debate on Nov. 3, 1915, in the Greek Chamber, a Ministerial crisis broke out, and the Zaimis Cabinet tendered its resignation to King Constantine.

The trouble started over a bill for extra pay to army officers during mobilization or war. Thereupon a lively discussion ensued between General Yanakitsas, Minister of War, and Deputies of various parties.

Premier Zaimis read an answer, denying an apology was due from General Yanakitsas, and declaring that the Government would consider insistence on this point a question of confidence.

In the debate which followed, lasting until 5 o'clock on the morning of Nov. 4, all the political chiefs participated. M. Venizelos made two long speeches, defending his policy and condemning the policy of his opponents in regard to the Balkan situation. He said he deplored the fact that Serbia was being left to be crushed by Bulgaria, Greece's hereditary enemy, who would not scruple later to fall on Greece herself.

VENIZELOS'S SPEECH

Challenged by a Government Deputy

as to whether he thought the King wished the country's destruction, M. Venizelos said:

I should have preferred not to drag the King's name into the discussion, but since you ask me I will say that in a constitutional Government the Crown has no place in responsibilities. Only foolish political leaders can think of hiding behind the Crown, which is irresponsible, for if they admit that in a parliamentary Government there can be such a thing as a Crown policy they are unworthy to represent a free and sovereign people.

No, the King does not wish the country's destruction. That is absurd. But our State is a democracy presided over by the King, and the whole responsibility rests with the Cabinet. If you want monarchy, say so openly, and call for the necessary changes in the Constitution; but your efforts will be unavailing, because the nation wants the Constitution to remain as it is.

I admit that the Crown has a right to disagree with a responsible Government if he thinks the latter is not in agreement with the national will, but after the recent election nonagreement is out of the question, and now the Crown has not the right to disagree again on the same question. It is not a question of patriotism, but of constitutional liberties.

I know that the King is a distinguished General, but he is not equally experienced in things political. If I have tolerated the present Cabinet I have done so because of the constitutional deadlock created by the Crown's action and the impossibility of holding elections in the present state of mobilization. You are mistaking this toleration for approval of your policy, which I disagree with diametrically.

Instead of new elections you had better suspend the Constitution until the end of the war, that we may know exactly where the responsibilities lie, and not drag the Constitution and national will through the shams of empty constitutional forms.

Finally in the early hours of the morning of Nov. 4 a vote was taken, which showed 147 against and 114 for the Government, with three abstentions. The dissolution of the Cabinet followed.

King Constantine on Nov. 7, 1915, charged Stephanos Skouloudis with the formation of a Cabinet. The ex-Ministers retained office, M. Skouloudis taking the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, as well as assuming the Premiership. Soon after the Greek Chamber was dissolved by a royal decree, and the date for new elections was fixed for Dec. 19, 1915.

The French Government received on Nov. 9, 1915, from Premier Skouloudis, head of the new Greek Cabinet, formal assurance of "our neutrality, with the character of sincerest benevolence toward the Entente powers." The communication addressed to the Greek Minister in Paris, reads:

Please give to the President of the Council the most formal assurance on my part of our firm resolution to continue our neutrality, with the character of the sincerest benevolence toward the Entente powers.

Please add that the new Cabinet accepts as its own the declarations of former Premier Zaimis regarding the friendly attitude of the Royal Government as to the allied troops at Saloniki. It is too conscious of the real interests of the country and of what it owes to the powers which are protecting Greece to swerve from this line of conduct. It hopes that the friendly feelings of these powers for Greece will not for a moment be influenced by malicious and misleading news purposely circulated with the main object of changing the good relations that exist between the Entente and Greece.

The attitude of Greece and the evidence of continued pressure by the Teutonic authorities on the King and Cabinet having caused marked uneasiness in the allied capitals, steps were taken on Nov. 12, 1915, to get assurances on at least one point that the allied troops would not be interned if they fell back across the border from Serbia. A Reuter dispatch from Athens said:

The British, French, and Russian Min-

isters today interviewed the Premier and demanded that Greece define the attitude she would observe in the event of the allied forces seeking refuge in Greek territory in case of a reverse in Serbian Macedonia. They insisted that no distinction be made between the Anglo-French and their Serbian allies.

The Greek reply is not known, but in view of the good-will evident on both sides the conviction prevails that a satisfactory solution will be reached.

Bulgaria and the Germanic Powers

Manifesto Issued by the Ministry of M. Radoslavoff

The text of a manifesto circulated by the Bulgarian Ministry of M. Radoslavoff contains a full and frank statement of why considerations of pure self-interest dictated the Bulgarian Government's decision to cast its lot finally with the central powers and against the Quadruple Entente.

The wording of some paragraphs of the manifesto seems to indicate that it was written anonymously. Russia, it says, is fighting for Constantinople, France for Alsace-Lorraine, England for commercial supremacy over Germany, and Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro simply for loot.

The manifesto points out economic and political reasons why Bulgaria must side with the central powers and Turkey instead of with the Quadruple Entente.

TODAY we see races that are fighting, not indeed for ideals, but solely for their material interests, it says. The more, therefore, we are bound to a country in a material way, the greater is that country's interest in our maintenance and increase, since thereby that one will profit who helps us and is tied to us by economic bonds.

If, therefore, we are to change our previous policy for indefinite, unsafe, and to us even unknown advantages, that means the ruin of our agriculture and trade, and indeed everything that we have built up in thirty-six years, the reconstruction of our entire business as a people, and the seeking of new export markets for our goods.

In this connection the manifesto cites statistics of Bulgaria's import and export trade with the various belligerent countries of the present war for the years 1907, 1909, *and* 1911, *showing that in those years the central powers and Turkey enjoyed ever-increasing import and export trade with Bulgaria as compared with the amount of its export and import trade with the Entente countries.*

The figures show that our trade, our interests, and our economic life are inseparably linked with Turkey, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, says the manifesto. It drives home this argument by pointing out the vast proportions of its foreign trade that consist of live stock and dairy products, saying that for the export of this it is dependent solely upon Turkey, while its exports of grain can go to any country in the world with equal advantage. It refers to the great hardships imposed on Serbia when Austria-Hungary, resenting the Serbian pro-Russian policy, placed obstacles in the way of the Serbian live stock exports, and it adds:

What would become of Bulgaria if Constantinople should become Russian and we should lose the Constantinople market? We have seen that almost our entire export trade in live stock, cheese, kashkawal, flour, &c., goes to Turkey—that is to say, to Constantinople. If, now, Constantinople is conquered by Russia, it will introduce there its autonomous protective staff, and will make impossible the present exports of Bulgarian products to Constantinople. Even as Bulgaria cannot now export anything to Russia, so it will be unable to export

anything to the Russian Constantinople. There are no other export markets for these products at present, and such cannot be easily found.

But if we go against Germany, it would for sanitary and veterinary [sic] reasons immediately cut off the imports of Bulgarian eggs and make more difficult our tobacco imports. All this would cause an economic crisis in Bulgaria such as we have never before witnessed and of which we can scarcely form a conception. Our live stock industry, as well as all mills that have been set up in Varna and Burgas to grind flour for Constintinople, will be ruined. Our finest and most useful industry will be destroyed, and the millions invested in them lost. The live stock industry is the basis of our agricultural life.

The manifesto calls attention to the German loan recently made to Bulgaria, adding that after the Balkan war, when, "humbled, but not destroyed," Bulgaria asked France for a loan, the request was refused categorically, unless Bulgaria would recognize the Bucharest Treaty and agree "not to carry on an independent policy," and to throw ourselves completely into the arms of the then Triple Entente, which would dispose of us as it pleased. It continues:

In those heavy days for Bulgaria Germany assisted and gave it the required loan without any political conditions whatsoever. Every impartial Bulgar is in duty bound to confess that through this loan Germany saved us from bankruptcy, as well as from political subjugation. The war has shown how mighty Germany, and even Austria-Hungary, is in an economic sense. If these States, therefore, desire it, they have always the power to render us valuable support. They have done so till now, and we have no reason to suppose that they will not support us also in the future. On the contrary, from the assurances in German newspapers and statements of German statesmen, we can with full confidence count upon German financial help. Even as we write these lines we are informed that Germany has again granted us a loan of 125,000,000 lewas ($25,000,000) for the defraying of current debts, without any political conditions.

Our greatest foe today is Serbia. It has subjugated the purely Bulgarian Macedonia and is administering it in a barbarian manner never before witnessed. For the Macedonian populace there are no laws and no human rights of any sort. This populace is, without exception, exposed to slaughter; the streams are red with blood; women have been violated, and the male population suitable for military service has been sent into the field to die for the creation of a "Greater Serbia." One need only profess to be a Bulgar in Macedonia to be beaten to death like a dog, so great is the hatred of Serbia toward Bulgaria. After the wars the Serbs had grown so arrogant that the transit of a Bulgar through Serbia—no matter who he was—was absolutely dangerous to his life, because in that State, which, according to our Government organ, Narodni Prava, is ruled by liars, there exist no laws for Bulgars. If we do not more quickly deliver our brothers in Macedonia from the unbearable, cruel, and bloody yoke, not a Bulgar will be left in this purely Bulgarian land. Things are, moreover, already in such a condition that Bulgaria cannot possibly exist next to a "Greater Serbia," inasmuch as the latter, which lays claim to our country up to the Jantra, will continually challenge us until it destroys us.

We do not know the wording of the famous note which the Quadruple Entente has delivered to the Bulgarian Government, but from what has been said and written in the newspapers, these facts are seen:

1. That Russia and its allies give us nothing for our neutrality, but, on the other hand, demand that we shall take part in the war as soon as possible.

2. That Bulgaria is to turn over its armies to the Quadruple Entente, placing them fully at the Entente's disposal, leaving the Entente to command them and send them wherever it seems advisable.

3. That the Bulgarian Army must conquer Constantinople and then hand it over to Russia; and,

4. In return for all this Bulgaria is permitted to retain the territory up to the Enos-Midia line, and it is promised some obscure and insufficient compensations in Macedonia, but only in case Serbia is sufficiently compensated by Austria.

That means: give your army, so that we may mix it up with our wild hordes and send them out for destruction on the various scenes of battle; and then, when Serbia has grown great and has taken South Hungary, Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, and has grown to a State of from fifteen to twenty millions Bulgaria will get a small bit of land.

This shows most clearly how strongly the Quadruple Entente is allied to Serbia; how it is unwilling to persuade the latter to make concessions, and how it mocks our legitimate demands. The Triple Entente is known for its noise and its making of alarms. It is known, too, that during our last negotiations for a loan they published secret notes and even meddled in our internal affairs merely in order to evoke disturbances in the country to win Bulgaria for the Quadruple Entente. In this respect Germany and Austria-Hungary work quietly and without noise, so that we do not know in all their details their proposals to Bulgaria; but nevertheless from those which we can read in their newspapers and from what well-informed persons have told us we can with certainty state that the promises of Germany and Austria-Hungary to Bulgaria for its neutrality are, in the main, as follows:

1. All of Macedonia, including Skopie, Bitolia, Ochrida, &c.

2. Friendly mediation between Bulgaria and Turkey for the purpose of ceding the line to Dedeaghatch and the territory west of the right bank of the Maritza. This agreement with Turkey is expected in a short time.

Still further territorial promises have been made to us at the expense of Serbia by the central powers in case of our active military assistance. These promises are in accordance with our demands for a common frontier with Austria-Hungary along the Danube. The present war has shown how absolutely necessary it is that we should have a direct and immediate connection with Hungary in order that we may be independent of a Serbia that has gone crazy, (sic.) But also other parts of Old Serbia have been set forth for us in prospect.

Here we can see clearly the Quadruple Entente, in return for slight, uncertain, and doubtful advantages, demands great sacrifices from us, and that Germany and Austria-Hungary give us clearly and categorically to understand the things they are willing to give us in return for incomparably slighter sacrifices on our part. But the question has another side as well—we do not believe in promises of any sort any more anyway, and still less those of the Quadruple Entente, which took up Italy as an ally after it had in such treacherous fashion trampled under foot its word of honor and broken a thirty-three-year-old treaty of alliance. On the contrary, we have full reason to believe in a treaty with Germany, which has always fulfilled its treaty obligations, and is fighting the whole world merely in order to live up to its treaty obligations to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. * * *

Finally, we must hold to that group of the powers which will win the victory in the present war, since only so can the important territorial extensions and further developments be insured. From the developments of the operations in the various theatres of the war, on the front against France and Belgium as well as the fronts against Italy, Russia, and Serbia, one recognizes more clearly day by day that victory is inclining on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. We need not linger long over the question, inasmuch as it has become clear to the point of certainty for every observer that Russia, which has lost fortresses like Warsaw and Ivangorod, will soon be overthrown, and then the turn will come for France, Italy, England, and Serbia. Germany has proved that it is so strongly organized in a military and material sense and can dispose of such enormous, superior, and inexhaustible forces as will enable it soon to overthrow its foes.



Battle Line on the Eastern Front, Nov. 15, 1915.

Russia's Campaign

Lack of Success in the Teutonic Operations Against Riga and Dvinsk

A HIGH authority representing the Russian General Staff on Oct. 23, 1915, authorized the following official publication in The Times of London:

From May till October the Russian Army has been subjected to uninterrupted blows along a front of 700 miles. The Austro-Germans applied every possible means, not excepting such as are forbidden by international treaties, in order to increase the pressure against us. Masses of their troops were flung against this front and sent to destruction regardless of losses. Military history does not afford another example of such pressure.

During these months of continuous and prolonged action the high qualities and mettle of our troops under the difficulties and arduous conditions of the retreat were demonstrated afresh. Notwithstanding his obstinacy in fighting and his persistency in carrying out manoeuvres, the enemy is still confronted by an army which fully retains its strength, morale, and its ability, not only to offer a stanch and successful resistance, but to assume the offensive and inflict blows which have been demonstrated by the events of recent days. This affords the best proof that the Austro-Germans failed to destroy, or even to disorganize, our army.

Seeing that they failed in that effort during the five months which were most favorable to them, it would be impossible for them to repeat the Galician and Vistula exploits now that the successes of the Allies in the west have complicated the strategical position. The crisis has passed favorably for us. We issued safely from the difficult position in the advanced Vistula theatre, where we were enveloped on three sides, and now stand based upon the centre of our empire, unexhausted by the war.

It is true that there is still much fierce and determined fighting ahead. There may be movements rearward, but there will certainly be advances also. Our army lives in the expectati n of a general offensive and looks with full confidence to the armies of its allies. It will march boldly and cheerfully forward, conscious that in so doing it is defending the interests of our country and the interests of our allies. Stern struggle with the forces of nature has schooled the Russians to hardships and ingrained in them the instinct to hasten to the succor and relief of a brother in need. Hence an appeal from our allies will always find a warm response from the Russian Army.

"By not advancing," General Ruzsky said on Nov. 15, "the enemy of Russia is really retreating." The words of the commander in charge of the aggressive campaign against the Austro-Germans in Russia indicate a pause in the activity of his foe.

Petrograd reported on Oct. 30 that the Austro-Germans were evacuating the South Russian Province of Volhynia, and that they had fallen back at Riga under heavy Russian attacks. Opening a counteroffensive west of Dvinsk, in Volhynia, in Galicia, and in Bukowina, the Russians on Nov. 4 claimed a victory on the Stripa River involving the capture of 5,000 prisoners.

A new movement, while continuing against both wings of the hostile forces, was begun on Nov. 10 by the Russians directed at the German centre. On the 12th the Germans admitted the withdrawal of their troops from ground west of Riga, and Petrograd reported continued success in Volhynia. While the Austro-Germans were falling back from the Dvina, a Russian outflanking movement in the Riga region proceeded within striking distance of the Tukum-Mitau railway, which connected the German fighting front with the fortress of Windau, and the Germans were yielding before Dvinsk as a result of the Russian offensive near Lake Sventon. In the south General Ivanoff reported that his repeated thrusts had during the past five weeks brought him nearly 130,000 prisoners.

London reported on Nov. 15 advices to the effect that the Russians "have definitely repelled Field Marshal von Hindenburg's drive toward Riga and Dvinsk and along the Dvina River, and have themselves taken the offensive."

A Subterranean Battlefield



The perfection of modern weapons of offense—more particularly the machine gun—has necessitated a return to the immemorial tactics of siege or fortress warfare, adapted to the open fiield. "For some time," wrote the British Eyewitness, in a recent dissertation on underground warfare, "the character of the artillery fire has been such as to force both combatants, even for some distance behind the firing line, to burrow into the earth in order to obtain shelter and to conceal their work as far as possible. . . . This has been carried on to such an extent that behind the front line trenches are perfect labyrinths of burrows of various types. The principal feature of the battlefield, therefore, as has often been pointed out,

on the Western Front

is the absence of any signs of human beings." To modernize such elaborate schemes of defense has become quite an art, and an important part of modern warfare. Elaborate galleries are driven for long distances and at depths which in places reach 50 or 60 feet below the surface. They are roofed and paneled with logs and beams, and from these branch off the tunnels ending in mine chambers containing the explosives which devastate the enemy's point of vantage. The artist's pictorial model, partly in section, is designed to give a comprehensive idea of these underground operations.

(Drawing by G. F. Morrell, © U. S. A., Graphic-Leslie Service.)

France and Catholicism

By the Catholic Committee of French Propaganda

Over the signature "A Missionary," in The German War and Catholicism, published by the Catholic Committee of French Propaganda under the direction of Mgr. Alfred Baudrillart, rector of the Catholic Institute of Paris, is discussed what is termed "The Catholic Rôle of France in the World." The following extracts emphasize the importance of the contribution.

THE author of the following pages does not intend—even in these days when war is raging everywhere—to wage war against anybody. Being a Frenchman, he cherishes for France the feeling of a true citizen and earnest patriot. But as he lived for many years far from his country's frontiers, associating with men of "every language and tribe," he knows that no land has a monopoly of what is good and right, and he trusts that his mind is liberal enough to render what is due to each.

We may love our native country without hating that of other people. It is in such a disposition of mind that I purpose, in a few pages, very sincere if not altogether complete, to remind those who are ready to forget it of the part France has played in the world as a Catholic nation.

In the formidable conflict which has threatened for a long time, and has now broken out under the pretense of an incident seized upon as a favorable opportunity, the Catholics of several neutral nations have taken their stand; and it appears that many of them, influenced by an active, methodical, skillful, and singularly bold propaganda, manifest in regard to France feelings which prove that their knowledge of our country is not accurate.

Alas! the chief reason of their attitude is not hard to discover; the anti-religious policy adopted by the Government these last years has brought us into discredit before the whole world!

And after the disastrous surprise of 1870, after the unfortunate treaty of Frankfort and its consequences, this has been a new victory won by Bismarck, more humiliating for us than the others, because it has been accepted by part of the nation and by those who govern it. Having experienced that religious strife in a country is an inexhaustible source of dissensions and weakness, Bismarck conceived the infernal idea, when he had put an end to the Kulturkampf in Germany, to pass it over to France. He succeeded only too well.

And it is after inoculating us with this virus which has poisoned and disfigured us that Germany points us out to the Catholics of Italy, Spain, and other places, saying: "Look at these atheists, these degenerate men! What good can be expected from them by the Holy Church? As to ourselves, it is another thing! * * * Gott mit uns!"

In a similar way, "the modern Babylon"—so Paris is called—is represented as the sink of all vices. The truth is that this very Babylon is chiefly known and frequented as such by foreign clients to whom she has been guilty of giving too willing a welcome in the past. But what a difference between this legendary Paris and the real one!

This unpleasant reputation is kept up by the foreign press with a wonderful persistency and uniformity.

When reading the German, English, Italian, and Spanish papers one cannot help being surprised at the tone of the correspondence sent over from Paris; nothing is mentioned but stories of the theatres, fashions, scandals, trifling news, entertainments, futilities, small incidents ridiculously exaggerated or generalized; social, political, financial, literary, artistic scandals; all that may serve to take away from us esteem and consideration by picturing us as a people falling into decay. Of the rest, no mention is made. The only excuse for those reporters is that their own morality does not allow them to rise above this level.

For a long time the German press has shown itself particularly brilliant in this way of relating history! On the whole, the Kulturkampf has met with better success than is generally believed. Its aim was to nationalize German Catholicism by enticing it away from Rome and turning it into a docile instrument for the use of the Emperor and the empire. The means were unsuccessful; but in some measure the result was obtained. Let the German Catholics be patriots; it is their right and duty; no one could think of blaming them for it. But what may cause some surprise is that they should have so easily consented for their own part to throw themselves into that sort of delirium germanicum which appears to have taken hold of the whole nation. In their eyes France, "that poor France," is an atheistic country utterly lost, out of which Christian life has almost entirely gone, and to which Germany so religious, so well organized, so strong ought to be substituted by means of a vigorous and methodical propaganda, at the same time national and Catholic. In other words, German Catholicism walks hand in hand with German imperialism. It has also its Weltpolitik!

Well, no! France does not deserve the reputation which is given her.

Certainly she does not deny her faults, sins, weaknesses, divisions, aberrations, for hypocrisy, at least, is not in her nature! But who will dare throw the first stone at her in Europe or out of Europe? * * *

We will not insist further!

Just now she is going through a severe ordeal, the ordeal of war; our young men face it gallantly, and the German Army does not find them as degenerate as they had been represented to be.

As soon as the cannon's powerful voice was heard at the frontier "l'Union sacrée" ("the sacred union") was concluded; the official label our country bore in the eyes of the world was torn, and beneath an artificial France apparently in decay appeared another France, partly hidden before, but which represented the real country much better. All of a sudden the old race turned around and revealed to the surprised world what lay concealed in the depths of her children's baptized souls; generosity, disinterestedness, valor, kindness, joined to a cool and calm determination of which nobody suspected them of being capable. Joan of Arc must have recognized her kindred!

A tremendous billow has swept away the froth lying on the surface. The history of France is full of such strange rebounds. Many a time the nation has seemed lost; the next moment it sprang up as by a miracle, to begin a new period of life and greatness. Such were the terrible crises of the nineteenth century, the English invasion, the Hundred Years' War, the religious wars, the Revolution and its consequences, the results of which are still felt. So many religious crises, so many national crises; so many restorations of France, so many restorations of Catholicism. The present period, which has seen all the principles that society rests upon questioned, seems to have reached its term; another has already begun.

A reaction was preparing in the minds, visible then to an attentive observer; since the war it has become evident. Maurice Barrès has remarked that with us revolutionary chivalry is united to Christian chivalry.

The German oppression has riveted one to the other, after the forty years of humiliation which she had forced upon us. The miracle will not cease.

President Wilson's Patience

By J. Shield Nicholson

Dr. Nicholson is Professor of Political Economy in the University of Edinburgh. The subjoined article, distinguishing between the principles of national sympathy and national interest, forms the first chapter of Professor Nicholson's pamphlet headed "The Neutrality of the United States in Relation to the British and German Empires," and published by Macmillan.

THE distinction between national interests and national sympathies is always of vital importance in balancing the issues of peace and war. Yet the distinction is very commonly ignored. The attacks made on the President of the United States on account of his patience are largely due to the failure to grasp this distinction.

The President, on the other hand, owing partly to his lifelong academic training, has perhaps been inclined to emphasize the distinction oversharply. He has persistently refrained from expressing in an official form the national sympathies because he did not wish to prejudice the national interests. With regard to the belligerent countries he has assumed the attitude of the impartial spectator. His mind is full of political science, theoretical and applied. Of the theory and the history of political science Woodrow Wilson knows more than all the other rulers of the world put together, if their learning could be tested in the old Chinese examination boxes by the most searching of Celestial examiners. Mr. Wilson's best-known book, "The State, Elements of Historical and Practical Politics," is a standard university textbook in all English-speaking countries. For five and twenty years (1885-1910) he was engaged in academic work, being in succession first Professor of Political Economy, then of Jurisprudence and Political Science, and finally Principal of his old university. Against this academic life he has to set two years as Governor of New Jersey, (1911-13.)

This life-long immersion in the academic treatment of politics considered as a preparation for the head of the greatest neutral State in the worldwide war was likely to be productive of one very great merit and one very grave defect. The very great merit is infinite patience in looking at a case on all sides. Of Mr. Wilson's patience and impartiality as an examiner there can be no question. He himself is so reasonable and impartial that he wants to make all the people in the United States equally openminded and patient.

The people of the United States are a susceptible people, but no nation need take offense at being compared to Christian in "The Pilgrim's Progress." The best of nations wants to get rid of its burden, and to find in some way eternal glory. The horror of this war is oppressive. Surely a great nation can do something to put a stop to it. The nation wants to run like Christian to get rid of its burden. In his journey Christian came to the House of the Interpreter, where he was told he would be shown many excellent things. Here is one:

> I saw moreover in my Dream, that the Interpreter took him by the hand, and had him into a little room; where sat two little children, each one in his Chair: The name of the eldest was Passion, and of the other Patience; Passion seemed to be much discontent, but Patience was very quiet. Then Christian asked, What is the reason of the discontent of Passion? The Interpreter answered, The Governour of them would have him stay for his best things till the beginning of next year; but he will have all now; but Patience is willing to wait.

This is the parable that the Interpreter of the White House tells his people in their progress to a better world: Patience not Passion must be their model.

But academic training is liable to beget not only the very great merit of patience, but the very grave demerit of indecision. The devastation of Belgium raised in the United States an outburst

EDITH CAVELL

English Nurse Executed by the German Authorities at Brussels

GENERAL VON BISSING

Military Governor of Belgium, Who Ordered the Execution of Edith Cavell

(Photo from Underwood & Underwood, © Brown & Dawson.)

of moral indignation which seemed to be the natural forerunner of intervention, or at least indignant official protest. But the President sat still in his judicial seat. He was content with saying that judgment was deferred. People began to ask: How long will you abuse our patience, Mr. President? Will you never move? If the German professors were as mad as March hares their own Professorial President seemed to the more restless ones as slow as an old tortoise. If ex-President Roosevelt did not use this similitude about his successor it was only because he did not think of it.

These strictures on Mr. Wilson's patience arose from the failure to grasp the distinction between national interests and national sympathies.

Mr. Wilson is clearly of opinion that the first duty of the President is to interpret the interest of his own country; and that it is only a secondary duty to voice the sympathies of the nation or of himself with the moral conduct or political aims of the belligerents except so far as American interests are concerned. Apparently he supposed that the expression of sympathies might safely be left to the press and the irresponsible "who's whos" who write to the papers. Not that he was indifferent to the national sympathies or indifferent to the sufferings caused by the war. Not that he thought that on no occasion should the President express any moral judgment on the conduct of the war, as the sequel plainly showed. But in plain English he thought, "least said soonest mended," especially having regard to the composite character of the United States population and their divergent sympathies.

This apparent want of firmness and decision in upholding international law was, in fact, capable of quite a different interpretation. By making a sharp distinction between interests and sympathies the President would be able to act with so much more vigor in case any real interest were involved, as again the sequel showed.

What, then, is the nature and bearing of this distinction between interests and sympathies?

That the distinction is very real is seen at once from the difference in the mere words in which the interests and the sympathies find utterance. The language of interests is the language of diplomacy, which always means a good deal more than it says, and leaves a good deal to be inferred. Here is an example:

> When we say in that dispatch we are "satisfied" that those conditions will be observed, is it not obvious that we use a language of courtesy which is always most becomingly employed between independent powers? Who does not know that in diplomatic correspondence under the suavity of expression is implied an "or" which imports another alternative?*

The silent diplomatic "or" is more effective than reams of rhetoric.

British diplomacy has always excelled in this suavity, as is frankly acknowledged by its enemies. Says Mr. von Mach:†

> The British state papers are always well written * * * they are written not only for the benefit of the recipient, but also for the world at large. If Germany and Austria would follow this example they would meet less opposition in foreign countries. It is not so much what they do as the way they do it that offends people.

Bismarck was the exception that proves the rule. His successors in the art of the new diplomacy have not done well. The present Chancellor spoiled all by his famous "scrap of paper" and his public statement that the violation of Belgian territory by Germany was "against the rules of international law."

Compared with the official expression of interests by the older diplomacy, the unofficial expression of sympathies is as thunder unto silence. Could there be any stronger contrast than between the official notes of the United States on the Lusitania and the unofficial language of the press? Mr. Wilson has followed the old tradition of suavity. In the second Lusitania note (June 10) there is a delightful example of the silent diplomatic "or." After "very earnestly, very solemnly" renewing the representations of

*Canning: Speech on Negotiations relative to Spain. April, 1823.

†What Germany Wants, p. 75. Boston, 1914.

the note of May 15, the second note concludes:

> The Government of the United States does not understand the Imperial German Government to question these rights. It understands it also to accept as established beyond question the principle that the lives of noncombatants cannot lawfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unresisting merchantman, and to recognize the obligation to take sufficient precaution to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is of fact of a belligerent nationality, or is of fact carrying contraband under a neutral flag.

What if Germany does question these rights? Perhaps Mr. Bryan rightly divined it meant war.

When we look beneath the surface to the ideas the words stand for we observe that, while national interests are limited by practical possibilities, the range of national sympathies is unbounded so long as the freedom of the press is maintained. The first duty of the head of a responsible Government is to consider how far national aspirations are capable of realization. It is true that he must consider not only the present interest but the future; but the future which he considers must still be within the range of the practical, and not in the shifting cloudland of the ideal. The ancient Persians used to teach their boys to shoot strongly by aiming at the sun, but the statesman who is always aiming at the sun is likely to have his eyes dazzled for less exalted targets.

With the exponent of national sympathies it is otherwise. It may be his first duty to arouse the national conscience regardless of practicality, and not only to lay stress on the common virtues and sensibilities but on the finer commands of chivalry and honor. But it is one thing to enforce a high standard at home by purifying or exalting public opinion and quite another to try to enforce the same standard by force of arms or the threat thereof in the rest of the world or in some particular independent State. Whether we like it or not, knight errantry as a policy for nations, if it ever existed, has passed away. The religion of humanity is not strong enough to breed Crusaders. In the issues of peace and war, every nation looks to its own interests as interpreted by its responsible or recognized Government.

The attitude of the other neutral nations (apart from the United States) reveals this distinction between interests and sympathies in the most marked manner. Who would have supposed, having regard to the history and the sympathies of Greece, that she would not at once have rushed to support England against Turkey? Who would have supposed that month after month Italy could have refrained from joining England in the war against Austria? The sympathies of Holland were stirred to the depths by the forced incursion of thousands of refugees from Belgium; she must have known that the architects of Greater Germany always classed Belgium and Holland together, and yet Holland clung to her neutrality. The list of illustrations need not be further extended. We know from the testimony of the Germans that they know that the sympathies of the whole world are against them. They cannot understand it. In some cases they are even amazed at the want of sympathy with their cause and their culture. They admit the want of sympathies, but they hope for a counterpoise in interests. At the worst they suppose that the fears of the lesser neutrals will paralyze action. That is the logic of their frightfulness.

The people of the United Kingdom who are inclined to think that British policy is the exception to the rule and is always and pre-eminently disinterested should recall their own history and the many occasions even in recent years in which British moral indignation has not been followed by military intervention; and in which it has been recognized that official protests not backed by the real threat of war are often worse than useless. The end of last July revealed Sir Edward Grey as one of the strongest statesmen of history. Yet how many times had that same strong man declined to meddle with the affairs of other nations in spite of moral indignation and apparent diplomatic opportunity?

The article in The Times of March 8, which created so much indignation among those who like to think that

British foreign policy is solely dictated by altruistic chivalry, was very near the truth "which often thought was ne'er so ill expressed":

> We keep our word [said The Times] when we have given it, but we do not give it without solid, practical reasons, and we do not set up to be international Don Quixotes, ready at all times to redress the wrongs that do us no hurt. * * * We reverted to our historical policy of the balance of power, and we reverted to it for the reasons for which our forefathers adopted it. They were not either for them or us reasons of sentiment. They were self-regarding and even selfish reasons. * * * When we subsidized every State in Germany and practically in all Europe in the great war, we did not lavish our gold from love of German or Austrian liberty or out of sheer altruism. No; we invested it for our own safety and our own advantage, and on the whole our commitments were rewarded by an adequate return.

Litera scripta manet. What The Times has said, perhaps under the spell of too much reading of the wisdom of Bismarck, has been said before in the language of the older diplomacy by all our strongest statesmen since England was a nation and not the name of part of an island.

In 1848 Lord Palmerston concluded a speech on the Polish question with these words:

> If I might be allowed to express in one sentence the principle which I think ought to guide an English Minister, I would adopt the expression of Canning, and say that with every British Minister the interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of his policy.

Taken without its context this opinion may well seem to be one of unscrupulous selfishness, and such also appeared to be the argument of The Times. The article was published at a time when British public opinion happened to be on the crest of a wave of altruism; not the cheap altruism of words, but the costly altruism of spending blood and treasure for the benefit, as it seemed, of other nations. The Times said the right thing at the wrong time. The truth it was concerned to preach out of season was apparently in direct opposition to facts; we were fighting (so we all believed) for Belgium and for Europe; this time at any rate we thought the stamp on the gold was of more worth than the gold itself—St. George and the Dragon was a fitting symbol of England crushing Germany. The Times told the truth, but in such a way and at such a time that it had the semblance of an untruth. For once the writer had forgotten his Dante: "Always to that truth that has an air of falsehood a man should close his lips if possible, for though he be blameless he incurs reproach."

But it will be asked, If The Times is right, what becomes of our championship of small nations? What of our wrath over the "scrap of paper"? Have we really got down to inconvertible notes not only in our currency but in our policy? Is the redemption to be suspended so long as it suits our interests?

By no means, but everything turns on the interpretation of our own interests and our own advantage.

Our most real interest is not to be measured in terms of money or in the magnitude of foreign trade. Our most real interest is to maintain those principles and ideas on which the British Empire has been built up; of such are liberty, humanity, and fidelity to agreements.

And to anticipate the moral of the argument, so it is with the United States. If the United States should be forced to go to war with Germany, it will be to lose the money but to save the soul of the nation.

Germany thought England would not go to war because war is so expensive; and in spite of the rude awakening in that case the same false reasoning is applied to the United States.

Execution of Edith Cavell

Official American Reports and a German Official Defense

Walter Hines Page, the American Ambassador in London, on Oct. 18, 1915, transmitted to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs papers from the American Legation at Brussels, Belgium, containing a "report upon the case of Miss Edith Cavell, a British subject, who was recently executed at that capital." The telegram of Minister Brand Whitlock, and the reports prepared by Hugh Gibson, Secretary of the American Legation in Brussels, and Maître de Leval, Legal Counselor of the Legation, appear below, followed by a statement by Dr. Alfred F. M. Zimmermann, German Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, defending this German execution of a woman.

MISS CAVELL'S DEATH

Brussels, Oct. 12, 1915.

TELEGRAM

American Ambassador, LONDON.

Your letter Sept. 23 and my replies Oct. 9 and 11. Miss Cavell sentenced yesterday and executed at 2 o'clock this morning despite our best efforts continued until the last moment. Full report follows by mail. WHITLOCK,

American Minister.

MR. GIBSON'S REPORT

Brussels, Oct. 12, 1915.

Sir: Upon learning early yesterday morning through unofficial sources that the trial of Miss Edith Cavell had been finished on Saturday afternoon, and that the prosecuting attorney (Kriegsgerichtsrat) had asked for a sentence of death against her, telephonic inquiry was immediately made at the Politische Abteilung as to the facts. It was stated that no sentence had as yet been pronounced and that there would probably be delay of a day or two before a decision was reached. Mr. Conrad gave positive assurances that the legation would be fully informed as to developments in this case. Despite these assurances, we made repeated inquiries in the course of the day, the last one being at 6:20 P. M., Belgian time. Mr. Conrad then stated that sentence had not yet been pronounced and specifically renewed his previous assurances that he would not fail to inform us as soon as there was any news.

At 8:30 it was learned from an outside source that sentence had been passed in the course of the afternoon, (before the last conversation with Mr. Conrad,) and that the execution would take place during the night. In conformity with your instructions I went (accompanied by Mr. de Leval) to look for the Spanish Minister and found him dining at the home of Baron Lambert. I explained the circumstances to his Excellency and asked that (as you were ill and unable to go yourself) he go with us to see Baron von der Lancken and support as strongly as possible the plea which I was to make in your name that execution of the death penalty should be deferred until the Governor could consider your appeal for clemency.

We took with us a note addressed to Baron von der Lancken and a plea for clemency (réquête en grâce) addressed to the Governor General, (Inclosures 1 and 2 attached to this report,) the Spanish Minister willingly agreed to accompany us, and we went together to the Politische Abteilung.

Baron von der Lancken and all the members of his staff were absent for the evening. We sent a messenger to ask that he return at once to see us in regard to a matter of utmost urgency. A little after 10 o'clock he arrived, followed shortly after by Count Harrach and Herr von Falkenhausen, members of his staff. The circumstances of the case were explained to him and your note presented, and he read it aloud in our presence. He expressed disbelief in the report that sentence had actually been passed, and manifested some surprise that we should give credence to any report not emanating from official sources. He was quite insistent on knowing the exact source of our information, but this I did not feel at liberty to communicate

to him. Baron von der Lancken stated that it was quite improbable that sentence had been pronounced, that, even if so, it would not be executed within so short a time, and that in any event it would be quite impossible to take any action before morning. It was, of course, pointed out to him that if the facts were as we believed them to be action would be useless unless taken at once. We urged him to ascertain the facts immediately, and this, after some hesitancy, he agreed to do. He telephoned to the presiding Judge of the court-martial, and returned in a short time to say that the facts were as we had represented them and that it was intended to carry out the sentence before morning. We then presented as earnestly as possible your plea for delay. So far as I am able to judge, we neglected to present no phase of the matter which might have had any effect, emphasizing the horror of executing a woman, no matter what her offense, pointing out that the death sentence had heretofore been imposed only for actual cases of espionage and that Miss Cavell was not even accused by the German authorities of anything so serious. I further called attention to the failure to comply with Mr. Conrad's promise to inform the legation of the sentence. I urged that, inasmuch as the offenses charged against Miss Cavell were long since accomplished and that as she had been for some weeks in prison, a delay in carrying out the sentence could entail no danger to the German cause. I even went so far as to point out the fearful effect of a summary execution of this sort upon public opinion, both here and abroad, and, although I had no authority for doing so, called attention to the possibility that it might bring about reprisals.

The Spanish Minister forcibly supported all our representations and made an earnest plea for clemency.

Baron von der Lancken stated that the Military Governor was the supreme authority (Gerichtsherr) in matters of this sort; that appeal from his decision could be carried only to the Emperor, the Governor General having no authority to intervene in such cases. He added that under the provisions of German martial law the Military Governor had discretionary powers to accept or to refuse acceptance of an appeal for clemency. After some discussion he agreed to call the Military Governor on the telephone and learn whether he had already ratified the sentence and whether there was any chance for clemency. He returned in about a half hour and stated that he had been to confer personally with the Military Governor, who said that he had acted in the case of Miss Cavell only after mature deliberation; that the circumstances in her case were of such a character that he considered the infliction of the death penalty imperative, and that in view of the circumstances of this case he must decline to accept your plea for clemency or any representation in regard to the matter.

Baron von der Lancken then asked me to take back the note which I had presented to him. To this I demurred, pointing out that it was not a "réquête en grâce" but merely a note to him transmitting a communication to the Governor, which was itself to be considered as the "réquête en grâce." I pointed out that this was expressly stated in your note to him, and tried to prevail upon him to keep it; he was very insistent, however, and I finally reached the conclusion that inasmuch as he had read it aloud to us and we knew that he was aware of its contents, there was nothing to be gained by refusing to accept the note, and accordingly took it back.

Even after Baron von der Lancken's very positive and definite statement that there was no hope, and that, under the circumstances, "even the Emperor himself could not intervene," we continued to appeal to every sentiment to secure delay, and the Spanish Minister even led Baron von der Lancken aside in order to say very forcibly a number of things which he would have felt hesitancy in saying in the presence of the younger officers and of Mr. de Leval, a Belgian subject.

His Excellency talked very earnestly with Baron von der Lancken for about a quarter of an hour. During this time Mr. de Leval and I presented to the younger officers every argument we could think

of. I reminded them of our untiring efforts on behalf of German subjects at the outbreak of the war and during the siege of Antwerp. I pointed out that while our services had been rendered gladly and without any thought of future favors, they should certainly entitle you to some consideration for the only request of this sort you had made since the beginning of the war. Unfortunately our efforts were unavailing. We persevered until it was only too clear that there was no hope of securing any consideration for the case.

We left the Politische Abteilung shortly after midnight, and I immediately returned to the legation to report to you.

(Signed.) HUGH GIBSON.

M. DE LEVAL'S REPORT

October 12, 1915.

Sir: As soon as the legation received an intimation that Miss Cavell was arrested, your letter of Aug. 31, of which copy is herewith annexed, numbered 1, was sent to Baron von der Lancken. The German authorities were by that letter requested, inter alia, to allow me to see Miss Cavell, so as to have all necessary steps taken for her defense. No reply being received, the legation, on Sept. 10, reminded the German authorities of your letter.

The German reply, sent on Sept. 12, was that I would not be allowed to see Miss Cavell, but that Mr. Braun, lawyer at the Brussels court, was defending her and was already seeing the German authorities about the case.

I immediately asked Mr. Braun to come to see me at the legation, which he did a few days later. He informed me that personal friends of Miss Cavell had asked him to defend her before the German court, that he agreed to do so, but that, owing to some unforeseen circumstances, he was prevented from pleading before that court, adding that he had asked Mr. Kirschen, a member of the Brussels bar and his friend, to take up the case and plead for Miss Cavell, and that Mr. Kirschen had agreed to do so.

I therefore at once put myself in communication with Mr. Kirschen, who told me that Miss Cavell was prosecuted for having helped soldiers to cross the frontier. I asked him whether he had seen Miss Cavell, and whether she had made any statement to him, and to my surprise found that the lawyers defending prisoners before the German military court were not allowed to see their clients before the trial, and were not shown any document of the prosecution. This, Mr. Kirschen said, was in accordance with the German military rules. He added that the hearing of the trial of such cases was carried out very carefully, and that, in his opinion, although it was not possible to see the client before the trial, in fact the trial itself developed so carefully and so slowly that it was generally possible to have a fair knowledge of all the facts and to present a good defense for the prisoner. This would specially be the case for Miss Cavell, because the trial would be rather long, as she was prosecuted with thirty-four other prisoners.

I informed Mr. Kirschen of my intention to be present at the trial so as to watch the case. He immediately dissuaded me from taking such attitude, which he said would cause a great prejudice to the prisoner, because the German Judges would resent it and feel it almost as an affront if I was appearing to exercise a kind of supervision on the trial. He thought that if the Germans would admit my presence, which was very doubtful, it would in any case cause prejudice to Miss Cavell.

Mr. Kirschen assured me over and over again that the military court of Brussels was always perfectly fair and that there was not the slightest danger of any miscarriage of justice. He promised that he would keep me posted on all the developments which the case would take and would report to me the exact charges that were brought against Miss Cavell and the facts concerning her that would be disclosed at the trial, so as to allow me to judge by myself about the merits of the case. He insisted that of course he would do all that was humanly possible to defend Miss Cavell to the best of his ability.

Three days before the trial took place Mr. Kirschen wrote me a few lines, saying that the trial would be on the next

Thursday, the 7th of October. The legation at once sent him, on the 5th of October, a letter (copy No. 2) confirming in writing, in the name of the legation, the arrangement that had been made between him and me. This letter was delivered to Mr. Kirschen by a messenger of the legation.

The trial took two days, ending Friday, the 8th.

On Saturday I was informed by an outsider that the trial had taken place, but that no judgment would be reached till a few days later.

Receiving no report from Mr. Kirschen, I tried to find him but failed. I then sent him a note on Sunday, asking him to send his report to the legation or call there on Monday morning at 8:30. At the same time I obtained from some other person present at the trial some information about what had occurred, and the following facts were disclosed to me:

Miss Cavell was prosecuted for having helped English and French soldiers, as well as Belgian young men, to cross the frontier and to go over to England. She had amitted by signing a statement before the day of the trial, and by public acknowledgment in court, in the presence of all the other prisoners and the lawyers, that she was guilty of the charges brought against her, and she had acknowledged not only that she had helped these soldiers to cross the frontier, but also that some of them had thanked her in writing when arriving in England. This last admission made her case so much the more serious, because if it only had been proved against her that she had helped the soldiers to traverse the Dutch frontier, and no proof was produced that those soldiers had reached a country at war with Germany, she could only have been sentenced for an attempt to commit the "crime" and not for the "crime" being duly accomplished. As the case stood, the sentence fixed by the German military law was a sentence of death. Paragraph 58 of the German Military Code says:

> Will be sentenced to death for treason any person who, with the intention of helping the hostile power or of causing harm to the German or allied troops, is guilty of one of the crimes of Paragraph 90 of the German Penal Code.

The case referred to in above said Paragraph 90 consists in:

> * * * conducting soldiers to the enemy * * * (viz.: "Dem Feinde Mannschaften zuführt.")

The penalties above set forth apply, according to Paragraph 160 of the German Code, in case of war, to foreigners as well as to Germans.

In her oral statement before the court Miss Cavell disclosed almost all the facts of the whole prosecution. She was questioned in German, an interpreter translating all the questions in French, with which language Miss Cavell was well acquainted. She spoke without trembling and showed a clear mind. Often she added some greater precision to her previous depositions.

When she was asked why she helped these soldiers to go to England she replied that she thought that if she had not done so they would have been shot by the Germans, and that therefore she thought she only did her duty to her country in saving their lives.

The Military Public Prosecutor said that argument might be good for English soldiers, but did not apply to Belgian young men whom she induced to cross the frontier and who would have been perfectly free to remain in the country without danger to their lives.

Mr. Kirschen made a very good plea for Miss Cavell, using all arguments that could be brought in her favor before the court.

The Military Public Prosecutor, however, asked the court to pass a death sentence on Miss Cavell and eight other prisoners among the thirty-five. The court did not seem to agree, and the judgment was postponed. The person informing me said he thought that the court would not go to the extreme limit.

Anyhow, after I had found out these facts, (viz., Sunday evening,) I called at the Political Division of the German Government in Belgium, and asked whether, now that the trial had taken place, permission would be granted to me to see Miss Cavell in jail, as surely there was no longer any object in refusing this per-

mission. The German official, Mr. Conrad, said he would make the necessary inquiry at the court and let me know later on.

I also asked him that permission be granted to Mr. Gahan, the English clergyman, to see Miss Cavell.

At the same time we prepared at the legation, to be ready for every eventuality, a petition for pardon, addressed to the Governor General in Belgium, and a transmitting note addressed to Baron von der Lancken.

Monday morning at 11 I called up Mr. Conrad on the telephone from the legation (as I had already done previously on several occasions when making inquiries about the case) asking what the military court had decided about Mr. Gahan and myself seeing Miss Cavell. He replied that Mr. Gahan could not see her, but that she could see any of the three Protestant clergymen attached to the prison; and that I could not see her till the judgment was pronounced and signed, but that this would probably only take place in a day or two. I asked the German official to inform the legation immediately after the passing of said judgment, so that I might see Miss Cavell at once, thinking, of course, that the legation might, according to your intentions, take immediate steps for Miss Cavell's pardon if the judgment really was a sentence of death.

Very surprised to still receive no news from Mr. Kirschen, I then called at his house at 12:30 and was informed that he would not be there till about the end of the afternoon. I then called at 12:40 at the house of another lawyer interested in the case of a fellow-prisoner, and found that he also was out. In the afternoon, however, the latter lawyer called at my house, saying that in the morning he had heard from the German Kommandantur that judgment would be passed only the next morning, viz., Tuesday morning. He said he feared that the court would be very severe for all the prisoners.

Shortly after this lawyer left me, and while I was preparing a note about the case, at 8 P. M. I was privately and reliably informed that the judgment had been delivered at 5 o'clock in the afternoon; that Miss Cavell had been sentenced to death, and that she would be shot at 2 o'clock the next morning. I told my informer that I was extremely surprised at this, because the legation had received no information yet, neither from the German authorities nor from Mr. Kirschen, but that the matter was too serious to run the smallest chance, and that therefore I would proceed immediately to the legation to confer with your Excellency and take all possible steps to save Miss Cavell's life.

According to your Excellency's decision, Mr. Gibson and myself went, with the Spanish Minister, to see Baron von der Lancken, and the report of our interview and of our efforts to save Miss Cavell is given to you by Mr. Gibson.

This morning Mr. Gahan, the English clergyman, called to see me and told me that he had seen Miss Cavell in her cell yesterday night at 10 o'clock, that he had given her the holy communion and had found her admirably strong and calm. I asked Mr. Gahan whether she had made any remarks about anything concerning the legal side of her case and whether the confession which she made before the trial and in court was, in his opinion, perfectly free and sincere. Mr. Cahan says that she told him she perfectly well knew what she had done, that according to the law of course she was guilty and had admitted her guilt, but that she was happy to die for her country. (Signed) G. de LEVAL.

[On the opposite page appears the German official defense of Miss Cavell's execution]

A Defense of the Execution

By Dr. Alfred F. M. Zimmermann

German Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Moved by foreign denunciations of the execution of Miss Edith Cavell, out of which he said Germany's enemies were making capital, Dr. Alfred F. M. Zimmermann, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on Oct. 24, 1915, made the authorized statement to the staff correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES in Berlin:

IT was a pity that Miss Cavell had to be executed, but it was necessary. She was judged justly. We hope it will not be necessary to have any more executions.

I see from the English and American press that the shooting of an Englishwoman and the condemnation of several other women in Brussels for treason has caused a sensation, and capital against us is being made out of the fact. It is undoubtedly a terrible thing that the woman has been executed; but consider what would happen to a State, particularly in war, if it left crimes aimed at the safety of its armies to go unpunished because committed by women. No criminal code in the world—least of all the laws of war—makes such a distinction; and the feminine sex has but one preference, according to legal usages, namely, that women in a delicate condition may not be executed. Otherwise man and woman are equal before the law, and only the degree of guilt makes a difference in the sentence for the crime and its consequences.

I have before me the court's verdict in the Cavell case, and can assure you that it was gone into with the utmost thoroughness, and was investigated and cleared up to the smallest details. The result was so convincing, and the circumstances were so clear, that no war court in the world could have given any other verdict, for it was not concerned with a single emotional deed of one person, but a well-thought-out plot, with many far-reaching ramifications, which for nine months succeeded in doing valuable service to our enemies to the great detriment of our armies. Countless Belgian, French, and English soldiers are again fighting in the ranks of the Allies who owe their escape to the activities of the band now found guilty, whose head was the Cavell woman. Only the utmost sternness could do away with such activities under the very nose of our authorities, and a Government which in such case does not resort to the sternest measures sins against its most elementary duties toward the safety of its own army.

All those convicted were thoroughly aware of the nature of their acts. The court particularly weighed this point with care, letting off several of the accused because they were in doubt as to whether they knew that their actions were punishable. Those condemned knew what they were doing, for numerous public proclamations had pointed out the fact that aiding enemies' armies was punishable with death.

I know that the motives of the condemned were not base; that they acted from patriotism; but in war one must be prepared to seal one's patriotism with blood whether one faces the enemy in battle or otherwise in the interest of one's cause does deeds which justly bring after them the death penalty. Among our Russian prisoners are several young girls who fought against us in soldiers' uniforms. Had one of these girls fallen no one would have accused us of barbarity against women. Why now, when another woman has met the death to which she knowingly exposed herself, as did her comrades in battle?

There are moments in the life of nations where consideration for the existence of the individual is a crime against all. Such a moment was here. It was necessary once for all to put an end to the activity of our enemies, regardless of their motives; therefore the death penalty was executed so as to frighten off all those who, counting on

preferential treatment for their sex, take part in undertakings punishable by death. Were special consideration shown to women we should open the door wide to such activities on the part of women, who are often more clever in such matters than the cleverest male spy. The man who is in a position of responsibility must do that, but, unconcerned about the world's judgment, he must often follow the difficult path of duty.

If, despite these considerations, it is now being discussed whether mercy shall be shown the rest of those convicted, and if the life which they have forfeited under recognized law is given back to them, you can deduce from that how earnestly we are striving to bring our feelings of humanity in accord with the commandments of stern duty. If the others are pardoned it will be at the expense of the security of our armies, for it is to be feared that new attempts will be made to harm us when it is believed that offenders will go unpunished or suffer only a mild penalty. Only pity for the guilty can lead to such pardons; they will not be an admission that the suspended sentence was too stern.

Dr. Zimmermann said in conclusion that there was not a word of truth in the report that the soldiers at first refused to shoot Miss Cavell, and then aimed so badly that an officer was forced to give the coup de grace. He stated:

The weakness of our enemies' arguments is proved by the fact that they do not attempt to combat the justice of the sentence but try to influence public opinion against us by false reports of the execution. The official report before me shows that it was carried out according to the prescribed forms, and that death resulted instantly from the first volley, as certified by the physician present.

The Case of Edith Cavell

By James M. Beck

Late Assistant Attorney General of the United States and author of "In the Supreme Court of Civilization: "The Dual Alliance vs. the Triple Entente," (which appeared in CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE in January, 1915.) Mr. Beck's fame as an analyst of the issues of this war is international. We present below his conclusions regarding the case from an article originally appearing in THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WILL the American people or the people of any nation hesitate to accept the clear, positive, and circumstantial statements of Minister Whitlock, Secretary Gibson, and Counselor de Leval, at least two of whom are wholly disinterested in the matter, as against the self-exculpatory, general, and anonymous denials of a "semi-official" press bureau, especially when it is recalled that, from the beginning of the great war, the German Foreign Office, with whom military honor is supposed to be almost a religion, has stooped to the most shameful and barefaced mendacity?

When the world recalls how Austrian Ambassadors in Paris, London, and Petrograd made the most emphatic statements that the forthcoming ultimatum to Serbia would be "pacific and conciliatory," and assured the Russian Ambassador that he could therefore safely leave Vienna on his vacation on the very eve of the ultimatum, and when the German Ambassadors in the same capitals gave the most solemn and unequivocal assurances that

> "the German Government had no knowledge of the text of the American note before it was handed in and had not exercised any influence on its contents,"

and later admitted, when the lie had served its purpose by lulling the world into a sense of false security, that it had been fully consulted by its ally before the ultimatum was prepared and had given it a carte blanche to proceed,

when these notable examples of Prussian Machiavellism are recalled, little attention will be given to these futile attempts to wash from the shield of German honor the blood of Edith Cavell.

One can to some extent understand the Berserker fury which caused a von Bissing to say in effect to this gentle-faced English nurse, "You are in our way. You menace our security. You must die, as countless thousands have already died, to secure the results of our seizure of Belgium"; but can we understand or in any way palliate the attempt to hide the stains of blood on that prison floor of Brussels with a cobweb of self-evident falsehoods?

These stains can never be washed out to the eye of imagination.

> "Let none these marks efface,
> For they appeal from tyranny to God."

In the last interview between our representative and Baron von der Lancken, which took place a few hours before the execution, our representative reminded these Prussian officials

> "of our untiring efforts on behalf of German subjects at the outbreak of the war and during the siege of Antwerp. I pointed out that, while our services had been gladly rendered and without any thought of future favors, they should certainly entitle you to some consideration for the only request of this sort you [the American Minister] had made since the beginning of the war."

Even our Minister's appeal to gratitude and to one of the most ordinary and natural courtesies of diplomatic life proved unavailing, and at midnight the Secretary of the American Legation and the Spanish Minister, who was acting with him, left in despair. At 2 o'clock that morning Miss Cavell was secretly executed.

Even the ordinary courtesy accorded to the vilest criminal, of being permitted before dying to have a clergyman of her own selection, was denied her until a few hours before her death, for the legal counselor of the American Legation on Oct. 10 applied in behalf of this country for permission for an English clergyman to see Miss Cavell, and this, too, was refused, as her jailers preferred to assign her the prison chaplains as well as her counsel. Even the final appeal of our Minister for the surrender of her mutilated body was denied, on the ground that only the Minister of War in Berlin could grant it.

Apart from the brutality of the whole incident there is one circumstance that makes it of peculiar interest to the American people and which gives to it the character of rank ingratitude. Our representative, as above stated, did advise the German officials that a little delay was asked by our Legation *as a slight return for the innumerable acts of kindness which our Legation had done for German soldiers and interned prisoners in the earlier days of the war before the German invasion had swept over the land.* The charge of ingratitude may rest soundly upon far greater and broader grounds.

This great nation had contributed in money and merchandise a sum estimated at many millions for the relief of the people in Belgium. In so doing it did to the German Nation an inestimable service, for when Germany conquered Belgium the duty and burden rested upon it to support its population to the extent that it might become necessary. The burden of supporting 8,000,000 civilians was no light one, especially as there existed in Germany a scarcity of food. As bread tickets were then being issued in Germany to its people, the supplies would have been substantially less if a portion of its food products had been required for the civilian population of Belgium, for obviously the German Nation could not permit a people, whom it had so ruthlessly trampled under foot, to starve to death. Every dollar that was raised in America for the Belgian people, therefore, operated to relieve Germany from a heavy burden.

Moreover, when the war broke out, Germany needed some friendly nation to take over the care of its nationals in the hostile countries, and in England, France, Belgium, and Russia the interests of German citizens were assumed by the American Government as a courtesy to Germany, and no one can question how faithfully in the last fourteen months Page in London, Sharp in Paris, and Whitlock in Brussels have labored to

alleviate the inevitable suffering to German prisoners or interned civilians.

In view of these services, it surely was not much for the American Minister to ask that a little delay should be granted to a woman whose error, if any, had arisen from impulses of humanity and from considerations of patriotism. To spare her life a little longer could not have done the German cause any possible harm, for she was in their custody and beyond the power of rendering any help to her compatriots. To condemn any human being, even if he were the vilest criminal, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon and execute him at 2 A. M. was an act of barbarism for which no possible condemnation is adequate.

Under these circumstances, it would be incredible, if the facts were not beyond dispute, that the request of the United States for a little delay was not only brutally refused, *but that our Legation was deliberately misled and deceived until the death sentence had been inflicted.*

This makes the fate of Miss Cavell our affair as much as that of the Lusitania. And yet we have the already familiar semi-official assurance from Washington that while our officials "unofficially deplore the act, officially they can do nothing." Concurrently we are told in the President's Thanksgiving proclamation that we should be thankful because we have "been able to assert our rights and the rights of mankind," and that this "has been a year of special blessing for us," for, so the proclamation adds, "we have prospered while other nations were at war."

I venture to say in all reverence that the God of nations will be better pleased on the coming Thanksgiving Day—which also should be one of penitence and humiliation—if we do a little more *in fact* as well as in words to safeguard the rights of humanity. Our initial blunder was in turning away the Belgian Commissioners, when they first presented the wrongs of their crucified nation, with icy phrases as to a mysterious day of reckoning in the indefinite future. An act of justice now will be worth a thousand future "accountings" after the long agony of the world is over. "Now is the accepted time, this the day of salvation."

Let our nation begin with the case of Edith Cavell, and demand of Germany the dismissal of the officers who flouted, deceived, and mocked the representative of the United States. That concerns our honor as a nation.

And you, women of America! Will you not honor the memory of this martyr of your sex, who for all time will be mourned as was the noblest Greek maiden, Antigone, who also gave her life that her brother might have the rites of sepulture? Will you not carry on in her name and for her memory those sacred ministrations of mercy which were her lifework?

Make her cause—the cause of mercy—your own!

German-Americans Against Wilson

In its issue of Oct. 25, 1915, THE NEW YORK TIMES *reported from Worcester, Mass.:*

A convention described as representing forty-six organizations of German-Americans, with a membership of 20,000 in this State, today adopted a resolution "firmly opposing" the re-election of President Wilson. The meeting was called by John Albrecht Walz, Professor of German Literature at Harvard University and State Chairman of the German National Alliance. The purpose was said to be largely to induce Americans of German descent to take a more active interest in political affairs, and no permanent organization was attempted. Announcement had been made previously that the gathering probably would indorse one of the candidates for Governor at the State election next month, but it was decided not to take such a step. The resolution, which was adopted after considerable debate, follows: "Resolved, That we, American citizens, assembled at Worcester, do not desire as an organization to indorse any candidate for Governor, but we believe in the desirability of unitedly discussing the question of the Gubernatorial candidates. We are, however, firmly opposed to the re-election of Woodrow Wilson as President of the United States."

The American Note to Britain

By Albert Bushnell Hart

Professor of Government in Harvard University

A vigorious declaration of intention to champion the integrity of established neutral rights "against the lawless conduct of belligerents" is contained in the note of Oct. 21, 1915, which the United States has addressed to Great Britain as a response to the several communnications of that nation concerning the American protest against British interference with American trade with Europe. Incidentally notice is served that the United States does not recognize as legal the British blockade of European ports. The note to Great Britain, which, because of its great length, was sent to London by special messenger, was made public by the State Department on Nov. 7. With it are pertinent papers, including a copy of instructions to American naval officers in the civil war, and a "statement regarding vessels detained by British authorities," signed by Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, who in the name of his Government serves notice on Great Britain that the United States "cannot submit to the curtailment of its neutral rights" by the British Orders in Council and prize court rules. The British measures, it is asserted, "are admittedly retaliatory and therefore illegal, in conception and in nature." Below appears a statement of the chief points involved, taken from an article by Professor Hart which appeared in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Nov. 14, 1915.

THE Germans have complained that, while the State Department has been very sharp in following up their delinquencies, it has not found time to deal with similar difficulties with Great Britian. The dispatch of Oct. 21 described itself as a formal reply to British "notes of Jan. 7, Feb. 10, June 22, July 23, July 31, (2,) Aug. 13, and to a note verbale of the British Embassy of Aug. 6"; it is therefore safe to say that this is not exactly a frenzied and impulsive appeal, based upon imperfect information. The State Department is nothing if it is not deliberate; and deliberation has made it possible to bring together a formidable array of principles, precedents, and cases.

The official reason for delay is that the United States had hoped that his Majesty's Government would be a good boy and would keep his written promises to reduce the delays and inconveniences in the treatment of American ships and cargoes. Naturally, in the ten months since the first dispatch on this general subject, there has been time for a lot of new cases to accumulate. From that point of view the note would have been stronger if the department had waited six weeks or six months longer. Still it would be most unfair to twit the department with delay if, now that the dispatch has appeared, it covered in a vigorous and statesmanlike manner all the solvable difficulties relating to our neutral trade.

Notwithstanding the rapid transit of intelligence, of diplomatic information and of the orders of shipowners, the note calls attention to an exasperating delay in handling American vessels, and other vessels with American cargoes on board, which have been overhauled by British cruisers. In the old days of sailing ships it was not easy nor common for the captor to bring his captures into port himself. He put a prize crew on, with orders to take the vessel to a specified port where a prize court could sit upon the capture. The capturing ship had every interest in saving the capture because otherwise there would be no prize on it; and the destruction of a prize on the grounds that it could not be brought into court was rare. Most of the captures of American ships and cargoes by the British have been near a British port, particularly that vast mart of world traffic, Kirkwall in the Orkney Islands. Whoever heard of Kirkwall before? Why Kirkwall? Because the English have virtually barred the Strait of Dover and compelled shipping bound for North Sea ports to go around the North of Scotland, and there has pocketed American and other vessels. The tables show a great number of vessels which were thus obliged to lie up from a day to a week, or in some cases several

months. This is vexatious; and the United States is quite right in the contention that it is also illegal and unfriendly to compel vessels to interrupt their yovages and to submit to inquisitorial searches of their cargo. The grievance is a real one and is aggravated by the fact that it is a return in another form to practices of which the United States complained nearly a year ago, and which the British Government promised to discontinue.

No part of the dispatch will provoke more British comment than the flat-footed assertion that the British prize courts are not judicial tribunals, making decisions solely on the general principles of international law, but a branch of the British military system; yet no part of the dispatch is sounder or more needed. The United States of America had experience of the impartiality of British prize courts a century ago, when, in 1805, the British Judges began to reverse their own previous decisions because their Government had changed its policy with regard to neutral trade. International law had not changed, the conditions had not changed, but something new had to be contrived to make it unpleasant for Napoleon.

Another part of the dispatch deals with the stoppage of cargoes, bound from the neutral United States to neutral Holland and the Scandinavian countries, such cargoes not being made up of munitions of war or other genuine contraband. This interference was hardly made in the worst days of the British Orders in Council and French Decrees, in the period just before the War of 1812. The British Government thus constitutes itself the distributer of American trade, deciding for us what foreign countries have enough oil or cotton or manufactures. The British trade experts watch the barometer of international commerce in every European neutral country; and when the trade rises above what the English think normal they take it upon themselves to cut off a part.

As Secretary Lansing forcibly shows, this policy amounts to a blockade of neutral ports, which is contrary to all principles of international law and common sense. In many ways the Scandinavian countries and Holland are now treated by Great Britain as though they were at war. On the other side there are some curious twists by which British shipments are made to such neutral powers, running the risk of their being re-exported to Germany, while similar American exports are stopped.

The dispatch clearly and definitely commits the United States to the conviction that the interference with American trade, which the British have sometimes called a blockade, is not a real blockade, even against the German coast, and is therefore in no way binding upon the United States. The dispatch is on that point perfectly clear; this country will henceforth protest every case of capture under the so-called blockade.

The logical foundation for that policy is that the United States as a neutral recognizes war where there is war and not where it does not exist. We have never denied the right to post a fleet off the German coast and to capture vessels attempting to enter or leave the German ports, whether those vessels be German or neutral. We have not recognized the right of the British to post ships in the Strait of Dover and the passages north of Scotland and assert that they are thereby blockading the German coast. Those water passages are avenues to other countries besides Germany. There is no more right to block them to our shipping than there would be to put a fleet ten miles off of New York Harbor, call it a blockade of the German coast, and capture American vessels cleared for Germany. No matter what the pressure upon the British Nation, they must confine their hostilities to the hostile and not extend them to the neutral. Otherwise any two powers that chose to go to war could compel all the rest of the world to suspend their commerce while these two chose to remain at war.

On the other hand, the British have a right to seize cargoes of contraband wherever found on the high seas, whether bound to a belligerent port or bound to a neutral port whence they are likely to reach the belligerents. The United

States Government claimed that right during our civil war and has never had the least disposition to deny it in the present worldwide war. Why should this right of capture be legal anywhere on the high seas, while captures for the reason of blockade are good only when a vessel is bound for a particular stretch of coast? Capture for contraband is a part of the general military operations; it is akin to destroying the ships of an enemy, and the offense which justifies capture occurs wherever the vessel is. Blockade applies only to a localized warfare. Ships that have notice that a particular port or coast is blockaded, clear for it at their peril; but they are not liable to capture if bound to unblockaded ports. The British are trying to avoid the restrictions of blockade by declining (for reasons best known to their naval authorities) to place a fleet off the German coast; and at the same time they are claiming the fullest privileges of blockade, and going far beyond them, by undertaking to limit and control the commerce of the world that is bound into the North Sea.

The question is often asked why the British, since they have the physical power, should not stop a commerce, some of which is certain to leak through to the Germans. The answer is very simple: the United States and other neutral powers have a right of navigation on the high seas which does not spring from the consent of belligerent powers, but from the inherent right of all maritime nations to make use of the sea as a common possession.

Up to this point the dispatch covers the ground in a wholesome and manly fashion. Its chief and crying defect is that upon the great question of what shall be contraband goods, Secretary Lansing has no more to say than: "There is no intention in this discussion to commit the Government of the United States to a policy of waiving of any objections which it may entertain as to the propriety and right of the British to include in their list of contraband of war certain articles which have been so included. The United States Government reserves the right to make this matter the subject of a communication to his Majesty's Government at a later day." This seems a weak expansion of Secretary Bryan's remark nearly a year ago that he would not "at this time" go into the question of the British list of contraband. By a vicious application of contraband American ships are being held up almost every day and sent into British ports, obliged to discharge and forfeit part or the whole of their cargo, even to forfeit the vessel, because they are carrying American products which have nothing to do with war, and are as innocent as babies' milk.

American Defense

By Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States; William J. Bryan, Late American Secretary of State; Theodore Roosevelt, ex-President of the United States

President Wilson, addressing, in New York on Nov. 4, 1915, a gathering representative of every phase of party democracy, assembled to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Manhattan Club, announced to the people his program of preparedness, his plan for a national defense. The text of the speech, together with the comment thereon by William J. Bryan and ex-President Roosevelt, appears below.

THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH.

MR. TOASTMASTER and Gentlemen: I warmly felicitate the club upon the completion of fifty years of successful and interesting life. Club life may be made to mean a great deal to those who know how to use it. I have no doubt that to a great many of you has come genuine stimulation in the association of this place and that as the years have multiplied you have seen more and more the useful ends which may be served by organizations of this sort.

But I have not come to speak wholly of that, for there are others of your own members who can speak of the club with a knowledge and an intelligence which no one can have who has not been intimately associated with it. Men band themselves together for the sake of the association, no doubt, but also for something greater and deeper than that—because they are conscious of common interests lying outside their business occupations, because they are members of the same community and in frequent intercourse find mutual stimulation and a real miximum of vitality and power. I shall assume that here around the dinner table on this memorial occasion our talk should properly turn to the wide and common interests which are most in our thoughts, whether they be the interests of the community or of the nation.

A year and a half ago our thought would have been almost altogether of great domestic questions. They are many and of vital consequence. We must and shall address ourselves to their solution with diligence, firmness, and self-possession, notwithstanding we find ourselves in the midst of a world disturbed by great disaster and ablaze with terrible war; but our thought is now inevitably of new things about which formerly we gave ourselves little concern. We are thinking now chiefly of our relations with the rest of the world, not our commercial relations—about those we have thought and planned always—but about our political relations, our duties as an individual and independent force in the world to ourselves, our neighbors, and the world itself.

Our principles are well known. It is not necessary to avow them again. We believe in political liberty and founded our great Government to obtain it, the liberty of men and of peoples—of men to choose their own lives and of peoples to choose their own allegiance.

Our ambition, also, all the world has knowledge of. It is not only to be free and prosperous ourselves, but also to be the friend and thoughtful partisan of those who are free or who desire freedom the world over. If we have had aggressive purposes and covetous ambitions, they were the fruit of our thoughtless youth as a nation and we have put them aside. We shall, I confidently believe, never again take another foot of territory by conquest. We shall never in any circumstances seek to make an independent people subject to our dominion; because we believe, we passionately believe, in the right of every people to choose their own alle-

CZARINA ALEXANDRA FEODOROVNA

BRAND WHITLOCK
American Ambassador at Brussels, Belgium

giance and be free of masters altogether.

For ourselves we wish nothing but the full liberty of self-development; and with ourselves in this great matter we associate all the peoples of our own hemisphere. We wish not only for the United States but for them the fullest freedom of independent growth and of action, for we know that throughout this hemisphere the same aspirations are everywhere being worked out, under diverse conditions, but with the same impulse and ultimate object.

All this is very clear to us and will, I confidently predict, become more and more clear to the whole world as the great processes of the future unfold themselves. It is with a full consciousness of such principles and such ambitions that we are asking ourselves at the present time what our duty is with regard to the armed force of the nation.

Within a year we have witnessed what we did not believe possible—a great European conflict involving many of the greatest nations of the world. The influences of a great war are everywhere in the air. All Europe is embattled. Force everywhere speaks out with a loud and imperious voice in a titanic struggle of Governments, and from one end of our own dear country to the other men are asking one another what our own force is, how far we are prepared to maintain ourselves against any interference with our national action or development.

In no man's mind, I am sure, is there even raised the question of the willful use of force on our part against any nation or any people. No matter what military or naval force the United States might develop, statesmen throughout the whole world might rest assured that we were gathering that force, not for attack in any quarter, not for aggression of any kind, not for the satisfaction of any political or international ambition, but merely to make sure of our own security.

We have it in mind to be prepared, not for war, but only for defense; and with the thought constantly in our minds that the principles we hold most dear can be achieved by the slow processes of history only in the kindly and wholesome atmosphere of peace, and not by the use of hostile force. The mission of America in the world is essentially a mission of peace and good-will among men. She has become the home and asylum of men of all creeds and races. Within her hospitable borders they have found homes and congenial associations and freedom and a wide and cordial welcome and they have become part of the bone and sinew and spirit of America itself. America has been made up out of the nations of the world and is the friend of the nations of the world.

But we feel justified in preparing ourselves to vindicate our right to independent and unmolested action by making the force that is in us ready for assertion.

And we know that we can do this in a way that will be itself an illustration of the American spirit. In accordance with our American traditions we want and shall work for only an army adequate to the constant and legitimate uses of times of international peace. But we do want to feel that there is a great body of citizens who have received at least the most rudimentary and necessary forms of military training; that they will be ready to form themselves into a fighting force at the call of the nation; and that the nation has the munitions and supplies with which to equip them without delay should it be necessary to call them into action. We wish to supply them with the training they need, and we think we can do so without calling them at any time too long away from their civilian pursuits.

It is with this idea, with this conception, in mind that the plans have been made which it will be my privilege to lay before the Congress at its next session. That plan calls for only such an increase in the regular army of the United States as experience has proved to be required for the performance of the necessary duties of the army in the Philippines, in Hawaii, in Porto Rico, upon the borders of the United States, at the coast fortifications, and at the military posts of the interior.

For the rest, it calls for the training

within the next three years of a force of 400,000 citizen soldiers, to be raised in annual contingents of 133,000, who would be asked to enlist for three years with the colors and three years on furlough, but who during their three years of enlistment with the colors would not be organized as a standing force, but would be expected merely to undergo intensive training for a very brief period of each year. Their training would take place in immediate association with the organized units of the regular army. It would have no touch of the amateur about it, neither would it exact of the volunteers more than they could give in any one year from their civilian pursuits.

And none of this would be done in such a way as in the slightest degree to supersede or subordinate our present serviceable and efficient National Guard. On the contrary, the National Guard itself would be used as part of the instrumentality by which training would be given the citizens who enlisted under the new conditions, and I should hope and expect that the legislation by which all this would be accomplished would put the National Guard itself upon a better and more permanent footing than it has ever been before, giving it not only the recognition which it deserves but a more definite support from the National Government and a more definite connection with the military organization of the nation.

What we all wish to accomplish is that the forces of the nation should indeed be part of the nation, and not a separate professional force, and the chief cost of the system would not be in the enlistment or in the training of the men, but in the providing of ample equipment in case it should be necessary to call all forces into the field.

Moreover, it has been American policy time out of mind to look to the navy as the first and chief line of defense. The navy of the United States is already a very great and efficient force. Not rapidly, but slowly, with careful attention, our naval force has been developed until the navy of the United States stands recognized as one of the most efficient and notable of the modern time.

All that is needed in order to bring it to a point of extraordinary force and efficiency as compared with the other navies of the world is that we should hasten our pace in the policy we have long been pursuing, and that chief of all we should have a definite policy of development, not made from year to year, but looking well into the future and planning for a definite consummation.

We can and should profit in all that we do by the experience and example that have been made obvious to us by the military and naval events of the actual present. It is not merely a matter of building battleships and cruisers and submarines, but also a matter of making sure that we shall have the adequate equipment of men and munitions and supplies for the vessels we build and intend to build.

Part of our problem is the problem of what I may call the mobilization of the resources of the nation at the proper time if it should ever be necessary to mobilize them for national defense. We shall study efficiency and adequate equipment as carefully as we shall study the number and size of our ships, and I believe that the plans already in part made public by the Navy Department are plans which the whole nation can approve with rational enthusiasm.

No thoughtful man feels any panic haste in this matter. The country is not threatened from any quarter. She stands in friendly relations with all the world. Her resources are known and her self-respect and her capacity to care for her own citizens and her own rights. There is no fear among us. Under the New World conditions we have become thoughtful of the things which all reasonable men consider necessary for security and self-defense on the part of every nation confronted with the great enterprise of human liberty and independence. That is all.

Is the plan we propose sane and reasonable and suited to the needs of the hour? Does it not conform to the ancient traditions of America? Has any better plan been proposed than this program that we now place before the country? In it there is no pride of opinion. It represents the best professional and

expert judgment of the country. But I am not so much interested in programs as I am in safeguarding at every cost the good faith and honor of the country.

If men differ with me in this vital matter, I shall ask them to make it clear how far and in what way they are interested in making the permanent interests of the country safe against disturbance.

In the fulfillment of the program I propose I shall ask for the hearty support of the country, of the rank and file of America, of men of all shades of political opinion. For my position in this important matter is different from that of the private individual who is free to speak his own thoughts and to risk his own opinions in this matter. We are here dealing with things that are vital to the life of America itself.

In doing this I have tried to purge my heart of all personal and selfish motives. For the time being, I speak as the trustee and guardian of a nation's rights, charged with the duty of speaking for that nation in matters involving her sovereignty—a nation too big and generous to be exacting and yet courageous enough to defend its rights and the liberties of its people wherever assailed or invaded. I would not feel that I was discharging the solemn obligation I owe the country were I not to speak in terms of the deepest solemnity of the urgency and necessity of preparing ourselves to guard and protect the rights and privileges of our people, our sacred heritage of the fathers who struggled to make us an independent nation.

The only thing within our own borders that has given us grave concern in recent months has been that voices have been raised in America professing to be the voices of Americans which were not in deed and in truth American, but which spoke alien sympathies, which came from men who loved other countries better than they loved America, men who were partisans of other causes than that of America and had forgotten that their chief and only allegiance was to the great Government under which they live. These voices have not been many, but they have been very loud and very clamorous. They have proceeded from a few who were bitter and who were grievously misled.

America has not opened its doors in vain to men and women out of other nations. The vast majority of those who have come to take advantage of her hospitality have united their spirits with hers as well as their fortunes. These men who speak alien sympathies are not their spokesman, but are the spokesmen of small groups whom it is high time that the nation should call to a reckoning. The chief thing necessary in America in order that she should let all the world know that she is prepared to maintain her own great position is that the real voice of the nation should sound forth unmistakably and in majestic volume, in the deep unison of a common unhesitating national feeling. I do not doubt that upon the first occasion, upon the first opportunity, upon the first definite challenge, that voice will speak forth in tones which no man can doubt and with commands which no man dare gainsay or resist.

May I not say, while I am speaking of this, that there is another danger that we should guard against? We should rebuke not only manifestations of racial feeling here in America where there should be none, but also every manifestation of religious and sectarian antagonism. It does not become America that within her borders, where every man is free to follow the dictates of his conscience and worship God as he pleases, men should raise the cry of church against church. To do that is to strike at the very spirit and heart of America.

We are a God-fearing people. We agree to differ about methods of worship, but we are united in believing in Divine Providence and in worshipping the God of Nations. We are the champions of religious right here and everywhere that it may be our privilege to give it our countenance and support. The Government is conscious of the obligation and the nation is conscious of the obligation. Let no man create divisions where there are none.

Here is the nation God has builded by

our hands. What shall we do with it? Who is there who does not stand ready at all times to act in her behalf in a spirit of devoted and disinterested patriotism? We are yet only in the youth and first consciousness of our power. The day of our country's life is still but in its fresh morning. Let us lift our eyes to the great tracts of life yet to be conquered in the interests of righteous peace. Come, let us renew our allegiance to America, conserve her strength in its purity, make her chief among those who serve mankind, self-reverenced, self-commanded, mistress of all forces of quiet counsel, strong above all others in goodwill and the might of invincible justice and right.

A Reply to the President

By William J. Bryan

Late American Secretary of State

Washington, Nov. 5, 1915.

I HAVE read the President's speech at New York with sorrow and concern. He is doing what he believes to be his duty, and so long as a man follows his conscience and judgment we cannot criticise his motives, but we may be compelled to dissent from his conclusions. I feel it my duty to dissent, and, as he has given his views with clearness and emphasis, those who differ from him are under a like obligation to express themselves with equal clearness.

He says that his position is different from that of the private individual in that the individual is free to speak his own thoughts and risk his own opinion. This sentence is a little obscure. In so far as he expresses his own opinion, he does not differ from the private citizen except that he speaks under a sense of official responsibility, but, where a nation's fate is involved in a policy, every private citizen who loves his country and tries to serve it is conscious of responsibility.

The President will not assume that he is more deeply interested in the welfare of his country than the millions who elected him to be, for the time being, their spokesman. And if, as he evidently believes, he is giving voice to the opinions of his countrymen, he is, of course, anxious to have them as frank with him as he has been with them—how otherwise can he know whether he represents or misrepresents their views?

He has announced a policy which has never before been adopted in this country and never indorsed by any party in the country, and he has no way of knowing, until he hears from the people, whether he has correctly interpreted the will of the public. His appeal is not to any party, but, as he says, to men of "all shades of opinion." He asks for the hearty support of the country, meaning, of course, that he wants the support, provided the people favor the policy which he has outlined. He could not, of course, ask them to support a policy they did not indorse, especially if they considered the policy dangerous to the country.

From my view of the subject, the plan which he proposes is not only a departure from our traditions, but a reversal of our national policy. It is not only a menace to our peace and safety, but a challenge to the spirit of Christianity which teaches us to influence others by example rather than by exciting fear.

The President says that we should be prepared "not for aggression but for defense." That is the ground upon which all preparation for war is made. What nation has ever prepared for war on the theory that it was preparing for aggression? It is only fair to assume that the European rulers who are involved in the present war thought that they were contributing toward the maintenance of peace when they were making elaborate preparations for defense. It is a false philosophy, and, being false, it inevitably leads into difficulties.

The spirit that makes the individual

carry a revolver—and whoever carries a revolver except for defense?—leads him not only to use it on slight provocation, but to use language which provokes trouble. "Speak softly but carry a big stick" is one of the delusive maxims employed by those who put their faith in force. There are two answers to it—first, the man who speaks softly has not the disposition to carry a club, and if a man with a soft voice is persuaded to carry a club his voice changes as soon as he begins to rely upon the club.

If there is any truth in our religion, a nation must win respect as an individual does, not by carrying arms, but by an upright, honorable course that invites confidence and insures good-will. This nation has won its position in the world without resorting to the habit of toting a pistol or carrying a club. Why reverse our policy at this time? The President himself admits that there is no reason for a change. He says:

"The country is not threatened from any quarter. She stands in friendly relations with all the world. Her resources and her self-respect and capacity to care for her own citizens and rights are well known." And to make the statement more emphatic he adds: "There is no fear among us."

If we're not threatened by any nation, if our relations with all nations are friendly, if everybody knows that we're able to defend ourselves if necessary, and if there is no fear among us, why is this time chosen to revolutionize our national theories and to exchange our policy for the policy of Europe? Why abandon the hope that we have so long entertained of setting an example to Europe? Why encourage the nations of Europe in their fatal folly by imitating them? Why impose upon the Western Hemisphere a policy so disastrous?

May we not expect all Latin America to be stimulated to preparation if we enter upon a new era of preparation? And will not such a policy make conflicts between these republics more probable? We shall do infinite harm to the neighboring nations, as well as to ourselves, if we are drawn into this policy which provokes war by a preparation which is impossible without a large increase in taxation and the arousing of a military system which sets up false standards of honor.

We are now spending more than $250,000,000 a year on preparedness—ten times as much as we are spending on agriculture—and I feel sure that the taxpayers are not in favor of increasing this sum at this time when a change is not only unnecessary but a menace to our national ideals.

There has not been a time in fifty years when there was less reason to add to the expenses of the army and navy, for we are not only without an enemy, but our preparedness is increasing relatively as other nations exhaust themselves. And there never was a time, and there never has been a time, in our whole history when our duty to the world more imperatively demanded self-restraint and the counsels of peace.

I hope the President will not be deceived by the atmosphere of the Manhattan Club. That is the one place in the United States where the mammon-worshipping portion of the Democratic Party meets to exchange compliments—there is no group further removed from the sentiment of the masses, whether you measure that sentiment by economical, social, or religious standards.

On the next page appears ex-President Roosevelt's criticism of President Wilson's speech on American defense.

A Shadow Program

By Theodore Roosevelt

Ex-President of the United States

The program announced by President Wilson at the Manhattan Club dinner is assailed by Colonel Theodore Roosevelt in a statement made public on Nov. 11, 1915, as a policy of adroit delay and make-believe action put forward for political purposes. The statement is part of an article which will appear in the January issue of The Metropolitan Magazine. The ex-President's statement appears below.

ASSERTING that the proposed plan is entirely inadequate, Colonel Roosevelt calls upon the "ordinary citizens" to wake to their needs and "lead the should-be leaders" who have failed them. He advocates a regular army of 250,000, with enough officers to command an army of 1,500,000 if a crisis should arise, and immediate action to make our navy the second in the world. He also pleads for permanent munition plants west of the Alleghanies.

The question of expense is secondary, the Colonel asserted, as "five years hence it may be altogether too late to spend any money."

Here is Colonel Roosevelt's statement:

There are two immediately vital needs of this nation; 1. That our navy shall at the earliest possible moment be made the second in the world in point of size and efficiency. 2. That our regular army shall be increased to at least a quarter of a million men, with an ample reserve of men who could be at once put in the ranks in the event of a sudden attack upon us; and provision made for many times the present number of officers; and in administration, provision made for a combination of entire efficiency with rigid economy that will begin with the abandonment of the many useless army posts and navy yards.

Neither of these needs is in any way met by the President's proposals. I am sincerely glad that he has now reversed the attitude taken in his message to Congress a year ago, in which he advocated keeping this nation unprepared and helpless to defend its honor and vital interest against foreign foes. But I no less sincerely regret that he has not thought out the situation and is not prepared to present a real and substantial plan for defense instead of a shadow program.

During the last three years our navy has fallen off appallingly in relative position among the nations. The Administration now proposes a plan, to be followed mainly by the next Administration, which, if hereafter lived up to, would perhaps replace the navy where it formerly was, in five years' time—a plan which in reality, therefore, is merely an adroit method of avoiding substantial action in the present. This will not do. There should be no policy of adroit delay and make-believe action. Our Government should make provisions this year which will insure the regaining of our naval place at the earliest possible moment. The work should begin on a large scale at once. This is of the first importance.

But is also vital to bring the army abreast of national needs. The proposed plan to create a rival National Guard of half-trained or quarter-trained volunteers—for that is what the absurdly named "continental army" would amount to—if tried will prove very expensive, very detrimental to the existing Ntaional Guard, and entirely useless from the standpoint of meeting the real needs of the country. It would put a business premium on the unpatriotic employer, who would not permit his men to take part in it. It would be much wiser to spend the money in increasing the size and efficiency of the National Guard.

The proposed increase in the size of the regular army is utterly inadequate to serve any real purpose. It is one of those half measures which are of service, if at all, only from the political standpoint. Either we need to prepare or we do not.

If we do, then we should prepare adequately.

I should not regard as wise a proposal for doing away with the New York Fire Department—the wisdom of such a proposal being about on a par with the wisdom of the attitude of the professional pacifists as regards what they are pleased to call "militarism." Yet it would not be materially less wise than a proposal to compromise by, on the one hand, having fire engines, but, on the other hand, not fitting them to throw a stream of water higher than the second story. The military plans of the Administration are on a level with plans for the New York Fire Department which should provide only for second-story hose; they go on the theory that it is desirable to try to put out a fire a little, but not too much. Now, it is always wise either to let a fire alone or to deal with it thoroughly.

I very earnestly hope that the ordinary citizens of this country, since their official leaders refuse to lead them, will themselves wake to their own needs and lead the should-be leaders. Let us at once take action to make us the second naval power in the world. Let us take the action this year, not the year after next. Do it now.

As regards the army, first and foremost let us have the plan of the General Staff made public. Let us know the advice of the experts. Then provide a regular army of a quarter of a million men. Relatively to the nation their army would be no larger than the New York police force is relatively to the City of New York. Provide a real reserve of enlisted men. Provide as many officers, active and reserve taken together, as will enable us to officer a million and a half of men in the event of war. Meanwhile do everything possible for the National Guard, providing the necessary Federal control to make it really efficient; and provide for many training camps like that at Plattsburg.

Drop the undemocratic continental volunteer army which discriminates between employer and employed, which would help the unpatriotic employe who refused to do as his patriotic rival was glad to do, and which would result merely in the establishment of an inefficient rival to the National Guard.

People speak in praise of volunteers. I also praise the volunteer who volunteers to fight, but I do not praise the volunteer who volunteers to have somebody else fight in his place. Universal service is the only way by which we can secure real democracy, real fairness and justice. Every able-bodied youth in the land should be proud to and should be required to prepare himself thoroughly to protect the nation from armed force.

The Germans and Louvain

An Associated Press dispatch dated at London on Oct. 19, 1915, *reports:*

Plans and descriptions of a rebuilt Louvain, prepared by German artists and architects, have been distributed in Louvain in order to get the Belgians interested in this work, but so far only a few new houses have been erected among the ruins. The descriptions are in the Flemish language. An English governess, who has just been released by the German authorities and who has come to London, declares that the Germans are using every means to ingratiate themselves with the people of Louvain. As the ruins serve to remind the Belgians of their woes, the Germans are doing all they can to enforce rebuilding, but the people are antagonistic, and want the ruins to stand until they can be seen by all the world.

Magazinists of the World on the War

Condensed from the Leading Reviews

Several articles by German writers, notably those by Count Reventlow, Captain Persius, and Rudolf Eucken, translated from German periodicals, have separate places elsewhere in this issue. But the excerpts from the world's reviews are this month unusually rich and varied, beginning with articles by several French Academicians and working through the best current comment by leading Italian, Russian, British, and German authorities. Altogether it forms an accurate and carefully chosen assemblage of the best European informed opinion.

The French Navy

By Jean Aicard

Member of the French Academy

In Les Annales for Sept. 19, *M. Jean Aicard of the Académie Française salutes the heroes of the French Navy in a stirring article:*

ONE day—you remember—the spectacle surpassed in sumptuous beauty anything that the imagination of men can dream. On that day the Russian fleet was visiting France. Those ships, glorious isles detached from the flank of distant Russia, were entering the Harbor of Toulon. On all those islands, on all those traveling edifices, a people of sailors were moving briskly but in order, saluting France and acclaiming her. They passed in front of the French squadron, which returned their salutes and acclamations in the warlike smoke of peaceful cannon. In the splendid harbor, Russia was evolving. She was entering our doors. * * * What a moment! I remember the flood of joyous tears mounting from hearts to eyes. My own were blurred. My Parisian associates joked a little. The wit of the boulevard reigned as absolute master in those days.

"Ah, these southerners! Where we find reason to shed a tear, they weep a torrent!"

Paris did not yet consider that the great emotions were "in good taste."

* * * I said to myself: "For the first time since 1870, France is not all alone." I recalled the saying of Michelet: "Germany will crack, pressed in between Russia and England."

And a great hope went through our hearts. We were waiting for England. She has come. Let us give her our love! Let us give ever more love to our navy and to that of the Allies.

Under what protection are our patient heroes of the trenches fighting? Under the protection of the fleets that bar the horizon to prudent, insolent, and infamous Germany.

No, the Summer of 1915 will not bring forth enough flowers on our Continent, if we want—according to the usage of the Greek women and our Bretonnes—to cast flowers as a funeral homage on the mortal waters that engulfed the Bouvet and the Gambetta.

* * * I have under my eyes a letter from a sailor, the son of one of my neighbors, who escaped drowning with the Gambetta. He writes:

> Immediately there were cries from all over. No light anywhere; one groped to get out of the battery where one slept. A minute later there came a second detonation. Happily for me I was near the ladder that leads down to my sleeping place. * * * Immediately some officers got there and, with electric lanterns, they made light for us. I succeeded in mounting the ladder. The ship was about to sink. I threw myself into the water. * * *

One asks oneself about the attitude of the officers of the Gambetta. Could they save themselves? Should they try at least to preserve their lives for the country that needed them? Beyond doubt, the officers should save themselves in

such a case, if they can. But can they, while a single man of the crew stays on board? Now, on the Gambetta almost the whole crew was about to perish. So what do these officers who have arrived do? A simple and sublime thing that I have not seen mentioned anywhere: They light the steps of the men who are pressing together, groping at the foot of the ladders—they "make light for them!" "To make light" is the Provençal expression for "to illuminate," and here it takes on a grandeur worthy of those glorious officers. Does it not seem as if you could hear them say to their men: "This way, boys! Look out, and lively there!" Are they thinking of themselves? No. They are "making light," and the ship sinks.

Now, when we are asked: "What did the officers of the Gambetta do, when that morsel of France was being engulfed?" We shall answer:

"They made light."

And that light is one that horrible Germany can neither kindle nor quench.

India and England in Flanders and in Normandy

By Maurice Barrés

Member of the French Academy

M. Maurice Barrés, of the Académie Française, writes in Les Annales for Sept. 26 of his visit to the headquarters of General French:

TWO days after I had admired that mysterious infantry, (the Gurkas,) those enigmatical visages from deepest Asia, I was permitted to see a parade of cavalry, the Sikhs of the Punjab, tall and strong, noble figures mounted on fine horses. All—beasts and men—bursting with health. Unlike the Gurkas, the Sikhs never cut their beard or their hair. Their beard is curiously rolled on their cheeks, their hair is bound back and hidden under high turbans. Here are no longer the pouchy eyes that had surprised me, and that seem planted awry in the face, but fine regular features, long ovals, a light golden color. * * *

I asked myself: "What are these Indians thinking, these Sikhs and Gurkas? What idea have they of the war? For whom do they fight, and why?"

"Why?" said an Englishman, laughing, "they know that a German is an ugly brute."

There is a good deal of sense in that joke. After more than a year of war, men fight to give back the blows received. I keep on asking, however, and am told:

"They fight because it is the order of the 'Raj.' As a believer obeys God, they obey the Government, the 'Raj,' who is their Providence on earth, the cornerstone of all things, the central something that is not discussed. Just as God has said 'Thou shalt not steal' so the 'Raj' has said 'Thou shalt fight.'"

Russian Strategy

By Emile Faguet

Member of the French Academy

M. Emile Faguet of the Académie Française publishes in the column of "Impressions" which he writes each week for Les Annales, his judgment of the Russian campaign as it appeared to him in September. The distinguished critic and philosopher sees the German Army in as much danger of "melting" on one front as the other.

DECIDEDLY, the Russians knew what they were doing, and did what they wanted to do. When a strategic retreat is spoken of, one does not at first know what to believe. It

may be, in fact, a simple manoeuvre to seek for a better field of operation, one that is known and is counted on. But it may also be a mere euphemism and an "honorable name" to cover a defeat. The things that follow can alone teach us what it really is. Now, some things have followed the retreat of the Russians and have shown us that it really was a strategic manoeuvre. They are at this moment taking the lead in their affairs everywhere. In the north, they are resisting with serious advantage while the Germans are getting deep into the marshes, where their movements, forward or backward, are of equal difficulty. In Galicia, they are having a success to report each day, and are taking an imposing number of prisoners.

The German army in Russia is melting as if in a crucible. The Russians offer the Germans the hospitality of the tomb. The Russians owe this good fortune to their tenacity, and their impassibility, to their phlegm. They are astonished at nothing. They lacked munitions; they fought without munitions or with an enormous inferiority of munitions. They had to evacuate important cities; they evacuated them, slowly, dispassionately, after having stripped them so bare that they could not be of any use to the enemy. They had to appear to be beaten, which is hard on one's pride; they resigned themselves to that, and even made of it an element of victory by inspiring in the enemy a feeling of confidence that has pushed him on to precipitous and rash movements. They have shown themselves adroit strategists and men of great coolness and of imperturbable decision. The new Russia, the Russia of glorious destinies, entitled to a great place, a place of honor in the European union, will date from 1915.

"Leave All Hope Behind"

By Alfred Capus

Member of the French Academy

IT is with Dante's legend for the gates of Hell that Alfred Capus apostrophizes the Kaiser on the occasion of the Czar's assuming supreme command of his armies. The article is a recent editorial in the Figaro. M. Capus, member of the Académie Française and author of many successful novels and plays, is editor in chief of the Figaro.

Public opinion everywhere has immediately understood the design of the Czar in placing himself at the head of his armies. It is the *Lasciate ogni speranza* for German peace, which our enemies hoped to find before the Winter at the gateway to the plains of Russia. They know that that peace, so solemnly promised by the Kaiser, can now be gained by them only through crushing all Europe, through destroying the British fleet, forcing our lines, and taking London, Moscow, Rome, and Paris—which would be a disproportioned task for the talents of Marshal von Hindenburg and of von Tirpitz.

So there is no means for an arrangement, (of a separate peace with Russia.) Germany is faced with that implacable "all or nothing," which, since the beginning of the war has been accepted by the Allies. Germany will have everything, or the world which she was tending to render uninhabitable will be rid forever of her hegemony and her threats.

* * * Neither the uncertainty of military operations in these last months nor the retreat of the Russian army, nor the cries of triumph from the press across the Rhine has succeeded in making us look on the situation differently. Bad days have not inclined us to the slightest concession: hope has remained unanimous and integral.

In Germany, and we cannot too much insist on this, the reverse is the case. Their views are changing ceaselessly and their ambitions are modified every day, according to events. * * *

The fact is that between the Kaiser and his people there is a tragic misunderstanding—the one having sworn to give to the other, in exchange for three million of her sons, a victory which no longer belongs to him.

The German Socialists

By Jean Bourdeau

In the Revue des Deux Mondes for Oct. 1st, M. Jean Bourdeaux of the Académie des Sciences Morals et Politiques writes on the effect of the war on the Internationalists. He examines their movement in the fifty years which have passed since it was founded, notes its great development, but is compelled to conclude from actual events that "The facts deny the truth of the idea, their conduct refutes their dogma."

DURING July, 1914, Vorwaerts, the official journal of the German Socialists, published numerous articles against militarism. * * * The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia was condemned more severely by the German and Austrian Socialists than by those of other countries. * * * The directing committee of the Social Democracy, in a manifesto, blamed the assassination of Serajevo in an energetic manner, but protested not less forcefully against the provocation of Serbia by Austria-Hungary.

The German Government was rendered responsible, not for the ultimatum, but for the decision that Austria would take, for Germany could influence her and assure peace. At the end of the manifesto the directing committee took a demagogue's tone, saying— "Not a drop of German blood must flow in this cause; the proletariat must not serve as cannon-meat for the classes that exploit it."

In France, M. Bourdeau explains, the Confédération Générale du Travail issued a manifesto recalling the decisions of the Internationalist Congress to declare a general strike in case of war.

No strike movement could be attempted by the French if isolated from their German and Austrian comrades; a previous agreement with them was necessary. * * * An interview took place in Brussels between Jouhaut, Secretary of the C. G. T., Legion, member of the Reichstag and Secretary of the centralized Gewerkschaften, and Mertens, Secretary of the Belgian Syndicates. To Jouhaut's urgent question: "What do you count on doing to obstruct the war that is preparing—are you resolved to attempt a movement?" Legion insisted on giving no reply. Jouhaut concluded from that that there was nothing to expect from the Germans.

M. Bourdeau describes the vote at the Reichstag on the credits for the war: "Long and passionate controversies agitated the Socialist group of the Parliament." It decided finally that the credits be voted unanimously.

The violation of Belgian territory, with indemnity, had been announced by Bethmann-Hollweg before the close of the sitting. The Socialists could change nothing in their declaration; but not one of them protested.

How vain, hypocritical, and empty was the pretention of the Social-Democrats to justify their vote by ignorance of conditions in which the war was begun. They belied their whole past. Julian Borchardt, author of a pamphlet, "Before and after the Fourth of August," writes that on that date the Socialists abdicated; that if they were right on that day, everything that they had taught for forty years was nothing but falseness and dupery. * * * * * * That solemn acquiescence with imperialism caused immense disappointment in foreign countries. Bebel and Liebknecht had declared against the war in former days, when France attacked Germany, and this time it is Germany who attacks, who tramples treaties beneath her feet, and the Social-Democrats approve and follow. They cut the bond of that internationalist movement that they have been directing and governing for a quarter of a century, they transgress the laws they have decreed.

Individual, State, and Nation in Light of the War

By Romolo Murri

Under this title Signor Romolo Murri publishes in the Nuova Antologia a study of the deeper phases of the human mind revealed by the war. Signor Murri, who began his career as a priest, has gained a high place in the estimation of Italians for his writings and his work as a Deputy.

A YEAR of war has not yet liberated us from the stupor into which it threw us itself at its outbreak. The spiritual unpreparedness among the nations of the Entente was even graver and more profound than the military unpreparedness—and this was enormous. And the first had naturally far more complex causes, and vaster ones, than the second, and was the cause of it.

All the currents of culture in recent times had contributed to draw men to the surfaces of social facts; the laws for these were searched for outside of human consciousness, outside of man, in so far as he is spiritual reality, will. * * *

And in the always broader vision of inferences and relations and accords there appeared also manifold contrasts; but when the latter had also been reduced to concrete and external things they lost their intimately tragic quality, and ended by being an argument for ever more ingenious researches for combinations and accords.

We can now perceive, as in a bright light, that this mode of seeing ourselves and history from without, becoming—as it was—always more familiar to our thought, detaching us from the true and intimate reasons and fountains of human action—was not adapted to make us understand the satanic ambush that was concealing the war—and to prepare us for the struggle. * * *

And today it is evident that the whole of mankind (not simply certain nations) is in action; that is to say that we are struggling, not for immediate interests, but for all that we are, as individuals, as peoples—and for all that we love—for traditions, the future, for honor, for dignity, for liberty; all the things whose value is before all else ethical touch men to the extent that they represent conscience and will—spirit, in a word. * * *

And now [says Signor Murri at the end of his article] even in the sorrow of this infinite spectacle of massacre and destruction an intimate and joyous hope rises within us, the hope that in the war, and by virtue of it, the human conscience may regain its equilibrium in public and international life, and the individual and the State, recomposed in the superior harmony of the nation, may become quicker and more efficient instruments in the history of the conscious creation of pacific social institutions.

Our War: From Trieste to the Summit of Italy

By Paolo Revelli

This article and the one which follows are of especial value in giving different phases of Italian opinion on the war. From the pages of Emporium, the admirable review published in Bergamo, we take the opening paragraphs of an article by Signor Paolo Revelli. After a careful study of the history of the disputed territory, he gives a lengthy discussion of it from the geographical and ethnographical standpoint.

THE army goes on: slowly, surely, tenaciously, with the proud courage of sacrifice which makes victory, even at the price of death, beautiful and to be desired. * * *

It is not a conquest, it is a reclaiming; it is not imperialism, it is a defini-

tive national adjustment; it is not the oppressive amputation of a unit or a right of another nation, it is the logical and necessary reaction from the inhuman and anti-historical principle of the fusion of races, which latter is the epilogue to the Catholic fusion of consciences that was the system of government of the least homogeneous State in Europe. This system was perpetrated in silent conspiracy with the most antiquated and politics-loving Church, in fealty to the fallen Holy Roman Empire from whom the monarchy hereditarily holds forty titles of nobility—a sort of mediaeval farce. This war is not one of competition for wealth or possessions, it is not one of military adventure, it is not the betrayal of an alliance imposed by a master on a slave, it is not a thing involving a compromise with conscience or with blind impulse or with taking advantage premeditatedly; it is the most imperious, most irresistible and most magnificent necessity in our history, it is the completion of the epic of our revolution, it is Italy redeeming herself finally from servitude, from the extortion—systematic, acute, silent and formidable—that has been carried on at the expense of her dignity as a nation.

* * * [They say in Vienna] "Italy's finances are ruined; the treasury of the Court is empty; the Italian is the perfidious hero of the dagger, the enemy of our country, the perjurer before God. The song of the recruits of the Trentino, a song imposed on ignorant peasants who kneel before a bribing priest, their conscience bowed under the fatigues of the day, is a song of crusaders against Rome, who would reconquer the imprisoned Pope, crusaders against the "Italian dogs" whom they would make subjects of Austria.

And when the tragic days of Messina gave to many a heart the noble and brotherly impulse of pity and help, the systematic preaching of hate was brutally, inhumanly intensified and counseled "not to make any haste but to consider calmly whether it is not a time for each man to think of himself alone and avoid every other aspect of the world," (V. Gayda.)

In military circles, in the military papers, it was even said quite openly that this was the moment to attack Italy. And the intimidation was more open yet, more aggressive and more insolent when the Italian Army was busy with Tripoli.

I Am Not an Irredentist

By Giuseppe Prezzolini

Irredentist, from the famous watchword "Italia Irredenta"—unredeemed Italy, the allusion being to the portions of Italy that were redeemed from foreign rule during the nineteenth century. Signor Giuseppe Prezzolini writes in La Voce of Florence of Italy's broader ideal in the war.

I AM so little an Irredentist that if Austria were to offer us Trento, Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia on condition that we abstain from entering the war against the central empires, I should be in favor of refusing. (This was written before Italy did enter the war.) If we obtained Trento, Trieste, Istria, Dalmatia and Vallona into the bargain, but at the same time and thanks to that act Germany succeeded in crushing France, striking down England and controlling Russia, we should have a state of things worse than we have now, when we do not possess Trento, Trieste and the rest, but we do have our liberty.

The problem of the war is not a problem of Irrendentism. It is the problem of Italian freedom * * * of the existence of all we call Italian. And it is not to be discussed or decided on the basis of the fate of Trento and Trieste, but on the basis of the fate of Italy. We shall not fight for 700,000 Italians,

(those of the unredeemed provinces,) we shall fight for 40,000,000 Italians. Irredentism is provincial.

These are ugly words, but in this present infatuation necessary ones. There are too many people who see Italy today through a glass marked "Trieste," and "Pola" of course, or even through one marked Lussinpiccolo, perhaps.

What you must do is to see Lussinpiccolo, or even Trieste, through a glass marked "Italy." Is that clear?

The problem is not to plant our banner on San Giusto, (in the Trentino.) The problem is to free Europe from German domination; a somewhat more important thing, it will be agreed. For what would it matter if the Italian flag flew over San Giusto and at the same time the German flag were at Tangier and Bona, and the Austrian at Saloniki? And would it be very important for the people of Trieste to become Italian citizens if Italy were about to become a vassal of Germany?

But Irredentism is a force. As such, it is opportune for politics to use it, for the crowd to take it up, for the sentimental man to give himself to it. It is also a very good thing for poets.

But for those who see clearly, what does Irredentism mean? The danger of turning a great action into a mean one.

Trento, Trieste, Fiume and the rest lie on our road. We shall take them if we can, for these reasons above all: to insure for ourselves relatively safe frontiers, (I say relatively because the only absolutely safe frontiers would be the north and south poles,) and to obtain the dominion of the Adriatic and cut the knot of this problem of Irredentism once for all. * * * But there is another side of the matter wherein the Irredentists are wrong. It is thus: that in Italy, there is everywhere an atmosphere of thought that makes narrowly patriotic problems appear out of date, they are no longer deeply felt, and even when reason makes us admit that they exist, they have not that tremendous importance that the Irredentists say they have. The latter must spend their whole time thinking about Slavs, Germans, and Hungarians. They are in a passion about some trifle or other—a school, a speech from the bench or at the Board of Aldermen. Their savings are applied to fighting foreign languages. These are excellent efforts on the part of minorities or majorities of no very great strength—against police and government oppression, against race and caste hatreds sharpened by imperial malignity. But to them * * * every instant given to the culture that elevates man, through which the spirit rises above the particular details of language, blood, and tradition and incorporates it in the living current of the higher humanity—every such instant, I say, seems to them lost. The nationalist struggle turns such Italians into provincials. It makes them belong to Trento, Trieste and Dalmatia, before they belong to Italy. In the best cases, even, it makes them Italians before they are men.

The Hunters of the Alps

(I Cacciatori delle Alpi)

By Eduardo Ximenes

Signor Eduardo Ximenes, in Emporium, gives some stirring chapters in the history of the famous Alpine Brigade.

PEPPINO, Ricciotti, Menotti, Ezio and Santa Garibaldi have donned their uniforms as officers in the army and presented themselves at their regiments, the Fifty-first and Fifty-second of infantry.

These regiments form the "Alpi" brigade and have their origin in the regiments known in '59 as the "Cacciatori delle Alpi," (the "Hunters of the Alps,") and commanded by the great Giuseppe Garibaldi, the grandfather of these present-day officers. To be incorporated in these regiments, which in all military and civil contingencies have

shown themselves worthy of their tradition, was always the legitimate ambition of the sons of Ricciotti. One of them had taken part in the battle of Gargaresc in Tripolitania, Jan. 19, 1912.

At that battle, I remember, in the darkness that was filled with fever, movement, shots and cries, a strange vision came to me: the figure of a young man in civil dress, on horseback, who was seconding the impetuous ardor of the battalion. The line of the forehead of the beautiful young head descended straight with the nose, without a change of angle—as in the profile of Mars or in the leonine head of Garibaldi. Who was it? It seemed to me as if on that field of battle one heard the flutter of the wings of Garibaldian spirits. I could not stop considering the apparition, so strange in this place and at this time; I was so dumfounded by it that I really thought it a hallucination.

"Don't you know him?" said Corrado Zoli as he came up to me. "It's Ricciotti, the son of Ricciotti Garibaldi."

A spurt of sand flew among the hoofs of the horses. "Look out," I said to Zoli, "your horse is wounded."

"Well, all right, as long as he doesn't fall," answered he.

"Freedom of the Oceans"

By Archibald S. Hurd

Author of "The War-Readiness of the Fleet," &c.

In England Archibald S. Hurd occupies a position corresponding to that of Captain Persius, Germany's foremost writer on naval affairs. In the following, taken from an article in the October issue of The Fortnightly Review, Mr. Hurd makes reference to the need for maintaining international maritime law.

THE Imperial Chancellor, on behalf of the Emperor, has claimed that Germany is fighting, among other things, for "the freedom of the oceans." In the new issue of the North German Lloyd Company's year book appears an article with the same burden. It is assumed that sea conditions will undergo, as a result of the war, "a complete transformation"; that an international prize court will be established as "a sort of conscience against the British acts of violence"; and that the "theory of mare liberum will form a whole program of further progress in the development of international law as soon as England's naval power has been broken down under the German arms, and, so far from being able further to hinder the advance movement of an international law at sea, she would at last become ripe for co-operating in the creation of such a sea law as would redound to the blessing of the entire world."

It is well that the British people should recognize that, though the British Navy has more than fulfilled the hopes which resided in it on the outbreak of war, they are involved already in controversies of a serious if not critical character with neutral nations, and particularly with the United States, as to the extent to which British sea power may legitimately be employed without infringing the freedom of the seas as defined by ancient precedent, regulated by the general body of the law of nations, and governed by international usage. In fact, the British Government is confronted with a situation which takes the mind of a historian back to the opening years of the nineteenth century. We then became parties to a controversy which was concerned with the freedom of the seas, and that controversy led to one of the most deplorable and unnecessary wars in the world's history.

But we are now confronted once more with the century-old controversy as to our right to command the sea in time of war against our enemies. A widespread and insidious effort is being made by

German agents to undermine the influence which we exercise in virtue of our fleet. It is not, let it be noted, supreme against the world, but supreme against any probable combination of foes. In other words, as our history has illustrated, we exercise sea command, even in war time, only so long as we exercise it in accordance with the general sense of justice entertained by neutral and friendly powers. The German campaign against what is described as "British navalism" is peculiarly dangerous, because it makes an appeal to sentiment and passivism. We have an illustration of this tendency in the speech delivered on Jan. 9 at the Republican Club, New York, by Herr Dernburg.

Herr Dernburg's ideas are diametrically opposed to those expressed by the German Emperor when he was promoting the naval movement in Germany. Then Germany was determined that the trident should be in her hands; now, since, in spite of all her efforts, she has failed in her ambition, it is demanded that the trident shall be abolished.

Germany has everything to gain by recommending to the world the new doctrine of the freedom of the seas, because she is today—and hopes to continue to be tomorrow—the greatest of all military powers. So long as the existing conditions at sea continue her army is imprisoned; it cannot move beyond the confines of the Continent which, for decades past, she has found too narrow for her ambitions. If once she could prevail upon the peoples of the world to agree to her conception of the "freedom of the seas," as expounded by Herr Dernburg and Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg, or even the alternative scheme advocated by President Eliot, then, indeed, world domination would no longer be merely an idle dream.

But at the same time, even at some temporary inconvenience, let us be on our guard against committing acts even savoring of illegality or injustice. A temporary advantage may prove a permanent embarrassment. We are not less the champions of the freedom of the seas than we are the immemorial champions of freedom on land. If the war should close leaving on the minds of neutral observers an impression that "British navalism" is in any sense the equivalent at sea of "Prussian militarism," grave injury will have been inflicted on the future of the British Empire, and the war will leave as a legacy seeds which may produce a renewed and fierce and, it may be to us, disastrous competition for naval power.

England's Third War Budget

By H. J. Jennings

[In the October Nineteenth Century and After]

ADJECTIVES of magnitude have been well-nigh exhausted over the figures of the September budget. They have been described as "unprecedented," "colossal," and "enormous," and at least one writer has employed Dominie Sampson's favorite exclamation, "Prodigious!" If these hard-worked adjectives had not become somewhat meaningless by everyday use we might say that they were appropriate to the occasion. For certain it is that the third war budget deals with an estimated expenditure and a tax revenue such as no country has ever had an experience of before.

It may be well to summarize here the main features of the tax. All incomes over £130 a year, whether salary or wage, will be taxed. This will add about 700,000 persons to the list of income-tax payers. Allowance for children will continue to be claimed by persons whose total income does not exceed £500, £20 being free of tax in respect to each child under 16 years of age. Since the beginning of the war the tax on earned incomes has very nearly trebled, and so,



ARISTIDE BRIAND

New Premier of France and Minister of Foreign Affairs

JULES CAMBON

Formerly French Ambassador at Berlin, Now General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the New Briand Cabinet

(Photo from M. E. Berner.)

also, has that on unearned incomes. Putting together the additions in the first and third budgets, we get an extra contribution on account of income tax and super-tax of £103,085,000.

The Chancellor expects to get an additional £2,240,000 a year by assessing farmers on the rent paid instead of, as hitherto, on one-third of the rent. This opens up a large and important question. Anything which may tend to check the enterprise of the farmer at the present time is to be regretted. To explain this it is necessary to revert to the American exchange question. Whatever temporary expedients may be adopted in order to alleviate the situation, it is clear that, so far as Great Britain is concerned, the only real cure would be such a change in our agricultural conditions as would enable us to do with less food produce from abroad, and especially with less wheat from America.

The question of restoring the exchange otherwise than by sending away our gold had therefore become an urgent one, but it was with the future rather than with the present aspects of the question that Mr. McKenna had to deal. His object is to restrict imports, especially of luxuries, to discourage extravagance, and, at the same time, to find money with the least amount of economic disturbance. To effect this he hits all around. No class escapes. The income tax is increased by 40 per cent., the exemption limit is reduced so as to bring in the wage earner from 50 shillings a week upward, the abatements are lowered, the super-tax is brought down heavily on the rich, excess war-time profits are to be shared equally with the State, we shall all have to pay more for our tea, sugar, cocoa, tobacco, and dried fruits, also for our motor spirit and patent medicines, and certain specified articles of foreign manufacture are to pay an import duty of one-third of their value.

In connection with direct taxation, the most novel move of the Government is that of taxing war-time profits. All trades, manufactures, concerns in the nature of trade and business, including agencies, whether engaged in the manufacture or sale of war materials or not, whose profits exceeded those of the previous year by more than £100 are to pay a special tax of 50 per cent. of such profit. In most cases the datum line will be the known average of profit assessed to income tax for 1914-15, but if the profit for 1914-15 is less than 6 per cent. on the capital employed, then that percentage may be taken as the datum line.

An independent tribunal will decide on the datum line for businesses for carrying out Government contracts for munitions which before the war earned less than a fair return on their capital. Interest will also be allowed on additional capital invested within the war period and on capital invested in the three years before the war which was unremunerative during that period.

These exceptions or allowances do not invalidate the important principle established in the new tax—the principle that the State has a right to share in the profits made out of the emergency of the State. As the 50 per cent. will be reckoned in addition to the income tax, it works out, after deducting the latter, at just over 60 per cent. net of the profits. For the current year its operation is limited to the business year of those firms or companies making up their balance sheets on or before the 30th of June last. This limitation will restrict the product of the tax for 1915-16, and it is not expected to yield more than £6,000,000, but for 1916-17 a much larger number of firms will come under its operation, and then a revenue of £30,000,000 is looked for—an estimate that appears to err on the side of over-restraint. It is even predicted in some quarters that shipping alone will furnish more than that amount.

The abolition of the halfpenny postcard will not only be a widely felt inconvenience, but it will be a serious blow to the picture-postcard industry as well. Apart from the consequences to the picture-card trade, is the game worth the candle? The deliveries of postcards in the United Kingdom are about 100,000,000 a year, which brings in over £200,000. Is it likely, if the minimum postage is raised to a penny, that the same amount will be obtained? This proposal is the

one serious flaw in the budget, and at the time of writing it seems probable that the Chancellor will have to bow to public opinion and withdraw it. The universal experience has been that the cheaper the postal facilities the greater and more profitable the business.

The complete result, or anticipated result, of these various new taxes will be practically to double tax revenue since the war began. German statesmen and editors make a boast of the fact that so far they have not raised any war funds by taxation. That is true, but—Mr. Hope, M. P., notwithstanding—they are pursuing the far less commendable course of raising the money by loans and by "hanky-panky" manipulations of currency paper. Dr. Helfferich, the Imperial Minister of Finance, recently admitted that he dared not impose further taxation, and it is a fair inference that he knew any such proposals would be futile —that the burdens of the German taxpayers are already as heavy as they can bear. We, too, might have carried on the war on loans without new taxation, and left posterity to foot the whole bill, but we have "chosen the better part." When the financial day of reckoning comes it will be found that the countries that have met at least a portion of their war expenditure out of revenue are in the sounder position.

Registration in Britain

By Clement Kinloch-Cooke

"The National Register and After" is the title of an article in The Nineteenth Century and After, of which the following is part:

ORGANIZATION in any undertaking, in any contest, in any campaign is an essential precedent to success. To disregard it is to court failure, to invite disaster. No sane person will cavil at these conclusions, no unbiased critic will challenge their accuracy. That being so, it follows logically and conclusively that if we are to win the war in a reasonable time, and without undue or unnecessary expenditure of life and money, the entire community must be organized. It is therefore with a sense of extreme satisfaction that the nation welcomes the appearance on the statute book of the National Registration act.

National service is the corollary of national organization. The one is of no avail without the other. Just as a shell does not become operative until the fuse is attached, so national organization is powerless without national service. In other words, the whole work of the register will be wasted unless the service it entails is made effective.

Yet, strange as it may seem, the call that the register involves was for a time in danger of being treated in some quarters as though it were an infringement of the rights of the people, and this because a suspicion was abroad that service under the act must necessarily mean compulsory service. That is not so.

No one denies, no one can deny, that the voluntary system has been most prolific in its results. Under that system we have raised an army of which the empire may well be proud. No country in the world can boast of a voluntary army equal in magnitude to the British Army; we possess a military force of volunteers such as the world has never seen. All that is readily and willingly conceded by the advocates of conscription.

But is our voluntary army large enough to accomplish the purpose in hand? Will it meet the enormous wastage that modern warfare entails? Has every recruit been so carefully chosen that, not only is he able to undergo training on this side, but is equally fitted to perform the more strenuous duties that await him when he reaches the actual theatre of war? Can we afford any longer to let married men with large

families enlist while single men stay behind?

We are fighting for our existence as a nation, our existence as a race; if the British Nation goes down in this conflict the British Empire goes down too. We must win, and we shall win. But it is no use thinking that victory is to be gained by following the old lines and pursuing the old methods. Everything must change, and above all our recruiting system must change. Just as France, Russia, and Italy have staked their all, so must Great Britain stake her all. Not only have the industries of the country to be organized, but the manhood and the womanhood of the country must be mobilized. Every man of military age who can be spared from the factory or the workshop and from the occupations necessary to transact the business of the State must bear arms.

In so momentous a crisis in our history it is only fitting that the Government should inform the public, as indeed they have done, that Ministers are engaged in examining the subject of conscription with a view of coming to a right decision. I cordially welcome the statement made by the Minister of Munitions that "the issue is one of fact, not of principle." Conscription is not a political but a military question, and it is on the conclusions arrived at by their military adviser that the decision of the Cabinet will be taken.

But let there be no hesitation. We have glorious traditions behind us and a splendid future in front of us, but there must be no halting between two opinions. Now is the time for action. Let that action be taken and success is assured.

The Vatican and the War

By Mgr. Canon Moyes, D. D.

The Right Rev. Mgr. Canon Moyes, D. D., in the October issue of The Nineteenth Century and After, discusses this situation under the chapter of "The Pope and the German Atrocities."

TO certain minds it has been a subject of surprise, and even of scandal, that the Pope has not publicly condemned the outrages committed by Germany during the present war. It has been pointed out that the struggle is one in which the leading nations of Europe are engaged, and that horrors surpassing all that we have hitherto heard of have been perpetrated. Vital issues of national equity and comity, and therein of national morality, have arisen and cried out for judgment. And yet at this historic crisis, when, if ever, plain and fearless speech is most wanted, the Papacy—the one power which claims to be at once spiritual and international, the power which can speak with authority to some two hundred and fifty millions of consciences—is found to remain strangely silent and to wrap itself up in its neutrality!

The answer may be summed up in saying that the Pope stands in an extra-national position, and that he has not been able to make the condemnations which some people have expected from him because such condemnations require investigations of facts, and these investigations have been largely outside his reach and, in many cases, outside his province.

It is undoubtedly true that the report of Lord Bryce's commission of inquiry stands upon a level of testimony notably higher and more authentic than anything which could be gathered from the ordinary columns of the press. In truth, it would be difficult to conceive, within the limits of its scope, any examination of the facts more thorough, more conscientions, or more convincing. Benedict XV. could hardly, any more than any other fair-minded reader, have risen from a study of its tragic pages with any doubt left as to the reality, the multitude, and the revolting character of the outrages committed. In the mind of the Pope the conviction would be even more

irresistible, as the findings of the report would be the echo and corroboration of the account already submitted to the Holy See by Cardinal Mercier.

And yet, however much the Pope may be personally convinced, if he is to act officially and judicially, it is plain that he cannot base an accusation upon what is, despite its excellence, an ex parte statement, emanating from one side only of the belligerent parties.

It is just because we have the conviction that the counterpleas of the Germans are so utterly hollow and fictitious, and that the real inspiration of the ideals and methods of their leaders are so hopelessly in contradiction to the Gospel, that we feel assured that time cannot fail to lift the mask from the face of our adversaries. Meanwhile, in the growing light of fuller evidence, facts which are the basis of judgment, now obscured or temporarily placed in judicial doubt by mendacious denials or lack of investigation, will emerge as undeniable; and at the fitting moment, when the cause of right and truth and humanity and civilization will claim its verdict, the witness from the Chair of Peter will not be wanting.

A German on the War

By G. Lowes Dickinson

In The Hibbert Journal, Mr. Dickinson comments on Dr. Friedrich Wilhelm Förster's "Germany's Young Men and the War":

IT is one of the evils of war that it cuts off the belligerent nations from all knowledge of the enemy's point of view. Whole nations may thus come to be regarded as something monstrous and outside the pale and the re-establishing of mutual comprehension be made unnecessarily difficult. Now, in the present war, nothing is more remarkable than the conviction of the people of every belligerent country that they are fighting a righteous war of self-defense, and even that they are fighting it honorably and their enemies dishonorably.

To illustrate this, I have brought together a few passages from a pamphlet by Dr. Friedrich Wilhelm Förster, entitled "Deutschlands Jugend und der Weltkrieg." Dr. Förster is Professor of Education at Munich, and exercises a great influence over the youth of Germany. He is, it will be seen, a pacifist, in spite of his idealization of the moral discipline of war, and an internationalist, in spite of his German patriotism. And though, of course, he speaks only for himself, his opinions may be taken to be at least as representative as those of men like Reventlow or Rohrbach. The reader will supply his own comments.

First, then, as to the origin of the war. Dr. Förster repudiates all responsibility for his own Government and nation:

> Our Kaiser allowed our opponents to get the advantage in mobilizing that he might have the advantage in love of peace. This moral advantage is of much greater significance, even for military power, than any external advantage that can be won at the cost of conscience. We neither desired nor caused the war.

On the contrary, the war was a conspiracy against Germany. And for this conspiracy our author attributes a chief share of blame to England. He pleads, nevertheless, for a just estimate of the English contribution to civilization, and against the passion of hate that has swept through Germany:

> Hate disorganizes, love disciplines. Fill yourselves with deepest sympathy for all who suffer in war, whose hearts are crushed, whose bodies are broken, whose homes are burned. Fill yourselves with enthusiasm for everything which your nation in the future shall build above these wrecks and ruins, and then charge and fight as one consecrated to death, doing your utmost to end this horror and win a peace which shall make a recurrence of such things impossible. Such a purification from the passion of hate is often easier on the field than at home. Those who remain behind have an abstract enemy in view.

With regard to the effects of the war upon the national conscience, our author seems to alter his position as he proceeds. At the beginning he is full of that kind of hot idealism of war which seems to be peculiar to Germans, and which constitutes their chief menace to civilization. He speaks sometimes as though life existed for the sake of sacrifice, and as though the sacrificing of life more than made up for the taking of it. But later he asserts roundly that war is opposed to Christianity:

> Christianity must not be swallowed up in the war spirit. Much has been said on this point in the last few months in an unchristian spirit, and the Divine truth has been betrayed to temporal interests and passions. Christ stands against war and above war. He who loses sight of this truth slays that deep conscience of civilization which is meant to goad us unceasingly on to allay this fury of war. We know well that if we were Christians there would be no war.

These extracts will serve to give some idea of the contents of this popular tract. There are in it many statements and assumptions which an Englishman cannot accept, many omissions of what he regards as essential points—for instance, there is no reference to Belgium—and much in the tone and manner which is distasteful to our less romantic temperament and more sober intellect. Nevertheless, a candid reader, who may have been swept off his balance by the events of the war, will recognize that it is not a nation of "barbarians" that the author represents.

A Theological Holiday—and After

By L. P. Jacks

ONE hears often nowadays the comment that current geographies will be tossed aside as a result of Europe's mighty conflict. And, indeed, the interlocked armies are engaged in making over—if not renovating—politically and even, in spots, topographically, a continent. Mankind will emerge from war's clouds to find new fields of thought, too, outspread for his incursions. One such is suggested by L. P. Jacks, writing in The Hibbert Journal, of which he is editor. Mr. Jacks says in part:

> Is there not ground for believing that a theological holiday, partial at all events, has actually been imposed upon Europe, and to a lesser extent also upon America, by the present war? A glance at the publishers' lists reveals at once an enormous reduction in the number of theological books issuing from the press; and in this connection it may be noted that an important theological journal which devotes its pages to the reviewing of these books has recently announced its suspension for "lack of material." * * *
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> A "new theology" began in fact to form around the war itself; but so different from the old both in topics and method, and in the persons from whom it originated, as to suggest the conclusion that many of our former friends, the theologians of ante-bellum days, were taking, or being forced to take, a holiday. * * *
>
> The intellectual eminence of Germany in the field of theology is challenged, and to some extent already discredited, by its association with the spectacle of present German conduct. * * * The sudden and complete cessation of the new supply of German theology, and the diminished respect for the old supply already on our hands—have had the effect for the time being of damping the ardors of theological speculation in so far as these were dependent, as to a great extent they were dependent, on German sources for their inspiration. * * *
>
> The war has suddenly launched us all into a new world where the laws and formulae of the old order are difficult to apply. * * * Is the world good? Is the world bad? Hardly a day passes but we are ready to shout an affirmative answer to both questions. Meanwhile our speculations about God are held in abeyance; the time for them will not come until we have recovered our lost bearings in the actual world. Let us first know what kind of a world it is in which we are living, and whether our human nature has or has not the force to establish the thing it believes to be good. * * *
>
> What, when the present lull is over, will be the effect of the war on the interpretation of religion in theology? The

analogy of the past suggests that, whatever happens, there will be no arrest or breakdown. Religion and theology have proved over and over again that they are able to maintain themselves in presence of the most deeply pessimistic views of the world and of human nature. * * * When all goes well and man seems to be making a success of his life, the theology of moral excellence will be in the ascendant. When all goes ill and the devil seems master of the world, the theology of salvation is bound to assert itself. * * * We may be tolerably sure that the effect of war will be to promote development in one or other of the two directions indicated. Which of the two directions will be taken depends very largely on the visions we are gaining during our present theological holiday; on the general impression left by the state of the world which the war will leave behind; and on our interpretation of the war itself when its full significance shall have been disclosed to us, as it will not be till long after the issue is determined. It may be that the issue of events will be such that we shall be able to look back on this tragedy as the most splendid episode of history and a crowning evidence of the nobility of man. That will be good for the theology of moral excellence. But this is by no means sure, and can only happen if certain forces, not yet victorious, get the upper hand. It is possible that humanity may emerge from this conflict not proud of its achievements but thoroughly ashamed of itself. * * *

The war has provided an astonishing revelation of man's capacity to sacrifice himself for an ideal. But what ideal? Had we been in earnest with the pursuit of moral excellence our ideal would have been one which would have rendered this war impossible. Consider only one among the multitudes of causes which produced the present crisis—I mean the enormous amount of deliberate lying which went on in certain places high and low. Had not the liars done their deadly work the war would never have taken place; and even now would cease automatically if all the newspapers, orators, professors, statesmen, Kaisers, and other users of language in Europe were to speak the truth consistently for a week on end. * * *

Who, then, can doubt that if the pursuit of moral excellence is to turn out a success, man will have to do much better in the future than he has ever done in the past? There is no reason why he should not. Nay, rather, the disgrace which has been brought on the human family as a whole by the actions of some of its members creates an opportunity for the others, as well as for the chief sinners themselves, to wipe out the disgrace by actions of a contrary kind. What, for instance, is to be the answer of every nation of seafaring men to the German outrage on the great and solemn traditions of the sea? I imagine it will be the resolve to uphold those traditions with a more unswerving loyalty than ever. That is the spirit which, if extended to the whole horrible situation created by the present war, might cause it to issue in a moral triumph.

Man, meanwhile, is neither as wise nor as good as he thought he was. A damaging blow has been dealt at the reputation of human nature; man's self-respect is for the moment lowered; and unless humanity redeems its character by some great act of atonement, as it conceivably may, it is probable that the theology which interprets religion as the pursuit of moral excellence will remain below the horizon for some time to come.

The Quintessence of Austria

By Henry Wickham Steed

UNDER the above title Henry Wickham Steed discusses in The Edinburgh Review the revelation which, he says, the hitherto misapprehended Austrian Empire and its ruling house have made of themselves in the course of months of warfare. Austria, Mr. Steed regards as a country "or, rather, an Imperial Estate, more Eastern than Western in character"; while Francis Joseph is "more nearly a Sultan than a true constitutional monarch." The writer says:

> * * * Attempts to understand Austria from the outside are almost certain to fail. * * * The racial strife, of which so much has been heard in reports from Austria and Hungary, is not in itself a proof of hopeless incompatability of temperament among the Hapsburg peoples. It is rather the outcome of a deliberate system of State which aims at setting off one race against the other, favoring those which behave well toward the dynasty,

curbing those whose power seems dangerous, and creating an equilibrium of moderate discontent in which no one race is ever entirely satisfied, never without jealousy of its neighbors, but in which each and all are taught to look to the Crown as the sole dispenser of benefits. * * * When all is said and done, the Austrian regards himself as a better fellow than the North German, a superior and more polished human being. * * * In these feelings the people are at one with the imperial family. Pride is still the strongest characteristic of the dynasty, most of whose blunders it has inspired. The Hapsburgs cannot stoop to conquer. They cannot place themselves in the position of others or treat them with that imaginative tact which smooths away obstacles and wins hearts. * * *

Mr. Steed takes up in some detail all the facts and fancies available regarding the Serajevo tragedy of June 28, 1914—the trigger-pulling of the war. He sees sinister, subterraneous influences from the Kaiser's realms in the preceding and succeeding circumstances. In part he says:

* * * There was undoubtedly a plot to assassinate the Archduke. In part, at least, it was organized at Belgrade—but so were most of the bogus anti-Austrian manifestations of 1908 and the majority of the anti-Serbian forgeries exposed during the Friedjung trial. It is possible that some corrupt or fanatical Serbians may have been implicated in it, but there is not a shred of evidence to implicate the Serbian Government. More enlightening than any circumstantial evidence is, however, the application of the test: *Cui prodest?* Serbia and the Serbian Government had nothing to gain and everything to lose by a crime which was bound to revive memories of the assassination of Alexander and Draga, and to put Serbia out of court in most European countries. Serbia, moreover, had just emerged exhausted, albeit victorious, from two Balkan wars, and was in no condition to pick a quarrel with the neighboring monarchy. The monarchy, on the other hand, had been repeatedly foiled in its efforts to pick a quarrel with Serbia. Had a pretext been deliberately manufactured to put all the apparent right on the side of Austria, and all the wrong on the side of Serbia, and to reduce to a minimum the Serbian chances of receiving sympathy or help from Russia, England, or France, no apter pretext than the Serajevo assassination could have been forged.

But, whether fatality or design came to the help of the central powers, whether they profited by an accident or jogged the elbow of Providence, they were not slow to take advantage of the crime. Whereas the Emperor Francis Joseph's first proclamentation to his peoples, in which he abjured them not to make the whole Serbian race responsible for the act of a few fanatics, seemed to betray a disposition not to push matters to extremes, it is certain that, a fortnight later, he had been persuaded by the German Emperor to sanction the ultimatum to Serbia which was designed to render her submission impossible. The German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, then, as always, in closest agreement with the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, worked hard and successfully to prevent a pacific solution. It is uncertain whether either Germany or Austria really believed that a European conflagration would ensue. They may have expected to "pocket" Serbia without undue trouble. They may have thought that Russia and France would "back down," and that England would not intervene. The attitude of the British Radical press and of some Unionist organs which advocated the punishment of Serbia certainly encouraged such a belief. Thus things drifted toward the catastrophe.

The time has not yet come fully to discuss the diplomatic history of the first year of the war. It can only usefully be said that not until after the first six months of the war did the diplomacy of the Allies really reveal comprehension of the main German purpose in precipitating it. That purpose can only be defeated decisively and irrevocably, if the diplomacy of the Allies is guided by the settled determination so to reconstitute Europe that a renewal of the struggle shall become impossible. Europe cannot be so reconstituted without the dismemberment of the Hapsburg Monarchy. The overthrow of the Turkish Empire and the settlement of the Balkan problem would necessarily involve the solution, once and for all, of the Austrian problem. The aim of the central empires is domination; the aim of the Allies must be, not passively or reluctantly but actively and constructively, liberation in accordance with the principle of nationality. Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania should receive as nearly as possible their ethnographical boundaries. Serbia should be united with all the Southern Slavs hitherto under Hapsburg rule, that is to say with the Serb and Croat inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, part of Istria, and the Slovene country. Bohemia and Moravia, with the Slovak country of Hungary, should be constituted an independent principality with a port on the Danube at Pressburg and a port on the Elbe at Aussig—of which the traffic before the war exceeded that of Trieste. An autonomous, reunited Poland under the Russian sceptre is indispensable to European stability. * * *

A Polish Socialist on Poland's Future

By Dr. Wittboldt Jodko

The position of the Russian-Polish Democracy is outlined in the subjoined interview with the leading member of his party, as given by the Stockholm Social Democrat:

OF all the nations subject to other powers, the Polish people feel their nationalistic self-consciousness most strongly. That is the reason why our striving for independence is so pronounced. I must state at once that all Poles are not antagonistic to Russia. This is due to the political situation, which makes a division logical. In the eyes of the Democratic element to which liberty becomes a question of life and death, it is essential to seek salvation in Western Europe. Without such affiliation, it could not even exist.

On the other hand, the conservative element—the landed proprietors and the bourgeois—leans toward Russia, and it is constantly utilizing its position for its own interest. This element lacks confidence in the people's movement and is resting in the belief that Russian domination will continue in Poland. Selfishness is the actuating force that makes the Conservatives support the Russian régime.

Even before the war these two divisions asserted themselves. One party aims at pulling away from Russia; the other strives to maintain the present relations. We, who belong to the first-named class, are firmly convinced that only by a deliverance from Russian control can we develop our political, social, and nationalistic consciousness. We do not believe in the possibility of a normal development under absolutism, even less under a liberal Russian régime. The tradition of centralization is a fixed matter for Russia. The all-penetrative bureaucracy exists because of this centralization and derives its nutriment therefrom. And a modern Russian state is to us Social Democrats an even more dangerous condition than the bureaucratic organization. In order that the bureaucracy can become a suitable governing force it would have to centralize to a still further degree than have the old Conservatives.

An independent development under any Russian Government is a sheer impossibility for Poland. And as the middle class in Russia gains greater and greater influence, the less of a chance will the Poles have to establish their political freedom. Those of us who firmly oppose Russia have been frank enough to give this opposition expression in the forming of the Polish Legion. More than half of the number in the legion belong in Russian Poland.

We of Russian Poland have organized military bodies. Six regiments have been completed, with the seventh under way. We have cavalry and several batteries, as well as a number of machine guns. It is not to be forgotten that the members of the legion are constantly in the field with the regular armies, and that the losses sustained have not been inconsiderable.

The Russians themselves have organized a Polish Legion, but it counts not over 1,500 men. As a matter of fact, it was a trick of the Russians to organize this body from among the soldiers. Nobody ever hears about this legion, what its purpose is or what it stands for, so we may as well discard the element as a factor in the Russian Polish situation.

The Duma does not furnish us any encouragement. We do not believe in Russian promises. Always, when Russia is in trouble, comes the promise of Polish autonomy. I believe that the central powers will give us liberty and that it is to their interest to create a buffer State between them and Russia.

In case, however, that the central powers should divide Poland between them then the question remains open, and Russia would continue to agitate within our country. The Russophile agitation will cease only when Polish soil is relieved of foreign control. In so far as concerns Posen, there a somewhat dif-

ferent condition prevails. In Posen the German and Polish elements mingle satisfactorily. So soon as the Russian Polish people are free they could also labor for the retention of the Polish idiom among the German Poles.

I believe unqualifiedly in a final victory for the central powers. The strength of the Russian armies is broken. They cannot for a long time to come prove dangerous. A sign in that direction is the great number of Russian prisoners. I know for a certainty that there is a great scarcity of officers. Where formerly three or four officers held command one now has charge.

The German Government in Relation to Belgian Works of Art

By Dr. W. von Bode

Chief Director of the Berlin Museums

The following statement by Dr. von Bode appeared in a leaflet issued by the League of German Scholars and Artists for the Advancement of Culture, Berlin:

UGO OJETTI, a writer of fiction in Florence, has invented and spread a foolish story according to which the chief director of the Berlin Museums is supposed to have given the German military authorities a "proscriptive" list of works of art to be taken from various public collections in France. Further, Ojetti says that as this plan could not be carried out, the director had advised the destruction of the Rheims Cathedral. This absurd and infamous libel was repeated and perhaps believed in all countries. But while we have been thus denounced as robbers and barbarians, Germany and Germany alone has in reality taken steps in order to protect works of art in the enemies' country. Directly after the occupation of Brussels the director of the Industrial Art Museum in Berlin, Herr von Falke, was appointed on my suggestion to superintend the protection of works of art in Belgium and their preservation for Belgium.

Herr von Falke, with the help of gentlemen employed in the Belgian public collections, has examined the works of art in the occupied parts of Belgium, and it has been ascertained that in all large towns ancient buildings, paintings, works of sculpture and of industrial art of any importance are in a perfect state of preservation, and are in safety with one single exception—the library of Louvain. The statement made in various towns that pictures or church treasure have been brought to London seems not to have been true, not even in the case of the van Eyck altar in Gand. In reality, such precious objects seem to have been hidden in cellars and other safe places. The preservation of these art treasures and the almost perfect state of preservation of all architectural masterpieces are wholly due to the extreme care taken by the Germans to avoid damaging the buildings during the bombardment of towns, wherever the bombardment was absolutely necessary from a military point of view.

In the case of the treacherous attack made on our troops by the people of Louvain, German soldiers saved the Town Hall and the churches from destruction by fire at the risk of their own lives. The burning of the library was entirely the fault of the libary officials, who had all fled, neglecting their obvious duty.

That the Belgian Government took no pains to preserve Belgian buildings is proved by the fact that while Herr von Falke was examining the cathedral of Malines the Belgian artillery fired shells at the building.

During the siege of Antwerp General von Beseler himself requested the Belgian commander to give him a list of

artistically valuable buildings and succeeded most admirably in preserving these from harm during the bombardment. In Gand and Bruges all monuments of architecture are intact. In Rheims also the German commander did all that was in his power to preserve not only the cathedral but also the older church of St. Remy from serious damage during the bombardment, although the French repeatedly placed batteries in the neighborhood of the cathedral and made use of the towers as posts of observation.

Religious feeling and knowledge and love of art, which are as widely spread in the army as in the nation, have everywhere made our army a protector of architectural masterpieces and of all works of art.

Poland's Deliverance

By Ignacy Daszynski

The Vienna weekly publication, Polen, recently contained the following article dealing with the situation in the war-torn territory between Germany, Austria, and Russia:

WITH the fall of Brest-Litovsk the last Russian soldier has been driven from Polish soil. The entire Kingdom of Poland, counting 13,000,000 souls, is thereby delivered from the Russian yoke. Central Europe is no longer in danger from the appearance of the Russian armies gathered along the Vistula.

The Kingdom of Poland, wrongly called Russian Poland, has been the greatest standing battlefield in the world. Two hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, the best in Russia, concentrated in ten great fortresses and fortified camps, threatened Germany and Austria, north, south, and west, ready to march at the command from Petersburg, which had allied itself with France and England. So formidable was this mass of soldiers that there were parts of the country where for each five of unarmed Polish men there was one Russian soldier to keep watch over them.

Four times during the nineteenth century Poland rose against this military oppression. Each time they struggled without Europe lending any assistance whatever. Capitalistic Europe had something else to do than support Polish uprisings. Poland itself had to sow the seeds of blood-bought liberty. And after each revolution stretched long lines of exiles bound for Siberia, where they were left to die. In this way the best elements among the people were systematically being destroyed during the course of a century.

Is it then to be wondered that later generations in Poland, finding themselves in the minority as against Russian aggression, and considering the fight an impossible and insane proposition, began to aim at an understanding with the Czar's empire? We repeat, however, that only a small proportion of the political element in Poland lost hope. On the whole the common people themselves, as well as the highly cultured, were far from believing that future justice for Poland was to be looked for in the Russian Chancellery. Even before any one was thinking of war with Russia, the people were secretly getting their weapons into shape for use against the enemy. It is true that these weapons were of an insignificant sort, but, such as they were, they were at hand. The revolutionary group was not numerous, but in which modern State—or, rather, in what country with such a police organization as in Russia—would it have been possible to get together 10,000 persons to war against the State? Yet the Polish people have understood the art!

Many observers of the grand events of the past, as reflected in the happenings in Poland, are inclined to attribute to the Polish people too much enthusiasm as regards the victories won by the Teutonic forces. But how difficult did not

this seem to have been some months back! It was the opinion that the lines along the Dunajec and the Vistula, the fronts of the Narew and the Niemen, would hold for at least a year. Why, then, belittle the victories won over the Russians?

The flight of the Russians from Brest-Litovsk makes possible a calm contemplation regarding Poland's future. The resistless victory of the Teuton armies strengthens the belief that a new era is at hand. The Polish Nation is gathering itself together; it rises from its sick-bed; it begins to rid itself of its chains. With the exception of that despicable element that left the country voluntarily with the Russians, the people of Poland breathe easier.

Everything in its religion, in its history, its culture, turns the Polish people away from Russia; Poland belongs to Western Europe. And this western influence cannot possibly bring the same pressure to bear that Russia so long exerted. For the present the armies of the central powers have the word. That is the reason why the situation still remains hazy. The people cannot speak out. But when the opportunity comes, Poland will say that it wants only to gain its liberty and chance to develop. The task will then devolve on twenty millions of people at the door of Russia to create a barrier against Russia. Poland is also the natural ally of the people of the Ukraine and the Jews. All must prepare to fight the absolutism of the Czar. Only the enemies of Poland can countenance the destruction of the Ukrainians and the Jews as necessary to the nation's deliverance. The Austrian policy regarding the development of the Ruthenians would have been impossible had it not been for the Polish majority willing to grant concessions to the Ruthenians in Galicia. As for the Jews, they found in Poland their second native country.

The relationship of a freed Poland to its deliverers is a question that comes under the future issues of the war. The question should not long wait for an answer. There is only one thing that I desire to emphasize in this auspicious hour that sees the Russians driven from Brest-Litovsk. The nations and peoples that desire to live in closer union with Poland must consider it as their equal. No interests based on opportunistic politics, no explication of what is best for the moment, no nationalistic illusions, can serve here. The Polish question is a very big question. Its solution is to be sought on the fields of battle of this gigantic world war, and constitutes one of its most significant factors. Let us make ready to aid in solving this question—a question on which may rest the peace of Europe for decades after the war ends.

Some Recent German War Literature

By M. Epstein

DR. EPSTEIN, who is assistant editor of The Statesman's Year-Book, has been wandering over the mountains of printed matter—books, booklets, pamphlets, and brochures—built by German writers with the war as a basis. Such publications had attained at the close of nine months of conflict a total of 4,518, including many bocks of verse, which Dr. Epstein dismisses as by-products of war literature. He discusses in The Hibbert Journal and, naturally, in no mental frame of amity, some of the more recent and pretentious outgivings of Teutonic historians, philosophers, and economists. He feels with evident astonishment that war fever has made them delirious. Speaking of "Heroes and Hucksters," written by Dr. Werner Sombart, he says:

> The great mass of the German people do not as yet care about the peace of the world, and have but little wish for friendship with England. Their political writers tell them that England's ideals are so totally opposed to their own that not only is a *rapprochement* with her unthinkable, but also undesirable. It is to be feared that this point of view is wide-

spread in Germany, and one of its doughtiest champions is Werner Sombart. * * * Sombart was the *enfant terrible* at the University of Breslau, opposed to all that the authorities stood for; to whom nothing was holy, not even the Kaiser. And now this man is among the stanchest supporters of German militarism and all that it connotes; he is the prophet of a new gospel for the German people. Such is the influence of the Demon of War.

"Heroes and Hucksters" is the title of the booklet wherein Sombart utters the burden of his message—for Germans only; he cares not what the rest of the world thinks. The English are the hucksters, the Germans the heroes; the English are the warehousemen, the Germans the warriors. * * * In the present war the religion of the shopkeeper is at death-grips with that of the warrior. Would you know what the shopkeeper's religion is, go to his philosophers. From Francis Bacon to Herbert Spencer, they are all only "philosophers," (in inverted commas.) He scoffs at them for being political economists, practical fellows, loving comfort and material well-being. Only a nation of shopkeepers could produce philosophers such as these; a nation with common sense, a nation whose leaders pride themselves on being able to understand the man in the street. Look at the quality of their Ministers. Compare Grey with Bethmann-Hollweg! * * *

Sombart next attacks English ethics. "The greatest good of the greatest number"—there you have the highest ideal of a trafficker's soul. His virtues? They are "the negative virtues" of contentment, honesty, moderation, diligence, justice, self-control, modesty, patience. One could not desire a better enumeration of English characteristics. Truly, Sombart is here "a Daniel come to judgment," but he knows it not. On he stalks, telling his countrymen that the State in England is in no wise a living organism, but a mechanical entity; that English world-politics is but the policy of an enlarged universal provider or store; that war for the Englishman is something in the nature of sport; and that England has contributed but little to the world's intellectual values, (he is careful to add "since Shakespeare.") Nothing in religion; a few poets, who were, however, of Irish birth, "and therefore anti-English"; nothing in music; in painting, ditto. In fact, a nation of shopkeepers cannot evolve any intellectual values, neither now nor in all eternity, even if they wished to. But they do not wish to; all they want, all they find delight in is comfort and sport. * * *

Herbert Kraus's defense of the invasion of Belgium as justifiable on international legal bases draws this comment from Dr. Epstein:

> The manner of the defense of "the holiest possessions" has been carefully considered too. In "The Present War in the Arena of International Law" Herbert Kraus admits that Germany when it invaded Belgium acted contrary to international agreements; but seeing that the measure was in self-defense, it was justifiable, as witness the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807 and the Caroline case in 1837. Pretty much the same argument is advanced by Ludwig Beer in his "Public Law and War." A candid admission of wrongdoing such as the Chancellor made in his famous Reichstag speech of Aug. 4, 1914, is much more straightforward than a series of twistings to attempt to prove that Germany did not sin against the law of nations. * * *

Psychological Defeat

By R. Arseneff

R. Arseneff, the celebrated Russian author and journalist, in discussing current political events in the September issue of the Vestnek Yevropi, (European Messenger,) deals at some length with the problem of what he terms the "psychological defeat," or feeling of despondency, resulting from the uninterrupted onward march of the Teutons. Mr. Arseneff begins his article with the question:

IS it true that there exists among the broad masses of the Russian people a negative feeling as to the advisability of further continuing our warlike measures, a passionate desire for peace at any price, a desire—terrible to utter—for defeats, which might hasten the end of the war? Has this come into life? Does it grow—this phenomenon for which the term "psychological defeat" is best fit? And if the "psychologically defeated" are not the creation of evil and fear, then what is their true status? Are they mere units or huge groups? The future alone can give the correct answer to these questions. It is, however, difficult to believe in the popularity of a feeling so radically adverse to the meaning

of this great moment. True, there were times when the prospects of a humiliating and difficult peace compared with one of complete victory seemed the lesser evil; they were the times when it was generally assumed that disaster to our arms outside would bring about a change for the better within the boundaries of our empire; but a great abyss lies between the conditions prevalent then and these prevailing now. It is one thing to wage a war undertaken without extreme necessity—a conflict having nothing in common with the vital interests of a people; it is another thing to wage a war, forced upon us by our adversary, conducted in a manner that violates the most elementary precepts of humanity and right, threatening, in case of victory, countless disasters.

It is a case of one country, inhabited by millions of slaves, systematically held in ignorance, rising against another country, which has awakened to new life, choosing a path where obstacles are likely to be met, but where turning back is utterly out of question.

Referring to the Russian treaties of Paris, Berlin, and Portsmouth as treaties of peace that did not in the least affect the might of the huge empire, Mr. Arseneff goes on:

The results of a treaty of peace between Russia and the Teutonic powers would be entirely different. This would be a peace of "defeat," inseparably linked with terrible loss and countless sacrifices. Above all, a peace of this sort would not be lasting. In the footsteps of one war would follow another war more sanguinary than the one waged at present.

Those high aims for the attainment of which Russia united with the leading nations of Europe would remain unattained; the deep wounds inflicted on the Russian people and their allies would remain unhealed.

Conditions and rules of life stamped and sealed by a victorious Germany would least of all facilitate the movement forward to the ideal aims so dear to the hearts of the masses of Russia and those of Western Europe. On the path to such aims there are no obstacles that can be removed by a German victory—that victory of which our "psychologically vanquished" dream.

Russia's Fourth Enemy—Bulgaria

By A. Menshekoff

The entrance of Bulgaria into the war was the cause of the bitterest disappointment to the Russian people. The Novoye Vremya of Oct. 21, 1915, *publishes an article, written by the Russian writer and journalist, A. Menshekoff, a life-long friend of Count Leo Tolstoy, and for years known as a Liberal. With the opening of the first Duma, however, and thereafter, he became the soul of conservative Russia. In his article headed: "Our Fourth Enemy," the distinguished journalist gives free expression to the deep resentment caused in Russia by Bulgaria's turning traitor to the Slav cause:*

A FOURTH front has been presented. War is declared on Bulgaria. For us—the old generation of Russians, who well remember the time when there was no such a thing as Bulgaria, when in her place were only Turkish raiders, it is especially hard to think of this fratricidal war. The war for Bulgaria's freedom in 1877 deeply shook all Russia, and even that part of our youth, too young to go forth to the front, took a most ardent unreserved part in waging the combat. That war was undertaken by Russia for no advantage or conquest, but with a view of freeing the Slav subjects from the Turkish yoke and persecution, threatening them with total destruction. The Bashibazooks, who soon after the outbreak of the war overran defenseless Bulgaria, subjected the Bulgars, their wives and children to ruthless death and destruction. Previous to an attempt at freeing the Bulgars, Russia

had to save them from an imminent death. That the threat of total destruction was not merely a threat is amply proved by the present wholesale murder of the Armenians, which still goes on in those outlying villages not as yet reached by our Caucasian troops. The saving of 2,000,000 Bulgars from certain death cost us, even according to Bulgarian figures, 200,000 lives, and two milliards in money.

Of course, we had every right to expect that the little Slav nation, virtually dragged by us from the jaws of a waiting grave and returned to a life of right and freedom, would remain with us—united in heart and mind for a long time to come, if not forever. It is useless to say that we made a bitter mistake. The mistake we made was already known to those Russian heroes who fought under the banners of Radyetsky, Gurko, and Skobelyoff, covering Bulgaria with their bodies and drenching her soil with their blood. Many of the officers and men coming home from the war of 1877 had a great deal to say about the treatment they received at the hands of our "little brothers."

Having learned to know the Mussulmans and Bulgars alike, many of our warriors showed a decided preference for the manly and honest character of the Turk, as compared with the evasive and shrewd traits of our co-religionists. Apparently the 500 years of slavery did not fail to effect a decided change in the Slav blood, of which little, indeed, runs through the veins of the present-day Bulgars.

After discussing at some length the character of the Bulgarian King and that of some of the Bulgarian statesmen, a great many of whom, according to the author, owe their education and position in life to the generosity of Russia, Menshekoff asks the question:

By what miracle has Germany accomplished the subjugation, by peaceful means, of the monarchs and Governments of Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria? Some great and tempting concessions were undoubtedly offered by the Governments of Central Europe, and, like scattered robbers gradually flocking in the well-organized band, Turkey and Bulgaria hastened to throw their fortunes in with that of the Teutonic powers. They are clearly tempted with the outlook of a huge world robbery, Bulgaria swayed from side to side for a whole year. But when she saw the Germans, according to the Bulgarian Premier Radoslavoff, "capture a great strip of the enemy's territory, without losing one foot of their soil," the argument advanced was final and decisive.

The Government, which came into life thirty-seven years ago, now joined hands with the highway nations of Europe, and together with them it will undoubtedly suffer a terrible fate. A hunger for the proper belonging to other peoples, the ambition to set up the Bulgarian crown supreme in the entire Balkan Peninsula, a desire not to give Russia her right of way to her only outlet to the ocean—here is the Bulgarian plot in a nutshell. This we must realize as a fact and deal with it accordingly.

Germany's Losses

A Copenhagen dispatch to The London Daily Mail, dated Oct. 25, 1915, reported:

The last thirty Prussian casualty lists issued contain the names of 159,901 officers and men killed, wounded, or missing. This brings the total Prussian losses published to 2,026,209. The lists do not include 228 Bavarian, 211 Saxon, 288 Württemberg, and 54 navy lists. The last lists included the names of seventy-seven airmen killed, seventy-five wounded, nine missing, and two prisoners, and four Generals killed and two wounded. The total German losses up to date are estimated at about 4,500,000. Among the latest casualties are many killed by poison gas. The losses of telephone and telegraph battalions in the trenches are very heavy.

A Festival Sun Near the Battle Front

By Pierre Loti

This article by Pierre Loti, (Captain Viaud,) recording his experience on the French battle front, appeared originally in L'Illustration, and is here translated by Charles Johnston.

IT was about 11 o'clock in the forenoon of that day that I arrived at a village whose name I have had to forget. I was in the company of an English commanding officer, whom the fortune of war had given me as a traveling companion on the day before, and we were graciously followed by a great magician—who was the sun. A radiant sun, a festival sun, transforming and beautifying everything. This happened in a department of the extreme north of France, I have never learned which, but one would have believed one's self in Provençe, so lovely was the day.

To get there we had been hemmed in for nearly two hours between two files of soldiers who were marching in opposite directions. On our right were the English, who were going forward to the battle, very clean and fresh looking, bright, and in good spirits, admirably equipped, with fine, plump horses. On our left the artillerymen of France, who were returning from the front, from the titanic battle, to get a little rest; dusty, they were, sometimes with bandages on their arms or heads, but with a joyful expression, with healthy faces, and marching in good order, in sections; they were even bringing back loads of empty shell cases, which they had had the time to pick up, showing conclusively that they had retired without haste and without fear, as victors whose commanders have ordered them a few days' respite. We could hear far away what sounded like a storm, at first only a low rumble, but which we drew nearer and nearer to. In the fields around us the peasants were laboring as though everything were as usual, yet uncertain whether the savages, who were making so much noise over there, might not come back one of these days to destroy everything. Here, there, and everywhere, on the grass of the meadows, there were groups that would have been pathetic under a gloomy sky, but which the sun found a way to brighten; refugees, in flight before the barbarians, cooking like gypsies around little fires of sticks in the midst of bundles of their poor household goods, packed up in haste during the terrible flight.

Our auto was filled with packets of cigarettes and newspapers which kind souls had charged us to carry to the combatants, and so closely were we pressed and held back by the files of soldiers on either side that we were able to distribute them through the windows of the auto, on the right to the English, on the left to the French; they held their hands out to catch them on the wing, and, smiling, thanked us with a quick military salute.

There were also villagers, who were walking, mingled with the soldiers, on this heavily incumbered road. I call to mind one very pretty young peasant woman, who, trudging between two English ammunition wagons, was dragging by a cord two babies asleep in a little cart; she was toiling along; the ascent was steep just there; a handsome Scotch Sergeant with a golden mustache, who was smoking a cigarette, sat with his legs dangling on the tail of the front wagon; he made a sign to her, "Pass me the end of your cord!" She understood, accepted with a pretty, shy smile, the Scotchman wrapped the fragile towing cord around his left arm, keeping the right arm free, to continue smoking, and thus he carried forward the babies of France, whose tiny cart the heavy truck pulled like a feather.

When we entered the village the sun was growing more and more magnificent. Everything there was in confusion, a mingling such as was never seen before and will never be seen again after this war, unique in history. All possible uni-

forms, every kind of weapon, Highlanders, French cuirassiers, Turcos, Zouaves, and Bedouins, whose military salute lifted their burnooses with a noble gesture. The church square was incumbered by enormous English autobuses, which had formerly plied between the districts of London, and still carried the names of the different parts of that city, in big letters. You will say I exaggerate, but really they had an astonished look, these autobuses, to find themselves bowling over French soil, chockful of soldiers. . . .

All these people mingled together were preparing breakfast. And all the time, one heard the great symphony carried forward by the savages, (who might come tomorrow; who knows?) the ceaseless cannonade; but no one paid any attention to it. Besides, how could one be anxious with such a splendid sun, such a wonderful sun for October, with roses still on the walls and dahlias of every color in the gardens hardly touched by the white frosts! . . . Every one settled himself as best he could for breakfast; one would have said a festival, a festival rather incoherent and strange, indeed, improvised close to some Tower of Babel. Young girls moved among the groups, little fair-haired children made presents of fruit gathered in their orchards. The Highlanders, considering themselves in a warm country, compared to their own, were in their shirtsleeves. Village priests and nuns of the Red Cross were seating wounded men on boxes; one kind old sister, with a face of parchment and lovely, honest eyes under her nun's cap, was settling, with a thousand precautions, a Zouave, both of whose arms were swathed in bandages, whom she was doubtless going to feed like a little child.

We were very hungry ourselves, the Englishman and I, and we discovered the inn, very prepossessing, where officers and soldiers were already at table together. (There are no longer any hierarchical barriers in these days of trial through which we are passing.) "I could give you some roast beef and stewed rabbit," the innkeeper tells us; "but as for bread, for example, no! You won't find any anywhere at any price." "Ah," said my companion, the English commanding officer, "and those two fine loaves there, standing before that door?" "Oh, those loaves belong to a General, who sent them because he is coming to breakfast with his aids." Hardly was his back turned when my companion, quickly pulling a big knife from his pocket, cut off the end of one of the golden loaves, and hid it under his cloak. "We have found some bread," he calmly told the innkeeper; "you may serve us." And, beside an Arab officer of the Great Tent, in a red burnoose, we breakfasted gayly with our guests, the soldiers of our auto.

The festival of the sun was at its height, joyously illuminating the variegated crowd and the strange autobuses, when we left the inn to resume our voyage. A convoy of German prisoners was traversing the square; sullen and furtive, they were marching between soldiers who looked a thousand times better, and people hardly noticed them. The old nun I have spoken of, the old nun with the pure eyes, was making her Zouave, helpless for the moment, smoke a cigarette, presenting it to his lips with the trembling and slightly awkward hand of a grandmother. She seemed at the same time to be telling him something very amusing—that innocent and childlike humor that the good sisters know the secret of—for they were both laughing. Who can tell what childish little story it may have been? An old priest who was smoking his pipe near them—without any grace, I am forced to admit—was also laughing to see them laugh. And at the moment when we were getting into our car again to continue our journey toward the region of horror where the cannon thundered, a little girl, a dozen years old, ran to bring from her garden a bunch of Autumn asters to adorn us.

What good people there still are in the world! And how much the aggression of the savages from beyond the Rhine has developed the sweet bonds of brotherhood among all those who really belong to the human race.

CROWN PRINCE CAROL OF RUMANIA

(Photo from P. S. Rogers.)

GENERAL FITCHEFF
Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Army

The Superfeeders

By Valentine Ward

The article presented below was published originally in New Days, a British weekly.

HAVE you noticed that people who eat too much, and too fast, generally want their own way about everything? And that those who are very impatient and determined to get on in the world are almost certainly great trenchermen who bolt their meals?

A self-made man who had amassed a lot of money and eaten a lot of food in too short a time, once told me that all people who carry through great projects are large eaters.

I knew what he meant by "great projects," and did not contradict him.

And a popular journalist once stated that "all the world's work is done by the gouty," and nobody took any exception to his statement.

That "world's work" is the same as the "great projects" of the self-made man.

From which it would appear that there is some connection between overfeeding, gout, and the accomplishment of great things in life.

It is true that when a man is preparing to "Will to Power" on a considerable scale, he stokes up for the effort in true German style. According to the magnitude of his design will food be needed for its achievement? Any traveler in Germany in recent years who knew this rule would have seen that a great national undertaking was going forward. The people were feeding with grim determination, mainly upon those foods which create gout and unscrupulousness. There were rumors that twenty-two courses to a dinner were by no means unusual in the Fatherland. The nation plowed its invincible way through them all, no *pièces de résistance* being able to withstand them.

Now, when people eat like that something must give way, their clothes, their health, or their moral principles; and it was their principles that went, for the gout incidental to such an effort is not an illness, but a state of the soul.

There were, of course, a few nervous people in the country who grew seriously alarmed that the nation might overdo it. They wrote cautionary books on health, and counseled restriction to the one helping of each course at dinner and other cowardly measures; but they were looked upon as eccentric and were little regarded. It was neck or nothing. The world's work must be done, the national destiny fulfilled, and a place secured either in the sun or in a sanatorium.

Cure places sprang up all over the country, into which many a Boche would retire annually for a six weeks' treatment when the tension became too great. This acted as a safety valve and prevented a premature explosion of that racial energy which was being accumulated for a great occasion.

They began to consider war to be holy, and I suppose it is by comparison with peace as they had known it.

The energy born of overeating is not a mere neutral force, capable of being put to both good and evil uses. Its origin being vicious, it is an evil thing in itself, incapable of any good. Harness the glutton to the car of virtue and his legs fail him. Hitch him to the chariot of Satan, and he has the speed of Atalanta and the strength of Hercules. His goal is always self. Your minor glutton will want the largest egg at breakfast. Your major glutton will want the earth.

Against his brother, the drunkard, the finger of condemnation has ever been pointed, but he himself has escaped reproach. Now that he has set the world afire his light no longer is hidden, and we may know him for what he is.

But humanity is hopeful of the drunkard and tries to save him, while the glutton is the despair of all who really

know him. To him no pledge, even of partial abstinence, is offered, for he would sign none. Those strange optimists who try in their ignorance to reason with him he dubs "food cranks" and the unthinking world applauds him, the greatest crank of all.

Among the few who have seen him in his true character must be numbered the poets, who have never sung his praises as they have sung the praises of the tippler. His vice presents no transient moment of beauty. The sculptor has shirked him, though the painter, less discriminating, has depicted him in certain deplorable masterpieces which most of us would gladly forget. But no painter, however obtuse, has in any age chosen him as a model for saint or martyr, for all have recognized that there is no saintliness in his aspect.

Fasting clears the inner vision as gluttony clouds it. There is no interior light which twenty-two courses will not extinguish. Did not Milton by inference testify the same when he extolled—

> Spare Fast, that with the gods doth diet,
> And hears the Muses in a ring
> Aye round about Jove's altar sing.

By which he meant that Gluttony, the opposite of Fasting, hears no celestial voices, nor banquets ever in such high company.

This being so, the intellectual and spiritual harvest of gluttons is a spare crop, and altogether pernicious. Their philosophy is blind and arrogant. Their books are few, and mainly deal with getting on in the world and such rascalities. Poetry they never wrote at all, but merely hymns of hate, nor have they painted any worthy pictures. Religion they have none. In music alone have they achieved anything. Some gluttons can undoubtedly sing, which is an unfathomable mystery, music being the divine art.

Gluttony is a burden to mind and body, a dungeon to the soul. It is the foster-mother of more ills than ever were nursed on drink, the evil soil in which all other sins do flourish.

But against it I have heard no sermon preached in any church, no cry of horror from a Christian pulpit.

And yet, if self is sin, here is ponderable sin, shouldering his way among us, full of uric acid, swank, and all uncharitableness!

Has no Bishop a word to say?

Wine in the Champagne District

Special correspondence of The London Times, dated Epernay, Sept. 25, 1915, *reported*:

While in other parts of France the vintage is being carried out in more or less normal conditions, the difficulties in Champagne are very great, owing to the fact that the battle line dominates a part of the vineyards. Buildings have been destroyed and other havoc caused by shell fire. In addition there is the difficulty, owing to the regulations, of moving about this region, quite apart from the question of transport. Nor have the Germans been the only destructive agency. The cochylis, a grub that eats the interior of the grape, has caused damage over a wide area and has been most active where the danger of gathering the crop has been the greatest.

Still, it is thought that the crop that is left, over the 30,000 acres of the real champagne country, may equal 300,000 to 400,000 hectolitres, (a hectolitre being 22 gallons,) which is 50 to 100 per cent. more than last year's. On the whole, indeed, it is a good year. The quality of the grape is excellent and there is enough acidity to give firmness. The other difficulties which confront the vine grower are of an economic character. There is a scarcity of labor everywhere in France, of horses and carts, and of barrels and bottles.

Is India Really Loyal?

By Allen Welsh Dulles

The writer of the following article on Indian conditions has been in charge of the Department of Philosophy of Ewing Christian College, Allahabad, India, for about a year. He reached India in July, 1914, and returned to this country late last August. He is a Princeton graduate and a nephew of Secretary of State Lansing.

SO much has been written about the loyalty of India to the British Empire and so little has been advanced that would tend to show any disaffection on the part of the Indian people that the conclusion must inevitably have been reached by the majority of persons that that country is supporting the British cause in much the same spirit as Canada or Australia.

All the outward evidences of loyalty seem to be present—Indian troops are fighting with the other British troops in France; the rajahs, native rulers, have been vying with each other in presents of money and war materials for England; and, finally, India has suffered no internal disorders or attempted revolts against British power. Is India as loyal as these circumstances would tend to show?

The present organization of the Indian army examples the wisdom of the English Government. Profiting from the bitter experience of the sepoy (soldier) mutiny of 1857, when fear for their religions gave the orthodox Hindus and Mohammedans, who then composed the larger part of the Indian army, some basis for a common attack against the British Government, the English have, in recent years, recruited the majority of their troops from the mountains of Nepal, outside of British India, the home of the famous Gurkas, who have little in common with the plainsmen of India proper, and from the Sikh community of North India, which has separated itself from both Hindus and Mohammedans by its adherence to the Sikh religion.

This choice of men has the double advantage of securing the bravest and physically most fit for the army, and also those who are least typically Indian and fanatically religious in sentiment. There is little danger that these soldiers could ever be induced to join with the Indian people in any attempt which they might make to achieve the end of their nationalistic aspirations, or to protect themselves against what they might imagine to be an infringement of their religious freedom. As mercenaries many would be as willing to fight against, as they would be to aid, any Indian insurrection.

Since the outbreak of war in Europe there has been no attempt made to enlist any large number of India's three hundred millions for service. What recruiting there has been has had for its object the keeping of the Indian army up to its normal strength, 150,000, while at the same time England has always kept a large English army in India. The places of the first line troops, which were removed shortly after the war broke out, were immediately taken by territorials, who are using India as their training ground and at the same time are kept ready to meet any anti-English movement.

The presence of these Indian troops on the western battle front of Europe could hardly be considered an expression of the state of Indian opinion even if they went to the war of their own free will. It need hardly be said that they had no choice in the matter. In going they obeyed the order of their English officers, who deal promptly and finally with any suspicion of insubordination on the part of their Indian soldiers; nor was it probably distasteful to them to go, as action is seldom unwelcome to the trained soldier after a long period of inactivity. In action they have shown themselves to be brave and useful soldiers.

Much of the support for the British cause from India has come from the

native Princes, the rajahs, who have nominal control over one-third of the territory of India, though only one-sixth of its people, and none of the important seaports being comprised in the large territory they govern. At the time of the British conquest of India it was found advisable to keep in power some of the Indian chiefs, who, along with the British, had seized what they could of the disintegrating Mogul Empire. The overwhelming supremacy of the British position left these Princes, whether single or combined, too weak to dream of being successful rivals of the British power.

It has been the policy of the English Government to maintain these native States under native rule as long as they have shown a friendly attitude toward the British Government and an enlightened treatment of their own people. In the case of the failure of a possible heir, too often an occurrence among Oriental Kings, especially in Indian history, the English Government would select some suitable Indian, of the royal line, if possible, to succeed to the control of the State. Every native State has an English official resident, who sees to it that the native ruler neither mismanages the internal affairs of his State nor aspires to excessive power. All the foreign relations of the States are controlled by the English Viceroy of India.

It will thus be clearly seen that the power of these native Princes depends absolutely upon the good will of the English. Further, the overthrow of that Government in India would shortly be followed by the downfall of the rulers of these native States in the anarchy which would inevitably follow the withdrawal of the English, since the power of these Princes does not come from the support they receive from their subjects. The peculiar diversity of the peoples of India makes it possible for an Indian ruler to be just as foreign to the Indians whom he may be ruling as an English Governor would be. As an example of this, the case of Hyderabad, the largest native State of India, might be cited. Of the ten million people in this State, over nine millions are Hindus, yet the ruler is himself a Mohammedan.

It does not seem strange that these Indian Princes should vie with each other in their presents to the English Government and should have a vital interest in seeing it bring the war to a successful conclusion. Their loyalty is more often the loyalty of self-interest than that of affection. When we read that Sindhia of Gwalior has given a hundred ambulance cars to the King of England, that the Nizam of Hyderabad has contributed so many lakhs of rupees to the Prince of Wales Fund, you may be sure that these men expect a return on their investment in the form of renewed favors from the English Government and the assurance of its continued support.

The majority of educated and half-educated Hindus and Mohammedans are not loyal to the British Government. A few, and here we find the true patriots and statesmen of the Indian community, appreciate what England has done for India and the part that country must play in India's future development, and are, in the truest sense of the word, loyal. Luckily for India there are enough of these men, few though they be, to act as a restraining influence on the reactionary element.

The reason for the strain of disloyalty which runs through the mass of the Indian people is not hard to find. No subject race is ever perfectly satisfied with its position as such when it possesses enough intelligence to do any thinking of its own. Almost every Hindu or Mohammedan, especially if superficially educated, has a tendency to protest at the position of servility in which he thinks he finds his fellow-countrymen. He overlooks the benefits which his country may be receiving from the ruling power and also the impossibility of organizing any Indian government which would receive the support of a united India.

The educated Indian cannot see why he should not have a responsible share in the government of his own country, and we, enjoying a democratic form of government, would have to admit that theoretically he is right. Practically, the application of such principles in India might at present have dire consequences. The East is not yet ready for a repre-

sentative form of government. China, turning back to a monarchy, in fact, if not in name, is only an example of this.

But what has more effect upon the ordinary Indian than the loss of political liberty, which is a theoretical rather than an actual loss, as India passed from the autocratic Mogul to the less despotic English, is the social inequality which exists between the two peoples through the habit of the ruling class of holding itself aloof from any social intercourse with the native. All the English clubs debar Indians, and exclusive English society seldom finds a place for the Indian gentlemen. It is a bitter experience for the returned Oxford or Cambridge student to find that he will not be accorded the same treatment from English society in India that he has been accustomed to in England.

The Indian has to put up with many instances of incivility from the English with whom he deals, discourtesy from the railway officials, and sometimes rough treatment from the English soldier. If he is an uneducated man he takes all this as a matter of course, but the Indian student resents such treatment bitterly. He can hardly be blamed for not loving his English master, or for overlooking what his wonderful administrative ability has accomplished for the country. Until there is some show of treating the educated Indian as a social equal that ever-growing class of Indian society will never quietly acquiesce in English rule.

The loyalty of the lower class of Indian, the laborers, has been alienated to some extent by events which have occurred recently.

The Indian workmen in South Africa were so evilly treated by the white element of that country that the condition to which they were reduced became a disgrace to the empire.

The refusal on the part of the Canadian immigration authorities to receive Indian labor has had grave consequences in India. The question is quite a different one than the United States has had to face in the case of China and Japan.

The incident in question has to do with the voyage of the Komaragut Maru, a Japanese ship, chartered by a company of about 300 Indians from the Punjab. On their arrival at Vancouver they were refused admission by the immigration authorities and sent back on their long journey to Calcutta. It is to be presumed that on their return voyage they were not filled with appreciation of the benefits which they derived from their position as British subjects.

To what extent England will satisfy India's desire for a place equal in dignity and responsibility to that of Canada and Australia is a problem for the future. Most observers would deny the ability of the Indian at the present time to deal with the difficulties of such a responsibility. Indian self-government, with its millions of people in utter ignorance, and with the multiplicity of its types, languages, and religions, presents quite a different and far more difficult problem than is found in either Canada or Australia.

Then there are these two additional problems for England to face: First, the demand of the educated Indian to be treated as a social equal; and, second, the demand of the laboring classes for the right of immigration into the other countries of the empire.

Until these issues involved in the present political and social inequality are met and some step taken to change present conditions in these regards, England will not find India a loyal country. Yet it is not at all unlikely that England will find the interests of good government will make necessary keeping a strong control over the Central Government. It does not seem probable that the Indian will ever get the social recognition he desires, or be welcomed as an immigrant. Thus it is very possible that India will never be wholly loyal to England. Yet it is unlikely that that country will ever be able to unite against England in such force as actually to menace her sovereignity, backed as it is by an English army.

The Net of the Slaver

By G. K. Chesterton

This article by the brilliant English critic and essayist appeared originally in New Days, a British weekly publication.

THE denial of nationality is a denial of identity, and, like many denials of identity, is false and self-interested. Those who cannot see that men are naturally divided into nations might as reasonably refuse to see that nations are divided into men. A nation is mystical and difficult to define; so is a man. By sophistry, selection, and nonrealization of the exception as proving the rule, it is as easy to be doubtful of the corporate identity in the one case as in the other. Those who said that there was no such country as Poland because it had been cut in pieces might come in time to say that there was no such Pole as Paderewski, because an indefinite number of pieces of his hair are said to be scattered among his female admirers. The opportunities for skepticism in everything are as endless as they are fruitless, and any ingenious person can cloud the outline of the individual biped by disquisitions on all kinds of intermediate things—on eggs, embryology, the Siamese twins, dual personality, wooden legs, sensitive plants, and the hind legs of a pantomime elephant. But he who sees the enormous mountain of the normal, and knows that in spite of these things a man is a man and a nation is a nation, will reply somewhat impatiently to such abuse of casuistry. He will cut short the dehumanized philosophies deduced from the Siamese twins of Austria and Hungary. He will cut short the explanation that Ireland cannot be a nation because it has attached to it the dead and artificial limb of Belfast. Yes, there were two Siamese twins at the show. And there were only two. Yes; there are wooden legs. There are also wooden heads.

But among the least noted proofs that nationality is normal, to Europeans at any rate, is the fact that every moral movement, however universal, emerges in a national form or, at least, under a national leadership. Christendom is indeed one thing, and ultimately moves together, but in each special movement a special nation is the figurehead and points the way in which the world is going. The title of one territory or one tribe is given in history and human speech to tendencies which were everywhere present, but which found their chief issue in that place and that people. We speak of the French Revolution, in spite of Jefferson and Paine. We speak of the Italian Renaissance, in spite of Ronsard and Shakespeare. Bismarck, by the way, said that Italy was only a geographical expression, but I think there must be people living on the Carso just now who wish it were not so expressive. Even developments more accidental or fugitive have come in course of time to have a local savor, and cling to the national associations in which they were strongest. Thus we English generally think of Presbyterianism as Scotch Presbyterianism, though the Presbyterian or synodical form of church government was part of the Protestant movement in Switzerland and France; and the very instrument to which it still appeals is called the Westminster Confession. And, though Luther was not a Lutheran, he was a German.

Now, the present war is a great many other things as well, but it is specially and supremely a fight between the Frenchman and the German. The Frenchman is defending the substance of what we call the French Revolution against something which seeks to overthrow and supersede it. The German is seeking to impose that alternative something of which he is by no means the only but certainly the most successful champion. That alternative something has not yet, in generally accepted language, a name; and this is indeed no small part of its

strength. Those who know bits of it call it benevolent despotism, or science, or social reform, or even socialism. Those who know one side of it call it the completion of organized society, or the Soul of the Hive. Those who know another side of it call it man (or, rather, a few men) taking command of evolution—the breeding ground of supermen. Those who know most about it call it slavery.

Any one who can see the large outlines of history can see that such cracks as skepticism has made in the walls of Christendom are already readmitting all the old heathen and even prehistoric things which we cleared away when first we became Christians. The defense of suicide has reappeared, for instance, and this doctrine of the divinity of mere despair has come chiefly from the half-heathen north; upheld by Scandinavians in theory and by Prussians in practice. Nothing in modern Germany is more typically modern and German than the stories of suicide among the young. This is probably what Dr. Moll, the Prussian professor, means when he says that the Belgian populace is ignorant and superstitious. He means that Belgian children have to be killed; but that Prussian children can be trusted to kill themselves. The defense of divorce and even polygamy has reappeared; many persons of importance on platforms demand divorce, apparently without having gone through the preliminary formality of marriage.

The defense of infanticide, that ancient heathen custom, has already been hinted at in the spiritual slums of eugenics. The return of heathenry to the human race would not be complete without the re-establishment of that great social institution on which the great heathen civilization reposed, and which the industry and persuasion of numerable priests in the Dark Ages gradually weeded from the world. It has been found generally convenient to describe this new but old rival to the Christian distribution of liberty and property by the name which Mr. Belloc used in his discovery and demonstration of this modern trend, and to call it the Servile State. Its essence is this: That the rich shall constitute the State, and the poor, their servants, be thus only the indirect servants of the State. So, in pagan times, the free men were the State and the slaves only its indirect servants. Its advantage would be that it would make impossible all that accidental agony which we call destitution. Its policy, or the direction of it, is well represented by the principle of compulsory insurance, begun in Germany and unfortunately imitated in England, by which the employe, solely as such, is compelled to a particular form of economic precaution, while his employer is under no such compulsion, but has to assist the compulsory operation with money. In short, the rich man is forced to buy medicine, but the poor man is forced to take it. This is literally slavery, and begins the claim for entire support on one side and entire obedience on the other. Slavery is scientific, it is workable, it is comfortable; and there is a temper, which we call the Christian temper, to which it is intolerable.

This new or renewed thing, which is in its recent origin barbarian and Germanic, finds its road barred by an older thing, which is in its origin mainly Christian. This thing is well represented by the little realm at which the Germanic powers struck the first blow when they began this war. I take the following description of Serbia from the fairest and most frigid encyclopedia I know: "They are a primitive people, cling to old customs and beliefs, and are thoroughly democratic in their institutions. The most striking feature of their social life is the family community, or Zadruga. The farms are all small in size, and the agriculture is backward and primitive. There are no paupers, no asylums, no 'homes' in Serbia." In short, there are none of the luxuries of highly developed societies. The Serbian clings to the old belief that it is better for one man to have one farm, instead of having either none of his own or twenty of other peoples, as in more advanced States. He clings to the old belief in democracy, which is one of the oldest in the world. He has no "homes," having a home instead. In the wild mountains around

Nish the wild institution of the Zadruga, or family, is still permitted to exist. He is backward in his farm, but by no means backward in his fight for it, and in fighting for his farm at this moment he is fighting for freedom throughout the world.

This peasant State is the norm of Christendom; Russia, for instance, is largely a larger Serbia. But it so happens that one of these peasant States, while remaining a peasant State, is also a polished and politically efficient one. Its name is France; and its place is at the head of the free peasantries. One of its most typical Kings said that all statesmanship should be directed toward putting a chicken in the pot of every peasant on Sunday. There is, we shall regretfully observe, a painful lack of progressive thought in this conception. The smallest circle of professors in the mildest Prussian town could tap every link of it with their tiny hammers of skepticism. The atheist professor would say that the desire to have a holiday to look forward to was a tribal rite, to propitiate what he would probably call Jaweh. The "humanitarian" professor would speculate upon the outraged feelings of the chicken. The strong-minded, world-conquering professor would say that the chicken need not be boiled, but the peasant ought to be; especially the Belgian peasant. The socialist professor would frown upon the idea of a hundred chickens in a hundred pots, but smile on the idea of a hundred chickens in one. The theosophical professor would point out that the King, the peasant, the chicken, and everything else were all melting into perfect oneness; or, in popular language, going to pot. But these professors, who in the Kingdoms of Germany are as common as chickens, in the Republic of France are almost as rare as Kings. The peasant State of France, like the peasant State of Serbia, is very poorly supplied with lunatics.

As the French Revolution had to fight before freedom was safe, so the German Revolution had to fight before slavery was safe. The actual declaration of war against the free peasant States of Serbia and France was a necessary part of the foreign policy of the Servile State. It was not the first, but rather the last, of the German steps to the security of the new system. Already they had covered the world with a network of communication and corruption; they had fortified foreign countries as their own; their spiritual spies were in every college and council. The enormous net was woven; the enormous trap of iron was set, which was to kidnap humanity as their old master, Frederick William, had kidnapped his giants. Then the sleeping soul in us, of all that has kept us free, awoke in the stillness, and we blindly (and barely) struck aside the blow. The iron net broke about Paris; and the noise we hear today is the noise of their nets being torn up all over the world.

"One Successful Pounce Will Win"

By Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

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The subjoined article by Conan Doyle was cabled to THE NEW YORK TIMES on Oct. 25, 1915, during a period of extreme pessimism in London concerning the conduct of the war by the Allies.

THE Duke of Wellington, in one of those acute philosophic asides which cropped up occasionally in his businesslike correspondence, remarked that a deep vein of madness ran through the British character. The noun is perhaps rather harsh, but our best friends have found marked eccentricity in our mental processes. One of the most curious manifestations is a tendency to excessive and ill-timed self-depreciation, not universal, for we have our optimists and even our braggarts, but so clamorous at times as to engage the attention of the whole world and completely deceive them as to our real situation and character.

The historian will find the phenomenon at all ages of our chronicle, and I expect that the original blue-skinned savage, as he poled his corracle along our creeks, was already lamenting the degeneration of his stock. It has, however, grown upon us with the years, and surely the most absurd sight of all the ages is that of Great Britain during our generation moaning and sobbing over her own inefficiency, while rapidly gathering up as much of the earth's surface and of the world's wealth as she could possibly lay her hands upon.

No better illustration of this national tendency could be found than a contrast between the German and British press during the last few months. If one were to take them at their face value, one would imagine, to read these articles, that Germany was not only confident of the future, but had in the past reason to congratulate herself upon the results of her efforts against Great Britain, while, on the British side, one would gather that there was great despondency and that up to now we had no reason to be satisfied with anything which we had done in the war.

Yet in our heart of hearts we are as certain of victory as that tomorrow's sun will come, and a dispassionate survey will satisfy any student of history that no great war in which our country has ever been engaged has been marked in the same space of time by such triumphant successes as those of the last fourteen months. Our troubles have been those of our allies; our victories have largely been our own. Germany can make a good showing up to date against the coalition. Against Great Britain she has been beaten at every turn.

Consider what we have done in this short space of time and compare it with the opening of any of our greater wars. In our war against the French Republic it was nearly two years after its inception that Howe's victory gave us a gleam of success. In the great war against Napoleon it was again two years before Trafalgar ended the fear of imminent invasion and twelve years of very varying fortunes before we won through.

Now, look at the work of fourteen months. We have annexed the whole great German colonial empire, with the exception of East Africa and a district in Kameruns; we have swept the German flag, both imperial and mercantile, off the face of the ocean; we have completely sterilized her fleet; we have repelled her serious submarine attack; played our game so skillfully that the flux of time shows us stronger, not weaker, in comparison; we have conquered South Mesopotamia from the Turks; we have completely repelled their attempted invasion of Egypt; we have helped to save Paris; we have, with French and Belgian assistance, but mainly by our own exertions, stopped the advance upon Calais, inflicting a loss of several hundreds of thousands upon the

Germans; we have, by our intervention at Antwerp, helped to extricate the Belgian Army; finally, and greatest of all, we have raised an enormous voluntary army, which is large enough to turn the scale between the European forces, and we have converted ourselves, with wonderful adaptability, into the great factory and munition store of the Allies.

That is our story, and if any man cannot see that it is a wonderful one, he is not merely a pessimist, but blind.

What have we to put on the other side of the account? I am dealing for the moment with large results and not with details. Where have we failed?

In the whole world our most severe critic could only point to one place—the Dardanelles. But have we failed in the Dardanelles?

I believe that if we should never force the strait the enterprise has none the less been worth the undertaking. We have lost 100,000. How many have the Turks lost? Certainly not less. We have held up a great body of their best troops, who would otherwise have been operating against us on the Egyptian and Mesopotamian fronts or in the Caucasus against the Russians. General Ian Hamilton has taken the pressure off General Maxwell on the one side and General Nixon on the other.

But the greatest of all the results from the Dardanelles expedition is that it has united us with Russia as nothing else could have done. She cannot now say, as she might have said, that we thought only of our own empire. We have spent our blood and our ships in trying to force the gates which close her in. When the episode remains a historical reminiscence, like the passage of Admiral Duckworth in 1807, this great result will still remain.

Again, one sequel which may prove to be of vital importance may spring from the Dardanelles. It is our operation there and the consequent danger to their ally which has drawn the central powers on to their southern advance. The immediate result of this has been to bring into the war the Serbians, who for nearly a year had been practically neutral, and so to open up a new front, which has to be supplied by the Germans with men and munitions. It is tapping a fresh vein in a body which is already slowly bleeding to death.

What have they to gain there? Putting aside all megalomaniac visions of an advance upon India, what is their practical goal? Should they overwhelm Serbia, it will go to our hearts, but will make no difference in the war, since Serbia had, as I already remarked, been obliged to rest upon her oars for many months. What next could they advance upon? Constantinople, with a strong allied force intrenched upon their flank at Saloniki? Would the Turks really welcome an army of Bulgars and other hereditary enemies marching into their capital at the expense of their hereditary friends?

And if we assumed everything and suppose them at Constantinople, what then? How will they cross the Egyptian desert and meet the quarter of a million whom we could line up on the Suez Canal? What will it profit them to be strong in Asia Minor by the time that attrition has worn them down, east and west and the ever-thickening allied lines are pushing inward for Berlin?

The more steadily one gazes at these fantastic fears the more they shred into mere phantoms of the imagination. The gains of the German expedition are shadowy and distant, the losses are immediate and obvious, and it is the Dardanelles pressure which has drawn them forth.

But have we failed at the Dardanelles? It is surely too early to say. Mr. Winston Churchill has been criticised for saying that only a few miles separated us from victory. Never was criticism more carping and unintelligent. What he said was an obvious fact, as true today as then. Had he said a few weeks, or even months, criticism would be intelligible, but he said miles, which was obviously true. What he meant to convey, and what he did clearly convey, was that if we had the victory we could not be robbed of the fruits of it as the Germans were robbed of their Paris, but that the prize was in our hands the instant the success was attained. He

did not underrate the formidable task. Still less would any one do so now. But we do not know the difficulties of the enemy. We cannot tell what weakening may occur or what change may come. We are ready on land and sea, and it is as true as ever that it is only a question of one successful pounce.

It is surely too early to write off the Dardanelles loss and to put it down as the one single item which should appear upon the debit side of our account, but I repeat that if there is no forcing of the strait, none the less the hostorian of the future may very well find that the operations have had far-reaching and fateful results.

On the military side, in our campaign of France and Flanders, great events have been so close to us and have confused us so with their successive concussions that one has to cultivate some mental detachment in order to get their proportion and their relation to each other or to the permanent values of history. So far as the British campaign is concerned, the following summary would in the main be correct:

The campaign began by defeats, honorable and inevitable, but none the less defeats, at Mons Aug. 23 and Le Cateau Aug. 26. This was followed by the victory of the Marne, Sept. 6-11, in which the honors rest with our French allies, and the drawn battle of the Aisne on Sept. 13, in which for the first time immobile lines were formed, a confession of failure upon the part of the invaders. There followed the long-drawn, scrambling action of La Bassée, Oct. 12-31, in which no result was obtained and immobility was again enforced. Simultaneously was fought the first battle of Ypres, Oct. 20-Nov. 13, in which the Germans were repelled, with very heavy losses, in their repeated attempts to capture that city.

This brought the fighting of 1914 to an end, save for the sharp fight at Festubert, Dec. 19-21, where the British sustained a reverse on the first day, which was equalized by a successful counterattack on the second.

The campaign of 1915 began with the costly British victory at Neuve Chapelle on March 10, involving the permanent capture of the village. There followed the local but intense fighting of Hill 60, which ended in a complete British victory at the time, though the garrison was afterward driven out by poison on May 5.

Then came the second battle of Ypres, from April 22 to May 24, one of the great battles of all time, in which the Germans failed again in their main objective, to capture the town and break the line, but did succeed in taking four heavy guns and some prisoners from us, besides gaining about two miles of ground along a front of twenty miles. It may therefore be fairly described as a German success. Before this fight had ended a second battle had broken out further down the line—the battle of Richebourg, May 9-24, which began by a bloody repulse of the British attack, but ended by a considerable and permanent gain of ground.

Then followed the fighting around Hooge, which continued with about equal fortunes during the whole Summer, the Germans having marked success on July 30-31, while the British won distinct victories on June 15-16 and Aug. 9.

Finally came the battle of Loos on Sept. 25, which can even now be hardly said to have finished, but which certainly has been a British victory, involving a gain of ground, prisoners, and guns.

Such in bare epitome is our military record up to date. It is to be remembered that for the first six months the Germans had a very marked preponderance of numbers, and that in the second half year, when the numbers had been equalized, they had an even more marked preponderance of guns and munitions. By the splendid exertions of the Allies the numbers in the west are now in our favor and the munitions at least on an equality.

What, then, may we not expect from the future?

Not only have we nothing to reproach ourselves with and a very great deal upon which to congratulate ourselves in actual war, but we have, as it seems to me, made remarkably few mistakes. Beforehand, thanks to the

firmness of Mr. McKenna, (First Lord of the Admiralty, 1908-1911,) in the matter of the eight great ships, and the driving power of Mr. Churchill, (First Lord from 1911 to 1915,) in the years immediately before the war, our navy was ready as it had never been before for a supreme struggle. Of the four army corps, which were the most that we had ever thought of sending abroad, two and a half were in time for the first clash, and the others followed. We played our part as we said we would play it, and we won our game, so far as we can count gains and losses, between Germany and ourselves.

If Mr. McKenna and Mr. Churchill put us in a strong position upon the water Lord Haldane (ex-War Secretary) forged the weapon which was to do such great service upon the land, the British military machine as we and the Germans know it. The splendid territorial army, the officers' training corps, which has been of such vital service, the conversion of the expeditionary force into a practical reality—all sprang from his clear and far-seeing mind. When one remembers his long defense of the territorials, the gibes to which he and they were subjected, the ridicule with which his assertion was met that they would have time after the outbreak of the war to become good troops before taking the field, and when one sees how entirely his forecast has been borne out, one does not know which is the more surprising—his foresight or the ingratitude and perverseness of so many of his fellow-countrymen. Future generations will, I think, look upon Lord Haldane as one of the saviors of the country.

After the outbreak of the war we have also been extraordinarily fortunate in our leaders. If one searched backward through the glorious files of British history one could not pick on a man who was so fitted by nature and training for the supervision of such a war as Lord Kitchener. His cold, mathematical brain, his power of thinking in terms of the year after next, his enduring, inflexible will power, his freedom from politics—all of these qualities make him an ideal leader in such a war. And what a collaborator in Mr. Lloyd George, who supplies exactly what a soldier lacks—the touch with the democracy, the power of the burning word, acquaintance with practical conditions of British life!

With such men at home, and with our leaders on sea and land, from Admiral Jellicoe and Field Marshal French downward, we can surely face the future with a light heart. Our troubles have never really been our own, but have arisen from the fact that the secret preparations of the central powers have made them for a limited time more powerful upon land than their neighbors. The margin of strength which is wanted we have to supply. By a miracle of organization and national spirit we shall be able to do so.

The worst of this unreasonable, pessimistic criticism is that it takes the heart out of men who are conscious of their own good work and makes them feel as if good and bad were alike. Also, it depresses the public and makes them vaguely think that all is wrong when nearly all is right. The conduct and handling of the navy have fortunately been largely immune from carpers, but take as an example the continual reiteration of such phrases as "The muddling of the War Office." The extraordinary efficiency of our War Office has been one of the surprises of the war. Was it muddling when it sent an expeditionary force abroad with such celerity and completeness, with a commissariat which all agreed to be unequaled and with transport and medical service which are the envy of our allies?

We talk with appreciation of the tenfold expansion of our army, but Lord Kitchener does not do such things by a wave of a wand. They are carried out by the hard work and organizing power of the War Office, which has expanded itself to tenfold duties within a year.

As to the munition question, it is one which came as a surprise to us, as to all the world, but it is notorious that there were economical, and not administrative, reasons for the delay in high explosives. Free trade has no doubt many advantages, but it has its corresponding de-

fects, and if you depend upon production in your own land you are likely to have such a crisis as we have successfully surmounted.

We take our history morning by morning, and often the morning seems a dark one. It is not thus that it is written hereafter. We see every swirl and backwater, but the man of the future will see only the main current of the stream. There is no cause there for pessimism, but rather good reason why we should be on our knees, thanking the Power that guides our destiny for evident proof that Great Britain still has the old clear brain to plan and the old strong arm to strike.

"Cannon Fodder"

By EDEN PHILLPOTTS

They are coming like a tempest, in their endless ranks of gray,
While the world throws up a cloud of dust along their awful way;
They're the glorious cannon fodder of the mighty Fatherland,
Who shall make the kingdoms tremble and the nations understand.

Tramp! tramp! tramp! the cannon fodder comes.
God help the old; God help the young; God help the hearths and homes.
They'll do his will that taught them, on the earth and on the waves,
Then, like faithful cannon fodder, still salute him from their graves.

From the barrack and the fortress they are pouring in a flood;
They sweep, a herd of Winter wolves, upon the scent of blood;
For all their deeds of horror they are told that death atones
And their master's harvest cannot spring till he has sowed their bones.

Into beasts of prey he's turned them; when they show their teeth and growl
The lash is buried in their cheeks; they're slaughtered if they howl;
To their bloody Lord of Battles must they only bend the knee,
For hard as steel and fierce as hell should cannon fodder be.

Scourge and curses are their portion, pain and hunger without end,
Till they hail the yell of shrapnel as the welcome of a friend;
They rape and burn and laugh to hear the frantic women cry
And do the devil's work today, but on the morrow die.

A million souls, a million hearts, a million hopes and fears,
A million, million memories of partings and of tears
March along with cannon fodder to the agony of war.
Have they lost their human birthright? Are they fellow-men no more?

Tramp! tramp! tramp! the cannon fodder comes.
God help the old; God help the young; God help the hearths and homes.
They'll do his will that taught them, on the earth and on the waves,
Then, like faithful cannon fodder, still salute him from their graves.

The Problem of an Enduring Peace

By Colonel F. N. Maude, C. B., late R. E.

The article presented below was published on Sept. 25 by New Days, the British weekly "Journal of the New Conditions."

THOUGH the burdens of this great war are pressing heavily and grievously upon all the nations which are now involved in it, I think that all who have been watching attentively the evolution of society in Europe during the last half century will agree that every week as it passes is bringing us nearer to a complete cessation of that abiding nightmare of fear and distrust which has made of Europe an armed camp ever since the conclusion of the Franco-German war.

At the outbreak of hostilities, almost every military thinker of European reputation was strongly inclined to the opinion that with the peace-trained conscript soldiers of the Continent, a protracted struggle was out of the question, not alone because of the industrial disturbance which it would involve, but because, reasoning from the battlefield experiences of 1866 and 1870, no Generals believed in the capacity of their troops to stand the hardships and horrors modern weapons would of necessity entail.

General Bonnal, for instance, admitted in France, Russia, and Germany as one of the foremost thinkers of his period, who had had ample experience of the fighting of both German and French troops, openly deprecated any military alliance with Great Britain on the grounds that the first twelve days of the war would probably decide it one way or the other, and the British contingents would be too late to influence a decision.

Possibly had his advice not been overruled and the British had not fallen into the place of honor at Mons, this prediction might have been realized, for it is quite certain that the Germans did stake everything they could mobilize and carry by road or rail on the success of their great sweep through Belgium; but neither Bonnal nor his friends were thinking of German victory. On the contrary, they were pretty confident of their own, and reasoning from 1870 had considerable grounds for their confidence. For in that war, at any rate, Germans had not shown any great capacity either for enduring punishment or for rallying after even a local defeat, as their own authors have most frankly confessed.

Looking back now after twelve months of fighting, it is abundantly clear that no catastrophic victories won by strategical superiority combined with tactical elan could have brought us the enduring peace we all desired from the first. For, though Germany might have yielded to expediency and made peace, we should still have had the Hohenzollern dynasty to reckon with, and the armed camp existence under which we had so long suffered would only have returned upon us in intensified force. For the German races would only have been welded into increased homogeneity by suffering, and the mutual confidence in one another among the several members of the Central Alliance would never have been shaken.

But this mutual confidence between Germany and Austria, between south and north within Germany itself, is the very root of the strength of the combined races. And it seems to me now, after watching attentively the trend of circumstances both civil and military, since the war began, that no other sequence of events, save that which has unrolled itself and is still evolving, whether it is conditioned by our Generals and statesmen or is being governed by far higher powers, as I myself believe, could have brought so surely to the complete solution of all the many difficult problems which have to be adjusted before our end is reached.

The break will first show itself in Austria, where the internal condition is becoming unendurable. When the pressure of the Russians and perhaps the

Rumanians begins again from the Czernowitz angle of the Bukowina, as it presumably will, she will appeal to Germany for help again, and appeal in vain, for not a German can be withdrawn from Russia as soon as the Autumn rains begin; and we are not likely to let any of them leave our front for a very long time to come, as they are now very securely held. The Hungarians, never too friendly to the Hohenzollerns, will go first; the Austrians will follow, dragging with them the South German States, and when, with the consequent financial crash that must follow, the scales fall from the eyes of the deluded people and they realize how they have been sacrificed in vain, the National Liberals and Socialists will coalesce to turn out the existing dynasty.

The voting power of the two parties is always considerable—but now that in Germany alone some two millions have been killed in action or died of disease, and millions more, including all the women, are hopelessly sick of the prevailing misery, their power will be complete and a new Government will come into existence, with which the Allies can treat, which they certainly never could do with the existing dynasty. And it will rest with the good sense of the powers to put forward conditions which, without inflicting unnecessary humiliation, will yet deprive the several sections of the Central Alliance of any common ground on which to found new aggressive forces or designs.

Now, the only factor which has made the Dual Alliance really formidable in the present war has been the German fleet. Had we not interfered, the threat of her navy on the Channel coasts would have simply paralyzed the defense of France, and but for her fleet in the Baltic, Russian troops might have landed near Stettin, only seventy miles from Berlin, at the very outset of the war.

But the only reason why the Socialists and National Liberals could be induced to vote money for a fleet was the pretext that a great mercantile fleet was necessary for the trade of Germany and needed a strong war fleet for its protection.

A great mercantile fleet, however, is by no means a necessity for the commercial development of Germany, because the neutral nations and ourselves could actually carry all her goods cheaper than German-owned vessels, owing to the better harbor and building facilities they severally possess. Sweden and Norway together could have run the German ships off the sea had the latter not been supported by Government subsidies most cleverly concealed but nevertheless most effectively administered. If we, in concert with our allies, or even without them, were to prohibit the use of any of our ports throughout the empire to German-owned vessels, the German merchant flag would disappear from the seas, and with it the last vestige of an excuse for the reconstruction of a war navy.

Without a real war navy, however, as I have said, Germany's power of offense against the great powers would be gone —for war on a big scale can no longer be carried on to a successful issue by a nation or group of nations deprived of all hope of obtaining command of the sea. The present war will prove this up to the hilt before we are through with it.

Without any hope of waging a successful war the nation would no longer submit to the existing military tyranny, but would be quite contented with the one-year militia system on the Swiss system the Socialists have long advocated, and to which, of course, no legitimate objection can be taken, since we cannot reasonably deny to any nation the right to an army for home defense; and training in the army has become such an integral factor in the educational scheme of all Continental countries that even the most pacifist of internationalists agree that it must be maintained in a modified form.

The abolition of the merchant flag is the only punitive measure I would see imposed upon Germany, since in the future evolution of the world there must be no room for the existence of a power at sea capable of abusing the potentialities of the submarine as she has done. If she has no trade to defend she has no need of appliances to protect what does not exist, and it is an equitable punishment because it imposes no re-

strictions on her legitimate commercial undertakings. As between maker and consumer it is of no consequence who carries the goods, provided the charges are the same for all.

For the rest, I can only trust that when the final settlement comes we shall put aside all idea of revengeful and humiliating conditions, since these always defeat their own object in the end and drive into underground channels the hatred and resentment they evoke. We have no desire to see the whole world permeated by secret societies for German revenge, and as regards the equity of punishment I fancy by the time the Allies have swept over the Rhine and beyond it, the inevitable track of death and destruction we shall leave in our wake will satisfy even the veriest gluttons for bloodshed.

Lastly, I would keep before my memory the full secret history of the shifts and evasions by which Prussia escaped from the limitations of her army imposed upon her by Napoleon. It would in fact be very useful to publish a short book on the subject at once—the curious will find all the information in the "Official Histories of the 1813 Campaigns" by von Quisdorp and von Holleben—and so arrange our terms of indemnities, surrenders, and so forth, that none should be of such nature as to furnish a nucleus of grievance around which the several German parties and States could regroup themselves. For, after all, this is the prime condition of an enduring peace—that confidence between the various groups whose action has brought about the present catastrophe should be rendered forever impossible.

Dominion Soldiers and English Girls

(From The London Morning Post, Sept. 24, 1915.)

A young daughter of a working woman has been knitting socks for soldiers of the dominions, and has received letters of thanks from a New Zealander. The following extracts are worth reproducing—first, as showing how much the spirit which animates the gifts is appreciated, and, secondly, as likely to prevent other donors and workers from being disheartened when they get no acknowledgment. The writer is a Sergeant Major who has been through two fights, and was on short leave in Egypt when this letter was sent:

You say I am the only one who has acknowledged the receipt of your socks. Well, dear, don't judge any soldier too harshly, as the others who received your socks may be dead by now. I am one of the lucky ones. I have been up the Dardanelles twice, and am ordered there again tomorrow, so your letter came just in time for me to answer. * * * I am very glad to hear you say that you thought it was your duty to help us. Little can you understand to what extent you and the ladies of England are helping us, and I think the Red Cross nurses here are just angels. There is not one of us who would not give his life for any of them, and when victory comes to us I shall always know in my heart that it was not the boys alone that did it, but the assistance we got from our dear British sisters at home helped us to make light of the awful troubles and trials that we have been subjected to. Yes, little girl, you are doing your duty nobly, and tomorrow I go once again to do mine, fearing nothing, just trusting in God. If I don't write again shortly don't worry, as there are plenty of better boys than I who have gone before me.

VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

Late Lord President of the British Cabinet Council, Resigned, Who Deplores Attacks on the Premier Made by a Resigning Minister (Sir Edward Carson)

(Photo from P. S. Rogers.)

SVEN HEDIN

Famous Swedish Explorer, Who by Invitation of the Kaiser Visits the German Battle Fronts

The Allied High Commands

By Maurice Barrés

Member of the French Academy.

This article appeared originally in the Echo de Paris, the translation here given being that of The London Daily Chronicle.

OUGHT the French to intervene in the Balkans or keep out? Or, rather, since we are already in, how far should we carry out intervention?

There are two schools.

Some realize how painful it would be from the moral point of view and how really disastrous to leave Serbia cut off and the railway to Constantinople open. Germany would try to seize the sort of hold against England in Egypt and even as far as India that she has over France and Russia. From the depths of Asia there would come to her new supplies of men and foodstuffs. The Turks would at once furnish her with a million soldiers.

Those who talk in this way are right. But there are others who point out with equal justification that intervention will need five or six hundred thousand men and that France by herself cannot provide them—can not and ought not. It would be a crime for France to open a tap through which her men and her munitions would be drawn off. We French must not compromise the future on this western front of ours. Our enemies are in the centre of the spider's web; they remain masters of the interior lines, and if we send too large a force yonder they will at once swing back against us and try to secure a decision in our home territory.

Here we have the two theses. * * * Only the high command can judge between them.

The French high command? No; not alone. A decision of such gravity from the strategic point of view cannot be taken save by an agreement between all the allied high commands.

From the moment that we cease to be able to count with certainty on Greece and Rumania, the problem in the Balkans becomes one that cannot be resolved by France alone. It is not a mere matter of creating a fourth fighting front. That front must be maintained and fed with men and munitions. Therefore it belongs to all the powers of the Quadruple Entente to concert their attitude and co-ordinate their action.

Today it must be done, not tomorrow, and already it is very late. We Allies have only too often the ca 'canny disposition. * * * It is the moment that counts. To use your strength at the exact instant: this is one of the great rules of strategy. If the upsetting of the equilibrium takes place before we have taken our resolution the current of neutral opinion sets against us.

Plainly Rumania and Greece are waiting for us to show our strength. But what are Italy, England, and Russia prepared and willing to do?

Germany counts upon our indecisiveness and the imperfect co-ordination of our forces.

She frankly admits that from the beginning of the war our lack of an active understanding is one of her chief assets. She says so, writes so, and holds forth on the matter learnedly. For Germany, have you not remarked it, has often the most brutal frankness and does not hesitate to expose to full publicity her feelings and hopes and calculations. * * *

Well, I have just been reading with great interest an article by Bernhardi upon what he calls, "The Mistakes of the Allies." I have never read anything more suggestive. It opens up new aspects of our strengths and weaknesses. It is plain what our enemies fear most. They would feel that they were lost, were all of us—English, Russians, Italians, Belgians, Serbs, and Montenegrins—to co-ordinate our efforts. Bernhardi points out at length that if England had

prepared herself for war, instead of counting exclusively on her allies; if Italy had come into the struggle right at the start, and if the Russians had taken a well-prepared and provided offensive before Germany had occupied the portions of our territory where she is now encamped, events might well have taken a quite different course. "Belgium," he says, "was conquered before the French and English could come to her help. They, in their turn, were forced on to the defensive before Russia was able to act with effect." I shall spare you the tone of superiority which this German critic adopts and which is quite unjustified, but shall come at once to his conclusion. "The powers of the Quadruple Entente," he says, "have committed the strategic mistake of not co-ordinating their action."

Let us not go on making this mistake, as, indeed, we have often done in the past year. What the allied Governments and armies need is a permanent high war council. Then one might examine at once whether one of the four powers does not possess at this moment forces that she is not using. Italy, whose fighting front is about to be immobilized by Winter, would not be willing to shut herself off from the preparations for a common victory. Intervention in the Balkans should be taken through the co-operation of the allied Governments, and the burden of the effort ought to be distributed among them, after an examination into all their forces, which would then only be considsidered as forming one and the same army.

Joy in Grief

[*From The London Daily Chronicle.*]

(Though it is a bitter sorrow, writes the mother of a soldier killed at Ypres, I am more sorry for those who have no sons to send. I had only two. The younger one went out last week.)

By A. W. B.

For me no tears, no useless grief;
For who could grudge, with power to give,
A little life so small and brief
That Britain still may live!

A son is laid upon the shrine—
Another goes—I murmur not;
And though a mother's pain is mine,
I envy no one's lot.

One sorrow overshadows all
That rends me for the sons I bore—
It is that at my country's call
I now can do no more.

The pity surging in your heart
You will not then to me extend;
She needs it who would do her part
But has no son to send.

And more the mother who has borne
Fair children but to bring her woe,
And changes mother-love to scorn
For boys who will not go.

The War and the France of Tomorrow

By Henri Bergson

Member of the French Academy

Professor Henri Louis Bergson, philosopher, historian, and French Academician, has been attached to the Faculty of the College of France for the last fifteen years, and he is well known in Great Britain and the United States. He writes as follows to the editor of this magazine:

"THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY *is most interesting, and I always read it with particular attention.*

"*I inclose a short lecture which I delivered in Paris a few weeks ago, and which appeared in the Revue Bleu; since then I have not written or spoken in public about the war.*"

Professor Bergson's article on the future of France, and sent by him to CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE, *appears below in translation:*

WHAT will be the France of tomorrow? It will be, you may be certain, whatever we shall desire it to be; for the future depends upon us, it is what untrammeled human wills make it. It is time to cast aside arbitrary theories which have been, I do not know why, dubbed scientific. Were the course of history determined by fixed laws, an intelligence sufficiently great, knowing the intensity and direction of the forces bearing upon humanity, would be able to calculate future events as an eclipse of the sun or moon is foretold. No. An intelligence, no matter how vast, possessing full details of all the primal causes acting today upon each man, would be incapable of deducing therefrom the formation of the future because everything will depend upon the stimuli, unforeseen and unforeseeable, which free wills, creators of their own destiny and that of their country, will give when and where they please, and in whatever direction they please.

Nevertheless, liberty is not caprice. A man may vainly make illogical decisions. He may persevere even for a while in such a line of conduct, if he has carefully reflected before starting. And so with a whole people. Here foresight is possible in a certain measure, provided it does not aim at rigorous precision and does not pretend to entire assurance, provided it seeks to emphasize tendencies rather than to prophesy events, provided, finally, it takes account of the psychological elements of the problem.

Nothing is more instructive in this respect than the fate of the forecasts regarding the present war. It has been remarked, and truly enough, that most of them had proved false. In spite of warnings many people insisted "War has become impossible. No chief of State will be foolish enough to declare it. What man would dare take the responsibility of setting fire to Europe and causing a catastrophe unprecedented in the world's history?" Nevertheless, such a man has been found. He has taken this responsibility lightly; and, not less lightly, a whole nation has followed him.

Then people said: "Even supposing war does break out, it cannot last. Neither the belligerents nor the rest of Europe would endure such a strain for more than a few weeks." Nevertheless, they have endured it. The war has already lasted many months, and we shall make it last until complete, definite victory comes.

They said also: "The new explosives, the long-range, rapid-fire guns will make bayonet charges impossible from now on. In future wars, if there are to be wars, great distances will separate the combatants." Well, never—I do not say since the invention of powder only, but since the invention of the bow and arrow—never have soldiers fought at such close range. At certain points on the front only a few meters separate the hostile armies. And as for bayonet charges, they have become so frequent that one can no longer, as in former wars, give them individual names to make them live

in posterity's admiration; they are a commonplace in this war.

It was said also that work in the fields would stop, that manufacturing and trade would tumble, that it would mean economic and financial ruin. Nothing has fallen, nothing has stopped. Economic and financial ruin threatens our enemies beyond a doubt, but our own condition in these respects is perfect, our credit intact. On all these points, and others besides, people were mistaken.

Why were they mistaken? Let us look closer, let us consider each of the predictions in turn. We shall see that they had always reasoned on human affairs without considering sufficiently the human element.

The arms of today have undoubtedly a much greater range and rapidity of fire than those of former times; and if matters progressed mechanically, the fighting forces would be as far from each other as the greater range of their arms would allow. But mankind is supple and inventive. In face of danger enormously increased, he has sought and found means of sheltering himself without renouncing the offensive, without ceasing even to menace the enemy constantly with a hand-to-hand combat.

And so with agriculture, manufacture, the very life of the country; they would be seriously menaced by the war if human needs were absolutely fixed things, incapable of extension and compression. But necessities contract and activity expands under stress of circumstance; consumption and production adapt themselves to new conditions. This elasticity of human nature and the psychology of human nature should have been taken into consideration before prophecies were made.

The psychology of nations had been still less considered, it would seem; otherwise no one would have believed the war impossible. Assuredly, war would be expensive even to the victor; but there was one nation which believed itself certain of victory, and which reasoned besides that, no matter what the cost, it would gain vastly, since it would attain thereby the domination of the world. On this single aim it had concentrated for half a century all its energy, aroused by cupidity and hatred into a state of arrogance and madness. To that nation setting fire to Europe was of slight consequence; in advance it absolved itself of all blame by persuading itself that it was the chosen people, instrument of God's will upon earth. Under these conditions war had to come.

Those who imagined that if war did break out it would be short were likewise deceived. The war could not possibly be brief, because it would be necessarily a war to the death. France would realize at once that her national existence was at stake—nay, more than her existence; the very fate of humanity—more than the existence of one or many peoples; the ideal of life, everything that makes life worth while. Yes; they should have foreseen all that, knowing what France has always been; and it should have been foreseen also that all Frenchmen would be in accord, united in a single unshakable resolution when the moment should come for arising against the powers of evil for the safety of the nation and of humanity.

As for foreseeing the state of mind of our soldiers, that is a different matter. One cannot foretell anything of the future except by past analogy, and the mental state of the French soldier is without precedent in the history of warfare. The psychologist who should insist upon comparing it with something familiar to him would have to seek elsewhere than in the annals of military valor. He would be obliged, I believe, to recall the descriptions which the great men of action among the mystics have left us of their inner life. They traversed, no doubt, the phase of enthusiasm which ends in ecstasy, but for them it was only a temporary state. Beyond the enthusiasm, further yet than the "vision of God," they reached that state of supreme calm where, having become again their former selves in appearance, speaking and acting like ordinary mortals, attending to their daily occupations and sometimes to the most humble work, they felt themselves inwardly metamorphosed, as if God had absorbed them into His eternity. Far be it from me to identify this

state of mind with that of our soldiers; nevertheless, there is an analogy. Hear the stories, read the letters which reach us from the front; all evoke pictures of the same kind. Not the slightest arrogance, but a genial and simple heroism, sure of itself as if, beyond enthusiasm, higher than all known forms of patriotism in which one still distinguishes himself from the country which he loves, the French soldier had brought his soul to entire unity with that of his nation and drew therefrom the strength to go no matter where, even to death itself, with a feeling of security.

Returning, then, to the question which we asked at the outset: What will remain tomorrow of all the accumulated energies of today? Shall we still have strength and inspiration to carry a victorious, rejuvenated, revivified France to higher and higher destinies? I can only reply once again: That will depend upon us; we shall preserve our energizing force if we desire to preserve it. Let me add, I believe we shall desire it.

I believe we shall desire it because our national will is not to suffer in future from the weakness which has hitherto hampered it in all its undertakings. Of this weakness we have perceived only the exterior, superficial symptoms; it has had its source in the depths of the nation's spirit.

You know, perhaps, that certain psychologists explain most nervous trouble by some former disappointment, by some thwarted, repressed tendency. The victim had become reconciled and perhaps even believed that he had forgotten the affair. It was an inclination or an ambition or an aspiration of early youth or even of infancy. As we were unable to satisfy it we had decided that we would think no more about it. But it has continued to think about us. Installed in the subsoil of our consciousness, it works there without our knowledge; it pushes and presses whatever is above it. That means shakings, explosions—in a word, the whole series of nervous troubles—until the physician-psychologist, having discovered the recollection concealed in the subconscious depths, brings it to the surface and drives it away.

Well, something of the same kind has happened to the mind of France. It had —that was forty-four years ago—a great disappointment, and it kept the memory thereof always alive and active, even when it believed to have forgotten. Oh, it was far from a wound of self-esteem; from such a wound we would have recovered. It was much deeper than that. By seeing force take the place of justice, Alsace-Lorraine snatched from France, success crown a course of brutality, chicanery, and falsehood, we had learned almost to doubt the existence of justice, and to lose faith in all the great things which had always been incarnated in France. And because we had yielded to doubt we were discontented. And because we were discontented with ourselves we were discontented with each other. Back of the visible, tangible causes of our discords was a wounded idealism, a patriotism—paradoxical as it may seem—a grieved patriotism which could be seen even in the anti-patriotic utterances of certain orators. But tomorrow the evil will have disappeared. Tomorrow the great injustice will have been repaired, force will have restored the right.

That is why I am without fear for the future. The France of tomorrow will be not only a victorious France; it will be a France which will desire and be able to preserve its impetus of inspiration, because it will have recovered, with the restoration of its territory, confidence in itself and confidence in the double ideal of liberty and justice with which its name has always been associated.

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

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

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Facts and Questions Before the British

By Viscount Bryce

Viscount Bryce, by his sympathetic study of American Government and his cordial relations with Americans, has made us feel that he is far from being an alien. His views on the situation that confronts his own land, therefore, will be of especial interest here. We publish below Viscount Bryce's recent Presidential Address to the British Academy.

THE year that has passed since the last general meeting of the Academy has been an Annus Mirabilis, full of unexpected and terrible events. To most of us it has been also Annus Deflendus, a year that has brought private sorrow to nearly every household as well as public sorrow to us all for the calamities in which it has involved the nation and the world. The British Academy has carried on its meetings and public lectures, making no change save one. The Council has this year proposed no foreign men of learning to be elected as Corresponding Fellows, fearing lest the judgment of their merits might be, or might possibly seem to be, influenced by the political relations in which the country stands. No suggestion has come from any quarter that we should deprive of their position as Corresponding Fellows any subjects of those foreign States which are now at war with Britain. The same may be said of our illustrious elder sister, the Royal Society. The general feeling has evidently been that the more all learned bodies are kept outside the passions of war the better for them and for the nations. When strife has ended and a period has elapsed long enough to soften the bitterness of feeling which now exists, it will be for learned bodies to try to link up the bonds of personal regard and intellectual co-operation, now unhappily severed, which have in time past served to bind the great peoples to one another.

Many will have felt, and all will admit, the dangers that surround any one who, influenced by strong emotions and possessing imperfect knowledge, should now commit to print his judgment of the events of the last eleven months. Every one among us must sometimes have had cause to regret, when reading them years afterward, words which he wrote in the heat of the moment. Time modifies our judgments as it cools our passions. Neither the friendships nor the enmities of nations can last forever. * * *

It is better that nothing should be said today in an address to the Academy which any one of its members, to whatever country he may belong, would feel pain in reading ten or twenty years hence. Newspapers and pamphlets will convey to posterity sufficiently, and even more than sufficiently, the notions and fancies and passions of the moment.

What we may do, not without profit, is to note and to set down in a spirit of detachment the impressions made upon us by the events which our eyes see and watch as they pass into history. Many a pen will for centuries to come be occupied by the events of this year, and endless controversies will arise over them. It is well that whoever has gained from his studies something of a historical sense should in a historical spirit place on record from month to month the impressions he receives. The record will be almost as useful if the impressions should turn out to be erroneous as if they should be confirmed by subsequent events, because what the historian of the future will desire to know is not only what happened but what people believed and thought at the time it was happening. That which is omitted has also its value. Fifty years hence men will be struck by the significance of things whose significance was not perceived by contemporary observers, and will seek to know why those observers failed to see or comprehend facts which will then stand out in bold relief.

So let me now try to enumerate briefly what are the facts of the present situation by which we are chiefly impressed

—facts that make it novel as well as terrible.

The first fact is the immense width and range of the war. Thucydides observed that men always thought the war they were then engaged in the greatest that had ever befallen. But here we have facts which show how much the present conflict does transcend any seen in previous ages. This might have been foretold twenty years ago, assuming that Russia, Germany, and Britain were involved, seeing how vast are the possessions and claims and ambitions of all three States. Yet the reality goes far beyond every forecast. All the six great European powers and four lesser powers are involved. So is the whole extra-European Old World, except China and Persia and the possessions of Holland and Portugal. In the New World it is only the Dominions and Colonies of Britain that are affected—a noteworthy illustration of the severance of the Western Hemisphere from the broils of the Eastern.

Secondly. There is the prodigious influence of the war upon neutral nations. This also might have been foreseen as a result of the development of world commerce and the interlockings of world finance. But here, too, the actual results are transcending expectation.

Thirdly. The changes in the methods and character of war have been far more extensive than in any previous period. It took much more than two centuries from the invention of gunpowder for musketry and artillery to supersede completely archery and defensive armor. The long pike, after having been used for some twenty-five centuries at least, was still in use as late as the Irish rebellion of 1798, and to a slight extent in the abortive rising of 1848. War, however, is now a totally different thing from what it was in the campaign of 1870-71, or even in the war between Russia and Japan of 1904. Chemistry has changed everything by increasing the range and the power of missiles, while electricity, without the wire, supplies new means of communication not only along battle lines but across hostile territory. Warfare in the air and warfare under the sea were heretofore undreamed of.

Fourthly. The cost of war is greater in proportion to the size of the armies, immensely larger as these armies are, than it ever was before. The ten belligerent European powers are estimated to be spending now more than ten millions sterling a day. At this rate their total expenditure for twelve months could not be less than 4,000 millions, and may be much more. But some competent economists put it at 5,000 millions, figures which are hardly more realizable by us than are those which express the distances of the fixed stars.

Fifthly. In each nation the whole body of the people is more fully and more hotly interested in, and united by, this war than by any it ever waged before. During the eighteenth century it was in most countries only the monarch and the ruling class that knew or cared what was happening. The great European conflict that began in 1793 brought a change. But this war is far more intensely national, in the sense that it has roused the feelings of the whole of each people from top to bottom, than any preceding conflict, and it is everywhere waged with a sterner purpose. In this respect we are reminded of the citizen wars of the small city States of ancient Greece and Italy, and of the Italian Middle Ages. There certainly never was a great war less dynastic than the present.

Sixthly. Some grave moral issues have been raised more sharply than before. Is a State above morality? Does the plea of military necessity (of which it is itself the judge) entitle it to disregard the rights of other States? (Cf. Thucydides v. 84-113, the case of Melos.)

Seventhly. The predictions that the vast interests involved, the increasing strength of defense as opposed to attack, and the growth of a general pacific sentiment would avert strife have all proved fallacious. The wisdom of the wise, where is it now? Some twelve years ago Maurice de Bloch, in a book that made a great impression at the time, argued that the growing difficulties of conducting military operations on a very large scale would prove an effective deterrent. More

recently an accomplished and persuasive English writer has shown how much more a nation has to lose by war than it can possibly gain even if victory crown its arms. Others have thought that a sense of solidarity among the workers in each industrial country would be strong enough to restrain their Governments from any but a purely defensive war. Others, again, have declared that democracies are essentially peaceful, because the mass of the people pay in their blood, other classes merely in their wealth. I do not say that these arguments are unsound, but the forces they rely upon have not proved strong enough for the occasion. For practical purposes the wisdom of the wise has been brought to nought, because the rulers of the nations have been guided by other motives than those of pure reason.

These observations relate to the palpable facts we have witnessed. Let us turn now to some of the reflections which the facts suggest. It is not easy to express these with that cold detachment at which the historian is bound to aim; but the effort must be made.

On that reflection which rose first to our minds when the war began, and which continues to be the sombre background to every aspect it presents—upon this I will not pause. After more than forty centuries of civilization and nineteen centuries of Christianity, mankind—in this case more than half mankind—is settling its disputes in the same way as mankind did in the Stone Age. The weapons are more various and more destructive. They are the latest product of highly developed science. But the spirit and the result are the same.

There has never been a time in which communications were so easy, and the means for discovering and circulating information so abundant. Yet how little is now certainly known as to the real causes which have brought about the war! The beliefs current among different peoples are altogether different, not to say contradictory. Some are almost demonstrably false. Even in some neutral nations, such as Holland, Switzerland, and Spain, opinion is sharply divided not merely about the rights but also about the facts. The whole German people seem to hold just as implicitly that this is for them a defensive war as the French hold the opposite; and, however clear certain points may appear to us in Britain, there are others which may remain obscure for many years to come.

How few are the persons in every State in whose hands lie the issues of war and peace! In some of the now belligerent countries the final and vital decisions were taken by four or five persons only, in others by six or seven only. Even in Britain decision rested practically with less than twenty-five; for though some few persons outside the Cabinet took a part, not all within the Cabinet are to be reckoned as effective factors. It is, of course, true that popular sentiment has to be considered, even in States more or less despotically governed. Against a strong and definite sentiment of the masses the ruling few would not venture to act. But the masses are virtually led by a few, and their opinion is formed, particularly at a crisis, by the authority and the appeals of those few whom they have been accustomed to trust or to obey. And after all, the vital decision at the vital moment remains with the few. If they had decided otherwise than they did, the thing would not have happened. Something like it might have happened later, but the war would not have come then and so.

How swiftly do vast events move, how quickly are vast decisions taken! In the twelve fatal days from July 23 to Aug. 4 there was no time for reflection. Telegrams between seven capitals flew hither and thither like swift arrows crossing one another, and it would have needed a mind of more than human amplitude and energy to grasp and correlate all the issues involved and to foresee the results that would follow the various lines of action possible in a game so complicated. Even the intellect of a Caesar or a Bonaparte would have been unequal to the task. Here the telegraph has worked for evil. Had the communications passed by written dispatches, as they would have done eighty years ago, it is probable that war might have been avoided.

Sometimes one feels as if modern

States were growing too huge for the men to whom their fortunes are committed. Mankind increases in volume, and in accumulated knowledge, and in a comprehension of the forces of nature; but the intellects of individual men do not grow. The power of grasping and judging in their entirety the far greater mass of facts to be dealt with, the far more abundant resources at command, the far vaster issues involving the weal or woe of masses of men—this power does not expand. The disproportion between the individual ruling men with their personal prejudices and proclivities, their selfish interests and their vanities, and the immeasurable consequences which follow their individual volitions, becomes more striking and more tragic. There were some advantages in the small city States of antiquity. A single city might decline or perish, but the nation remained, and another city blossomed forth to replace that which had withered away. But now enormous nations are concentrated under one Government, and its disasters affect the whole. A great modern State is like a gigantic vessel built without any watertight compartments, which, if it be unskillfully steered, may perish when it strikes a single rock.

How ignorant modern peoples, with all the abundant means of information at their disposal, may nevertheless remain of one another's character and purposes! Each of the nations now at war has evidently had a false notion of its adversaries and has been thereby misled. It has not known their inner thoughts, it has misread their policy. It was said in the days of the American civil war that the misconception by the Southern States of the Northern States, and their belief that the North cared for nothing but the dollar, was the real cause why their differences were not peaceably settled, and yet they were both members of the same Republic and spoke the same language. European nations cannot be expected to have quite so intimate a knowledge each of the other, yet both their commercial intercourse and the activity of the press and the immensely increased volume of private travel might have been expected to enable them better to gauge and judge one another's minds.

Historians as far back as Thucydides have made upon the behavior of nations in war time many general observations, which have been brought out in stronger light by what passes from day to day before us. A few of these I will mention to suggest how we may turn to account the illustrations which Europe now furnishes. When danger threatens a nation its habits change. Defense becomes the supreme need. In place of the ordinary machinery of government there starts up a dictatorship like that of early Rome, when twenty-four lictors surrounded the magistrate, and the tribunician veto, with the right of appeal, sank away. The plea of public interest overrides everything. The suspension of constitutional guarantees is acquiesced in, and acts of arbitrary power, even if violent, are welcomed because taken as signs of strength in the ruler. Even the withholding of information is submitted to. The voice of criticism is silenced. Cedit toga armis. The soldier comes to the front, speaks with an authority greater than that of the civilian statesman, is permitted to do whatever he declares to be necessary for the nation's safety. So long as that is secured, everything else is pardoned, and success gives enormous prestige.

Whoever watches these things must see how dangerous to freedom is war, except in those communities where long tradition has rooted constitutional habit very deep. In old Greece seditions opened the way to the tyrant. Napoleon supposed that the Duke of Wellington would, after Waterloo, have made himself master of England. So might a victor of another quality have done who had achieved such a triumph as Wellington's, had not an ancient monarchy and Parliament stood in his way. War is the bane of democracies. If it be civil war, he who restores peace is acclaimed like Augustus. Even a Louis Napoleon may be welcomed when he promises security for property. If it be foreign war, the man of the sword on horseback towers over the man on foot who can only talk and administer.

So, too, those psychical phenomena

which former observers have noticed when a country is swept by war or revolution have become vividly real to Europe now. The same passion seizes on every one simultaneously and grows hotter in each by the sense that others share it. It is said that when sheep, feeding unherded on a mountain, see the approach of a danger they all huddle together, the rams on the outside facing the foe. The flock becomes one, with one mind, one fear, one rage of fear. So in times of danger a human community feels and acts like one man. The nation realizes itself so vividly that it becomes a law to itself and recks little of the opinion of others. The man is lost in the crowd, and the crowd feels rather than thinks. Passion intensified supersedes the ordinary exercise not only of individual will but even of individual reason. Fear and anger breed suspicion and credulity. Every one is ready to believe the worst of whoever is suspected. What is called the power of suggestion rises to such a height that to denounce a man is virtually to condemn him. Lavoisier is sentenced to be guillotined; he pleads that he is a harmless chemist, but is told that the Republic does not need chemists. After the death of Julius Caesar, Cinna, the poet, is seized, and, when he protests that he is not Cinna the conspirator, is nevertheless killed for his name, the bystander (in Shakespeare) adding, "Kill him for his bad verses." A foreign name is taken to be evidence that its bearer is a spy.

There is no tolerance for difference of opinion, and to advance arguments against the reigning sentiment is treason. Any tribute to the character or even to the intellectual gifts of an enemy is resented. Sentiments of humanity toward him are disapproved, unless the precaution is taken of expressing these in the exact words of Holy Scripture. The rising flame of hatred involves not merely the Government and armies of the enemy, but even the innocent citizens of the hostile country. These well-known phenomena are all more or less visible in Europe today, though in our own country the coolness of our temperament and the fact that no invader has trodden our soil have been presenting them in a comparatively mild type.

The intensification of emotions includes those of a religious kind, and these not always in their purest form. In most countries, it is only the most enlightened minds that can refrain from claiming the Deity as their peculiar protector and taking every victory as a mark of His special favor. Modern man seems at such moments to have reverted to those primitive ages when each tribe fought for its own god and expected its own god to fight for it, as Moab called on Chemosh and Tyre on Melkarth. True it is that a nation now usually argues that Divine protection will be extended to it because its cause is just. But as this is announced by every nation alike, the result is much the same now as it was in the days of Chemosh and Melkarth. Oddly enough, the people in whom fanaticism used to be strongest are now responding more feebly than ever before to the appeal of the Jihád. Is it because the Turkish Mussulmans have infidel powers for allies as well as for enemies that this war seems to them less holy than those of the centuries in which their conquests were won?

Upon other symptoms indicating a return to the conditions of warfare in earlier ages I forbear (for a reason already given) to comment. It is more pleasant to note that some of the virtues which war evokes have never been seen to more advantage. Man has not under civilization degenerated in body or in will power. The valor and self-sacrifice shown by the soldiers of all the nations have been as conspicuous as ever before. The line of heroes that extends from Thermopylae to Lucknow might welcome as brothers the warriors of today; while among those at home who have been suffering the loss of sons and brothers dearer to them than life itself, there has been a dignity of patience and silent resignation worthy of Roman stoics or Christian saints.

In these and other similar ways we see many a feature of human character, many a phase of political or religious life recorded by historians, verified by present experience. We can better under-

stand what nations become at moments of extreme peril and supreme effort; and those of us who occupy ourselves with history find it profitable to note the present for the illumination of the past.

But the future makes a wider appeal. Every one feels that after the war we shall see a different world, but no one can foretell what sort of a world it will be. We all have our fancies, but we know them to be no more than fancies, for the possibilities are incalculable. Nevertheless, it is worth while for each of us to set down what are the questions as to the future which most occupy the public mind and his own mind.

Will the effect of this war be to inflame or to damp down the military spirit? Some there are who believe that the example of those States which had made vast preparations for war will be henceforth followed by all States, so far as their resources permit, and that everywhere armies will be larger, navies larger, artillery accumulated on a larger scale, so that whatever peace may come will be only a respite and breathing time, to be followed by further conflicts till the predominance of one State or one race is established. Other observers of a more sanguine temper conceive that the outraged sentiment of mankind will compel the rulers of nations to find some means of averting war in the future more effective than diplomacy has proved. Each view is held by men of wide knowledge and solid judgment, and for each strong arguments can be adduced.

The effects which the war will have on the Government and politics of the contending countries are equally obscure, though every one admits they are sure to be far-reaching. Those who talk of politics as a science may well pause when they reflect how little the experience of the past enables us to forecast the future of government, let us say in Germany or in Russia, on the hypothesis either of victory or of defeat for one or other power.

Economics approaches more nearly to the character of a science than does any other department of inquiry in the human as opposed to the physical subjects. Yet the economic problems before us are scarcely less dark than the political. How long will it take the great countries to repair the losses they are now suffering? The destruction of capital has been greater during these last eleven months than ever before in so short a period, and it goes on with increasing rapidity. It took nearly two centuries for Germany to recover from the devastations of the Thirty Years' War, and nearly forty years from the end of the civil war had elapsed before the wealth of the Southern States of America had come back to the figures of 1860. One may expect recovery to be much swifter in our days, but the extinction of millions of productive brains and hands cannot fail to retard the process, and each of the trading countries will suffer by the impoverishment of the others.

This suggests the gravest of all the questions that confront us. How will population be affected in quantity and in quality? The birth rate had before 1914 been falling in Germany and Britain; it had already so fallen in France as only to equal the death rate. Will the withdrawal of those slain or disabled in war quicken it? And how long will it take to restore the productive industrial capacity of each country? More than half the students and younger teachers in some of our universities have gone to fight abroad, and many of these will never return. Who can estimate what is being lost to literature and learning and science from the deaths of those whose strong and cultivated intelligence might have made great discoveries or added to the store of the world's thought? Those who are now perishing belong to the most healthy and vigorous part of the population, from whom the strongest progeny might have been expected. Will the physical and mental energies of the generation that will come to manhood thirty or forty years hence show a decline? The data for a forecast are scanty, for in no previous war has the loss of life been so great over Europe as a whole, even in proportion to a population very much larger than it was a century ago. It is said, I know not with how much truth,

that the stature and physical strength of the population of France took long to recover from the losses of the wars that lasted from 1793 till 1814. Niebuhr thought that the population of the Roman Empire never recovered from the great plague of the second century A. D.; but where it is disease that reduces a people it is the weaker who die, while in war it is the stronger. Our friends of the eugenics society are uneasy at the prospect for the belligerent nations. Some of them are trying to console themselves by dwelling on the excellent moral effects that may spring out of the stimulation which war gives to the human spirit. What the race loses in body it may—so they hope—regain in soul. This is a highly speculative anticipation, on which history casts no certain light. As to the exaltation of character which war service produces in those who fight from noble motives, inspired by faith in the justice of their cause, there can be no doubt. We see it today as it has often been seen before. But how far does this affect the noncombatant part of each people, and how long does the exaltation last? The instance nearest to our own time, and an instance which is in so far typical that the bulk of the combatants on both sides were animated by a true patriotic spirit, is the instance of the American war of secession. It was felt at the time to be almost a moral rebirth of the nation. I must not venture here and now to inquire how far the hopes then expressed were verified by the result; for such an inquiry would detain you too long.

These are some of the questions which it may be interesting to set down as rising in our minds now, in order that the next generation may the better realize what were the thoughts and anxieties of those who sought, sine ira, metu, studio, to comprehend the larger issues of this fateful time. It is too soon to hope to solve the problems that are crowding upon us. But we can at least try to see clearly what the problems are, and to distinguish between the permanent and the temporary, the moral and the material causes that have plunged mankind in this abyss of calamity; and we can ask one another what are the forces that may help to deliver it therefrom. This is a time for raising questions, not for attempting to answer them. Before some of them can be answered most of us who are met here today will have followed across the deep River of Forgetfulness those who are now giving their lives that Britain may live.

"Britain Needs Three Million More Men"

In a London dispatch of The Associated Press dated Oct. 17, 1915, *appears the following:*

"Great Britain needs 3,000,000 more men by Spring."

This declaration was made today by Brig. Gen. Sir Eric Swayne, Director of Recruiting in the northern command, in a speech at Hull. General Swayne estimated that Germany still had between 9,000,000 and 10,000,000 men from the ages of 18 to 45, and that therefore it was useless to talk about wearing her out.

In the Spring, he said, Germany would lose more men than the Allies, which would balance the numbers of the Allies and the central powers, but if Great Britain should raise 3,000,000 additional troops, Germany probably would recognize that it would be fruitless to continue. Great Britain, he added, did not want compulsion, but unless 3,000,000 more men were recruited by the Spring, the military authorities could not be responsible for the results of the war.

Dickens and Carlyle as Germany's Friends

By Hermann Modersohn

In the Englandbuch, published by the Berlin Taegliche Rundschau, Hermann Modersohn declares that not only have many of the leading English authors shown great friendship for Germany in the past, but that they have often opposed the British Government in its dealings with other nations. The article presented below is from the chapter "Englishmen of the Past."

THE Leipsic art firm of C. G. Boerner has recently obtained possession of a heretofore unpublished letter of Charles Dickens, in which this writer, esteemed as highly in Germany as in England, expresses himself in unmeasured terms of admiration for German culture. The letter was written on Sept. 13, 1841, from Broadstairs in Kent, and was addressed to Dr. Heinrich Kuenzel, who had in mind the publication of a German periodical with the title "Britannia." Kuenzel had many ties that bound him to England. For a number of years he was tutor in the home of the Duke of Southerland. Further, in 1852, he accompanied a German theatrical company to England, where the players presented some of the leading dramatic works of Germany with marked success. The letter from Dickens was as follows:

> My Dear Sir: I would have answered your letter immediately, but I still spend the Fall season in this section of England, and I did not receive it until yesterday. Please accept my heartiest thanks for your kind letter, and I want you to assure the gentleman who remembers me so kindly that I consider myself highly honored. But what may I be able to say regarding the "Britannia" matter? You must know that you have my most heartfelt wishes in what you are to undertake.
>
> Believe me, my dear Sir, that next to the favors shown me and the good opinion entertained for me by my own countrymen I value the esteem of the German Nation above all else. I admire and appreciate it more than I can express in words. I know that with its great spiritual advancement and the height of its culture it is the chosen people on the globe, and I have never been prouder and happier than when I heard for the first time that my works had found favor in their eyes. Nothing that links English literature to Germany can make me indifferent. The aim of your new periodical is my aim, and of every Englishman who takes interest and pleasure in the growth of mankind's spiritual conception. May God speed you and yours! I only wish I could speak German, if ever so poorly. In such a case I would be your callaborator within six months.
>
> I remain, my dear Sir, as ever yours,
>
> CHARLES DICKENS.

At one time Dickens attended the funeral of his friend and colleague, Hone, and, writing about the matter to John Forster, he said: "We entered the small chamber where the pallbearers had met. The scene was really pitiful. In one corner was the widow with the children, weeping bitterly, while in another corner the rest conversed quite unreservedly. I have never been so painfully impressed by a contrasting picture.

"The preacher was a Nonconformist who, as soon as we had been seated, spoke up loudly and most emphatically: 'Mr. C., did you notice the announcement in the morning papers regarding our departed friend?'

"'I did,' C. replied, as he fastened his eyes on me, for on our way to the funeral he had informed me with no little pride in his voice that he was the author of the notice in the newspapers.

"'Oh,' the preacher spoke up, 'then I want to tell you that you have not only committed an offense against me, the servant of the Lord, but also an offense against the Lord, whose servant I am.'

"'But how is that?' C. questioned the minister.

"'It says in this notice that the deceased, after he had failed with his publication, was advised by me to try the pulpit, which is both false, unchristian, and, to speak plainly, sacri-

legious and downright despicable. Let us pray.'

"Whereupon, I give you my word for it, in the same breath and after kneeling down, as we all did, the preacher began a very indifferent sort of prayer. I felt very badly for the family's sake, but as C., on his bent knees, seemed quite overcome, and yet whispered to me that if this had not been a funeral and the man a preacher he would have given him a box on the ear, it seemed as if only a burst of laughter could afford me relief."

We owe to Dickens the most splendid figure ever created of a hypocrite—Pecksniff in "Chuzzlewit." It is quite to the point how Forster treats of this Pecksniff in his biography of Dickens. After telling what Americans thought about Dickens's description of land speculations characterized as "Eden," Forster declared: "In any case, they have no Pecksniff. Brought up in an atmosphere much more poisonous than the others' 'Eden,' of far greater extent and much more difficult to drain, Pecksniff is entirely our own. This state of affairs is not one pleasing to our national pride; but this character is at least English whenever our people, if not exactly of the Pecksniff type, favor and encourage the race of the Pecksniffs. When it is objected that the character is overdrawn and that the coloring is laid on too heavily, it must still be admitted that here is something long tolerated and sometimes honored. It is very possible that a number of persons may have been the model for Pecksniff, but it was to be expected that 'grotesque impossibilities' would be made use of."

Dickens himself calls attention to this in his introduction, and he further points out what he considers a still greater danger, namely, that the many who wanted to be considered much better than they are supported such enterprises as would benefit them alone, and thus, without themselves becoming Pecksniffs, made Pecksniffs possible.

As had been anticipated, Carlyle, during the war of 1870-71 arrayed himself wholly and enthusiastically on the side of Germany. The fate of France appeared to him as a punishment of Providence. The news about Gravelotte and Sedan reached him in Scotland while he was visiting at the grave of his wife, and he wrote regarding it to Professor I. A. Froude, his biographer, as follows: "September, 1870. Never before have I read about so remarkable a war, and I expect the result to be more healing, more uplifting, more hopeful than in any other war in my time. I believe for a certainty that the Prussians will keep those parts of Alsace and Lorraine that are still German, or that they expect will again become German. The whole world cannot deny them that nor can the heavens. Since long ago Germany is the most peace-loving, the most religious, and in most respects the most influential of nations. Germany ought to be President of Europe, and it is likely that within another five hundred years she will be charged with that office."

One of the most important works of Carlyle dating from that time is his complete, historical presentation of France's political attitude toward Germany during the past 400 years. As English sympathy for the French increased with each defeat of the latter, Carlyle prepared his article in the form of a letter to the publisher of The Times. It bears the date of Nov. 11 and appeared in The Times on Nov. 19. It is also included in the "Collected Works" of the author.

Carlyle begins with a public announcement as to the ignorance in England regarding the political history of France and Germany. He then tells clearly and without the least sign of affectation or exaggeration of the political situation in both countries from the time of Louis XI. and Emperor Max to Napoleon I. and about the wars that Germany was drawn into through the intrigues of France. He next speaks of the honor of France. The character of Bismarck, so little understood in England, he described succinctly as "not a person of Napoleonic ideas, but of ideas quite superior to Napoleonic." He concludes his appreciation of Germany with the following words: "That noble, patient, deep, pious, and solid Germany should be at length welded into a nation and be-

come Queen of the Continent, instead of vaporing, vainglorious, gesticulating, quarrelsome, restless, and oversensitive France, seems to me the hopefulest public fact that has occurred in my time."

A veritable flood of letters, wise and foolish, intelligent and offensive, swept over the Carlyle home in the course of the next few weeks as a result of his political declaration. From Hamburg came a telegram from the Prussian Minister, Count Bernstorff, who expressed his deep appreciation because the noted historian had written so favorably regarding his countrymen.

A few years following the war Carlyle received from Germany two exceptional tokens of honor—in 1874, the Order Pour le Merite, and in 1875, on the occasion of his eightieth birthday, a congratulatory letter from Bismarck.

In 1865 Carlyle completed his "History of Frederick the Great." The work showed a surprising knowledge of German characteristics, quite different from what any other foreigner had done before. Macaulay made a barbarian of Frederick Wilhelm. Carlyle sees in him the driving wheel of the Prussian Nation, and presented him as the prototype for Prussia's historic eminence.

Carlyle found in Josef Neuberg of Wurzburg a literary assistant whose translations of "Friedrich II." did much to gain popularity for the work in Germany. What Eckermann meant to Goethe, Neuberg was to Carlyle.

Accompanied by Neuberg, Carlyle, as early as 1852 and 1857, made trips to Germany. In the city of Schiller and Goethe he found much to remind him of his own home. The relics in the Luther Chamber touched him greatly; he kissed the oaken table and he sat up late that same night and wrote his octogenarian mother an exhaustive letter about it all.

The letter of congratulation sent Carlyle by Bismarck is worth repeating at this day. It read: "Berlin, December 2, 1875. My Dear Sir: The celebration in honor of your birthday concerns also Germany. I want to tell you this in words of my mother tongue. As you have brought home to your own countrymen the personality of Schiller, so you have given to the Germans a splendid characterization of their great Prussian King. What you have said about the heroic writer, that he rested under the noble obligation to be truthful, you yourself have done. But, happier than others of whom you have spoken, you stand to enjoy your own creations. I trust your power of productivity will long remain with you.

"COUNT v. BISMARCK."

The Kaiser's Christmas—a Prediction

In an Associated Press dispatch from Budapest, dated Oct. 23, 1915, *appears this estimate and prediction:*

The military experts on the newspapers here estimate that not more than six months more will be required to establish communications with the Turkish Army. The Pesti-Napolo, however, says:

"The German Emperor will spend Christmas in Constantinople at the head of his victorious troops."

The editorials in the newspapers dwell on the importance of the Balkan campaign as a means of establishing a basis for an early peace. The Pestihirlap says in this connection:

"The stroke through the Balkans will bring peace nearer, for it is a stroke aimed directly at England, which heretofore has stood safe and isolated, boasting of her ability to continue the war three years or more. England lately has been the only obstacle in the way of an early peace. As soon as her world power is threatened she will manifest a willingness to consider the question of peace."

The Azest says: "The Balkan campaign is the easiest task ever intrusted to an army leader. If the present plan is carried out it will be impossible for the Allies to escape capture or disaster, and the only real military task is to accomplish all this with the smallest possible loss to ourselves."

The newspaper adds that even with the greatest force the Anglo-French Governments can muster the Germanic armies will outnumber them two to one, while the Austro-German artillery is in the proportion of five to one.

J. PIERPONT MORGAN

Head of the Chief American Banking House of the Group Handling the Anglo-French Credit of $500,000,000

ARCHDUKE EUGENE

In Command of the Austrian Forces on the Italian Front

(Photo from Universal Press Syndicate.)

The German War and Democracy

How the Masses in Germany May Become More Self-Governing

This article on the probable result of the war upon democracy in Germany was printed in the semi-official Cologne Gazette and has had an enormous circulation throughout Germany.

CERTAIN things have been so conclusively proved by the past war year that for all future time they can never again be an object of dispute. No weakening may take place in the external State power, as a result forsooth of a point of view that holds that their sharpness and strength can be even approximately dispensed with, by reason of friendly sentiment and concessions on the part of our neighbors. In judging the relations between us and the great neighboring States, no party will stand distinct from others because it maintains that we could save money by relying upon the progressive subordination of the principle of power (Machtprinzip) to the basis of good-will among civilized races. We will waste no more time in discussions of that subject, since even the Socialists, too, have had their experiences with their brethren in foreign lands. Similarly, even those who have most faith in progressive principles will postpone the discussion of these questions for several generations. The war has worked too convincingly.

It has eliminated, also, from our political discussions the word "Fatherlandless." We cannot even imagine those political stupidities which could bring about the reintroduction of that word into our vocabulary. Too much has been learned anew in all realms for that, at home and, above all, out there in the field. The men who will come back have accomplished so much together, endured so much together, have shown and witnessed so much love for the highest common good, that for them the question of who loves the Fatherland more or whether one loves it more than the other, and whether there are persons who take an indifferent or even hostile attitude toward it, has been finally settled. And these men constitute the living basis of our future politics. On this basis no one will again be able to build up a policy of spying out a man's sentiments or persecuting him because of his sentiments. That will not work any more. The one side will not want it, and the other will not stand for it; and both together will constitute the overwhelming majority.

This already borders upon the question: Will Germany after the war be more democratic? This question can doubtless be answered only with yes and no, not with yes or no. The common experiences have relegated social and communal differences to the background; the future will bring with it a simpler method of living, and therewith a diminution of the social differences. The democratic trait created by the war will be carried over into the political life in so far as the odium of "Fatherlandlessness" will at last be removed from the only party to which, in the eyes of certain political parties, it attached. On the other hand, there will disappear from our political life the idea of exceptional legislation, in the sense in which that term was used heretofore, and against the objects of such legislation, since also the "exceptions" have disappeared in view of their demonstrated trustworthiness for patriotic purposes.

A democratic character will appear in our internal political life also, owing to the fact that the demands for a full participation in the directing of the State destiny—the right of ballot!—will be more emphatically insisted upon. One cannot imagine that the present-day three-class ballot system will continue in the old form. But all democracy will have a different basis than at present;

the sentiment tending to strong, and conscious, and energetic Machtpolitik, (policy of power,) proudly conscious of its own national peculiarity, " State-preserving," (Staaterhaltend,) in the best sense of the word. The maintenance of our own strong peculiar German economic type; strong agriculture as the foundation of the powerful industrial superstructure, the demonstrated mistake of the purely free-trade ideal, will soften the party shadings of political economic contrasts and put in their place rational considerations of practicability. All of us have become agrarians a little.

On the other hand, the questions of provisioning the people have sharpened extraordinarily the view and feeling for all that which even remotely borders upon improper increase in prices of important foodstuffs. Wherever the guilty ones may be in this respect, they will find no mercy from the verdict of the people, even up in high quarters. The experiences of the war will be translated into our legislation also in this province. But the differences of opinion concerning these questions will be greatly stripped of political party characteristics, and here, as in other political realms, it will be one of the most important questions at issue how much practical State socialism is healthful and necessary and how much is injurious.

The war has brought us a great many necessary institutions of a State socialistic character. Theorists and practical men will have to take up the question how far economic individualism may be curtailed, and how an extraordinarily essential impulsive force of economic development, the personal interest of the subject engaged in business, can be prevented from losing its incentive for amassing fortunes to such a degree that it may become anaemic. The number of officials will be extraordinarily increased by the coming institutions in the form of State monopolies, even as will the number of persons drawing annuities from the State and the pensioners of the war. The State insurance legislation, on the other hand, will not be able, for a long time to come, to make any further progress. Its high-water mark will remain the insurance of employes. The next care will be that of reconquering foreign markets, and that cannot be furthered by the imposition of new socialistic burdens. This, too, can no longer be a party question after the war, but must be treated solely from the point of view of practicability.

Thus, democracy and socialism, which the war has in a certain sense strengthened, will also be held in check by the experiences of the war, and a healthy political realism, which has gradually perceived the importance of the State authority and of leading personages to an extent undreamed of, will determine the limits of the development, just as the experiences of the war will remove much of the bitterness of political, and especially of religious, differences.

How the party life and the relations of the parties to the Government shall constitute themselves depends upon divers factors. One of them is the extent to which the Government has succeeded in recasting its own principles, (" unlernen," i. e., " unlearn and relearn.") This remains for the time being the Government's own secret. But the auspices are favorable; the words of the Chancellor still ring in all ears, and the words of the Kaiser will never be forgotten: " I know no parties any more; I know only German." The other factor is the mass-sentiment and mass-mood which the home-coming army will bring with it. Here individual experience can only by conjecture seek to arrive at a general opinion. Assuredly our field gray fighters will return attaching very little importance to the value of trival controversies about minor party differences.

That ought to favor the disappearance of party nuances and the forming of larger party organizations on the Left, (Radical,) as well as on the Right, (Conservative,) side of the House. The conclusion of peace will most likely have a great influence upon the alignment of the parties; in this respect, no matter what the result of the peace, there should be two directions.

More should not be said at present on this point; here, too, there is still too much in a state of flux and dependent

upon the actual developments. Assuredly the questions of foreign policy, which are even now already busying in a gratifying manner all trained minds, will exercise a great influence on the future party life. Out of this there are growing up new, important, and fruitful objects of dispute. In this respect, too, we can at the moment form only surmises, and the open discussion of these questions would transgress the limits of the fredom of speech. But one thing is sure beyond all doubt; we are entering the new period of German history with a feeling hardened in the fire that we are dependent upon one another in all sections of our people, a feeling of unshakable confidence in the goodness and safety of our State organization, and with the energetic will that our policy shall be directed more by considerations of practicability than by theories, and with the no less energetic general demand that various long and thick queues that still dangle behind us shall be cut off as soon as peace has been restored to the country.

Evening in the Gallipoli Peninsula

[From The Westminster Gazette.]

By E. N. MOZLEY

The immemorial hills in darkness fade,
While on the western waters' rim the sun
Blazons his fierce farewell, and yielding place
To sorrow-pregnant gloom, outpours his light
On purer, happier lands, while all around
Night's diadem reanimates the sky,
And all things seem at rest.
All things but man.
What lights are these that fill yon desolate hills
Like lamps that glisten in our northern vales
For Labor's need? Far deadlier purpose here,
Where gleam those undetermined rings of fire.
Hark, the war-clangor in the echoing gorge!
Or nearer climb, and feel the shuddering earth,
While the mine's fury cleaves its way to heaven.
Grim lie in wait our foes; 'gainst whom are set
Warriors of Ind, and, still more dread, the sons
Of her, the mistress of the Southern Sea.
Shall then the Crescent wane, an Empire fall,
And Constantine's great city yield the throne
To Christ, and Holy Wisdom hear anew
Her ancient oracles?
Transcendent Power!
Named by thy children after many tongues,
Yet known with but one heart, Divinest Love,
Look down with pity on our ignorant strife,
And judge our cause in thy foreknowledge set.
So, if our hearts be evil and our war
The bitter fruit of lost and soul-less life,
Give them the palm, nor let a bitter truce
Turn all to nought. But if thy kingdom's rule
Advanced may be by placing in our care
The dreadful weight of victory, then we pray
Our banners bless, our cause sustain, and last
Thy peace beyond all knowledge give the world.

Gallipoli Peninsula.

Russia's Hour of Destiny

By Professor Theodor Schiemann

Professor Schiemann, who is a personal friend of Emperor William, is one of the greatest living authorities on East European affairs, and is the leading editorial writer of the Kreuz Zeitung. In the subjoined article, translated by Dr. Kuno Meyer, the noted German scholar describes what he considers to be the contemporary conditions in the Russian Empire.

THOSE who predicted that soon after the beginning of the war a revolution would break out in Russia were not acquainted with the true conditions of the country.

The agrarian reforms inaugurated by Stolypin had given the Russian peasant land. He was told that the war would bring a great increase of territory to Russia and that during the war and after it the land owned by the "aliens" in Russia would be handed over to him, the orthodox Great Russian peasant. Hence the peasantry throughout the country were for the war.

The "aliens" themselves, in Finland, the Baltic provinces, Lithuania, Poland, and in the Ukraine, could not rise while the concentration of the huge army was taking place in the western districts inhabited by them.

Meanwhile, the more appalling the defeats suffered by the Russian armies were the more sanguine the official versions of the war reporters became, and the more severe were the means employed by the military authorities under the direction of the Commander in Chief to keep the truth from the people. Those who but passed an unfavorable remark on the situation or said anything more than the official statements contained were fined 3,000 rubles or imprisoned for three months. The same punishment was meted out to those who merely put a question about the events of the war to a wounded soldier, even though he were a relative, or to a hospital nurse or doctor. Every letter was to be read by the censors established at all Post Offices, and, as that proved impracticable, many letters were destroyed unread. No lists of losses were published, or at most incomplete ones, delayed for many months.

On the other hand, the enormous numbers of the wounded and sick pouring back into Russia spread dismay everywhere. By the Fall of 1914 these had increased to such extent in the Governments of the south and centre that the towns could no longer contain them. They had to be sent to the neighboring villages. Those who are familiar with the filthy, floorless huts inhabited by Russian peasants, where they live under the same roof with pigs and chickens, and who know their often harsh brutality, will realize that this must have spelled death to many of the wounded. The result of the absence of organization and the lack of the simplest remedies has been that at most 5 per cent. of the wounded are able to return to the fighting lines. The testimony of all army surgeons who have had a scientific training agrees in this. They speak with a shudder of their colleagues from the interior of the empire, and declare themselves helpless in the face of a senseless organization and a system that sends the wounded before they are completely healed into Central Russia and beyond, merely to make room for the ceaseless stream of new victims.

While this is going on, the daily official reports speak of nothing but new, glorious victories, of the insignificance of the Russian losses in comparison with the enormous losses suffered by the "insolent and malignant enemy"—the common designation of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies. No wonder that as early as October last a great agitation seized the masses of the people and that thousands besieged the offices in the great cities, as, e. g., in Charkow, where the official telegrams were issued, demanding that they should be told the truth. The Government replied by dispersing the crowds with the knout and sabre of the Cossacks.

Badly tended wounded soldiers clothed

in rags came into all houses, begging for food and tobacco. Army orders were issued strictly forbidding any begging by soldiers, but were ineffective to stop it. Add to this that on their return home many thousands who had been dismissed from the army as unfit for further service told everywhere the same story, that they had been poorly nourished and badly led, that the officers caroused and reveled, but were incompetent and helpless in battle. When the soldiers would not advance they were knouted by the Cossacks and compelled to attack by machine guns and artillery. They described how they had had to wait without rifles in the trenches until their comrades had fallen, whose rifles they then picked up; and how different all this was with the enemy, how well the enemy was fed and cared for, how the officers were like brothers or fathers to the men, and how terrible he was in battle. The burden always was, "it is impossible to beat the Germans."

At the end of April, after a long conference at the Ministry of Education, all universities and middle-grade schools of the empire were closed. The official reason for this step was that with the coming of the warm season epidemics were to be expected, and, further, that the nervousness, which through the war had taken hold both of masters and pupils, made any profitable teaching no longer possible. In reality these hotbeds of revolution were closed because it had become apparent that they were so infected with revolutionary ideas that instruction could no longer be carried on.

Among the people themselves revolutionary propaganda was further spread by many industrial laborers, dock workers and others, who, having lost their employment on account of the standstill of industry and commerce, were returning to their native towns and villages.

In the army an organized propaganda has been at work from the commencement of the war, so that, according to reliable figures compiled by the revolutionary centres, about 20 to 25 per cent. of the whole army had been won over by last Christmas. Since then the movement has undoubtedly spread further, especially since some of the best elements of the army, about 200,000 sons of German colonists, whose families the Czar, by a ukase of February last, has expropriated and transported, view the dissolution of the army with grim satisfaction and surrender to the enemy at the first opportunity. Other aliens, Letts, Esthonians, Lithuanians, Poles, &c., act in the same manner.

Another effect of the growing discontent and the spread of the principles of revolution is the constantly recurring shooting of officers by their own men, which has assumed proportions of which the military authorities of the central powers are hardly sufficiently informed. It must undermine the confidence of even the bravest Russian officers in their men.

The circumstance that from the outset the Government has excited the popular passions, and thus lent a hand itself to spread lawlessness among the people, now bears unexpected fruit, and the revo- the military authorities of the central situation for their own ends. The unspeakable pogroms in Moscow and numerous other places would never have assumed such large proportions if the revolutinary elements had not co-operated. It was their object to destroy as many mills and warehouses as possible, so as to deprive the Government of the wherewithal to carry on the war and to bring about a state of anarchy, from which a new order of things is to spring.

What exact shape this new order is to take is a matter of indifference to the leaders of the movement at present. On the whole, their ideal is a socialist republic, in a loose federative form, grouped by nationalities. It is the ideal of 1905, viz., a great Russian republic, with its seat at Moscow, and loosely attached to it and separated by natural boundaries, Finnish, Esthonian, Lettish, Lithuanian, Polish, Caucasian republics and from Chelm and Rowno to Taganrog, the little Russian Ukraine.

It appears that the liberal elements of the Left, who are as anti-German as the reactionaries themselves, are desirous to utilize the general state of perplexity and helplessness, as well as the revolutionary movement, to secure for them-

selves the upper hand in the Government. Prince Mansyrev, who during the last days has been mentioned by the press as entertaining the idea of the formation of a coalition Ministry from among the various parties of the Duma, is a member of the Cadet party. By emphasizing his fanatical hatred of Germany he has succeeded in obtaining in some measure the confidence of Government circles. In 1905 he was a declared revolutionist, intimately connected with the central committees of the Lettish revolutionaries and similar organizations. This explains his special hatred of the Baltic Germans, whose expropriation and transportation he now demands. If he should succeed in bringing about a larger participation of the Duma in the Government, that would mean another step toward revolution; for such an arrangement is bound to aid the development of anarchic conditions.

The Czar and his entourage, as well as the Court of the Dowager Empress, which sides with the Czar, will have to decide either for the Grand Duke Nicholas, behind whom the reactionaries are grouped and whose followers are aiming to put him on the throne, or for a parliamentary coalition Ministry, which would undertake to carry on the war with the prospect of being rewarded by liberal concessions. Either way will, I think, lead to a catastrophe. But in face of the desperate condition of the army and the threatening attitude of the people, the resolution to make a choice will be lacking and the policy will be to muddle along from day to day.

By the gaping contrast between expectations and wishes on the one hand and the ever more transparently disastrous situation on the other, the whole of Russia has now become seriously alarmed. Besides, there is severe suffering from the great distress and the bad economic conditions which the war has brought down upon the whole empire. At first the maintenance and provisioning of the millions of the Russian Army were considered technically impossible, and everybody was astonished when, under the draconic orders of the Commander in Chief, the commissariat performed all that could be demanded. But those who are acquainted with the facts know that the whole economic foundation of Russia has simply been ruined thereby. Only by incredible sacrifices was it possible to keep up and nourish the huge army. The Commander in Chief, who has little understanding for political economy, was wholly indifferent to this ruin of his native land. He needed provisions for his soldiers, and he got them, often bad, in all cases unequal, but he got them.

The harvest of 1914 had been very unequal throughout the empire. It was excellent in Poland, the Northern Caucasus, in the district of Kuban, and in Western Siberia; middling in the south and southwest; bad in Central and Eastern Russia; and it miscarried completely in the north, northwest, and in the Baltic provinces.

All these things combined have increased the ill-feeling against the Government, without lessening the hatred against Germany, and they are all cleverly exploited by the revolutionary party. In February last the police in Petersburg knew that the revolutionary centres had succeeded in creating an organization far superior to that of 1905. The Government had the threads of the conspiracy well in its hands, it knew much, though not all; but it was considered too dangerous to proceed with wholesale arrests. A premature outbreak was feared, which would have reacted unfavorably upon the west, as well as upon Rumania and Italy. It was also believed by the Government that the movement might yet be kept down by a victorious advance into Hungary and a march upon Budapest, while in the case of a Russian defeat, in which it is true they did not believe, everything was lost in their opinion, as it was. This was also the prevailing view in Court circles. The bestowal of a sword of honor by the Czar upon the Commander in Chief for the conquest and incorporation of Galicia with Russia, and the spasmodic official celebrations of victories, were intended as preventive measures against the coming revolution. The debacle in Galicia which followed immediately afterward

was the beginning of the end—unless, indeed, Russia succeeds in concluding an early peace, so that those parts of the army which are still intact and loyal may keep down the revolution. Another way of fighting the revolution would be to sacrifice the aliens to the Russian peasant. In the latter case the whole fault of the ill-success of the Russian arms would be laid at the door of the allied western powers and of the alien population—Jews, Germans, Esthonians, Letts, and Poles. All these would be expropriated, driven out, and practically annihilated. A terrible fate would await the Germans of Russia.

Russia's Foreign Credit

An Associated Press dispatch from Petrograd, dated Oct. 24, 1915, *reported:*

An imperial ukase, issued today, authorizes the Russian Minister of Finance to transact on foreign markets credit operations amounting to 5,500,000,000 rubles, ($2,750,000,000,) and to issue abroad the necessary Treasury bonds in pounds, francs, and dollars. Explaining his plans to a representative of the press, Pierre Bark, the Finance Minister, said the whole fiscal system of Russia would be reformed on the basis of the income tax, which already had been approved by the Duma, and now was under consideration by the Council of the Empire. All textiles, he said, also would be taxed, which would bring into the Treasury $75,000,000 annually. Schemes for creating tea, sugar, and match monopolies are being worked out. The question of a 6 per cent. internal loan shortly will be determined, as the Russian money market is rich in resources, the proof of which, said the Minister, would be found in the recent official statement that current deposits in private banks had reached the marvelous total of $2,000,000,000, and that the increase in deposit accounts for the year ended in September amounted to $350,000,000, while the savings bank deposit monthly increase was $25,000,000.

Consul General Snodgrass, at Moscow, in a report which reached the State Department at Washington in September, summarized the various issues of bonds and notes made by Russia for war purposes since the beginning of the war. These were as follows:

BONDS ISSUED AT 5 PER CENT.

Aug. 5, 1915	400,000,000 rubles	$206,000,000
Oct. 19, 1915	400,000,000 rubles	206,000,000
Oct. 19, 1914	12,000,000 pounds	58,000,000
Jan. 8, 1915	500,000,000 rubles	257,000,000
Jan. 8, 1915	40,000,000 pounds	194,650,000
Feb. 19, 1915	500,000,000 rubles	257,500,000
Feb. 19, 1915	500,000,000 rubles	257,500,000
April 9, 1915	400,000,000 rubles	206,000,000
July 1, 1915	1,000,000,000 rubles	515,000,000

NOTES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

April 29	200,000,000 rubles	$103,000,000
June 23	50,000,000 pounds	243,325,000
March 26	625,000,000 francs	121,000,000

The total debt thus incurred since Aug. 1, 1914, was $2,407,880,000. The proposed new credits of $2,750,000,000 would make a total war debt of $5,157,880,000.

Origin of British Supremacy of the Seas

By Gerhard von Schulze-Gaevernitz

Pro-Rector and Professor of Political Economy in the University of Freiburg.

How England became Queen of the Ocean, striving with the Dutch and the French for mastery, is here told by Dr. Gaevernitz. Besides his professional duties he is also a member of the German Reichstag. The following article is from The New York Evening Mail, which received the original from its Berlin correspondent in response to the question, "What do the educated Germans really believe about England?"

DUTCH Ships Bringing in an English Frigate" is the title of a striking picture which adorns the Mariz-Haus in The Hague, the historic residence of the Orange family. This picture, like all other Dutch seascapes of that period, reminds one of the time when Great Britain's naval supremacy had not yet been established and accepted beyond challenge.

In those days an Admiral Tromp swept through the Channel with the symbolic broom at his masthead. A menacing Ruyter ventured to the mouth of the Thames. A Hugo Grotius boldly demanded the "freedom of the seas," the equality of all on the sea, the highway of nations. That was the noonday of civilization! In the background was the seventy years' struggle for freedom—a struggle between a hopeless minority and a world-embracing despotism.

Religious zeal and tolerance, patriotic devotion to the fatherland, combined with the full development of individual initiative and personality, Orange heroism, commercial daring, and civil liberty had won that triumph which was glorified by the highest achievements of science and art. Emerging victorious through darkness and distress, Rembrandt's most German soul flamed up toward heaven.

About 1650 the world's trade was in Holland's hands. The Dutch commercial fleet then comprised more than half the tonnage of Europe. England and the rest of the world turned imitative eyes toward the country which, "having no forests, yet builds the ships of the whole earth." The thought of the Great Elector, as well as that of Frederick William I. of Prussia, was deeply rooted in the traditions of the Netherlands.

But the world position of the Netherlands was shattered by the hard facts of war. England insisted upon the punishment of Grotius for daring to demand free seas, and, through its crown lawyer, asserted ownership of the seas as far as the American and German coasts as British property. This claim she enunciated in the unmistakable language of warships.

Up to this time the Dutch had had no navy, and armed some of her merchant ships to meet emergencies. But wool-exporting England built the first specialized men-of-war. Those ships were superior to those of their foe, especially in artillery. With this new and superior weapon England imposed upon the Dutch the Navigation act, which ruined Holland's trade as international middleman.

As a token of their humiliation, Dutch ships were obliged to dip their colors to the English flag. It was at this time that Cromwell gave utterance to the doctrine: "England cannot tolerate upon the ocean any flag but its own without consent."

That tenet, which, like the entire Cromwellian policy, was adopted by successive monarchs and statesmen, has dominated the entire British economic policy, whether expressed or implied, down to this day. In this connection I need but to cite Adam Smith's attitude toward the Navigation acts.

The downfall of the Netherlands was hastened by the fact that the country was practically a stretch of coast and lacked the protection of a strong German hinterland. Germany remained an idle witness of the Dutch drama, although the Prince of Orange at the Diet of

Worms had called out in warning: "Your battle is being fought, for the struggle in progress at the mouth of the Rhine is for the mastery of the seas."

Later on the English successfully drove France, then the next strongest Continental power, into war with the Netherlands, until in the eighteenth century the French, once the dreaded enemies of England, had become her allies "on sufferance" and had drifted into a state of impotent inactivity. With the Netherlands eliminated, England and France remained the "sea powers" of the world. Frederick the Great wittily spoke of "a British man-of-war with a Dutch sloop in tow" as representing the sea power of his time. Ever since those days Great Britain has maintained a firm hold upon Neptune's trident, which is the sceptre of world domain.

> She (England) wants to close free Amphitrite's kingdom
> As one might close his own home gate.

Thus Schiller, with his keen insight, characterized the ultimate cause of all world wars in his age as well as our own. The English wars of that time were directed against France as the most dangerous rival for the dominion of the seas and of the world. If one may speak of hereditary enmity in the changing course of European politics, such an enmity grew up in the 200 years' feud between France and England.

Arthur Girault, Professor of History at the University of Poitiers and member of the Colonial International Institute, in his work on "Principles of Colonization" ("Principes de Colonisation," Paris, 1904) deals with the period of French history from 1688 to 1815. During that interval not less than seven fierce and long wars were fought between France and England. "All those wars," says Girault, "were trade wars for England, the purpose of which was to destroy the naval and colonial power of France. English activity brought about all the alliances which were then concluded against us in Europe. And while our troops were fighting on the Continent, she destroyed our navy and seized our colonies."

In the beginning of her struggle with England, France was superior to her rival in population and revenue. In colonial enterprises, too, she led. She had isolated the British settlements on the east coast of North America from the "hinterland." Canada, the Mississippi Valley, Louisiana, and the prosperous West Indies marked the uninterrupted continuity of Greater France in America. In India, too, France had taken the initiative before England. Dupleix discovered the secret of conquering India by means of Indian soldiers, Indian taxpayers, and a handful of European military leaders. The English simply carried out the idea of Dupleix, a fact which Seeley in his "Expansion of England" expressly acknowledges.

Even during the American War of Independence the brilliant Suffren ruled the Indian Ocean for France—that sea which since that time has been looked upon as the exclusive property of England until the cruise of the Emden in our own day. This triumph she achieved by concentrating all her strength upon her navy, and by inducing other nations to fight out her wars on land. At one time she played off the French against the Dutch, then the Germans against the French, and today the French against the Germans.

It was a favorite saying of William Pitt's that the English conquest of America was accomplished by the attacks of Frederick the Great upon France. During the fury of the French Revolution what remained of the French Navy was systematically and wantonly annihilated by the destruction of all naval traditions.

Carnot made use of the revolutionary enthusiasm and the "sovereign power of the State" to reconstruct the army. But it is not easy to improvise a new navy, although the flags of the French revolutionary armies bore the proud inscription, "Freedom of the Seas! Equal Rights to All Nations!" ("Liberté des mers! Egalite des droits de toutes les nations!")

The great Corsican aimed to degrade Albion to a "second Isle of Oloron." The Egyptian campaign and the conquest of the European Continent were both directed against England. Europe was too

small for Napoleon; he said contemptuously: "Cette vielle Europe m'ennuie."

Napoleon's belief that he could defeat England in Germany is easily understood if one bears in mind the importance of German trade to England. Since the conquest of Holland by France, Hamburg had become the heir of Amsterdam's trade and shipping. About 1800 the North German market was England's most important commercial asset. After his victory at Jena, Napoleon, by the decrees of Berlin, barred English goods from German coasts.

At the beginning of his war with Russia, Napoleon, looking a hundred years ahead, wrote: "It all resembles a scene in a comedy, and the English are the scene shifters of the whole show." The thought of reaching India by an overland route occupied Napoleon's mind all his life. By pushing into India, the great Corsican hoped, even though deprived of a navy, to win the "freedom of the seas."

The tremendous waste of strength in the Napoleonic wars reduced the world position of the ancient régime of France. At Waterloo the question of the dominion of the seas was finally decided in favor of England.

Furthermore, during her original struggle with France, England had reached out and made herself the economic centre of the world. She had become the industrial State, the freight carrier, the broker and banker of the world. For Karl Marx, British capitalism was a synonym of capitalism, and capitalism as he described it had many British traits.

In the war with France the British acquired a tremendous colonial empire. While all the Continent was paralyzed by the Napoleonic wars, they temporarily established a monopoly of all overseas markets. All non-British commercial fleets were destroyed. During that struggle England is said to have incorporated 4,000 European ships in her commercial fleet.

After seven years of warfare, on the 18th of February, 1801, Pitt was enabled to say in Parliament: "We have succeeded in developing our foreign and domestic trade to a higher point than it has ever before attained, and we can look upon the present as the proudest year which has ever been granted to our land." England was then the only rich country; in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars she more than once held her Continental allies together by subsidies and loans.

It is important to call to mind those facts, for the memory of the Napoleonic period was admittedly a consideration in the minds of British statesmen when they declared war upon Germany.

It is no less important to understand the spiritual and moral bases of British world dominion, for the Briton first excelled his Continental rivals in intellectual and moral development, then overcame them economically by initiating the factory system, and finally established his political supremacy over them. All British greatness was molded in the Puritan age. The outlines of that old and rigid type have been worn down today, but it still marks the ideal type of Anglo-Saxon. In one phase it embodies everything that an Englishman implies by the word "liberty"—that is to say, the intellectual, economic, and political emancipation of the individual from social restraint, self-control, responsibility to one's own conscience, self-help based and systematically developed upon a strong physique.

The other side of the picture shows severe self-restraint, dutiful service to one's profession or occupation, the limitation of sexual relations to the married state, and a demand for the right to rule as a "chosen people." The "economic man" of Adam Smith is a thoroughbred Briton who earns for the sake of earning and not to enjoy and spend. Sexual self-control is one of the bases upon which British world dominion has been built up. Service done to his own nation appears in an Englishman as a service done to humanity, which can be furthered in no way so well as by applying the British red to some new section of the world's map.

This faith, unshaken by any sympathetic understanding for foreigners, ("natives," whether they be Hindus or Germans,) is a source of national

strength of the first order. It is dangerous to underrate one's foe. The typical Anglo-Saxon is as hard as steel, tenacious of purpose, cold as a dog's nose. He is thoroughly inartistic, always ready to subject the gay and beautiful world to the hard test of arithmetic.

Newton's "mechanism of nature," which Goethe hated so thoroughly; the "economic mechanism" of Ricardo, another Englishman, which Marx railed against so passionately, are products of the calculative British mind.

Only that nation would be able to administer a political check to Great Britain which has stored up within itself the valuable elements in the British mind and spirit and can offer at the same time a stronger and richer ideal of culture, the nation that has developed its concept of civilization to new and more nearly eternal values. The French failed to develop these qualities.

It is necessary to keep in mind that the spiritual supremacy of English thought preceded English economic and political and world dominion until Immauel Kant. For two hundred years the high point of European thought lay in Great Britain. The vigorous flow of Puritanism became stagnant in the "enlightenment" of France; its religious significance was lost.

Divine revelation was displaced by sober empiric religion, to which nothing was real that could not be touched. Pleasure displaced duty; nothing was of value that could not be tasted with pleasure. Referring to Bentham's "Mill of Happiness," Nietzsche said: "Man does not strive for happiness; but an Englishman certainly does."

The French became heirs of British enlightenment, as Voltaire observed and Macaulay repeated; France became the "interpreter of England's thought to mankind." In French hands enlightenment became more attractive, but also more radical. As a French conception, the "rights of man," originally a British conception, conquered the world and developed into the dynamite that destroyed outlived social forms.

But with the leverage on an irreligious enlightenment, even Napoleon's genius could not lift British virility from the saddle. Deaf to the "chatter of ideals," he appealed to the baser motives in men —vanity, the love of titles, instincts of luxury. Napoleon sacrificed freedom to equality; he throttled parliamentary representation of the people. He regarded religion as a State-sanctioned superstition which prevented rich people from being murdered by the poor.

The spiritual ground upon which he stood was too soft to enable him to lift the British mass. The most brilliant Caesarism was wrecked on the hard rock of Anglo-Saxon strength.

After Napoleon's fall the colossus of British world dominion rose to its last and greatest height. Having control of the seas, England dominated colonial enterprises, in which other nations could participate only so far as she was willing. In most oversea regions the Briton typified all Europe. Great Britain's world dominion recalled the long-vanished greatness of ancient Rome.

In 1846, when England took up free trade, the earth was British economic territory. England proudly called herself the "workshop of the world." She took it for granted that all other nations would also adopt free trade, and would continue to exchange their raw materials and foodstuffs for English manufactured goods. For the greatness of England as she was then the earth was just big enough.

The Manchester school of philosophy can be understood only by those who have grasped the idea that free trade was the Manchester men's method of British world dominion, namely, domination of the world through commercial travelers and price lists. At that time a Briton could afford to be cosmopolitan because to him British interests were identical with the best interests of mankind. England, in his opinion, managed the world best as a trustee of all other nations, and for all peoples on the same basis so long as they were content to get along without factories or shipping!

The Teutonic-Russian Issue

By Dr. Alexander Redlich

In a book recently published at Stuttgart, Dr. Redlich, the Austrian publicist, aims to show that Austria-Hungary was forced into war by the Czar's Government. Extracts from the work are given below.

THE conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia owes its origin primarily to the Russian striving for expansion in the Balkan Peninsula, which in turn is only a part of the plan cherished by Russian politicians for more than 200 years.

History has given us the story of an alleged will of Peter the Great, in which the possession of Constantinople on the one hand and the mastery of the Baltic on the other are designated as the goal of the Russian endeavor. This testament has never really had any existence, and it is said to be an invention of Napoleon's, but its contents are in perfect accordance with the traditional plans which have been followed by all Russian rulers since the days of Peter the Great. * * *

The expansion of Russia along the Baltic had come to a standstill long ago. But the urging toward the south has remained one of the governing principles of Russian policy to this day, and is today the most important of all, since its eastward expansion has been hindered for the present by Japan and England. This urging toward the south has, therefore, for over a hundred years determined the nature of Russian policy toward Turkey.

It formed the first point of contact between Russia and the Hapsburg monarchy, and at first by no means in a hostile sense. For the beginning of the Russian offensive against Turkey dates from the end of the defensive wars which Austria was forced to wage for hundreds of years against the Ottoman Empire. So we behold Austria and Russia as allies against Turkey in the second half of the eighteenth century. But even at that time there was jealousy between the two empires. The Russian attempts to divide Turkey in conjunction with Austria-Hungary persisted to the middle of the nineteenth century. Austria-Hungary resisted these intentions, and became a greater obstacle to Russian dreams of conquest than any other power, although it would never have agreed to wage war on Russia in behalf of Turkey—in contrast to the western powers who supported Turkey by force of arms in the Crimean war. For a long time the conviction has therefore prevailed in Russia that the way to Constantinople lay through Vienna.

At first Russia contented itself by demanding the division of Turkey, and it is apparent that an understanding with Austria-Hungary was by no means precluded. The ancient formula of partition is altered to suit the new circumstances, and Russia is willing to reserve the eastern half of the Balkan Peninsula as its sphere of influence and leave the western half to the influence of Austria-Hungary. This thought already contains the germ of the Russian agreement to the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. Russia, indeed, repeatedly declared itself prepared to approve the annexation of the occupied provinces by Austria-Hungary, and even urged the latter to proceed to take this step. * * *

The Balkan policy of Austria-Hungary since the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been marked by the greatest moderation. Austria-Hungary has consistently avoided any attempt to make further acquisitions on the Balkan Peninsula, and this strict adherence to law has given it the right to forbid the expansion of Russia. Without pronouncing any judgment as to whether this was the wisest policy to pursue, we must at least say that it completely refutes the charges against the monarchy. * * *

Nothing shows the position of affairs more clearly than a comparison between the relations of Austria-Hungary to

Serbia on the one side and that of Russia to Bulgaria on the other. While Serbia during the eight years of friendly relations with the Dual Monarchy found herself free to develop unhindered, Russia treated Bulgaria as a vassal State. Prince Alexander of Bulgaria was overthrown by Russian influence, because he attempted, without the consent of St. Petersburg, to form an alliance with Eastern Roumelia, which would have been quite in accordance with Russian ideas.

His successor also incurred the wrath of Russia when he took up an independent standpoint. It could not be expected that Austria-Hungary would be too scrupulous in making use of such dissensions between Russia and Bulgaria. Nothing, however, has prevented Bulgaria from repeatedly falling back into the arms of Russia. Nevertheless, whenever Bulgaria showed itself rebellious it was held responsible by St. Petersburg. * * *

This Austro-Hungarian policy of moderation has certainly injured no one except perhaps the monarchy itself. It most not be concluded from this that she will, without more ado, adopt contrary tactics. But it is certain that with Russia she has a different game to play, for her own moderation, through which she thought to bring the policy of Russia to a deadlock, has robbed her of many chances, with entirely hindering the progress of Russia. She has not by any means remained inactive, and one may believe that without the Austro-Hungarian opposition, Russia would perhaps have already sat upon the shore of the strait.

Britain's Blockade

By SIR GILBERT PARKER

The Atlanta Constitution received on Oct. 24, 1915, *the following letter from Sir Gilbert Parker in reply to an editorial attacking Great Britain's use of sea power in regard to American trade:*

Editor Constitution: In your issue of Sept. 12 an editorial appears commenting upon the pamphlet called "The Spectre of Navalism," by Mr. Julian Corbett, which I sent to you for your consideration. I have read the article carefully, and it appears to me that you have mistaken Mr. Corbett's interpretation of the words, "the freedom of the seas."

In Mr. Corbett's view, the freedom of the seas does not mean that in time of war there shall be no blockade, no contraband, and that ships of all belligerent and of all neutral nations shall pass to and fro on the ocean as in time of peace. If that means the freedom of the seas in your view, or in the view of many Americans, I am afraid it would not be received by your executive Government as one possible to put into practice.

The only weapon which the United States possesses to preserve her honor in peace and war, apart from the moral influence of her people, is her navy. Would the United States, if she went to war tomorrow with Spain or any other country—and I only quote Spain because there was a Spanish war not so long ago—agree to that freedom of the seas which would make her navy powerless to exercise one of its most important functions—to lay its hand on material which would increase the offensive and defensive power of the enemy?

Her navy is her only available weapon, as she has not an army for expeditionary purposes. When she desires to enforce her power in Mexico she does it with battleships. Would she, at war with any nation on earth, deprive herself of those powerful weapons, which hasten the end of a war, blockade and contraband?

The freedom of the seas preached by Germany is advocated to protect her from her own naval weakness. England's natural weapon as an island power is her navy. America's natural weapon as a power in an insular position is a navy. Is either prepared to forego that agency, which the United States so freely used in her civil war? It would be yielding to nations with great land forces that which is the effective offset to such power. Naval power in blockading merely does at sea what the siege of a city does on land.

GILBERT PARKER.

London, Oct. 4, 1915.

Nine German Princes Slain

Record of Heirs of German States in This War

THOUGH the Kaiser and his six sons have so far escaped with their lives in the war, other great families of Germany have not been so fortunate. Out of a total of sixty-four of their members who marched to battle with their regiments, nine have been killed, among them a nephew of the Kaiser.

A book has just appeared in Germany dedicated to the memory of these nine Princes, giving, wherever possible, full details of how they met death. If the information is trustworthy, the Princes of Germany are excellent examples to their followers. Without exception those with whom the book deals seem to have been popular with their men—brave in the face of peril and careless of their own safety when it was thrown into the scale with that of their subordinates.

Of the nine, no less than four were relatives or connections of the princely family of Lippe, which still rules—though its powers are by no means what they were before the creation of the German Empire—over various bits of territory sandwiched in among the greater States of Central Germany. One of the others, Prince Henry of Reuss, was of that family whose members have the unique custom, if they are in the line of succession, of taking the name Henry and the numeral corresponding to it after all preceding Henrys have been counted. Thus, this Prince was Henry XLVI. of Reuss.

The Princes whose careers and deaths are recorded in the book dedicated to their memory are:

Maximilian of Hesse, son of a sister of the Kaiser; Friedrich Wilhelm zur Lippe; Friedrich of Saxe-Meiningen; Ernst of Saxe-Meiningen, his son; Ernst zur Lippe; Otto Victor of Schönburg-Waldenburg; Wilhelm zu Schönaich-Carolath; Wolrad zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, and Henry XLVI. of Reuss.

Prince Maximilian of Hesse, the Kaiser's nephew, was only 20 years old when he was killed in Northern France. He was a son of Prince Karl Friedrich of Hesse and Princess Margarete of Prussia, sister of Emperor William II. His father and older brother had already been wounded in the fighting on the western front. Details of the death of Prince Maximilian are lacking.

Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Lippe was killed in the very first engagement of the war, the storming of Liége. He was a younger brother of Count Ernst zur Lippe-Biesterfeld, regent of the Lippe-Biesterfeld lands, and an uncle of their present ruler, Julius zur Lippe-Biesterfeld. Prince Friedrich was born in 1858 and became a color-bearer in one of the crack Prussian regiments in 1880. After successive promotions he received the rank of Colonel and in 1913 was placed at the head of the Seventy-fourth Hanover Infantry Regiment.

Just how he met his death is a matter of dispute. According to some of the evidence he fell just after he had snatched up the banner of his regiment and began to wave it before his men, to encourage them in storming the fortifications of Liége. This same account has it that he had already received a serious wound, but, utterly disregarding it, continued to lead his men, banner in hand, until he fell pierced by several more bullets.

The commander of another infantry regiment gave a somewhat different account of the Prince's end. A reliable eyewitness, he reported, had said that a detachment of Prince Friedrich Wilhelm's regiment, bearing one of the regimental banners, had fought its way to a position on the northeastern walls of the City of Liége on the morning of Aug. 6, 1914. There it was surrounded by greatly superior forces of Belgians, who attacked with great fury and threatened to overwhelm the detachment completely.

The Prince commanded his men to form a hollow square. In this formation they defended themselves with the utmost determination. At last, far away to the left, German reinforcements were discerned. The Prince, in a kneeling position, placed a field glass to his eye and commanded one of his men—the same who gave this version of his last moments—to raise the regimental standard, so that the approaching Germans might see it plainly and be guided toward the spot where they were so badly needed.

The man obeyed. He waved the banner back and forth. This brought a hail of Belgian bullets. The banner was shot from its bearer's hands; at the same moment the Prince fell, shot in the breast and throat. He started to say something beginning with the words, "Take my greetings to—" but died before he could finish.

Kaiser Wilhelm sent a message of condolence on Prince Friedrich Wilhelm's death to the reigning Prince of Lippe, in which he said:

"I beg you to accept the expression of my sincerest sympathy on the occasion of the death of your worthy uncle, who, as a shining example of a brave German Prince, died at the head of his regiment at Liége for Emperor and empire."

The Prince's body was taken to his native land and buried beside his ancestors at Detmold.

Prince Friedrich of Saxe-Meiningen, the next German Prince to fall, was connected with the Lippe house by marriage, his widow being a sister of the reigning Prince of Lippe. He was a son of Prince Friedrich of Saxe-Meiningen, and was born Oct. 12, 1861. Unlike most scions of princely houses, he was studious, averse to display and social life. As a student at the University of Bonn, back in the eighties, he refused to have an adjutant or other followers, as was the custom with men of his rank, and refused even to keep a carriage and horses. His high lineage brought him membership in the "Borussia," most exclusive of the students' dueling corps, to which only noblemen can belong, but he attended its meetings but rarely, despite the fact that the present Emperor, at that time a Bonn student, was very prominent in "Borussia" gatherings.

The Prince got his "baptism of fire," or something like it, while at Bonn, when a retort exploded near him while he was making a chemical experiment.

As a Lieutenant at Strassburg, he continued to keep away from gayety and social life and devoted himself to hard study of the subject of artillery, which branch of the service he had entered after being made Colonel in 1902, Brigadier General in 1907, and Major General in 1910. He was retired at his request in 1913. Five months before his death he celebrated his silver wedding.

He went to the front when war began, although he had broken his arm a short time before in a fall. His 18-year-old son, Prince Ernst, doomed like his father to death, also joined his regiment.

For a time it was impossible for his relatives to learn details of Prince Friedrich's death, as men were falling by thousands on the western and eastern fronts, but at last another of his sons, Prince George, wrote thus to his mother from Brussels:

I have made a long excursion from here to France, and at Charleroi spoke with a priest who was present when father's body was embalmed.

In the evening I got to Laon, where I visited a friend, whose uncle commands the division in which father fought, and I also saw father's successor, the present commander of his brigade. Hipp (orderly of the dead Prince) was also at Laon, and I spoke to him, and also saw father's horses, Molly, Dora, and Carmen. Hipp has taken good care of the horses and is quite well himself. Others whom I saw were Captain Weitz, father's Adjutant, who was with him up to the last minute, and another gentleman on father's staff, who has often spoken with Count Meerfeldt, in whose arms father died.

According to their stories, father and Weitz rode forward on Aug. 23 on a reconnoissance into the woods south of Charleroi. The enemy fired only a little and did not disturb them. But when our infantry came out of the woods a terrible firing began.

Father continued to reconnoitre in the midst of it without getting hit. As our infantry could get no further without artillery support, father himself went back to bring up a battery. Ignoring the enemy's fire, he rode up a slope to pick out a position for the

guns, and allowed nobody to accompany him, as he did not wish to endanger them. He then led the battery in person to the chosen position, again came under sharp fire and again escaped unharmed.

While the artillery was firing, he resumed his post of observation by a house near the fringe of the woods, and climbed on an overturned wagon to see better. But the fire got too hot, so he went into the house.

Then he was struck. In spite of repeated warnings, he persisted in going outside the house, where Count Meerfeldt had already been struck. He tried to jump to one side, but crumpled up in the very act, and died instantly. The wounds seem to have come from machine gun bullets, but possibly he was hit by three shrapnel balls, all at the same time, just as I have been by two at once.

The soldiers put him immediately on a stretcher. * * * On the morning before he died he wrote to you. One of the staff officers recalled that father asked him whether he had written to his wife, adding that he himself had done so.

Hipp, the Prince's orderly, also wrote a letter to his master's widow, in which he said:

"Your Highness may imagine how I feel. At first it seemed as if he could not possibly be dead. But one has to get accustomed little by little."

In the dead man's pocket a letter addressed to his wife was found, with a streak of blood across it. And in his pocketbook was her picture, also drenched with his blood.

His body was taken to Germany and buried in the town cemetery at Meiningen.

His son, Prince Ernst of Saxe-Meiningen, lay dead in Northern France, unbeknown to his relatives at home, while the bells of Meiningen were tolling for his father. The news had come that he was wounded and a prisoner at Maubeuge, then still in French hands. That was all.

When the Germans captured Maubeuge, investigations conducted by German officers proved that Prince Ernst had died of his wounds, and it fell to the Kaiser to communicate the news to the young man's sister at Meiningen, who in turn broke it to his mother, already mourning her husband and uncle.

Prince Ernst had a presentiment that he would never see his home again. Just before his departure he collected a number of keepsakes, asked his mother to distribute them among his best friends, and said to her:

"I shall never return."

Wounded comrades who did return described the boy's death. He was on patrol duty north of Maubeuge. The enemy made a sudden sortie; the Prince's horse was shot under him. Close beside him lay a non-commissioned officer, pinned under his horse and wounded. The Prince scrambled to his side and helped the man to his feet.

As he did it a bullet struck him in the head. Men rushed to help him. He motioned them away.

"We must not be taken," he said; "that would be terrible." Then he lost consciousness. In a few moments the French rushed up and overpowered the Prince's comrades. They took him into Maubeuge to the hospital, where he died the next day without having recovered consciousness.

Another comrade told how the French soldiers took the buttons from the uniforms of those captured with the Prince, as they were the first Germans to be taken, but respectfully refrained from touching those of the latter. This same man declared that the conduct of the French in Maubeuge had been most chivalrous. They did all in their power for Prince Ernst, and spoke in high terms of the courage and calm he had shown in the engagement. And they buried him with military honors.

Prince Ernst zur Lippe, fourth of the Lippe family to fall in the war, lost his life near St. Quentin late in August, 1914. He, too, was young, like Prince Ernst, having been born in 1892.

He was killed by the explosion of an ammunition wagon beside which he was standing. Projectiles struck him in the back, causing instant death. He was carried to the rear, where a Captain closed his eyes. Next morning he was buried close to where he fell.

Later his body was exhumed and buried in a strip of woods near Detmold, the principal town of the Lippe lands, lying opposite the great monument erected to the German national hero Hermann, who destroyed the Roman

legions in the battle of the Teutoburg Forest. Of him also the Kaiser wrote in terms of high praise in a telegram of condolence to the ruler of Lippe.

Prince Otto of Schönburg-Waldenburg, of a family exercising lordship over territory in Saxony, was killed fighting in the neighborhood of Rheims soon after his thirty-third birthday. He was a Lieutenant in the Potsdam Guard Hussars, in which his father, who preceded him as Prince of Schönberg-Waldenburg, had served fourteen years. In memory of his father the young Prince gave a fund of 20,000 marks, ($5,000,) the income of which is turned over to deserving non-commissioned officers of the regiment and their families. On coming of age, in 1903, he gave other large sums for charitable purposes.

Prince Otto served at the beginning of the war on the eastern front. He was then transferred to France, and ten days after joining his regiment he took part in his last fight.

He met death, like so many other officers, while making a reconnoissance to determine the enemy's position. Accompanied by a small detachment, he was riding toward a railway embankment, when some French infantrymen hidden behind it suddenly opened fire on the party. One of the first bullets struck the Prince, who fell from his horse. His men hurried to his side, intent on giving him first aid, but he called out to them not to bother about him, but to report at once to headquarters the presence of the hostile troops and not to come back for him until they had done it.

They obeyed, made their report, and one hour later returned to where the Prince had fallen, accompanied by a doctor. But the Prince was dead. The doctor said that he must have breathed his last within a few minutes after being hit. The bullet had entered a little below his heart.

During a lull in the fighting he was buried by his comrades under a rosebush, the entire corps of officers of the Hussar regiment forming the funeral cortège. Later his body was exhumed and taken to Lichtenstein, where it was again buried with full military honors. On this occasion it was borne to the place of sepulture by wounded soldiers convalescing in Germany. They carried ahead of the coffin the simple wooden cross which had marked the Prince's burial place in France.

Prince Wilhelm zu Schönaich-Carolath, a Lieutenant in a regiment of Uhlans, was killed in Belgium a few days before his thirty-fourth birthday. Having ridden ahead of his regiment to ascertain whether the village of Meysse was occupied by the enemy, he fell into a regular hornets' nest. His men drew rein, wheeled their horses, and made off without noticing that their leader had fallen wounded to the ground.

When they missed him, a number of them galloped back, only to learn that the village was in the possession of English and French troops. This gave an opportunity to one of the Prince's men, a Uhlan called Jacob, to prove himself a man of splendid nerve. Though he knew that Meysse was held by the foe, Jacob crept into the village, entered a house on which a Red Cross flag was flying, and found the Prince, severely wounded. Recognizing the brave soldier, the Prince exclaimed: "Well, well, there's one of the Second Squadron Uhlans."

Then he swooned. In spite of the danger, Jacob stood around while a doctor did what he could for the wounded man.

"Are you being well cared for?" he asked the Prince. "My commander wishes to be sure of it." The Prince said that his wound was not serious. Then he gave his pistol to the brave soldier. "Keep it for yourself," he said. He tried to say more, but was too weak.

"You'd better get out of here," the doctor advised Jacob. "The enemy's all around." Seeing he could do nothing for the wounded man, the Uhlan crept back to the German lines and reported on what he had seen. He got the Iron Cross.

Soon the Germans drove the enemy out of Meysse and set about finding Prince Wilhelm. The doctor said that he had been transferred to Brussels. There they learned that he had died the night before, soon after reaching the hospital.

The news of the death of Prince Wol-

rad Friedrich zu Waldeck und Pyrmont reached Waldeck, his ancestral domain, on Oct. 18 of last year, just as the people were eagerly awaiting news of some victory that might serve to lend lustre to the celebration of the aniversary of the battle of Leipsic on that day. Instead of any such news his family received a telegram reading: "Prince Wolrad killed Oct. 17 at Moorslede, while leading a patrol."

He was born in 1892 and from early childhood showed signs of a determined and original cast of mind. Once he was told that he must take off his hat when people saluted him. "Why?" he objected. "Brother Fritz keeps his soldier's helmet on, doesn't he?" His family wanted to make a lawyer of him, but his heart was set on being either a sailor or a soldier.

After studying in Germany, he spent some time at Oxford in the Summer of 1910, and then attended the University of Grenoble in France. After spending some time as a student at Heidelberg and Halle, the family decided that it was no use to try to keep the Prince from his bent, so he became a soldier. In his new profession he showed far more proficiency than as a college student, and was soon made a Lieutenant in one of the Hessian dragoon regiments.

He fought in the Vosges, on the Meuse, in the battle of the Marne. His letters home told vividly of terrible scenes. Once, he narrated, some Frenchmen held up their hands in token of surrender and then fired on the Germans approaching to capture them. The Prince's revolver was shot out of his hand; several of his comrades fell.

"After that all the Frenchmen were killed, whether wounded or not," he wrote grimly. "Prisoners were not taken and have not been taken since."

Two of his horses were shot under him in the course of the fighting in France before he himself was killed, and a third when he, too, gave up his life. This was in a fight at Moorslede, near Lille. He was trying to aid a wounded dragoon of his command when a bullet killed him instantly. His orderly wrote:

"He looked after his men as if they were his own people. He was much beloved among us. You cannot imagine how badly the dragoons felt when his Highness was killed. He was the best officer in the regiment. He went out on more patrol rides than any other officer, because he could find the roads better than the rest. Every one wanted to go patrol riding with him."

Prince Wolrad was something of a poet and wrote a number of verses by no means martial in character, with titles like "The Silence of the Forest" and "Homesickness." His body was taken back to Germany and buried with impressive ceremonies on the Hagen Mountain in his native domain.

Prince Henry XLVI. of Reuss was only 19 years old when he fell. He left school to go to the front, and was made a Lieutenant in a Hessian regiment.

His one wish was to win the Iron Cross. It was never fulfilled. In an attack on English trenches near La Bassée he was struck by shrapnel fragments and killed on the spot.

His soldiers apparently were quite attached to him. One private, a much older man, was always called "father" by the boy. An old railroad flagman at a railroad crossing in Marburg, where the Prince used to live, said that every one in the neighborhood liked him. "He never passed without stopping to chat with us," said the old fellow.

The Sultan of Turkey

By Professor James Israel

Surgeon to the Sultan

Called to Constantinople last June for the purpose of performing an operation on Mohammed V., Professor James Israel, the famous German surgeon, on his return to Berlin, in an interview, as translated below from the Berliner Tageblatt, spoke on his experiences while giving literally relief to the "Sick Man" of Europe, as follows:

I WAS requested by the Turkish Ambassador on June 10 to hasten to Constantinople. The journey was very slow, and I did not reach my destination until the 16th. I found the aged Sultan in a very poor condition. For years he has suffered from gall stones, and it took me an entire week to determine whether an operation could be undertaken without danger.

Not only medical consideration was in question, but political, for in case there should have been a fatal issue to the operation, a change in ruler would have been necessary, and that would at the time mentioned have had grave consequences.

In respect to this matter I had a number of conferences with both the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the result that they finally left the decision entirely in my own hands. In view of the fact that without an operation the days of the Sultan would have been much shortened, and on account of the great pain in which the patient constantly found himself, I determined to operate, which resulted in the removal of the gall stones. As you know, the Sultan quickly recovered.

In view of the advanced age of the Sultan the courage with which he underwent the operation was really remarkable. Shortly before it took place he said to me: "I am not afraid to die, for in my present condition I am of little service to my country." As his oldest son remarked that he could not understand how he had the courage to place himself on the operating table, the Sultan recited the words of a Persian poet which was to the effect that "An old horse of blooded stock can always endure more than a young horse of inferior stock."

It is to be taken for granted that I had many talks with the Sultan, but the conversation was naturally somewhat difficult, since his Majesty speaks no other language than Turkish, and a French interpreter had to be employed. Much of what I was told cannot be made public because of its political nature. I will take the chance, however, of repeating some of his talk with me. For instance, he said: "When you get back to Berlin tell the Emperor that I am no friend like the King of Italy, but that I keep my word unqualifiedly in every instance."

From my own observations, as well as from what I learned in many military and political quarters on the ground, the Sultan is absolutely right in believing that victory will crown the efforts of the central powers and Turkey, and that the activities of the Quadruple Entente against the Dardanelles will come to nought.

The conversation with Professor Israel then turned to other matters. Very interesting were his observations regarding affairs in Constantinople. When asked whether it was true, as reported in the newspapers of the Entente powers, that the greatest depression ruled in the capital, Professor Israel replied: "There is no truth in such reports. Neither in Constantinople nor elsewhere in Turkey do the people show the slightest nervousness. On the whole, the Turk is not nervous. He displays great calmness, and I had special opportunity for noticing this quality.

The war is reflected principally in the uncountable masses of soldiers that pass through the city, and the streams of wounded that necessarily fill the hospitals to overflowing, and of which 30

per cent., due to the excellent care given them, return to the front within a short time. In regard to the food question, there appears to be no difference between now and what obtained in times of peace. This refers to almost all kinds of products. Nor did I find the prices much changed.

I learned from personal observations in the hospital that the Turkish soldiers, with scarcely any exceptions, request to be sent to the front immediately they are well. This desire is expressed by both officers and privates. Visiting half a dozen hospitals I everywhere found the care of the wounded most excellent. I know for a fact that the same condition prevails among the troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

It may be understood that I had occasion to meet many of the leading men of the country, both at Court and among the military. Everywhere I found the strongest possible belief that the Dardanelles would hold against any attack that could be brought against the defenders. This was especially so since plenty of ammunition had come to hand.

The existing relationship between the Germans and the Turks is such that it could not be better. Again and again I have been told by the Grand Vizier and the Foreign Minister how much they feel themselves bound to Germany and the Germans. Above all, Enver Pasha is tireless in emphasizing his admiration for German ingenuity and industry.

Kultur in Constantinople

The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung publishes a report to the effect that fourteen German professors are to be assigned to serve at the Turkish University at Stamboul. The German-Turkish Society is authority for the information that the Ottoman Government is responsible for the new step to introduce more German Kultur into the empire. Commenting editorially on the matter the Allgemeine Zeitung says:

This decision is an unquestioned evidence that the Turkish Government, notwithstanding war and its trials, looks into the future. Not only the military alliance with Germany is to be of service, but in a cultural direction we can expect much.

The matter concerns no less than fourteen professors, respectively of psychology and pedagogy, of history touching the Oriental peoples, geography, geology and mineralogy, botany, zoology, inorganic chemistry, organic chemistry, technical chemistry, law, economics, financial economy, ural languages, and Semetic languages.

In the selection of professors, the co-operative efforts of the German adviser to the Turkish Minister of Education, Counselor Schmidt, with the Constantinople authorities, have borne fruit. Up to the present, the following educators have declared themselves ready to accept the difficult task in Turkey: Dr. Anschuetsz, Psychology and Pedagogy, Hamburg; Professor Dr. Lehmann-Haupt, Ancient History, the University of Berlin; Dr. Obst, Geography, Marburg; Dr. Penck, Geology, Leipsic; Dr. Leick, Botany, Greifswald; Dr. Hoesch, Organic Chemistry, Technical High School, Charlottenburg; Dr. Fester, Technical Chemistry, University of Frankfort; Professor Dr. Schoenborn, Jurisprudence, Tuebingen, and Professor Dr. Giese, Turkish Language, the Oriental Seminary.

The Turkish language is to be used throughout, since the students have but a slight acquaintance with German, and French, considering the present situation, is out of the question. The first year of the five that the professors will spend in Turkey will be given up almost entirely to familiarizing with the language, which is not one of the easiest. It is to be hoped that the efforts which will be made at Stamboul in the present instance will bear as rich fruit as has been the case where German Kultur has been introduced in other countries.

The Trade of Persia

By Hermann F. Geiler

In the Frankfurter Zeitung, Herr Geiler, the well-known Munich traveler, gives his impressions of Persian trade conditions at the present time, and as changes may be effected by the war, as follows:

A BUSINESS activity, such as we understand it, is out of the question when considering the trade of Persia. This is even the case in cities of first importance. One of the first surprises to meet the stranger who seeks out the business sections, the bazaars, is the absolute lack of advertising efforts. In even the least important towns of Anatolia one observes and becomes fascinated by the innumerable fanciful signs along the streets, with inscriptions extolling all manner of wares. The attitude of the merchants, with their insistence that one buy of them, is another evidence showing the tireless activity of the traders. Then there are the countless street peddlers that throughout Turkey, even in Constantinople, are characteristic of the city life.

The Persian tradesman takes a different stand. He considers it beneath his dignity to descend to such means as require expenditure of lung power, or make the public acquainted with his commodities through displays or advertisements. There is a motto among them to the effect that "he is the best business man who is known, without making himself known." The trade propaganda extends from mouth to mouth, between seller and buyer; never does the producer do business direct with the retailer, but always there is the middleman as the go-between. The Persian manufacturer would never think of doing business except through agents or jobbers.

The bazaar life of Persia is responsible for much of the lack of publicity methods. Almost always the bazaars are located in very narrow streets that house industrial activity as well. Anything new in the way of articles of this or that kind are almost immediately known to the purchasing classes. Those in search of goods know to a certainty where commodities are to be found, in what quantities, and at what prices. This is a fact that has prevailed for generations. The merchants are known to everybody. That is one reason why there does not seem to be any great necessity for publicity. The entire effort of the business man is to keep expenses down in order to be able to sell his goods as cheaply as possible.

High rents are an abomination to the Persian merchant. The darker and smaller the establishment the happier he appears to be. Signs are only conspicuous by their absence. The nasal organ is the guide leading to the shoemaker, the dealer in confections, the hairdresser, the cheesemonger.

This peculiarly psychological business method of the Persian, this desire to live in retirement and self-conscious dignity, finds its expression even in the affairs of the Imperial Bank of Persia. This great institution transacts most of its business in some very unpretentious rooms within the bazaar section, where, to the tune of the ever-present tea urn and the smoking of cigarettes, trade amounting to millions is conducted annually. And yet, there stands the palace-like structure of the bank itself in the central square of Teheran, while the real business is transacted in those smoke-filled bazaar rooms.

This desire to remain in the background is illustrated again and again when some Persian merchant with wide connections returns from a trip to European centres of trade and boasts of the fact that he did his most important business with a house that possessed the most unpretentious offices and salesrooms, but which, however, had immense stocks in such an out of the way locality.

So long as Russia and England

strove with each other for the upper hand in Persia the condition referred to remained unchanged. The war has furnished the opportunity for German and Turkish influence to get a foothold. Within the past year Turkish business and industrial enterprises, backed by German acumen, have been able to supplant the English and Russian influence in various quarters. Efforts are being made to show the Persian trader the advantage of publicity as practiced by Germany. There is already noticed a tendency to take kindly to the methods in vogue in Europe as regards elaborate signs over business establishments. A dozen of these signs are in evidence now in the bazaar quarters. And the newspapers of Teheran are beginning to fill with advertisements of financial houses. The German-Turkish influence is increasing to the extent that a boycott has virtually been instituted against goods of Russian or English origin.

Before Marching, and After

(IN MEMORIAM: F. W. G.)

By THOMAS HARDY

(From The Fortnightly Review)

Orion swung southward aslant
Where the starved Egdon pine trees had thinned,
The Pleiads aloft seemed to pant
With the heather that twitched in the wind;
But he looked on indifferent to sights such as these,
Unswayed by love, friendship, home joy, or home sorrow,
And wondered to what he would march on the morrow.

The crazed household clock with its whirr
Rang midnight within as he stood,
He heard the low sighing of her
Who had striven from his birth for his good;
But he still only asked the Spring starlight, the breeze,
What great thing or small thing his history would borrow
From that Game with Death he would play on the morrow.

When the heath wore the robe of late Summer,
And the fuchsia bells, hot in the sun,
Hung red by the door, a quick comer
Brought tidings that marching was done
For him who had joined in that game overseas
Where Death stood to win; though his memory would borrow
A brightness therefrom not to die on the morrow.

September, 1915.

Why the Russian Duma Was Prorogued

By a Russian

This article appeared originally in The London Daily News.

THE prorogation of the Duma, an act which aroused extraordinary excitement throughout Russia, and might have had still more serious consequences, seems to have produced in England little more than vague speculation as to its reasons. In England people have not understood the series of events which led up to prorogation of the Duma. What is even more important, they have not shared the legitimate confidence and rejoicing which should have been given them had they clearly understood the events that followed on the prorogation.

It is important to realize exactly what the Duma stood for in the mind of the Russian Nation. The Russians were enduring a heavy mental stress of a long period of retreat. This retreat was on a gigantic, obvious scale, obvious in its effects even to those many hundreds of miles from the front. It was explained by a shortage of ammunition and equipment. Wounded soldiers returning into the heart of the country and into the capital brought to town and village stories that made that lack af ammunition and equipment more than a mere factor in an intellectual problem.

The result of this was that the nation, not doubting of ultimate victory, was clamorous for open criticism and some sort of control of the paid officialdom which it felt had played it false. The Duma seemed, to the educated classes, to the peasants, to the workpeople in the towns, to the very cabmen of the capital, their only hope of such criticism and control. For a time it was refused to them. Then, under the stress of the fall of Warsaw, it was considered unsafe to provoke public opinion by further refusal, and the Duma was summoned. All for a moment seemed to be well, and the Duma, conscious of the nation behind it, astonished everybody by the frankness with which it set forth in a hundred speeches the thoughts that had been in the minds of all.

To understand what followed it is necessary to realize the nature of the Russian politician, and no less the difference between this Duma and those that had preceded it.

First let me describe the difference, the essential difference, between this Duma and those that had preceded it. That will explain why the enemies of the Duma, the believers in reaction, in the traditional form of the Russian autocracy, were seriously afraid of a Parliament which for the first time was a Parliament in fact as well as in name. The point to realize is this, that there are fourteen political parties represented in the Russian Duma. These parties are as follows:

The Extreme Right.
The Nationalist.
The Progressive Nationalist.
The Right Octobrists.
The Zemstvo Octobrists.
The Left Octobrists.
The Poles.
The Mohammedans.
The Peasants.
The Progressives.
The Cadets.
The Labor members.
The Social Democrats.
The Social Democrats (minority party.)

The word minority distinguishing the Social Democrats does not refer to the members, but to the result of a Congress held in Sicily some ten years ago.

While thus disunited the Duma was weak, but things became very different when Miliukov, the leader of the Cadets, and Gushkov, the Octobrist, who fought for the Boers, and in many ways has proved himself one of the strongest personalities in Russian politics, working together, succeeded in forming what was called the Progressive bloc. They combined all the parties in the preceding

list except on the one side the Extreme Right, Nationalists and Progressive Nationalists, and, on the other, the Social Democrats. Then, for the first time, the Bureaucracy was faced by a Duma with the power of making itself felt. The majority enjoyed by the Progressive bloc was absolutely overwhelming, and the power the bloc enjoyed was not slow in affecting both sides.

The next stage in the story depended on the peculiar character of the average Russian politician. No sooner do any two Russians agree on anything than they sit down to draw up a program. No sooner had the Progressive bloc been formed than, in spite of the fact that every man in it was solely concentrated on doing what should be done for the winning of the war, they sat down to elaborate and serious consultation on their program, which was to show everybody on what subjects they were all agreed. They produced a program embodying about a dozen points, including reform of the Zemtvos, a broadening of the franchise, the recognition of trade unions, and the establishment of a Government possessing public confidence, which meant a Government of public men not recruited from the ranks of officialdom.

It is obvious on the face of it that the few points I have noted are enough to constitute the widest possible reformation in the Russian system of government. The leaders of the bloc have since declared that they did not mean this program as anything but a statement of ultimate hopes on which they were agreed, and that for the present they were content to concentrate their attention on the successful prosecution of the war. They had not said so when they formulated the program, and they gave their enemies the opportunity of saying: "Look what these people are determined to do under cover of the national difficulty." The result was to be foreseen. The Premier Goremykin, an old reactionary, went off to the Czar, and, as a reply to what he could well make out to be a threat on the part of the bloc, obtained a decree of prorogation, which he held before his colleagues of the Cabinet who had met to consider the question. With the exception of one man, all sided against him; but there lay the Czar's order on the table, and the thing was done, very politely, the enraged Duma being told that it had successfully accomplished its destiny.

But for the patriotism of the members the result might have been chaos. There was a time when Miliukov threatened that all members of his party who were also on the committees formed for dealing with questions of munitions, &c., would resign their positions. This would have been an incitement from above to a general and disastrous strike. He was fortunately made to see the danger of it, and the leaders of every party set themselves to preventing disturbance of any kind. The story is not yet over. In any case the Duma will have learned that whatever may be its ultimate aims, whatever its apparent power, it is better not by a display of tactlessness (with which, after all, it is hard not to sympathize) to set a lever under itself and in the hands of its enemies.

The Czar's Daily Habits

In a dispatch to The London Times from Russian Headquarters, dated Oct. 22, 1915, *the following appeared:*

The Czar personally gives most of his time to military affairs, leading a life of the greatest simplicity and winning ovations from townspeople each time he appears in the streets, which he very frequently does. He drives every afternoon without guards or escorts and walks about the country talking with the peasants and others. He is almost invariably accompanied by his son and is apparently absolutely devoted to the heir to the throne. The Czarevitch, whom I have seen repeatedly, impresses one as a healthy, high-spirited boy of great charm and winning personality. Since being here I am inclined to believe the talk of a separate peace, which was widely circulated after the fall of Warsaw, never had any basis in fact from the beginning of the war.

Dutch Opinion of Italy and Germany

By a Hollander

The Nieuwe Courant, Amsterdam, in its issue of Sept. 1, published the impressions of a Hollander as gathered by him in passing through Italy and Germany on his way home from Egypt. A translation of the article appears below.

A REALLY comprehensive understanding among the people, an absolute conviction, appeared to me to be absent in Italy. One did not feel that this war, as in the case of the other countries concerned, centred around Italy's national existence. It is true that I had heard a good deal about Italia irredenta, about national unity, of the domination of the Adriatic. But now it sounded very much like pure rhetoric. Not once did I get the impression that deep-rooted thoughts were at the bottom of it all.

To me it appeared like automatic repetitions of sugar-coated ideas; not the outpourings of a people's soul brought from its inner researches and replete with passionate longing. If I am not much mistaken, here lies the great danger to Italy. Just as in the case of the individual cause and effect hang together, so also where the collective aspiration of a nation is concerned. Italy's psychological mobilization, as it were, does not seem to me sufficient. Both motive and mobility of people's genius, from which springs and develops a national war, are too weak in the present instance. The enthusiasm resembles a soap bubble; a pretty poem, perhaps, due to the assistance rendered by scribbler politicians. All this is not enough for a nation that must strain every nerve to make use of its power.

I do not speak here of the justice of the Italian cause nor of the high value of Italy's performance. I only doubt whether the preparations had been of the right sort; whether Italy had used common sense in placing its idealism and susceptibility in jeopardy by thus departing from its place of national independence on the other side of the Alps. Italy must bring other psychical factors to the front so as to reap from its national efforts of the present. The victory in this war belongs to those who show the greatest energy and know how to take advantage of each step gained. If the Italians want to win they must find a way to awaken their national energy. True, Italy entered enthusiastically into the war, but the heavy losses have already had the effect of dampening this enthusiasm.

It is my opinion that there is danger of the soap bubble bursting much more suddenly than it appeared. No matter how brilliant may have been the military preparations; the cannons may be ever so plentiful and powerful, the courage of the troops exemplary, Italy can hardly expect to play any conspicuous rôle in this war because back of all its paraphernalia there lacks the driving spring that, to my mind, is the really valuable factor—the absolute, national conscience that turns an entire people in but one direction.

I was in Germany but a short time; about five days in the north and south. I purposed, however, to get the fullest possible amount of observation that my limited stay allowed. I wanted to absorb the spiritual atmosphere, as well as to get at the bottom of the people's sentiment and ambition. The confession must be made here that these five days made a powerful impression upon me. Was the sudden contrast the reason? I came from a country replete with indolence, Egypt; for a whole year I had been living in an anti-German atmosphere. Or were there other reasons? Germany exhibited something that drew me within the radius of its suggestive aim; a power so great that I had to summon my whole strength not to fall from the pedestal of my calculating objectivity; not to be swallowed up in the immensity of the German aspiration.

I discovered neither famine nor lack of work; no people depressed and eager

for peace. Although the newspapers of the Quadruple Entente had prepared me to find a shortage of soldiers, I could not see it. Germany continued to live its normal life. People bought goods, they kept on traveling, money appeared to be plentiful. There was plenty of luxury in evidence. Where the money came from I am unable to say. To all appearances the war was bringing good business. The entire land seemed to me like a garrison. Everywhere I saw new, trained soldiers. Not children, nor old men, but soldiers flushed with health and young manhood; men in their best years.

In spite of the tremendous efforts in the east, notwithstanding the numerous strength on the western front, there seemed to be not the slightest diminution in human material. The great result of the campaign in the east brought along a renewed national consciousness. No one could be found who did not believe absolutely that final victory would fall to Germany. To be sure, many mourned the great losses sustained, but not a soul desired on that account to give up until fully victorious. The nation is even now preparing for another Winter campaign. All submit to the inevitable, while resting their complete confidence in the Government and the army leaders.

To a neutral like myself it seemed rather comical to see the abounding hatred that existed against the English. All Germany appeared united in this respect. Toward France there was shown a certain amount of compassion; Russia was viewed with indifference. But with England there was no compromise. I had had no opportunity for knowing to what extent this hatred was encouraged by the political exigencies of the moment, or whether it was an outcropping of the nationalistic energy. For that reason I tried to get at the fountain head of this feeling and to learn its course of development. I learned that in Germany, England is considered the chief criminal touching the world war; all are convinced that British gold and affiliation alone prolong the struggle. The hatred is further nourished by the fact that the British employ black troops in Flanders. I met a returned soldier from that battle ground who exclaimed with flashing eyes: "The English! Where's Kitchener's army? In England! And in Flanders? Gurkhas, Sikhs, Bengalis, Punjabis, Turcos—all black fellows from Asia turned loose in the name of liberty and civilization!"

I dare say that the utilization of black troops during a national struggle like the present is Germany's greatest grievance, and the main cause for the people's hatred toward England.

Germany has grown too rapidly, it has become a power in too short a space of time. The effect is readily seen. Today it stands alone in the world, without a friend and without any sympathizers. There is wanting in the nation those subtler qualifications that engender sympathy; also those finer shades termed tact and good manners, but which in reality are degrees of hypocrisy. In a thousand different ways I was made to feel how the people's characteristics lacked those nicer qualities that belong to an older civilization and culture. I must confess that many things struck me as needlessly without tact, but I cannot help expressing my admiration for what Germany is doing as a nation. We may quarrel, if we will, over the question whether Germany had this war long in preparation, whether it wanted the war, or began it. But an organization that can display such national energy as Germany has done deserves notice. The individual, the masses, the whole nation have but one aim—victory. It is in the air; it vibrates throughout the atmosphere like the electrical-charged room affects the motors and the machines. The individual has nothing to say. Individualism is submerged. There is unity in thought, in feeling, in action. Here lies Germany's strength. Not in its howitzers, not in its submarines, not in new chemical discoveries, nor in the organization of production and distribution. All these are but manifestations; only instruments of use because of that tremendous force back of them—the marvelous energetic power of the soul of the German people.

We can admire this gigantic influence

and power; hate it, or despise it, as we will. It cannot change the fact. This is what the Allies must attack and tear asunder. The question is whether they possess the necessary means to accomplish this task.

The Battle Harvest Moon

By H. T. SUDDUTH

O golden Harvest Moon that now
  Slowly ascends the eastern skies,
Glimpsed through the elm tree's leafy bough
  In silent majesty you rise!
On spires and roofs of the far-spreading town
Serene in mellow splendor you look down.

Low now the sound of busy streets
  In thy white silence dies away,
Or from the charmed distance greets
  The ear like echoes of the day,
As slow in stately pomp, outdating man,
You cities gild and desert caravan.

Along dim streets and avenues
  Thy rising tide of radiance flows,
And in thy softened light they lose
  The garishness that daytime shows;
Not all the city's wealth or pride or gold
Can with thy magic vie and pomp of old.

For, veiling stars with silvery light,
  Thou mak'st the skies one Milky Way;
Thy silent progress through the night
  Naught can arrest but dawn of day;
Dim continents and oceans dark you drown
In floods of light as now the sleeping town.

Man's pomp of pride or place or power
  But transient in the moonlight seems,
For thou hast looked, as in this hour,
  On cities that are now but dreams;
On Thebes and Nineveh, Palmyra, Tyre,
You looked, and saw their glories proud expire.

And you, O Harvest Moon, look down
  On Europe's widespread battlefield,
Where ere the forest leaves turn brown
  A greater harvest it will yield,
And thousands that tonight now look on you
Perchance for the last time your light will view.

Earth's harvest now is gathered quite,
  In all but furthest northern lands,
But thou, O Moon, doth shed thy light
  On fields where Death the Reaper stands,
His ripened harvest white before him spread,
Behind him strown the long swaths of the dead.

Dim, dread, and ghastly is the sight,
  O golden Harvest Moon, you see—
Stern dead men strown on fields of night
  Where helpless wounded gaze on thee,
While in a million homes sad mothers yearn
And weep and pray for sons who'll ne'er return!

Two Scandinavian Congresses

Scandinavia's position during the war, with particular reference to the shipping interests of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, formed the chief basis for discussion when the Northern Interparliamentary Union reconvened in the Hall of the Folkething in Copenhagen, in September. The newspapers of Denmark allotted much space to the discussion of the Scandinavian Peace Congress held in Copenhagen in September. Authoritative accounts of both congresses appear below.

I.

The Northern Interparliamentary Congress

This account is translated from the Danish newspaper, Dagens Nyheder, of Copenhagen.

THE first features of the gathering of the Northern Interparliamentary Union were three addresses touching the experiences of the three Scandinavian countries and their neutrality, with special regard to shipping during the war.

The first speaker was the Chairman for the Danish War Insurance Institute, former Finance Minister Neergaard, who said: "It is apparent that there is no more vital issue during the war than the security of neutral shipping. Especially as this concerns the small countries does it become a question of their weal and woe, and particularly so to the three northern nations. For this reason every step ahead from a lawless condition to a lawful one is greeted with the utmost satisfaction by us.

"The North Sea became from the start a hotbed for mines, and it was only after repeated protests that such routes were established as brought comparative safety to traffic. In most instances the Danish War Insurance Company has been compelled to make these routes obligatory, no matter what has been the inconvenience to ship owners.

"Likewise in the Baltic there have been planted many mines, and the losses to date amount to ten ships valued at 3,700,000 crowns. In view of the fact that it is almost impossible to establish the identity of the mines there has been no way in which to collect on these losses.

"Since May 27 we have lost no vessels through mines. But now arises the question regarding contrabands. It is to be admitted that England has relinquished its severe hold so as to adhere more strictly to the Declaration of London. But this is done to a very limited degree, and if England now adheres closer to the declaration than does Germany, which considers it void, the reason is that Great Britain is strong enough to secure its prizes in a more conventional manner.

"This and other experiences prove, I am sorry to say, that it is might and self-interest, and not justice, which decide to what an extent the rights of people are to be respected. On that account the contraband zone has been extended to an improper extent; not only by departures from the Declaration of London, which the warring nations at once made, but by the manner in which the violations have been carried out. If in the course of months the neutral nations have been able to obtain certain modifications this has been accomplished only after the most exhaustive protests and efforts on the part of the neutral Governments.

"On the question of neutral prizes, it is evident that Germany has proceeded in the most unconcerned manner as regards formerly established regulations. It is certainly contrary to the rights of nations that Germany should destroy neutral ships, and this method can be defended even less so when we consider that examination itself is against the rules.

"This world war has shown the neutral countries to what a degree the internationål regulations of the seas can be interpreted to suit conveniences, and there are many people who believe that it is useless to labor further in order to restore the rights of nations on water.

I do not agree with this view. Despite all difficulties and violations, the fact is still there that even during the present world crisis much of that which in course of time has been incorporated in the declarations remains in force."

Speaking for Norway and its shipping, Mr. Movinckel declared that much of what the preceding speaker had said about Scandinavian conditions in this war referred with particular force to Norway. When sea traffic came to a halt in August, 1914, the daily losses to the shipping trade amounted to 100,000 crowns. It became at once necessary to establish a State insurance organization. Norway's merchant fleet was valued last year at 400,000,000 crowns, and, while the fleet is now worth 500,000,000 crowns and the Norwegian mercantile marine is on an upswing generally, the losses have been many.

During the first year of the war Norway lost sixty-one ships valued at 18,000,000 crowns. Sixteen of these ships were destroyed by mines. Although in most instances the crews had time to leave their vessels, thirty-nine lives have been lost through mines and torpedoes.

Mr. Movinckel did not think that America, strong as it is, had proceeded with sufficient energy against violations of the rights of neutrals. He insisted that, as three voices sounded louder than one, the three Scandinavian countries should continue to uphold right against might so that justice might be seated in honor above the struggling masses.

Elief Loefgren of Stockholm, a member of the upper chamber of the Swedish Parliament, told about conditions in Sweden. The Swedish merchant fleet did a business of close to 140,000,000 crowns in foreign sailings before the war. For a while after war broke out the whole business went to pieces. Then the State insurance plan became operative and gradually the traffic returned.

The neutrality policy of the three Scandinavian countries had proved of vast benefit, declared Count Adelswaerd. He felt convinced that the meeting of the three Kings at Malmoe was the expression of the inmost desires of the peoples of the north. The Northern Interparliamentary Union rejoiced in the fact that the brother nations, brought together through such eventful and direful conditions as the great war, would continue to labor for their neutrality, not only while the conflict raged, but when peace is restored. Count Adelswaerd concluded by saying that the Northern Interparliamentary Union had at last realized one of its greatest desires—complete co-ordination between the three countries of the Scandinavian north, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway.

II.

The Scandinavian Peace Congress

The subjoined account appeared in the Dagens Nyheder of Copenhagen.

IN September, 1915, the eighth Scandinavian Peace Congress reconvened in the hall of the Landsthing. There met about 100 delegates, among them twenty-five from Sweden and ten from Norway. Among the Danish delegates were present the Minister of Education, Keiser-Nielsen. Other well-known persons at the gathering were the Mayor of Stockholm, Lindhagen, and Congressman Warrinsky of Sweden. Two noted clergymen, Pastors Klaveness and Hansteen of Norway, were also on hand as delegates. The opening of the congress proved considerably of a disappointment to not a few of those at the meeting. The right atmosphere was absent. But how could it have been different? A peace congress, while the cannons sent their thunderous echo throughout Europe!

On behalf of the Danish Peace Society the address of welcome was made by Superior Court Advocate Petersen, a member of the Folkething. He spoke in part as follows: "We are meeting while the world war rages. But that does not shake our faith in the cause of

peace or in its progress. Like all great movements, the peace cause must be purified through many trials. And just now, while the war is at its height, the work for peace among the northern people is strengthened. It lends color to our argument that we are absolutely neutral and that our main desire and aim are to keep outside the war zone.

"I bid you all welcome in the sincere hope that our labors during the congress will yield a rich harvest and add value to the work for peace."

The Chairman for the Swedish Peace Association, Count Adelswaerd, made the statement that the three northern peoples stood shoulder to shoulder like three brothers. Mr. Sandstoel, an editor from Stavanger, Norway, declared that his country was sure of a final victory for the cause of peace among nations. He affirmed that Scandinavia had before it the great mission of spreading the light of the peace cause and of truth throughout the world. He wanted the congress to make plain to peoples everywhere that the war was the greatest crime against humanity. He asked support for a war against war.

Arnt Oeksnevad of Norway, on behalf of the teachers interested in world peace, asked that instruction in history be changed so that the peace ideal could be brought home to children. The need, he said, was not for a history about war, but about peaceful progress. The teachers should not tire of presenting Christ as the organizer of the peace cause, and to stamp war as murder.

Mr. Barruel was of the opinion that there would be no peace in Europe until there was a common language. He wished to make a recommendation to that effect, but was prevailed on to leave the matter open until the next meeting in 1916.

Mme. Koch of Copenhagen would provide punishment for mothers who permitted their children to play with tin soldiers, or who would tell their boys that it would give them pleasure to see their sons lay down their lives in battle. We must educate our sons to refuse to go to war, she declared. We must battle for peace and against drink.

Mme. Louise Noerlund of Copenhagen spoke on peace and disarmament. She said that just so long as military equipment prevailed, permanent peace would be impossible. To bring about such peace the work of education would have to begin at the bottom. The heroism of war would have to be excluded from the children's curriculum. It would be essential to present war as it actually is—the triumph of brutality that drove mankind ever downward.

Pastor Carsten Hansteen spoke on the importance of having the universities aid the peace cause. Shortly after the war broke out the question was raised, who was to blame for starting it? Now another question had arisen, Pastor Hansteen said, namely, what can we do to prevent a repetition of such a catastrophe? The friends of peace would have to look around for an ally, and such an ally was present in the universities. Because of the impressionableness of youth, the universities were the best field to sow the seed of peace. If they would collaborate, here would be a splendid opportunity, he argued.

At the conclusion of the congress nine resolutions were adopted. They are to be presented to the three Scandinavian Parliaments for their consideration. One of the resolutions protested against compulsory military service. Another resolution was in effect that where compulsory service obtained those who did not desire to enter the army should be allowed to go free.

Letter From the Galician Battle Front

By a Russian Officer

The subjoined letter is by a Russian officer serving with one of the Caucasian regiments and appeared originally in the Novoe Vremya ("The New Time") of Petrograd.

WE are still sitting in the guard's hut, which is uninteresting. and has already been described. Once in awhile, with no apparent reason, the Germans "get mad," bursting internally, so to speak, and begin to shoot six-inch bombs at our trenches, lavishing explosives and metal; not trunks yet, only suitcases of the larger size! At times you hear no explosions whatever, just a kind of hissing and squealing, and then—bang!—a great ball of black smoke springs up out of the ground, followed by loose earth, splinters, broken fragments of metal and stones. At other times, it is a whole series—bang, bang, bang! Once in a while the enemy artillery shoots at peaceful inhabitants heavy shells which work terrible damage. Quite recently they sent a bomb into a cottage just below our fort, in the smiling valley. Of course, the house was destroyed in a single moment, and burned up like a bright candle.

Women shrieked, children cried, the cattle bellowed, and the earth shook with the explosion. * * * God be praised, we are well accustomed to artillery fire, we are old-timers, but the sight of a peaceful home, smashed into and burning, filled with women and small children, was * * * not pleasant. One little boy, especially, looked pitiable. The toddler, trying to escape from the flames, hid behind a wall, where he was immediately so badly contused that he was unconscious for most of the next twenty-four hours. The irony of this occurrence lies in the fact that the owner of the house that was destroyed by the Austro-Germans is still fighting in the ranks of the Austrian Army. On the same day the picturesque roadway toward the fort, which I described in one of my letters, was also destroyed by the enemy. Here and there yawn bomb-made craters, the lining of the road, blue gravel and red clay, oozing out. You have to be careful about riding out, for you are as likely as not to get a present from the other chaps that will leave nothing of you but a damp spot. They are pretty generous with these presents of theirs! One of these days we were ordered to gather some straw to lay along the river bank to light our way in case we had to cross the river. This started a bombardment that was lovely to see. For a long time the Germans ripped at this wretched straw with a zeal that deserved a more worthy object, and finally their shells set the straw on fire. But you can get accustomed to anything pretty quickly. The Germans toil in vain, for their presents attract no attention whatever. Only yesterday a heavy shell burst in the midle of a yard where several of our Caucasian mounted militia were enjoying a cup of tea. One of them was killed, one had a hand torn off, others received slight scratches, and several horses were maimed. But nobody was impressed; these mountaineers merely swore at the breaking of their teapot. No wonder; the weather is warm these days, and you get very thirsty, and so much good tea lost, and more tea to be made!—wasn't it a typical bit of German piggishness? Surely they knew that the bosses don't allow us to drink uncooked water, so of course they shot at our teapot!

Think of us sitting somewhere in a trench, worn out by the day's work, and waiting to be sent off duty, the time for which is close at hand. The hot day has come to an end, the sun is set, after mercilessly grilling the earth since early morning. The last line of light has disappeared from the horizon, and a lovely Summer night has descended from heaven, with cooling and

refreshing dew. What lots of stars, and how bright they are! They shine over our heads; they are shining also over our beloved mother, Russia—as if bringing us a greeting from her, a greeting to us, her children, in battle. In front of us, at the foot of a rounded ravine, the river, shallow in Summer, flowing on, its wavelets murmuring and, in the thicket bordering the bank, the fresh evening breeze whispering among the leaves. On the opposite bank the enemy are hiding. Like us, they are sitting in their trenches; they are sending us no more death-greetings, probably tired out by the long day. No wonder; just before sunset their fire was particularly hot, ending only after twilight, when the darkness was complete. A little village that caught fire from the shells is still blazing away across the river, every cottage aflame, and a long row of bright flames hangs over the bank like a string of shining beads on the neck of a dusky village beauty. Well, could we not attempt what Lermontoff describes—"Angry mountaineers crawling up the bank, each one sharpening his dagger!" If only they would allow us to try! But they won't allow it yet; the time has not come yet; the bosses know best, and everything comes in its appointed time. Meanwhile, profiting by this quiet spell, let us talk!

I can assure you it is not at all bad here. The night is warm, the grass is soft, in my hand I am holding a glass—of the strongest tea, such as I could never get at home. First of all, of course, my beloved Caucasian mountaineers, in whose glorious ranks have already flown eleven months of my life. At times the work lay heavy on our shoulders, we were cold and hungry and overburdened. But if you could only realize how gorgeous were the days, how brightly colored stretched the path before our whole division, what fervent faith there was in the justice of our cause; if you could only realize how full our souls were of perfect contentment! This starlit night, in the white mist before the dawn, I see arise the shades of our slain comrades. They are so many—but their unfading eyes shine victorious, full of joy. Here is our valorous commander, brave even among the brave, our long-bearded father, never to be forgotten. He did not believe in immortality, but now he has learned the reality of it, and his pale face smiles at us! I understand! Your smile tells me you are sure of your regiment; your mountaineers will never "blacken your face," even now when you are dead!

Here, in the trenches, I got a letter from a mountaineer, of higher grade than the rest of us, a great man in our army, on whose breast blooms the white flower of military glory, the Cross of St. George. He writes: "I rejoice at every success of my tribesmen, now, and, even more, in the future, for the fine work and deserts of our young regiment will lay the foundation, the future promise of the prosperity of our whole tribe. Young chaps who are fighting their country's enemy from sheer love of fighting, from excess energy, do not think that at the same time they are hammering out the prosperity and destiny of their own people. But we know, and we are convinced that mighty Russia, with her constant generosity, will rightly value the deeds of her youngest sons, the Chechen mountaineers, who so recently crossed weapons with her. We have forgotten that on both sides now. The mighty Mother ever forgets the errors of her sons * * *"

May the writer of this letter be permitted to say that little has been said of the doings of the Chechen mountaineers, perhaps because they are modest, as warriors ought to be. But our regiment has already some great achievements to its credit, which have become forever a part of its brief history. The letter from our senior Chechen comes as our reward, because we see how carefully we are watched by one whose white hair we reverence. Not one face among the Caucasian warriors will be "blackened." The Chechen mountaineers are fighting for the glory of their great Mother, Russia, and, with God's help, our women will not have cause to mock us when we come back victorious to our mountain villages scattered like eagles' nests among the hills * * *

The Ukraine as a Russo-Austrian Problem

By Professor Michaelo Hrushevsky

Professor of History in the University of Lemberg, the author of the following article is considered the principal authority on affairs concerning the Ukrainian people. Translated from La Revue Politique Internationale of Paris by George Raffalovich, the article throws into strong relief the difficulties encountered by both Russia and Austria to fuse the Ukraine with the rest of the two nations.

IN 1772, when Poland was first divided up, Western Ukraine, now Eastern Galicia, became part of the Habsburg Kingdom in virtue of certain long-standing claims of the Hungarian Crown to this country. Some years later, Bukowina, (the present region,) which formerly belonged to Moldavia, was added to it. This passing of Western Ukraine into the rule of Austria awoke a new national fervor in the country. The Austro-Hungarian Government had but lately learned—at the time of the movement against ecclesiastic union in Galicia—of the deplorable condition in which the Ukrainian population of Hungary found itself. Steps were taken to ameliorate the moral and material condition of the priests of the United Greek Church in Galicia and in Hungary. A particular importance attached to the United Church in this province during the eighteenth century, for it became transformed here into the Ukrainian National Church. The measures that were established by the Austro-Hungarian Government had, therefore, far-reaching consequences, as had also the efforts it made to disseminate instruction among the urban and rural population, together with the attempts to ameliorate the economic condition of the people. Insignificant as were in reality the reforms brought about, and fleeting as was the current of Ruthenophil sentiment in the policy of the Government, this attitude nevertheless created a deep impression upon the Ukrainian population, which once again enjoyed a sense of nationality and lost the feeling of despair with which it was stricken during the later years of Polish supremacy. Even after the Austrian Government, under the influence of the Polish aristocracy, had characterized its Ukrainian policy by a strongly reactionary feeling, the energy of the national movement was not completely dissipated. Development of culture and of the national ideal were still apparent in the first half of the nineteenth century.

On the other hand, the Ukrainian territory which had fallen to the share of Russian rule on the partition of Poland (Volhynia, Podolia, the land west of the Bug, and that around Kiev) had no cause to look for any revival of nationalist aspirations. The rigor with which the Polish or Polonized aristocracy ruled the Ukrainian peasantry became now more merciless still, supported as the Poles were by the authority of Russia. The subordinate administrative officials were for the most part the docile servants of this aristocracy. Certain attempts to appeal to orthodox tendencies that were hostile to Poland, which had been made by the Russian Government in order to protect the serfs of the Ukraine, were quite futile. Opposition to serfdom was treated as treason. Everything which was not in the hands of the Polish aristocracy—education, Church, or literature, in a word, the intellectual life of the country—had to combat unscrupulous Russophil tendencies. The Government even went to the length of forbidding in the Church all the national rites, including even the Slavo-ecclesiastic tongue, which was the matrix of the Ukrainian language. These circumstances explain why the signs of a national revival first showed themselves in Eastern Ukraine, notwithstanding the Russianizing it was undergoing.

For a while it looked as though the old

institutions of the hetman period were about to be re-established; the Czar Paul, who strongly opposed the policy of his mother, gave evidence of a wish from the beginning of his reign to give new life to some of the old political liberties. It is said that it was the Minister Bezborodko, a Ukrainian patriot, who inspired his master with these designs. The reign of Paul was a short one, however, and his successor, Alexander, returned to the principles of Catherine and set up again in the Ukraine the organization established there by the Empress. Nothing remained to remind the people of the time of the hetmans save the civil law, applicable to this day in the Governments of Tchernicov and Poltava, the country of the hetmans of old.

The longing to see the old Constitution restored made itself manifest from time to time, especially on such occasions as the Russian Government sought to recruit the Cossack militia in the Ukraine. This happened in 1812 and again during the Polish rising in 1831, on both of which occasions the authorities sought to blind the eyes of the people with various promises of ameliorative measures. During the Crimean war, especially, the enrolling of volunteers aroused intense excitement among the peasantry, in whom national aspirations were still vigorous. All expectations of this kind met only with disappointment, but they helped to keep alive the nationalist feeling among the Ukrainian people. The Russian Government made a pretext of these aspirations for looking with even greater suspicion upon certain candidates for the hetmanship, as well as of frowning upon other real or imaginary manifestations of Ukrainian irredentism.

It was not only in matters of sentiment but in political ideas as well that the tradition of the Cossacks tinged all memories of their heroic struggles for liberty, the idealized figures of their knights, and the freedom which continued to exist among the intellectual classes and in the poetry of the Ukraine, especially in the district of the Dnieper. The study of the past and of historic documents which were taken up with devotion by Ukrainian families in direct descent from the Cossacks, the collecting of popular traditions, which became numerous after 1820 or 1830—all this brought back to mind the symbols of national heroism, and was handed down from generation to generation as a sacred legacy from the past and a promise for the future.

The exodus of the Ukrainians or the divergence of the national activity toward Austrian Ukraine, toward Lemberg, which became a centre for the national life, was weighty with results not only for the Ukrainian movement in Russia but also for the development of Austrian Ukraine itself. Aready, about the year 1860, after the first prohibition of the Ukrainian language in Russia, this event had contributed to the sustenance of the Ukrainian national life in Austria at a very critical moment in the development of this section of the subject people. After the movement had gradually grown weaker in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, under the pressure of the general reactionary movement in Galicia, the story year of 1848 poured a refreshing breath over the Ukrainians of Austria. The Austrian Government sought in the Ukrainian population something to set off against the Polish revolutionary movement. The final liberation of the serfs, the admission of the moral and political rights of the Ukrainian people, (or Ruthenians,) the creation of the first institution of any importance in the domain of culture and politics, the nationalization of the schools, the formal promise of a university for Lemberg, the administrative separation of the two Galicias (Ukrainian and Polish) which had been artificially united in 1772—all these influences assisted the birth of a new era in the life of the Austrian Ukraine.

But these years that were so full of hope soon passed, to be followed in their turn by the reaction of 1850, which brought to the Ukrainians of Galicia the most bitter deceptions. The promises made were completely forgotten for the most part, and the Ukrainians of Galicia, this "Tyrol of the East," after having aided the Austrian Government in its combat against the rising of the Polish

aristocracy, were left to the unscrupulous rule of these same nobles, into whose hands the whole administration of Galicia passed once again in the year 1850. The Polish aristrocracy and bureaucracy utilized the growing influence which they possessed for the purpose of insinuating to the Austrian rulers that the Ukrainian population of Galicia was an uncertain element, devoted to Russia and the orthodox faith. These intrigues were an obstacle to any attempts on the part of the Ukrainians to open the eyes of the Government to the fatal consequences of a Polish predominancy in Galicia, under which the Ukrainians suffered horribly.

Thus arose a painful crisis in the national life of the Ukrainians of Galicia. Disillusions and doubts followed one another and the way was open for the Russophil current toward which the Polish aristocracy was eagerly driving the Ukrainian element. Certain intelligences, despairing of any Ukrainian regeneration, turned to Russian culture in order to escape complete Polonization.

The arrival of fresh Ukrainian immigration, coming in 1863 to employ their activity on Galician soil, after the suppression of the Ukrainian movement in Russia, cannot under the circumstances be too highly appreciated. At a critical moment this influence brought the necessary aid to the Ukrainian element, chiefly of the younger generation—which had remained faithful to the program of 1848. It helped them to strengthen their morale and to play their part in the life of Galicia.

From about 1880 this "popular" Ukrainian movement, as it was called, took a firm hold of the people in Galicia, nor did it fail to keep in touch with the Ukrainian movement in Rusisa as well. It acquired considerable influence over the masses. This was especially so with the left wing of the movement, which was the more radical part and originated in 1890. Moreover, the close bond which, uniting Russian and Austrian Ukrainians, enabled the latter to utilize the resources of Galicia for their own development. The writers of Russian Ukraine took part in propaganda work and education in Galician Ukraine. From 1880 to 1905, that is to say for a quarter of a century, Galicia was, so to speak, a kind of intellectual Piedmont for the Ukrainian movement. Galician newspapers became the political tribune for the discussions and resolutions of the questions which were agitating the big Russian Ukraine and the small Austrian Ukraine. Galician educational establishments became the meeting places of the élite of both regions, who came together to combine their intellectual resources, with the object of preserving their common patrimony.

One can easily understand that this movement, almost entirely banished from Russia, took up an irreconcilable attitude in regard to the centralizing policy of the Russian Government. It was further equally intransigient in its hostility to the Polish oppression in Galicia. It goes without saying that the Russian Government, always hostile to anything which would favor Ukrainian "separatism" in a broad sense, put a stop to any opportunism in the Ukrainian movement. In Austria Polish supremacy raised an insuperable obstacle between the Ukrainians and the Government; any compromise with the latter was subject to the assent of the masters of Galicia, which meant, of course, the surrender of all Ukrainian aspirations. And as soon as one of the political leaders of Galicia showed any intention of making generous concessions, the Galician masses and the radical Russian Ukrainians were not long before they exhibited a vigorous disapproval.

This is what happened in 1890, when some leaders tried to arrive at a compromise with the Government. The Austrian and Russian Ukrainians united in offering such opposition to the plan that it could not be carried out.

The end of the century was signalized by a rapprochement between the two Ukraines. This had a most happy result for the national life, thanks to the reciprocal control exerted on political questions.

From this moment the progress of national culture in Russian Ukraine has made rapid progress, in spite of all attempts made to stop its course. The

present time shows a remarkable development in the Ukraine, which, benefiting by the enthusiasm of all classes, has reached a high state of culture, thus rendering service to the progress of national feeling. Ukrainian literature has produced a number of excellent writers. It has at last succeeded in securing the abrogation of the law which forbade the popularizing of scientific works. However, it was not until the advent of the new period which followed the Russo-Japanese war that the daily press regained its liberty.

Since it has been shown that the position of the Russian Ukrainians has no attractions for their Austrian brethren, while, on the other hand, the lot of the Austrian Ukrainians governed by the Poles does not seem at all enviable to the Russian Ukrainians, the educated classes of both Ukraines have come to the conclusion that it is preferable to strive for a broad administrative autonomy suitable to both monarchies, without having recourse to extreme measures.

But even this policy has met with many difficulties in Austria, combated, as it has been, by the groups of Polish leaders. The same has happened in Russia, where, without counting the Government, the liberal educated classes, although in close contact with the élite of the Ukraine, were yet hostile to the idea of autonomy. It is only about 1913 and 1914 that one observes a change of opinion among the progressive parties in Russia. Then for the first time do the claims of the Ukraine seem worthy of any attention. Such liberal views characterize the well-known efforts made in the Duma of 1913-14 by the Constitutionalists, the Socialists, and the Labor Party.

Such was the situation when, sooner than one expected, there broke over Europe the cataclysm from which one expects a radical transformation of the conditions of existence of many subordinate nations and the solution of numerous problems. It is difficult to say whether it will solve the Ukrainian problem. Whatever may happen, those who have followed the developmnet of this question know that if present events do not bring about a solution of it, or at least open the way to such a solution, it will remain a source of new convulsions, not less terrible than those of today. Let the statesmen say to themselves: "The Ukrainian question will not be solved by ignoring it or by further oppression. It can only be solved by adopting a policy of active realization in regard to the two Ukraines."

A Requiem

(*From The Westminster Gazette.*)

Greet him hosts of heroic dead,
Finely achieved though but half begun—
Never a word we could wish unsaid,
Never a deed we might hope undone.

Fair and full as the Summer's ray—
Pure and liquid—alive with light,
Brief yet boundless—a dream of Day
Haunting the starry sleep of Night.

—By WALTER SICHEL.

THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS

[British Cartoon]

1812—1915



—The Bystander, London.

SHADE OF NAPOLEON: "Nice place Russia, eh?"

[American Cartoon]

Execution of Edith Cavell

—From The New York Sun.

Deutschland Ueber Alles.

[German Cartoon]

Absalom in the Balkans

—© *Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.*

ENTENTE DIPLOMATIST: "And to think that the nasty German oak should throw me from the saddle!"

[British Cartoon]

The Kaiser and His Recruit

—*The Bystander, London.*

WILHELM: "Ah, that's right, Ferdy, my boy! We Germans must *hang together*, y' know."

FERDINAND (*sotto voce*): "Beastly unpleasant way of putting it ! ! !"

[German Cartoon]

A Russian Bull

—© *Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.*

"Ivanowitsch, this is awful news! The saints be praised that I can't read it!"

[British Cartoon]

Ganymede and the German Eagle

—*From Punch, London.*

SULTAN: "Of course I know it's a great honor being 'taken up' like this; still, I'm beginning almost to wish the bird had let me alone."

[American Cartoon]

The Hyphen

—From The Sun, New York.

"The Same on Either Side."

[English Cartoon]

Realization

—*Punch, London.*

"When I went to Bulgaria I resolved that if there were to be any assassinations I would be on the side of the assassins."—Statement by FERDINAND.

[German Cartoon]

The Defective

—© *Fliegende Blaetter.*

MRS. JOHN BULL: "My baby Mars is over a year old, but the brat cannot yet stand on his feet."

[American Cartoon]

The French Phoenix

—From The World, New York.

The Harmonious Rise of the Briand Cabinet.

[German Cartoon]

Bomb-Proof Shelters

—© *Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.*

On account of the danger from Zeppelins, King George might seek shelter in one of the many empty safes of his country.

While Czar Nicholas could be protected by sand bags.

[Italian Cartoon]

The American-German Conflict

—© *L'Asino, Rome.*

A war of marionettes—without shedding of blood.

Putting His Foot Down

—From The World, New York.

Uncle Sam's Treatment of the German Bombers of Shipping.

[German Cartoon]

Revealed Documents



—© *Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.*

The picture discovered in the dark room of the Belgian archives grows clearer and clearer—Edward VII., Iswolski, Grey, Sazonoff, Delcassé, and Poincaré.

[American Cartoon]

The Rivals

—From The New York Times.

The diplomats of the warring powers await outside the champion lady equilibrists.

People Who Ought to Be "Strafed"



—*From The Sketch, London.*

The Pessimist Who Tells of Imaginary Dangers—and More to Come.

[American Cartoon]

The Pincers



—*From The New York Sun.*

The Predicament of Serbia in the Balkans.

[German Cartoon]

The Crown Prince's Counterdrive

—© *Fligende Blaetter, Munich.*

JOFFRE: "French, I feel as though something were nipping me—it seems as if there's something in the air."

[British Cartoon]

Never Again!

—Captain Bruce Bairnsfather in The Bystander, London.

"In future I snipe from the ground."

[German Cartoon]

The Tactics of 1812

—© *Simplicissimus, Munich.*

"Now the Russians have finally drawn the Germans as far as Riga! All that we now need to do is to entice them toward Paris and London; then we'll have won."

[Italian Cartoon]

Militarism Fallen

—© *L'Asino, Rome.*

The Peace of Tomorrow.

[German Cartoon]

The Pope and Peace

—© *Simplicissimus, Munich.*

"And he sent forth a dove from him," but still "the waters were on the face of the whole earth."

Chronology of the War

Showing Progress of Campaigns on All Fronts and Collateral Events From October 12, 1915, Up to and Including November 12, 1915

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EUROPE

Oct. 13—Bulgarians attack Serbia at three points; Germans take Semendria; Russians repulse Teutonic allies near Dvinsk and in Galicia.

Oct. 14—Russians have further success in the Dvinsk region and in Galicia, generally strengthening their positions; Serbians repulse Bulgarians on the River Nischava; Austro-Germans are making a slow but steady advance in the invasion of Serbia.

Oct. 15—Great Britain declares war on Bulgaria; Germans, Austrians, and Bulgarians continue their advance into Serbia; Germans occupy Pozarevec; Russians gain in Galicia, driving back Austro-Germans west of Tarnopol; Russians hold offensive south and southwest of Dvinsk.

Oct. 16—France declares war on Bulgaria; troops of Entente allies leave Saloniki to help Serbia.

Oct. 19—Russia and Italy declare war on Bulgaria; Bulgarians captured Vranya, quitting the railway between Nish and Soloniki, while Austrians capture Obrenovatz and Germans press south from the Danube.

Oct. 21—Bulgarians are pushing into Serbia from several directions.

Oct. 22—Russians make gains north of Tarnopol; Russians check Germans near Riga and gain ground south of Dvinsk.

Oct. 24—Serbians are attacking along the Nish-Sofia line; Germans force crossing of the Drina at Vishegrad; French troops form junction with Serbians.

Oct. 25—Bulgarians take Uskub.

Oct. 26—French repulse Bulgarians on a five-mile front in Serbia.

Oct. 27—Germans continue their attacks in the Riga and Dvinsk regions.

Oct. 28—German army which crossed the Danube at Orsova effects junction with Bulgarian army which invaded Serbia near Prahovo; east Danube ports are lost to Serbia; Serbia is cut off from all supplies by way of Rumania; Montenegrins attack Austrians south of Vishegrad (Bosnia) and at Gora.

Oct. 29—Germans push on in North Serbia; Bulgarians take Zaiecar and Pirot.

Oct. 31—Germans take Milanovac; Austrians take Mount Gora; Montenegrins are resisting Austrians desperately along the Drina; Bulgarians occupy part of Veles, with heavy losses; Russians begin a new offensive in Galicia and heavily bombard Austrian positions on the Stripa River.

Nov. 2—Germans take Kraguyevac, the arsenal town of Serbia; Bulgarians are bombarding the Nish forts; Germans begin a new drive at Riga; Russians are on offensive in Dvinsk region.

Nov. 3—A French army has landed at Kavala, Greece; Russians take strong offensive in Galicia, on the Styr, and before Dvinsk.

Nov. 4—Main Serbian army is falling back in good order, destroying buildings and supplies.

Nov. 5—Bulgarians reach the outskirts of Nish; Germans are closing in on Kraljevo.

Nov. 6—Serbians defeat Bulgarians in the Babuna Passes; French defeat Bulgarians near Valandovo.

Nov. 7—Bulgarians take Nish, but get little booty; main Bulgarian and German armies effect a junction at Krivivir, northwest of Nish; Entente allies are rushing up troops; Entente allies defeat Bulgarians in the south; Germans take Kraljevo; French are pushing north in Serbia, repulsing Bulgarian attacks; Montenegrins defeat Austrians in two engagements.

Nov. 8—Russians attack Austro-German lines at many points north and south; Austro-Germans in Serbia take Kruseval.

Nov. 9—Large British forces are landing at Saloniki; French in Serbia are nearing Veles.

Nov. 12—Germans fall back on the Riga front; French in Serbia advance on the west side of the Vardar River.

CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE.

Oct. 13—Furious German bombardment forces French back near Souchez; Germans gain ground in the Vosges.

Oct. 14—A British drive near Loos results in capture of German trenches and most of the Hohenzollern Redoubt.

Oct. 16—French recapture the summit of

Hartmannsweilerkopf in the Vosges; French make gains near Arras.
Oct. 19—French repulse a German offensive near Rheims.
Oct. 22—Massed fire of allied artillery checks threatened attacks in Belgium and the Souchez region.
Oct. 24—Germans fail in the eighth attack in five days near Souchez.
Oct. 27—French blow up German trenches north of Arras.
Oct. 28—Severe artillery fighting in Belgium, and in the Champagne and Arras regions.
Oct. 31—Germans take the Butte de Tahure from the French in Champagne, but are repulsed in other Champagne attacks.
Nov. 2—Furious fighting for the Butte de Tahure, which is still in German hands.
Nov. 6—Heavy artillery engagements at many points.

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.

Oct. 14—Italians make gains in Tyrol.
Oct. 17—Italians take Pregasina, an advanced point of the Riva fortifications.
Oct. 22—After a fifty-hour artillery bombardment, the Italians launch a drive in the coastal region and take Austrian positions.
Oct. 23—Italians, on the offensive, gain ground at several points, particularly in the Carso region; Austrians have heavy losses in Tyrol.
Oct. 24—Italians continue a general offensive and make gains.
Oct. 26—Severe fighting along the Isonzo, where a battle has been in progress for four days.
Oct. 28—Italians are making gains on the Isonzo.
Oct. 29—Austrians repulse general Italian attacks at the Gorizia bridgehead and elsewhere.
Nov. 2—Italians surround Fort Hansel, centre of Austrian system of fortifications around Malborghetto.
Nov. 3—Italians continue a general offensive, which Austrians declare is meeting with no success.

TURKISH CAMPAIGN.

Oct. 15—Official British figures show that the British had lost 96,899 men up to Oct. 9 at the Dardanelles.
Oct. 19—Major Gen. Monro is appointed British commander at the Dardanelles to succeed Sir Ian Hamilton.
Oct. 20—Both sides are using mine operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula.
Oct. 30—Allied artillery damages Turkish trenches on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

NAVAL RECORD.

Oct. 13—German steamer is sunk in the Baltic by a British submarine.
Oct. 15—British submarines have sunk a German destroyer and a German torpedo boat in two engagements near the entrance to the Baltic.
Oct. 16—Entente allies declare a blockade of the Bulgarian coast in the Aegean Sea; British submarines have recently sunk five German transports in the Baltic.
Oct. 19—British submarines sink six German steamers in the Baltic.
Oct. 21—Squadron of Entente allies bombards the Bulgarian port of Dedeaghatch on the Aegean, killing 1,000 soldiers and doing much property damage.
Oct. 22—British submarines sink four German ships in the Baltic.
Oct. 23—British submarines have sunk twenty German ships, with an aggregate tonnage of 38,000, in the last ten days in the Baltic.
Oct. 29—Russian squadron shells Varna.
Oct. 31—Allied squadron shells Bulgarian ports on the Aegean.
Nov. 2—German steamer is sunk in the Baltic by a British submarine.
Nov. 7—Submarine flying the Austrian flag sinks the Italian liner Ancona in the Mediterranean; 149 persons are lost and it is stated that Americans are among them.
Nov. 8—United States note to Great Britain, protesting against the blockade, dated Oct. 21, is made public; German Submarines have recently sunk four British merchant ships.
Nov. 10—One French and three British ships have been sunk in the Mediterranean by German submarines.

AERIAL RECORD.

Oct. 13—Zeppelins make a night raid on London, their bombs killing and wounding many persons, the death list being put at 55 and the wounded list at 114.
Oct. 16—French aeroplanes bombard one of the railroad stations of Metz.

BELGIUM.

Oct. 13—It is learned that Miss Edith Cavell, an Englishwoman, lately the head of a training school for nurses in Brussels, was shot yesterday by the Germans on the charge of harboring fugitive British and French soldiers and Belgians of military age, and assisting them to escape from Belgium.

FRANCE.

Oct. 13—Théophile Delcassé, Foreign Minister, resigns, Premier Viviani assuming the portfolio.
Oct. 28—Premier Viviani's Cabinet resigns, M. Briand being called upon to form a Cabinet.

GREAT BRITAIN.

Oct. 19—Sir Edward Carson, Attorney General, resigns from the Cabinet.
Oct. 29—The total British casualties to Oct. 9 were 493,294, according to official British figures.
Nov. 6—Kitchener has gone to the Eastern theatre of war.

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